Introduction

Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS) is a non-banking (NBFC) or what is

referred to as ‘shadow bank’. Established over 30 years ago, with the goal to fund
infrastructure projects across the country. Few of the projects it has helped are Ranchi-Patratu
Dam Road, Baleshwar-Kharagpur Expressway, The Tripura Power Project and Gujrat
International Finance Tech City (GIFT).
The IL&FS shareholders are LIC, SBI, Japan’s Orix Corporation, HDFC and CBI. IL&FS also
has subsidiaries which include transportation network subsidiary IL&FS Tranpostration
Netowkr LTD. (ITNL), Engineering and Procurement company IL&FS Engineering and
Construction Co. LTD and financier IL&FS Financial Services LTD.

What had actually happened?

The problems with Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS) commenced when it
defaulted payment obligations to bank loans along with interest and including long-term and
short-term deposit which were due on 14 September 2018. On September 15 th, ILFS reported
that they had received notices for default in few of their inter corporate deposits. Shortly after
this, various rating agencies also started to downgrade the ratings of both of its short-term as
well as long-term from AA+ to BB. These defaults were very harmful as they jeopardized

4
Vishnani, S., & Bhatia, M. (2019). Accounting conservatism and corporate governance: Evidence from the
Indian banking sector. International Journal of Indian Culture and Business Management, 19(3), 303–318.
hundreds of investors, banks, pension funds and mutual funds associated with IL&FS, along
with other non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) because of their investment safety as
well as collectability. This in turn resulted in a massive sell off of shares of these non-banking
financial companies and because of which the prices also nosedived which in turn resulted in
repayment pressure in mutual funds holding such financial instruments and adversely impacted
sentiments in the stock, money and debt markets. It also created a considerable systematic risk,
leading to good quality debt papers being sold at very high discounts to meet redemption
demand. It was also reported that it had received notices for delays and defaults in servicing
some of the inter-corporate deposits accepted by it.5

The IL&FS group operates over a hundred subsidiaries and is sitting on a debt of Rs. 94,000
crore.6

In this grave incident, it was pointed out by various scholars how the failure of corporate
governance was one of the leading cost of this problem. “Describing the IL&FS matter as a
“watershed moment”. Corporate Affairs Secretary Injeti Srinivas has said it was a blessing in
disguise that forced the government to take the bull by its horns and address the difficult issue
of corporate governance.”7 The crisis in IL&FS reveals various corporate governance issues.8
With IL&FS, the government felt that a change in governance as well as management were
needed to save a company.

5
What is IL&FS Crisis, (Business Standard August 10, 2021) Accessed at https://www.business-
standard.com/about/what-is-il-fs-crisis
6
Ibid
7
PTI, ‘IL&FS case a 'blessing in disguise' to address corporate governance issues: Official’ (The Economic
Times, 07 April ,2020)Accessed at-
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/ilfs-case-a-blessing-in-disguise-to-address-
corporate-governance-issues- official/articleshow/75029570.cms?
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst 8
Asish K Bhattacharyya, ‘IL&FS
crisis: Learnings in corporate governance’ (Business Standard 07 October,2018) Accessed at-
https://www.independentdirectorsdatabank.in/pdf/partners/imt/IL&FS_crisis_Learnings_in_corporate_governanc e-
A_Case_Study.pdf
Table 1. IL&FS Timeline: When and What Happened from June 2018 till December 2019
Date News Item
June 2018 IL&FS group’s transport subsidiary IL&FS Transportation Networks (ITNL)
delayed repaymentof USD 64 million of inter-corporate deposits from
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI). Rating companies
ICRA and CARE rating agencies downgraded ITNL’s debt papers/credit facilities
citing weak financials.There was lots of criticism of rating agencies being
reactive, rather than proactive in the media and investors community (Parmar,
2018).
21 July 2018 Group’s Founder and Chairman Ravi Parthasarathy steps down, citing health
reasons. HemantBhargava, LIC MD and nominee, takes charge as Non-Executive
Chairman of IL&FS group. (Parmar, 2018).
28 August 2018Group’s financial arm IL&FS Financial Services defaults on repaying a few
hundred billion ofrupees to its commercial-paper investors but pays the
same two days later.
(Parmar, 2018).
Early 2018
September
2018
August-end 24 September
and early- 2018
September
2018
28 September
12 September 2018
to 29 September
26 September 2018
2018
12 September
2018

15 September
2018

18 September
2018
21 September
The group defaults Several short-term loan defaults take place, totaling USD 63 million
on a USD 143 (bank loans: USD 41million, term deposits: USD 15 million and
million term loan short- term deposit of USD 7 million). (Parmar, 2018).
and its subsidiary In a letter to employees, IL&FS says USD 2.3 billion is stuck in claims and
defaults on dues termination payments with concession authorities and it had been planning on
worthUSD 71 raising USD 6.4 billionthrough the issue of shares and USD 500 million as
million owed to long-term debt from shareholders. (Parmar, 2018).
SIDBI. (Parmar, Former LIC Chairman SB Mathur takes over as IL&FS group Chairman.The
2018). company startedplanning to monetize assets to pare its debt by up to USD
ICRA, CARE and 4.3 billion over the next 18 months and identifies 25 projects for the same.
Brickwork Ratings (Parmar, 2018).
downgraded the Market regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) started
conglomerate’s looking into the IL&FSmatter with regards to rating agencies and the impact on
various long- and mutual funds. (Parmar, 2018).
short-term Fears of a debt market crisis, due to an IL&FS default prompts DSP Mutual
borrowing fund to sell commercial papers of Dewan Housing Finance (DHFL) which
programmes worth leads to a contagion effect inequity markets, which crashed nearly 1,500
over USD 1.7 points. Ramesh C Bawa, MD and CEO of IL&FSFinancial Services
billion to ‘default’ resigns. (Parmar, 2018).
or ‘junk’ grades. IL&FS defaulted again and loses access to fund raising through
ICRA downgraded commercial paper
the group twice in market for up to six months from the date of repayment of this obligation.
a fortnight and IL&FS board seeksrelief from NCLT to work out an arrangement with
removes all group shareholders, creditors and board of directors. SIDBI threatens to file a case at
entities from its the NCLT for non-repayment. (Parmar, 2018).
Top shareholders meet RBI and raised concern on the crisis. (Parmar, 2018).
rating watch.
Meanwhile, the RBI At its Annual General Meeting (AGM), IL&FS decides to raise USD 643
initiates a special million through a rights issue and raises borrowing limit to USD 5 billion
audit. (Parmar, from USD 3.6 billion.The companyappoints Alvarez and Marsal as
2018). specialist agency to execute the debt restructuring plan. (Parmar, 2018).
1 October 2018 NCLT judgement allowed government to assume control on the company and
institute a newboard under the chairmanship of Uday Kotak and five other
board members. (Parmar, 2018).
(Table 1 continued)
(Table 1 continued)
Date News Item
15 October 2018 NCLT passed an interim order granting a moratorium on all creditor actions
against IL&FS aswell as all its group companies (Goel, 2018a).
22 October 2018 IL&FS new board appointed advisors for developing and executing a
resolution plan (Goel,2018b).
21 Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered a case of money laundering against the
February former
2019 CMD of IL&FS Ravi Parthasarthy, former director Hari Sankaran, IL&FS Rail and
IL&FSTransportation Networks India Limited (ITNL) (Rajput, 2019).
4 March 2019 Audit firm Grant Thornton submitted its interim report on the special audit of
IL&FS flagging dealings aggregating to USD 1.9 billion as suspect (Business
Standard, 2019a).
5 March 2019 New IL&FS board sent a show cause notice to the former Board of
IL&FS Financial Services Limited (IFIN) asking why the criminal action
should not be initiated against them (Rajput & Sinha, 2019).
23 April 2019 IL&FS agreed to sell its 874 megawatts (MW) operational wind energy
portfolio to state-run gas utility GAIL (India) Ltd for `4,800 crore, this
ensures that debt of
`3700 crore on wind power Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) will be fully paid back.
23 April 2019 IL&FS agreed to sell its 874 megawatts (MW) operational wind energy
portfolio to state-run gas utility GAIL (India) Ltd for `4,800 crore, this
ensures that debt of
`3700 crore on wind power SPVs will be fully paid back.
15 May 2019 Independent directors of various IL&FS companies are under the
scanner of Ministry ofCorporate Affairs (MCA) for alleged lapses in
carrying out their duties.
22 May 2019 The ED carries out raids is residences and offices of four directors of
IL&FS, this was inconnection with money laundering probe.
30 May 2019 The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the new board at IL&FS
are investigating why questions raised by a junior analyst at a rating agency
about financial irregularities at the infrastructure financier were ignored
by the top management at the creditworthiness evaluator.The junior
executive has allegedly told probe officials that when he brought his
concerns to the notice of the senior management at the rating agency, the
decision makersrefused to act upon his findings, claiming the books of
IL&FS and related companies were good.
4 June 2019 The Supreme Court of India allowed reopening of IL&FS accounts for the
last five years.Themove by the top court comes as a setback for Hari
Sankaran, the former IL&FS managing director, who had challenged an
 order by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) to
reopen the past books of the embattled infrastructure lending company.
8 June 2019 It was reported that the Auditor, Deloitte and Haskins and Sells (DHS)
was aware of the company’s modus operandi of funding the defaulting
borrowers for payment of interest andprincipal in a fraudulent manner by
IL&FS management time and again to window dress theasset book of the
company for several years.The auditor was thereby complicit in nature
with the management.
10 July 2019 Il&FS group starts monetizing its assets, put its 2,880 acres of non-
contiguous land banksspread across seven villages in the Kutch region
of Gujarat for sale.
21 July 2019 Grant Thornton reported that the credit rating agencies gave top ratings to
IL&FS group entities despite being aware of the weak financials of the group,
SEBI hence expanded its probe into the role of credit rating agencies
CRAs.
16 August 2019 Blatant mis-governance reported by RBI report.The RBI report said
that some of the key committees in IL&FS did not convene any meetings in
last few years, the Risk ManagementCommittee (RMC) and the
Investment Review Committee did not meet for around threeyears.
(Table 1 continued)
(Table 1 continued)
Date News Item
17 August 2019The ED filed charge-sheet and attached assets worth Rs 570 crores under
the provisions ofPrevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA)
6 India’s first fully privately financed Rapid Metro system, built by IL&FS is
September
facing closure due tothe financial crisis.
2019
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited (GNFC), in its
21
November annual report mentioned that it might lose Rs 10.25 crores as it is holding
2019 secured and unsecured debtsecurities of IL&FS.
IL&FS reported a loss of Rs 22,527 crore for the year ended March 2019
5 as against a profit of Rs 333.4 crore in March 2018.The company has
December incurred a loss (including other comprehensive income) of Rs 22,527.25
2019 crore for the year ended March 31, 2019, and hasnet liabilities of Rs
16,935.1 crore, the company’s auditor SRBC & Co said.
Audit quality review of Deloitte, Haskins and Sells by National Financial
13 Reporting Authority(NFRA) reported,‘The AQR has disclosed that DHS
December (Deloitte) has failed to comply with therequirement of the SAs (standards of
2019 auditing).The instances of failure noticed are of such significance that it
appears to NFRA that DHS did not have adequate justification for issuing the
audit report asserting that the audit was conducted in accordance with the
SAs’.
Source: Kukreja, G., Gupta, S. and Bhatia, M. (2021) ‘The Failure of Corporate
Governance at Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited: Lessons Learnt’,
South Asian Journal of Business and Management Cases, 10(1), pp. 63–76. doi:
10.1177/2277977921991897.
Primary Causes of the Default

As IL&FS was defaulting in Commercial papers and inter corporate deposits. It was soon
apparent that the company had gone bankrupt. To scrutinize the causes of fault, we will first
deal with the business model of IL&FS which functions on buying and selling of the
securities which are then collateralised by loans, thus if one tries to put it forward one can
also say that IL&FS relies on existing credit claims for their business.

Which, again is a risky thread to walk on, which we in turn see as it plays out into a string of
defaults in 2018. IL&FS which was once a top 100 compnay in the Fortune 500 was now
showing clear signs of financial fragility in their system.

Along with this, IL&FS also functioned as pyramid structure which consists of three layers
1. The Holding Company.
2. The SPV (Special Purpose Vechile)
3. Finacing for various project companies.

In addition to this, IL&FS also worked as huge Ponzi scheme, for apparently to acquire
funding for its loss making companies by taking the advantage of its reputation in the market,
where it was often confused as a government entity.

Along with this various corporate governance issues which aided to this fall
1. Independent Directors.
2. Role of Credit Rate Agencies.
3. Fiduciary Duty of the Board.
Corporate Governance

Corporate governance is the broad term desribes the processes, customs, policies, laws and
institutions that directs the organizations and corporations in the way they act, administer and
controll their operations.It works to achieve the goal of the organization and manages the
relationship among the stakeholders including the board of directors and the shareholders.It
also deals with the accountability of the individuals through a mechanism which reduces the
principal-agent problem in the organization. Fine corporate governance is an essential
standard for establishing the striking investment environment which is needed by competitive
companies to gain strong position in efficient financial markets.9

The board always treated IL&FS for their own interests and thus made it to branch to 350
complex subsidiaries, which, even for a board which is highly equipped becomes hectic and
challenging, and thus making it unmanageable. Other notable point here is the fact that
IL&FS projected itself as a public sector, which made it super easy for them to raise funds
and gain confidence.

Suffice it is to say that mismanagement, complex holding structure, intertwined with the
glaring lapses by the auditors and credit rating agencies led to the almost collapse of the
IL&FS. The immediate impact was on the banks and other financial institutions, thereby
exposing the vulnerabilities and the systemic risks in the economy. 10

9
A Literature Review of Corporate Governance Humera Khan+ cite***
10
Kothari and Ghosh; AJEFM, 2(3): 35-48, 2020; Article no.AJEFM.233
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

Independent directors help in guiding the company, they act as mentors. Their prime role is to
improve the corporate credibility and governance standards by working as a yardstick as well
as a watch dog to see any upcoming risks and help in navigating through it. It helps evaluates
the performance of the board. It is important to have a trustworthy independent director for
the betterment of the corporation. The belief seems to be that outside independent directors
will strengthen corporate boards by monitoring the actions of management and ensuring that
management decisions are made in the best interests of the stockholder.11

In this case, the Independent directors of the board were all famous personalities, namely R. C.
Bhargava, Chairman Maruti, Michael Pinto, former Secretary for shipping, Sunil B Mathur,
Former LIC Chairman, Jaithirth Rao, Banker Citibank and Rina Kamath, a legal practitioner.
The board’s success solely depends on the effectiveness of the independent directors, which
only happens when the inpendent directors have proper expertise in the field in which the
company functions. But in the case of IL&FS, the independent directors lacked proper
expertise when it came to handling a complex NBFC such as IL&FS. Unfortunately,
they lacked experience in managing a complex NBFC, engaged in financing infrastructure
project.12

The implications of a governance crisis in a systemically important financial institution can

be catastrophic to the financial markets and the economy. 13 There are a number of empirical
studies none of which find a positive relationship between the presence of independent
directors and improved financial performance.14 This board did not fail to consider the utility
of risk management function. Which is why the risk management committee, which majorly
had these

11
Petra, S.T., 2005. Do outside independent directors strengthen corporate boards?. Corporate Governance: The
international journal of business in society.
12
Ibid
13
Umakanth Varottil, ‘Governance Of Financial Institutions: Call For A Paradigm Shift’ (Bloomberg Quint,
08th October,2018) Accessed at- https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/governance-of-financial-institutions-
call-for-a-paradigm-shift.
14
D Langevoort, ‘The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability’ (2000–2001) 89 Geo LJ 797
independent directors did not plan or brainstorm over anything, even the finances of the
company were in a compromised position. Not only this, these independent directors never
questioned the Chairman and Managing Director (CMD). Therefore, it is no surprise that the
board failed to manage the crisis that was brewing over the last three-four years.15

15
Ibid
Role of Credit Rate Agencies.

Well-defined and enforced corporate governance provides a structure that, at least in theory,
works for the benefit of everyone concerned by ensuring that the enterprise adheres to
accepted ethical standards and best practices as well as to formal laws. Now the credit rating
agencies play a very important role in the corporate governance. A credit rating for an issuer
takes into consideration the issuer's credit worthiness and affects the interest rate applied to
the particular security being issued16 These ratings are used by various investors,
governments, issuers etc. The lower of these ratings though, creates a vicious circle of
upping the interest rates, with increase in expenses but at the same time a decrease in the
credibility. This is why it is important to tread carefully with these ratings.

The credit rating of IL&FS went from AA+ to BB after they had defaulted, which made it
quite clear that the original ratings were not correct. Had they been so, they would have been
rated AA+ because of the faltering situation that was boiling in the corporation since a long
time. Inaccurate ratings therefore distort both the prices of debt instruments and the interest
rates payable on them.17
This proves that these agencies don’t act independently and often paid by the management.
As ating agencies are bound to be concerned about the sustainability of their revenue sources
because they’re profit driven businesses, they will fight to protect their income at the expense
of aggressive or objective ratings that could compromise revenues, although in the long-run
will damage their businesses.18

16
Ahmad, Tabrez and Rashmi, Prachi and Bakshi, Peyali and Saha, Ankur, An Assessment of Role of Credit
Ratings Agencies in the Corporate Governance Process: The Case for Including Internal Contracts in the Formal
Rating Assessment (October 10, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1486679
17
‘Why credit rating agencies are still getting away with bad behaviour’ (The Conversation 23rd June,2019)
Accessed here- https://theconversation.com/why-credit-rating-agencies-are-still-getting-away-with-bad-
behaviour-117549
18
Ibid
Fiduciary Duty of the Board

Studies have demonstrated that the presence of co-opted directors, regardless of whether they
are executive or independent, weakens their ability to monitor management, which
compromises the protection of stakeholders' rights.19 Companies with a high proportion of
co-opted BoDs retain more cash instead of correctly distributing this uninvested surplus
among shareholders.20

As it has been established that the Board owes fiduciary duty towards its shareholders. And it
has been clearly illustrated in the IL&FS debacle, that to benefit the company the board
should consider its fiduciary duties very seriously towards the stakeholders. If the board acts
for their own interests without protecting the shareholders interest then there will be a
collapse of the corporation which happened in this case as the board clearly failed to fulfil its
fiduciary duties and that in turn put company in crisis.

19
Zaman, R., Atawnah, N., Baghdadi, G.A. and Liu, J., 2021. Fiduciary duty or loyalty? Evidence from co-
opted boards and corporate misconduct. Journal of Corporate Finance, p.102066.
20
Do co-opted directors influence dividend policy? P. Jiraporn and S.M. Lee Financ Manag, 47 (2) (2018),
pp. 349-381
Conclusion

Although, IL&FS case shook the very core of corporation , it was a great wake up call for the
government to address the issue of corporate governance. All NBFCs are regulated by RBI
and SEBI and because of the IL&FS fiasco, the gaps in these institutions was brought to
light.
It also brought various positive changes such as a stringent credit rating with a more
transparent financial reporting.
It also brings to the light the developing future of NBFCs which acts as a regulatory backing
and helps in prospering various institutions. There is also a urgent need to develop a ‘ risk
sensitive oversight regime’ for institutions like IL&FS which helps in gaining an oversight
over the functioning so that if any event is likely to occur, one can have a foresight for it and
prepare for adequate remedies beforehand.
All financial institutions should also be covered under bank stress testing and it should be
performed at appropriate intervals. In addition to that, an inspection mechanism similar to
RBI’s inspection should be established.
The government should also consider having a contingency fund where some profit is stored
from NBFC’s for a crisis like the one happened with IL&FS.
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