(Library of Legislative Studies) Cristina Leston-Bandeira - Southern European Parliaments in Democracy-Routledge (2015)

Southern European Parliaments in
Democracy
Southern European Parliaments in Democracy analyses the development

of the parliaments of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey since
the mid-1980s. This book considers the challenges of the transition to
democracy and outlines how the Parliaments of Southern Europe have
adapted to the pressures of a democratic polity. Its focus is an
assessment of the main changes that have taken place since the periods
of transition to democracy right up to the present day. Chapters are
country specific and consider a variety of indicators, from legislation
and scrutiny to the social background of MPs.
This book was previously published as a special issue of The Journal of
Legislative Studies.
Cristina Leston-Bandeira is a Lecturer in Legislative Studies at the

University of Hull.
Page Intentionally Left Blank
THE LIBRARY OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
General Editor: Philip Norton
ISSN 1460-9649
A series of new and recent books exploring the role of legislature in

contemporary political systems.
The volumes typically draw together a team of country specialist to
provide in-depth analysis.
Parliaments in Contemporary Western Europe

Edited by Philip Norton
Volume 1: Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe
Volume 2: Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe
Volume 3: Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe
Second Chambers
Edited by Nicholas D.J. Baldwin and Donald Shell
Delegation and Accountability in European Integration

The Nordic Parliamentary Democracies and the European Union
Edited by Torbjörn Bergman and Erik Damgaard
The Uneasy Relationships between Parliamentary Members and Leaders

Edited by Lawrence D. Longley and Reuven Y. Hazan
Parliaments in Asia
Edited by Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed
Conscience and Parliament

Edited by Philip Cowley
The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees

Edited by Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H. Davidson
Members of Parliament in Western Europe

Roles and Behaviour
Edited by Wolfgang C. Müller and Thomas Saalfeld
Parliaments in Western Europe
The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe

Edited by David M. Olson and Philip Norton
National Parliaments and the European Union

Southern European
Parliaments in Democracy
Edited by
Cristina Leston-Bandeira
First published 2005 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
# 2005 Cristina Leston-Bandeira
Typeset in Times by Techset Composition Limited
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this title has been requested
ISBN 0-415-35888-4
Contents
1 Introduction: Southern European

Parliaments in Democracy Cristina Leston-Bandeira 1
2 The Italian Parliament: In Search Giliberto Capano

of a New Role? and Marco Giuliani 8
3 Much Ado about Something?

Parliamentary Politics in Italy Amid the
Rhetoric of Majority Rule and an
Uncertain Party System Luca Verzichelli 35
4 Internalising the Lessons of

Stable Democracy: The Portuguese Cristina Leston-Bandeira
Parliament and André Freire 56
5 The Hellenic Parliament: The New Rules

of the Game Penelope Foundethakis 85
6 The Spanish Parliament in a

Triangular Relationship, 1982 – 2000 Jordi Capo Giol 107
7 Parliament and Citizenship in Spain:

Twenty-Five Years of a Mismatch? Pablo Oñate 130
8 Volatility in Politics, Stability in Parliament:

An Impossible Dream? The Turkish Grand
National Assembly during the Last Two Decades İlter Turan 151
9 Conclusion: The Impact of Democratic

Practice on the Parliaments of Philip Norton
Southern Europe and Cristina Leston-Bandeira 177
Index 186
Page Intentionally Left Blank
Southern European Parliaments
in Democracy
CRISTINA LESTON-BANDEIRA
THE STUDY OF SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS
The emergence of new democracies in Southern Europe in the 1970s led to a

proliferation of literature on theories of transition to and consolidation of
democracy. Here were several countries with geographical, cultural and his-
torical similarities going through a concomitant experience of introducing
democracy after a period of authoritarian regimes. This provided an excellent
opportunity to develop and deepen theories on democratisation, leading to
prolific and seminal literature.1 However, not only did this literature neglect
the study of institutions,2 but also the successful consolidation of democracy
and the emergence of new democracies elsewhere3 has resulted since the
beginning of the 1990s in a diminished interest in these countries; or at least
in their status as developing democracies. Having once lost the label of ‘new
democracies’, these countries acquired the status of established democracies,
being grouped together with old democracies such as the United Kingdom.
Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis allude to this when they say that ‘at some
moment when consolidation is well advanced, new democracies cease to be
called “new” and are regarded as established’.4 This lack of interest has
been particularly notable in the case of parliamentary institutions, as their
study in a framework of ‘consolidation of democracy’ was never deepened
in Southern Europe (SE).5 As a consequence, there is no adequate study of
how institutions, notably parliaments, have developed as democracy has
become established in Southern Europe.
Rather than looking at two separate moments (new versus established
democracy), it is important to ascertain how parliaments adapt to the
process of democratisation. The values of legitimacy and representation are
very dear to newly democratic parliaments, but as the practice of democracy
settles in, the values of efficacy and stability become more and more import-
ant. The purpose of this special issue is to ascertain how the parliaments of
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey have adapted to the pressures of a
democratic polity.
The only book to date entirely dedicated to the parliaments of Southern
Europe was the one edited by Ulrike Liebert and Maurizio Cotta: Parliament
and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe,6 a comparative study on
2 SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PARLIA MENT S I N DEMOCRACY
the role played by those parliaments in the process of democratic transition and
consolidation. Although this was a vital contribution in making Southern
European (SE) parliaments known to the scholarly community, it has inevita-
bly become outdated. Fifteen years have passed since the chapters for that
volume were written and since then the SE democracies have developed
and gone through numerous changes. There is not only a need for an updated
account of these parliaments – many scholars doing comparative work often
look for a more updated version, only to realise that they only have that
volume to quote from – but also for a volume that centres on the practice
of democracy in these parliaments.
Today, a different perspective has to be adopted in order to understand
these parliaments. The role of a newly democratic parliament is necessarily
different once democracy starts to mature. However, parliaments in SE are
often considered in the same way as other Western European democratic par-
liaments; as if, once passed the transitional period, they would acquire the
same characteristics as democratically well-established legislatures. As a
consequence, many features are usually taken for granted whilst others
more relevant are disregarded. Introduced as a central element of the new
regimes, parliament has personified in all five SE countries the principle of
democratic legitimacy. As democracy consolidated and started to mature,
the need for efficacy became more pressing; the main issue ceased to be
how legitimate was the new regime, but rather how effective it was in deliver-
ing outputs. In this context, parliaments had to adapt not only in terms of their
role in the political system but also in their internal organisation. This volume
will help to clarify whether this duality of change – role in political system
and internal organisation – indicates the specificity of the development of
new institutions such as those of Southern Europe.
Some of these issues have been addressed by authors based in each of
these five countries. However, in most of these cases the research on parlia-
ment has been sparse and dispersed, resulting overwhelmingly in publications
in the indigenous language – not easily accessible to the international legisla-
tive studies scholarly community. What is more, the depth and range of that
research has varied enormously across the five countries. Whereas Spain
and notably Italy have seen a huge development of the political science
community resulting in a number of studies specific to parliament,7 this has
been less visible in the cases of Turkey, Portugal and especially Greece. In
the last two cases, the study of parliament has been looked at mainly from
the perspective of constitutional law.
One of the aims of this volume is to make some of this research known to
the international legislative studies scholarly community by bringing together
scholars originating from each of these countries. The authors contributing to
this volume are all leading members of their native research communities and
INTRODUCTION 3
specialise in the study of parliament; indeed, in some cases they are the main
reference in the study of the native parliament. The volume also aims to
provide an update on the development of the main functions of these parlia-
ments since the mid-1980s. The main aim and focus of analysis is to show
how these parliaments have adapted to the pressure of a democratic polity –
in particular, whether they have undergone any significant changes: has the
practice of democracy led to a revision or adaptation of the parliamentary
models established when democracy was introduced?
THE CONTEXT OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS
Although all five SE countries share many similarities, two stand out: Italy and
Turkey. Italy is the SE country with the longest democratic experience (since
1948) and also the one that has undergone the most dramatic changes in the
period considered here. The Tangentopoli scandals of the 1990s led to a
major revision of the electoral system with dramatic consequences for the
party system – even if the consequences for parliament are not always that
clear, as Capano and Giuliani, as well as Luca Verzichelli, will show. Italy
also stands out for its unique style of political instability (nurtured by a
very strong parliament and supported by administrative continuity). Further-
more, the Italian Camera dei Diputati and Senato are also the most well
studied parliament of the five SE ones. Turkey, on the other hand, has had
the most convoluted democratic process out of the five countries. With a
very unstable party system, it has undergone two military interventions, one
of which was relatively recent: 1960 and 1980. This has had a variety of con-
sequences in the institutionalisation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,
as shown in İlter Turan’s chapter. Turkey is also the only SE country that is not
a member of the European Union (EU).
The remaining three countries, Greece, Portugal and Spain, have very
similar political systems and democratic history. Democracy was introduced
in the mid-1970s and entry to the then European Economic Community
(EEC) took place in 1981 for Greece and 1986 for the Iberian countries. In
all of these three countries parliament is elected through the proportional rep-
resentation d’Hondt system; they are typical party government democracies,
where parliament is dominated by party. Spain stands out for its quasi-
federalist system. It comprises a State of Autonomous Communities, where
an asymmetrical regional system ascribes considerable powers to a number
of regions. As we shall see in Capo Giol’s chapter, this regionalism has had
huge consequences for the Spanish Cortes during the period considered
here. In all three of these countries, the party system has been relatively
stable and power has generally rotated between two main parties. Besides
this, the Hellenic Parliament and the Portuguese Assembleia da República
share many other similarities in the development of their internal rules, as will
be shown by the chapters of Penelope Foundethakis and Leston-Bandeira and
Freire.
VOLUME ORGANISATION AND ISSUES ADDRESSED
The volume is based on country-specific chapters on Greece, Italy, Portugal,

Spain and Turkey. The parliaments of Greece, Portugal and Turkey are ana-
lysed in one chapter each. The breadth of the research already developed on
the Italian and Spanish parliaments justify two chapters each, one on issues
of political representation and one on institutional aspects. Each chapter
centres on the period from 1985 onwards, even if reference to the previous
period is made. This is just an indicative date, it marks the end of the
period analysed in the Cotta and Liebert book.8 The chapters will focus on
the main changes in terms of the role of parliament and its internal organis-
ation. Amongst others, each chapter will follow the following four themes
of analysis:
Constitutional Change
New democratic institutions are often introduced as a reaction to past experi-
ences, but also following existing models in other countries. However, until
put into practice, these are just mere abstract models, of unknown outcome.
Together with procedural design, political behaviour is what shapes insti-
tutions. So, as the new democratic models were put into practice in the SE
countries, were there any reactions to their outcomes? Or have these models
been accepted as they were? Each chapter will review any demands for con-
stitutional change that have been made; as well as effective constitutional
changes that have been introduced. It will review the areas on which consti-
tutional change has focused – the electoral system, the relationship with citi-
zens and executive accountability being only a few. In particular it will
consider whether these changes have followed any specific trend in terms
of parliament’s powers – to weaken or reinforce it. Has parliament’s place
in the political system remained predominant as democracy was put into
practice?
Internal Organisation
One of the crucial dimensions to understand the actual practice of a new par-
liament is its internal organisation. Parliament’s internal organisation may in
fact be much more a determinant in the political outcomes and citizens’ views
on parliament than the actual constitutional design. The chapters will review
how the SE parliaments are organised internally, assessing in particular the
importance of legal procedures and the power given to parties in parliament’s
INTRODUCTION 5
structure. Both legal procedures and parties can be seen as two key variables in
ensuring a solid foundation for a newly democratic parliament9 – they provide
a framework for contained parliamentary activity, avoiding the dangers of pol-
itical pulverisation typical in new regimes. The chapters will review whether
there has been any change primarily at the level of the Rules of Procedure and
in parliament’s internal structure.
The chapters will look in particular at the distribution of competences and
powers between committees and Chamber. Has there been a move towards
transformative type parliaments, in detriment to arena features?10 A focus
on the Chamber would be expected in the first years of democracy, as it embo-
dies the principles of legitimacy, representation and transparency in decision-
making. However, as democracy is put into practice and efficacy in decision
becomes more important, are committees’ powers and role reinforced?
Finally, resources are said to be one of the key factors determining parlia-
mentary activity.11 However, in the context of new political regimes being set
up, with serious economic and social problems to address, how easy has it
been to reinforce parliaments’ resources in Southern Europe?
Relationship with Government

The relationship between parliament and the executive is a traditional key
dimension in assessing legislatures. All chapters will review this relationship
and in particular whether there has been any change as a consequence of demo-
cratic practice. Have executives been reinforced in the decision-making
process to the detriment of parliament, in line with the general trend of devel-
opment of West European parliaments? In particular, how has the dual
relationship of legislative power and scrutiny developed? Has one increased
to the detriment of the other? Some of these SE parliaments were ascribed con-
siderable power in the legislative process when democracy was introduced;
however, as the main basic laws were established and a need for more specific
regulation grew, did parliament’s legislative powers shift to the executive? As
a consequence, has the need for scrutiny become more pressing?
Styles of Political Representation

Finally, the style of political representation is another key dimension to assess
the impact of democratic practice on the SE parliaments. These are countries
where representation has been associated in the past with the development of
clientelistic networks; where the power of individual deputies has put regime
stability in jeopardy. As a consequence, the relationship between deputy and
party has been a key determinant of parliament’s relationship with citizens,
with party acting as the foundation upon which to build a stable democracy.
Direct links between parliament – deputy – and citizens were not a priority
in the establishment of democracy in Southern Europe. Has this become
more so as democracy has become more mature? Has there been any
reinforcement of the links with citizens? How do deputies perceive their
mandate as constituency and national representative? Has there been any
move between a delegate and trustee style of representation? Have the
relationships between deputy and party changed in the last 15 years?
On the other hand, these chapters will also show if the practice of democ-
racy has brought in a higher professionalisation of the job of deputy (MP).
Have turnover rates decreased, have deputies’ socio-demographic profiles
changed significantly? Have the deputies changed as much, or as little, as
the parliamentary institution itself?
Throughout these themes there will be one cross-cutting continuing
dimension: that of partyness – a concept already used by Ulrike Liebert in
the Liebert and Cotta book.12 The distribution of parties in parliament, govern-
ment’s party support and the stability of the party system are all crucial factors
influencing each one of the above dimensions; what is more, this is of particu-
lar importance in the context of establishing democracies such as those of
Southern Europe, where circumstantial changes may have a deeper impact
on the political system’s foundations than it would in well-established
democracies.
These were the themes defined as the framework of analysis for all the
chapters included in this volume. However, as with any other SE enterprise,
the outcomes are often somewhat different; each chapter has pursued our
general aim, the effects of the practice of democracy in the SE parliaments;
but, in its own style, through specific perspectives – in short, in true Southern
European style.
NOTES
1. See, for instance, G. Pridham (ed.), Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Demo-
cratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Routledge, 1990) and R. Gunther,
P.N. Diamandouros and H.-J. Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation –
Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1995).
2. Although institutions were considered, the focus was not on the institution in itself, but on the
process of transition to and consolidation of democracy; that is, on the institutions’ role and
contribution to that process of democratisation. Despite following this focus of analysis, there
are noteworthy exceptions in U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Con-
solidation in Southern Europe (London: Pinter, 1990).
3. First Latin America and then Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of the latter, the insti-
tutionalist literature did develop contrary to what had happened with Southern Europe.
4. G. Pridham and P. Lewis, ‘Introduction – Stabilising Fragile Democracies and Party System
Development’, in G. Pridham and P. Lewis (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies –
Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge,
1996), p.2.
5. Contrary to what happened in Central and Eastern Europe, where the study of parliament has
resulted in prolific publications and projects. Just to name a few: A. Ágh (ed.), The Emergence
INTRODUCTION 7
of East Central European Parliaments – The First Steps (Budapest: Hungarian Centre of
Democracy Studies Foundation, 1994); L.D. Longley and D. Zajc (eds.), The New Democratic
Parliaments: The First Years – Working Papers on Comparative Legislative Studies III
(Appleton, WI: Research Committee of Legislative Specialists of the IPSA, 1998); and
D. Olson, ‘Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of
Central Europe’, Political Studies, 46/3 (1998), pp.432– 64.
6. Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe.
7. The following examples illustrate this activity: A. Martı́nez (ed.), El Congresso de los Dipu-
tados en España: Funciones y Rendimiento (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 2000) and G. Capano
and M. Giuliani (eds.), Parlamento e Processo Legislativo in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino,
2001).
8. Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe.
9. As shown by Pasquino in his analysis of executive –legislative relations in Southern
Europe, G. Pasquino, ‘Executive –Legislative Relations in Southern Europe’, in Gunther
et al. (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, pp.261–83 and by the experiences
of the new parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe in D. Olson and P. Norton (eds.),
Journal of Legislative Studies (special issue on The New Parliaments of Central and
Eastern Europe), 2/1 (1996).
10. Following Polsby’s typology in N. Polsby, ‘Legislatures’, in F.I. Greenstein and
N.W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, V (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1975), pp.257–319.
11. P. Norton, ‘Introduction: The Institution of Parliaments’, in P. Norton (ed.), Parliaments and
Governments in Western Europe (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), pp.12–13.
12. U. Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the Consolidation of Democracy – A Comparative Assessment of
Southern European Experiences’, in Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic
Consolidation in Southern Europe, pp.249–72.
The Italian Parliament:
In Search of a New Role?
G I L I B E R T O C A P A N O and M A R C O G I U L I A N I
Italy has been a democracy for more than 50 years. Even taking into account
the most restrictive of indicators, its consolidation as such can be seen to date
back to the early 1950s at least.1 This means that, compared with the other
Southern European democracies included in this volume, we are going to be
faced with a different type of political and theoretical problem in our analysis.
Cotta recognised this when he argued that placing ‘the Italian case in a
Southern European perspective . . . raises some methodological problems’.2
While, on the one hand, it is true that the major challenge faced by all these
political institutions is no longer their consolidation, but rather their effective-
ness, on the other hand we should acknowledge the existence of differences
due to the different time period in question.
This means that potential differences emerging from a comparison over
20 years – an increased degree of monitoring on the part of parliament, for
example – cannot, in Italy’s case, be attributed to the different degree of
institutionalisation of its political system, which had already had sufficient
time to attain stability but needs to be explained in more specific terms.
From a substantive point of view, the more the founding moments of a
democracy and the institutional choices made at that moment date back in
time, the less relevance they appear to have for the present, and the more
they are subject to subsequent amendments.
The importance of this observation may vary from one institution to another,
and even its overall influence depends on several different historical contingen-
cies. Nonetheless, many of the successful attempts to reform the Italian political
system made over the past ten years would undoubtedly have produced different
results if they had been attempted earlier. The proportionality of the electoral
system, the balance between parliament and government, the rules of law-
making, the unitary character of the state, the integrity of the constitution and
even the exile of the former royal family, the Savoias, have for a time been
irrefutable features of the Italian political scene precisely because they were
an integral part of the founding moments of the Republic. Although we do not
believe that a comparatively longer history represents a sufficient explanation
for the desire for change, it does however remain true that present political
THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT 9
elites perceive past choices as less constraining than they would have been a few
decades ago, thus encouraging a new attitude towards the evaluation of dom-
estic institutions. Efficacy rather than tradition, efficiency instead of dispersion
of power, decisional costs rather than external risks: these appear to be the most
highly valued yardsticks in this particular period.
Clearly the organisation of the parliament has not escaped this revisionist
stance. On the contrary: since the 1980s it has found itself either directly or
indirectly at the centre of most efforts at reform. Its assemblearism and frag-
mentation, together with the interna corporis, have been amongst the major
factors perceived as underlying the immobility of the first 40 years of the
Italian Republic. It would not be difficult to draw up a list of the many
changes designed to modify, or that indirectly affected, the nature of this
strategically important democratic institution. If we do so without observing
any particular order, our list would include the following: the majoritarian
transformation of the electoral law; the several amendments made to
parliamentary rules governing the relationship between government and the
assemblies; reform of the structure of the executive and the modification of
its normative instruments designed to enhance its autonomy; decentralisation
and federalist attempts to reduce the supremacy of the central legislative
institution; reform of the budgetary process, and so on.3
The question remains whether, and to what extent, all these changes
have really modified the real role, the working and the internal dynamics
of parliament itself. As the famous adage from Il Gattopardo 4 had it, it is
all too simple to see how institutions adapt themselves to the changing
environment and to specific pressures in order to preserve their basic features.
The answer to our fundamental question is therefore not quite so straight-
forward, and needs some preliminary specifications and an explicit empirical
investigation.
In order to provide a systematic analysis of this subject, albeit of an invari-
ably synthetic character, we have chosen to use the seminal distinction
between parliamentary functions made by Bagehot at the end of the nineteenth
century.5 In particular, following a section concerning the internal rules and
organisation of the Houses, we are going to deal with four different functions
which allude to the ones advanced by the eminent British thinker: the ‘elec-
toral function’, which hints at parliament’s role in selecting the governmental
coalition, entrusting it with powers and ultimately dismissing it; the oversight
function, representing the other side of the same coin, when Bagehot writes
that ‘they [the House] guide him [the Premier]’ and that ‘the whole life of
. . . politics is the action and reaction between the Ministry and the parlia-
ment’;6 the expressive function, or at least the common perception of its
being representative of public opinion; and finally the legislative function,
which Bagehot would undoubtedly have acknowledged as being more
relevant now than it was at his time, a ‘season . . . [when] the nation [was not
so] misfitted with its laws’7 as has so often been the case in recent times.
Finally, we are going to offer an interpretation of the extent and direction of
those changes experienced by the Italian Parliament over the last two decades.
PARLIAMENT’S INTERNAL STRUCTURE: RESOURCES AND RULES
Parliaments are institutionalised organisations leading their own, autonomous

lives. Certain features of their internal dynamics do give us more information
about the quality and the intensity of the degree to which parliament is insti-
tutionalised, and about the basic pre-requisites of parliamentary action and
behaviour.
From this point of view, leaving aside the description of parliamentary
practices until later, we need to focus on the internal resources of the Italian
Parliament, and in particular on the parliamentary rules of procedure and
their development over the last 20 years. From the administrative point of
view, the two Chambers are completely free to organise their own internal
layout. They can establish their own rules governing the recruitment, selection
and pay of staff, without having to observe the general regulations governing
the public sector as a whole. This independence also explains the fact that
starting salaries of parliamentary staff are about 30 per cent higher than
those of other public service employees, and may end up being double the
latter towards the end of an employee’s career.
As far as staff numbers are concerned, Table 1 shows that after an increase
at the beginning of the decade – representing the achievement of 20 per cent
growth established during the 1980s – there was a slight fall (more marked in
the case of the Senate).
As to financial resources, the Chamber of Deputies had a budget of E823
million in 2001, whereas the Senate’s budget stood at E366 million. Expendi-
ture on personnel (MPs, staff and pensions) amounted to 66 per cent of the
total annual budget for the Chamber and to 72 per cent for the Senate.
In terms of Italian public expenditure in general, the financial resources of
parliament are the ones that have increased the most. In fact, the Senate’s budget
accounted for 0.38 per cent of public expenditure in 1979, whereas this figure
had risen to 0.69 per cent by 2001; the Chamber’s budget rose from 0.79 per
cent of total public expenditure in 1979 to 1.74 per cent in 2001.8
We also need to point out that right through the 1990s the internal admin-
istrative organisation of both Chambers underwent a number of changes prior
to total reorganisation in 2000 – 2001, aimed at adapting their working to the
changed political, institutional and technological framework.
On the basis of the above-mentioned data, we can argue that from the quan-
titative and organisational perspectives at least, the performance of the Italian
TABLE 1
PARLIAMENTARY STAFF DURING THE 1990s
Staff Clerks Staff Senate Clerks

Chamber and Top (315 Senators) and Top
of Deputies Officials Officials
(630 MPs)
1989 1,864 162 980 114

1992 1,886 215 1,028 118
1995 1,939 215 906 111
1998 1,821 202 892 109
2001 1,807 194 870 103
Source: Senato della Repubblica, Relazione annuale sullo stato dell’Amministra-

zione del Senato (1990–2001); Camera dei Deputati, Relazione annuale
sullo stato dell’Amministrazione della Camera (1990–2001).
Parliament should have changed more compared with the past, when it was less
well served – except in terms of salary – than other national assemblies.9
Whilst maintaining the high levels of pay – both for MPs and staff –
the Italian Parliament has significantly increased the quantity and quality of
the services and facilities provided to legislators, thanks largely to an increase
in funding and to the use of new technology. This improvement shows some
shades in the distribution of the personnel among the internal units and
the cultural background of clerks and top-level officials. The allocation of
employees among the various organisational structures shows a certain
degree of redundancy in those activities not directly involved with core
functions,10 while some strategic units – such as policy and research services
– remain undersized.11 Furthermore, a law degree remains the main edu-
cational qualification required of applicants for graduate posts if we exclude
those specifically pertaining to the field of information technology. Very
few posts require qualifications in economic or financial subjects. Support
services for policy-making are usually provided by clerks and officers with
a legal background.12 This raises questions about the nature of the documen-
tation and policy dossiers drawn up by such staff and provided to MPs.
Internal rules and organisation are important elements in the life of parlia-
ments: they weigh much upon the institutionalisation of parliaments, and they
provide an essential view, albeit incomplete, of the way things ought to be
done by parliament.13 As a matter of fact, parliamentary rules of procedures
have been a basic instrument, used by assemblies to design their own
working and to influence the external political process by foreseeing or affect-
ing the general trends characterising the political system as a whole.
In order to understand the evolution of standing orders over the last
20 years, we first need to sum up briefly how they have developed since the
fall of fascism, when the new constitution came into force and the republican
parliament began to restore the standing orders of the pre-fascist regimes. The
old parliamentary procedures were an expression of the atomistic, individua-
listic behaviour characterising Italian parliamentary politics during the liberal
age, when the relationship between governmental majority and opposition was
structurally fluid.14 The fact was that the standing orders, combined with the
constitutional power of permanent committees to legislate directly, constituted
a structural factor encouraging the distinction between the governmental
majority and the legislative one. This genetic imprinting has strongly mod-
elled the internal dynamics whereby only the cohesion of the ruling coalition
could ensure the effectiveness and the efficiency of the law-making process; at
the same time, the content of the initial standing orders represented a perma-
nent threat to the solidarity of the ruling coalitions.
So the internal parliamentary rules of the time favoured the political crisis
of the ruling coalitions and the progressive weakness of governmental
majorities since the mid-1950s, thus contributing significantly to the emer-
gence of the praxis and theory of the so-called ‘centrality of parliament’,
which was formally ratified by the general reform of standing orders in
1971. That reform formalised the following elements: the predominant role
of the leaders of parliamentary groups – without any reference to the size
of parliamentary groups – in determining the parliamentary agenda (under
the unanimous agreement rule); the unequivocal protection of the parliamen-
tary groups’ rights and role, to the detriment of the government’s; more infor-
mative, supervisory powers (granted to the committees in particular); greater
power to check the performance of the public administration and the
implementation of public policies.15 The 1971 reform was the natural con-
clusion of a long-term dynamic, and at the same time the institutional pre-
requisite for the subsequent change in the political framework. In fact, in
1976 a broad coalition government was formed, including the Communist
Party, which also provided the speaker in the Chamber of Deputies right
up until 1992. In other words, the 1971 reform reinforced the embedded
model of the internal parliamentary way to work, strengthened the role of
all the inside players (individual MPs, committees, parliamentary groups
and leaders), deeply institutionalised a crowded network of internal veto
points, and thus ‘froze’ internal parliamentary culture and self-perception,
establishing the idea of the superiority and centrality of the assemblies in
the political system. Assemblearism, which had been the deep-rooted evil
of the Italian political system since unification, attained its highest formal
expression.
However, having only just reached a peak of institutionalisation, the
internal workings of parliament began to show their shortcomings. The
need to manage parliamentary activities through a wide-ranging consensus,
in an arena characterised by many joint-decision traps, made the parlia-
mentary processes, and especially the legislative ones, totally exhausting,
inefficient and ineffective. It is no coincidence, therefore, to learn that after
the 1971 reform, beginning with the Sixth legislature (1972 – 76), the
number of decree-laws began to increase dramatically,16 proof of both
the further weakening of government’s position in parliament and the level
of the consensual-assemblearistic style reached in the internal workings of
assemblies (and in particular of the Chamber of Deputies). On the other
hand, the pluralist nature of the standing orders, kinder as they were to
individual MPs and parliamentary groups rather than the governmental
majority and a collective opposition, gave considerable opportunities to
block legislative activities by the stonewalling of a few deputies. This
often happened during the Seventh legislature, especially as a result of the
filibustering of the four Radical Party MPs.
Starting with the Eighth legislature, the striking dysfunction in parliamen-
tary working that had emerged during the previous decade (together with the
end of the grand coalition formula) forced the question of reforming standing
orders onto the political agenda, where it remained for a considerable time up
until the end of the 1990s at least. In fact, during the 1980s the internal rules
underwent a number of changes (sometimes contradictory, always partial and
contingent).17 The most important changes were the following:
. Restrictions on speech times (introduced for the first time in the Chamber
and reinforced in the Senate, where they already existed).
. Power to select amendments given to the speakers.
. Power to decide on the planning of the agenda – should there be no unani-
mity among parliamentary leaders – given to the speakers.
. Introduction of planning of the discussion time spent in the Chamber of the
Deputies (with the exception of decree-laws).
. Introduction of a special session to deal with the budgetary law (ensuring its
approval at the end of each year also by reinforcing the government’s role in
the process).
. Drastic limitations to the use of the secret ballot.18
These reforms, formulated in a more incisive way in the Senate than in the
Chamber, constituted an incremental process of rationalisation of the original
model. However, it was not a radical modification: it merely eliminated the
more assemblearistic rules and introduced some rather weak instruments
designed to bring in efficiency to internal activity.
The well-known political upheaval marking the beginning of the 1990s
(the 1991 referendum, Tangentopoli, the 1993 referendum and the subsequent
change into an overwhelmingly majoritarian electoral law) had a direct impact
on the internal life of parliament. From the 1994 elections onwards, it was
clear to many players that the wished-for majoritarian transformation of the
political system required a radical change in parliamentary functioning
(especially in the Chamber of Deputies). This led to a new reform of the stand-
ing orders of the Chamber of Deputies in 1997. The fundamental changes
made by the new reform focused on the power of government within parlia-
ment, on the right of opposition, and on an improvement in the quality of
legislation.
The reform tried to reinforce the role of government in the legislative
process by abolishing the unanimity requirement for leaders of parliamentary
groups during the planning of the political agenda, lowering the quorum to
three-quarters of all representatives;19 in those cases where the prescribed
quorum could not be reached, the power to plan activities was delegated to
the speakers; at the same time, the reform gave government the chance to
notify parliament formally of its priorities. Further restrictions on speech
times, on the timing of the legislative process and on the selection of
amendments, were also introduced (regarding the Chamber of Deputies,
albeit without attaining the effectiveness of the Senate’s standing orders on
this point).
As far as the right of opposition is concerned, it should be pointed out that
for the very first time, the reform of the Chamber’s standing orders in 1997
(followed by that of the Senate in 1999), include a formal reference to the
‘opposition groups’ and to the ‘majority groups’. This is especially with
regard to the fact that opposition groups have the right to more time than
those within the majority during the discussion of governmental bills; and
at least one-fifth of discussion time should be dedicated to those bills sub-
mitted by the opposition groups.
In order to improve the quality of legislation, in the Chamber of Deputies20
a Legislation Committee composed of eight MPs has been set up, with the job
of providing advice on the quality, homogeneity and clearness of bills and
governmental regulation proposals.21
With regard to the internal structure of the permanent committees system
– the hard core of parliamentary working – some changes are of interest. First
of all, the number of permanent commissions in the Senate changed during the
1990s from 12 to 13 (with the addition of the Environmental Committee). In
the Chamber of Deputies, the Committee on Internal Affairs has been aboli-
shed, while a Committee on European Union Policies has been set up. The
committees’ network also includes a number of bicameral committees with
various functions regarding a great many different matters.22 Moreover, the
committees’ advisory role on government regulations has been strongly
reinforced. This is particularly true on budget and public finance, where the
advice on bills involving public expenditure is compulsory.
Many scholars have pointed out that the 1997– 98 reform of standing
orders (especially those of the Chamber) has meant that the Italian Parliament
now works in a majoritarian way, or at the very least has clearly abandoned its
consociational legacy.23 The truth is clearly more complex than this, however.
In fact, the new rules that have been introduced since the beginning of the
1980s have undoubtedly attempted to rationalise the activities of parliament
and make them more effective, especially with regard to the legislative
process: however, real agenda power still lies in the hands of the parliamentary
leaders and speakers (conceived as referees between parliament and govern-
ment, although they are obviously biased towards those assemblies which
elected them). The basic role of the specialised permanent committees has
not been undermined (on the contrary, their powers have been widened, and
now include advising on governmental regulations or legislative-decrees).
No restrictions to the presentation of private member’s bills have been intro-
duced (a permissive condition designed to flood the agenda, as will be shown
below); government has not been furnished with adequate powers to lead the
discussion; the amendment system, even if rationalised, is still unbalanced in
favour of MPs with respect to government. Moreover, during the last 20 years
of procedural reforms, a strategically important element of internal life has
remained substantially unaffected: the rules concerning the composition of
parliamentary groups.24 The absence of any link between the electoral
results and the composition of parliamentary groups represents a fundamental
legacy of the previous assemblearistic period, and a very strong hindrance to
change with regard to the internal praxis. In other words, 20 years of reform of
internal procedures had proven incapable of substantially affecting the histori-
cally rooted consensual style that characterises parliamentary life.
THE ELECTORAL FUNCTION
In a parliamentary democracy the executive is accountable to the Assembly.

The way in which this relationship is embodied in rules and institutions
differs from one country to another, with an explicit or implicit vote of confi-
dence, more or less stringent rules for dismissing the government, and stricter
or looser connections to the outcome of legislative votes. Italy is traditionally
considered to have a pure parliamentary system in which all those characteri-
stics that give parliament one of the highest degrees of ex-ante and ex-post
control over the executive are magnified.25 It thus makes sense to evaluate
the working of the Italian Parliament in terms of what Bagehot considered to
be its most essential function, particularly given that several scholars have con-
sidered the executive–parliament sub-system to be of particular importance in
any understanding of the Italian case.26 Two main features should be taken into
consideration in order to understand its evolution over the last two decades: the
chosen type of coalition and the efficiency of this selection process. The first
aspect hints at the internal logic of partisan interaction, whereas the second
touches on one of the most censured aspects of parliamentary life.
Parliament is certainly not directly responsible for choosing the party
composition of the executive. This is the specific duty of the future prime
minister, whose task it is to analyse the different forms of potential coalition
and evaluate them in terms of their internal consistency, policy reliability,
likely duration and so on. Nonetheless, it is parliament, or rather the major
parliamentary groups, which ‘advise’ him/her on the plausibility of the
assumptions made, of the logic adhered to and of the balance achieved.
Furthermore, the latter are even responsible for keeping to or breaking the
original ‘contract’. We all know that virtually all Italian governmental
crises have been of extra-parliamentary origin; however, it is still possible
to evaluate whether anything has changed over the last ten or 15 years.
First of all, we may observe that since the mid-1970s it has been almost
impossible to pursue consistent minority agreements. Subsequent to the
period of ‘national solidarity’, the only minority executive was the Sixth gov-
ernment led by Fanfani in 1987, which merely led the country towards an early
general election. Given the lack of any specific statutory rules protecting the
executive, such as implicit investiture or constructive no-confidence votes,
minority (single-party) governments became unlikely as the numerical and
symbolic status of the pivotal party declined. If we exclude the ‘technical’
government led by Dini on the one hand, and the role of the re-founded Com-
munist Party in the Prodi government on the other, it has become increasingly
less appealing to support governments without being part of them – a practice
which, on the contrary, was quite common during the early legislatures. For at
least a decade after 1980, party groups tended to reach oversized agreements,
something that is in keeping with the consociational character often attributed
to the Italian political system. In order to find a legislature characterised by
minimum-winning coalitions right throughout its duration one has to wait
until the unstable centre-left governments of the 1996 –2001 period, which
had no chance of extending their parliamentary support further. Strangely
enough, what is now commonly perceived as the real start of a new majori-
tarian era in Italian politics – the second Berlusconi government – sees the
reappearance of the oversized formula.
While the idea of appealing directly to the electorate is now a common
feature of political discourse,27 one that reduces the electoral function of
parliament itself, at least the process of selecting and appointing the executive
should appear more efficient than before. There are a number of different indi-
cators which help us to evaluate this point: the number of governments in each
legislature, their respective duration, the bargaining attempts made, the length
of time required to set up government, and the ‘survival rate’ of that same
government.28 The implicit assumption we make here is that the efficiency of
the parliamentary electoral function is higher the more it contributes to a
rapid selection of a lasting government. Unfortunately, this has not even
been the case over recent decades. Each legislature has witnessed more than
one executive and more than one type of partisan coalition. The actual
value differs as a result of the length of the legislature itself rather than
some sort of improvement made. In spite of two notable exceptions – the
Craxi and Prodi governments – the average lifespan of governments still
fluctuates around the well-known discouraging value of 11 to 12 months each.
A specific point ought to be made here regarding the formation of the first
executive after a general election. Generally speaking, the parliamentary
system in a multi-party context like the Italian one has been much criticised
because of the secret bargaining taking place after the election, involving
the secretaries of the major (and even minor) parties. It has been argued
that, in a proportional system, characterised by strong reasons for diversifying
the political message, the will of the nation’s citizens is systematically
betrayed by post-electoral deals. Since 1996, Italian electors have known
the likely composition of the coalition and its leaders well in advance. In
spite of the role of the President of the Republic – who in theory has to
chose the new prime minister and approve the list of ministers – their
names are made public well in advance, and even written on the ballot
sheets. Thus, in the ‘new era’ of Italian politics, it should not have been
difficult to set up governments immediately after voting had taken place
without betraying electoral promises. There are technical reasons that make
it impossible to enter ‘Palazzo Chigi’ the day immediately after the elections:
nonetheless, the three post-election executives during the new ‘majoritarian
era’ needed 44, 26 and 39 days respectively to get going. A little more than
a month was the average length of time required even in the so-called
‘First Republic’, an indication that the underlying political logic of the
parliamentary ‘electoral function’ has not changed very much despite the
different context. Evidently, the choice of parties and leaders has always
been less problematic than the distribution of portfolios, a matter that is still
a challenge even in an apparently solid coalition like the present one.
For this same reason, the actual reduction in the number of bargaining
attempts made prior to the definitive appointment of a prime minister and a
coalition – with the recent exception of the first mandate granted to
D’Alema in 1998 – is not totally reassuring.
Finally, as we said, a well-selected executive tends to give a long-lasting
government. At the moment, it is too early to say much about the survival
chances of the present government, although it has all the potential for estab-
lishing a new record for duration. Nevertheless, we can assess how past ‘first
executives’ after general elections performed by calculating the ratio of their
actual duration to the respective maximum potential. A rate of 100 per cent
would mean that the government lasted the whole five-year legislature, while
50 per cent would mean that it was changed half-way, and so on. During the
first eight legislatures, this index normally scored between ten per cent and
30 per cent. Craxi, in the Ninth legislature, attained the still unequalled
record of 61 per cent, but then the indicator dropped to 13 per cent with
Goria (Tenth legislature), 17 per cent (Amato, Eleventh) and 13 per cent
(Berlusconi, Twelfth), before improving again with Prodi in the last legislature
(49 per cent). The duration of an executive is not entirely a parliamentary
affair, especially in the case of Italy. However, this index would suggest that
the modification of consolidated political formulas and attitudes is far from
being an easy task. The experience of the first 40 years of the Italian Republic
shows that a multi-party environment is not a sufficient condition for short sur-
vival expectations. At the same time, the disincentives of a quasi-majoritarian
and almost bipolar system are still not enough to guarantee long-lasting
executives, or the fruitful and efficient fulfilment of the parliamentary electoral
function.29
OVERSIGHT
Scant political and scholarly attention has traditionally been paid to the over-
sight activities performed by the Italian Parliament. The first reason for this
can be found in the precarious equilibrium characterising executive coalitions.
This feature of the Italian political system has shifted attention towards what is
sometimes considered to be the definitive form of ex-post control, that is, the
possibility of dismissing the government in charge. The parties in government
themselves, and especially their leaders – who seldom took on governmental
responsibilities – constituted the most serious challenge to the survival of the
executive. Risks materialised in the form of external partisan events, such as
national conferences in which an altered equilibrium amongst party factions
may indirectly affect the prestige and influence of a prime minister, or in con-
cealed legislative attacks on confidence motions proposed by the executive
itself in order to protect important pieces of legislation.30
Secondly, research suggests that traditional oversight instruments, such as
question time and interpellations, are appealing to politicians provided they
are given media coverage, especially on television. In Italy, journalists and
the mass media in general, while often reporting on political issues, rarely
deal with these aspects of the functioning of a parliamentary democracy,
thus contributing for their part to the scant public importance of the instru-
ments of parliamentary control.
Nonetheless, something has changed over the past decade or so, as can be
seen from a closer look at the overall use made of oversight instruments
(which we can roughly separate into guidance and control devices).31 Until
the mid-1980s, MPs adopted 30 –40,000 oversight acts each legislature,
with guidance instruments accounting for no more than ten per cent of the
total amount, but things began to change from the Tenth legislature
(1987 – 92) onwards. At this point, the ‘quantity’ of oversight activities
(motions, questions, resolutions and so on) clearly exceeded the level of
50,000 for the first time, and this number continued to grow during sub-
sequent legislatures. Even the composition changed slightly, initially with
further growth of control to the detriment of guidance, followed by a clear
increase in the latter. The trend becomes even more visible if we relate
these amounts to the varying duration of the different legislatures, as can
be seen in Figure 1.
Oversight seems to rise sharply at the beginning of the 1990s, in the leg-
islature that saw the beginning of the Italian political turmoil, reaching around
50 acts a day. Although the first signs of an increase can still be traced back to
1987 –92, the level of use of oversight instruments almost doubled over the
next decade. To be honest, what grew most was the use of questions requiring
a written answer, one of the weakest instruments of control, whereas most
control and guidance methods followed the same pattern. Furthermore, the
FIGURE 1
DAILY LEVELS OF OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY (GUIDANCE AND CONTROL)
Note: The present legislature is updated at 13 Feb. 2002.

Source: Own elaboration on data from the web of the Camera dei deputati: www.parlamento.it.
last few years have seen the introduction of two new oversight instruments –
Prime Minister’s Question Time and the chance to make urgent interpellations
– which were probably the only mechanisms Italy still lacked.32
Thus, one possible hypothesis is that, in what is now commonly called the
Italian ‘First Republic’, the relationship between majority and opposition
parties consisted in a silent pact of mutual non-interference. In spite of an
apparently strong degree of antagonism, law-making was on the whole
marked by consensualism33 and parliamentary oversight, regardless of the
potential of available instruments, was under-used both by the opposition
and by majority backbenchers. As we said at the beginning of this section,
executive action was restricted in the main by party directives or by the clien-
telistic trap of the secret ballot during the law-making process. In the transition
period, with the radical upsetting of the party system and the request for
greater autonomy for the executive, this sort of extra-parliamentary oversight
became less effective and more problematic. At the same time, the need for
control and supervision increased with the adoption of a majoritarian logic
in what used to be a consensual political environment. This change has
proven to be far from straightforward, and its outcome is still not clear.
What almost certainly happened was that there was a change in the relation-
ship between executive and Assembly, including a more active use of both
control and guidance oversight instruments.
With the figures presented in Table 2, we have decided to take a closer
look at the key instruments within the two major categories of oversight: inter-
pellations for the control function, and the adoption of motions and resolutions
of the Assembly for the purposes of guidance.34 The figures shown refer to
1976 – 2002, and thus cover at least 15 years of Christian Democrat ‘domina-
tion’, an uncertain phase of political turmoil, and the first years of what now
seems to be the new post-transition framework.
Table 2 shows the monthly and total use of the chosen oversight instru-
ments, as well as the same figures broken down according to the different
(majority or opposition) coalitions. Apart from the still rather unsettled
Fourteenth legislature, we can see how the levels of use of the major oversight
instruments, both on the control and guidance side, are noticeably higher
during the ‘Second’ than they were in the ‘First Republic’. While the
number of interpellations made during the 1970s and early 1980s stood at
around 20 – 30 a month, this figure rose to 50 – 60 in the 1990s. The same
thing happened in the case of motions and Assembly resolutions, which
rose from less than ten acts per month to almost 20. These figures have
grown in the case of both majority and opposition MPs, which may suggest
that the new electoral system induces a greater degree of individual
involvement of the elected, testified even on the law-making side by the
increase in bill submission. However, a second aspect ought to be underlined
TABLE 2
MEASURES OF SELECTED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY
Legislature Interpellations Motions þ Assembly Resolutions
7th (1976–79) 803 (22.3) Maj. 31.5% (7.0) 156 (4.3) Maj. 29.5% (1.3)
Opp. 67.5% (15.1) Opp. 68.6% (3.0)
8th (1979–83) 3,169 (64.1) Maj. 25.6% (16.4) 452 (9.1) Maj. 26.5% (2.4)
Opp. 70.1% (44.9) Opp. 73.0% (6.7)
9th (1983–87) 1,706 (35.3) Maj. 26.7% (9.4) 456 (9.4) Maj. 35.3% (3.3)
Opp. 73.3% (25.9) Opp. 64.7% (6.1)
10th (1987–92) 2,557 (43.7) Maj. 22.7% (9.9) 991 (16.9) Maj. 26.4% (4.5)
Opp. 72.3% (31.6) Opp. 71.3% (12.1)
11th (1992–94) 1,654 (68.8) Maj. 19.2% (13.2) 459 (19.1) Maj. 22.0% (4.2)
Opp. 79.5% (54.7) Opp. 77.8% (14.9)
12th (1994–96) 1,274 (50.7) Maj. 40.8% (20.7) 473 (18.8) Maj. 35.1% (6.6)
Opp. 52.5% (26.6) Opp. 59.0% (11.1)
13th (1996–01) 4,168 (67.7) Maj. 28.6% (19.4) 1,369 (22.2) Maj. 38.3% (8.5)
Opp. 50.5% (34.2) Opp. 50.5% (11.2)
14th (2001–) 305 (39.8) Maj. 45.6% (18.1) 121 (15.8) Maj. 45.5% (7.2)
Opp. 38.0% (15.1) Opp. 44.6% (7.0)
Note: Absolute figures, monthly values in brackets and percentages distinct for origins. The sum
is always less than 100 per cent due to the activity of MPs belonging to the Mixed group
(not included). The present legislature is updated at 13 Feb. 2002.
Source: Own elaboration on data from the web of the Camera dei deputati: www.parlamento.it.
here. Whereas in the past the greater part of oversight was exercised by the
opposition with seldom less than 70 per cent of proceedings, more recently
even MPs belonging to the majority have been involved to a similar degree.
Since interpellations, motions and resolutions of the Assembly cannot
simply be dismissed as being addressed to marginal or specific questions,
but normally relate to important general issues, the new equilibrium in
oversight activity probably points to some form of systemic change. The
bi-polar nature of the Italian political system since 1996, together with
the greater autonomy now granted to the executive (for example, its wider
use of delegated powers, or its being the only player in the EU arena), have
further reduced the role of, and the degree of freedom exercised by, individual
MPs and parliamentary groups. Since they lack most of the ‘exit’ strategies
available up to the 1980s, such as the secret ballot, any ‘vocal’ instrument
acquires new status. Through ex-ante (motions and resolutions) and ex-post
oversight (interpellations), opposition groups and majority backbenchers
are trying to restore their role in the parliamentary political process,
thus somehow limiting or fixing the independence of the executive.
The more the latter pushes for self-determination and decisiveness,
the more the former need to exploit all the political and statutory resources
they possess.
THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION
This term refers to the fact that parliament is more than a legislative machine
or an instrument for maintaining the accountability of government. Parlia-
ment, more than any other institution, symbolises the democratic spirit and
represents the range of opinions and attitudes of a country’s citizens. The
system works in both directions. On the one hand, the representational mech-
anism should ensure that the pluralistic character of a society has, in the form
of parliament, a high-level political forum for discussion and debate. On the
other hand, it is parliament as an institution and its members as a collective
body that need to gain the faith and trust of citizens as the supreme guarantor
of democracy. This is achieved by means of the pedagogical character of par-
liament itself, whereby citizens ‘hear what otherwise [they] should not’.35
Unfortunately, it is not possible to operationalise the expressive function
with the same degree of precision as other ones, particularly since it is imposs-
ible to measure it directly by evaluating parliamentary activity itself from the
expressive point of view. We have thus chosen to adopt an indirect research
approach, involving an evaluation of the image which parliament itself
conveys to society, and measuring public attitude and feelings towards this
institution. Instead of trying to grasp how MPs themselves relate to this func-
tion, we will partially reconstruct it through its reflection in public opinion. It
is the nature of the expressive function itself, and it consisting mainly in a
relationship, which permits us to adopt this indirect approach.
Public opinion of the workings of political institutions and people’s trust in
them would appear to be a good representation of the concept we are trying to
analyse here. Moreover, the Italian case looks particularly appropriate with
regard to this for two different, yet inter-related, reasons. On the one hand,
it has been argued that long-term public dissatisfaction with the functioning
of democracy has characterised the Italian republican experience.36 Figures
from the regular Euro-barometer surveys show that in Italy there has always
been discontent with the institutions: this discontent has been both specific
(that is, it has nothing to do with the overall dissatisfaction with life of the
country’s citizens) and consistently double the European average. With the
disappearance of external constraints and internal rigidities, and especially
after the so-called Tangentopoli episodes of political bribery, this frustration
became one of the root causes of political change at the beginning of the
1990s. On the other hand, political elites have been well aware of the import-
ance of the problem, continuously hinting at the mismatch between insti-
tutions and electors as one of the major dilemma to be solved. The reform
introduced over the past decade may represent a turning point, and the new
institutional framework, and in particular the new parliament, may be evalu-
ated with regard to this issue as well.
The year in which the numerous political scandals that shook Italy reached
their peak – 1993 – constituted a low-point in public ‘satisfaction with the
way democracy works’. Subsequent surveys show a slight increase in that
satisfaction, thus apparently confirming expectations regarding the introduc-
tion of the new majoritarian electoral system. However, satisfaction with
democracy still lingered well below the EU average and, more important
from our point of view, the specific appraisal of parliament is far from
encouraging. Figure 2 shows the data from three surveys conducted by the
European Commission over the last five years, giving the respective percen-
tage of people who declare that they tend to trust their national parliaments
in three geographical areas: Italy, the European Union and Southern Europe
(excluding Italy).
What is most striking is that the Italian Parliament figures are well down
on the other EU member state parliaments, and in particular from the average
value for the southern countries (Spain, Greece and Portugal). This low level
of public trust cannot simply be attributed to overall dissatisfaction with pol-
itical life, since Italians generally manifest a completely different attitude
towards supra-national institutions such as those of the EU.37 This level of
FIGURE 2
TRUST IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT
Note: Percentage of people answering that they ‘tend to trust’ the parliament.
Source: Own elaboration on Eurobarometer data EB 48, EB 51, EB 55.1.

discontent may be seen as the result of the poor performance of parliament in

representing and expressing public feelings. In spite of the prospect of redu-
cing the gap between citizens and their representatives, thanks to the single
district constituencies introduced in 1993, the overall effect has not satisfied
expectations. Although much of the public’s distrust in parliament derives
from its general discontent with Italian politics – the level of people’s trust
in parties, or in government itself, is even lower – the public’s feelings
towards the main locus of democracy within a country should not be
underestimated.
PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Since the mid-1980s, the Italian Parliament’s legislative role has radically
changed, so that at the beginning of the new millennium the traditionally per-
ceived centrality of its legislative function is clearly blurring, leaving parlia-
ment in the midst of an identity crisis. Figures and a number of events would
tend to substantiate this. To start with, the figures for the amount of bills
submitted prove to be of considerable interest.
Figure 3 underlines the incredible rise in the number of bills presented in
parliament. This increase is due exclusively to private members’ bills, since
the government persevered in its attempts to maintain the amount of bills it
presented at the same level.38 As we all know, in the Italian Parliament
there are no restrictions on bill presentation; however, this absence of limits
– which accounts for the comparatively higher degree of action in respect to
other countries – does not justify the dramatic proliferation which has
occurred since the Eleventh legislature (notwithstanding the already enormous
amount of bills presented during previous legislatures). The absence of
restrictions simply represents a favourable institutional condition, but not an
independent variable.
In fact, the historically rooted high numbers of bills presented has to be
traced back to the aggregate behaviour of individual MPs, who were perfectly
aware that they had very little chance of obtaining a legislative outcome – and
in fact the rate of success of bills has progressively dropped. The fact is that
the presentation of bills was used by individuals to demonstrate their active
involvement to their constituency and political party. Thus the high number
of bills is the result of games being played outside parliament, and not of
any attempt to produce laws. At the beginning of the 1990s, exogenous
factors – the electoral reforms made in 1991 and 1993 – affected the institu-
tionalised praxis, speeding it up. In fact, empirical data would seem to suggest
that those MPs elected in majoritarian constituencies have a greater propensity
towards presenting bills than those elected by the proportional rule.39
This clearly visible individual fervour on the one hand is an indicator of the
FIGURE 3
BILLS IN PARLIAMENT (1948 – 2002)
Note: The present legislature is updated at 8 Feb. 2002.
Source: Own elaboration on parliamentary data: www.parlamento.it.
opportunity individual MPs have of playing their own ‘symbolic’ game

outside the confines of the strategies adopted by their groups, parties and pol-
itical alliances. On the other hand it points to the complexity of parliamentary
working and its internal links and relationships.
It is clear that the huge rise in the number of bills presented is an important
factor conditioning the effectiveness of legislative activity, and in particular of
non-governmental law-making. As Table 3 shows, this increase in action
taken is a self-propagating phenomenon: at the beginning of a legislature,
MPs race to present bills,40 thus overcrowding the agenda, slowing the
legislative process, making it difficult to change approved laws should they
prove ineffective, and so on. This hyperinflation creates the conditions for
the emergence of a vicious circle, whereby parliament is increasingly less
capable of transforming its bills into laws.
TABLE 3
RATE OF SUCCESS OF BILLS IN PARLIAMENT (1987 – 2002)
Legislature Bills assigned Bills approved
10th (1987– 92) 7,734 Government 1,359 1,548 (20.1%) Government 762 (56.1%)
Private 6,375 Private 786 (12.3 %)
11th (1992– 94) 4,605 Government 804 469 (10.2%) Government 241 (30.0%)
Private 3,801 Private 228 (6.0%)
12th (1994– 96) 5,538 Government 973 313 (5.7%) Government 265 (27.2 %)
13th (1996– 01) 11,586 Government 1,459 912 (7.9%) Government 708 (48.6%)
14th (2001–) 2,571 Government 125 58 (2.2%) Government 45 (36%)

Notes: Bills assigned to the permanent committees for the first step of the legislative process.
The present legislature is updated at 14 Feb. 2002. The percentages refer to the proportion
of bills approved out of the assigned ones.
Source: Own elaboration on parliamentary data www.parlamento.it.
In fact, if we look at Table 3 we can see that the overall rate of success of
bills in parliament dropped dramatically by more than half between the Tenth
and the Thirteenth legislatures, falling from 20.1 per cent to 7.9 per cent.
However, what really emerges is the different performance of government
and parliament. Whereas the former more or less maintained the number of
bills presented and their degree of success, the latter saw a distinctive fall
in both absolute and percentage terms. Moreover, during the 1990s the distri-
bution of approved bills also changed radically. Whereas during the Tenth
legislature, MPs’ bills represented a little more than half of the total amount
of those approved, in the Thirteenth legislature this percentage fell to 22.4.
This trend is also confirmed by the data concerning the origin of laws.
Table 4 points out that the percentage of laws deriving from private members’
bills decreased significantly between the Tenth and Thirteenth legislatures.
The above-mentioned data may thus initially give the impression that over
the last decade parliament’s legislative role has steadily declined while that of
government has grown. However, as often happens, first impressions can be
somewhat misleading. The same Table 4 helps to illustrate this point. It
shows not only the origin of the laws but also the composition of governmental
laws. These laws are sub-divided into four main types: converted decree-laws,
budgetary laws, laws ratifying international agreements and annual EU
laws, and others. In the case of the first three types, government is either
constitutionally or substantially given the right of initiative. Thus it has no
competitors in these specific areas. What emerges from Table 4 is that the
government, however, failed to capitalise on the weakening of parliament’s
TABLE 4
ORIGIN AND TYPE OF LAWS (1987 – 2002)
10th 11th 12th 13th 14th

Legislature (1987–92) (1992–94) (1994–96) (1996–01) (2001–)
Laws approved 1,076 314 295 905 56

Governmental 704 (65.4%) 231 (73.6%) 261 (88.5%) 695 (76.8%) 44 (78.6%)
origin
Conversion of 185 (17.2%) 118 (37.5%) 122 (41.3%) 174 (19.2%) 36 (64.4%)
decree-laws
Budgetary laws 32 (3.0%) 11 (3.5%) 10 (3.4%) 39 (4.3%) 4 (7.1%)
Laws ratifying 195 (18.1%) 67 (21.4%) 116 (39.4%) 288 (31.9%) —
international
agreements and
annual EU laws
Other 292 (27.1%) 35 (11.2%) 13 (4.4%) 194 (21.5%) 4 (7.1%)
Mixed origin 85 (7.9%) 8 (2.5%) 6 (2.0%) 36 (4%) —
Non-governmental 287 (26.7%) 75 (23.9%) 28 (9.5%) 174 (19.2%) 12 (21.4%)
origin
Note: The present legislature is updated at 31 Jan. 2002.

Source: Own elaboration on parliamentary data: www.parlamento.it.
role in the law-making process, and finally to reign over parliament. The real
competition between government and parliament is summed up by the figures
for non-governmental laws and by those governmental ones grouped together
under the ‘other’ heading (the real laws dealing with the ordinary legislative
process). The situation is clear: between the Tenth and Thirteenth legislatures,
the ability of government to get those of its bills not included in the reserved
categories passed as law not only did not increase, but on the contrary was
weakened.
This reduction in ordinary legislation resulting from the competition
between government and parliament is confirmed if we add up the laws of
non-governmental origin, of mixed origin, and of non-reserved governmental
origin: they accounted for more than 60 per cent of the total amount in the
Tenth legislature and following the two brief legislatures during the radical
transition phase, represented about 45 per cent of the total in the Thirteenth
(and this trend is also confirmed by the figures for the first months of the Four-
teenth legislature). This constitutes yet another symptom of the progressive
weakening of the centrality of the Italian Parliament’s legislative function,
as well as of the government’s ability to legislate by means of the ordinary
procedures in the assemblies.
The decline in parliament’s law-making role is further testified by the
progressive delegation of legislative powers to the executive during the
1990s.41 This trend reached a peak during the Thirteenth legislature, when
the amount of legislative decrees, due to delegated laws,42 exceeded the

number of the laws approved through the ordinary process.43 So, over the
last decade the increasing use of delegated laws and of de-legislation44
has meant that the Italian Parliament has accepted the reduction in many of
its legislative competencies, leaving government the freedom to take decisions
on reform and strategy in a considerable number of policy fields, while the
majority of ordinary laws approved by parliament are of but a marginal or
sectional character.45
Empirical evidence shows that the new majoritarian trend pursued since
the 1980s through the reform of internal rules, and during the 1990s
through electoral reform and by changing standing orders once again, has
achieved rather ambiguous, strange results with regard to the legislative
function. In fact, the strategy of governing outside ordinary procedures
seems to be the opposite of what one would expect from a majoritarian
model of relationships between government and parliament. Why should
government have withdrawn from parliament when it could have led it? It
is clear that the reforms did not produce the expected results on the workings
of parliament, and as a consequence executives – constrained to govern –
have to opt for other ways of accomplishing their duties.46
The fact is that the standing orders and electoral reforms did not under-
mine the survival of the consensual law-making style, but only outlined a
majoritarian style of internal parliamentary life. As we have seen, consensual
law-making persisted throughout the 1990s by simply changing its insti-
tutional setting (moving from the committee rooms to the plenum itself),
whereas the decreasing number of laws approved in the permanent commit-
tees has been matched by an almost equivalent increase in the number of
laws approved by assemblies with oversized majorities.47 The fact is that,
given the internal rules and institutionalised practices, the adversarial
dynamics within parliament can only exist when the issue in question is ideo-
logically radicalised. However, this strategy can only be pursued occasionally
by Italian governments: they are coalition executives, characterised by a series
of internal cleavages. As a result, they cannot continually constrain their
parliamentary majority to behave passively and simply follow the executive’s
guidelines. To compel parliament is a really dangerous thing, since it consti-
tutes an incentive to MPs and parliamentary groups to use all the powerful
tools their institution has at its disposal to fight government.
The incapacity of parliament to modify its internal rules and practices,
given the adversarial trend within the political context, created conditions
which favoured the demise of its historically most prominent function, the leg-
islative one. The centrality of legislation in parliamentary activity is being
challenged not only by governments but also by the processes of Europeanisa-
tion and decentralisation. Government, as we have underlined – urged into
taking the lead in the field of legislation by the external pressure of European
integration and by the legitimisation obtained under the new electoral rules –
is trying to become more autonomous with regard to legislation by governing
outside parliament. The Europeanisation and decentralisation processes conti-
nually reduce parliament’s legislative duties. The role of the European Union
in limiting the legislative sphere of parliaments is a well-known phenomenon;
it is worth remembering that a constitutional reform, law no. 3/2001 that came
into force in October 2001, has changed the distribution of legislative powers
within the Italian political-institutional system. What we are referring to in
particular here is that this law has radically reduced the omnipotent legislative
role of parliament – sanctioned by the 1948 constitution – by reserving many
legislative duties to the regions and by establishing many policy fields where
the legislative actions of the Italian state and the regions may compete with
one another.48 The implementation of this reform has proved troublesome,
but in the next few years its effects will be increasingly felt.
The role of the Italian Parliament as ‘almighty Legislator’ has therefore
been significantly curtailed since the beginning of the 1980s as a result of
the pressure exercised by the above-mentioned dynamics.
CONCLUSION
The so-called ‘Italian transition’ of the 1990s had a profound impact on

parliament, albeit often of a quite unexpected kind. Many external changes
forced it to modify its role and performance, but as usually happens when a
well-established institution is under strain, parliament tried to resist by adapt-
ing in order to maintain its specific, historically rooted patterns of behaviour
and internal principles. The chief prize at stake has been parliament’s
central institutionalised role within the political system, and its formal and
substantial prerogatives in the legislative process. The political trend urged
the parliamentary institution to adjust to the much-invoked bi-polar dynamics,
which basically meant the acceptance of the centrality of government in
the legislative process. At the same time, it was encouraged to change the
content and the quality of its functions, by focusing more – as Bagehot
would have it – on its expressive, oversight and electoral activities rather
than on its legislative functions. Parliament was thus asked to change its
institutional identity radically – its deeply consolidated internal practices
dating back to the age of liberalism. Above all, traditional patterns of
behaviour (culturally reproduced within assemblies), challenged by external
changes, included the absence of a clear majority/opposition divide; the
lack of any strong institutional tools favouring the prominence of government
within parliament;and the consensual decisional style.
Did parliament respond positively to those demands? The data and facts
presented in this article point to a rather contradictory, ambiguous situation.
The impression one gets is that parliament experienced serious difficulty in
adapting to external pressures, and the strategy it has adopted has been
merely a defensive one. The clearest evidence of this is the continuous
reform of standing orders, which has proved incapable of creating the con-
ditions needed for the executive to be capable of governing in parliament.
In fact, the procedural innovations introduced since the 1980s have been
designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the legislative
process – perceived as the most important function of parliament – without
actually providing government with reliable agenda and procedural powers.
Strong parliamentary resistance to the majoritarian trend has forced the gov-
ernment into looking for other ways of governing: for example, by legislating
outside of the ordinary process. This shift from a horizontal relationship
between parliament and government to a vertical one has led assemblies to
strengthen the oversight function, as shown by the sudden, noticeable rise in
the use of guidance and control devices, and by the provision of more parlia-
mentary advice regarding governmental acts and regulations. Thus, the control
and legislative functions have been counterbalanced to some degree, although
this has happened in a rather indirect, under-formalised way.
However, this re-balancing has occurred at the same time as a reduction in
the electoral function, both because of the popular legitimisation of the
prime minister requested by political parties, and by the persistence of
extra-parliamentary practices in the formation of executives. Furthermore,
expressive performance has continued to be rated very low, proof of the
substantial distance that persists between parliament and public opinion.
The considerable institutional ‘viscosity’ of parliament has prevented it
from actively adapting to environmental pressures, and has limited it to
simply reacting to them in order to preserve traditional values and practices
together with the consensual decisional style, which are in fact the constitutive
elements of its institutional identity. But the absence of a conscious, proactive
strategy has weakened its resistance. The final result is a strange mix of old
and new practices and dynamics, which have yet to come together in any
coherent order.
The Italian Parliament has lost the traditional role it previously played in
the political system, even though it still remains a powerful institution,
capable of conditioning – albeit in a mainly negative way – the legislative
process and the survival of executives – as shown by the political events
of the Thirteenth legislature and the first few months of the Fourteenth
legislature. Thus, in order to keep up with current developments, the Italian
Parliament needs to redirect its role and accept what appears to be the trend
in most advanced parliamentary democracies: in other words, the sharing of
the legislative function by many institutions located at different systemic
levels, a function that can no longer remain a prerogative of parliament
(or of the governmental/parliamentary sub-system).
However, the Italian Parliament seems to be valiantly resisting this
trend, as a result both of its institutional history and of several contradictions
emerging within existing political forces; forces which sometimes appear to be
only superficially oriented in a majoritarian direction.49 So even if parliament
is undoubtedly a player searching for a script, there are no guarantees it will
find a new one.
NOTES
1. See L. Morlino, Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis. Parties, Groups, and Citizens
in Southern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). We do in fact exclude those
‘severe tests’ which require a single or double alternation in government, as this would
lead us to label ‘Italian democracy “unconsolidated” [at least until 1996, which] would be
unenlightening and extravagant’ (G. Di Palma, ‘Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalisa-
tion: A Minimalist View’, in U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic
Consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp.36–7).
2. M. Cotta, ‘The “Centrality” of Parliament in a Protracted Democratic Consolidation: The
Italian Case’, in Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in
Southern Europe, p.55.
3. We could add the increasing competencies of the European Union and the effects of the
subsidiarity principle, both of which reduce the autonomy of national parliaments, but they
would not be particular to Italy.
4. G.T. di Lampedusa, Il Gattopardo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1958).
5. W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: Watts, 1964 [1867]). For a different, but par-
tially overlapping distinction, see P. Norton, ‘The House of Commons’, in B. Jones et al.
(eds.), Politics in the UK (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000).
6. Bagehot, The English Constitution, p.151.
7. Bagehot, The English Constitution, p.153
8. Source: Senato della Repubblica, ‘Il Dibattito interno sul bilancio’, I quaderni delle informa-
zioni parlamentari (Roma: Camera dei deputati, July 2001; www.camera.it).
9. See M. Rush, ‘The Pay, Allowances, Services and Facilities of Legislators in Eighteen
Countries and the European Parliament: A Comparative Survey’, Report No. 38: Review of
Parliamentary Pay and Allowances, vol.II (London: HMSO, 1996), pp.47– 52.
10. For instance, this is the case of more than 60 per cent of the staff in the Chamber, where there
are about 300 workers and 400 ushers.
11. The staff within these units represent less than seven per cent of total staff. The clerks and top
officials involved account for about ten per cent.
12. The majority of graduate jobs – with the exception of technical posts such as those of
librarians or statisticians – are those of ‘consigliere giuridico’ (legal advisor). The written
and oral tests in the open competition for access to those positions cover the following
areas: parliamentary, constitutional, administrative, trade, civil, international and labour
law; Italian history and political economics. For the few positions of ‘consigliere economico’
(economic advisor) the tests obviously cover economic subjects as well as parliamentary and
constitutional law and Italian history.
13. See P. Norton, ‘The Legislative Powers of Parliament’, in C. Flinterman, A.W. Hering and
L. Waddington (eds.), The Evolving Role of Parliaments in Europe (Aperldoorn: Maklu,
1994), pp.15–32; P. Norton, ‘Introduction: The Institution of Parliaments’, in P. Norton
(ed.), Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1998),
pp.1–15; G.W. Copeland and S.C. Patterson, ‘Parliaments in the Twenty-first Century’, in
G.W. Copeland and S.C. Patterson (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World (Ann Arbor,
MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.1–11.
14. V. Lippolis, ‘Maggioranza, opposizione e governo nei regolamenti e nelle prassi parlamentari
dell’età repubblicana’, in L. Violante (ed.), Il Parlamento (Torino: Einaudi, 2001), pp.613–
58; M.L. Mazzoni Honorati, ‘Il procedimento legislativo’, in S. Labriola (ed.), Il Parlamento
repubblicano (Milano: Giuffrè, 1999), pp.246–76. The main features of those standing orders
were: the absence of any planning of the legislative process; the lack of special treatment for
government in the law-making process; the absence of instruments with which to control
obstructionist behaviour; favouring the secret ballot.
15. G. Floridia and S. Sicardi, ‘Le relazioni tra governo-maggioranza- opposizione nella prassi e
nell’evoluzione regolamentare e legislativa’, Quaderni Costituzionali, 11/2 (1991), pp.225–89.
16. The following data clarify this point: Fifth legislature (1968–72): 69 decree-laws were
submitted to parliament; Sixth (1972–76): 124; Seventh (1976–79): 167; Eighth
(1979–83): 275; Ninth (1983–87): 307; Tenth (197–92): 466; Eleventh (1992–94) 490;
Twelfth (1994–96): 735; Thirteenth (1996–2001): 487. Source: Camera dei Deputati,
www.camera.it.
17. The standing orders were radically changed a total of seven times (in 1981, 1983, 1986, 1987,
1988 and 1990) in the Chamber and three times (1982, 1985 and 1988) in the Senate.
18. Till 1988, the secret ballot was compulsory for the final voting of each bill in the Chamber of
Deputies, whereas it was discretionary in the Senate. These rules favoured the phenomenon of
the so-called ‘franchi tiratori’, MPs voting against party lines mostly in order to protect sec-
toral or individual privileges and interests. After the reform of 1988, which drastically reduced
its use, the secret ballot is applied only for cases concerning individuals; it is optional on
matters regarding constitutional freedom’s right of citizens and minorities, parliamentary
standing orders, electoral laws and laws on constitutional bodies (parliament, government,
constitutional court and the President of the Republic).
19. This change concerns the Chamber, while the Senate maintains the unanimity principle.
20. In the Senate, a new internal administrative structure was established in 2001, precisely
designed to support the assembly in improving the quality of legislation, while some of the
functions handled by the Committee for Legislation in the Chamber are in the hands of the
Constitutional Affairs Committee.
21. This advice is compulsory in the case of decree and delegating laws.
22. At the beginning of the Fourteenth legislature there are 14 bicameral committees. Two are
constitutionally provided (on the regional issues and on the authorisations to proceed
against MPs investigated by the judiciary). Six have a control, oversight and vigilance role
(for instance the Television Committee). Four play a consultancy role (as is the case, for
example, of the Committee on Administrative Reform). Two are in charge of investigation
(regarding the mafia and waste recycling).
23. See, for instance, Stefano Ceccanti, ‘Regolamenti parlamentari: un altro tassello di una
riforma strisciante’, in Quaderni Costituzionali, 18/1 (1998), pp.157–72; L. Lanzalaco, ‘Il
nuovo regolamento della Camera: una risorsa dopo la Bicamerale’, Il Mulino, 379 (1998),
pp.882– 93; A. Palanza, ‘La perdita dei confini: le nuove procedure interistituzionali nel Par-
lamento italiano’, in Violante (ed.), Il Parlamento, pp.1211–60.
24. See L. Verzichelli in this volume.
25. T. Saalfeld, ‘Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency Relations
and Problems of Oversight’, European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), pp.353–76.
26. See M. Cotta, ‘Il sotto-sistema governo-parlamento’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 17/2
(1987), pp.241– 83.
27. From 1996 onwards, the bipolar electoral competition has in fact eroded away much of par-
liament’s discretionary power to select its government, thus partially turning general legisla-
tive elections into the investiture of a coalition and prime minister. The rhetoric of popular
sovereignty considered a major element of stability in the much-admired German political
system, even views a constructive vote of no-confidence, as a sort of betrayal of the citizens’
will, labelling it in a disparaging way as a ‘ribaltone’ (U-turn).
28. That is, the ratio between the actual duration of a government and its potential maximum
duration, in percentage terms. This kind of index has several shortcomings when
calculated for the second, third, etc. government of each legislature, but is of significance
and comparative value when applied to the first one (as we have done). For these indicators,
see W. Müller and K. Strøm (eds.), Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), and, especially, the chapter written by L. Verzichelli and
M. Cotta, ‘Italy: From “Constrained” Coalitions to Alterning Governments?’ pp.433–97.
29. A further example is represented by the troublesome replacement of two junior ministers
(Justice and Culture) and two central senior ministers (Home and Foreign Affairs) in the
first year of the present Berlusconi government: something that goes well beyond the usual
reshuffles of Westminster democracies because of the harsh political disputes in the parlia-
ment and within the majority itself.
30. MPs were in the main not discouraged by the risk of an early election, since the standard result
of a lost confidence motion always used to be the formation of another government (probably
of the same sort), some type of reshuffling of ministerial positions, and the deadlock of the
undesired policy.
31. We here distinguish guidance instruments – such as motions, orders of the day and resolutions
– from control instruments – as interpellations and oral or written questions. The first ones try to
bind ex ante the executive to some sort of goal or programme which may be extremely specific
or quite general, whereas the second ones normally require an ex post explanation of events,
governmental behaviours and attitudes, or (lack of) policy implementation.
32. As perceived by M. Wiberg in ‘Parliamentary Questioning: Control by Communication?’ in
H. Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1995), pp.179–222. Italy is the only European country retaining the complete array of
parliamentary questioning instruments.
33. M. Cotta and P. Isernia, Il Gigante dai Piedi d’Argilla (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996); G. Capano
and M. Giuliani, ‘Governing Without Surviving? An Italian Paradox: Law-making in Italy
1987–2001’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 7/4 (2001), pp.13–36.
34. Through the use of motions MPs propose parliamentary debates and try to bind the govern-
ment policy on certain topics, whereas resolutions are normally taken at the end of these
debates or after communications from the executive.
35. Bagehot, The English Constitution, p.153.
36. L. Morlino and M. Tarchi, ‘The Dissatisfied Society’, European Journal of Political
Research, 30 (1996), pp.41– 63.
37. G. Martinotti and S. Stefanizzi, ‘Europeans and the Nation State’, in O. Niedermayer
and R. Sinnott (eds.), Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), pp.163–89.
38. The level of government bills fell from 17.6 per cent in the Tenth legislature to 12 per cent in
the Thirteenth. Source: G. Capano and M. Giuliani (eds.), Parlamento e processo legislativo
in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001).
39. See F. Zucchini, ‘Arena elettorale, arena parlamentare e arena legislativa’, in Capano and
Giuliani (eds.), Parlamento e processo legislativo in Italia, pp.57–84.
40. See M.Giuliani and G. Capano, ‘I labirinti del legislativo’, in Capano and Giuliani (eds.),
Parlamento e processo legislativo in Italia, pp.13–50
41. For an in-depth study of the historical evolution and juridical implications of the
delegation laws see N. Lupo, ‘Le leggi delega e il parere parlamentare sugli schemi di
decreti legislativi nell’esperienza repubblicana’, in Labriola (ed.), Il Parlamento repubbli-
cano, pp.361– 423.
42. When parliament delegates to government the power to adopt legislative decrees (primary-
level regulation) in defined policy areas, in agreement with the principles established by
parliamentary act.
43. Capano and Giuliani, ‘Governing Without Surviving? An Italian Paradox: Law-Making in
Italy 1987–2001’, p.23.
44. When parliament authorises government to substitute parliamentary laws with governmental
decrees (secondary level regulation).
45. Capano and Giuliani, ‘Governing Without Surviving? An Italian Paradox: Law-Making in
Italy 1987–2001’, pp.23–7.
46. It has to be pointed out that the first months of the Fourteenth legislature seem to confirm the
‘governing outside the ordinary procedures’ strategy, since the new centre-right government
has presented numerous delegating bills in order to intervene in strategic policy sectors. This
has been the case, for instance, with educational reform, labour market reform, the procedures
to speed up the construction of important infrastructures, the reform of company law, and the
abolition of inheritance tax.
47. The figures here are in Capano and Giuliani, ‘Governing Without Surviving? An Italian
Paradox: Law-Making in Italy 1987–200’, p.20. This trend is persisting in the Fourteenth
legislature as well.
48. For a clear presentation of this point see N. Lupo, ‘Alcune riflessioni sul Parlamento alla luce
del nuovo titolo V della Costituzione’, Amministrazione in cammino, electronic journal,
www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it/.
49. For example, very often over the last years Berlusconi has spoken about returning to
proportional representation electoral law.
Much Ado about Something? Parliamentary
Politics in Italy Amid the Rhetoric of Majority
Rule and an Uncertain Party System
LUCA VERZICHELLI
This article deals with the transformation of parliamentary politics in Italy

over the last 15 years (1987 –2001) – a period that is short enough to allow
an intensive investigation to be made, yet one that has also been discontinuous
enough to tell us a number of different stories. These include: the last legisla-
tive term of the political regime which we today call the First Republic (1987 –
92); a legislature that coincided with a dramatic phase of political turmoil
(1992 – 94); another short legislature which followed the introduction of a
semi-majoritarian electoral system (1994 –96); and finally the five-year term
separating the victory of the centre-left in 1996 from the unequivocal
revenge of the centre-right alliance at the May 2001 elections.
Given the complexity of the topic, rather than explaining the longest
lasting characteristics of parliamentary practice, the purpose of the present
paper is to raise questions about its various perspectives, in the light of expec-
tations that have been nurtured during this difficult period. Since another
contribution to this volume deals with the transformation of the institutional
aspects and the relationship between parliament and government, this article
will concentrate on the problems surrounding these changes, at the level of
parliamentary representation and composition, which redefine the political
identity and institutional capabilities of the legislature. The number of politi-
cal players within parliamentary institutions will be analysed, the degree of
cohesion among them, and the various ways they have interacted during
such a delicate period of political change.
In order to reach these analytical and explanatory goals, the first section
will discuss the argument of a possible change of the parliamentary configu-
ration, moving from a brief account of the traditional patterns of parliamentary
politics in Italy. This discussion will give some food for thought, best explored
by means of empirical evidence. In the third section some data will be pre-
sented about the consolidation of the ‘new’ Italian parliamentary elites
during the 1990s. In the fourth section, the focus will be on the consolidation
of the new legislative party system.
TOWARDS A NEW FORM OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IN ITALY?
The Contradictory Image of Traditional Parliament in Italy

In line with the research tradition based on the seminal work by Nelson
Polsby concerning the US Congress,1 the outcomes of each parliamentary
activity are strongly correlated to the nature of the political confrontation
within the legislature, and to the capability of the actors operating in these
institutions to establish and consolidate a permanent, functional set of rules
and procedures. The emergence of different patterns of parliamentary politics,
namely the transformation of the functioning of parliamentary parties and the
fortification of a new, well-esteemed leadership, are necessary pre-requisites
for the definition of a ‘critical change’ in the overall configuration of a
legislative body.
To what extent, anyway, should we expect a profound change at this level
of the political system? Most of the previous studies of the Italian case give a
rather contradictory image stressing the political role of the parliamentary
arena and the weak nature of the parliament itself. During the age of the
‘First Republic’, in fact, parliament had been a central institution in terms
of constitutional prescription, and the parliamentary arena had always been
of crucial importance for the rearrangement of those policy guidelines sub-
mitted by the winning parties and drafted by the cabinet ministers. Moreover,
the parliamentary elite (which in this respect could be conceived of as a
unitary actor) used to be the traditional locus for the development of all pol-
itical careers, and a decisive source of legitimisation for the more restricted
pool of political leaders. In fact, while the Communist Party used to have a
selected parliamentary leadership, rotating the candidates coming from the
middle ranks of the party apparatus, the politicians of governmental parties
saw a parliamentary career as a necessary pre-requisite to have the chance
of a ministerial appointment. More importantly, electoral performance
measured by the preference votes received used to be the decisive factor in
establishing the chances of penetrating the inner circle of the long-standing
ministers, especially among Christian Democrat ministers.2
Nevertheless, the consolidation of parliament as a central institution, and
the strengthening of the single MP’s role, was accompanied by two elements
of ‘relative’ weakness: first of all, the key historical role played by MPs in
Italy did not necessary entail a strong influence as policy-makers in the case
of all of them. One of the results of the ‘decentralisation’ process, that is,
the full legislative power given to the permanent committees by art. 72 of
the 1948 Constitution, was the poor performance offered by this consocia-
tional feature of the Italian parliamentary system, as most of the laws directly
approved by the committee were micro-distributive type bills of little rel-
evance. To adopt Di Palma’s expression, if the government did not govern
PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IN ITALY 37
well, most parliamentarians limited themselves to (political) survival; in other
words, getting the minimum payoff.
Secondly, during the entire period of the First Republic, parliamentary
party groups (PPGs) in both the Chambers were almost totally in the hands
of their respective party organisations. This was due to two reasons: the low
degree of institutionalisation of PPGs themselves as institutional bodies, and
the strong control exercised by the national party elites over the recruitment
of parliamentary candidates.
All these characteristics have been analysed in a plethora of works written
by both Italian scholars and ‘Italianists’, who, over the years, have formulated
a number of different interpretative and prescriptive hypotheses concerning
the institutionalisation of the Italian legislature. Nevertheless, the simple
argument taken as the basic starting point in this article should be accepted
by most of those authors: the radical change in the political system which
took place at the beginning of the 1990s implies great expectations in terms
of the ‘destiny’ of those features which used to make the Italian parliamentary
system both strong and at the same time ‘fragile’ from the point of view of
internal political equilibrium. In other words, the solid certainties about the
roles of the legislature and its members in Italy were suddenly disappearing,
while a very vague scenario had been opened by the political crisis of
the 1990s.
The Breakdown of the Old Party System

The first feature connected to these expectations is the dramatic fate of the
‘historical’ party system, which was almost totally removed between the elec-
tions of April 1992 (when the Northern League entered the parliament, with a
consistent number of representatives), and those of March 1994, when the
new-born party of Forza Italia gained about 25 per cent of the votes. In par-
ticular, it was the first election ruled by a semi-majoritarian electoral system
(1994) to produce the decisive collapse of the old party actors: the crisis
was particularly violent within the governmental parties – the Christian
Democracy, the Socialist Party and their minor partners, the Liberal Party,
the Republican Party and the Social Democrats, which suddenly collapsed
after two years of political turmoil and hundreds of legal actions brought
against their most prominent leaders. On the other hand, the two ‘excluded
poles’ – the heir to the strong Communist Party on the left, and the Italian
Social Movement, which embodied the Fascist ideological tradition on
the right – were in a sense ‘miraculously resuscitated’ by the political
conjuncture, since they could now take advantage in the short term of
the abrupt de-legitimisation of their traditional ‘governmental’ opponents.
Nonetheless, their reintegration was subordinated to an exhausting process
of restoration, which led to significant divisions, and to a remarkable turnover

of the political elite.
The second systemic change which has marked the last 15 years is the
recurrent use of the rhetoric of majority rule: in turn, many promoters,
second-line politicians trying to survive the breakdown of their respective
parties, leaders of interest groups, economic elites and the media have under-
lined the need to transform the Italian parliamentary democracy into a ‘major-
itarian regime’. Most of these requests assumed that an automatic inverse
correlation had to exist between the parliamentary centrality established by
the 1948 Constitution and the weakness of a responsible core executive,
thus explaining the disappointing performance of Italian democracy.
All the attempts at reforming the Italian institutions during the last decades
have been guided by a very unclear idea of what ‘majoritarian’ democracy is,
and in any case have proved incapable of affecting either the institutional
structure of parliamentary democracy or the internal set of rules and pro-
cedures in both Chambers.3 After all, the two main factors of the transform-
ation of parliamentary politics (the 1993 mixed-majoritarian system and the
extraordinary degree of parliamentary turnover) were somehow provoked
by the situation ‘outside’ the parliamentary arena, namely the phase of
political chaos occurring during the Eleventh legislature (April 1992 –March
1994). In particular, it is important to remember here that (1) the referendum
movement active between 1991 and 1993 promoted the two popular votes
abrogating some parts of the previous electoral legislation, and thus forced
the parliament to produce immediately a new electoral law; (2) the explosion
of the old party system and the emergence (especially in the central sector of
the political spectrum) of a number of new forces engaged in a time-consuming
process of realignment could start only when a strong judiciary action (the
so-called clean hands operation) led to the accusation of illegal party financing
for most of the top party leaders of all the governmental parties and, to a lesser
extent, of the traditional communist opposition.
Questions and Propositions

The arguments above lead us to confirm that a significant change has taken
place in recent Italian parliamentary politics, but they also seem to indicate
the need to test the implications of such a change by means of more reliable
empirical analyses.
A first cognitive problem that emerges here concerns the real extent of
change produced by the new electoral rules and the new legislative party
system. If one looks to all the political indicators, it is easy to note that the
introduction of the mixed-majoritarian rule was the only ‘certain’ innovation
during the crucial period of crisis regarding the legitimisation of the whole
political class. All the other rearrangements have been cancelled or postponed
(for instance, the changes of parliamentary rules of procedures) to the day-to-
day parliamentary life of the subsequent period.
The first question, therefore, concerns the development of a ‘Westminster-
like’ model of democracy during such an atypical intra-democratic transition
period: to what extent does the sudden application of a (quasi) majoritarian
solution to the rules of parliamentary formation entail a significant move
towards the consolidation of an ‘adversarial’ arrangement of parliamentary
life? Here, the adjective ‘adversarial’ basically means the introduction of a
clear-cut divide between majority and opposition, and the emergence of a
relative degree of unification of the parliamentary elite on both sides of the
political spectrum.
The second question concerns an interpretative problem involving the
timing of the change: is there an impact because of the prolonged political
crisis, on the degree of substantive change of parliamentary politics in
Italy? According to the theories that have emerged from the observation of
democratic experiences in the Mediterranean area,4 we can imagine that the
time variable plays a relevant role in reproducing compromises and ‘less revo-
lutionary’ points of equilibrium between political elites, interests and insti-
tutions. An uncertain and prolonged time of change, therefore, would
influence the process of realignment, pushing both new and established
players towards satisfactory compromises, modernising without destroying
the existing set of parliamentary procedures. In other words, the more a
(quasi) majoritarian model imposed by bottom-up pressure is long and uncer-
tain, the less radical (at least compared with what was pre-announced) its
impact on the practice of parliamentary democracy. This would mark a
clear difference between the Italian transition of the 1990s and the case of
intra-democratic transition normally compared to it, that is the passage from
the IV to the V Republic in France, where the ‘majoritarian change’ took
place much more rapidly.
Of course, such general questions require a complete analysis of parlia-
mentary transformation in Italy, which would take much more time and
space than has been possible to give to the preparation of the present
article. For the moment, we are limited to testing two simpler propositions
that, if confirmed, would provide further indications about the nature of
parliamentary change in Italy. Both propositions pertain to the structural
features that have been used to classify different parliamentary practices
within a historical framework of transformation.5 The first is linked to the
concept of the consolidation of the core of law-makers, and can be articulated
as follows:
The replacement of the old parliamentary elite and the turbulence within
the party system have pointed more to an incremental process of
adaptation rather than any dramatic change in parliamentary recruit-

ment, the main results of which are a more flexible and controlled
system of parliamentary recruitment, and a compromise between old
features and new representative symbols of the ‘majoritarian era’.
The second proposition, concerning the concept of partyness of parliament
can be expressed as follows:
The partial introduction of majoritarian rule, within the context of per-
sisting fragmentation of the party system, has led to the establishment of
a twin speed functioning of parliamentary politics: the ‘majoritarian
scenario’ takes place during and immediately after the elections, to be
followed by a more ‘transformative’ process during the subsequent
phases of the legislature.
A discussion of these propositions, in the final part of the paper, will help
to shed some light on what is a chaotic game whereby a plurality of players
(individual representatives, parties, alliances) encounter a highly changeable
set of opportunities (strategies and ways of entering the core of the political
class) which lead to a rather fluctuating scenario in terms of parliamentary
practice. This is probably the game being played at present within Italian
parliamentary politics: however, in order to deal with the rules and constraints
of such a game, and thus to imagine its likely duration, we first need to analyse
the available data.
AFTER THE 1980s: THE SLOW RE-CONSOLIDATION OF THE

ITALIAN PARLIAMENT 6
What Degree of Consolidation? The Difficult Rise of a New Elite

The political crisis that emerged at the end of the 1980s, and the changes in the
international scenario had a number of very important consequences, includ-
ing the radical renewal of the political class in Italy. The key indicator of this
renewal was the sudden removal of hundreds of experienced ‘national repre-
sentatives’ from within the parliamentary arena: in 1992, the percentage of
parliamentary newcomers had already increased to its highest rate since the
first democratic election following the end of the Second World War; the
1994 elections marked an astonishing peak of change, a very uncommon
one within the context of democratic continuity.7 Figure 1 provides unques-
tionable evidence of the magnitude of the changes that took place during
the most critical phase of the transition period. This phenomenon is obviously
connected with the unexpected breakdown of the pre-existing party system.8
Nonetheless, even during the following years, the degree of turnover remained
at around 40 per cent, that is about ten percentage points higher than the
FIGURE 1
THE SENIORITY OF ITALIAN MPs (1987 – 2001)
Source: CIRCaP – Siena.
‘normal’ rate during the 1950– 90 period. The early election of 1996, called
only 25 months after Berlusconi’s first victory in March 1994, reduced the
absolute rate of newcomers, but it did not increase the percentage of MPs
with any real parliamentary seniority.9 In other words, the ‘fresh men’
seemed to have difficulty in penetrating the core of the political system or,
perhaps, many of them were not interested in utilising parliament to maximise
their political influence. This seems to point to a quite different approach from
that adopted in the past, when parliamentary success was considered a
‘normal’ goal for careerist politicians, especially among the governmental
parties.
In many respects, the 2001 elections could be considered the finale of this
process of transformation, but Figure 1 clearly shows how different the
configuration of the current parliamentary elite is from the one observed
prior to the big bang in Italian politics: the degree of difference can easily
be summarised as follows: ten per cent fewer senior members than in 1987,
ten per cent more newcomers than at that time.
Why has the process of consolidation within this elite group proved so
difficult? The answer to this question depends upon a number of variables.
These include certain factors related to the political conjuncture of the
1990s: the ‘violent’ crisis demolishing the entire leadership of the five
parties which had been in government for 40 years; the ‘invasion’ of the
political scene by other elite groups (in particular, judges, economic elites
and the media) and the nature, to some extent ‘improvised’, of the two
forces capable of gathering most of the electoral power previously held by
the old government parties. In fact, the Northern League, an innovative
example of a territorially based movement, had to face very relevant
changes in its parliamentary representations, both because of the oscillating
electoral outcomes10 and the several cases of individual defections from
MPs who did not accepted the strategic lines taken by the leader Umberto
Bossi. Moreover, the party of Forza Italia, founded by Silvio Berlusconi,
whose character as a private or firm party is still being strongly debated,
was initially recruiting a considerable number of managers, industrialists,
journalists and well known professionals, but most of them preferred to
leave politics after a short personal engagement.
Besides the explanations provided by the political conjuncture and the
complexity of the Italian crisis, we can conceive of at least two ‘systemic’
factors underlying the flexibility of the recent parliamentary elite. The first,
related to the reintroduction of a single-member constituency system,11 is
the opportunity for a more ‘open’ process of parliamentary selection, where
the traditional selectors (the parties) have to take into account a variable
like candidates’ visibility in society.
This idea, which was one of the corollaries of the pro-majoritarian rhetoric
in some way supported by new ad hoc regulations of electoral campaigns and
personal responsibility of candidates, leads to the promotion of several ‘begin-
ners’ from different areas of civil society, who may have a good chance of
entering the parliamentary arena, whilst maintaining a clear distance from
the idea of a real political career.
The second factor that makes the new parliamentary elite both more inno-
vative and weaker than in the past is the absence of any real alternative model
of parliamentary recruitment. No doubt the decline of party machines, not just
in terms of political mobilisation but with regard to their ability to establish a
large ‘pool’ of parliamentary aspirants, has made room for the emergence of
some ‘bottom-up’ processes of parliamentary selection. On the other hand,
control over the appointment of candidates for the single-member constituen-
cies remains in the hands of the national party elites, and no party, since the
introduction of the semi-majoritarian system, has experienced a more
transparent mode of candidate selection. The main result of all these factors
seems to be, at least for the time being, a process which is still dominated
by a few players (the leaderships of the main national parties). However,
the comparison with the past reveals a more ‘randomised’ exit: once the
coalition summit has allocated each single constituency to one of the parties,
and after the parties have expressed their ‘natural’ candidates, the possibility
to express a veto by local party notables, other parties of the coalition and/or
the most important interest groups operating in each constituency, can in
fact determine different outcomes.
This random character particularly emerges when electoral competition is
not bi-polar (as was the case in 1994), or when the excessive fragmentation
within one of the coalitions encourages the use of ‘transversal’12 candidates
(as in both the centre-right coalition in 1994 and the centre-left one in 1996).
What Form does Consolidation Take? Representing both Old and New
As has been stated before, the large-scale reorganisation of parliamentary poli-
tics probably came to an end after the 2001 elections, opening another ques-
tion about the real meaning of that change. The first tests carried out using
empirical data13 support the theory of the emergence of certain partial
changes: on the one hand, the new elite is capable of embodying the clear
continuity with the ruling class which used to be the key player up until the
mid-1980s. On the other hand, the same elite seems to be much ‘closer’ to
a considerably changed civil society, where the early 1990s’ criticism of a
‘blind-delegation’ to the party organisations remains, and the idea of talking
about electoral platforms is more frequent than in the past.
Let us first examine the signs of continuity. If non-political backgrounds,
age at election and gender have never really deviated from the traditional
trend, the political backgrounds of Italian MPs radically changed during the
crisis years. However, after the 2001 election the elite profile returned to
the same level of political expertise observed during the early 1980s. This
meant that all the novice politicians who emerged during the transitional
phase were quickly replaced by more experienced people, trained either
within political organisations or in local government administrations.
Figure 2 shows that the percentage of parliamentarians with a non-party
background (and therefore recruited on the basis of alternative requirements)
fell to less than 30 per cent, that is, the same level as in the 1980s, where a
significant number of non-party candidates had been recruited by the national
parties in order to ‘modernise’ their parliamentary forces. With regard to local
representative experiences (Figure 3), the return of this factor is even more
significant given that more than two-thirds of elected MPs show such previous
experience.
Another factor leads us to interpret the consolidation of the parliamentary
elite as an implication towards the direction of continuity: the political begin-
nings of a large majority of current MPs lies with the same political parties that
suddenly disappeared between 1992 and 1994. With the sole exception of the
Northern League’s personnel, whose recruitment still reflects its origins as an
anti-establishment organisation, having no connections with the previous
elite system, all the other parliamentary groups have some reason to define
FIGURE 2
MPs WITH NO PARTY EXPERIENCE 1987 – 2001 (%)
themselves (or to be defined by their detractors) as the heirs of some traditional

party or other. The connection can easily be found at the two extremes: the
democratic left and, to a large extent, the party of Rifondazione Comunista
(the Re-founded Communist Party) emerged from the old Communist Party,
FIGURE 3
MPs WITH NO LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE 1987 – 2001 (%)

while the right-wing National Alliance is the successor to the old Italian Social
Movement. The Christian Democratic legacy has been divided among various
parties situated on both the majoritarian coalitions, while the parliamentary
group of Forza Italia represents, at the same time, a contradictory mix of con-
tinuity and discontinuity. In fact, if the parliamentarians from Mr Berlusconi’s
party are generally the less experienced and the less well-connected to a party
background, the leadership of Forza Italia is composed mainly of long-
standing politicians with different political backgrounds. The figures show
that there has been a gradual return of former Christian Democratic
members (even) to this party. However, the presence among Forza Italia’s
MPs of people coming from very different political tendencies (liberals,
socialists, radicals, and even leftist personalities converted by the ‘End of
History’ thesis) leads us to think that a fairly innovative method of parliamentary
recruitment is used by this party.
After the 2001 elections, about 70 per cent of deputies and senators were
former members of (at least) one of the parties from the First Republic. In
other words, the need to represent the ‘New World’ does not appear to
hinder a certain deference to old principles and to the recruitment of people
whose political background dates back to before the majoritarian age.
Then how is this new world to be represented? An analysis of occupational
background is an effective instrument, since it grasps those long and mid-term
changes concealing the most important historical turning-points in the practice
of modern representation.14
From this point of view, the radical change in parliamentary representation
in Italy seems to have already happened before the upheaval in the party
system. The profile of the 1987 legislature reflects the main traits of compara-
tive trends,15 that is to say, an increase in the public sector representation, a
partial reduction in the number of traditional lawyers in politics and a sizeable
reduction in full-time politicians and trade union functionaries.
Fifteen years later, the aggregate data tell us exactly the same story: those
MPs with a ‘public sector’ background oscillate between 30 per cent and 40
per cent (Figure 4). On the other hand, the breakdown by majoritarian
coalitions shows a clear inclination of the centre-left cartel to promote these
social categories, while the centre-right is much more ‘privately oriented’.
The significant shift between the occupational origins of left and right MPs,
therefore, breaks with the tradition of homogeneity of social and occupational
profiles observed between the largest governmental party (the DC) and the
largest opposition party (the PCI) until 1987.
Nonetheless, a limit to this ‘majoritarian’ character soon emerges, if we
analyse more detailed information and conduct a more exact party break-
down.16 In fact, it is easy to see that intra-bloc fluidity is much more
evident than it was 20 years ago, and that the backgrounds of the MPs
FIGURE 4
MPs WITH PUBLIC SECTOR OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND 1987 – 2001 (%)
within the same cartel are sometimes at odds: on the centre-left, for instance,
MPs from post-communist parties are still mainly full-time politicians, while
academics and higher civil servants predominate in the moderate parties. In
the centre-right, many from the AN’s MPs come from the legal profession,
while artisans and small-scale entrepreneurs dominate the Northern League;
Forza Italia’s MPs, on the other hand, come from a variety of different pro-
fessional and business backgrounds.
THE PARTYNESS OF PARLIAMENT TOWARDS AN

‘INDIVIDUALIST’ LEGISLATIVE STYLE?
This section verifies the second proposition illustrated above, concerning the
nature of the partyness of parliamentary institutions. However, we first need
to understand the degree of fragmentation of the new legislative party system
together with the changes in the relationships between the external party organ-
isations and the parliamentary factions, before and after the 1990s crisis in Italy.
Our term of reference is the nature of legislative parties during the 40 years
prior to 1987, which could be defined as strong yet bound by the powerful
nature of external organisations.17 Studies of this period usually emphasise
the relative weakness of parliamentary party groups (PPGs), focusing on the
insufficient degree of discipline characterising the legislative behaviours of
MPs elected by governmental parties. The adjective ‘relative’ refers to the
differences among the patterns of legislative discipline characterising each
PPG: it is widely known that the absolute discipline within the Communist
group was very different from the Christian Democratic model, characterised
by a high degree of internal conflict – encouraged by the secret vote (the
predominant voting rule until 1988) – and thus by the action of Franc
tireurs. On the other hand, the continuity of each parliamentary group was
never in question, and a certain control over the legislative behaviour of
their affiliates could be assured by all party organisations. This leads us to
classify the rather complex case of the Christian Democratic PPG as an
example of party faction predominance, internally divided but still strongly
linked to the party organisation.18
This parliamentary framework can be seen as a very peculiar one with the
context of Southern European democratic experience, since it allowed for the
establishment of the practice of consociationism for a lengthy period between
1948 and 1985,19 whilst on the other hand guaranteeing an amazing degree of
continuity with parliamentary practice.
So, what kind of changes can be seen at this level of analysis after the mid-
1980s and, above all, after the introduction of the mixed-majoritarian electoral
system?
Tables 1 and 2, which summarise the political composition of the
Chambers, and Figure 5 provide a highly enlightening picture of the fragmen-
tation of the legislative party system in both Chambers of the Italian Parliament,
between 1948 and 2001 using, instead of the mere number of PPGs actually
formed at the beginning of each parliamentary period, the effective number
of parliamentary groups. That is, a weighted measure considering the distri-
bution of seats among the different groups.20 In particular, it shows the sharp
increase of fragmentation between 1992 and 2001. During the second half of
the 1980s, parliamentary fragmentation was already on the increase due to a
variety of different factors. First of all, the traditional concentration of seats
in the hands of the two major parties had been seriously challenged: by compar-
ing the data for the 1983 and 1987 elections with the situation in 1979, we can
see that the seats held by PCI and DC fell from more than 72 per cent in both
Chambers to an average of 65 per cent (Senate) and 62 per cent (Lower
Chamber) during the1980s. The increasing consensus of the Socialists and
the success of the Republican Party in 1983 were the reasons behind this
new pattern of distribution among the traditional parties.
The second factor underlying this increasing fragmentation was the mate-
rialisation of some small parliamentary players challenging the traditional
structure of the legislative party system. In 1983 some deputies elected
from the PCI list formed the independent left group in the Lower Chamber,
thus repeating what had already happened in the Senate since 1976. In
1987, the group of the Greens was formed in the Lower Chamber, due to
the rule of procedure stating that some MPs elected from the same list and
TABLE 1
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY GROUPS IN THE ITALIAN LOWER CHAMBER
(1987 – 2001)
1987 1992 1994 1996 2001
Proletarian Democracy 8
Re-founded Communism 35 39 35 11
Communist Party 157
Democratic Left Party 107 172 137
Federation of Left 143
Independent Left 20
Greens 13 16
La Rete Democratic Net 12
Radicals 12 6
Socialist Party 94 92
Social Democrats 17 16
Republican Party 21 27
Italian Renewal 26
Popular Party 33 67 80
Christian Democracy 234 206
Christian Democratic Centre 27 30 40
Northern League 55 117 59 30
Liberal party 11 17
Forza Italia 113 123 178
National Alliance 92 99
Italian Social Movement 35 34 109
Mixed group 8 7 49 26 41
representing a nationwide organised party could form a PPG without reaching

the threshold required to form a new group (20 deputies).
Using a similar interpretation of the standing orders, the Radicals obtained
a sufficient number of senators to form their own groups in both the Chambers.
Finally, in 1992, two completely new parties, the Northern League and the
Network (Movement for Democracy), entered parliament and formed their
own groups.
The revolutionary outcomes of the 1994 elections marked the beginning of
a new era for the Italian legislative party system: the completely renewed pol-
itical scenario was characterised by an extraordinary degree of political
instability,21 but also by a considerable uncertainty over the ‘use’ of PPGs.
In fact, some attempts to merge different parties into federative PPGs, or at
least to co-ordinate the groups belonging to the same majoritarian cartel,
were made over the years. Nonetheless, the prevalent tendency remained
that of maintaining autonomous party groups (or political components
within the mixed/residual groups, in the case of the small number of MPs
attached to a given party that did not allow them to form a new PPG). The
figure shows that the most impressive increase in PPGs affected the Senate,
TABLE 2
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY GROUPS IN THE ITALIAN SENATE (1987 – 2001)
1987 1992 1994 1996 2001
Re-founded Communism 20 19 11
Communist Party 85
Democratic Left Party 66 99 65
Federation of Left 76
Independent Left 17
Greens 13 14 10
Radicals 6
Socialist Party 45 51 10
Social Democrats 7 12
Republican Party 9
Italian Renewal 11
Popular Party 34 31 41
Christian Democracy 127 112
Regional Autonomies 10
Christian Democratic Centre 12 15 29
Unified Christian Democrats 10
Northern League 25 60 27 17
Liberal Party
Forza Italia 36 47 82
National Alliance 44 45
Italian Social Movement 16 16 48
Mixed group 12 24 19 15 25
where some ‘occasional’ groups emerged thanks to the relatively low

threshold (ten senators) required for the formation of a new group. Overall,
the degree of fragmentation among PPGs between 1992 and 2001 is impress-
ive, as one can see in counting the real number of groups formed in parliament:
in fact, after the 1992 elections they reach the peak of 13 (in the Lower
Chamber) and eight (in the Senate). At the beginning of the three ‘semi-
majoritarian’ legislatures the first figure fell slightly, while in the Senate
eight or nine groups remained.
Political uncertainty and the competition in each majoritarian cartel
between at least two large parties lead to a significant degree of dispersion
of seats among the PPGs. Thus, the number of actual groups has been con-
siderably higher than the average for the previous decades, returning to a
‘normal’ level in 2001, of about 5.3 in the Lower Chamber and 6.3 in the
Senate. In other words, the competitive parliament model of the1980s,
based upon several parties but strongly concentrated around the role of very
few of them,22 is replaced with a less competitive parliament where, especially
during the most chaotic phase of transition, the four largest PPGs hardly
accounted for 75 per cent of seats.
FIGURE 5
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES IN ITALY (1948 – 2001)
The measure we have used in Figure 5, the effective number of parliamen-

tary groups, is generally a reduced measure of the fragmentation, in compari-
son with the real (absolute) number of PPGs. Moreover, it considers the unit of
analysis to be the groups that are officially formed according to the rules of pro-
cedures of the Chambers, not the party components within the mixed group,
which are today recognised as autonomous actors in parliamentary agenda-
setting and have access to some of the benefits and resources provided by
the same rules. Thirdly, the measure cannot control the actual fragmentation
which denotes some ‘federative’ PPG (the case of the federate left in 1994)
or some highly factionalised parliamentary party.23 At the end of the story,
this important measure has to be considered just like a sort of ‘minimal’
figure indicating the pattern of competition and fragmentation within the par-
liamentary arena after the introduction of a more majoritarian rule.
The increase in the number of PPGs after the introduction of a majoritarian
electoral system does not necessarily imply the failure of a ‘coherent’ adver-
sarial dynamic between the groups ‘in government’ and those located within
the opposition. At first sight, of course, it seems that the ‘majoritarian’ parlia-
ment in Italy is quite different from our image of a ‘Westminster-like’ world.
From this point of view, the 2001 elections seem to mark a possible end to the
instability and the consolidation of a new system, characterised by a less dis-
persive form of distribution and a relatively stable connection with nation-
wide, outside organisations. Four of them in particular can be considered to
represent the bi-polar structure of the new party system: Forza Italia and the
National Alliance hold most of the seats of the centre-right majority (sup-
ported by the minor groups of the Northern League and the Unified Christian
Democrats), while the Democratic Left and the newly founded Margherita
(the Daisy) represent almost all the opposition seats, since the Re-founded
Communist Party presence has been significantly reduced.24
The calculation of the absolute or effective number of groups (or parties) is
not the only element in the analysis of legislative partyness during these times
of change. In fact, in order to test the theory that a majoritarian system should
lead to a stricter and more coherent regulation of party discipline, we have to
examine the evolution of parliamentary politics in the midst of elections and
after the initial setting up of the groups. From this point of view, there can be
no doubt that the initial impact made by the new electoral rules has been rather
delusive for the supporters of the Westminster-like system. In fact, during the
Twelfth and Thirteenth legislatures (1994 – 2001), more than 20 per cent of the
parliamentarians in both the Lower Chamber and the Senate shifted from one
group to another or were forced to dissolve their group because the desertion
of other members had reduced the number of affiliates below the legal
minimum. The members of some new groups formed during the course of
these legislatures changed their political affiliation from one side of the major-
itarian competition to another, and in a few cases, individual coalition hoppers
elected in single-member constituency by one of the two main cartels, decided
to move across to the other side.
What does all this disorder mean? Was it that Italy was simply going
through a prolonged period of transition involving an extremely slow
process of party system and parliamentary institutionalisation, or that indivi-
dualism and opportunism are about to emerge as systemic features of the new
regime? The history of European democracies gives several examples of fluid-
ity in the composition of parliamentary groups, and this phenomenon has been
particularly frequent in the Mediterranean area. The trasformismo during the
phase of Liberal Italy (1861 –1924) the transfuguismo in Spain during the
recent transition to mature democracy,25 or even the Assemblearism described
by De Jouvenel in the France of the Third and Fourth republic, are good
examples of such problematic experiences. Nevertheless, the magnitude of
fluidity within the Italian Parliament since the beginning of the 1990s crisis
is hardly comparable with the other examples of democratic transition
coming from the Mediterranean area. Here, the phenomenon of progressive
discontinuity within each legislature has to be linked to a conjuncture (the
continuous reshaping of the party system between one election and the
next) as well as to the incredible loss of control by all party fractions over
their own MPs. The first problem, which is related to the crisis of the entire
party system and its consequences on democratic dynamics, is of course of
crucial importance, but not really pertinent to this simple account of the trans-
formation of parliamentary politics. Conversely, the problem of individual
party hoppers and the general lack of discipline currently displayed, as has
been mentioned, have to be considered as a future threat to internal parliamen-

tary life even in the long term. The establishment of a solid bi-polar electoral
competition between two coalitions (which seems to be the main result of the
2001 election) is, in fact, a necessary but not sufficient precondition if the
uncertainty within the Chambers is to be overcome. At least three other con-
ditions still have to be satisfied if further instability is to be avoided: firstly, a
further reform of the normative concerning the electoral system, from a poss-
ible adjustment of the current mixed system (the abolition of the proportional
quota) to a completely new regulation, should help to guarantee each MP the
free use of his/her representative role while, at the same time, keeping him/her
closer to the voters he/she is representing. Secondly, the stabilisation of
the new party organisations and leaderships, whatever model may take the
party system. Finally, which could be crucial, the establishment of a new
balance between local politicians, interest groups and the national party
elites which define the requirements for candidate selection.
MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING? THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGE

FACED BY PARLIAMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
What form of political representation is the Italian parliament tending towards

today? Is it moving towards a more ‘adversarial’ pattern of confrontation
between PPGs or is the near future going to be characterised once again by
fragmentation and the persistence of a new trasformismo?
According to Ulrike Liebert,26 the mature parliament of the First Republic
embodied the competitive dominant parliament type, that is to say a legislative
institution whose centrality is not in question, but whose relative power vis-à-
vis the executive is subject to continuous changes, and whose strong
internal organisation, characterised by decentralisation and plurality of
specialist competencies, can allow for the emergence of diverse institutional
capabilities from one issue to another, from one moment to another, and
from one MP to another.
This article started off by presenting evidence of the fact that the very
origins of the 1990s crisis in Italy were closely connected to a strong demand
for majoritarian democracy. This demand, however, has always remained
rather vague. In addition to that, the reforms adopted both at the legislative
level and within the Houses’ rules of procedure, did not determine the political
conditions that could have changed the very nature of legislative life. In fact, the
number of players within the parliamentary arena during the first part of the
transitional period was much greater than those leaving the scene. Moreover,
instead of acting as an incentive to inter-party co-operation, the introduction
of the single-member constituency seems to have created a further centrifugal
force and room for individual opportunism.
In the end, the changes Italy has had to deal with are very different from
those we would have expected just ten years ago: the rhetoric of majoritarian
democracy did not produce the expected simplification of parliamentary poli-
tics. Nevertheless, it is worth underlining the innovative meaning of the story
told here. If we look to the possible consolidation of the new parliamentary
party system, a ‘game of two halves’ seems to emerge, whereby majoritarian
competition seems to be perfectly accepted during the phase of electoral align-
ment (and consequently during the legislature’s formation) while the phase
between one election and the next shows just how all the ‘proportional’
players are still strongly rooted to the parliamentary arena. The stability of
some general features of parliamentary partyness, together with the emer-
gence of specific intra-coalition distinctions between the social and political
profiles of MPs, seems to support this kind of interpretation.
Much ado about a little more than nothing, then? Of course, given this
argument that (only) in 2001 were we able to see stronger hints of reconsoli-
dation of the whole system in Italy, this conclusion has to be an extremely cau-
tious one. It is still too early to speak of a new model of party representation
and to introduce hypotheses about critical changes in the role of individual
MPs. Therefore, rather than formulating weak assumptions about the degree
of change we are going to see in the coming years, it would be better to try
and understand whether Italian parliamentary life is definitely striding
towards the establishment of a clear model, or is just ‘paddling about’ in its
permanent fluidity.
As far as we can see from the evolution of parliamentary representation,
the future seems to depend on the outcome of a prolonged struggle between
a strong factor of institutional continuity and another element pressing for
the partial evolution of parliamentary politics. In particular, a certain continu-
ity seems to be a natural effect of the purely disruptive nature of the actors pro-
voking the political transition: in fact, the collapse between 1992 and 1994
was mainly the result of a crisis of legitimisation involving top political
leaders heavily criticised by ‘anti-party parties’, elites and institutions lying
outside the political game. With the passing of time and the abating of nega-
tive feelings, many proposals, values, styles and, to a certain extent, leaders
from the First Republic were able to re-emerge. Thus, while the newcomers
from the transitional period have been seen as the destroyers of a bad
system, the new ones invited to represent the nation now appear, on the
whole, to be much more similar to the career politicians of 15 years ago.
The reason for innovation emerges from the two ‘exogenous’ changes
mentioned above: the introduction of a controversial, yet innovative, electoral
system, and some partial effects of majoritarian rhetoric. The ideas of
the greater accountability of the political representatives and the attempt
to stress the importance of administrative skills rather than political
competences, together with the candidates’ job experience, all seem to point to
it. One extreme consequence is that many Italian parliamentarians seem to
have adopted certain ‘anti-political’ sentiments used by most new political
players. The latter do not have any direct impact on parliamentary life or
representative roles, yet, in the long run, they can contribute towards creating
the necessary conditions for a different system of representation.
NOTES
1. N.W. Polsby, ‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives’, American

Political Science Review, 62 (1968), pp.144–68.
2. See M. Calise and R. Mannheimer, Governanti in Italia. Un trentennio repubblicano
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982).
3. On this issue see the article by G. Capano and M. Giuliani in this volume.
4. For an exhaustive account of these theories, complete with empirical studies of Southern
European systems, see L. Morlino, Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis. Parties,
Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
5. I refer in particular to the analysis by U. Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the Consolidation of Democ-
racy’, in U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in
Southern Europe (London: Pinter, 1990).
6. I owe some of the ideas introduced in this section to my colleague and friend Francesco
Zucchini.
7. See L. Verzichelli, ‘The Parliamentary Elite in Transition’, European Journal of Political
Research, 34 (1998), pp.121–50.
8. An extensive analysis of that historical turning point, within the framework of a long-term
account of the modification of the Italian parliamentary elite can be found in M. Cotta and
L. Verzichelli, ‘La classe politica: cronaca di una morte annunciata’, in M. Cotta and
P. Isernia (eds.), Il Gigante dai piedi di argilla (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996).
9. Figure 1 is based on a ‘minimal’ definition of seniority, that is, a parliamentary experience of
at least two legislatures. Compare with more detailed data in L. Verzichelli, ‘Da un ceto par-
lamentare all’altro. il mutamento nel personale legislativo italiano (1992–2001)’, in
R. D’Alimonte and S. Bartolini (eds.), Maggioritario finalmente? (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002).
10. Between 1992 and 1994 The League gave the impression of being able to ‘conquer’ many
votes in all the northern regions, including metropolitan areas like Milan, Turin and Genoa.
After that the electoral strength of this party stayed mainly concentrated within the north-
eastern rural areas.
11. The single-member constituencies were used in Italy after the Unification (1861) up until
1919, when a PR list system based on large constituencies was introduced.
12. We can define a transversal candidate as a non-professional politician, who is clearly on the
side of a majoritarian coalition, but without affiliating to any of the parties involved in that
coalition. The success of this kind of candidate was particularly relevant in 1994 and 1996,
when some candidates from the civil society could benefit from the nationwide electoral rea-
lignment, surprisingly defeating the incumbent candidates from the other coalition.
13. See, for instance, L. Verzichelli and F. Zucchini, ‘The New Parliament and the Start of a
Decisive Legislature’, in J. Newell (ed.), Berlusconi’s Victory: The Italian 2001 Elections
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
14. On this issue, see M. Cotta and H. Best, Parliamentary Representatives in Europe. 1848–
2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
15. See A. Mastropaolo, Il ceto Politico. Teoria e Pratica (Roma: Nis, 1993).
16. For a comprehensive presentation figures see Verzichelli, ‘Da un ceto parlamentare all’altro.
il mutamento nel personale legislativo italiano (1992–2001)’.
17. In his book on the centrality of parliament during the consolidation of Italian democracy,
Maurizio Cotta indicates the 1948 election as the watershed marking the beginning of a
new and stable era: ‘at the parliamentary level, personal groupings disappeared and the
control of parties over members of parliament produced a stabilisation of alignments’.
M. Cotta, ‘The Centrality of Parliament in a Protracted Democratic Consolidation: The
Italian Case’, in Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in
Southern Europe, pp.55– 91.
18. Compare L. Helms: ‘Parliamentary Party Groups and their Parties: A Comparative Assess-
ment’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 6 (2000), pp.104–20.
19. For an in-depth account of the continuities and discontinuities in Italian parliamentary demo-
cracy compare the work by D. Hine, Governing Italy. The Politics of Bargained Pluralism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
20. It is the application of the effective number of parliamentary parties introduced by Laasko and
Taagepera, which in most of the comparative works is considered to be a key indicator of
party system fragmentation. See, for example, A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
21. For a detailed description of the evolution of Italian party politics between 1994 and 1996 see
A. Di Virgilio, ‘Electoral Alliances: Party Identities and Coalition Games’, European Journal
of Political Research, 34 (1998), pp.5– 33.
22. This is in fact one of the features underlying the classification of the 1980s Italian legislature
as a competitive one. See Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the Consolidation of Democracy’, p.265.
23. It is the case of the centre left party called I Democratici, formed during the Thirteenth leg-
islature. Also, it concerns the Margherita group, formed in 2001 from the fusion of the same
Democratici with the centre-left oriented Christian Democrats and with a micro-party led by
the former Prime Minister Lamberto Dini. To some extent, the group of Forza Italia can also
be considered as a factionalised one, both because of the dual ideological orientation of
the party (the co-existence of Catholic and Liberal representatives), and for some internal
conflicts about European/foreign policy and civil rights (radicals versus conservatives).
24. A complete account of the party system changes between 1996 and 2001 has not been
provided here. A more detailed account can be found in Verzichelli and Zucchini, ‘The
New Parliament and the Start of a Decisive Legislature’.
25. See M. Sanchez de Dios, ‘Parliamentary Party Discipline in Spain’, in S. Bowler, D.M. Farrell
and R.S. Katz (eds.), Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government (Columbus, OH: Ohio
State University Press, 1999), pp.141–65.
26. Compare Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the Consolidation of Democracy’, p.260.
Internalising the Lessons of Stable
Democracy: The Portuguese Parliament
C R I S T I N A L E S T O N - B A N D E I R A and
A N D R É F R E I R E
At the end of the 1980s, the literature described the Portuguese Parliament as a
highly unstable and ineffective institution. These were the conclusions of
research carried out during a time of many and sudden changes, the mid-
1980s. However, just over a decade later a quick glimpse at the Assembleia
da República shows a very different institution. After a decade of political
instability, the end of the 1980s brought in an era of stability and a time
when primary social and economical problems had been addressed. It was
in this context that change was brought into the Portuguese Parliament. This
article centres exactly on that issue: the development of the Portuguese Parlia-
ment with the practice of democracy. Whereas in the 1970s/mid-1980s
democracy was still being consolidated, from then on the Portuguese
regime entered a new phase: the actual practice of democracy. When democ-
racy was first introduced the values of representation and legitimate decision-
making were all too important to be overlooked. As effectiveness became the
key word for democracy to work, Portuguese parliamentary practice changed
accordingly.
As one of the least studied Southern European parliaments, this article
attempts to bring in different studies of the Assembleia in order to provide a
comprehensive profile of the institution. After providing the context of
change from the 1970s/1980s to the 1990s/2000s, the article looks into the
social and demographic characteristics of Portuguese MPs, as well as parlia-
mentary career patterns. It then moves on to the crucial factor in understanding
change in the Portuguese Parliament: revisions of its regulatory framework.
This provides the context to understand the transformation of the focus of par-
liamentary activity from legislation to scrutiny. Overall, the article will show
the steady journey of the Portuguese Parliament towards professionalisation.
PARLIAMENT IN ITS FIRST DECADE OF DEMOCRACY
When the ‘Revolution of the Carnations’ spread across the streets of

Lisbon in April 1974, little was known about what was happening, who the
THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT 57
revolutionaries were and what were their intentions. At the time, little or no
thought was given to the representative assembly, a dormant institution for
nearly 50 years. People adhered to the idea of regime change and the revolu-
tion was carried out rather smoothly. However, the two years that followed
brought considerable turmoil and the role that the representative assembly
should play in the new regime became one of the main points of tension.
From 1974 to 1976 there was a transitional situation in Portugal: non-
elected provisional governments ran the country and the constitution was
being drawn up by the Constituent Assembly; it was a time when the structures
of the new regime were being established. The outcome of that process was
heavily conditioned by a tension between two opposing groups, both compre-
hending military and party factions: one group defended a parliamentary
representative democracy, even if transitory under a military surveillance,
and the other one supported a revolutionary model, where the military
would dominate with little or no space for a representative institution.
The overwhelming support given by the population to the election of
the Constituent Assembly in 1975 became a stepping-stone to strengthen
the model of a representative democracy where parliament would play a
central role.1 Although the Assembly only had powers to draw up the consti-
tution, in the year that followed deputies made active use of the parliamentary
arena to influence and condition Portuguese politics.2 Parliament therefore
became the very symbol of the affirmation of a representative political
system for the new Portuguese regime. It was in this context that the new
Portuguese democracy placed parliament at the centre of its political
system, with the oversight of a President of the Republic elected by the
people and a Council of the Revolution later substituted by the Constitutional
Tribunal.3
The following years confirmed parliament’s centrality in the political
system, reflected in some of the political instability evident in the first
decade of Portuguese democracy, as seen by M. Braga da Cruz and M. Lobo
Antunes.4 Between 1976, when the first parliament was elected, and 1987, ten
different governments were in power; three of which were short-lived
presidential cabinets that did not survive parliament’s opposition. This was
a time when primary social and economic problems had to be dealt with, as
well as building up the rules of a functional and legitimate democratic political
system. In this context, parliament was hardly a stable and linear institution,
which explains the conclusion reached by Liebert and Opello that the
Portuguese Parliament was a fractionalised and barely institutionalised
Assembly.5 This assessment fails to take due account of the newly democratic
nature of the Assembleia then, but it does point towards the main changes that
have taken place in the Portuguese Parliament from the first to the second
decade of democracy: stability and rationalisation of procedures.
Walter Opello applies the criterion of institutionalisation and, unsurpris-

ingly, concludes that there was a ‘de-institutionalisation, decay and break-
down’ of the Portuguese Parliament.6 His assessment is mainly based on
indicators of a weak organisation, high turnover rates of MPs and parliament’s
marginality in policy-making. Opello states that the Assembleia made ‘no sig-
nificant contribution to public policy in Portugal’ throughout its first decade of
existence.7 This marginality in policy-making is contested by authors such as
Lobo Antunes who point out that, in fact, parliament made a crucial contri-
bution towards setting up the basis for the new Portuguese democracy by
drawing up fundamental laws, such as on national defence, local finances,
rural reform, the National Health Service, and so on.8 However, Opello
does make a fair assessment of the lack of institutionalisation of the Assem-
bleia da República in its first decade of democracy, as would be expected in
a very young institution.
On the other hand, in her seminal comparative analysis of the South Euro-
pean parliaments in the process of consolidation of democracy, Ulrike Liebert
shows that the Assembleia da República’s institutionalisation was consider-
ably constrained by party fragmentation. In her view, the first years of parlia-
ment had a ‘strong non-party factionalism, rampant multi-partyism, wide
diffusion of power, fluid parliamentary majorities and frequent estrangement
from the executive’.9 This made it an ‘indeterminate type’ of legislature,10
where the relationship with the executive was volatile and very fragile. As
Portuguese politics became more stable in the mid-1980s, Liebert identified
a change towards a ‘co-ordinate type of legislature’, as there was more
space for co-operation and interdependence between the executive and parlia-
ment. Although Liebert’s interpretation contains some misunderstandings of
the first years of the Portuguese democratic regime,11 it does point out the
importance then of partyness as a major factor influencing parliament’s
nature.
These two interpretations show, therefore, a lack of institutionalisation
accompanied by strong party instability in the Portuguese Parliament’s first
decade of democracy. The main changes brought in by the second decade
concern exactly these two points. Not only has there been political stability
since 1987, but also considerable changes have been introduced in the
organisation and structure of parliament. The outcome is a parliament rather
different from the one of 1976.
THE POLITICS OF STABILITY
The elections of 19 July 1987 marked the beginning of a new era in Portuguese
politics and, particularly, in the Assembleia da República. A Partido Social
Democrata (PSD)12 absolute majority was elected under the leadership of
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, becoming the first single party majority elected
to the Portuguese Parliament. As a consequence, a full four-year legislature
was completed for the first time.
In order to understand the changes that took place in the years after 1987,
we must step back to the 1985 parliament: the Fourth legislature. The PSD was
then in government, but in a minority. The Fourth legislature had very singular
characteristics, the main one being the unexpected appearance of a fifth party
in the political system: the Democratic Renewal Party (Partido Renovador
Democrático – PRD).13 The PRD appeared as a party above politics and
not clearly defined in ideological terms. Formed on the eve of the 1985 elec-
tions, the PRD managed remarkably to gather 18 per cent of the votes. As a
consequence, there was no major opposition party during the Fourth legisla-
ture and no clearly defined focus of power. This distribution of political
power made possible, on the one hand, a very strong parliament and, on the
other, a particularly consensual one.14 Simultaneously, this legislature
coincided with crucial events for the Portuguese political and socio-economic
systems: the election of the first civil president of the republic, and, most
importantly, the entrance of Portugal into the European Economic Community
(EEC) in 1986.
Throughout this legislature there were several cases of strong disagree-
ment between government and parliament; with parliament being perceived
as the cause of delays and obstructions. The legislature eventually came to
an end in 1987 with the passing of a motion of censure on the government.
The subsequent elections led to the PSD absolute majority and to years of pol-
itical stability. There was a clear feeling in 1987 that the Portuguese were tired
of instability and the Fourth legislature was seen as the last straw. The PRD
decreased to a mere five per cent in 1987 and disappeared altogether from par-
liament in 1991. For the first time, a four-year term of a legislature was com-
pleted and then repeated: the PSD absolute majority was re-elected in 1991.
These two legislatures (Fifth and Sixth) were followed by the 1995 elections,
won by the Partido Socialista (PS), which formed a minority government
(Seventh legislature). Although based on a minority, the Seventh legislature
completed its four-year term. The Eighth legislature, elected in 1999, led to
a peculiar situation: a parliament with a tie between the government’s
number of deputies (115) and the opposition’s (115). This fell half-way
through and led in March 2002 to the Ninth legislature, a post-election
coalition between the PSD and the CDS-PP (Centro Democrático e Social-
Partido Popular).
Hence, after 11 years of transition to and consolidation of democracy,
from 1974 to 1985, the Fourth legislature brought in a transitory period,
1985 –87, that led into subsequent years of stability. It could be argued that
since 1987 there has been a process of ‘maturation’ of democracy: integration
in the EEC brought in the means to develop the country’s social and economic
fabric and political stability provided a framework to institutionalise parlia-
mentary procedures and practices. Table 1 shows party representation in the
Portuguese Parliament from 1974 to 2003.
BRIEF PROFILE OF THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT
The Assembleia da República has an important status in the constitutional

design of the Portuguese political system; particularly since the 1982 revision
when parliament acquired, for instance, the power to amend and vote on the
annual State Budget. The power of parliament becomes particularly clear
when minority governments are in place. The Assembleia da República is
one of the poles of the Portuguese triangular political system,15 where the
President of the Republic oversees both the legislature and the government.
Government is politically responsible to parliament and the constitution regu-
lates a number of scrutiny instruments such as the interpellations. In terms of
legislative initiative, parliament also shows a powerful position. Among other
powers, it has the exclusive right to legislate on a wide range of 21 policy areas
and a number of laws require a qualified majority. One of the most respected
voices on the Portuguese constitution, Jorge Miranda, actually states that at
least constitutionally the Assembleia has ‘primacy’ over the legislative
process.16
However, in practice, the key players are the parties. Two main reasons are
the proportional representation electoral system and the legal prerogatives
affirming the party as the key representational unit. The 230 deputies are
elected through closed party lists (following the d’Hondt system) and their
mandate is to represent Portugal as a nation rather than the electoral districts.
What is more, once in parliament, deputies cannot move to a different parlia-
mentary group (PG) from the one through which they were elected.17 This
system aims to avoid the dangers of the nineteenth to early twentieth
century caciquismo – local clientelistic networks through which favours
were promised in exchange for votes. Hence the focus on the party and on
the national level, to the detriment of the individual MP and the constituency.
The PG is the core unit of parliamentary organisation. From opposition
rights to resources, most parliamentary activity is organised according to
PGs. Even the votes are announced by party and not by deputy (unless he
or she has dissented). The distribution of rights between PGs is in proportion
to the number of deputies each PG has elected; the larger the PG, the more
rights it will be entitled to. This logic of proportionality is therefore repro-
duced throughout parliamentary activity. A clear example of this is the Con-
ference of Representatives. The Conference is the main decision-making
organ where most of parliamentary agenda is determined and it comprises a
TABLE 1
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT
(number of MPs per parliamentary group in each legislature; italic indicates the parties in government)
Parliamentary First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth Ninth
Groups (1976–80) (1980 –83) (1983–85) (1985–87) (1987–91) (1991– 95) (1995–99) (1999–2002) (2002– ?)
PSD 73 82 75 88 148 135 88 81 105

PS 107 66 94 57 60 72 112 115 96
PCP 40 39 41 35 27 15 13 15 10
CDS/PP 42 46 30 22 4 5 15 15 14
PRD – – – 45 7 – – – –
PPM – 6 – – – – – – –
ASDI – 4 3 – – – – – –
UEDS – 4 4 – – – – – –
OTHER 1 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 5
Total 263 250 250 250 250 230 230 230 230
Government various Coalition Coalition Minority Absolute Absolute Minority Minority Coalition
support majority majority
Notes: OTHER stands for the following Parliamentary Groups (PGs): the MDP, the UDP (both small left wing parties), the PEV (Green Party, but elected in
a joint list with the PCP), the PSN (one-off 1991 party representative of pensioners) and the BE (a coalition of several small left wing parties).

Some of these PGs were elected together in a joint list. The PPM is a small monarchic party. The ASDI was formed by PSD dissenting MPs and the
UEDS by PS dissenting MPs.

These are the 1976 election results. Due to constitutional prerogatives, there was an intermediate election in December 1979. However, these
results were only in force until the following May, when elections to the Second legislature took place. The results of the 1979 elections were
as follows: PSD (80), PS (74), PCP (44), CDS (43), PPM (5), MDP (3) and UDP (1). Due to the several changes of government during the First
legislature, we have opted for not indicating which parties were in government then.
Source: www.parlamento.pt/deputados/resultadoseleitorais/index.html.
representative of each PG and of the government, plus the president of parlia-

ment. Views are put by party and decisions are reached on a majority basis
when consensus has not been achieved.
This profile has had a number of changes in the second decade of
Portuguese democracy, as we shall see in the following sections. However,
this is broadly speaking the context in which parliamentarians, parliamentary
activity and outputs have to be analysed in the Portuguese Parliament: one of a
potentially powerful institution, where party politics dominate.
SOCIAL PROFILES OF PORTUGUESE MPs AND CAREER PATTERNS
In order to understand the changes over the last 25 years in the Portuguese Par-
liament, it is crucial to look at the patterns of selection of the Portuguese MPs,
as shown by Gallagher and Marsh: ‘A change in parties’ selection procedures
in any given country might . . . have direct consequences for the way politics
operate there.’18 The social and political profiles of Portuguese MPs have
changed considerably since the very first elections to the Constituent Assem-
bly back in 1975. However, as this section will show, there are fewer changes
in the actual procedures of selection and career patterns.
Following a new institutionalist perspective, the selection of MPs is seen
here as a function of several factors.19 This perspective sees parliamentary
recruitment as a function, firstly, of the political system profile (legal, electoral
and party systems, and the structure of opportunities) and of the party context
(party organisation, party rules and party ideology). Second, while this new
institutionalism accepts that institutions affect individuals’ strategies, it also
shows that the motivations, resources and behaviour of individuals must be
taken into account to fully understand the recruitment process. The motiv-
ations and resources of potential candidates are seen as supply factors and
the motivations and actions of the gatekeepers (party officials, party
members, party voters, pressure groups, and the mass media), as demand
factors.
This section looks into the legal and institutional constraints on candidate
selection since 1975, as well as career patterns. Special emphasis will be given
to the effects of the electoral system and party organisation over candidate
selection and the control of MPs’ political careers. Finally, the analysis of
the socio-demographic profile of MPs will enable us to identify trends in
the patterns of legislative recruitment in the Portuguese Parliament.20
Candidate Selection to the Portuguese Parliament: The Effects of the

Political, Electoral and Party Systems
The structure of opportunities is very restricted in Portugal, particularly if
compared to countries with decentralised systems of government, such as
those with federal government/bicameral parliaments and/or regional elected
bodies. As Portugal has a semi-presidential system,21 the President of
the Republic, the head of state, is at the top of the political careers for
public officials. Other elected positions include the MPs to the single
Chamber of the Assembleia da República and, since 1987, the MEPs to the
European Parliament. Other than these central positions, Portugal only has
elected bodies for local government (Municı́pios and Freguesias – councils
and parishes), except for the two islands of Azores and Madeira, where a
regional government system operates.22 Therefore, horizontal political
careers in Portugal are almost non-existent, and vertical ones are limited.
The constitution defines a few incompatibilities between the MP’s
mandate and other official positions. MPs cannot serve in other official
positions such as in the cabinet, courts, local executive office, regional execu-
tive and representative offices, specific positions in the central, regional
and local administration, nor can they be President of the Republic or
MEP at the same time. Those occupying any of these positions must resign
from them before assuming their seat in parliament. Plus, Portuguese parlia-
mentary candidates must also fulfil certain requirements in terms of criminal
record and mental health. The legal restrictions on the Portuguese MP
mandate are not very different, therefore, from other Western democracies,
except perhaps in terms of the incompatibility of being a MP and a member
of cabinet.23
Parties dominate the regulatory framework of the Portuguese candidate
selection process. Candidates for the Assembleia da República must be
presented by political parties. Moreover, the electoral system of proportional
representation (PR) closed lists gives a great deal of power to political parties
in terms of candidate access to parliamentary careers. This system was
designed to strengthen the role of the political parties in the new democracy,
a very important function back in the 1970s and 1980s: the reinforcement of
the parties’ role allowed in many ways an effective consolidation of democ-
racy.24 The PR closed list system does not stimulate MPs to be responsive
to their voters’ demands, at least at the constituency level, because their
careers are more dependent on top party officials than on voters. On the
other hand, the Portuguese electoral system is a single-tier regime with
many large electoral districts: in the 1999 parliamentary elections there
were two very large districts (Lisbon and Oporto, with 49 and 37 seats,
respectively), eight medium to large constituencies (seven to 17 seats), and
12 small districts (two to six seats). Therefore, the design of the electoral
system itself, namely the magnitude of some constituencies, does not create
incentives for the candidates and MPs to be responsive to their district
voters; in large and medium sized electoral districts it is very difficult for
citizens to know their MPs and to hold them accountable.
As seen above, during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s the
Portuguese democratic regime was characterised by cabinet instability.
However, since 1987, when the first absolute majority was elected to parlia-
ment, majoritarian rule has developed25 and the issue of cabinet instability
has clearly lost importance, namely in electoral system reform. Electoral
system revision has been a recurrent topic of discussion almost since the
beginning of democracy, but pressure for electoral reform has become particu-
larly strong since the beginning of the 1990s. Since then the main argument for
reform has been the strengthening of the ties between MPs and citizens.26
Different types of proposals have been made, but there seems to be some con-
sensus towards a mixed member proportional system.27 Agreement was nearly
reached in the Seventh legislature, but eventually the consensus between the
PSD and the PS fell through over a specific issue:28 the PSD wanted to
reduce the number of MPs while the PS did not.29 Nowadays, the PS seems
to accept that reduction – as seen in the PS Manifesto for the 2002 parliamen-
tary elections – so apparently there is room to proceed with electoral reform in
the Ninth legislature.
The idea that single-member districts are the best way to increase the
incentives for a closer relationship between voters and MPs is widely sup-
ported.30 However, the electoral system is not the only cause of a weak link
between Portuguese MPs and citizens; other factors, internal to parliament,
also contribute.
First, there is a high volatility of MPs: ‘the MPs citizens elect are not
necessarily the ones that will represent them. . . . If any of [the] elected MPs
are unable to assume their mandate, then they will be substituted by other
candidates from their party list; . . . thus, the MP actually assuming the
mandate may have not been originally elected.’31 This type of replacement
has been characteristically high in the Portuguese Parliament, in large part
due to the incompatibility between the MP and cabinet member positions,
as well as to electoral campaigning.32 However, this was more of a problem
in the first decade (see Table 2). Since then, procedures have been revised
and limits introduced in the periods of substitution allowed; still, this is an
area that could do with more restrictions to avoid this volatility of MPs.33
Second, as seen above, PGs dominate parliamentary activity, to the
detriment of MPs individually considered. Third,
at the local level there is virtually no contact structure between MPs and
citizens. . . . However, the reform of 1993 did stipulate that every fortnight
there should be a place for contact between MPs and citizens in the consti-
tuencies. The contact should take place in the office of the Governo Civil,
a sort of a-partisan representative of the administration in each district.
There is little evidence of the actual application of that prescription.34
TABLE 2
SUBSTITUTIONS OF MPs
(average per legislative year in each legislature)
Third– Eighth–
first first
First Second session Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh session
(1976– (1980– (1983– (1985– (1987– (1991– (1995– (1999–
80) 83) 84) 87) 91) 95) 99) 2000)
Number of 64 219 576 207.5 118 90 60.7 119

substitutions
Notes: There are no data available for the second year of the Third legislature. The Eighth
legislature’s data refer also only to the first year, when the main bulk of the substitutions
are made. The average for the whole of the legislature would, no doubt, reduce this
number.
Source: A. Araújo, M. Costa-Lobo, A. Freire, C. Leston-Bandeira and P. Magalhães, O Parla-
mento Português: uma reforma necessária (Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais/Instituto
Amaro da Costa/Assembleia da República, 2002), p.118.
Again, this is an area that needs enhancing, although positive changes have been
introduced recently in parliament’s interface with citizens (see below). Fourth,
patterns of candidate selection within the parties do not favour strong links
between candidates/MPs and their constituencies, because their careers are
heavily dependent on the national party top officials. Furthermore, there is
little decentralisation in candidate selection, especially in the left-wing
parties (PS and PCP), but also in the right-wing Christian democratic party
(CDS-PP) since the Seventh legislature.35 Regional and local party executive
organs have a role in the process of candidate selection but the major
role belongs to the national executive party organs, even in the more
decentralised PSD.36 There is some discussion about changing this, making
candidate selection more decentralised and giving greater incentives for local
connections of MPs.
Fifth, ordinary party members do not participate in the process of recruit-
ment for parliamentary elections. Portuguese political parties’ statutes do not
require, or even consider, rank and file party members to participate in
the process of candidate selection for parliament, as happens in most of
the OECD industrialised democracies, at least within the major parties
in these countries.37 Allowing for ordinary party members to participate in
the process of candidate selection, as well as decentralising the process,
could result in MPs’ careers being less dependent on party top officials.
That way MPs would respond more to the constituents’ needs, rather than
the party leader.
Socio-Demographic Profile of Portuguese MPs, 1975– 2002

The socio-demographic profile of Portuguese MPs has changed considerably
throughout the last 25 years. Figures 1 – 3 draw a basic socio-demographic
profile of the Portuguese MPs.38
There has been a slight increase in female representation in the Portuguese
Parliament, particularly since the 1990s (Figure 1). The major change
occurred between the Seventh and the Eighth legislature, and was the result
of a bill proposed by the PS government (Proposta de Lei 194/VII, 4 March
1999). This bill introduced a limit on the proportion of each gender in the
lists presented to elections, both to the national and the European parlia-
ments.39 The bill did not pass because all opposition parties voted against
it, but it had significant effects: all opposition parties declared that they
were in favour of a higher representation of women in the Portuguese Parlia-
ment, but that the change should occur mainly as a result of self-regulation
rather than by law. As a consequence, all parties felt obliged to include
more women in their lists of candidates. Those with the main increases
were the PS and, particularly, the PCP, which remained the PG with the
largest percentage of women, as had been the case since 1975.40
The Portuguese case is especially interesting because it works against
electoral system explanations of the differences in female parliamentary rep-
resentation.41 On the other hand, party explanations for those differences do
not hold good either: the PCP always had the greatest percentage of women
among its parliamentary group and the PS only became clearly different
from the right-wing parties in the Eighth legislature.
FIGURE 1
GENDER IN THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT, 1975 – 2002 (%)
Notes: ‘Const.’ Refers to the Constituent Assembly (1975 – 76). The First Legislature is divided in two (First-
A and First-B), due to the 1976 constitutional provision requiring that the first legislature should only
end after four years (that is, 1980). Political instability led to early elections in 1979, even if the First
legislature continued until 1980. These are called the intercalated elections (First-B). The same applies
to the subsequent Figures.
Source: A. Freire, Recrutamento Parlamentar: Os Deputados Portugueses da Constituinte à VIII Legislatura
(Lisbon: STAPE/MAI, 2001), pp.233 – 4.
Finally, we should note that even in the Eighth legislature representation
of women in the Portuguese Parliament is very low in a comparative perspec-
tive, namely below the latest Spanish Parliament and all the other West
European democracies, except the United Kingdom, France and Italy.42
Portuguese MPs are clearly getting older (Figure 2), even if their age
patterns are in line with other West European democracies.43 This is clearly
related to the process of maturation of the political system: there were
many young MPs (below 36 years) in the foundational period, but since the
1980s this is less and less so. On the one hand, this process indicates a differ-
entiation of the political system from other social spheres, since it is related to
greater professional specialisation of the MPs. But, on the other, it indicates a
growing closure of the political system.
The educational qualifications of Portuguese MPs have increased over the
years (Figure 3). Whereas in the 1970s the proportion of MPs with a university
undergraduate degree (plus those with a post-graduate degree) represented
60 per cent of the total number of MPs, in the 1990s this had increased to
80 per cent. What is more, this increase is mainly due to the proportion of
those with a post-graduate degree. Again, this trend indicates greater pro-
fessional specialisation of Portuguese parliamentarians, but also a growing
social closure. If we consider the ratio between the educational levels of
MPs and that of the mass of citizens in different countries, we soon conclude
that the Portuguese Parliament is one of the most elitist among Western
democracies.44
Political Careers of Portuguese MPs, 1975 –2002

Professional specialisation of politicians is a clear indicator of political system
modernisation since it is related to the differentiation of the political sphere
from other social sub-systems. Again, this phenomenon can also be interpreted
FIGURE 2
PORTUGUESE MPs BY AGE GROUPS, 1975 – 2002 (%)

(Lisbon: STAPE/MAI, 2001), pp.234 –6.
FIGURE 3
ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS OF PORTUGUESE MPs, 1975 – 2002 (%)

(Lisbon: STAPE/MAI, 2001), pp.236 – 8.
as a closure of the political system.45 These issues will now be analysed

through two other dimensions: the positions occupied by Portuguese MPs in
the parties’ hierarchy (Figure 4) and their prior political experience in
elected offices (or appointed political offices, as for instance cabinet positions
in the national or regional levels of government – Figure 5).
There has been a clear decline in the percentage of MPs that occupy no
position within the formal hierarchy of their party (Figure 4: category
‘others/without position’):46 in the 1970s this figure was above 70 per cent,
in the 1980s it fell to around 60 per cent and in the 1990s there was a signifi-
cant decline to around 40 per cent. That is, during the 1990s 60 per cent or
more of Portuguese MPs were top officials within their parties. These
figures are clearly in line with the patterns found among most Western democ-
racies since the Second World War.47 This trend clearly shows a modernis-
ation of the Portuguese system, that is a growing differentiation from other
social systems through an increased professionalisation of its members.
Although it is difficult to identify a clear trend, the information available
suggests that a centralised pattern of recruitment of Portuguese MPs prevails.
Figure 4 shows an overall increase, from the first to the second decade of
democracy, of the proportion of MPs that have held local or regional positions
within their parties. However, it also shows an increase in the proportion of
MPs that have served in a party position at national level. The ratio
between these two categories suggests overall a reinforced centralisation
from the first decade to the second decade of democracy.48
In Figure 5 MPs’ political experience is measured by their prior political
offices (be it elected or appointed): national and regional government
(appointed); local government (elected); deputies to national and European
FIGURE 4
OFFICES HELD BY PORTUGUESE MPs IN PARTIES’ FORMAL HIERARCHY,
1975 – 2002 (%)

parliaments (elected).49 It also shows the proportion of MPs that have not had
any prior political experience.
The proportion of MPs with no prior political experience is quite low.
Figure 5 shows that since 1985 only about 20 per cent of the MPs in each
legislature, at the most, have not had prior political experience. The only
exception was the CDS-PP in the Seventh and Eighth legislatures, but this
was due to a radical change in the party leadership.
FIGURE 5
PRIOR ELECTED OR APPOINTED POLITICAL OFFICES OF PORTUGUESE MPs,
1975 – 2002 (%)

The data do not show any specific trend in terms of prior experience in the
national parliament. In fact, the figures are characterised by ups and downs
varying in accordance with the electoral conjuncture.50 Turnover rates
varied between 70 per cent (First-A, Second and Seventh legislatures), 60
per cent (Third, Fifth and Eighth legislatures) and 50 per cent (First-B,
Fourth and Sixth legislatures).51 On average, the Portuguese turnover rate
between 1976 (First legislature) and 1999 (Eighth legislature) is 60.6 per
cent, which is a very high figure compared to the West European average of
around 20 –30 per cent.52 The Spanish rate for the democratic period (45.2
per cent – still higher than the West European average)53 suggests that the
age of the democratic regime should be considered as a factor explaining
the levels of parliamentary experience of MPs. The difference between the
Portuguese and Spanish cases (around 15.4 per cent) can partially be explained
by the incompatibility between the MP and cabinet member positions, which
exists in Portugal and not in Spain. That is why the other indicator of parlia-
mentary experience included in Figure 5 – ‘MP (any time)’ – is much more
revealing of Portuguese MPs’ parliamentary experience than the standard
measure of turnover rate. As an average, since 1976, 50.1 per cent of MPs
serving in each legislature have had parliamentary experience in the past.
Contrary to the above indicators suggesting a reinforced centralised trend
at the party level, Figure 5 shows a clear increase in the proportion of MPs
that have served in local government. What is more, since 1987 prior experi-
ence in local government actually exceeds the proportion of MPs that have
had prior experience in the Assembleia da República. This can be seen as
an indicator of growing connections between MPs and constituencies,
strengthening the link between voters and MPs. However, more in-depth
research would be necessary to confirm this inference.54 MPs can accumulate
functions in parliament and local government (non-executive) and these data
can be more representative of electoral campaigning strategies than of real
local connections of MPs.
Overall, the data show a trend of growing modernisation of the Assembleia
da República’s parliamentary recruitment. But it also suggests a growing social
closure in citizens’ access to parliamentary careers. Although this is a steady
trend since the first democratic parliament was elected, the fifth legislature
does represent in many ways a turning point, as is the case with the parliamen-
tary activity and regulatory framework of the Assembleia.
REGULATORY CHANGE
One of the key characteristics of the Portuguese political system is the number
of changes it has gone through – at least at a regulatory level, but also with
a visible impact upon parliament’s activity and role. The Assembleia da
República is regulated fundamentally through two documents: the Consti-
tution of the Portuguese Republic (CPR) and the Rules of Procedures
(RP),55 both of which have been revised on a number of occasions.
The CRP is a rather detailed document (with a total of 299 articles) that has
a variety of direct consequences for parliamentary activity, namely on its
method of election, scrutiny and legislative powers. The CRP has undergone
four revisions since the original version of 1976, most of them subsequent to
the first decade of democracy: in 1982, 1989, 1992 and 1997. In 1982 parlia-
ment’s powers were reinforced to the detriment of the president and the gov-
ernment, as a consequence of the redistribution of powers of the transitory
Council of the Revolution.56 The 1989 revision’s main impact was on the
economic sections of the CRP and the 1992 revision was undertaken to
ensure the CRP conformed to the Maastricht Treaty. The main idea behind
the 1997 revision was to reform the political system; hence the amendments
made to the electoral system rules.57 But, regardless of the focus of each revi-
sion, each one has reinforced parliament’s powers, in particular its legislative
powers.58
Still, it is at the RP’s level that most changes have taken place. The RP is a
particularly detailed document that oversees all activity in the Assembleia da
República and has been extensively revised. These revisions show a very clear
pattern of development towards a more rationalised and efficacious institution.
Not surprisingly, these revisions all took place subsequent to the first decade
of democracy. During the first decade, not only were political actors still
experimenting with democratic practice, but also other matters had priority
over parliamentary procedure, such as the serious social and economic pro-
blems that Portugal faced at the end of the 1970s. Besides this, all revisions
took place in a situation of majority:59 1985 (coalition between PS and
PSD), 1988, 1991, 1993 (all under the PSD absolute majority) and 2002
(coalition between PSD and CDS-PP). The general impact of these revisions
was one of regulating practices, rationalising procedures, reinforcing the
power of the majorities, redesigning the scrutiny instruments and enhancing
the committee system.
The 1985 revision was clearly a reaction to ten years of convoluted parlia-
mentary practice. Procedures were regulated, limits were put on specific
instruments that were used in an obstructive manner and there was a first
attempt to rationalise procedures – for instance, the timings for intervening
in the Chamber were reduced. It was also then that majority rule was intro-
duced in the Conference of Representatives. The reinforcement of majorities
was particularly clear in the 1988 revision. Whereas in 1976 parliamentary
rights such as the number of questions to put to the government were distrib-
uted on a basis of belonging or not to the government, from 1988 onwards
the size of the PG became the key factor. In the first years of democracy,
the concern to protect opposition rights was such that any opposition PG,
regardless of its size, would be entitled to set the agenda of more plenary
days than the PGs represented in government. As the practice of democracy
was consolidated, consensual criteria were substituted by majoritarian ones;
legitimacy by efficacy.
Partly as a reaction to this the revisions also strengthened and redesigned
scrutiny. New debates on current and polemical issues were introduced in the
Chamber in 1991 and 1993,60 and became very popular. Other classical instru-
ments such as committees of enquiry and questions to the government were
also enhanced. This happened in concomitance with a redesigning of the
Chamber and committees’ role. As the committee system became more
complex, allowing for a more specialised and detailed review of legislation,
scrutiny through public debate and public questioning was reinforced in the
Chamber.
The Assembleia of 1976 was heavily based on the Chamber. All legislative
reading stages took place in the Chamber and committees could not meet
when the Chamber was summoned; parliament was effectively the
Chamber. As the years went by, the need for a more effective way to deal
with legislation resulted in an increase of the committees’ competences,
resources and power. The committees of today are completely different
from those of the 1970s: among other changes, the second reading has been
ascribed to them, they tend to meet publicly rather than privately, they have
autonomy to summon witnesses, each committee is entitled to at least one
research assistant and the 2002 revision created the Conference of the Com-
mittees’ Chairs. A very different picture, therefore, from the one drawn by
Opello in 1986 in the following statement: ‘The committees have not grown
in importance or specialisation since 1976.’61 At the same time as committees
became more specialised and professionalised, the tribune role of the
Chamber was reinforced.62
Another area of regulatory change has been the reinforcement of links with
citizens. Although this has not always resulted in a narrowing of the relation-
ship between MP and constituency, it is important to point out the conscious
effort from parliament in this area. The 1990s revisions all made small adjust-
ments recognising constituency work as part of MPs’ parliamentary activity.
MPs were given an opportunity to intervene in the Chamber independently
of their PGs, for instance, and these interventions have centred mainly on con-
stituency topics. The right to petition was also considerably enhanced at the
beginning of the 1990s, although since then there has been little sign of its
revitalisation.63
The second decade of democracy represented, therefore, considerable
change for the Portuguese Parliament from a regulatory point of view. As
we shall see in the following sections, these changes had a strong impact on
actual parliamentary practice. This explains the many differences between the
Assembleia of today and the parliament described by Braga da Cruz and Lobo
Antunes in their seminal text written back in 1987.64
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY
Parliamentary activity of the Assembleia da República has changed a great

deal from its first decade of democracy to the end of the 1980s onwards.
Two main factors caused these changes: the regulatory revisions explained
above and the experience of a period of eight years of absolute majority
(1987 – 95). Whereas originally there was a focus on the Chamber and on
the legislative function, as the practice of democracy sank in, parliament
became more institutionalised and the legitimation function developed.
Increased Legislative Effectiveness, Same Power

As seen above, the Assembleia da República has, in principle, a powerful role
in policy-making. However, as in other modern party-dominated West Euro-
pean democracies, the practice is rather different. What is more, in absolute
terms, the legislative output in the first decade is not that different from the
subsequent decade. The main differences are in the style of discussion and
deliberations. Procedures have been rationalised and the committees’ role in
the legislative function has expanded.
Table 3 shows not only that Portuguese MPs are fairly active in initiating
legislation, but also that a fair share of their proposals is approved at the final
vote. What is more, this legislative power seems to have become particularly
high in the second decade of democracy, as the percentage of bills approved at
final vote has varied between 18 and 38. However, this increase is not due to a
lower proportion of bills being rejected; as Table 3 shows, this has actually
also increased. The main reason for a more successful approval rate lies in
the rationalisation of procedures. The overall result of this rationalisation is
that less time is spent discussing each bill, thus allowing for time to discuss
more bills. Besides this, the increased specialisation of committee work has
also resulted in a more effective legislative deliberation process.
As Table 4 shows, the number of bills that never reach first reading has
decreased enormously since 1976. The first reading is a very important delib-
erative stage in the Portuguese Parliament: it is the first public debate where
parties and government give their views on a particular bill.65 The inability66
to discuss a bill at first reading, rather than the rejection itself, has represented
the main hindrance in the deliberative process. This has affected both MPs’
and government’s bills: before the fifth legislature, more than half of MPs’
bills and between 16 and 44 per cent of government bills were never discussed.
This explains why even in situations of majority, such as the Second and Third
TABLE 3
LEGISLATIVE OUTPUT OF THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT, 1976 – 2002
(average per year in each legislature; % in relation to the total number of MPs’/Government bills proposed)
MPs’ bills Government bills
Proposed Rejected Approved Proposed Rejected Approved

(Fi) (%) at final vote (Fi) (%) at final
(%) vote (%)
First 78.5 14.6 31.5 83.0 3.3 54.4

(1976– 80)
Second 79.7 13.0 13.0 43.7 0.0 49.6
(1980– 83)
Third 148.0 5.7 9.8 51.5 0.0 68.0
(1983– 85)
Fourth 165.5 4.2 24.5 22.0 9.1 34.1
(1985– 87)
Fifth 112.8 18.0 20.4 44.0 0.0 94.9
(1987– 91)
Sixth 107.8 23.4 18.3 29.5 0.0 88.9
(1991– 95)
Seventh 117.8 15.7 37.6 65.5 3.8 81.3
(1995– 99)
Eighth 179.3 16.7 35.7 37.3 0.9. 70.5
(1999– 2002)
Notes: Please note that the values referring to MPs’ bills do not include municipal bills. As
explained elsewhere, municipal bills need to be excluded in order to have an adequate
understanding of the legislative output of the Portuguese Parliament, see
C. Leston-Bandeira, ‘The Portuguese Parliament and Democracy’, West European
Politics, 24/1 (2001), p.145; and L. Sá, O Lugar da Assembleia da República no
Sistema Polı́tico Português (Lisbon: Caminho, 1994), p.330.

Although no government bill was rejected at first reading, there was one (a Basis bill)
rejected at Final Vote. This is very unusual and only happened because the majority
PG did not gather enough MPs to guarantee a qualified majority.
Source: Data base collated by the author from the archives and the activity reports of the Assem-
bleia da República, except for the Eighth legislature data, which were given directly by
parliament’s Divisão de Informação Legislativa e Parlamentar.
legislatures, the percentage of government bills approved was a mere 50 and

68, respectively. It was from the Fifth legislature onwards that the ability to
discuss bills at first reading improved considerably.
Indeed, the Fifth legislature represents a turning point in the Assembleia’s
legislative function. It was only then that government bills reached a level of
90 per cent approval and, since then, this rate has remained very high even
in situations of minority such as the Seventh and the Eighth legislatures.
Similarly, the number of MPs’ bills rejected has also increased. Since then,
the legislative function of the Portuguese Parliament has become closer
to its democratically well-established counterparts; one where government
TABLE 4
BILLS THAT DO NOT REACH THE FIRST READING
(% in relation to the total number of MPs’/Government bills proposed)
MPs’ Bills Government Bills
First (1976– 80) 40.1 38

Second (1980–83) 60.7 44.3
Third (1983–85) 73.3 25.2
Fourth (1985–87) 61.9 15.9
Fifth (1987– 91) 47.2 2.3
Sixth (1991–95) 25.9 6.8
Seventh (1995–99) 27.0 9.2
Source: Data base collated by the author from the archives and the activity reports of the Assem-
bleia da República.
dominates. Still, at the same time, as seen above, the bills proposed by
parliament do enjoy a relatively high success rate, especially in a situation
of minority.67 Since the mid-1980s, parliamentary procedures have been regu-
larised and the legislative output fluctuates basically according to the size of
the government’s majority. Following Norton’s typology,68 the legislative
role of the Portuguese Parliament varies in the continuum of policy-making,
policy-influencing and little-or-no-policy affect, according to whether the
government is supported by a minority, a coalition or an absolute majority.
In Search of an Identity for Scrutiny

It is at scrutiny level that the changes in Portuguese parliamentary activity can
be best perceived; in particular, the impact that the experience of the absolute
majorities had. The Portuguese Parliament of the 1970s was conceived primar-
ily as a legislative Assembly and parliamentary control was seen essentially as
a mechanism to ensure the maintenance of democracy. The emphasis was put
therefore on ultimate instruments such as motions of censure and confidence
that question the very existence of government, rather than scrutinising it.
As said elsewhere, scrutiny was then a guarantee of democracy.69 With the
practice of democracy, not only were new scrutiny devices introduced
and/or regularised, but also the actual use of control instruments became
more of a routine for Portuguese MPs.
It was only in 1985 that key scrutiny instruments such as the requerimen-
tos (written questions) and the questions to the government (QGs) were insti-
tutionalised. Although the practice existed already, it lacked a regulatory
framework. A new section for the requerimentos was created in the RP and
the term of QGs ( perguntas ao governo), as such, was introduced. This
partly explains why, throughout the first decade, interpellations and commit-
tees of enquiry were the only two control devices with some visibility. Both of
these are sporadic and solemn instruments, inadequate for regular and conti-
nuing scrutiny of the government’s actions.70 In any case, Table 5 shows
that the use of control devices was very low in the first years of democracy.
The first parliament hardly made any use of control instruments and although
the subsequent parliaments see a slight increase, it is from the Fifth legislature
onwards that Portuguese MPs become accustomed to regularly activating
scrutiny devices.
With the Fifth legislature, the first PSD absolute majority period, came a
sense of government dominance. It was the first time a single party had an
absolute majority and this happened subsequent to a legislature where govern-
ment was particularly weak and dependent on parliament’s will. Partly as a
reaction to this, and partly because of parliament’s partisan nature, the domi-
nance of the PSD became a strong feature of those years. What is more, Prime
Minister Cavaco Silva was known for having a difficult relationship with
parliament. This context favoured the development of the prevailing idea
that parliament had lost its importance, particularly amongst opposition
TABLE 5
SCRUTINY DEVICES IN THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT, 1976 – 2002
(average per year in each legislature)
Requerimentos Sessions of Interpellations Proposals of Special

QGs Committees Debates
of Enquiry
First 628.25 1.0 1.5 0.5 n.a

(1976– 80)
Second 865.3 1.0 3.0 5.7 n.a.
(1980– 83)
Third 2,307.0 3.0 3.5 8.0 n.a.
(1983– 85)
Fourth 2,388.5 2.5 2.0 4.0 2.5
(1985– 87)
Fifth 1,175.3 9.5 5.5 5.75 3.75
(1987– 91)
Sixth 1,250.5 8.0 6.25 8.3 7.75
(1991– 95)
Seventh 1,245.5 8.75 5.5 2.25 23.0
(1995– 99)
Eighth 1,854.0 5.3 4.7 3.3 37.3
(1999– 2002)
Note: QGs stands for Questions to the Government.

The information available suggests that there were no special debates in these years.
Sources: First to Third legislatures: data from parliament’s Divisão de Documentação, kindly
granted by Professor Manuel Braga da Cruz. Fourth to Seventh legislatures: data base
collated by the author from the activity reports of the Assembleia da República.
Eighth legislature: data given directly by parliament’s Divisão de Informação Legisla-
tiva e Parlamentar.
PGs. As a natural reaction to this sense of government dominance, PGs started
to use scrutiny on a more regular basis. In the face of very little, or a lack of,
influence in policy decisions, parliamentary work focused on the activity of
scrutinising; in particular scrutiny involving some form of publicity.
Hence the increase of scrutiny from 1987 onwards. With the exception of
the requerimentos, there was an increase in the use of scrutiny in the Fifth leg-
islature with no significant decline since then. The increase was particularly
clear in devices involving public debate in the Chamber, such as the special
debates. Following the rationalisation of timings and procedures in 1988,
MPs started using every single opportunity to publicise their own proposals.
The value of public debate became very important. Hence the creation in
the 1990s of a number of special debates such as the urgency debates, the
debate on the nation state or the committees’ debate. At the same time, com-
mittee work was also made more public: most meetings for both standing and
enquiry committees became open to the media in 1993, as a rule; before then,
they met behind closed doors, unless otherwise decided. So, not only has
parliamentary scrutiny become more of a routine, but its nature has also
changed.
Despite these changes, the provision for scrutiny is still seen as unsatisfac-
tory, primarily the committees of enquiry71 and the QGs. The Portuguese Par-
liament has developed a number of opportunities to generate public debate, but
still lacks effective instruments for detailed and focused scrutiny. The requer-
imentos have slow and low response rates72 and the QGs are too irregular and
uninteresting. A simple description of the Portuguese system of QGs is self-
explanatory: sessions for QGs take place every two weeks, usually on a
Friday morning and until the mid-1990s, at least, the government was able to
choose which questions it wished to answer. The 1993 revision enhanced the
QGs’ debates and the 2002 revision introduced a new type of QGs,73 but this
instrument is far from having the high profile of the British Question Time,
or the complexity and effectiveness of the German and Spanish questions.
Since the late 1990s scrutiny in the Portuguese Parliament has also devel-
oped a new feature: the focus at committee level. In many ways this comes as a
natural consequence of the general enhancement/reinforcement of committee
work. The public hearings (audições) are a clear example of this. The possi-
bility of committees organising hearings of experts was considerably
enhanced in 1993, being considered by some as the main improvement of
that RP revision. Although the precise number of hearings is not clear, parlia-
ment’s reports show a clear increase of these and the press has become accus-
tomed to reporting them. Another example is the creation of the Standing
Committee for Budgetary Oversight (Comissão de Execução Orçamental) at
the beginning of the Ninth legislature (2002). As said before, the Portuguese
Parliament has considerable powers of discussion and amendment of each
year’s State Budget. Up to the Eighth legislature, the Committee of Economy

and Finance had the main responsibility for this task. However, this committee
was also responsible for any other legislation dealing with economic issues. It
had, therefore, a very limited capacity to oversee the execution of the State
Budget. The creation of a committee specific to the budget, with clear compe-
tences to scrutinise its execution, as happens in many other parliaments, was a
long-awaited expectation of MPs.
At the end of the first decade of Portuguese democracy, António Vitorino
stated, as a conclusion on parliamentary scrutiny, that ‘parliamentary action in
Portugal is still in search for its own identity’.74 Since then, scrutiny has devel-
oped an identity characterised primarily by the style of public debate.
However, this identity is still being forged and the new millennium has
seen the beginnings of a more specialised type of scrutiny.
PATHS OF REFORM
Despite the changes the Portuguese Parliament has already been through in
little more than 25 years, there is much discussion of the need for reform.
As in other West European democracies, Portuguese public opinion conveys
a general sense of dissatisfaction with politics. In a young democracy such
as the Portuguese, this becomes a particularly critical issue and has led the Pre-
sident of the Republic Jorge Sampaio to call on several occasions for an effec-
tive reform of political institutions. As the core of the political system,
parliament becomes easily identified as the main target for reform – even if
the need for reform (if there is one) actually belongs elsewhere.
It was in this context that the ad hoc Committee for the Reform of the Pol-
itical System was created at the beginning of the Ninth legislature. This
committee has held a large number of public hearings with experts on political
and constitutional affairs and is expected to produce consensual legislation in
this area. One of the main expectations in this process has been the electoral
system. As seen above, this has been the topic of much discussion for over a
decade now, but, once again, no agreement seems to have been reached
between the main political parties on this matter.75 At the time of writing
this article, this committee was about to introduce amendments mainly on
legislation dealing with parties and party financing.
The relationship between parliament and citizens has been one of the main
foci of this discussion on reform. As seen above, despite no changes in the
electoral rules, the Assembleia da República has in fact introduced small regu-
latory amendments in parliamentary activity aiming to enhance contacts
between MP and citizens. Besides this, from an administrative point of
view, a number of initiatives have also been developed since the late 1990s
to improve the interface between parliament and citizens. Here are a few
examples: huge improvements in parliament’s archives (open to the public),
the Youth Parliament (a one-off parliamentary session composed of elected
representatives from schools around the country), Parliament’s Channel (a
cable TV channel produced by and about parliament), parliament’s new
website (still under reconstruction) and the development of ports of call for
citizens such as a telephone hotline.
These examples are indicative of a recent clear development of parlia-
ment’s administrative structure. As a last note on change in the Portuguese
Parliament, this should be emphasised as a major difference between
today’s parliament and the one from the 1970s and 1980s. After a period of
consolidation of democratic parliamentary practice (1970s/1980s), came one
of regulation and rationalisation (1980s/1990s) and, finally, considerable
efforts have been made to professionalise the Assembleia da República
since the late 1990s. Not only have physical and administrative resources
been improved,76 but also parliament’s support services to MPs and the com-
munity at large have been expanded, as the above examples illustrate. Still,
much needs to be done in order to make the resources of the Portuguese Par-
liament comparable to its counterparts in Europe.
CONCLUSION
The young Assembleia da República has therefore undergone considerable

change since its inauguration back in 1976. Two main factors explain this
change: the very practice of democracy and the experience of the absolute
majorities period.
In terms of the Portuguese MPs’ socio-demographic profile, the main
changes have been the ageing of MPs and a significant growth in education
levels, both resulting from a maturation of the political system. Female rep-
resentation is still low, despite a recent timid increase in the percentage of
women elected. Career patterns show a clear process of professionalisation.
First, the presence of MPs occupying positions within their parties’ formal
hierarchies has increased during the democratic period. Second, prior political
experience of MPs, be it in elected or appointed offices, is very high. However,
in terms of prior parliamentary experience the Portuguese rates are low; a
phenomenon related to the young age of the democratic system and the
incompatibility between MP and cabinet member positions. As Best and
Cotta state, there is an inherent tension between political professionalisation
and democratisation.77 The Portuguese case is no exception: the growth in pol-
itical professionalisation of Portuguese MPs represents a growing maturation
of the political system, but also an increasing systemic closure.
In terms of its parliamentary structure, the Assembleia da República has
gone through considerable institutionalisation of its activity and procedures.
The result is the dual development of an arena and of a transformative type of

legislature.78 On the one hand the PG has been confirmed as parliament’s core
unit and the Chamber’s tribune function has been reinforced. But, on the other,
the committees’ structure has been enhanced and more independence of inter-
vention has been ascribed to MPs. The real transformation of the Assembleia,
in terms of its parliamentary activity, has been in reality a move from an
emphasis on the legislative function towards a development of its legitimation
function.
In the 1970s, the affirmation of democratic ideals, in opposition to the
inheritance of nearly 50 years of dictatorship, made the principle of public
decision-making extremely dear to the creators of the new regime. Hence
the emphasis then on parliament’s legislative function. As the practice of
democracy developed, in the mid-1980s/1990s, the importance of other parlia-
mentary functions became obvious. It was in this context that scrutiny devel-
oped, as well as links with citizens. In the second decade of democracy, the
Assembleia da República developed its legitimation role, whilst keeping its
legislative function.79 However, the Portuguese Parliament has not stopped
changing. In fact, the calls for reform are as strong today as they were 20
years ago. Again, the links with citizens and scrutiny are the main areas
where reform is urged.
From the image of a factionalised and ineffective parliament portrayed by
Liebert and Opello,80 the Assembleia da República has developed over little
more than 25 years into a stable and complex institution that is still open to
change.
NOTES
1. Despite calls for a blank vote, as a vote on the revolutionary model, there was a turnout of 91.7
per cent and only 6.3 per cent of the voters opted for a blank vote. The 1975 elections were the
first ones where universal franchise was applied in Portugal.
2. M. Lobo Antunes, ‘A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’,
Análise Social, 100/1 (1988), p.80; and J. Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, Tomo I –
o estado e os sistemas constitucionais, (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1997; 1st edn. 1981), p.344.
3. The Constitution of 1976 stated that the Council of the Revolution would be transitory and last
only for the first parliament. The Council was indeed eliminated from the Constitution in
1982, when its powers were redistributed amongst the president and two new organs: the Con-
stitutional Tribunal and the Council of State.
4. M. Braga da Cruz and M. Lobo Antunes, ‘Revolutionary Transition and Problems of Parlia-
mentary Institutionalization: The Case of the Portuguese National Assembly’, in U. Liebert
and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp.154–83.
Consolidation in Southern Europe, pp.249–72, and W. Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: An
Organizational Analysis of Legislative Performance’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 11/3
(1986), pp.291– 319.
6. Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of Legislative Performance’,
p.291.
7. Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of Legislative Performance’,
p.313.
8. Lobo Antunes, ‘A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’, p.88.
9. Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the Consolidation of Democracy – A Comparative Assessment of
Southern European Experiences’, p.260.
Southern European Experiences’, pp.260–61. This classification is based on Weinbaum’s
type of legislatures, M.G. Weinbaum, ‘Classification and Change in Legislative Systems:
With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan’, in G.R. Boynton and C.L.
Kim (eds.), Legislative Systems in Developing Countries (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1975), pp.31–68.
11. C. Leston-Bandeira, From Legislation to Legitimation: The Role of the Portuguese Parlia-
ment (London: Routledge, forthcoming, 2004), Ch.1.2. In our view, Liebert overstates the
party fragmentation that existed then (especially if compared to the fluidity known in the
newly democratic parliaments in Eastern Europe), as well as the influence of the President
of the Republic in parliamentary practice.
12. According to M. Gallagher, M. Laver and P. Mair, Representative Government in Western
Europe (New-York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), these are the four main Portuguese parties:
the PS (Partido Socialista) a socialist/social democrat party; the PSD (Partido Social
Democrata), a right liberal party; the PCP (Partido Comunista Português), a communist
party; and the CDS-PP (Centro Democrático e Social-Partido popular), a Christian democrat,
catholic, party.
13. According to Gallagher et al., Representative Government in Western Europe, the PRD was a
left liberal party.
14. C. Leston-Bandeira, ‘The Role of the Portuguese Parliament Based on a Case Study: The Dis-
cussion of the Budget’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 5/2 (1999), pp.46–73 and J.M. Saraiva,
‘Assembleia da República: o regresso às minorias’, Expresso – Revista, 9 Nov. 1985, p.24.
15. J.J.G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Fundamentos da Constituição (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora,
1991), p.213.
16. J. Miranda, ‘O actual sistema português de actos legislativos’, Legislação, 2 (1991), pp.7–27.
17. If an MP wants to disaffect the party, he/she becomes an independent MP. In order to move
into a different PG, that MP will have to wait for new elections when he/she may be put in the
list of a different party.
18. M. Gallagher and M. Marsh, Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. The Secret
Garden of Politics (London: Sage, 1988), p.1.
19. P. Norris, ‘Legislative Recruitment’, in L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi and P. Norris (eds.), Comparing
Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective (London: Sage, 1996), pp.184–215;
P. Norris (ed.), Passage to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); P. Norris and J. Lovenduski, Political
Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
20. This section builds on the work developed in the following books: A. Freire, Recrutamento Par-
lamentar: Os Deputados Portugueses da Constituinte à VIII Legislatura (Lisbon: STAPE/
MAI, 2001); A. Araújo, M. Costa-Lobo, A. Freire, C. Leston-Bandeira and P. Magalhães,
O Parlamento Português: Uma Reforma Necessária (Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais/
Instituto Amaro da Costa/Assembleia da República, 2002).
21. See M. Duverger, ‘A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government’, in
A. Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992), pp.142–49; M.S. Shugart and J.M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Consti-
tutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997);
A. Freire, ‘Presidentes e eleições presidenciais no Portugal democrático’, in António Costa
Pinto (ed.), Os Presidentes da República Portuguesa (Lisbon: Temas & Debates, 2001),
pp.192–211.
22. For a description of the different levels of government in Portugal, see M. Baum and A. Freire,
‘Parties and Territory in Portuguese Politics’, in J. Bukowski et al. (eds.), Between Europea-
nization and Local Societies: The Space for Territorial Governance (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2003).
23. Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parlia-
ment, pp.188–98.
24. T. Bruneau, ‘Introduction’, in T. Bruneau (ed.), Political Parties and Democracy in Portugal
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p.1.
25. T. Bruneau et al., ‘Democracy, Southern European Style’, in N. Diamandouros and R. Gunther
(eds.), Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe (Baltimore, MD: The
John Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp.16–82.
26. For a general overview on the history of Portuguese proposals for electoral system reform and
their respective arguments, see M.B. Cruz, Sistema Eleitoral Português: Debate Político Par-
lamentar (Lisbon: INCM, 1998); Freire, Recrutamento Parlamentar: Os Deputados Portugu-
eses da Constituinte à VIII Legislatura.
27. F.F. Lopes and A. Freire, Partidos Políticos e Sistemas Eleitorais: Uma Introdução (Oeiras:
Celta, 2002).
28. Amendments to the electoral system law need a two-thirds majority to pass. This majority can
usually only be achieved by joining together the votes of the PSD and the PS.
29. A. Freire, ‘Reforma eleitoral adiada por intransigência na defesa do número de deputados’,
Finisterra, 31–32 (1999), pp.203–6.
30. M. Shugart and M. Wattenberg (eds.), Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both
Worlds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); J. Curtice and P. Shivley, Phillips, ‘Who
Represents Us Best? One Member or Many?’ Paper delivered at the XVIII IPSA World Con-
gress, Quebec City, Canada, August 2000.
31. C. Leston-Bandeira, ‘Parliament and Citizens in Portugal: Still Looking for the Links’, in
P. Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p.135.
32. Leston-Bandeira, ‘Parliament and Citizens in Portugal: Still Looking for the Links’, p.135.
33. However, it should be noted that the system of substitutions is used on a variety of manners by
different PGs. For instance, the BE makes an explicit use of this as a rotation system: to allow
different MPs, representing different interests, to enter parliament for specific periods of time.
34. Leston-Bandeira, ‘Parliament and Citizens in Portugal: Still Looking for the Links’, p.145.
35. After the 1991 electoral defeat, the new CDS leadership changed the party’s ideological
profile, altering the name to Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular. Its internal organis-
ation in legislative recruitment also changed, becoming heavily centralised (see below).
36. For more details on party selection procedures, see Freire, Recrutamento Parlamentar: Os
Deputados Portugueses da Constituinte à VIII Legislatura, pp.45–53.
37. See S. Scarrow et al., ‘From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing Dis-
tribution of Power within Political Parties’, in R. Dalton and M. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties
Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp.129–56.
38. All of the data can be found in Freire, Recrutamento Parlamentar: Os Deputados
Portugueses da Constituinte à VIII Legislatura, and can be given upon request to: andre.freire@
iscte.pt. This dataset is being integrated in the CUBE project on European Parliamentary Repre-
sentatives, directed by Heinrich Best, Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli (Eurelite Group).
39. J.M.L. Viegas and S. Faria, As Mulheres na Política (Oeiras: Celta, 2001), p.55.
40. Freire, Recrutamento Parlamentar: Os Deputados Portugueses da Constituinte à VIII
Legislatura.
41. Norris, ‘Legislative Recruitment’; Norris (ed.), Passage to Power: Legislative Recruitment in
Advanced Democracies; Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and
Class in the British Parliament.
42. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Women in Parliament’, www.ipu.org.
43. For data on other countries, see Norris (ed.), Passage to Power: Legislative Recruitment in
Advanced Democracies; H. Best and M. Cotta, Parliamentary Representatives in Europe,
1848–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
44. Norris (ed.), Passage to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies; Best and
Cotta, Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000; and UN World Development
Indicators, CD-Rom, 2001.
45. Best and Cotta, Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000, p.495.
46. This category includes people that do not occupy any position in the parties’ formal hierarchy.
However, even if not belonging to the parties’ formal organisation, some MPs do occupy pos-
itions in autonomous organisations (of workers, women, and so on) that are related to their parties.
47. See Norris, ‘Legislative Recruitment’; Norris (ed.), Passage to Power: Legislative Recruit-
ment in Advanced Democracies; Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender,
Race and Class in the British Parliament; Best and Cotta, Parliamentary Representatives
in Europe, 1848–2000, p.495.
48. Excluding the data referring to the Constituent and to the Fourth legislature, which are very differ-
ent from the other legislatures, there is an average ratio of 2.25 for the first decade (First to Third
legislatures) and 3.375 in the second decade (Fifth to Eighth legislatures). That is, for every MP
with a party position at national level, 2.25 MPs had a regional/local one in the first decade.
49. MPs’ prior political experience in the national parliament is measured by two indicators: par-
liamentary experience in the last legislature – MP (LAST LEGISLATURE); and prior parlia-
mentary experience in any legislature – MP (ANY TIME).
50. Freire, Recrutamento Parlamentar: Os Deputados Portugueses da Constituinte à VIII Legis-
latura, pp.113–25.
51. Note that Figure 5 shows prior parliamentary experience of Portuguese MPs and not turnover.
Turnover is calculated as 100 minus political experience rates in each year.
52. Best and Cotta, Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000, pp.504–6.
54. Research into the discussion of the annual state budget between 1983 and 1995 does support
this information though: from the Fifth legislature onwards the links between MPs and their
constituencies became clearer in their work in parliament (C. Leston-Bandeira, From Legis-
lation to Legitimation: The Role of the Portuguese Parliament, Ch.6).
55. Respectively, Constituição da República Portuguesa and Regimento da Assembleia da
República. Besides this, other important regulatory documents include: the Statute of MPs,
which deals in detail with MPs’ rights and duties and the Organic Law of the Assembleia
da República, which prescribes on administrative matters.
56. Of which we emphasise parliament’s new powers to amend the State Budget and the restric-
tions on the president’s power to dismiss government and to dissolve parliament.
57. The 1997 constitutional revision introduced the possibility of including single-member con-
stituencies into the electoral system. However, despite much discussion on this matter and
several attempts to revise the electoral system law, no change has been introduced since
the system that was first adopted in 1975 to elect the Constituent Assembly.
58. J. Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitutional, Tomo I – O Estado e Os Sistemas Constitucio-
nais (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1997; orig. edn. 1981), pp.370–407.
59. The absolute majority voting rule is required to change the RP.
60. Besides this, the 2002 revision also institutionalised a monthly debate with the prime minister
(Regimento da Assembleia da República, 2002, art. 239.o). In the Seventh legislature, Prime
Minister António Guterres introduced the practice of monthly Chamber debates with the
prime minister. The 2002 amendment institutionalises this as a regular practice.
61. Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of Legislative Performance’, p.304.
62. For more details on specific RP changes, see Leston-Bandeira, From Legislation to Legitima-
tion: The Role of the Portuguese Parliament, Ch.3.3.
63. For more details on these changes enhancing links with citizens, see Leston-Bandeira,
‘Parliament and Citizens in Portugal: Still Looking for the Links’, pp.138–9.
64. Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes, ‘Revolutionary Transition and Problems of Parliamentary
Institutionalization: The Case of the Portuguese National Assembly’.
65. The first reading stage is preceded by a prior referral in committee, where a report is produced
on each bill; no partisan views are formulated at this stage. First reading takes place in the
Chamber.
66. Please note that it is a question of inability and not of rights. Portuguese PGs have had con-
siderable agenda-setting rights, particularly before 1988.
67. This is partly explained by the way bills are proposed and accounted for in the final laws
approved, which results in inflated numbers. Any given bill proposed on a specific issue
tends to cause the proposal of more bills from other PGs, as this is a way of ensuring a
prime time to intervene in the first reading debate; the non-proponent PGs have considerably
less time to speak. The result of this is an inflationary number of bills. The 2002 RP revision
introduced limits on this and, as a result, this practice may change in the future. On the other
hand, the number of bills approved at final vote include any bill that has made a contribution to
the discussion of the final law draft, even if minimal. That is, in practice, it includes all the
bills approved at first reading and discussed in committee at second reading, together with
the main proponent bill(s), reaching the final vote stage.
68. P. Norton, ‘The Legislative Powers of Parliament’, in C. Flinterman, A. Willentteringe and
L. Waddington (eds.), The Evolving Role of Parliaments in Europe (Antwerp: Maklu
Uitgevers, 1994), pp.15–35.
69. C. Leston-Bandeira, ‘The Portuguese Parliament and Democracy’, West European Politics,
24/1 (2001), p.150.
70. Please note that interpellations in the Portuguese system are regulated in detail by the CRP;
where it is stated that each PG is allowed to propose a maximum of two interpellations per
year.
71. See G. Rosendo, ‘Comissão de inquérito à PJ inconclusiva’, Expresso, 21/12/02, p.10.
72. This has improved. Whereas in the Fourth legislature the response rate was 37 per cent, in the
first year of the Eighth legislature this had improved to 63 per cent.
73. There are now two types of QGs: departmental (sectorial) and general ones (Regimento da
Assembleia da República, 2002, art. 240.o and 241.o). It is too early to assess the impact of
this change.
74. A. Vitorino, ‘O controlo parlamentar dos actos do governo’, in M. Baptista Coelho, Portugal:
O Sistema Político e Constitucional (1974–1987) (Lisbon, Instituto de Ciências Sociais,
1989), p.386.
75. See M.T. Oliveira, ‘Reforma eleitoral adiada sine-die’, Expresso, 14 Dec. 2002, p.10, and S.J.
Almeida, ‘Lei dos partidos está pronta’, Público, 29 March 2003, p.21.
76. Note the inauguration in 1999 of the new building that has provided, among other things, new
meeting rooms and offices for MPs – today most MPs share one office between two, rather
than five or six as had happened since the late 1980s, or no office at all as was the case in
the first decade of democracy.
78. N. Polsby, ‘Legislatures’, in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political
Science, V (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp.257–319.
79. Leston-Bandeira, From Legislation to Legitimation: The Role of the Portuguese Parliament,
Ch.7.
Southern European Experiences’, and Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: An Organizational
Analysis of Legislative Performance’.
The Hellenic Parliament:
The New Rules of the Game
PENELOPE FOUNDETHAKIS
The transition of the Hellenic Parliament from post-war autocratic parliamen-

tarism and a dictatorship that collapsed in 1974, to rational parliamentarism
within a polarised political system up to 1985 has already been well
researched.1 This article attempts to focus on the new data that make up the
character of the Hellenic Parliament.
Although parliament had a fundamental role at the basis of the new demo-
cratic regime, it failed to develop into an efficient and democratically run insti-
tution. The weakness of the parliament proved to be a key problem during
the 1985– 2001 period. This was demonstrated first in the parliamentary
response to the gradual reduction of its political power, due to the strengthen-
ing of the executive; secondly, in the parliamentary response to the scorn to
which its members were subjected by ‘public opinion’ due to the frequent
accusations of non-transparency and improper exchanges with the sources
of economic power. A balance between its new roles shaped by the
complex reality of mass democracy in international society has not yet been
achieved by the Hellenic Parliament. During the process of the recent consti-
tutional revision, many members of parliament referred nostalgically to a past
age of parliamentary resplendence.
Equilibrium is also being sought between the two basic opposing parlia-
mentary tendencies at the level of internal procedures. This can be observed
in two areas: first, the individual institutional role of the member of parliament
(MP) comes into conflict with that of the collective parliamentary formations;
second, the need for broader participation comes into conflict with the need for
greater speed and effectiveness. Clearly, the constitution and the standing
orders (SO) gave priority, in the first area, to the weakening of the institutional
role of the MPs and the reinforcing of the parliamentary groups. In the second
area, reference is made to effectiveness at the expense of democratic legitimi-
sation of the parliamentary process.
The revision of the constitution in April 2001 and the SO in December 2001
dealt with these problems in a positive way. However, both of the major parties
displayed political timidity and a closed shop mentality on some of the issues.
How these new provisions will be implemented and the influence they will have
on the Greek political system remains to be demonstrated.
THE HELLENIC PARLIAMENT IN BRIEF
The Greek Parliament consists of one Chamber and fulfils the function of
the legislative body in a parliamentary republic. There is no tradition of a
Senate, although there are two historical examples, in 1844 and in 1927,
which did not last long. There are 300 MPs, according to the law. The
constitutional provision allows for between 200 and 300 Deputies, but the
‘tradition’ is for the maximum. The Greek peculiarity lies in the weak
status of the parliamentary opposition, in the very strong relationship
between the governmental party on the one hand and the state and the
administration on the other. This fact is the relic of a democracy, economy,
and even society, dominated by the state since the nineteenth century. Since
1987 steady efforts have been made, through the revision of the SO, to
strengthen parliament – that is, to strengthen the opposition. The identification
between government and parliamentary majority has been helped by (a) an
almost absolute party discipline and (b) an electoral system which tradition-
ally restricts the political game to the two main parties – the centre-right
and the centre-left.
Until the latest revision of the constitution and the SO (2001), parliamen-
tary work was very centralised. Although there was a constitutional provision
about the possibility of splitting the plenum into two sections, practice worked
against this choice. The institutions of the Presidium of the Parliament and of
the Conference of Presidents, created in 1987, have contributed considerably
towards a more organised parliamentary work.
There is a steadily increasing number of committees. The need for a
‘working’ parliament has led to an enlargement of the new legislative compe-
tences of the six permanent parliamentary committees (standing committees),
which has resulted in taking over a great deal of the work of the plenum. These
committees are: the Standing Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs;
on Defence and Foreign Affairs; on Economic Affairs; on Social Affairs; on
Public Administration, Public Order and Justice; and on Production and
Trade. There are also two special committees: on the Financial Statement
and the General Balance Sheet of the State, and on European Affairs.
Besides these, there are four special permanent committees: on Greeks
Abroad; on Institutions and Transparency; on Technology Assessment; on
Equality and Human Rights. The internal affairs of parliament are the
subject matter of four committees established in every regular session
(Committee on SO of the Parliament; Committee on Parliamentary Finances;
Committee on the Parliamentary Library; and Committee on International
Parliamentary Affairs). Finally there are the investigation committees
and the ad hoc parliamentary committee for the conducting of preliminary
investigations in the case of impeachment.
THE HELLENIC PARLIAMENT 87
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 1985 – 2001: THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM,
THE PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTAL CRISES
The Greek political system was marked by the change of government in 1981,
when the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came into power. In 1985,
PASOK won the elections again and implemented a system of ‘reinforced’ pro-
portional representation with elements of a majority system.2 The constitutional
revision of 1986, the content of which was restricted to a drastic reduction of the
excessive powers of the President of the Republic, did not succeed in reinfor-
cing the parliament.3 On the contrary, it reinforced the predominance of the
governing party, primarily its leader, and the prime minister.
This took place within the framework of a bi-polar system and of single-
party governments, the rule in the Greek political system,4 in combination
with a deficit of intra-party democracy,5 which continues to the present day.
Intra-party democracy is a problem in Greece, perhaps more so than in other
European countries, as there is a solid tradition of politicians with strong
personalities, who ‘owned’ their parties and imposed absolute party discipline.
The last party leaders of this tradition were Konstantinos Karamanlis and
Andreas Papandreou. During the last 10 –15 years there has been an effort
within the parties to improve the democratic process of party decision-
making. However, to this date, there is a legal disagreement over the vague
constitutional provision on political parties (article 29, para.1), on whether
it commits parties to internal democracy or not.
Due to the Koskotas scandal,6 which acted as a catalyst for political devel-
opments, the atmosphere of the 1989 elections was intensely loaded against
the socialist party. A few months prior to the election, the governing party
passed a bill establishing a system of genuine proportional representation.7
This changed the existing system of ‘reinforced’ proportional representation
in place since 1974. The clear aim was to hinder the right-wing party of
New Democracy (ND) in the formation of a majority government. Following
the election of June 1989, a paradoxical coalition government of the right in
co-operation with the Communist Party was formed.8 Its slogan was ‘purifi-
cation’: ‘catharsis’. It aimed at bringing impeachment charges against
Andreas Papandreou and three other ministers of the PASOK government
in the ad hoc Special Court.9 This was followed by the government of Grivas,
which conducted the elections of November 1989 when once again a single-
party government failed to emerge. The publicly accepted government
of Zolotas – a non-parliamentarian and university professor10 – led to the
dissolution of parliament after the failure of the parties’ agreement concerning
the election of the President of the Republic. A New Democracy government
emerged from the elections of 8 April 1990, with a marginal majority:
its majority was secured thanks to the vote of the one MP elected from
the centre-right party ‘Democratic Renewal’ (‘DIANA’). This government

fell after some of its MPs seceded. However in the first months of its term,
the ND government had already brought back the system of ‘reinforced’ pro-
portional representation11 with a law which remains in force.12 Andreas
Papandreou was declared not guilty13 and, following the elections of
October 1993, PASOK gained a large percentage difference over ND,
forming once again a Papandreou government, followed by the Simitis gov-
ernment.14 Single-party governments of PASOK emerged in the elections of
September 1996 and April 2000 under the same electoral law.15
Three elements stand out in this turbulent period which help to interpret
the provisions of constitutional law: the first is the endurance of the political
system under intense strain; the second is the successful implementation of the
detailed provisions for the cabinet formation process which were enacted with
the 1986 revision;16 the third is the on-going preference of the electorate for
the bi-polar model and single-party governments.17
The instrumentalist use of electoral law by every governmental majority,
frequently making changes a few months prior to elections, resulted in the
addition to the constitution, in its recent revision, of a clause dealing with
this issue. According to the new provision (article 54 para.1 Constitution
[C]), the electoral system is defined by statute law that comes into effect in
the elections subsequent to the forthcoming elections. This is the case, unless
two-thirds of the MPs decide that it will come into effect in the forthcoming
elections. The new provision that expresses the admitted distrust of the govern-
mental majority was accepted by all – MPs, parties and public opinion. Given
the repeatedly abusive dissolution of parliament to date,18 the question arises as
to whether the problem has simply been transposed from the timing of the
passing of electoral law to the timing of the dissolution of the parliament.19
THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
The extensive revision of the Greek Constitution concerned 51 articles and

was passed in parliament on 6 April, 2001.20 The revision process was seen
as particularly consensual, a point of view supported in part by the number
of votes in favour of the proposed provisions. The consensus was achieved
easily, however, as confrontational issues of great political interest (state–
church relationship, non-public universities, dissolution of parliament, rights
of immigrants, protection of property rights) were not discussed. The revision
was therefore considered as ‘superficial and only procedurally consensual’,
‘not daring’, ‘colourless’, ‘awkward’ and ‘dangerous’.21
In contrast to the revision process as a whole, where consensus remained
difficult to obtain, the constitutional law provisions aiming at parliament’s
modernisation emerged as an area of very broad agreement between the two
TABLE 1
VOTES AND SEATS, 1985 – 2000
Parties Fourth Term Fifth Term Sixth Term Seventh Term Eighth Term Ninth Term Tenth Term
2 June 18 June 5 November 8 April 10 October 22 September 9 April
1985 1989 1989 1990 1993 1996 2000
% of no of % of no of % of no of % of no of % of no of % of no of % of no of
votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats
PASOK 45.82 126 39.13 125 40.67 128 38.61 123 46.88 170 41.49 162 43.79 158
New Democracy 40.84 161 44.28 145 46.19 148 46.89 150 39.30 111 38.12 108 42.73 125
Communist Party 9.89 12 19 4.54 9 5.61 11 5.53 11
Synaspismos1 1.84 1 13.12 28 10.97 21 10.28 19 2.94 0 5.12 10 3.20 6
POLAN2 – – – – – – – – 4.87 10 2.94 0 – –
DIKKI3 – – – – – – – – – – 4.43 9 2.69 0
DIANA4 – – 1.01 1 0.67 1 – – – – – –
Ecologists – – – – 0.58 1 0.77 1 – – 0.08 0 0.05 0
Other5 1.61 0 2.46 16 1.59 27 2.78 68 1.47 0 2.21 0 2.01 0
300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Notes: 1 The Coalition of the Left and of Progress was the co-operative effort of the Communist Party of Greece and the Communist Party of the Interior,
which ran together in the elections of 1989 and 1990. In the elections of 1985 they ran separately, while in the elections of 1993 and thereafter, the
Communist Party of Greece had left the united coalition.
2 Political Spring under Antony Samaras, a personalised party of the centre-right with nationalistic positions in external policy. Not active since 1999.
3 Democratic Social Movement under Dimitris Tsovolas, former minister of PASOK, a personalised party of the left.
4 Democratic Renewal under Costis Stefanopoulos, with MPs who left the New Democracy Party. It dissolved itself in 1994.
5 None of the parties or the independent MPs included here won a percentage over 0.8%. The far right National Patriotic Union in 1985 won its largest
percentage of the votes, 0.60%.
6 The MP Rodopis Sadik Achmet Sadik, with 0.38% is elected as an independent.
7 Two independent MPs.
8 Six independent MPs.
Source: Official Results, published by the Ministry of the Interior.
major parties and disagreement with the small parties. It was the section on
parliament that underwent the most changes. Thirty provisions received
more than 250 votes in both rounds. These were related to: the election and
composition of parliament; electoral disqualifications and incompatibilities
of MPs; the rights and duties of MPs; the organisation and functioning of
parliament; as well as the powers of parliament. Only two provisions relating
to the powers of parliament received less than 180 votes.22 The systematic
coherent voting alignment by party is a clear indication of the intensity of
party discipline, even though the party leadership had declared that throughout
the revisionary procedure party discipline would not apply.
Certain general conclusions can be reached with regard to the revised pro-
visions. First, recourse was made to constitutional rules on provisions which
could be the subject matter of formal law. The second, which follows from
the first, are the very detailed changes that reach the point of breaking the
unity of the constitutional text. A typical example in the area of parliamentary
law is where the constitutional provisions make recommendations on electoral
funding (article 29 para.2 C), on electoral law (articles 51 and 54 C), as well as
on electoral disqualifications and incompatibilities (articles 56 and 57 C). This
tendency towards ‘obesity’ of the constitutional text demonstrates the mistrust
towards the governmental majority and is connected with the manipulation of
the legislative process to produce mere superficial legislative changes, clien-
telism, superfluous provisions in bills and the lack of real participation of the
opposition in the law-making process.23
The parliamentary debate on the revision of the provisions on parliament
had three central points. The first is the anxiety expressed by MPs concerning
the improvement of their role and putting forward their particular points
of view. The second concerns the demand for ‘an improved parliament’, a
‘reorganisation of the functioning of popular representation’ which was con-
nected with ‘modernisation and rationalisation of the legislative proceedings
and of control over the executive’. The third point is related to the problem
of corruption, of illegal political funds, and of the improper and illegal connec-
tion of economic interests and political choices.24
LEGISLATION
The most significant amendment concerns the legislative competence of the

permanent parliamentary committees that are formed and function for each
yearly parliamentary session (article 70 para.2 C).25 According to
the amended article 70, these committees, which had competence only in
the processing of bills following the revision, acquire in addition autonomous
legislative competence, with the exception of cases in which the plenary
session has exclusive competence.26 The small parties and a fair number of
TABLE 2
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1981 – 91
Terms Ministerial Ruling Party Opposition Total
Third 1981–85 1,058 29% 438 12% 2,160 59% 3,656 72.6%
Fourth 1985– 5.1989
Fifth 17 7.5% 157 69.5% 52 23% 226 4.5%
6.1989–11.1989
Sixth 67 23.7% 216 76.3% – – 283 5.6%
11.1989–3.1990
Seventh 233 26.7% 228 26.1% 411 47.1% 872 17.3%
4.1990–15.6.1991
Total 1,375 27.3% 1,039 20.7% 2,623 52% 5,037 100%
Source: D. Melissas, ‘Legislation in Greece’, Parliamentary Review, 7–8 (1991), p.100

(in Greek). Data adapted.
MPs from the two large political parties were completely opposed to this
change. Despite the objections, the amendment was accepted with the follow-
ing addition: all MPs may submit law proposals27 and additions or amend-
ments in any permanent committee irrespective of their membership
thereto. Any permanent committee may refer any dispute concerning its com-
petence to the plenum by resolution adopted by an absolute majority of all its
members (article 72 para.3 C).28 In accordance with the constitutional adjust-
ments, the competence of the permanent parliamentary committees is con-
ditional upon the competency of the plenum.29 The SO overturned the
ruling of competence in favour of the committees (article 89 para.3 SO) and
turned the rule into the exception, stating that the Conference of Presidents
may introduce a bill for debate and vote by the plenum.
Irrespective of these problems, however, we must underline the signifi-
cance and usefulness of the new adjustment on legislative competence of
the permanent committees. It contributes indisputably to the rationalisation
of parliamentary functioning.
Another classic example of the contortion of the legislative process is
the issue of provisions and amendments not related to the subject matter of
a law, which has been taking place constantly since 1974.30 These are unre-
lated provisions either embodied in the bill, or proposed suddenly as additions
and amendments at the last moment, usually late at night. Their existence is
overtly declared in the title of the laws by the common denotation
‘and other provisions’.31 The unrelated provisions exacerbate the fragmented
and contradictory adjustments, facilitate the clientelistic accommodations and
hinder citizen access to the laws that affect them, especially if one takes into
consideration the relative scarcity of codifications.32 This problem was not
solved by the revision, and the clause remained as it was. As a result, in the
case of dispute over whether a clause of a bill is related to its main subject
matter or not – and being thus considered unconstitutional – parliament is
competent for the decision, that is the parliamentary majority.33
The implementation of the Constitution of 1975 has demonstrated that in
the Hellenic Parliament issues of whether the content of a bill is contrary to the
constitution are made on the basis of party discipline of the members of any
governmental majority, as well as of the opposition. Very often, members
of the government declare that the solution to some controversial issue is
the passing of the respective legal provision, when the provision itself, as
part of a presidential decree, has already been judged unconstitutional in the
preventive controls undertaken by the ‘Conseil d’Etat’. This constitutes a con-
tortion of the parliamentary examination of the constitutionality of bills. In
combination with the refusal of courts to examine the interna corporis of
the parliament and the absence of a Constitutional Court, it leads to an inse-
cure political situation, in so far as some laws are judged unconstitutional in
retrospect and in a fragmented fashion.
Still, the revision broached this topic of unconstitutionality on the issue of
the time period during which additions and amendments can be introduced.
Prior to the constitutional revision, ministers could introduce additions and
amendments at any time, even during the course of the parliamentary
debate. MPs could introduce these as late as the day before the debate
began. The revision provides for the amendment and additions of the ministers
and MPs to be introduced at least three days prior to the initiation of the
debate, so as to avoid the legislative body being taken by surprise.34
The revision of the debate and the voting process on the State Budget and
the General Balance and Financial Statements of the State were positive.
According to the new rules, the Minister of Finance is obligated to present
a draft budget to the competent permanent parliamentary committee on the
first Monday of October. The Minister of Finance introduces the budget to par-
liament at least 40 days (as opposed to the prior 30 days) before the beginning
of the fiscal year, ‘taking the comments of the Committee into consider-
ation’.35 This interpolation allows actual control over budgetary figures and
is very important, particularly taking into account that voting in the plenum
takes place by ministry on the total amount, without the possibility of the
amounts being amended.
With regard to the General Balance and the Financial Statements of the
State, the revised provision of article 79, paragraph 7 stipulates that the
government must append the report of the Court of Auditors. Altogether
these constitute the subject matter which is processed by a special committee
of MPs, after which they are announced by the plenum. This greatly facilitates
the business of the parliament and ensures the transparency of the data
required for a sound assessment by the plenum.
In an attempt to reinforce the role of parliament, the government is
obligated to inform parliament on issues subject to decrees within the frame-
work of the European Union and their debate, based on the revised provisions
of article 70, paragraph 8 C. In this case, the competent committee makes
its findings known, which are then conveyed to the competent ministry as
provided for in the SO (article 32A SO and 41B SO).
Of course, the quality of legislation does not depend only on constitutional
provisions. The legal framework should be complemented by the qualifications
of the constitutional provision for the actual improvement of the performance of
the parties, the parliamentary groups and the individual MPs. This is achieved
with direct access to and complete provision of information concerning the
business of the government in every field, with scientific support both in
parliament as well as for the MPs. The new provisions of the SO bring about
real improvement in the legislative process. However, parliament continues to
legislate without fully informing or briefing, without being able to enter the
ministerial mazes involved in legislating and the drafting of laws.36 This
deficit primarily concerns the opposition and may account for the exercising
of legislative initiative almost exclusively by the government.37
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE
Until recently, exercising control over the government was taboo for MPs and
for the governmental party. Over the last decade, their timid adoption of
means of parliamentary control has been observed. In all cases, and reasonably
so within the framework of present day parliamentarism, control remains the
basic competence of the parliamentary opposition.38
The Greek Constitution provides only for a few means of parliamentary
control, particularly addressing reports and complaints (article 69 C), the sum-
moning of a minister (article 66 para.3 C), the investigation committees
(article 68 para.2 C) and of course the motion of censure (article 84 C). The
remaining control devices are specified by the SO: questions and current ques-
tions, interpellations and current interpellations, questions of the MPs to the
ministers, the ‘informing and briefing’ procedures of parliament and
announcements or declarations of the government to the parliament (articles
124 –38A SO).
The revision of 2001 brought about two positive amendments: (1) the
awarding of competence for parliamentary control to the permanent
parliamentary committees as well as to the section when parliament is in
recess – in the past this competence was held only by the plenum (article
70 para.6 C) – and (2) the ease with which the permanent committees can
summon ‘any person’ (‘any civil servant’ in its former wording) whom they
consider useful for their work (article 66 para.3 C).
Intense criticism could be levelled at the refusal of parliament to revise

the controversial provision concerning the investigation committees. The
problem rests on two points: the first concerns the decision of parliament on
the establishment of investigation committees on issues of foreign policy
and national defence, where an absolute majority of MPs is required (article
68 para.2.2 C).39 During the revision, an amendment, which would extend
the right of the minority to set up investigation committees, was not accepted.
Thus a ‘privilege’ of governmental majority is preserved, justified by the need
for the ‘protection’ of classified data on ‘sensitive national issues’. This is an
endemic tendency that in essence limits the possibilities of parliamentary
intervention in many fields. A long tradition of secretiveness on the part of
the Greek administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry
of Defence contributes to the all too easy characterisation of documents as
confidential. This results in awkwardness and often the avoidance of inform-
ing parliament on many issues. It also makes the conduct of scientific research
in these fields difficult.
The second point concerns the general provision on the formation of
‘ordinary’ investigation committees. In its article 68 para.2.1 C, there is a
contradiction regarding the decision on the formation of those committees.
This stems from the phrase ‘majority of two-fifths’, since two-fifths does
not constitute a majority. The SO interpret the controversial constitutional pro-
vision in favour of the parliamentary majority. In other words, it is specified
that the relevant decision requires an ‘absolute majority of those present,
which cannot be less than two-fifths of the entire number of the MPs’.40
The application of this provision to date has demonstrated that each and
every time the interpretative version that best serves any government is
chosen. Of course, opinions change when the former governing party
becomes the opposition and, vice versa, when the opposition becomes the
governing party.41 In this way, the parliamentary minority is deprived of an
important means of parliamentary control, while the contradictory and ‘oppor-
tunistic’ interpretations of the constitution damage the credibility of MPs and
the parties.
AMENDMENTS OF THE STANDING ORDERS
The amendments of the SO as a corollary of the constitutional revision began

eight months after the new constitution came into force. They were passed on
6 December 2001, after debate by the plenum for only two days.42 The
SO passed in June 1987 still constitute the basic text in which many new
institutions have been established, such as the multi-party presidium, the
Conference of Presidents, the current questions and interpellations and
the permanent committees. These to some degree reinforce the position of
the opposition comparatively to the previous SO of 1975, and provide for
much more analytical regulations.43 The latest amendment confirms the
characteristics of the post-1974 SO with regard to the interpretation and the
specification of the constitutional provisions. First, the parliamentary majority
is reinforced at the expense of the minority. Second, the rights of the MPs give
way to the rights of the parliamentary groups. Third, the time allowed for par-
ticipants, MPs and ministers to speak is gradually being reduced. The reasons
behind these choices are connected primarily with facilitating the majority and
secondarily with the permanent appeal to effectiveness at the expense of actual
work. However, fears of the misuse of rights by the minority and obstruction-
ism aimed only at opposition are not misplaced. Prior to 1967 and also after
1974, this was a method used by the opposition. The recent past has not
been marked by many similar phenomena. It should however be stressed
that some of the changes in the SO over the past decade, besides its last
broad revision, seek a reinforcement of the rights of the minority parliamen-
tary groups.44
The presidium of the parliament is elected for the entire parliamentary
term and is made up of the speaker, five deputy speakers, three rectors and
six secretaries. Two of the deputy speakers, one rector and two secretaries
are from the opposition (article 6 SO). With regard to actual involvement in
the parliamentary procedure, the Conference of Presidents is important. It
was established in 1987 to co-ordinate parliamentary legislative and control
business. It consists of the speaker, the former speakers, the deputy speakers,
the chairmen of the permanent committees, the chairman of the Committee on
Institutions and Transparency, the heads of the parliamentary groups and an
independent MP as a representative of the independents. Its decisions are
made by absolute majority (article 13 SO).45 The most important competen-
cies of the conference are the examination of the Order of the Day, setting
the time allowed for debating bills, the choice of members of the independent
public authorities, and making proposals to the plenum. During the recent
amendment of the SO, there was particular debate over the nature of the
Conference of Presidents as a screen for the speaker himself, where he (or
she) would be able to determine the outcome of decisions without publicly
doing so. The criticism was made that there is an over-representation of the
parliamentary majority, when one takes into account that all the chairs of
the permanent committees belong to the governing party.
The SO specify the detail for the constitutional provision on the under-
taking of parliamentary business. With the exception of the plenum, they
state that the section, when parliament is in recess, exercises parliamentary
control through questions (article 126 para.5 SO), current questions and
current interpellations (article 129 para.1 SO). At the beginning of each
sitting, the permanent committees of the session may hold a ‘debate at the
initiative of MPs’ on one or two issues of more general interest to the ministry
within whose jurisdiction the bill is being debated (article 128 SO), using in
effect a control device that was already available for the plenum (article
132A SO).
The interpellations constitute an effective means of parliamentary
control, but they are not entrenched with a constitutional provision. The
new amendments of the SO specify the debate of current interpellations
every Monday. Those MPs who have signed the interpellations, as well as
the competent minister, take part in these debates. It can be seen as positive
that the conference under the new provisions cannot easily avoid issues that
are politically unpleasant for the majority.46
The questions of the MPs to the ministers (articles 126 – 8 SO) as well as
the answers (within 20 days) from the competent ministers are presented in
written form. The current questions are of particular interest (articles 129–
32 SO); they were established for the first time in 1987 and have undergone
quite a few amendments with regard to procedure. Following the amendments
of October 2000, the questions of the MPs are directed not only towards the
ministers, but also towards the prime minister.
The ‘informing and briefing’ procedures of parliament constitute means
of parliamentary control in the broader sense. The debates with priority
over the Order of the Day were established in the SO of 1987 (article 143
SO), formalising a practice that had existed since 1974. The debate concerns
national issues or issues of more general interest on which the prime minister
informs parliament and a debate ensues in which the chairs of the parliamen-
tary groups and one or two ministers take part.
The announcements or declarations of the government to the parliament
(article 142A SO), established in 1993, are announcements by the prime min-
ister on any public matter. They are followed by comments from the chairs of
the parliamentary committees. The prime minister informs the speaker, in
writing, that he intends to address the parliament on a serious public issue,
mentioning the subject matter. The speaker has to inform the leaders of
the parliamentary groups at least 24 hours before the announcements of the
prime minister. The announcements take place in the plenum and there is
an oral procedure, prior to any other issue on the Order of the Day. The
prime minister may speak for ten minutes, the leaders for five minutes.
There is also a second round with five and three minutes respectively.
The proliferation of parliamentary committees is also a constant in the
amendments of the SO. In the recent amendment, a new committee was
created: the Special Standing Committee on the Financial Statement and
General Balance of the State (article 31A SO). In 1996, the special permanent
committees were created (article 43A SO) and included the following: Greeks
Abroad; Institutions and Transparency; Technology Assessment on Issues of
Bioethics; and now a Committee on Equality and Human Rights has been
added, in which provision has been made for the equal participation of men
and women MPs.
Special mention must be made of the new amendments to the SO on
research and specialised support, as well as administrative support of
parliamentary business. In the amended SO, the research support service of
parliament (articles 160– 63 SO) is greatly enlarged47 and the scientific
council acquires broader competence. The research support of parliamentary
business is directed particularly toward European, international and compu-
ter-related issues. However, questions to experts are exclusively posed
by the chairs of the committees, while individual MPs have support from
only one research assistant. Time will tell whether in this way the existing
information deficit of MPs and the research support of their work will be ade-
quately dealt with. This is probably unlikely. In any parliament, the research
service can offer means to build up criticisms at the stage of legislative
initiative, which in Greece is monopolised by the government. The need for
critical examination of the proposed statutes assists the parliament vis-à-vis
the government, however de facto it consolidates the opposition. It is
unknown whether these ambitious amendments will be able to deal with the
political friction created by the organisation of impartial research support
for parliament.
THE GOVERNMENT – PARLIAMENT RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between government and parliament is of course scattered

among provisions of parliamentary law. This is due to the overlapping of
the legislative and the executive powers in the parliamentary regime. The
relationship between the two powers is, for instance, influenced by the over-
lapping of parliamentary and ministerial jobs. The very few ministers who
are not MPs are often treated in a rather hostile manner by governmental
MPs. Given the very large number of ministers and under-secretaries – 48
at present – all MPs may hope, theoretically, that they will acquire ministerial
status within the parliamentary term.48
During the 1990s, three elements created a new situation that influenced
the relationship between government and parliament.
The first concerns the weakening of MPs in their traditional clientelistic
role. This is related primarily to the possibility of appointing candidates to
positions in the public sector. During the 1980s, appointments of those
favoured by the governmental party came under the control of the party mech-
anism, creating tension between party officials and MPs. Later, the passing of
a bill on recruitment in the public sector with open examinations and objective
criteria removed such a possibility from the hands of the MPs.
The second concerns the overall antagonism between MPs and ministers
that runs through the overall functioning of parliament. The important thing
for the government is to maintain a balance between its ministers and the gov-
ernmental party MPs so as to preserve intact its own partisan and ideological
homogeneity within and among the parliamentary majority.
The third element, a very recent one, is the extension of the competencies
of local government. The prefects, now elected since 1994 as well as the
mayors, have much greater political and economic strength than in past
decades, often stronger than the MPs themselves.49
From the debates on the amendment, a desire emerges for a new ‘arrange-
ment’ of the given ideological and political identification of the government
with the majority in parliament; that there should be a systemic independence
between majority and government. Many MPs mentioned or alluded to the
need for the parliamentary majority to be differentiated, if only in tone,
from the government. This was seen to be necessary in order for the autonomy
of its role to be convincing and to contribute to the credibility of parliament
overall. On the other hand, strengthening the rights of the minority and of
individual MPs as counterweights to the prime ministerially centred govern-
mental hierarchy, was the reason used to justify most of the changes.
On the technical issues of the relationship between government and parlia-
ment, the following changes have taken place.
First, the parliament acquires the competence to rule on the incapacity
of the prime minister in exercising his duties for health reasons (article 38
para.2 C), after the submission of a proposal by the parliamentary group of
the prime minister’s party, or by two-fifths of the MPs. This addition
emerged from the situation that existed when Andreas Papandreou was ill
and the country found itself ungoverned in August 1988.
Second, important changes were introduced in an area that can be con-
sidered as part of the relationship between parliament and government: the
independent public authorities (IPAs). From 1989 to the present, more than
20 of these authorities have been established by law. They have the privilege
of ‘independence’, often with the safeguard of autonomous administration and
financing as well as the protection of the independence of their members.50
The common basis of the IPAs is transparency in areas of social life where
relations of power put human rights at risk. The amended constitution
included some IPAs51 where the issues of their formation and functioning
were provided for in a general provision (article 101A C), considering these
a sui generis form of the organisation of executive functioning. A number
of points characterise this amendment with regard to parliament. First, the
individuals who staff these authorities (technocrats and research assistants)
are chosen by the Conference of Presidents of the Parliament, by consensus
or by a four-fifths majority. Second, the members are appointed for a set
term and enjoy personal and functional freedom. Third, parliamentary control
of these authorities is conducted according to the specific provisions of the SO.
Fourth, the constitution does not provide for the financial autonomy of the
IPAs. The SO specify the obligation of the IPAs to submit a yearly report
on their work to the speaker, who conveys it to the competent committee,
which comes to conclusions about the work of the IPA and sends it to the
competent minister (article 138A SO). A major problem for parliament –
government relations is the possible blow to parliamentary authority insofar
as the IPAs depart from the hierarchical pyramid of administrative organis-
ation.52 But, to date, it is not possible to ascertain yet the extent of the
effects of the IPAs on the relationship between government and parliament.
THE STATUS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
The conflict that appears between the two constitutional principles of free
representative mandate and party discipline constitutes a major problem.
The operational criterion of the Greek political system is probably party
discipline that is set by the political leaders; strict party discipline is always
justified by the appeal to unity and the effective functioning of the party.
The deficit in intra-party democracy is carried to the parliamentary field and
becomes visible when the chairs of the parliamentary groups publicly
declare without hesitation when they will ‘allow’ the MPs to exercise their
‘free vote’. The only outlet for overcoming the juxtaposition between the
party and the parliamentary fields is an ad hoc balancing of two constitutional
principles, within the framework of the ‘theory of harmony in practice’.53 It
would be difficult for a revision of the constitution to overcome this inherent
constitutional ‘contradiction’. The balancing referred to above is part of the
general functioning of the political system, primarily of the Greek political
culture that cannot be solved vaguely at the level of constitutional provisions.
In any case, the new legislative and control competencies of the permanent
parliamentary committees reinforce the individual presence of the MPs, as
committee work is less party-dominated.
A major issue concerning the position of MPs is citizen perception of their
trustworthiness. General scorn is expressed about political and parliamentary
discourse as seen in many different surveys of public opinion in Greece.
Specific amendments and their applications contribute to this situation. It
was not by chance that the debate of the position and the rights of MPs
during the revision of the constitution was connected with the closed shop
manner in which they execute their role,54 in connection with the more
general perception of corruption. On this point, three issues were identified:
parliamentary immunity, parliamentary salary and the funds of MPs during
electoral periods.
The issue of immunity was brought up by all the parties and a revision of
the respective provision was proposed by the opposition, which in the end was
not passed (article 62 C). The amendment on the immunity of MPs is a classic
example of a volitionally mistaken application of a reasonable constitutional
provision. There were strong reactions from the press, public opinion and MPs
themselves against the usual rejection of all the proposals on the revoking of
immunity: from 1974 to September 1996, about 700 applications were made
to revoke immunity and only three were accepted.55 This has happened even
in cases of behaviour obviously not becoming to the status of MP.56 The par-
liamentary minority proposed the reversal of the requirements for the revoking
of immunity, whereupon immunity would be granted only when there were
political causes. Parliament proposed that the provision remain as it was,
the basic argument being in the difficulty in defining the exact meaning of
political causes.
The issue of MPs’ salaries (article 63 C) was the subject of debate in con-
nection with the proposal of the majority for the addition of a phrase (con-
sidered pompous by many) to demonstrate ‘honour and respect’ for the
MPs. This was withdrawn, but it does constitute an example of the low
esteem in which MPs are held. It also illustrates the limited means available
to them relative to the general and special secretaries of the ministries or
the mayors or prefects. The entire network of provisions on the research
and administrative support of MPs is specified in the SO, without reference
to the constitution.57
The parliamentary funds during the pre-electoral period are connected to
the issue of party funds during the same period.58 The strict new provision
was laid down following an intense debate concerning illegal funds of the can-
didates, their ‘covert’ backers, the illicit relations with the mass media, which
create inequalities between candidates and distort the will of the electoral
body. The amended constitution imposed a ceiling on funding, the violation
of which constitutes grounds for the forfeiture of MP status. A special body,
in which members of the judiciary participate, has competence for this
control.59
There are new amendments with regard to electoral disqualifications and
incompatibilities for MPs, which in Greece are traditionally regulated by
the constitution. During the debates on the revision, an absence of party cohe-
sion was noted in this area. Two diametrically opposed tendencies were
observed with regard to the disqualifications, which did not follow party
lines. One tendency favoured the extension of disqualifications, while the
other supported their drastic reduction. The viewpoint of the majority’s
general rapporteur is typical of the contradictions involved in this issue:
according to him, the disqualifications ‘work as a means of settling intra-
party relations and of managing the role of political officials’.60
The total number of disqualifications (article 56 C) were reduced and
amended as follows. First, they were described in more detail so that contro-
versial judicial decisions would be avoided in the future. Second, return to the
public sector is facilitated for those who have to resign to become candidates.
Third, the complete disqualification of prefects is provided for over the course
of their four-year term, even if they resign. Fourth, disqualifications are
imposed on members of the independent authorities.
The incompatible attributes (article 57 C) were extended so that there
would be a barrier between the economic functions of the state and MPs’
status. Here, too, the parliamentary debate brought to light the major
problem of the improper interweaving of economic and political power. The
new economic reality led to new incompatible capacities such as that of
administrator, member of a board of directors or shareholder of a company
that enters into any kind of contract with the public sector, or of a company
of the printed or electronic media. Inter-party conflict emerged from the pro-
posal and the final voting on the provision prohibiting MPs from working.61
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE PARLIAMENT AS AGORA
The Hellenic Parliament is attempting to overcome the obstacles posed de jure

and de facto by the reinforcement of the executive. The constitutional revision
of 2001 attempted to deal with the above-mentioned parliamentary crisis of
many decades, despite the vague content of that crisis. The whole effort is
marked by awkwardness and the debate was not able to bring the new insti-
tutional role of the parliament to the fore.
In the present period, along with an unavoidably limited consolidation of
its role of legislation and control, parliament may also attempt to promote the
field in which it has a comparative advantage relative to the other instruments
of the state. This is the promotion of transparency in the decision-making
process. Indeed, over and above the specific competencies granted to it by
the constitution, the parliament recognises its mission, critical to the regime,
of distinguishing itself as the most important public forum which gives power
to all political forces represented therein.62 Three elements determine the
legitimisation produced by the parliamentary procedure: (a) the recognition
of conflict of interests and consequently, its regulation; (b) the necessity of
political compromise; and (c) the visibility of the processes through which
attempts are made to establish specific decisions.
For these reasons, publicity constitutes a founding principle of parliamen-
tary law,63 aiming to achieve political communication through the visibility of
the parliamentary process. According to the theory of the legitimisation of the
parliamentary decision, debate in the plenum does not produce the decision,
taken for granted the cohesion of parties, but it rather entrenches an already
materialised decision by revealing the reasons why every parliamentary group

and each MP support their views and opinions. In this sense, the MPs, who
already know the issues and the arguments for and against a political decision,
are not the only recipients of parliamentary debates. The speeches of members
of parliament and members of the government are directed mainly, or at least
to a significant degree, towards the audience, towards the representatives of
the press and towards the electorate more generally. This is less so in the
committees where the participation of each MP is more effective. The broad
publicity of parliamentary business is also seen as briefing the citizens, and
as the basis for conducting scientific studies related to the functioning of
parliament.
The perception of parliament as a forum is revealed in many interventions
of MPs during the course of the debates on the constitutional revision of 2001:
a fact not found in the fifth and the sixth parliamentary revisions of 1986 and
1974 – 75.64
This broadly defined publicity may be accomplished through the media,
primarily the electronic media, but also through means other than those pro-
vided for in the constitution and the SO. Such means might include the
easy, direct and quick access to official minutes of the business of the
plenum and the committees, which in Greece is only in part feasible
through the Internet. Other means could be the option of buying parliamentary
minutes and other parliamentary publications in bookstores, the organisation
of seminars on that subject and the conduct and the publication of scientific
research for MPs and on the business of parliament.65
The printed and electronic media are recognised as the most important
means of ensuring the publicity of the parliamentary processes. The new pro-
vision of article 15 para.2 C stipulates that the legislator defines the obligatory
and free broadcast of the business of parliament and of its committees by radio
and television. Moreover, since September 2003 the Greek Parliament
operates its own TV channel that broadcasts the parliamentary debates and
informs the public on the activities of the parliament.
NOTES
1. N. Alivizatos, ‘The Difficulties of “Rationalisation” in a Polarised Political System: The

Greek Chamber of Deputies’, in U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic
Consolidation in Southern Europe (London and New York: Pinter, 1990), pp.131–53.
2. Law N1516/1985 was passed a few months prior to the elections on 2 January 1985. The basic
criterion for this law was the electoral victory of the governmental party. For this period, see
C. Lyrintzis and I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.), Elections and Parties in the 1980s. Developments in
and Prospects for the Political System (Athens: Themelio, 1990).
3. On the unexpected and the lightning-speed 1986 constitutional revision, proposed by
A. Papandreou and PASOK on 9 February 1985, in addition to the marginal and the
dubious legality of the parliamentary process, see A. Manessis, The Constitutional Revision of
1986 (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1989), pp.18 ff.
4. See the results of the parliamentary elections of the period 1985–2000, Table 1.
5. P. Foundethakis, Intra-Party Democracy, according to Article 29 of the Greek Constitution
(Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1987).
6. The Koskotas scandal was connected with the manipulation of bank and publishing activities
in favour of the governing socialist party and with the bribing of government officials. Con-
cisely for this period, see T. Diamantopoulos, Greek Political Life: The Twentieth Century
(Athens: Papazisis 1997), pp.263–306.
7. Law 1847/1989.
8. The Tzannetakis government (2 July–12 Nov. 1989).
9. Provided in art. 86 para.4 C. The impeachment was also supported by some MPs from
PASOK.
10. The duration of this government was from 23 November 1989 to 11 April 1990. It was formed
from all the parties with the exception of the ecologists.
11. This is a translation of a term often used in Greek literature referring to the difference between
the aim of the electoral system and its practical results. The aim of the electoral system is to
lead to a strong government in a political system where the two major parties have a difference
of 1 –10 per cent of the votes in the elections. The electoral law does not favour party
coalitions: the first party gains seats ‘stealing’ from the second, and the third party also has
a percentage of seats higher than the second party. There is also a mechanism to ensure
that the maximum difference between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats
is 0.7 (see Table 1), as well as a threshold of three per cent.
12. Law 1907/1990. On the inequity of ‘reinforced’ proportional representation at the expense of
small parties and coalitions of parties from 1974 to 1990, see K. Chrysogonos, The Electoral
System and the Constitution (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1996), pp.247–87.
13. The exoneration decision of 15 January 1993 with seven votes in favour and six against (in the
Special Court, one of the supreme courts, presided over by the president of the Supreme Civil
and Criminal Court – Areopag), allowed for a variety of interpretations.
14. 13 Oct. 1993–17 Jan. 1996 and 22 Jan. 1996–22 Sept. 1996 respectively.
15. The main points of the electoral law are referred to in P. Spyropoulos, Constitutional Law in
Hellas (The Hague: Kluwer – Sakkoulas, 1995), p.74 ff. Empirical research on the elections
of 1996 and 2000 with analytical data from gallop polls, see P. Kafetzis, G. Mavris and
I. Nikolakopoulos, ‘Elections 1996’, Greek Review of Political Science (GRPS), 9 (April
1997), pp.167–207, and K. Zafeiropoulos et al., ‘Elections 2000’, GRPS, 17 (May 2001),
pp.7–139. For the previous period, see K. Zafeiropoulos and T. Chatzipantelis, ‘Electoral
Fluctuations in the 1985– 1996 Period’, GRPS, 13 (May 2000), pp.5–29.
16. Article 37. See G. Anastasiadis, The Three Applications of Article 37 of the Constitution
(June, October and November 1989) (Thessalonika: University Studio Press, 1990). The
provision of article 37 is part of a whole revision aiming to reduce the competences of the
President of the Republic. The constitutional provision on the formation of government
does not leave any room for presidential initiative. Almost everything is regulated in detail
by the constitution.
17. The choice of the two large parties by the electorate, based on electoral results from June 1985
to 2000, moved between 79.8 per cent, the lowest, in 1996 with a system of ‘reinforced’
proportional representation, and 86.86 per cent, the highest, in November of 1989, in a
much more proportional system.
18. In the nine electoral periods since 1974, in only one case (after the elections of June 1985) has
the four-year term been served to its end.
19. The dissolution of parliament has turned out to be a prerogative of the government, especially
of the prime minister, who can dissolve parliament and proclaim elections at the most favour-
able timing. Since 1977, the usual way to cause parliament’s dissolution has been by quoting a
‘national issue of exceptional importance’ on the proposal of the cabinet (art. 41 para.2).
20. In the parliament submitting the proposal for revision of the constitution (term IX), the
debate went on in the Revision Committee from 21 October 1997 to 4 March 1998, in
the plenum from 2 April to 20 May 1998. In the Revisionary Parliament (term X), the
debate went on in the Revisionary Committee from 30 August to 19 November 2000,
in the plenum from 17 January to 6 April 2001. The debate on the issues of the
parliament occupied the plenum of the Revisionary Parliament for seven of the total of its
22 sessions.
21. Particularly with regard to the two final characterisations, see N. Alivizatos, Uncertain
Modernisation and the Nebulous Constitutional Reform (Athens: Polis, 2001), pp.155–232.
22. For the entire new constitutional framework, see K. Mavrias, Constitutional Law (Athens:
Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 2002), pp.599–669.
23. See G. Sotirelis, Constitution and Democracy in the Age of ‘Globalisation’ (Athens: Ant.
N. Sakkoulas, 2000), pp.197– 224; G. Kaminis, ‘Parliament: The Challenge of Improvement’,
in Twenty Years of the 1975 Constitution (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1998), pp.163–99;
P. Foundethakis, The Rights of Parliamentarians in the Greek Parliament: The Principles
of Parliamentary Law (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1993).
24. P. Foundethakis, ‘The Role of the Parliament in the Proposal for Constitutional Revision’, To
Syndagma, 26/6 (2000), pp.1177–204.
25. S. Koutsoubinas, ‘Legislation in the Parliament at the Time of the Revision Proposal’, To
Syndagma, 26/6 (2000), pp.1225–30.
26. These cases are defined in article 72 para.1 C.
27. Any single member of parliament may submit a ‘law proposal’. The competent ministers may
submit ‘bills’. The difference between the two terms is merely terminological.
28. Thus the problem was created of whether the plenum can in essence alter legislative
provisions which a permanent committee has prepared, or whether it must pass it as is or
reject it, see articles 72 para.4 C, 104 para.5 SO, 108 SO.
29. Article 72 para.2.1 defines that the debate and the passing of all the bills which do not belong
to the absolute competence of the plenum ‘may take place during the course of the session, by
the competent Permanent Committee’.
30. On the practical significance of the amendments see Table 2. There are 5,037 amendments for
1,015 bills.
31. From 1975 until 1993, 522 out of 2,178 laws had in their titles ‘and other provisions’, see the
research of the National School of Public Administration, ‘Disfunctionalities in the Making of
Legislation in Greece’ (1995), pp.6– 7.
32. According to the Greek Constitution, judicial or administrative codes drafted by special com-
mittees established under special statutes may be voted through in the plenum of parliament
by a special statute ratifying the code as a whole. Legislative provisions in force may also be
codified by simple classification.
33. Article 74 para.5 C. According to the general rule of article 67 C, parliament decides with an
absolute majority of the members present, which cannot be less than one-quarter all the MPs,
that is, 75 out of the 300.
34. Article 74 para.3 C and article 87 para.2 SO.
35. Article 79 para.3 C.
36. Kaminis, ‘Parliament: The Challenge of Improvement’, pp.181– 6.
37. From 1974 until 1990 only four bills proposed by the opposition had become laws, all on
totally secondary issues. From April 1990 until September 1996, 556 laws were passed.
Only three of these came from the opposition.
38. See the related P. Foundethakis, ‘The Institution of Parliamentary Opposition’, in Harmossino
Aristovoulos Manessis, Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law Studies, vol. II (Athens:
Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1998), pp.509–26.
39. There are two types of investigation committees: ‘ordinary’ investigation committees that
deal with every matter except issues of foreign policy and national defence and the investi-
gation committees on issues of foreign policy and national defence.
40. Article 144 para.5 SO.
41. On this issue, see P. Foundethakis, ‘Committees of Investigation, According to art. 68 II of the
Greek Constitution’ Armenopoulos, 41/6 (1987), pp.641–50.
42. Plenary sessions of the parliament on 5 and 6 December 2001.
43. Besides this, ten amendments followed 1987’s revision (9.1989, 7.1990, 5.1991, 3.1993,
11.1993, 2.1994, 6.1996, 4.1997, 12.1997, 10.2000). They were basically aimed at a slight
reinforcement of the rights of the minority, at the facilitating of technical issues, at the inte-
gration of European matters into the functioning of the parliament and at the reduction in the
time allowed for all those involved in the parliamentary procedure to speak.
44. Symbolically, the reinforcing of the role of MPs in relation to ministers was expressed in the
new provision of article 64 SO on the permanent committees, in which MPs have priority over
the list of speakers.
45. Given that all the chairs of the permanent committees belong to the governing party, the
over-representation of the majority is clear. Only in the Committee on European Affairs
(new article 32A SO) is one of the two deputy speakers from the official opposition and
the secretary is from the third most powerful parliamentary group.
46. Articles 134– 8 SO.
47. Provision was made for 80 scientific positions.
48. The period of government of A. Papandreou (1981–89 and 1993–96) was marked by frequent
cabinet re-shuffles. On the contrary, the period of government under K. Simitis (1996–2004)
was characterised by the longevity of the members of the cabinet.
49. In many cases, MPs prefer to leave their parliamentary seats to be elected as prefects or
mayors. There are also, on the contrary, many MPs who come from local government,
which constitutes an example of the power and the recognisability which facilitates their
election, bringing them into conflict with MPs of their own party.
50. M. Antonopoulos, Independent Regulatory Agencies (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas 1993).
51. These are (a) the Personal Data Authority (article 9A C), (b) the National Radio and
Television Council (article 15 para.2 C), (c) the Authority for Confidential Communications
(article 19 para.2 C), (d) the Supreme Council for the Choice of Personnel (article 103 para.7
and 118 para.6), (f) the Ombudsman (article 103 para.9 C).
52. I. Kamtsidou, ‘The Principle of the Division of Power and the Independent Regulatory
Agencies’, To Syndagma, 25/3–4 (1999), pp.543–53.
53. For each case in which an MP differentiates himself from his party through a free vote we
cannot say that either one of the two principles predominates. This depends upon the issue.
It is then a political decision as to which principle is more appropriate. Overall, on the
interpretative principle of ‘Praktische Kondordanz’, see K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfas-
sungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 20th edn. 1995), p.28.
54. It is indicative of the fact that no one mentioned, in the constitution revision debates, the
possibility of reducing the number of MPs. A reduction to 200 is allowed in the constitution,
article 51.
55. See I. Varvitsiotis, Parliamentary Immunities. Greek and European Practice (Athens: Ant.
N. Sakkoulas, 2000), p.20.
56. The most blatant recent examples were a car accident caused by an MP who was drunk, and
the beating up of a referee in a football stadium. In the second case, the MP was afterwards
made an under-secretary!
57. Compared to most countries of the EU, Greek MPs receive approximately one-third. Every
debate on increasing their salary is an occasion for the press and ‘public opinion’ to demon-
strate their populism and make further uncomplimentary comments, see V. Voloudakis,
Current Constitutional Issues, 1983– 1994, vol.II (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1994),
pp.93–4.
58. Article 29 para.2.
59. The proposal for control to be exercised by the Court of Auditors was not accepted.
60. E. Venizelos MP, The Parliamentary Session, 26 Sept. 2000, p.35.
61. In the transitional provisions of the Constitution, article 115 para.7 C, the position on pro-
fessional incompatibility which would have come into force by law no later than 1 January 2003.
62. Analytically, see Foundethakis, The Rights of Parliamentarians in the Greek Parliament,
pp.163 ff.
63. Article 66 para.1 for the plenum, amended article 66 para.3 C for the permanent parliamentary
committees. With this amendment, the publicity of the committee business, which is
supported by a provision of the SO, article 38 para.1 SO (25 Nov. 1993), is now based in the
constitution. Prior to 1993, the sessions of the committees were not made public.
64. In his proposal to the Revision Committee of the Revisionary Parliament, the General
Rapporteur of the majority recognised this new reality, referring to the safeguarding function
of the parliament to ensure transparency, E. Venizelos, Report (Athens: Hellenic Parliament,
2000), p.639.
65. Problems are created due to the difficulty of access to the minutes of the parliament prior
to 1998, and of all the publications, since their sale is not permitted by parliament or any
bookstore. It is also well known that very little use is made of the Internet in Greece; even
university libraries do not have the minutes of the revisions of the constitution after 1974.
Thus, due also to the difficulty of access to the actual functioning of parliament, studies
with publishable data are almost non-existent in the Greek literature.
The Spanish Parliament in a Triangular
Relationship, 1982–2000
JORDI CAPO GIOL
The 1982 elections in Spain have generally been considered to be the moment
symbolising the end of a political transition. The socialist victory and the dis-
appearance of the attempted coup d’état revealed the solidity of the Spanish
political system, where it was possible to alternate between parties and the pol-
itical institutions could work in a normal manner.
During the transition, the Cortes was the centre of political life. As the only
institution legitimised by democratic vote, the parliament was responsible for
drawing up a constitution and the House was the meeting place for practically
the whole of the party elite to negotiate a consensual process leading to
democracy.
With the constitution in place and the consolidation of the normal political
game of competitive elections, the parliament soon stopped working in a con-
sensual manner.1 When the exceptional situation disappeared that had enabled
the important function of the parliament, it was limited to the role such houses
play in other parliamentary systems: a forum of debate with a capacity to inter-
vene in the decision-making process that depended on the relationship with the
executive.
At the same time, the strong decentralisation of the state with the conso-
lidation of the Autonomous Communities caused the appearance of new
power centres. The autonomous parliaments and governments (also local gov-
ernments) contributed to placing the parliament in a position of less hegemony
than in the initial stages of the system, through their ability to appeal to the
political elites and the creation of new elites, through the formation of specific
issues, their legal powers and human, economic and administrative resources.
On another level, the construction of the European Union was also a weaken-
ing factor for any old-fashioned conception of parliamentary sovereignty.2
The Cortes is thus one of many actors in a complex network where the
functions are defined politically and constitutionally by the existence of
other powers. In this sense, having overcome the exceptional nature of the
transition to democracy, the Spanish Parliament does not seem very different
from other parliaments in countries with a greater democratic tradition.
Beyond the particular features derived from the respective standing orders,
it is hardly surprising that the Spanish Parliament leans towards the European
model, where parliamentary action is directed from the government and con-
trolled by the majority. Its legislative influence is thus reduced and the parlia-
ment oscillates (depending on the political situation and issues under debate)
between approaching the idea of a mere rubber stamp or having a greater
ability to make changes. At the same time, the difficulty met by the opposition
in modifying bills decisively is compensated for by a strengthening of their
control and scrutiny activities.
A comparison between parliaments clearly defining the significant
variables would show the extent to which the Spanish Parliament is more or
less capable of influencing public policies than those of other countries.
However, in any case, the differences would be more quantitative than quali-
tative, and so the Spanish political evolution placed the Cortes in a similar
structural position and its analysis (the topical ‘parliamentary crisis’) would
not be different from that of other systems. In relation to Spain, there would
be no parliamentary specificity that could fit in the ‘post-transitional’ and/or
‘Southern Europe’ categories.
However, despite this general similarity, Spain is still different and consti-
tutes a case apart, because the end of the political transition (understood as the
institutionalisation of the rules, procedures and values of democracy) did not
bring about the definitive closing of one of its permanent historical conflicts.
The constitutional recognition of a certain pluri-national state character and
the adoption of federal-type mechanisms by the creation of the Autonomous
Communities eliminated neither the debate nor the tensions on the structure
of the state. Between 1982 and 2000 it is not possible to analyse outside
this profoundly conflictive axis, because it affects the whole structure of the
two houses and the kind of relations that are established in the houses
between the state political parties and the nationalist political parties.
In this way, the Spanish political system shares with other European gov-
ernments the fact that its parliament is generally controlled by the government,
but is exclusively characterised in the way that the parliament has to mediate
with nationalist minorities and with materially federal decentralised areas. If,
theoretically, federal type states have the Senate (Upper House) for this func-
tion, in Spain it is Congress (Lower House) where the nationalist parties are
essential for governing. Thus, the relations between government and parlia-
ment acquire tendencies that possibly are not found in other democracies.
THE SENATE: A FEARED REFORM
Any description of the Cortes rapidly discards the Senate as a significant actor.
Within the general lack of empirical studies of the Spanish Parliament there is
complete absence of any important investigation of this house. This is proof of
the common conviction of its limited political functions. In fact the Senate
THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT 109
may not invest or censor the government and its legislative functions are
highly limited by brief times for debate and a final position that depends
entirely on the will of Congress.
This does not mean that the Senate has been unable to modify some laws
through amendments. No matter how forgotten and small this function might
be, there are no highly systematised data that indicate that negotiations
pending from the Lower House have been concluded in the Senate or, on
the other hand, that manoeuvres have been made to the benefit of the govern-
ment to restrict a greater debate such as that which takes place in the Congress.
This is a subject that would deserve a more detailed investigation to overcome
the commonplace view of the irrelevance of the Senate. It is not unthinkable to
show that, over the years, the parties (with highly disciplined parliamentary
groups in both houses) have progressively discovered the usefulness of the
Upper House for their parliamentary manoeuvres.3 This is a question that
cannot be dealt with here, although it is an interesting change in recent
legislatures.
The basic question is another: the Spanish Senate is dysfunctional in a
state which is materially federal in many respects but not in the characteristics
of its bicameralism because the electoral system and powers of the Upper
House are more related to the non-federal systems.
In fact, during the constitutive process, there was already the conviction
that the regulation of the Senate was unsatisfactory. The need for a compro-
mise between the right-wing parties (in favour of a more conservative
second House) and the left wing and the nationalist parties (with federalist pre-
tensions) led the Senate to be placed in a state of ‘stand-by’. It was to have a
mixed composition and most of the senators (four per province) would be
chosen via a corrected majority system, and the rest (approximately a fifth)
by the autonomous parliaments. As the House was not federal, it could not
have political powers that might be to the detriment of the more proportional
Congress.
This was the political compromise, also facilitated by the fact that in the
constitutive legislature neither the map nor the autonomous power was
clearly defined. However, from 1978, the solution adopted was severely criti-
cised both in academic terms (the whole of the constitutional doctrine) and by
the political leaders. As the autonomous system was generalised and consoli-
dated, there was a more obvious need to reform the Senate for the central and
autonomous elites, whether they were right or left wing or nationalists. There-
fore, in 1989, the Senate itself approved a first motion insisting on the need for
reform.
Nevertheless, there is a certain ‘sacralisation’ of the Spanish Constitution.
To reform the Senate means to modify a constitution drawn up in a consensual
manner and to reopen an issue where the conflict relations between the state
and autonomous powers crossed on the question of the peripheral national-

isms. For these reasons, the solution adopted by the political elites was both
imaginative and provisional. Without modifying the constitution, in 1994 the
Senate approved what would be the most important organisational reform
(at least theoretically) of the Spanish Parliament since 1978; the creation of
the so-called General Commission of the Autonomous Communities.
The importance of this reform lay in three aspects: its members, its sym-
bolic elements and its functions. Its limitations lay in the fact that this new
structure had to be balanced against the limited senatorial functions at least
until the constitution was reformed, although the commission was also con-
ceived as a test for a possible future senate.
The General Commission of the Autonomous Communities sits in the
Senate and its members are appointed by the parliamentary groups. The com-
mission was formed exclusively by provincial or autonomous senators, but its
broad composition, which doubled the number of members in the remaining
legislative commissions, was designed to give way to the largest possible
number of autonomous parliamentarians. Furthermore, to reinforce this feder-
alising character, all of the senators appointed by the autonomous parliaments
could intervene in the debates, despite not being able to vote even though they
were not actual members of the commission. However, the most important,
original aspect lay in the fact that, together with the members of the central
government, the president and the ministers of the Autonomous Communities
are also able to participate. There is no need to stress that this presence of the
executive members of the regional governments is reminiscent of the Länder’s
participation in the German Bundesrat.
As a symbolic element, the use was permitted alongside Spanish of the
Catalan, Basque and Galician languages. For the first time in the constitutional
history of Spain an organism of the central state lost its monolingual nature,
but as a result of a compromise on such a problematic issue this authorisation
was restricted to only one of the activities of the commission, though doubtless
the one with greatest political visibility: the annual debate on the state of the
autonomies.
The list of functions described in the standing orders of the commission
stresses its symbolic importance. This list is very long and exhaustive;
however, a first impression of a strong commission would be misleading. In
fact the commission does not have decisional powers and its functions are
predominantly informative. The commission was conceived as a place for
debate and communication between the state and the Autonomous Commu-
nities and not a decisional arena. It could not be otherwise without modifying
the constitutional functions of the Senate.
It is therefore not surprising that this commission did not live up to expec-
tations; its functions have not meant a change in politics and the Senate is still
in its marginal position. In fact, the failure of the attempted reform is shown by
the absence of the compulsory annual debate on the ‘state of the autonomies’,
held by the government of the Partido Popular (PP) since 1998.
Given such a situation, the reform of the Senate is still present in political
debate. The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), Izquierda Unida (IU)
and the nationalist parties (at least in their public declarations since their pro-
grammes are aimed more at asymmetric relations than at a federal state)
demand a reform of the Senate. The PP, with their parliamentary majority,
successfully oppose these attempts from a conception of a new ‘constitutional’
centralism which is expressed in not giving further powers to the Autonomous
Communities, and particularly insofar as tendencies of sovereignty appear in
them and nationalist terrorism has not disappeared.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of this debate4 or the tensions
between Spanish and peripheral nationalisms. However, it is necessary to
point out that the existence of an autonomous system is crying out for
another kind of senate, while the confrontation between the centralist and
autonomist positions make such a reform a difficult process.
Moreover, the attempts at federal reform having failed, the parliament
does not have the chance of a direct representation and compensation of the
interests of the Autonomous Communities, which are negotiated directly on
executive levels in sectoral conferences and through bilateral contacts
between the central government and some autonomous governments. When
such agreements require parliamentary backing, this tends to happen basically
in Congress. But surprisingly, although the Lower House is not constitution-
ally the place to represent the Autonomous Communities, the presence of
nationalist parties in the Spanish party system reintroduces the tensions and
the complexity of the autonomous state, even over issues that do not have a
territorial content in themselves. In other words, the typical bipolar relation-
ship between government and parliaments becomes a triangular relationship
(government – parliament –autonomous systems) in Spain that crystallises in
Congress.
THE CONGRESS IN A PARLIAMENTARY NETWORK
Focusing now on the Lower House, which, as pointed out, is the one with
greater decision-making powers, the working of the parliament cannot be
understood without bearing in mind that the period analysed corresponds to
a stage of profound restructuring of the party system.5 In fact, in 1982, the
Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) (the party that had guided the political
transition) practically disappeared as a result of the divisions caused by
internal tensions, and was replaced in the government by the PSOE. Thus
started a stage of absolute majorities for the PSOE (Second, Third and
Fourth legislatures between 1982 and 1993) that oscillated between 202 repre-
sentatives and 175 in a house of 350 members, and fell electorally from 48 per
cent to 39 per cent. On the right, the UCD was replaced by the PP. Its results
left it far behind the PSOE (around 25 per cent of the votes) and with hardly
more than 100 representatives and, which is also important in considering its
parliamentary behaviour, a great weakness in its programmes that led it pro-
gressively to a reformulation, transforming its initial right-wing positions
into others of a more moderate kind.
It was not until the 1993 elections (beginning the Fifth legislature) that the
restructuring of the party system caused by the loss of the UCD was com-
pleted. The attempts of Adolfo Suárez to form a new party, the Centro Demo-
crático y Social (CDS) had failed and the changing of the old guard in the PP
(Fraga) for new generations (Aznar), together with more moderate political
pronouncements, allowed this party to compete successfully with the PSOE.
The period of weakness in the political representation of the right-wing elec-
torate had come to an end.
However, the 1993 elections were still won by the PSOE, but now without
an absolute majority. Felipe González formed a minority government to face
the fifth legislature6 supported by the nationalist parties and particularly the
Catalan group Convergència i Unió (CiU).7 This legislature was characterised
by tense political confrontation. The PP used serious cases of corruption and
dirty war against terrorism in a media, legal and parliamentary battle to dele-
gitimise the socialist government. An additional factor in this political tension
was the fact that the minority government was supported by the Catalan
nationalist party and, to a lesser extent, the Basque nationalists. A large part
of public opinion (encouraged by the rank and file of the PP) feared that
regional parties, under the appearance of contributing to the stability and
TABLE 1
ELECTORAL RESULTS AND COMPOSITION OF CONGRESS, 1982 – 2000
1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000

% seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats
PP 26.2 107 26.1 105 25.6 107 34.8 141 38.8 156 44.5 183
UCD 7.1 11 – – – – – – – – – –
CDS 2.9 2 9.1 19 7.8 14 – – – – – –
PSOE 48.4 202 44.3 184 39.2 175 38.8 159 37.6 141 34.1 125
PCE/IU 4.1 4 4.6 7 8.9 17 9.6 18 10.5 21 5.4 8
CiU 3.7 12 5.0 18 5.0 18 4.9 17 4.6 16 4.2 15
PNV 1.9 8 1.5 5 1.2 5 1.2 5 1.2 5 1.5 7
CC – – – – – – 0.9 4 0.9 4 1.0 4
Others 5.7 4 9.4 12 12.3 14 9.8 6 6.4 7 9.3 8
Source: Junta Electoral Central/Ministerio del Interior.

governability of Spain, could use their pivotal function to the benefit of their
respective Autonomous Communities. In this hard political context, Felipe
González finally brought forward the elections after CiU voted against the
1996 budget and withdrew the support it had given the government until
that time.
The 1996 elections brought about the second alteration. The PP became
the leading parliamentary power, but with only 156 representatives and
therefore without an absolute majority, so Aznar entered into a pact (as the
PSOE had previously done) with the nationalist parties to give the minority
government stability for the Sixth legislature.8 However, unlike in the pre-
vious legislature, the pact was formalised in writing, which gave greater
clarity to the relationship between the minority government and its parliamen-
tary partners, and also allowed public opinion to be offered a clear explanation
of the terms that had been agreed.9
The elections in 2000 (which opened the Seventh legislature still in pro-
gress) gave a new victory to the PP, which achieved an absolute majority
facilitated by the electoral crisis of the PSOE. Thus the dependence of the gov-
ernment on the nationalist minorities disappeared.
This brief explanation of the electoral changes and Spanish politics shows
two situations that are considered by academic literature as variables that
explain parliamentary behaviour. On the one hand, legislatures with a
governmental parliamentary majority (1982 – 93, the Second, Third and
Fourth legislatures of the socialist majority and from the year 2000, the
Seventh, with a majority for the PP) and, on the other, legislatures where
the government has been in the minority (1993 – 96, the Fifth legislature
with the socialist government, and 1996 –2000, the Sixth legislature with
the popular government). According to standard explanations applicable to
the Spanish case, when the government has a comfortable majority there
is less parliamentary intervention, which, by contrast, increases when the
government is in a minority.
However, this general explanation must be qualified in the Spanish case
due to the specific aspect of the presence of autonomous nationalist parties
in the game of parliamentary majorities. In fact the Organic Law on the
General Electoral Regime (approved in consensus in 1985)10 maintained all
the disproportional traits that had been apparent since the decree-law of
1977 that had regulated the first elections. The electoral system, though tech-
nically proportional (d’Hondt formula), gives a notable electoral bias to the
large state parties, and the nationalist parties are not arithmetically benefited.
Nevertheless, the system favours them insofar as their votes are concentrated
and they are not laminated like the centrist state parties (CDS) or IU, so their
negotiating capacity grows in situations where the main party fails to gain the
absolute majority.11
The support of the nationalist parties in minority governments has been

considered the solution to a problem of governability or the expression of
the same problem. The debate centred on the convenience of the majority
and minority governments, the need and possibilities of electoral reform,
and the like. However, what is important to highlight here is that the pivotal
position of the nationalist parties alters the conventional explanation of the
strength or weakness of parliaments before the executive. Actually, the stan-
dard variable ‘legislature of majority or minority’ has to be modified in the
Spanish case, as a result of the specificities introduced by the autonomous
arena.
In reality, the structure of opportunities offered by the Spanish party
system for nationalist parties is strengthened or limited by the situation of
these parties in their respective autonomous governments. Obviously –
although until now not all of the analytical consequences of this have been
drawn – the weight of the nationalist votes depends not only on their being
mathematically necessary for the stability of the government. Their negotiat-
ing capacity is seriously reduced if these parties also need one of the large state
parties to consolidate their autonomous government.
For this reason we earlier pointed out that the typical bi-polar relationship
between the government and the parliament becomes a triangular one in
the case of Spain. Negotiations are not carried out in a single arena, the
Spanish Congress, but in a multiple game where vote exchange (and sanc-
tions) intervenes in the central parliament and in the autonomous parliaments.
In this sense, the most important distinction does not lie between situations
where one party has the absolute majority (the Second, Third, Fourth and
Seventh legislatures) and situations where a minority party governs (Fifth
and Sixth). It seems more significant (and this must be done on a double
level, the Catalan and the Basque) to differentiate between the following
four situations:
(a) Central government with an absolute majority in Congress, which

coincides with an autonomous government supported, in turn, by an
absolute majority. In this case, the nationalist parties may not be belliger-
ent in Congress. Collaboration with the parliamentary majority, which
does not need them, facilitates the relationship between the central and
autonomous governments.
(b) Central government in a minority, supported in Congress by a nationalist
party that has a majority in its autonomous house. This situation is the
most critical in the central arena as the minority government depends
on the nationalist parties. However, there are extra-parliamentary reasons
that might attenuate the conflict due to the constant need of the auto-
nomous government to reach agreements with the central government.
(c) Central government in a minority supported in Congress by a nationalist
party that is also in a minority in its autonomous house. In this case, an
exchange occurs and a non-collaborating attitude from the nationalist
group is immediately replied to by the state party in the autonomous
parliament. This leads to pacts of mutual stability between the two
parties in the two parliaments.
(d) Central government with an absolute majority in Congress coinciding
with a nationalist party that is in the minority in its autonomous house.
Now the autonomous party is obliged to collaborate in Congress
(although its votes are not necessary) because otherwise the stability of
the regional government would be endangered.
In a theoretical diagram, these possibilities might be expanded still further.

The cases mentioned are the ones that have, for the moment, occurred in
Spain. There is not space in this article to comment on them in detail, and
they are shown diagrammatically in Table 2. A more thorough analysis
would have to be carried out on the different involvement of the Catalan
and Basque parties in the governability of Spain, the distortions created by ter-
rorism, Basque sovereignty, and so on. What is important to state here is that
these are general lines.
Table 2 shows that between 1982 and 1993, the PSOE not only had the
absolute majority in Congress, but could also be assured of the collaboration
TABLE 2
GOVERNMENTS IN SPAIN, CATALONIA AND BASQUE COUNTRY, 1979 – 2001
Spain Catalonia Basque Country
1979–82 1980–84 1980–84

UCD minority CiU minority PNV
1982–86 1984–87 1984
PSOE CiU þ ERC PNV
1985–86
PNV þ PSOE
1986–89 1987–88 1986–90
PSOE CiU PNV þ PSOE
1989–93 1988–92 1991
PSOE CiU PNV þ EA þ EE
1991–94
PNV þ EE þ PSOE
1993–96 1992–95 1995–98
PSOE minority CiU PNV þ PSOE þ EA
1996–2000 1995–99 1998
PP minority CiU minority PNV þ EA
2000 . . . 1999 . . . 2001 . . .
PP CiU minority PNV þ EA þ IU
of the PNV (because it formed a coalition government with the socialists in

the Basque Country), and also CiU, for the reasons noted previously on the
relationship between the two governments, which control their respective
houses.
The two minority legislatures present a different scenario. In the Fifth,
the position of the Catalan nationalist party was stronger because it had the
majority in its autonomous parliament, whereas the PSOE was governing in
a minority and the votes of the CiU could not be replaced mathematically
by those of the PNV. This led to an unwritten pact of collaboration by
which the government ensured itself a parliamentary majority. In the Sixth
legislature, however, both the PP and CiU were in the minority, which led
to the written collaboration despite the hard confrontation between the two
parties in the electoral campaign. By contrast, the PNV has been able to
develop a policy on sovereignty because since 1998 they have managed
to make their government independent from the state parties. In the current
legislature, the PP has a comfortable majority in Congress, whereas CiU
depends on the votes of the PP in the Catalan House, which forces them to
collaborate with the government in the central parliament.
These are very brief notes to describe a complex political process but it
needs a mention as it indicates that the definition of a majority in government
and the factors that drive state and nationalist parties to collaborate are not
only developed in Congress. In this sense, for instance, a typical description
would indicate that the Fifth and Sixth legislatures are minority governments;
on the contrary, in our opinion, the two legislatures are structurally very differ-
ent, even though in both of them there has been an agreement between the
governing party and the Catalan parliamentary group.
But this observation is also intended to be more explanatory. The inter-
relation of the processes of different parliaments means that the analysis of
the Spanish parliament is not accurate if we fail to consider that it forms
part of a parliamentary network. In the period under consideration, the
Catalan and Basque scenarios have been significant in this network, but it
must be remembered that in the future it is possible that other parliaments
might be incorporated, such as those of Galicia or the Canary Islands.
In this way it becomes clear that it is a function of Congress in Spain
(which requires further detailed study), to mediate between the majo-
rities (and minorities) of government of the state and the Autonomous
Communities. The electoral results of Congress not only determine the possi-
bility of participation of the nationalist parties in the state government, but
also the direction of the alliances in the autonomous parliaments.12
In a quasi-federal state, with a fragmented party system and no territorial
uniformity, Congress is the political instance of mediation between the state
electoral results and those of the Autonomous Communities. In the same
way as the central political arena is influenced by the presence of nationalist
parties, the autonomous parliaments cannot do without the strength of the
groups in Congress. The function of articulation, the mediation function, is
essentially a political function. The relations between the state and the nation-
alist parties that direct regional governments are established through a
parliamentary network where negotiation in Congress is a resource for the
autonomous policy and vice versa; strength in the autonomous parliaments
is an instrument for politics in the centre. Although in the heat of the discus-
sion and in the tensions between centre and periphery this fact has hardly been
observed, Congress does not play an irrelevant role in binding by political
means what otherwise would only be maintained as a juridical, constitutional
and statutory relationship.
THE SURPRISING LEGISLATIVE CONSENSUS
The fact that the Spanish Parliament cannot be understood without a general
view of the Autonomous Communities is not, however, an excuse to ignore an
analysis of the bilateral relations established between the central executive and
Congress. These relations allow us to consider the location of the parliament in
the well-known categories of ‘transformative legislatures’ or ‘arena’.13 In this
sense, the consolidation of the democracy and the end of the constituent leg-
islature led to the abandonment of the consensual orientation by the political
elites and a majority-type mechanism came into place where the government
controls parliamentary activity through its party. Therefore, the stages of
absolute majority are viewed as periods of parliamentary subordination,
whereas in periods of minority government the parliament would take on a
more important role.
However, the Fifth and Sixth legislatures display a double character. On the
one hand, the government is in a minority, which gives a greater chance for the
intervention of parliament. On the other hand, for the reasons mentioned above,
the government is assured of loyal support from the Catalan nationalist minority
(CiU) and Coalición Canaria (CC) (and the PNV too in the Fifth legislature);
therefore the government may act as though it had a parliamentary majority.
In fact, Table 3 shows how the government has constant control of the leg-
islative activity both in majority and minority legislatures. Therefore, the bills
submitted by the government become law (from the Second legislature) in
percentages of between 86 per cent and 89 per cent, except for the Fourth
legislature, where the percentage falls to 79 per cent. Therefore legislation
is essentially a governmental initiative.
It can also be seen that in the two minority legislatures, the First (UCD)
and the Fifth (PSOE) (but not the Sixth, PP), the percentage of bills from
the parliamentary groups increases compared to the other legislatures. In the
TABLE 3
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY, 1977 – 2000
Government’s Parliamentary Others Decree- Total

bills Groups’ bills laws Passed
submitted passed submitted assed
Constituent 174 111 71 9 – 63 183

1977–79 63.8% 12.6% –
60.5% 4.9% 34.4%
First 342 237 193 28 – 102 367
legislature 69.2% 14.5% –
1979–82 64.5% 7.6% 27.7%
Second 205 183 106 13 3 40 239
legislature 89.2% 12.2% – –
1982–86 76.5% 5.4% 1.2% 16.7%
Third 125 108 141 10 3 20 141
1986–89 76.5% 7.0% 2.1% 14.1%
Fourth 128 101 154 16 1 30 148
1989–93 68.2% 10.8% 0.6% 20.2%
Fifth 130 112 83 14 3 40 169
1993–96 66.2% 8.2% 1.7% 23.6%
Sixth 192 172 283 22 5 85 284
1996–2000 60.5% 7.7% 1.7% 29.9%
Notes: The first percentage refers to the number of bills submitted, the second to the total passed.
Sources: Memorias de las Legislaturas, Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid.
period that concerns us, from 1993 to 1996, the parliamentary groups managed
to achieve approval of almost 17 per cent of their proposals as laws, a much
higher figure than that of the other sessions.
However, this is a very weak indicator for deducing a larger parliamentary
influence. The proposals of the groups are also rejected at times of minority
government, as in the Sixth legislature, when these figures fall to seven per
cent, and it does not seem that the percentage differences are so large
between legislatures as to turn them into a particularly explicative parameter.
Furthermore, the content of the proposals is usually of very little importance.
It seems more important to us to note what may be more significant, both
in terms of the content of the rules and the special relationship established
between the government and the parliament: the approval of the decree-laws.
The decree-law is emergency legislation, approved by the government,
and must be accepted (without alterations) or rejected by Congress. A weak
government could find great difficulty in achieving such acceptance, but this
is not the case. Table 3 shows that in the Fifth and Sixth legislatures the
number of accepted decree-laws rose. Both the PSOE, and much more so
the PP (85 decree-laws), have frequently made use of this emergency legis-
lation. The reason for this is that, as the government is in a minority,
decree-laws avoid the parliamentary discussion of ordinary laws. One more
thing, in the Spanish constitutional system, decree-laws (once accepted by
the Congress and therefore in force) may be discussed as bills on the
request of a parliamentary group, and on the acceptance of the house. Note
that in minority sessions over 75 per cent of these decree-laws were not
dealt with later as bills and that those that were discussed always received
the consent of the party in power for this new discussion.
The double character of the Fifth and Sixth sessions is therefore obvious.
As there is no majority, the government seeks to avoid the parliamentary
debate but, at the same time, is sure that it has the majority for its decree-
laws. They are neither rejected nor accepted and submitted to a further
debate. This leads to a rather surprising conclusion: it is not entirely true
that parliament has more chances to take part in minority sessions.14 Although
this is true in theory, the reality is that in these so-called legislatures of min-
ority the government had always been supported by some nationalist parties.
On the other hand, despite the opposition having more leeway in these
situations, the government has mechanisms to block and obstruct the parlia-
mentary intervention (by legislating through decree-law, for instance). There-
fore, contrary to the usual explanations, there is no definite evidence indicating
that legislatures of minority are correlated with a more powerful parliament.
It could in fact be exactly the contrary. A weak government in arithmetical
terms would compensate for its feebleness by reducing the participation of
the legislative power in policy-making.
Coming back to the empirical analysis, a great deal of data show that
legislative activity was relatively comfortable for the government. As
Table 3 shows, governmental legislative success15 has oscillated in all ses-
sions between 89 and 93 per cent, no matter whether the situation is one of
majority or minority.
Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 4, not all laws are rejected out of hand
by the opposition groups, which would be expressed as overall amendments.
Table 4 shows, for instance, that the PP has reduced the number of its overall
amendments and in the Fifth legislature (socialist minority and therefore with
a greater chance of success for the opposition) its overall amendments were
minimal. One reason for this is possibly the progressive moderation of this
party on its way to power, which would also be combined with the presen-
tation of moderate bills by the PSOE in compromise with the pivotal nationa-
list groups, which at no time could be understood as having formed part of the
opposition.16 However, beyond this explanation of party strategies, the most
TABLE 4
OVERALL AMENDMENTS BY PARTIES IN EACH LEGISLATURE, 1982 – 2000
Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth

(1982– 86) (1986–89) (1989–93) (1993– 96) (1996–2000)
AP/PP 71 46 51 21 0
PDP/DC – 17 – – –
UCD 14 – – – –
CDS 7 26 – – –
CiU 26 15 11 0 0
PNV 27 15 14 2 3
CC – – – 7 1
PSOE 0 0 0 0 43
PCE/IU 26 19 30 34 50
Sources: Author’s calculations from Diarios de Sesiones (1977–2000) and Memorias del
Congreso. (Partially published in J. Capo, ‘Oposición y minorı́as en las legislaturas
socialistas’, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 66 (1994), p.99).
important thing in the understanding of the dynamics of the government and

the parliament is that, normally, parliamentary transformation must be limited
to partial amendments and not the total rejection of the content of a law.
If it is surprising that the legislative success of the opposition does not
grow in minority legislatures (Table 3) and nor does the total, though sym-
bolic, rejection of laws (Table 4), more surprising still is the number of
votes cast in support of the laws. It has been stressed that the constituent
legislature was a period of consensus; it has been rarely stressed that in the
Spanish Parliament the laws received (on average) more than 200 votes in
favour and very few against or abstentions.17 Even in the Fifth and Sixth
minority legislatures, the legislation of the PSOE gained 224 votes in favour
and only 42 against with 23 abstentions, and that of the PP, 244 votes in favour,
51 against and 11 abstentions.
These data indicate various things. They show that the number of the
voting MPs has increased in these last two legislatures as a result of a parlia-
ment without a majority and therefore with greater value placed on each vote,
which demands the presence of the representatives in the House. But at the
same time, the government may be seen to pass its laws with ease and there
is a high degree of agreement in the legislative texts.
The reason for this agreement must be sought in a qualitative analysis18 as
there are laws that receive almost unanimous voting and others that face strong
opposition. In general it could be said that routine laws, or those with little
capacity to transform, cause practically no debate; however, it is not only
these. Laws concerning European integration and presence in international
organisations also receive the consensus of the two main parties and the nation-
alist forces. Likewise, laws relating to the increased powers of the Autonomous
Communities (reforms of statutes, economic concerts, delegation of powers
and the like) also receive the favourable vote of all groups as all direct some
autonomous government. Even many organic-type laws that develop rights
and freedoms receive large majorities and in the economic field certain ‘liber-
alising’ laws are shared by the PSOE, the PP and the nationalist parties.
The gross figures of Table 5, despite being spectacular, do not clearly
define the agreement reached insofar as, obviously, the strength of the
majority party may explain the variations in votes. In order to correct this dis-
tortion, we have established a ‘weighted consensus index’19 according to the
following formula:
In observance of this formula, the data were obtained and are shown in
Table 6.
And so the parliamentary consensus grew while the socialist majority was
falling. The PSOE in the second legislature (with its maximum force of 202
members) rarely sought the support of other groups (index: 1.37). The Third
and Fourth legislatures saw a growing understanding with other parliamentary
forces (1.55 and 1.50) and in a minority situation (Fifth legislature) they
reached their highest level of parliamentary agreement (1.72). The PP, also
in a minority in the Sixth legislature, surpasses this figure with an index of 1.80.
This means that the weaker the government, the more votes in favour are
gained by their laws. This fact, which might seem a paradox, has an expla-
nation that must necessarily be pluri-causal. In a state of majority, the govern-
ment is able to legislate freely, yet in times of a minority the government has
to anticipate the reactions of the other groups and especially those of its
nationalist allies. Moreover, the progressive moderation of the PP also had
an influence (as we saw before in its total amendments) in search of a more
centrist electorate that would allow the party to enter government. Finally,
there was a certain exhaustion of the socialist programme, which led the gov-
ernment in the final legislatures to present fewer innovative laws. With respect
to the minority popular legislature (1996 –2000), it must be remembered that
TABLE 5
AVERAGE OF VOTES PER BILLS BY LEGISLATURES, 1977 – 2000
Const. First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth

(1977–79) (1979–82) (1982–86) (1986–89) (1989–93) (1993– 96) (1996– 2000)
pro 229 237 208 210 202 224 244

contra 7 24 39 33 47 42 51
abst. 12 12 16 14 19 23 11
Source: Calculations from Diarios de Sesiones, 1979–2000. (Partially published in J. Capo,

‘Oposición y minorı́as en las legislaturas socialistas’, p.96).
FIGURE 1
WEIGHTED CONSENSUS INDEX
part of the party’s programme was put off until the Seventh legislature when it
had a majority.
In other words, the fact that a government is in the minority does count,
but relatively because the government does not lose control of the legislation
(legislative initiative, emergency legislation, essential content and so on)
but simply has to seek procedures to permit it to avoid confrontation with
the opposition. A suitable interpretation of Spanish parliamentary activity
would be to say that when the government needed to (even in the Fifth and
Sixth legislatures), it was able to work as though it had a majority because
this was guaranteed by the nationalist parties; but the need grew to find parlia-
mentary agreement.
Unfortunately, little data are available to observe the forms of negotiation
between parliamentary groups. The Congress reports have only published the
result of the amendments in the Fifth legislature. According to this infor-
mation, nearly 25 per cent of the amendments were accepted and somewhat
more, 30 per cent, if the budgetary law is excluded. However, it must be
said that even in a minority situation the PSOE managed to approve 93 per
cent of the amendments it presented,20 whereas the other groups only
managed 11 per cent, even though these represented 40 per cent of the total
amendments accepted. There are data to indicate that CiU intervened in the
modification of the budgets in 1994 and 1995, whereas the other parties
failed to approve their amendments, but the budgets were hardly altered.21
TABLE 6
WEIGHTED CONSENSUS INDEX BY LEGISLATURES
Const. (1977–79) 1.95

First (1979–82) 1.80
Second (1982–86) 1.37
Third (1986–89) 1.55
Fourth (1989– 93) 1.50
Fifth (1993–96) 1.72
Sixth (1996–2000) 1.80
Source: Author’s calculation (partially published in J. Capo, ‘Oposición y minorı́as en las legis-
latures socialistas’, Revista Española de Investigaciiones Sociológicas, 66 (1994), p.97).
The Spanish Parliament therefore transforms the texts presented by the
government, but it may be said that the government never loses control of
this transformation. In the context of high party discipline, the amendments
of the first party are negotiated and accepted by the executive and the amend-
ments of the opposition may be rejected with the support of the parliamentary
allies. In fact, the government has always been in a position to decide which
bills could be modified by the parliament and which, on the other hand, would
not be altered despite parliamentary debate.
And one thing more, laws are processed with relative speed. According to
our calculations, in the last two minority legislatures, from the time a bill was
presented for final approval by the two Houses, only six months passed in real
time (discounting the periods of parliamentary inactivity). This coincidence
between Fifth and Sixth legislature – in a very different political context
for the governments of PSOE or PP – indicates highly institutionalised proce-
dures for debate that have a relative autonomy of the external constraints.
In the description offered here we would insist that both majority and min-
ority governments control the legislative activity while assuring broad
majority support. How is this interpretation compatible with the opinion of
the Spanish political elites on the weakness of minority governments? In
this sense, a telling example would be that Felipe González failed to
manage to approve the budgets of 1996 due to the contrary vote of his ally
CiU, and had to call elections a few months later (although the dissolution
had already been announced).
The explanation lies more in the particular situation than a situation
applicable to all minority legislatures. In fact, the same kinds of problems
were not posed in the following legislature, when the PP did not have an
absolute majority either. In the Fifth legislature, the weakness of the govern-
ment was political and electoral. Serious cases of economic corruption and the
dirty war against ETA were being investigated by the press, the parliament and
the courts. In such a situation, CiU, with its electoral calculations, withdrew its
support for Felipe González even though it did agree with the economic
TABLE 7
PARTIAL AMENDMENTS, FIFTH LEGISLATURE (1993 – 96)
Total Passed %
Amendments 15,845 3,794 23.9

Excluded budgets 11,786 3,516 29.8
PSOE presented 2,413 2,249 93.2
Other group presented 13,432 1,545 11.5
Source: Memoria de la V legislatura, Congreso de los Diputados (Madrid, 1997), pp.545–671.

Author’s calculation.
orientation of the budget. But the debate and the battle to bring down the
government were occurring in another area. It was not in public policies or
legislation that the opposition made its criticism, but rather in the creation
of parliamentary committees of inquiry. The parliament was not belligerent
in defeating laws, but rather in the control mechanisms; the minority govern-
ment had a majority to legislate, but not to avoid being investigated when
public opinion had turned against it.
THE EXPANSIVE CONTROL
The committees of inquiry are just the tip of the iceberg, an extreme case of
general control activity that seems to be gaining more relevance. Over the
years, the Spanish Parliament has increased its rate of work. Although the
data are incomplete because they refer only to the last legislature, Table 8
shows the number of meetings and the time put in, to which it is necessary
to add the work performed by the many sub-committees and study committees
that are not mentioned here. All this would therefore seem to point to the exist-
ence of an active parliament, although public opinion seems to believe the
contrary.
In this context of increased performance, special attention must be
drawn to the spectacular growth in the activities of orientation and control.
Both the initiatives that take a position on an issue (proposals and motions)
and those that serve as scrutiny and control (interpellations, questions and
requests for reports) have taken on greater importance. The use of either
form has varied with legislatures, but the growth tendency is undoubted. At
the same time, the presence of the government and senior civil servants
before the House or the committees to give explanations is more and more
frequent.
In this way, the scrutiny function of parliament has been consolidated,
although it may not be said that this is due only to the fact that the government
TABLE 8
MEETINGS, SIXTH LEGISLATURE (1996 – 2000)
Meetings Hours
Plenary 271 1,354

Permanent Council 13
‘Mesa’ 238 335
Board of Spokespeople 115 121
Committees 1,082 3,585
Source: Memoria de la VI Legislatura, Congreso de los Diputados (Madrid, 2001).

was in the minority. In some of these aspects, the activity was even greater in
the Fourth legislature than in the following two. The increasing control
would therefore seem more a general tendency than an element linked to a
political situation of minority, although this was relevant in consolidating
this trend.
It would not be unheard of either for the representatives to be broadly
engaged in controlling the government (or posing questions where the govern-
ment may come into its own) insofar as they are granted a higher degree of
autonomy than legislative production, highly subject to the supervision of
the parliamentary group and the party. In this way, through this activity,
they become representatives of specific interests which may become a
useful option for developing a political career beyond parliament.22
In fact, little more may be said about the control activity because there is
not sufficient empirical study to be able to advance solid interpretations on this
issue. It is necessary to be more aware of the individual and party interests that
direct this control, the preferential issues and the sectors affected. Therefore
we do not know to what extent these parliamentary initiatives truly pressurise
the government; they may present the performance of a certain ritual that
allows a majority – opposition game with a wink at public opinion.
In any case, it would also be necessary to highlight that in the scrutiny
activity, as in the legislative activity, the government has a broad margin
for flexibility. Therefore, the government only attends on 52 per cent of the
occasions requested and the senior officials little more than 70 per cent.
This already indicates that the opposition is unable to force the executive to
appear, but perhaps even more telling is the fact that during the budget
debates only three per cent of the ministers appear and less than 50 per cent
of the other members requested.
These figures, however, do not reduce the importance of the control
activity. In fact, one of the issues where the effects of the minority legislatures
have been visible was the successful attempt not to increase the control of
the government. This, by contrast, shows the importance that this function
is supposed to have but also shows the executive’s strength. In fact, during
the Fourth legislature a reform of the 1982 standing orders was consensually
prepared, which broadened the possibilities of the opposition; however, it was
not approved and in the two following legislatures (minorities) both the PSOE
and the PP blocked the reform, which could work against their interests.
CONCLUSIONS
In the final analysis, the Spanish Parliament still seems dependent on guide-
lines and practices that were formulated during the period of political transition
and the difficulty of Senate reform is proof of this, as well as the fact that there
TABLE 9
CONTROL ACTIVITY BY LEGISLATURES, 1977 – 2000
Const. First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth

(1977– (1979– (1982– (1986– (1989– (1993– (1996–
79) 82) 86) 89) 93) 96) 2000)
Non-legislative 114 662 224 501 786 953 2,240

proposals
Motions 37 75 37 102 145 108 175
Interpellations 129 389 210 214 225 142 203
Verbal questions 131 1,157 1,828 3,103 4,467 3,475 4,941
Written questions 304 3,820 9,200 19,458 15,309 14,886 32,719
Appearances before the 7 9 10 26 58 34 46
plenary
Appearances in 184 612 906 2,247 3,656 3,678 4,605
committees
Requests for reports 133 732 1,928 4,957 3,168 2,588

Notes: As the bills presented by the parliamentary groups are called ‘proposiciones de ley’
the other resolutions submitted by parliamentary groups are ‘proposiciones no de ley’.
In fact, these ‘non legislative proposals’ could be understood as motions. The difference
lies in that for the Spanish Parliament the word ‘motion’ is related more to a previous
parliamentary activity (for instance, a motion could be presented after an interpellation).
An interpellation is a kind of question addressed to the government that produces a
general debate in the Plenary with the participation of all parliamentary groups,
whereas a verbal question reduces the debate to the Minister and the MP in the committee.
By ‘appearances’ we mean the presence of the members of the executive and high civil
servants in the hearing.
Source: Memoria de la VI legislatura del Congreso de los Diputados (Madrid, 2001), p.187.
has been no modification of the electoral law or the standing orders of Congress
that serves to give representatives greater autonomy with respect to their par-
liamentary groups or the party leaders. Thus, the parties are the true actors
structuring a parliament that was constitutionally designed to facilitate the
action of the government in situations of majority (obviously) and minority
and, at the same time, allow the opposition to enforce some control.
In this sense, parliament is not only the House echoing the government, but
a space that the government can control through its party with the essential
support of the nationalist groups, depending on the needs of the autonomous
governments. In this way, the House has been working essentially on a
majority basis which allows it to run regularly and produce an output in accord-
ance with the political drive of the government. However, at the same time, the
need for pacts to overcome minority situations, the possibility and practice of
alternation, the continuity in the democratisation process of a state that had not
concluded with the approval of the constitution, the importance of European
integration or devolution to regions also facilitates the existence of nego-
tiations and agreements within the limits set by the governing party.
Nevertheless, if the Senate has serious shortcomings in the federal con-
ception of a state, through Congress, the parliament manages to relate state
political dynamics to those of the autonomous parliaments directed by nationa-
list parties. The Congress is the House where nationalist peripheral parties
gain an asymmetrical power to that of other autonomous communities gov-
erned by state parties, though at the same time it is a centre of attraction
that influences parliamentary alliances in the communities governed by
these nationalist parties.
Therefore the parliament has been functional. It serves the government, the
nationalist minorities and the opposition. It has sufficiently flexible character-
istics not to be identified with a rubber stamp or a governmental roller.
However, at the same time, it is still dominated by the majority. It is not a
federal parliament. Congress, however, expresses the territorial asymmetry
of a state with significant nationalist parties in some autonomous communities.
The control mechanisms do not prevent the executive from running the agenda
and the public policies, but these, especially in exceptional situations, become
a useful tool of the opposition in the face of public opinion.
This functionality and flexibility were consciously sought in the prep-
aration of the constitution, and the continuity of the parliamentary procedures
in the brief history of Spanish democracy is hardly surprising. The constituents
wanted to create a parliament that would facilitate government, but which
would not have a marginal role in the political process. The constituent con-
sensus provided the parliament with an influx of many theoretical conceptions
on its powers and functions, creating an amalgam of all of them.23
Therefore, any category we use to sum up the Spanish Parliament must be
left wide open to include nuances. There are in fact several paradoxes. Its bica-
meralism must be defined as non-federal, but the complexity of the Auton-
omous Communities has been incorporated in Congress by the pivotal
presence of nationalist parties. At the same time, these parties by their
special pivotal position undermine the concept of legislatures of minority –
although this concept cannot be overlooked. The former leads onto the conse-
quence that the Cortes has usually been working as if there was a clear
majority for the government, but the latter reduces the typical explanatory
power of the theories of the declining power of parliament and of its
limited rubber-stamp position.
The Spanish Parliament is neither consensual nor majoritarian but it could
be understood as a negotiating House where a balance (sometimes unstable) is
reached between the strengths and weaknesses of the parties that run the Spanish
government and the Catalan and (to a less extent) Basque ones. The idea of a
negotiating parliament makes it possible to explain how government has a
majoritarian type of control over parliamentary work. This has been achieved
through the possibility of intervention from other parliamentary parties.
NOTES
1. J. Capo et al., ‘By Consociationalism to a Majoritarian Parliamentary System: The Rise and
Decline of the Spanish Cortes’, in U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic
Consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Pinter, 1990), pp.92–130. We do not insist now
in this article on aspects that were analysed 20 years ago.
2. M. Cienfuegos, ‘Las Cortes españolas ante la integración europea’, in C. Closa (ed.), La
europeización del sistema polı́tico español (Madrid: Istmo 2001), pp.197–221.
3. This does not mean that the formal model given by G. Tsebelis and J. Money, Bicameralism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) was applicable to Spain. The weak
institutional force of the Senate and the fact that the parties unify the conduct of the parlia-
mentary groups in both houses mean that negotiation in Congress is not carried out thinking
of a possible different vote from that of the upper house.
4. On the Senate reform with a constitutional focus, VV.AA., Ante el futuro del Senado
(Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 1996); F. Pau (ed.), El Senado, cámara de repre-
sentación territorial (Madrid: Asociación Española de Letrados Parlamentarios y Tecnos,
1996); F.J. Visiedo, La reforma del Senado: territorialización del Senado; Comisión
General de las Comunidades Autónomas (Madrid: Senado, 1997).
5. J.J. Linz and J.R. Montero, ‘The Party Systems of Spain: Old Cleavages and New Challenges’,
Estudio/Working Paper, No.138 (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados del Instituto
Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1999), pp.1–121.
6. On the development of the Fifth legislature, E. Guerrero, Crisis y cambio en las relaciones
Parlamento-Gobierno (1993–1996) (Madrid: Tecnos, 2000).
7. J. Marcet and J. Argelaguet, ‘Nationalist Parties in Catalonia: Convergència Democràtica de
Catalunya and Esquerra Republicana’, pp.70–86, and B. Acha and S. Pérez-Nievas, ‘Moder-
ate Nationalist Parties in the Basque Country: Partido Nacionalista Vasco and Eusko
Alkartasuna’, pp.87–104, in L. de Winter and H. Türsan (eds.), Regionalist Parties in
Western Europe (London: Routledge/ECPR, 1998).
8. For the study of the parties that led to the formation of minority and non-coalition govern-
ments, both in 1993 and in 1996, J.M. Reniu, ‘Las teorı́as de las coaliciones polı́ticas
revisadas; la formación de gobiernos minoritarios en España, 1977–1996’ (Doctoral thesis,
University of Barcelona, 2001; forthcoming in CIS-Siglo XXI, 2002).
9. The party debate in C.R. Aguilera de Prat, ‘Los socialistas ante los pactos de gobernabilidad
de 1993 y 1996’, Revista de Estudios Polı́ticos, 111 (2001), pp.9– 43, and C.R. Aguilera de
Prat, ‘Convergència i Unió ante los pactos de gobernabilidad de 1993 y 1996’, Sistema,
165 (2001), pp.99– 129. For an analysis of the positions of the electorate, J. Capo, ‘El
bucle de la gobernabilidad: opinión pública y pactos en las elecciones de 1996’, in J. Matas
(ed.), Coaliciones polı́ticas y gobernabilidad (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polı́tiques i
Socials, 2000), pp.241–66.
10. 239 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. J. Marcet, ‘Consenso y disensos de doce años
de ley electoral’, Revista de las Cortes Generales, 41 (1997), pp.201–15.
11. There is an abundance of academic literature on the Spanish electoral system. As it is
impossible to quote all quality works, we refer simply to two recent publications with
broad reference to the existing bibliography: J. Montabes (ed.), El sistema electoral a
debate. Veinte años de rendimientos del sistema electoral español (1977–1997) (Madrid:
Parlamento de Andalucı́a y Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1998), and J. Capo,
‘Sistema electoral y gobernabilidad española’, Revista Española de Ciencia Polı́tica, 1
(1999), pp.55–80
12. The minority CiU government is currently supported by the PP in the Catalan Parliament.
Coalición Canaria forms a government with the PP in its community. It is not hard to under-
stand that this relationship would change if the PSOE governed in Spain.
13. J. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); M. Mezey,
Comparative Legislatures (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979); P. Norton (ed.),
Legislatures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); N. Polsby, ‘Legislatures’, in
Norton (ed.), Legislatures.
14. The explanation moves partly away from that proposed by L.M. Maurer, ‘Parliamentary
Influence in a New Democracy: The Spanish Congress’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 5/2
(1999), pp.24–45. On the basis of this discrepancy, the whole of this article reflects our differ-
ent interpretation about minority legislatures. However, it is worth stating a point that could
lead to confusion for anyone comparing the two articles. Maurer refers to the so-called
legislative-decree (decretos-legislativo), which is a decree that follows from parliamentary
delegated law. We refer to the decree-law (decreto-ley) that is a law elaborated by government
and accepted by Congress . The particular procedure of the decree-law indicates very well to
what extent the government may be considered weak or strong. For more details on these two
kinds of rules, see the Spanish Constitution, articles 82 to 86.
15. That is the sum of the government laws and decree-laws that were approved.
16. For a more systematic analysis of the data presented here see J. Capo, ‘Oposición y minorı́as
en las legislaturas socialistas’, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 66 (1994),
pp.91–113.
17. It must be remembered that these data only affect the bills that, in principle, are more signifi-
cant due to their content or the debate they cause. Approximately one-third of the bills are like
the Italian ‘leggine’ discussed exclusively in commission, and do not receive a total vote in the
plenary.
18. We have attempted a quantitative and qualitative approximation in J. Capo, La legislación
estatal en la España democrática. Una aproximación politológica (Madrid: Centro de
Estudios Constitucionales, 1990).
19. The meaning of this index is as follows: the more the result obtained surpasses the unit, the
greater the capacity to add votes of the opposition around the majority party. If, on the other
hand, the results should coincide with this unit, the governing party will only receive its own
votes. Finally, if the figure were under one, it would indicate that the majority group would not
even receive its own votes (for instance, the loss of dissident representatives).
20. Although many of these amendments are ‘transactional’, that is, they present a text negotiated
with the amendments of the remaining groups.
21. J. Calvet, Minority Governments and Parliamentary Agreements: The Case of Spain (Quebec:
Congress of the IPSA, 2000).
22. In the Sixth legislature (electoral continuity), 52 per cent of the representatives were new and
throughout the legislature over one-sixth of the representatives were replaced according to our
calculations. Therefore, there has been no change in the steps indicated by M.L. Morán, ‘Un
intento de análisis de la clase parlamentaria española: elementos de renovación y permanencia
(1977–1986)’, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 45 (1989), pp.61–84. See
also J. Linz et al., ‘Spanish Diputados: From the 1876 Restoration to Consolidated Democ-
racy’, in H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–
2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp.371–462. For the consequences on parliamentary work, see
Capo, La legislación estatal en la España democrática. Una aproximación politológica,
pp.113–27. One explanation of this strong renovation lies in the abundance of political
positions and posts in the senior administration offered by the highly decentralised Spanish
political system, which, combined with the routine and the party discipline of the parliamen-
tary work, leads representatives possibly to prefer the extra-parliamentary possibilities, and
the parties, when they decide to renew their electoral lists, might offer compensation to the
outgoing representatives.
23. J. Capo, La institucionalización de las Cortes Generales (Barcelona: Universidad de
Barcelona, 1983).
Parliament and Citizenship in Spain:
Twenty-Five Years of a Mismatch?
P A B L O O Ñ A T E
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRATIC LIFE IN SPAIN:

AN HISTORIC RECORD
On 15 June 2002, Spain celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first free
elections representing the longest democratic period of Spanish political
history. These elections provided Spanish citizens with the opportunity to
choose their political candidates, thus putting an end to the former authoritar-
ian regime. The democratic political system is today fully consolidated and
has managed adequately to channel social interests and conflicts, catering
for varied political opinions and diverse regional differences, which is attested
by the fact that three major political options have succeeded each other in
government and parliament.
It is possible to state that the political system is now fully institutionalised
and has more than amply complied with its role of solving and managing
conflicts, contributing to the peaceful co-existence of Spanish citizens.1 The
institutional instruments afforded by the Spanish Constitution of 1978 have
created an efficient framework that even includes mechanisms for its own
reform, if it becomes necessary. Therefore, this is a good time to analyse
and take stock of the role played in this process by the Spanish Parliament
– Las Cortes Generales (divided into the Congreso de los Diputados, the
Lower House and the Senado, the Upper House), as the key institution of
the political system and the mainstay of the transition to democracy, consoli-
dation and institutionalisation processes. This analysis is thus carried out
considering the feelings, attitudes and opinions generated by its role while
acknowledging the criticism directed at this institution in recent decades.
Leaving aside the theories of the crisis or the decline of parliaments and
the restrictive paradigm 2 when studying this institution, it should be
considered a multi-functional and versatile institution that has faced deep
changes with great stability and has managed to adapt itself to these in a
very flexible manner.3 It does not come as a surprise that the adaptability
shown by parliaments has been described as an ‘all-purpose flexibility’4 and
that in spite of certain changes in their functions and the loss of their
traditional monopoly over some of them, it still remains the sole institution
vested with formal and popular legitimacy to carry out the functions assigned
PARLIAMENT AND CITIZENSHIP IN SPAIN 131
to it, wherefore it becomes an essential institution for modern political
systems.5 This is precisely the stance adopted in order to carry out our
analysis.
Considering the importance of subjective factors attached to the gener-
ation of support for this institution, in other words, how citizens perceive
the institution, its members and their activity,6 we shall focus on an analysis
of the characteristics that best describe MPs (a profile of parliamentarians),
and on the attitudes and opinions of the citizens with regard to the institution
and its members (the parliamentarians). Considering that under the Spanish
constitutional system the role of the Congreso de los Diputados outweighs
that played by the Senado, most of our discussion will refer solely to the
former, and it is not necessary to examine its organisation or operation here,
as these matters have already been dealt with in the contribution of Jordi
Capo. In any event, most of what will be said here about the Congreso de
los Diputados is applicable equally to the Senado.
The 25 years in which a democratic parliament has been in force in Spain
may be broken down for analytical purposes into three periods clearly delim-
ited by the results of the polls and the distribution of the seats in parliament.7
The first period commenced in the wake of the first democratic polls held in
1977, which opened the Constituent legislature, up to the exceptional elections
of 1982. In 1977 a moderate right-wing party (Unión de Centro Democrático,
UCD) held the barest majority thus requiring the support of other small parties
to approve acts and pass bills through parliament. The Spanish Socialist Party
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) led the opposition, holding almost
the same number of seats as the UCD, so that the political arena was in the
hands of small parties which acted as arbitrators. The 1979 elections, which
opened the First legislature, generated very similar results, although they
were not so highly competitive. The Spanish Parliament played a leading
role in transforming an autocratic regime into a democratic system. It was
here that the institutional design of the new democratic system was conceived
and propped up, while the representative institution provided a legitimate
framework for the rest of the political system. This brought parliament into
the limelight and its leading role is comparable to that observed in other par-
liaments involved in a similar process of transition to democracy.8 The main
parliamentary activity at that time – albeit not the only one – was the draft of
the constitutional text on a consensual basis, with the participation of almost
all political groups in a joint effort to create a document where nobody would
feel excluded and valid for every form of government.9 In view of the special
circumstances of the transitional period, the Spanish Parliament and in par-
ticular, the Congreso de los Diputados became the main and in fact almost
the only forum for political debate, agreement and decision, as it was the
only ‘place’ in which the leading politicians of the party were present and
met, as no other bodies or institutions had been created at that time. Due to all
the above, the Spanish Parliament acquired a leading role, acting as a provider
of support, vitality, presence and legitimacy which was irradiated to the rest of
the new political system10 which it would hardly enjoy again, due to the insti-
tutional design adopted.11
The second period is framed between the elections of 1982, which opened
the Second legislature, and 1993. Parliamentary action at that time is charac-
terised as being in a dormant or lethargic state arising from the absolute
majority of seats obtained by the Socialist Party (PSOE) at the elections
held in 1982, 1986 (Third legislature) and 1989 (Fourth legislature), as its par-
liamentary group imposed such a majority in all voting sessions of the House,
whereby it became subject to the decisions adopted by the government. The
opposition was in the midst of an internal leadership crisis that prevented it
from exercising effective control in order to provide a clear alternative govern-
ment. The House became a body charged primarily with the ratification and
ex post legitimacy of what had already been decided by the executive, and
at the same time new instances and representative forums appeared for the
representation of social interests that did not exist during the transition to
democracy. As a consequence of all this, the Spanish Parliament stepped
down from its leading role during the transition period and entered into a
quiescent parliamentary activity. Institutional normality brought about a para-
lysis of the dynamism that it had experienced some time before.
The third period is inaugurated by the general elections of 1993 (which
opened the Fifth legislature) leading to a series of parliamentary agreements
between the party in power and regional forces which provided the necessary
support for the passage of bills. At the same time, the main opposition party,
which had changed its name to Partido Popular (PP) – Aliansa Popular before
1989 – had closed the door on its internal conflicts and had become a clear
alternative to the existing government, with a more ambitious agenda and
developing an intense effort of opposition and control of the government in
parliament. The parliamentary arena was waking from its slumber of the
1980s, and was experiencing a new dynamism which was not interrupted in
spite of the PP winning the 1996 election, opening the Sixth legislature (it
also required the support of small regional parties to secure approval of its pro-
jects) and in spite of the ample majority of parliamentary seats obtained in the
election of 2000 (which opened the Seventh legislature); the PP preferred to
continue availing itself of the support of small regional parties during the
voting sessions although in terms of numbers it was not strictly necessary.
This situation has turned the parliament into a sounding board that presents
certain images to society, whereby this institution has regained some of
its former activity and presence which became very diffused during the
previous decade.12
In the following we shall attempt to take into account this division into
three periods (intense activity and presence at the beginning, inactivity, and
then an awakening of parliamentary action, respectively), although our analy-
sis suffers from the lack of available data during the first period: the Centro de
Investigaciones Sociológicas (Spanish Institute of Sociological Research,
CIS) produced its first surveys only from 1982 onwards. Some data exist for
the earlier period, but there are no series that would allow for comparison
back to that moment. Firstly, we offer a social and political profile of MPs
of the Congreso de los Diputados in order to show evidence of the changes
and continuity detected in these 25 years of parliamentary activity, referring to
the personal circumstances of those involved (the MPs), and consequently of
the House. In the second section we shall discuss the opinions and attitudes
of the MPs towards the institution, their activity, their ties with their political
party and with other members of the House and with citizens. This will provide
us with the necessary information to know how MPs feel about the work they
carry out and their place of work. Finally, the last section deals with opinions
and attitudes of the electorate towards the parliamentary institution, the work
carried out there, its activities and players, and the importance they attach to
this assembly for the functioning of the democratic system, including their
feelings about how parliamentarians represent the interests of the citizens,
and so on. All the above allows us to provide an X-ray of the attitudes gener-
ated by the institution, in order to attempt a diagnosis which is provided in our
conclusions of what the key players feel and experience with respect to the
relations set up in these last 25 years of parliamentary activity.
THE PROFILE OF SPANISH MPs
In these 25 years of parliamentary activity the Congreso de los Diputados has

experienced a much higher rate of renewal of MPs than is commonly found in
other political systems; almost half the members elected in each legislature are
new to the House. This renewal ratio varies from one parliamentary group
to another depending on their success at the polls and the internal struggles
suffered by each party.13 This high renewal ratio also affects – and to a
greater extent, as it applies to 68 per cent of its members – the composition
of the different Comisiones Permanentes (Standing Committees) of the
House which, at least in theory, are specialised bodies charged with discussing
technical issues.14 In order to explain this high renewal ratio and why such
appointment is not cherished, several factors have been identified, among
which we would point out the stringent limitations to holding another office,
poor remuneration, the reduced presence of ordinary MPs considering the
hierarchical structure of the House and the difficulty of advancing in a political
career from that of a backbench MP.15
This lack of continuity among Spanish MPs hinders their professionalisa-

tion and has reinforced the sway of strong parliamentary groups (which are a
reflection of the distribution of political parties in the House). Since the first
elections of 1977, the legal regulations and the Rules of the House have
chosen to boost the presence of those parliamentary groups in lieu of fostering
the capacity of independent action of the MPs. The objective sought in order to
facilitate transition to democracy was a strengthening of political parties in all
institutional areas considering the initial starting point of the party organis-
ations, reducing partisanship and weak loyalties, diminished presence and
social integration. Parliamentary groups became effectively the players of
parliamentary life, and the field of action of individual MPs was virtually
non-existent if he or she did not receive support from his/her political party.
The high renewal rate of the House reinforced this trend.
This dependency, which is also commonly found in other parliaments akin
to the Spanish political environment, is not seen as something negative by
most citizens or by the MPs themselves. According to surveys carried out
by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas only 48 per cent of citizens con-
sider that MPs should follow their own judgement rather than the guidelines of
the party if these proved to be different. In the case of MPs, only four per cent
of them consider that their judgement should always prevail, whereas 67
per cent replied that it depends on the nature of the issue, and only 30 per
cent stated that the guidelines set by the party should always be final.16
The presence of women occupying seats in the Congreso de los Diputados
has increased at the same rate as in most other European parliaments. During
the First legislature the presence of women MPs in parliament was negligible,
both in terms of numbers (they represented little more than five per cent of 350
seats) and also in parliamentary proceedings. Their presence started to
increase, albeit slowly, after the Third legislature, although a leap forward
would only take place during the Fourth legislature (commencing in 1989)
during which 15 per cent of MPs at the Congreso de los Diputados were
women. It was at that time that the inclusion of women in the electoral lists
of political parties (occupying senior positions in general) had become an
issue17 which was taken into account by all political parties to avoid a negative
reception from citizens. In the1990s, such growth consolidated and women’s
presence grew at a similar rate to that registered on average in other parlia-
ments in other European countries, above that achieved by France, the
United Kingdom or Belgium but still considerably below the ratios for
Scandinavian countries.18 Following the March 2000 elections, 29.7 per cent
of seats are now occupied by women. And, for the first time in Spanish
history, the speakers of both Houses (Congreso de los Diputados and
Senado) are women, who also preside over six of the 19 committees of the
Lower House.19
The percentage of women varies from one parliamentary group to another:
initially the highest percentage of women MPs was found in Isquierda Unida
(Spanish left-wing party – during the Sixth legislature, which commenced in
1996, they achieved a 33.3 per cent ratio). Of the two leading parties, the
Socialist Party has had the highest ratios of women MPs in the last legislatures
(27.7 per cent during the Sixth legislature, and 38.4 per cent in the Seventh
one, which commenced in 2000), ahead of the Popular Party, which only in
this current legislature has registered a ratio of women MPs in excess of 25
per cent among its ranks (26.8 per cent). This trend clearly indicates that
the presence of women in the House and in other political institutions is
growing, and also in terms of occupying increasingly high-profile positions.
The average age of MPs has remained quite stable, close to 45 years. By
age groups, it may be seen that younger MPs (under 40) have gradually lost
ground since the founding elections held in 1977; at that time almost 40 per
cent of MPs were under 40 whereas at present they hardly account for 20
per cent of its members. The number of MPs with an age range of 40 to 59
has grown over this period from 50 per cent to 73 per cent of total MPs.
Among senior age groups, upward and downward trends may be seen when
examining the 60 to 69 group, and in the age group of 70 and over, the
trend is clearly a downward one, as shown in Table 1.
Considering the various parliamentary groups, differences may be
detected in the age of their respective MPs arising chiefly from the electoral
results of their party, whether it has obtained the majority of votes (in
which case some MPs are appointed to hold office in the government) and
also if the party has experienced any internal struggles.
Spanish MPs are highly qualified: in all legislatures approximately 75 per
cent of them have had a higher education degree, a large number of them are
law graduates, followed at a considerable distance by holders of degrees in
TABLE 1
AGE OF SPANISH MPs BY LEGISLATURE (%)
Constituent First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh

1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000
,30 6.2 4.3 2.4 3.0 0.6 0.3 1.4 2.9

30/39 33.5 40.4 34.9 29.0 26.3 17.6 19.0 16.6
40/49 31.5 34.4 32.1 42.9 47.7 48.9 45.1 37.1
50/59 18.6 13.2 22.6 21.0 22.3 27.8 27.0 34.9
60/69 8.5 5.4 6.7 3.0 2.3 5.1 7.5 7.1
.70 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.3
Source: For 1977–96, P. Gangas, ‘Los diputados españoles: 1977–1996’, p.275. For 2000, Con-
greso de los Diputados, www.congreso.es. The figures represent a percentage considering
a total of 350 MPs that make up the Congreso de los Diputados.
economy, arts and medicine. But if we consider their professions prior to

becoming MPs we find that certain variations have ensued during the eight
legislatures analysed here. The number of civil servants has progressively
increased and at present accounts for half the MPs of the House. Without
any doubt, the fact that they may return to their previous office and their experi-
ence in the administration are the two factors that explain why so many
civil servants become MPs. On the other hand, the number of technicians,
attorneys, manual workers, farmers and businessmen in the House has
gradually diminished. It seems logical that having to forsake their line of
business for a four-year period is not exactly an incentive to become an MP.20
Some Spanish MPs had previous political representative experience in
regional parliaments or local councils, although considerably less than their
European colleagues. In the present legislature, 29 per cent of MPs had pre-
viously held office in local councils, whereas only 22 per cent had gained the
same experience in regional parliaments.21 The number of those who move
from local councils or regional parliaments to state parliament has increased
in the last 25 years: during the First legislature very few of them had previously
been involved in local or regional politics.22 These figures are greatly reduced
if we compare them to those who held prior office on a sub-state representative
level in parliaments of other countries, although the fact that this figure is
steadily increasing could be a sign that this trend will continue in the future
as parliamentary life spreads over a larger number of legislatures.
In summary, the Congreso de los Diputados has experienced a consider-
able renewal rate from one legislature to another, considering the House
as a whole but also with regard to the members or chairs of the different
committees. This high renewal rate has been consistent throughout the
Spanish democratic period. The average age of Spanish MPs has not varied
considerably over these 25 years (46 years), even if there are fewer young
representatives. There has been, however, an increase in women holding
seats in the House (especially since 1989), as well as of MPs with prior experi-
ence in the local or regional representative bodies. It could be said that the
Spanish representative profile is getting closer to that of other European
long-institutionalised parliaments.
THE OPINIONS OF MPs
According to article 66 of the Spanish Constitution, the parliament is vested

with the functions of representing the Spanish people, drafting and passing
laws, controlling executive action and approving the national budget. Only
42 per cent of MPs consider that they represent all the Spanish population,
while 28 per cent of them stated that they represented the voters of their
constituency, 17 per cent the voters of their party and nine per cent the
political party to which they belong. However, in view of the data recorded in
Table 2, when they have to take a decision it seems that they not only take into
account the opinion of the citizens they claim to represent.23
The opinion of party leaders is taken into account almost to the same
degree as that of the voters of their constituency, and to a greater extent
than public opinion in general, voters of the party or its affiliates. This is in
line with their opinion that they chiefly represent the majority of citizens
(either of the country or of their constituency), while observing at the same
time party discipline when voting (most MPs consider that such discipline
could be relaxed on certain occasions depending on the nature of the issue).
However, as we shall see, although MPs are convinced that they represent
the interests of citizens, their opinion about dealing with this topic is not so
emphatic.
Spanish MPs say they are acquainted with the issues that relate to the
citizens of their constituency and have frequent contact with them; 86 per
cent of them stated that citizens, their party affiliates and leaders contact
them very often or quite often, as well as other MPs (in all cases more than
80 per cent) and citizens’ associations (60 per cent). On the other hand,
they have little or no contact with religious groups (83 per cent), professional
associations, Secretaries of State or business associations (in all cases above
60 per cent have no contact). According to their statements, they have a
plural knowledge of general problems and keep abreast of issues that affect
their constituency.
As we shall see in the next section, the opinions of citizens in this respect
hardly match those provided by their representatives. To put this matter into
focus, we simply note that only five per cent of citizens polled stated that
they had contacted an MP of their constituency when facing a problem that
TABLE 2
GROUPS WHOSE OPINION WEIGHS ON THE DECISIONS OF MPs (%)
A lot or Little or No reply

considerably nothing
Voters of their constituency 90.5 2.2 7.4

Party leaders 82.4 7.2 10.5
Public opinion in general 75.2 15.6 9.2
Party affiliates 63.7 22.6 13.6
Media 36.6 50.9 12.8
Other MPs of the party 42.4 41.3 16.4
Lobbies 23.0 62.9 14.0
Voters of their party 79.2 10.6 10.2
Government 39.7 46.4 13.8
Source: Study 2,250, conducted in 1997, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

affected them personally, or their town or city. Additionally, 86 per cent of

those who have never contacted an MP declared that they would not even
think of doing so. It seems that Spanish citizens do not feel very close to
their parliamentary representatives.
Going back to the importance attached by MPs to the different activities
carried out in the course of their parliamentary work, we find that the represen-
tative function (defending the interests of their constituency) comes first,
followed closely by the task of drafting laws (Table 3). It should be empha-
sised that they consider the defence of party interests slightly more important
than preparing the National Budget, the measure that records the state’s
income and expenditure and the allocation of resources.
As is to be expected, there are differences between MPs belonging to the
leading parliamentary group (Grupo Popular, which supports the government)
and MPs from the main parliamentary group of the opposition (Grupo Socia-
lista); however, most of them consider – to much the same extent – that their
main task is to defend the interests of their constituency, and MPs from the
party in power believe that they represent the country to a much greater
extent than those in the opposition (with percentages of 72.9 and 56.5 respect-
ively). Still more striking is the high percentage registered for activities invol-
ving the passage of bills among MPs of the opposition (they attach only 4.5 per
cent less importance than the majority group) considering that the Spanish par-
liamentary system of adversary politics implies that their legislative initiatives
(whether as motions or amendments) are hardly ever seconded. Obviously,
one of the main roles of the opposition is to study the bills and motions
proposed by the leading parliamentary group in order to present amendments
and prepare the debates. It is very much the same in the case of the budget
(which is considered a more important activity by opposition MPs than by
those of the leading party). In this sense, the parliament is increasingly
TABLE 3
WEIGHT ATTACHED TO THE DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES
OF PARLIAMENTARY WORK (%)
A lot or Little or No reply

considerably nothing
Represent the country 60.7 29.2 10.1

Draft laws 87.1 10.1 2.7
Solve the country’s problems 89.0 7.4 3.6
Control Executive action 72.1 24.4 3.5
Defend the interests of my party 66.8 28.1 5.1
Draft the Budget 66.0 28.3 5.6
Represent the interests of my constituency 90.1 6.2 3.8

being used as a sounding board to reach the general public and ensure visi-
bility. As is to be expected, controlling executive action is perceived as far
more relevant among opposition MPs (twice as much) than among MPs
belonging to the leading group.
This information on the importance attached to certain activities by MPs
may be matched against the degree of satisfaction they derive from these.
Table 4 provides an overview of the different activities or issues involving par-
liamentary duties of MPs,24 and the data obtained are certainly striking if com-
pared to what has been recorded above: the activity which is perceived as most
appealing to MPs is that related to the drafting and passage of bills which
occupied the third position in the ranking of the importance given to activities.
To uphold interests and solve particular problems within their constituency
occupies tenth place as to degree of satisfaction and appeal, although it was
considered the most important of their duties. Controlling executive action
occupied fourth position in importance, whereas in the list of the most satis-
factory activities it merits a second-to-last entry. On the other hand, for
most Spanish MPs the least appealing activity by far is meetings of commit-
tees or of the plenary, notwithstanding the fact that they devote almost 40 per
cent of their time to this.
In spite of these contradictions between the degree of importance attached
to each activity and the level of satisfaction obtained, most Spanish MPs
admitted that they were very satisfied with their work; three-quarters of
them stated that they were very satisfied (11.6 per cent), or satisfied
(65.6 per cent) in their role as MPs, whereas only 21.7 per cent of them
declared that they were unsatisfied with their work and there were no ‘very
unsatisfactory’ replies. However, oddly enough, the MPs from the leading
parliamentary group are least satisfied with their work (providing the lowest
TABLE 4
THE MOST APPEALING AND SATISFACTORY ACTIVITY FOR MPs IN THE COURSE
OF THEIR PARLIAMENTARY DUTIES (%)
Legislative function, drafting laws 23.6

Contact with social sectors 17.8
Solving problems in general 14.3
Parliamentary debates 11.0
Defend interests and solve problems of their region 6.5
Committee work 4.2
Political debates, in general 3.4
Controlling executive action 2.6
Social influence and closeness to decision power 2.4
Others 4.9
No reply 9.3

number of ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ replies – eight percentage points

below that scored by the opposition) and their replies were more likely than
those of other MPs to register ‘very unsatisfied’ or ‘unsatisfied’ (approxi-
mately 15 percentage points more). On the other hand, those whose day-to-
day activity is not backed by the majority of the House feel more satisfied
with their work.25
Moreover, this general degree of satisfaction goes hand in hand with a very
stringent system of disqualifying circumstances to holding office that makes
the post of MP a full-time job. MPs may not pursue extra-parliamentary activi-
ties and most of them consider that they do not have a higher income as MPs
than they did before coming to office. Furthermore, when a proposal for the
elimination of this system of disqualifying circumstances is put to them,
54.2 per cent of MPs were against such a proposal and only 41.3 per cent
stated that a more flexible system would be preferable. On the other hand,
the main complaint of Spanish MPs regarding their work is the lack of
human resources, which ranks far above other concerns such as lack of econ-
omic or material resources, lack of information or advisory services, bureauc-
racy, administrative proceedings or the operation of the internal services in the
House. In light of all the above there is no doubt that MPs are satisfied with
their work, which makes the high renewal ratio from one legislature to
another all the more surprising.
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS
From the very beginning of the current democratic period, most Spanish
citizens (85 per cent on an on-going basis) have considered that a democratic
system is preferable to any other system of government. These democratic
convictions lead us to believe that this parliamentary institution – where
political representatives chosen by citizens take their seats and which, in the
case of the Spanish parliamentary system, appoints the members of the main
constitutional bodies – should receive considerable attention and sympathy
from those very citizens. However, judging from the results of surveys,26
Spanish citizens to a considerable extent are not familiar with the parliamentary
institution, its functions, its players – the MPs – and the work carried out by
them. The data supporting this statement have remained stable since 1982.
The Congreso de los Diputados is the institution that selects the majority
of officers for the main constitutional bodies. Therefore it is not surprising that
a great majority (more than 78 per cent) of citizens consider that parliament is
very or quite important for the functioning of democracy,27 whereas only ten
per cent consider that it is hardly or not at all important; likewise, 75 per cent
of those polled consider that parliament is a necessary institution and only
seven per cent stated that it was unnecessary.28 In a similar vein, there are
many more (twice as many) citizens who consider that the decisions adopted
by the Congreso de los Diputados have a great or considerable impact on them
(62 per cent) than those who seem to think it hardly affects them or not at all
(32 per cent).29 All the data summarised here show that this institution
receives a considerable degree of diffuse support from Spanish citizens,30
support which has hardly undergone any significant variation over time in
spite of the different political parties in power or changes in parliamentary
majority. As has been mentioned elsewhere, we therefore have a diffuse
support of a structural nature.31
But the position changes if we consider the opinions relating to the degree
of specific support which citizens attach to the parliamentary institution.32 The
first remarkable issue is that there is widespread ignorance as to the functions
vested in this institution, or of the name of the Speaker of the House (in spite of
being the third most important political officer of the country). Less than 40
per cent of people surveyed, regardless of the party they voted for, were
able to provide the name of the speaker of the Congreso de los Diputados
(who is also the speaker of parliament). This percentage plummets if we
take into account the number of citizens who are able to remember the
name of the candidate that headed the list of the political party they voted
for, regardless of whether he/she was finally elected or not (let alone the
results when the question referred to other electoral candidates occupying
lower positions in the blocked and closed list when running for elections).
A similar attitude may be inferred from the degree of interest shown by
Spanish citizens with regard to parliamentary activity: 60 per cent stated
that they were not at all or hardly interested in parliamentary debates and
only 30 to 45 per cent declared that they were greatly or somewhat interested.
A significant increase is noticeable over recent years (since 1996) in the pro-
portion who claim to be interested (a ten per cent increase approximately)
which coincides with Partido Popular winning the elections and the parlia-
mentary agreements with three other parties during the period of revitalisation
of the House which was mentioned at the beginning of this article. However,
there are still more citizens who have little or no interest in the work carried
out by their MPs than those who wish to be informed of their activities. Fur-
thermore, this high ratio of disinterest remains constant (hardly varying more
than four per cent) regardless of whether the person polled had voted for the
majority party of the House or the first opposition party. In any case, parlia-
mentary activity consistently merits less attention than that carried out by
the local council, the national or the regional government. In spite of the
fact that most senior officers of the country are appointed by the House, that
the National Budget is approved by the House and it exercises a direct or indir-
ect control over all political institutions (in political and economic terms),
most Spanish citizens consider that as an institution it has a diminished
power, rated below that held by the national government, banks, major com-
panies, multinationals, political parties and the judiciary.
This lack of interest and under-rating of parliamentary debate is in line
with the opinion held by most citizens as to the importance of the issues
discussed in the House: less than half of those surveyed (between 31 to 50
per cent, depending on the political situation at the time) consider that the
main issues of the country are discussed in parliament, while 32 to 49 per
cent of those polled consider that the House pays too much attention to unim-
portant matters. The changes in these figures do not seem to correlate with any
specific trends, significant circumstances or to a division in political periods.
Only 51 per cent of citizens consider that the debates held in the House have a
major or considerable impact on them, whereas 41 per cent of them consider
that the debates in which their MPs are involved have little or no effect on
them. There are as many citizens who consider that such discussions do not
affect them at all as those who consider that they have a considerable
impact on them (14 and 13 per cent respectively).
Citizens do not feel that their interests are either particularly represented or
defended by MPs: 60 per cent of citizens consider that MPs do not defend their
interests at all or hardly (15 per cent think that their interests are not
represented at all). Only 27 per cent think that MPs defend them to a consider-
able or sufficient extent and a mere 2.6 per cent feel that their interests are
effectively represented. These global figures, which remain stable over time,
are, however, subject to variation when considering if the person questioned
voted for the party which held the majority of seats in the House at that
time, with differences between replies of approximately 20 percentage
points. Those who consider that their interests are highly or sufficiently
represented by their MPs have never exceeded 50 per cent, not even among
those that voted for the leading party from time to time (and within the
group of those who voted for the majority party, only 40 per cent claimed
that their MPs represented to a great extent, or sufficiently, the interests of
their electorate).
On examination of the data obtained when the citizens are polled about
what they consider to be the main concern of their elected representatives,
the results are even more eloquent. As shown in Table 5, citizens consider
that MPs are more concerned (twice as concerned) about their own interests
or those of their party than those of the electorate or of Spain. There seems
to be a wide consensus among citizens that MPs are not primarily concerned
with the general good or the interests of those that voted for them, which
contrasts with the results obtained in the former section when we analysed
the main concerns stated by MPs in the course of their parliamentary work.
In view of these figures, it may be relevant to examine how Spanish
citizens grade the extent to which MPs take into account the opinions of
TABLE 5
AREAS OF CONCERN OF SPANISH MPs ACCORDING
TO CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS (%)
A lot Considerably Hardly None
Their own interests 37.2 42.6 9.0 1.3

The interests of their party 31.7 52.3 6.9 0.8
The interests of their voters 5.0 30.6 44.9 10.5
The interests of Spain 4.7 36.3 38.0 10.7
Source: Study 2,309 conducted in December 1998, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas

(N/sample size ¼ 4,970).
different groups when they have to adopt a political decision in the course of
their parliamentary work. Considering the data collected in Table 6, it follows
that citizens do not consider that there is much responsiveness from their
parliamentary representatives. Citizens feel that neither their interests nor
their opinion is taken very much into account by MPs, who are much more
concerned with their own interests and opinions.
In light of the above data, it may be advanced that Spanish citizens are not
very satisfied with the political institution that allegedly represents their
interests and national sovereignty: they are hardly aware of its functions,
players, show little interest as to its activity (much less than in the case of
other institutions), in their opinion it does not hold much power, and the
debates conducted in the House are hardly relevant and have little impact
on them. They also consider that their interests are not the main concern of
their MPs and that their opinion as citizens and voters is hardly taken into
account in the parliamentary decision-making process.
TABLE 6
OPINIONS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY MPs WHEN ADOPTING THEIR DECISIONS,
ACCORDING TO CITIZENS’ OPINION (%)
A lot Considerably Hardly None
The electorate of their constituency 3.5 21.6 42.2 13.9

Public opinion in general 4.2 26.7 40.8 12.6
Voters of their party 6.5 36.3 30.8 9.1
Lobbies 8.5 34.5 25.2 7.8
Party affiliates 7.4 39.8 29.3 5.9
Media 10.2 38.9 25.3 7.2
Party leaders 23.8 46.0 12.0 2.7
Source: Study 2,240 conducted in April 1997, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. The ques-
tion is only posed to those persons who stated that they followed parliamentarian activity
with great or considerable interest (N ¼ 654).
The result of the evaluation of Spanish citizens as to the work carried out
by the parliamentary institution is far from positive. In fact it ranks behind the
work of their local council or the regional government, that of the national
government and their respective regional parliament. Only 27 per cent of
the citizens consider that the work carried out at the national parliament is
positive, while 42 per cent of them rated it as average and 14 per cent
considered it negative.33 The degree of satisfaction over the functioning of
parliament is low, as may be gathered from Table 7. Only in 1998 did half
the citizens polled declare themselves satisfied with its functioning. But the
previous surveys show a higher proportion of Spanish citizens dissatisfied
with how parliament works. The only exceptions to this are the 1995 and
1998 data, but there are no specific circumstances which may explain these
exceptions.
CONCLUSIONS – PARLIAMENT AND CITIZENSHIP: 25 YEARS OF

MISMATCH?
All the foregoing data lead to the conclusion that there is a mismatch between
the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados and Spanish citizens. Spaniards have a
very different perception from MPs about parliament and its actors’ work.
Spanish citizens do not show any real interest in what their representatives
do or in who they are; they do not feel very satisfied with the effective
running of their parliament, or with the way in which MPs perform their
duties, or with how the general interest (their interests as citizens) is rep-
resented in this institution, or the extent to which their opinions are taken
into account when making decisions. The figures verify that many of these
opinions persist over time and are widespread: they remain basically
unchanged regardless of changes in the current political situation, of the
party voted for by the citizens or the majority party. There are hardly any
TABLE 7
DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH HOW PARLIAMENT WORKS (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Very satisfied 2 2 1 2 2 1 4
Satisfied 34 41 30 47 42 28 54
Very satisfied þ Satisfied 36 43 31 49 44 29 58
Dissatisfied 33 33 47 29 37 44 24
Very dissatisfied 8 9 10 5 5 9 3
Dissatisfied þ Very dissatisfied 41 42 57 34 42 53 27
Source: Data from Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Studies Nos 2,042, 2,076, 2,124,
2,201, 2,229, 2,240 and 2,286. The figure (N) refers generally to 2,500 cases except
1998 which was 5,000. The 1997 data refers only to the Congreso de los Diputados.
significant changes to these negative perceptions of the institution that to a
great extent connects them with the state. The differences over time in the par-
liament’s composition, its functioning, dynamics and internal activities have
therefore had no effect on citizens’ perceptions, which remained stable
during the 1980s and 1990s.
On the other hand, it can be observed that the opinions of citizens hardly
match those put forward by MPs on the same issues. Their way of perceiving
the development of parliamentary work and their representative function is
altogether different, depending on whether the persons surveyed are citizens
or MPs. The responsiveness level of the former runs counter to the perception
of the latter.
Notwithstanding these views on the running of parliament, the activity of
MPs does not seem to be a major worry for Spanish citizens, judging from the
data examined this does not affect the level of diffuse support for the insti-
tution and the political system as a whole. A token of this high level of
diffuse support is the stability of electoral turnout in the different elections
held since 1977. This high and stable turnout ‘is generally considered to be
an eloquent indicator of a healthy democracy which reflects the trust placed
on the political system’.34 Besides this, the percentage of citizens who think
parliament is really important for democracy is quite high and stable.
It is now some years since Norton stressed the importance of analysing
parliamentary institutions within the context and political culture that sur-
rounds the institution.35 Those who have studied the political culture of
Spanish citizens generally agree that it runs on the lines of apathy, lack of
interest, a feeling of subjective inefficacy, democratic cynicism, and is unat-
tached to the political system, its institutions and authorities. Citizens are
not committed politically speaking (at least in the institutional arena) but
they do not reject the system: they still consider that a democratic system is
the only valid manner of organising political co-existence, the electoral
turnout is still quite large, and they still consider that parliament is a key insti-
tution acting as the cornerstone for the democratic system. The Spanish demo-
cratic system, its stability and legitimacy do not seem to be endangered.
These attitudes are not only found among Spanish citizens. They have
been detected in a considerable number of Western political systems in
which the principles and institutions of the democratic system enjoy a solid
support from citizens who are becoming increasingly more sophisticated
and are highly critical of its running and day-to-day results.36 In these
systems ‘a clear evidence of a widespread eroded support to politicians and
the functioning of democratic institutions . . . is detected. The lack of
confidence in the responsiveness of authorities has been relayed to them
and has spread to the institutions themselves’.37 A general decline in the
trust placed on political institutions of representative democracy is noticeable,
and this obviously also affects the parliament, but the Spanish Congreso de los
Diputados is the one parliament that has registered the lowest decline in con-
fidence placed in it (merely a percentage point in five years) of the different
parliaments considered (the decline on average for the period considered
has been 12 percentage points).38
When talking about the mismatch between the Spanish Parliament and
its MPs on one side, and its citizens on the other, we are, to a large extent,
identifying ‘unsatisfied democrats’ unhappy with the operation, efficacy or
performance of parliament, but who support democracy and the democratic
political system as the only system of government: more sophisticated, parti-
cipative and critical citizens who at the same time – and perhaps due to
these traits – are unsatisfied with the operation of the main institutions of
representative democracy. This does not necessarily mean that they should
be considered as a threat to the system, but on the contrary they may bring
about change and reform within these systems.39
Talking about the Spanish case, Linz pointed out,40 several years ago, that
a high degree of legitimacy is compatible with low levels of efficacy (or, as
Easton put it,41 a high level of diffuse support and a low level of specific
support), without posing a threat to or compromising the stability of the
system – at least in the short term. Perhaps all these attitudes should be exam-
ined as a consequence of the ‘cyclical fluctuations’ noted by Cotta42 with
respect to ‘representation’ and ‘decisionism’, which implies that in certain
situations citizens tend to participate intensely and become involved in politi-
cal issues, whereas at other times they turn their back on general issues, thus
exhibiting a highly ‘social and political privatism or individualism’,43 taking
refuge in an extreme interpretation of ‘the democracy of the Moderns’.44 In
any event, it is not irrelevant for the health of democratic systems that the
parliamentary institution is seen as a ‘house without windows’45 which is
operative from a political standpoint but which does not mean anything to
most citizens. We trust that precisely those citizens who are ‘unsatisfied
democrats’ act as a spur so that democratic systems and their representative
institutions become more receptive and tuned to citizenship, achieving an
effective integration of this institution into their daily lives.
NOTES
1. Obviously this is not the place to discuss the largely unresolved conflict of the Basque
Country. It is the only issue that the constitutional political system has not been able to
solve or channel adequately.
2. P. Norton, ‘Parliaments: A Framework for Analysis’, Western European Politics, 13/3 (1990),
pp.1–9. See, also S.C. Patterson and G.W. Copeland, ‘Parliaments in the Twenty-first
Century’, in G.W. Copeland and S.C. Patterson (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World.
Changing Institutions (Ann-Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), p.154.
3. When making this assertion, we take into account the growth of the state apparatus, new con-
texts, new commitments under the responsibility of the state, new agents which perform
certain tasks formerly ascribed to parliament, evolution of political parties (mass, catch-all,
cartel parties), cultural change and a more sophisticated, unsatisfied and demanding citizen-
ship, the dismantling in part of the welfare state, integration on supranational political
instances, territorial decentralisation processes, and the like.
4. N.J. Polsby, ‘Legislatures’, in F.I. Greenstein and N.J. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political
Science, vol.5 (Addison-Wesley, 1975), p.297.
5. G. Loewenberg, ‘The Role of Parliament in Modern Political Systems’, in G. Loewenberg
(ed.), Modern Parliaments. Change or Decline? (Chicago, IL: Aldine Atherton, 1971),
pp.14 ff.; Polsby, ‘Legislatures’, pp.262 and 302; U. Liebert, ‘Parlamento y consolidación
democrática en el Sur de Europa’, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 42
(1988), pp.103 and 131; P. Norton, ‘Parliament in the United Kingdom: Balancing Effective-
ness and Consent?’, West European Politics, 13/3 (1990), p.29; P. Norton, ‘Introduction’,
Parliamentary Affairs, 50/3 (Special Issue on Western Legislatures), (1997), p.468;
G.W. Copeland and S.C. Patterson, ‘Changing an Institutionalized System’, in Copeland
and Patterson, Parliaments in the Modern World. Changing Institutions, p.160; J.R.
Montero, ‘Parlamento y opinión pública: las percepciones y los niveles de apoyo a las
Cortes Generales’, in A. Garrorena (ed.), El Parlamento y sus transformaciones actuales
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1990), p.102; J. Santamarı́a, ‘El papel del parlamento durante la consolida-
ción de la democracia y después’, Revista de Estudios Polı́ticos, 84 (1994), pp.18 ff.; P. Oñate,
‘Parlamento y crisis de la representación en España’, paper submitted to the IV Congreso de la
Asociación Española de Ciencia Polı́tica, Granada, 1999, p.22.
6. Liebert, ‘Parlamento y consolidación democrática en la Europa del Sur’, p.121; P. Norton,
‘Legislatures in Perspective’, West European Politics, 13/3 (1990), pp.146 and 147.
7. A. Martı́nez, I. Delgado and P. Oñate, Parlamento y opinión pública en España (Madrid:
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1998), pp.11 ff.
8. Liebert, ‘Parlamento y consolidación democrática en la Europa del Sur’, p.94.
9. Discussed in P. Oñate, Ideologı́a y consenso en la transición polı́tica española (Madrid:
Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1998), where readers interested in this matter may
find more information.
10. J. Capo et al., ‘By Consociationalism to a Majoritarian Parliamentary System: The Rise and
Decline of the Spanish Cortes’, in U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic
Consolidation in Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey (London: Pinter
Publishers, 1990), p.102. Regarding the exceptional role and functions played by the Spanish
Parliament under these political circumstances please refer to Santamarı́a, ‘El papel del Par-
lamento durante la consolidación de la democracia y después’, pp.12 ff.
11. This institutional design implied that parliamentary sovereignty was enthroned as a myth
almost from the very beginning of its democratic existence, in favour of a very strong execu-
tive, with the corresponding impact on the opinion of citizens as to the representative nature of
parliament and parliamentary representatives (U. Liebert, ‘Parliament as a Central Site in
Democratic Consolidation: A Preliminary Exploration’, in Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament
in Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey,
p.10). These underpinnings consisted of an electoral system clearly based on majority, a
constructive no-confidence vote similar to that established in the Basic Law of Bonn, the
requirement of simple majority to win a no-confidence motion, the appointment of ministers
by the president of the government, limitations to the creation and operation of parliamentary
groups, a reinforced position of the speaker in directing parliamentary work, the possibility of
passing legislation by the executive using the system of decree-laws, and so on.
12. Such was the case of Scandinavian parliaments at the end of the 1980s: the reactivation and
revitalisation of parliamentary activity in these countries on all fronts during the decade of the
1980s is closely related to the minority condition which the governments of those three
countries experienced in that decade and especially in the 1990s, and with the guidelines of
co-operation and competition which were established between the different political parties
as a consequence of this situation. In this sense, please refer to E. Damgaard, ‘The Strong
Parliaments of Scandinavia: Continuity and Change of Scandinavian Parliaments’, in

Copeland and Patterson (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World. Changing Institutions?
pp.90 and 100.
13. More details in P. Oñate, ‘Congreso de los Diputados, grupos parlamentarios y partidos’, in
A. Martı́nez (ed.), El Congreso de los Diputados en España: funciones y rendimiento
(Madrid: Tecnos, 2000), pp.129 ff. The renewal ratio in the elections of March 2000 was
43.4 per cent (which was very similar in both major parliamentary groups, according to the
data provided by I. Delgado and M. Jerez, ‘Las elecciones de 2000: un intento de análisis
de los parlamentarios españoles en perspectiva comparada’, paper submitted to the V Con-
greso de la Asociación Española de Ciencia Polı́tica, Sept. 2001. The number of MPs that
have held office during three consecutive legislatures is not even one-third of the total
members of the House.
14. The renewal ratio of members belonging to standing committees between the Fifth and the
Sixth legislature was 68 per cent. On-going chairmanship of these committees reveals an
astonishingly low ratio: only 20 per cent of the persons who held this office in each legislature
had also done so in the preceding one. But only seven per cent of the chairs of standing com-
mittees had held an appointment in the Board of Governance (one chair, two deputy-chairs
and two secretaries) of that standing committee. And not even 50 per cent of the chairs of
a standing committee had been members of the same in the previous legislature. More
details in P. Oñate, ‘La organización del Congreso de los Diputados’, in Martínez (ed.),
El Congreso de los Diputados en España: funciones y rendimiento, pp.89 ff.
15. There are comparatively few ministers who had previously been MPs, whereby it becomes
less attractive to remain in office as an MP. See J. Botella, ‘Parlamento y carreras polı́ticas’,
in M. Ramı́rez (ed.), El Parlamento a debate (Madrid: Trotta, 1997), p.152; and M. Jerez, ‘La
elite parlamentaria’, in Ramı́rez (ed.), El parlamento a debate, p.133.
16. Study nos.2,240 and 2,250 conducted in 1997 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
17. The Socialist Party as its German counterpart had adopted a 25 per cent quota for women in its
electoral lists. Compliance with the quota became mandatory as from 1994. However, most of
them occupied positions that provided them with few opportunities of becoming elected. In its
turn, the Partido Popular, following its reorganisation in 1989 wanted to convey an image of a
centre party and therefore it was essential to place women in senior positions. Since then the
number of women included in its lists and considered for senior appointments, whether in the
House or in other institutions, has grown constantly.
18. The percentage of seats occupied by women has been as follows: 14 per cent in 1989, 15.6 per
cent in 1993, and 21.6 per cent in 1996. Data gathered from P. Gangas, ‘Los diputados
españoles, 1977–1996’, in Martı́nez (ed.), El Congreso de los Diputados en España:
funciones y rendimiento, p.275.
19. Only three out of 14 legislative standing committees (Constitutional, Foreign Affairs,
Environment) are chaired by a woman. The three other chairwomen of standing committees
are of non-legislative committees (considering that two of them chair the House Rules and
Appointments Consultative Committee which are always chaired by the person acting as
the Speaker of the House from time to time). Information taken from the web page of the
Congreso de los Diputados (www.congreso.es).
20. For an assessment of the studies and previous occupation of Spanish MPs – a setback is the
high no-reply level by MPs – please refer to Gangas , ‘Los diputados españoles: 1977–1996’,
p.278; and Delgado and Jerez, ‘Las elecciones de 2000: un intento de análisis de los parlamen-
tarios españoles en perspectiva comparada’, p.28.
21. Data provided by Delgado and Jerez, ‘Las elecciones de 2000: un intento de análisis de los
parlamentarios españoles en perspectiva comparada’, p.33.
22. See Botella, ‘Parlamento y carreras polı́ticas’, pp.148 and 152.
23. El Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas carried out a study in December 1997 (no. 2,250)
on the attitudes and opinions of Spanish parliamentarians about the institution, the work and
activities carried out there. The study was based on a survey conducted on all MPs which has
not been repeated and therefore it is not possible to analyse the evolution experienced by such
opinions and attitudes over time, either previously or at later moments. In spite of its static
viewpoint, it provides interesting information on how the main players of this institution
perceive different aspects of their day-to-day work and life. It would be desirable that a
study of this nature were conducted in each legislature, so that regular series could be obtained
on the same questions and indicators. This study was the subject of an in-depth analysis at a
research project titled ‘Representación polı́tica, decisiones colectivas y acción partidista en
los procesos de reforma institucional. Un análisis comparado de España y México’, which
has yielded its first fruits in the book edited by Martı́nez, El Congreso de los Diputados en
España: funciones y rendimiento.
24. The questionnaire does not contemplate exactly the same categories so it does not warrant a
comparison in strict terms. However, the data gathered make it possible to perceive the
relationship between the importance attached to each activity and the degree of satisfaction
obtained.
25. An attempt has been made to explain this paradox considering the dependency to which the
majority is subject regarding small regional political forces due to the correlation of political
forces existing in the Congreso de los Diputados at the time when this survey was conducted.
Probably this factor has something to do with this circumstance, as the MPs who were most
satisfied with their work were those belonging to the group that seconded Grupo Popular in the
voting sessions, which claimed certain benefits in exchange. See I. Delgado, ‘Elites polı́ticas y
vida parlamentaria: actividades y motivaciones de los diputados españoles’, in Martı́nez (ed.),
El Congreso de los Diputados en España: funciones y rendimiento, p.335.
26. We will use the information available from the surveys conducted by the Centro de Investi-
gaciones Sociológicas between 1982 and 2000. Most of these surveys provide similar data
which implies that there are no substantial variations over time, or due to the political situation
or the political party in power. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, we will provide data
referred to the average of the period considered. Unfortunately there are no data for these
issues for periods before 1982. The opinions of Spanish citizens on parliament have been
analysed in depth in I. Delgado, A. Martı́nez and P. Oñate, Parlamento y opinión pública
en España. On representation and its crisis in Spain, see Oñate, ‘Parlamento y crisis de
representación en España’.
27. As was to be expected, these figures are somewhat higher (seven percentage points) among
those who voted for the leading party. As we have already stated, this opinion hardly
changed over time and the importance attached to the House did not diminish even during
the years in which Spanish political life was plagued by scandals of political corruption
(1993 to 1996).
28. Even among those who at times stated that an authoritarian regime would be preferable (thus
showing their lack of democratic spirit), the ratio of citizens who consider that parliament is a
necessary institution is three to one.
29. However, Spanish citizens consider that decisions of parliament have less effect on them than
those stemming from regional parliament, the national government, the regional government
and their local council (in this order). The decisions passed in the Spanish Parliament only
have – in their opinion – a higher degree of importance than those of the European Parliament
or the European Commission.
30. The expression ‘diffuse support’ in the sense used by Easton is understood to be a ‘reserve of
favourable attitudes of citizens towards the political system [or some of its institutions], which
makes them accept or tolerate certain political outputs which do not deserve their favour or
which may entail detrimental consequences for them’. D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of
Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p.273. This issue was discussed
recently by P. Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), considering (based on Easton’s category) that the
concept of political support is multi-dimensional and its five aspects must be differentiated
for an adequate measurement of the same.
31. Oñate, ‘Parlamento y crisis de la representación en España’.
32. Specific support, which may equally refer to the political system, its institutions or its
authorities, arises from the satisfaction experienced by its members both in terms of results
or outputs of the system and from a general and abstract evaluation of its performance in
political terms. D. Easton, ‘A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support’, British

Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), pp.437 ff.
33. Study No. 2,286 of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, May 1998 (N ¼ 9,980).
34. P. Norris, ‘Representation and the Democratic Deficit’, European Journal of Political
Research, 32/2 (1997), p.281. As Topf put it, ‘West European national elections are in
little danger of losing the capacity to bind citizens to the political system’, R. Topf, ‘Electoral
Participation’, in H.D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds.), Citizens and the State (Oxford:
Oxford Unviersity Press, 1995), p.50.
35. Norton, ‘Legislatures in Perspective’, p.147.
36. For a general overview please refer to the works compiled by Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens.
Global Support for Democratic Governance. The conclusion of P. Norton in the monographic
issue on Western Parliaments may be consulted: ‘Conclusion: Stronger Links, Weaker
Support’, Parliamentary Affairs, 50/3 (1997), pp.468–75.
37. R.J. Dalton, ‘Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies’, in Norris (ed.), Critical
Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance, pp.63 and 67.
38. Please refer to the data provided by H.D. Klingemann in this area, ‘Mapping Political Support
in the 1990s: A Global Analysis’, in Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens. Global Support for
Democratic Governance, p.51.
39. Klingemann, ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis’, pp.32, 43 and 56.
Other contributions in Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic
Governance.
40. J.J. Linz, ‘Problemas de la democracia hoy’, in J. Montabes (ed.), El sistema electoral a
debate: veinte años de rendimientos del sistema electoral español (1977–1997) (Madrid:
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1998), pp.26 and 27.
41. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.
42. M. Cotta, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Centrality of the Italian Parliament: Transformations of the
Executive-Legislative Subsystem after the Second World War’, in Copeland and Patterson
(eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World. Changing Institutions, pp.66 and 67.
43. J. Habermas, Problemas de legitimación del capitalismo tardio (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu,
1986), pp.54, 78 and 96; as well as C. Offe, Partidos polı́ticos y nuevos movimientos sociales
(Madrid: Sistema, 1988), pp.171 ff.
44. B. Constant, ‘The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns’, Political
Writings (London: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
45. C. Melnik and N. Leites, House Without Windows (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1958).
Volatility in Politics, Stability in Parliament:
An Impossible Dream?
The Turkish Grand National Assembly
during the Last Two Decades
İ L T E R T U R A N
The well-known work by Liebert and Cotta on Southern European legislatures

was entitled Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe.1
The title suggests what the authors assume: parliaments occupy an important
position and perform critical functions in the consolidation of democracy in
political systems that have made a transition to competitive politics. The
nature of their contribution, however, remains unclear. Summarising the
different views on the role of parliaments in democratic consolidation,
Liebert reminds us that while some view parliament as a central site ‘in build-
ing legitimacy for the new regime’, others give it somewhat less prominence
in this process than political parties and charismatic leaders.2 Di Palma, on the
other hand, argues that parliament is unlikely to have been a major actor in
designing the original rules of the democratic game, and that its role in demo-
cratic consolidation is ‘in the reproduction of [democratic] consent’,3 not in
the initial design.
Liebert and Cotta viewed consolidation as a passing phase of democratic
evolution. In their opinion, after consolidation, parliaments in Southern
Europe would move towards adapting themselves to serving the needs of a
democratic polity. While they were optimistic about democratic consolidation
in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, they were cautious in their evaluation of
the Turkish experience. Liebert noted that ‘the swift process of crafting the
new constitution which profoundly reorganized the system of government
was not followed by regime consolidation, but rather by problems of institu-
tionalization, in particular at the level of the Grand National Assembly’. She
attributed these to the exclusivistic nature of constitution-making as well as to
the limitations imposed on the party system which in turn produced instability
among the parliamentary groups.4
Kalaycıoğlu, in his contribution to the same volume, discusses some of the
reasons for this failure in his brief analysis of the cyclical breakdowns of
Turkey’s democracy, showing that conditions have allowed only ‘nascent
institutionalization’ in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA).5
More than a decade later we are faced with the same question, only implied in
Kalaycıoğlu’s article: Can a parliament become highly institutionalised in
what otherwise is an unstable political environment? Can it serve as an
agent of democratic consolidation? Or, to repeat Di Palma’s question: Can
it reproduce democratic consent though it has not been a part of the initial
design? While the immediate temptation is to say no, more careful analysis
may reveal that there are ways in which the presence and the functioning of
a parliament in a competitive political system may enhance the consolidation
of democracy and that a certain amount of institutionalisation is possible even
under conditions of flux.
In this context, Turkey certainly constitutes an appropriate case to study.
Firstly, the Turkish political parties have been in flux since the early 1970s.
This has produced a party system which is hardly characterised by its stability.
There are no indications that this tendency has been tempered. Second, the
relationship between political parties and their parliamentary extensions
does not allow the legislature to acquire an autonomous personality of its
own, making it vulnerable to the volatility experienced in other parts of the
political system. Third, state elites, comprising the armed forces amongst
others, have staged interventions and devised constitutional systems which
have modified, constrained, limited and reshaped the power of the legislative
institution and its exercise. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the impression, to
be substantiated later, that the TGNA has been an agent of democratic conso-
lidation and has itself become more institutionalised over time.
HISTORICAL-POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The Evolution of the Parliamentary Institutions

Turkey got its first parliament in 1876 during the Ottoman Empire. That exper-
iment was quickly terminated, however, with the outbreak of the Turco-
Russian War of 1877 – 78, to be reinitiated three decades later in 1908. The
Ottoman House continued to function until early 1920 when it was closed
by British occupation forces, which found it too nationalistic. The British
action facilitated the efforts of the Nationalist resistance, which was striving
to develop its own political institutions. The Turkish Grand National Assem-
bly was opened in Ankara in late April of the same year. A colourful body
comprising a variety of representatives, some elected others appointed by
the governors of provinces, the TGNA was unanimous in its determination
that foreign occupation should be terminated. The National War of Indepen-
dence was conducted and won under its auspices. The TGNA declared that
the Ottoman Empire had come to an end when the representatives of the
Sultan’s government were invited to the peace talks by the Allies.
THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 153
After the signing of the peace treaty at Lausanne in the summer of 1923,
the first elections, in which the People’s Party led by Mustafa Kemal (later
Atatürk) won all the seats, were held. Shortly thereafter, the TGNA declared
the country a republic. A year later, it adopted a new constitution proposed by
the government, bringing to an end ‘government by assembly’, an arrange-
ment in which the ministers were seen as no more than representatives exer-
cising executive powers on behalf of the legislature, and replacing it with a
classical parliamentary system, though under single-party rule. Not surpris-
ingly, the TGNA quickly fell under executive domination as is the rule in par-
liamentary systems. This hierarchical relationship between government and
the legislature, deriving from the fact that the government is at the same
time comprised of the leaders of the majority party(s), has continued to this
day, although the country moved to competitive politics in 1946 and has
twice, in 1961 and 1982, adopted new constitutions.
From its very beginning, the TGNA has been a politically important
institution. The legitimacy of the entire political arrangement derived
from the presence of a national assembly that had abolished and replaced
the monarchy and in which ‘the national will’ was said to become manifest.
Throughout the single-party period (1923 –46) the legislature met regularly
from late autumn to early summer each year and debated laws and policies.
The ministers came before it to explain and defend their policies. While
such debate did not alter the substance of bills that originated in the govern-
ment, it served to legitimise and popularise political action. Such patterned
activity also contributed to the institutionalisation of the TGNA as an inte-
gral part of the political system. Elections were held every four years with
extensive campaigns. Voter registers, polling stations and the election ritual
constituted an infrastructure that later proved critical in the smooth tran-
sition to competitive politics.
The deputies of the single Republican People’s Party (RPP) came from
either amongst the civilian and military bureaucrats (centralist elites) or
from among the local notables. As the position of the national government
became more receptive towards society because of the conditions imposed
on it by the Second World War, the local notables assumed a critical role in
challenging the single-party system and bringing it to an end. The transform-
ation of the single-party system to a multi-party system was debated and even-
tually accomplished in the TGNA. The opposition to the RPP, the Democratic
Party, was formed in the parliament by RPP deputies who challenged the pol-
icies of the government.
Since its founding, the TGNA has preserved its critical role in the Turkish
political system as the key legitimising institution. The country has experi-
enced two military interventions in 1960 and 1980, in part because of impasses
in the parliament and its failure to address major pressing questions, but in
both instances the military leaders have not only appointed constituent (1960)
and consultative (1980) assemblies very quickly, but have legitimised their
intervention by promising at the outset and then restoring competitive politics
after coping with the national emergencies that they had said were the reasons
behind their intervention in national politics. Failure to keep their promise
would have seriously undermined their own credibility and popular esteem.
The parliamentary system as established by the constitution of 1924 con-
tained no effective checks and balances against the government and the parlia-
mentary majority whose confidence it enjoyed. The multi-member district and
the ‘winner-takes-all’ electoral system taken together, on the other hand, pro-
duced parliaments in which the electoral majority was much over-represented
and seen as being insensitive to the concerns of those in the minority. The con-
stitutions of 1960 and 1982 introduced checks on the powers of the govern-
ment and the parliament while modifying the electoral system. The
constraints placed on the power of the parliament are discussed later. With
regard to the electoral system, while the multi-member districts have been
retained throughout, proportional representation replaced majority represen-
tation as its guiding principle after 1961. In 1982, a national electoral
threshold of ten per cent and a district threshold were introduced, barring
parties that failed to achieve them from placing representatives in the parlia-
ment nationally and from the district. The district threshold was ruled uncon-
stitutional in 1995 as undermining the representativeness of those elected.
Otherwise, although the details of electoral laws have been changed at
almost every election since 1961, the basic features of the electoral system
have remained the same.
The Party System and the Political Parties

Turning to Turkish political parties, we have already noted that the single
Republican People’s Party (RPP) gave birth to the Democratic Party. The
latter was disbanded following the military intervention of 1960, encouraged
by the RPP which had come to feel that the DP had grown so authoritarian that
it would not allow fair elections opening the way to its replacement. Following
the return to competitive politics, although a number of new organisations had
come into being to claim the legacy of the now defunct DP, eventually the
Justice Party (JP) won the contest and was able to constitute the government
by itself from 1965 until 1971.
In the late 1960s, however, the Turkish political system began a major trans-
formation. The two main parties, the RPP and the JP, experienced splits among
their ranks and some deputies left them to establish new parties. These proved
ephemeral. More significant however, was the emergence and rapid strengthen-
ing of two new parties on the right: the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party
and the religiously oriented National Salvation Party. With the dispersal of the
vote among parties, governments from 1973 to 1980 had to be coalitions. During
this period, there was a deep polarisation between the parties of the left and the
right. Somewhat unstable and ineffective coalitions generally formed by parties
on the right failed to cope with mounting economic difficulties and violence, and
opened the way to a military intervention in 1980.
The military leaders abolished all pre-1980 parties and then tried to mould
a new two-party system by using electoral engineering techniques, depriving
the pre-1980 leaders from their political rights and by denying newly formed
parties not to their liking access to the 1983 elections for transition to civilian
politics. Once civilian politics were restored, however, the pre-1980 parties re-
emerged gradually to replace the somewhat artificial parties supported by the
military. In the 1983 elections, one party that the military had reluctantly
allowed to compete, the Motherland Party, emerged as the victor. Represent-
ing a mix of economic and political liberalism with an attachment to tra-
ditions, the MP ruled the country by itself for two terms, from 1983 to
1991. Afterwards, the tendency for the vote to fragment returned with all its
ramifications. Since that time, Turkey has been ruled by coalition govern-
ments of varying durability.
The major actors in this post-1983 coalition game of musical chairs
include:
. the Motherland Party (centre-right)

. the True Path Party (successor to the pre-1980 Justice Party) (centre-right)
. the Republican People’s Party (pre-1980 RPP revived) (centre-left)
. the Nationalist Action Party (pre-1980 NAP revived) (right)
. initially the Welfare Party and after its closure by the Constitutional Court
the successor Virtue Party and after the closure of that party by the Court,
the Justice and Development Party and the Felicity Party (all successors
to the pre-1980 National Salvation Party) (right)
. the Democratic Left Party (established by a former leader of the RPP)
(centre-left)
Other minor actors have also come and gone while further changes are
always likely.
Table 1 displays with unmistakable clarity the trends that have character-
ised the post-1983 period. The number of parties participating in elections has
risen steadily. The vote has become increasingly dispersed, as indicated by the
index of fractionalisation. The vote percentage of the largest party has gone
down from 45 per cent to nearly 20 per cent and the number of parties in
the legislature has gone up. What the table does not show is the volatility of
the vote.6 Votes during the past 15 years have shown significant fluidity
between parties, and the electoral fortunes of parties have gone up and
TABLE 1
ELECTIONS AND PARTIES DURING THE POST-1983 PERIOD
Election N of parties N of parties in Party w/highest Fractionalisation

Year in elections parliament % of the vote Index
1983 3 3 45.2 0.649

1987 7 3 36.3 0.757
1991 6 5 24.0 0.786
1995 12 5(6) 21.3 0.835
1999 21 5 22.2 0.853
Notes: Fractionalisation index comes from D. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral
Laws (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), p.56. The index is one minus
the sum total of the squares of the percentages of the vote each party has obtained in
the election expressed as a decimal fraction.
Motherland Party allowed the candidates of the Grand Unity Party to run on its ticket in
anticipation that the distortions in the electoral laws would bring in additional deputies to
the MP itself. The GUP deputies left to form their own parliamentary party once they
were elected. Parentheses are used to indicate the real number of parties.
Source: Calculated from information contained in I. Ezherli, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (1920–
1998) ve Osmanli Meclisi Mebusani (1877– 1920) (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet
Meclisi, 1998), pp.106–10, except for the elections of 1999 calculated with figures
obtained from other souces.
down.7 Some have come dangerously close to failing to achieve the national
threshold of ten per cent that is required for any deputy to win a seat.
Turning our attention to the parties themselves, it may be observed that,
increasingly, the Turkish political parties have become small, narrowly
based organisations with weakening links to society over time.8 The tendency
of the parties to fragment into small organisations is attributable to a number
of factors. Firstly, the military government of 1980 –83 closed all existing pol-
itical parties in order to build an entirely new party system. As civilian politics
were restored, parties other than those initially allowed by the military came
into being, many of them claiming to represent pre-1980 parties. On occasion,
more than one party claimed the same pre-existing heritage. These conditions
were highly conducive to the erosion of party identification among the electo-
rate.9 Thus, when the post-1983 parties and those claiming to represent an
earlier heritage all came to compete in the political arena, a system of many
parties evolved, each getting a small portion of the vote. The voters, generally
possessing a moderate and pragmatic political orientation,10 are baffled with
such an array of choices and do not force the consolidation of parties.
Rather, they shift their vote between this or that party, depending on a
variety of factors.
Second, the small size of the parliamentary party groups generates a neces-
sity to form coalition governments in which small parties get the opportunity
to wield more power than their electoral achievements would indicate. The
possibility of becoming a coalition partner serves as a disincentive for small
parties to unite. Third, parties serve mainly as networks for patronage, that
is, the distribution of public resources to active party supporters.11 Patronage
is better distributed in small networks. In fact, larger parties have had more
difficulty in meeting the demands of their constituents and have experienced
centrifugal pressures since catering to the demands of some, creating jealousy
in others. Fourth, small parties, lacking strong organisation, have come to rely
more and more on the personality of the party leader as a way of advancing the
party’s public appeal. As the importance of the leader’s personality has
increased in politics12 it has become more difficult for parties to unite with
other parties possessing similar orientations, since each leader develops
particular interests in the perpetuation of his/her own position.
Fifth, the government extends financial support to political parties that are
able to form groups in parliament that have at least 20 deputies. This gives
small parties the means to survive with their own resources, reducing their
desire to become incorporated into bigger units. Sixth and last, the growth
in the number of political parties in parliament does reflect the increasing
differentiation in Turkish society in terms of both economic interests and
ways of looking at the world. As new constituencies have begun to take
shape or become stronger they have found it more attractive to organise sep-
arately rather than join an existing party since coalition politics often serves to
increase the marginal importance and therefore the power position of small
parties, because often a parliamentary majority cannot be mustered without
obtaining their support. This gives small parties considerable leverage in
advancing their interests and this would most likely be reduced were they to
become part of a larger organisation.
Turkish political parties are not mass organisations with large member-
ships. For example, they do not have reliable membership rosters and keep
little record of those who have paid their dues. They try to compensate for
the absence of reliable organisational links with the masses by trying to
reach the voter through the appeal of the party leader.13 This makes for
strong, authoritarian and oligarchical leadership. The party leaders possess
critical instruments through which they can impose their will on the party’s
deputies in parliament. They can initiate disciplinary action against any
member who makes critical remarks about them. They can stop the deputy
serving on committees, speaking on the floor on behalf of the party, serving
their constituency if the party is in government; and, ultimately, becoming
a candidate with some chance of winning at the next elections.14 On
this last point, it should be noted that the possibility of holding a primary
election for candidate designation exists but has not been used in recent
elections.
Personal conversations with deputies have revealed the development of

new ways to render them submissive to the party leader. For example, histori-
cally, the meeting of the party group has constituted a forum in which deputies
can speak their minds, question party policies and even criticise the leadership.
The late Turgut Özal, prime minister from 1983 to 1989, initiated the practice
of accepting visitors into these meetings, violating the rather lengthy tradition
to the contrary. Other parties quickly adopted the same practice. Nowadays,
the meetings have turned into occasions where the deputies display their
support for their leader. After the deputies are seated, the party leader
makes his entry. All deputies stand up and applaud. The leader addresses
the session, usually boasting about the party’s recent achievements and
severely criticising opponents. The deputies may then take the floor to
support their leader. For those who offer criticism, a group of party activists
loyal to the leader are at hand, if necessary, to hiss and boo the speaker.15
EFFECTS OF PARTIES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM ON PARLIAMENTARY

BEHAVIOUR AND INSTITUTIONALISATION
The growing number of parties, the wide dispersal of the vote among them, the
volatility of the vote, the ensuing high turnover rate of deputies (Table 2), the
emphasis on patronage, the weak organisational links of parties to society and
the oligarchical leadership of parties all carry implications as to what happens
in the TGNA, how deputies behave, how parties interact with each other, how
the legislature performs its duties and whether it advances in the direction of
further institutionalisation.
Parties in Parliament: Impediments to Institutionalisation
The fragmentation of the party system and the volatility of the vote make
parliamentary parties rather unstable organisations in the long term. This
TABLE 2
TURNOVER RATES OF DEPUTIES
Year % re-elected % of freshmen
1983 7.0 93.0

1987 36.7 63.3
1991 29.6 70.4
1995 35.6 64.4
1999 43.6 56.4
Note: The rates are calculated on the basis of whether a deputy was re-elected for the succeeding
term. Some, in fact, may have served in the TGNA during earlier terms, classified as
‘freshman’ in the table.
Source: İ. Turan, ‘Parlamentolarin Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’, in İ. Turan (ed.),
TBMM’nin Etkinliği (Istanbul: TESEV, 2000), p.26.
instability is further exacerbated by the fact that deputies change parties.16
They need to retain their cohesion internally, keeping their deputies from
switching to other parties. They need to keep the loyalties of their voters
since a small decline in voter support may further reduce their share of
seats in the TGNA, sometimes bringing them close to dropping below the
national threshold of ten per cent. The imperatives of such a situation
dictate parliamentary strategies that include somewhat overtly hostile
relations with rival parties even when they may be partners in the same
coalition. In this way, group cohesion may be maintained while the voters
are sent signals to distinguish between what looks like a set of similar parties.
Relations between parties are further undermined by the fact that parties
are patronage networks. When in government as coalition partners, each quar-
rels with its partners regarding who should get how much of what. When in
opposition, they work hard to bring the government down so that they can
have a chance to get into the seats of power once again.
What does this all mean in terms of what happens in parliament? Under-
standably, relations between parties, even between those who may be partners
in a coalition, are characterised by a lack of trust. This can turn into active hos-
tility between the government and the opposition during the heat of parliamen-
tary debate, sometimes producing ‘unruly’ behaviour,17 with possibly sad
consequences. In 2001, for example, an opposition deputy died of a heart
attack on the floor during a push-and-shove match that had ensued in the
course of debate. The high incidence of unruly behaviour slows down the pro-
ceedings of the legislature and serves to undermine its public standing.
The lack of ability to dispense public resources as patronage poses a
serious challenge to parties in opposition since their networks of political
brokers can be tempted to switch sides to the holders of power. For such
reasons, much opposition energy is devoted to finding ways to undermine
the existing government: encouraging disharmony within it, standing in the
way of its getting anything done by paralysing the functioning of the parlia-
ment, inviting government deputies to leave their party in return for rewards
and persistently challenging the legitimacy of the government. In this struggle,
parliamentary procedures and instruments are used for purposes other than
those for which they were intended. An example is the use of motions of
censure (interpellations) and the motions to launch legislative investigations.
These instruments are the strongest means available to the parliament to exer-
cise oversight on the executive. A legislative investigation constitutes the first
step of an impeachment proceeding, therefore requiring reasonably convin-
cing indication of wrongdoing. A motion of censure, on the other hand,
again requires clear indication of wrongdoing, failure or inability to rule.
Such motions should be used only on rare occasions. Yet, as can be seen
from Table 3, these instruments have been used frequently, especially
TABLE 3
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES IN THE TGNA
Type of activity 1983–87 1987–91 1991–95 1995–99 1999–
Oral questions 1,080 1,255 1,824 1,261 1,679

Written questions 2,232 2,202 7,550 6,950 5,723
General debate on a 23 46 69 38 24
selected issue area
Legislative inquiry 68 151 (9) 247 (52) 313 (63) 247 (22)
Legislative 16 (1) 4 25 (7) 46 (23) 4 (1)
investigation
Motions of censure 3 28 42 22 (3) 24
(Interpellations)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the number of motions that have been carried.
Source: The information has been kindly provided by Dr Şeref İba, Deputy Director, Department
of Laws and Resolutions of the TGNA.
during the time of coalition governments, to test the staying power of

government.
The strained relationship between government and opposition seriously
hinders their ability to co-operate even on matters of mutual interest. These
difficulties lead government parties not to take the views of the opposition
into account even in matters relating to the functioning of the parliament as
an institution. The presence of a pervasive atmosphere of flux and uncertainty,
on the other hand, induces all parliamentary parties to think and act with only
short-term gains in mind, although what is done may well have long-term con-
sequences. The adoption of and the affecting of changes in the rules of pro-
cedure (RP) and the changing of the size of the TGNA would constitute
cases in point.
The RP under which the Turkish legislature operates were accepted in
1973. In a body characterised by difficult relations between government and
opposition, building consensus on an entirely new document had proved
impossible, leading the Justice Party, enjoying a majority at the time, to
adopt wholesale the new RP it had prepared.18 The post-1983 legislatures
used the same RP although the latter had been written with the 1961 Consti-
tution in mind and did not address current constitutional realities. Efforts to
draw up an entirely new set of rules appeared to be out of the question but
neither could consensus be developed on a narrower set of changes. Finally,
in 1996, government parties agreed on changes, many having to do with bring-
ing the existing rules into compliance with the constitution. But they also
included among others, for example, an innovation enabling the government
to ask that a bill be taken up as a ‘fundamental law’ if approved by three-fifths
of the whole house. A bill with that designation would be subject to special
procedures decided on by the legislature.19 It is using this procedure that
many of the recent economic reform bills have been enacted. Such an achieve-
ment would have taken an inordinate amount of time and possibly proved
impossible under the old rules. But because the RP changes had been
imposed on it, the opposition rejected them from the beginning and challenged
them in the constitutional court. Almost six years later, the court ruled this
particular provision to be unconstitutional. Although it will be some time
before the decision will take effect, the government parties will be signifi-
cantly constrained in their law-making activities in the future unless a
mutually acceptable solution is found.
The decision of the parliament to change the constitution so as to increase
the size of the TGNA first to 450 in 1987 and then to 550 in 1995, on the other
hand, shows that pure short-term political expediency may sometimes pro-
vide sufficient motivation for inter-party co-operation. On both occasions,
increases in the size of the parliament reflected not a deficiency in the perform-
ance of legislative services owing to a deputy shortage but the political needs
of the parties at the time. In the first of these instances, Prime Minister Özal
had decided to move the elections a year ahead with the hope that his party
might retain the majority in the parliament before an evident decline in his
support gained momentum. The opposition wanted, on the other hand, to
bring their pre-1980 political leaders, whose rights they hoped would soon
be restored through a referendum, back to the parliament. The incumbents,
however, many of whom knew from the high turnover rates that have pre-
vailed during the post-1983 era that they would not be re-elected, would not
consent to an early election unless a way was found to enhance their
chances of re-election. Increasing the size of the legislature was such a
measure because it allowed parties to retain a similar number of seats even
if their share of the vote was to decline. A similar experience was lived
through in 1995, this time adding another 100 seats to the legislature,
raising the total to 550.
An inability to draw up or amend the RP and modify its size in the interest of
political expediency does not bode well for the institutionalisation of the Turkish
legislature. Willingness to make rules or amend them only to meet immediate
needs implies a readiness to play with rules such that the legislative environment
is rendered unpredictable. This is the opposite of institutionalisation if that is
defined as patterns becoming known, accepted and valued over time. Further-
more, such behaviour invites interventions from the outside, undermining the
prerogatives of the institution. During the recent debates – for example, on
the pay rises the deputies awarded themselves – it was often suggested that
there were already too many deputies and that the size of the legislature
should be cut. That such a possibility is raised at all as a measure to reduce
public expenditure shows that the failure of an organisation to institutionalise

may lead the public to treat it with scant esteem.20
The Deputies: Survival Takes Precedence Over All

The instability of political parties themselves in terms of voter support, their
dependence on the distribution of patronage for survival, their authoritarian
leadership and the high turnover rate of deputies, have effects on the behaviour
of the individual deputy that carry implications for the institutionalisation of
the legislature. The deputies perceive their occupation to be a high risk job.
This is understandable: subservience to the party leader more than any other
achievement is likely to determine whether they are re-nominated at the
next election,21 and there are many others of a similar bent against whom
each has to compete. Some may find total submission to a leader unacceptable.
The electoral support of parties varies such that defeat in the election always
looms large.
The first outcome of these conditions is a tendency to maximise gains
while in office since tenure is likely to be limited. The area where this has
become manifest no less than seven times during recent years has been the
passing of several laws and one constitutional amendment for higher pay
and better retirement conditions. In each instance, there has been a public
uproar against their action. In the end, the decision has either been vetoed
by the president or annulled by the constitutional court. In the most recent
case, in October 2001, the president of the republic chose to humiliate the
deputies by deciding to submit a constitutional amendment that allowed for
substantial pay increases for deputies to a public referendum. Rather than
face certain defeat at the ballot box, the deputies chose to amend the consti-
tution once again, restoring it to its pre-amendment form. It should be
pointed out that in the issue of pay hikes, the parties have kept their distance
from the deputies and have allowed them to seize the initiative, recognising
both that they cannot stop the parliamentarians anyway and that there is no
benefit to be derived from getting involved.
Many deputies retain outside businesses, some take on new jobs during
their tenure. These serve two main purposes: generating additional income
for the deputies and constituting a cushion if they lose the election. Article
82 of the Turkish constitution deals with jobs a deputy cannot hold.
However, the article, which is elaborate in imposing restrictions on the
holding of public jobs, passes on the responsibility of defining what other
employment and business restrictions should apply to the TGNA, saying
that these should be determined by law. Such a law has never been enacted
although the constitution has now been in force for 20 years. Many deputies
hold other jobs, conduct other businesses without letting conflict of interest
considerations get in the way. The matter occasionally enters public debate
when a scandalous incident is uncovered, but quickly recedes to the back-
ground with nothing being done.
While prone to maximising gains in office, the deputies also try to improve
their re-election chances. They use different strategies depending on the con-
ditions. One important strategy is to emphasise constituency service, both
serving the political brokers from one’s electoral district and the needs of
the district itself. This activity, through which the deputy hopes to enlist the
support of his local organisation in order to impress the party leadership in
his bid for re-election, can easily become a full time job, leaving little time
for the deputy to discharge other parliamentary duties. In a recent survey,
29 per cent of the responding deputies indicated that they needed more time
to tend to the needs of their constituents. The figure for service to the consti-
tuency was even higher at 41 per cent. Very few thought they needed more
time for activities such as general sessions, committee work and other
parliamentary business.22 During the 1991– 99 period, lack of attendance
was widespread. This made it possible for opposition deputies to call for a
quorum to terminate legislative sessions on many occasions before the
session started. It appears that the priorities of deputies in favour of constitu-
ency service have undermined the functioning of the parliament and probably
contributed to a decline in its public esteem.23
Concern with getting re-elected in a context where re-nomination has
become the prerogative of party leadership encourages the deputies to try to
impress their party’s leaders by submitting problems or opportunities for
their attention and by trying to speak on the floor. Somewhat less orthodox
means are also employed especially by deputies whose skills in other areas
may be lacking.24 For example, a number of deputies from the same party
may rise and march towards the podium, shouting insults at the deputy who
has the floor and is in the process of delivering highly critical remarks
about the party of the protestors or their leader. Similarly, a shouting or,
more rarely, a jostling match may ensue between deputies of one party and
another, when a deputy from one party attacks the leader of the other as
he/she addresses the house. With all such behaviour the intention is the
same: show loyalty to the party, especially its leader, and get them to notice
you, thus improving your chances of re-nomination.
Behaviour deviating from that prescribed in the RP, sometimes turning
unruly, is not, however, always purposive behaviour intended to catch the
attention of the party leaders. The fact that the percentage of freshmen in
the legislature is quite high at any given time (Table 2) means that the function
of socialising the novices to the written and ‘unwritten’ traditions of the insti-
tution is not well performed. A study of the perceived familiarity with the RP
and tenure lends support to the obvious point that freshmen legislators are
likely to be less familiar with them (Pearson r ¼ 0.34, p , 0.000)25 but the
inference to be drawn from this is not encouraging. Unfamiliarity with rules

inevitably leads to less patterned behaviour which in itself encourages conflict
as well as producing inefficiencies such as wasting time, undermining institu-
tionalisation and reducing the public’s esteem for the legislature.
The most problematical behaviour is the changing of parties that may
occur under one of several circumstances.26 On relatively few occasions, a
deputy may feel that his party and his personal viewpoints are far apart
while another party is closer to his beliefs. Such a situation is possible in a
fragmented party system where several parties may be ideological relatives.
More commonly, a deputy may decide to leave his party if he becomes con-
vinced that his chances of re-election under his current party affiliation
appear unlikely while another party promises a much better re-election pro-
spect.27 Sometimes, a government party deputy may threaten to leave his
party if he feels that he is not getting a fair share of patronage, but that is
usually taken care of by giving him a ‘fair’ share. And finally, and problema-
tically, on a number of occasions, parties have deliberately recruited deputies
from others, either to bring a government down or, more often, to muster a
majority when governments are being formed. On these occasions, news-
papers have alluded to the opening of the market for inter-party transfers,
saying openly that significant material rewards are accorded to deputies
who avail themselves of inter-party mobility.28
To conclude, the insecurity of the deputy leads to behaviour which in turn
generates outcomes that slow down or hinder institutional advancement of the
legislature. Deputies have tried to raise their salaries to a much higher level
than those of other public jobs, they have held back from regulating conflicts
of interest in the performance of their jobs, some have resorted to unruly beha-
viour to impress their leaders, and they have changed parties for political and
material gain. Such behaviour not only works against the emergence of pat-
terned behaviour in the parliament but also contributes to the shaping of the
low esteem in which the deputies and their institution are held by the public.
THE GOVERNMENT, THE PARTY GROUPS AND THE LEGISLATURE
In parliamentary systems, including Turkey, the power of the government over

the parliamentary group is strong. Deputies are expected to support their
government, knowing that refusing to do so will bring the government
down and deprive them of the benefits of power. Therefore, government is
not challenged but turned to for leadership and guidance. This proclivity is
reinforced by the fact that the head and other members of the government
are at the same time the leaders of their political party. Earlier, we described
the prevalent position of the party leadership vis-à-vis deputies irrespective of
whether they are in government or opposition. In an environment in which
much of politics is perceived to be dispensation of patronage, being in govern-
ment only strengthens the hand of the party leaders to elicit support and obe-
dience from the deputies. In short, neither the deputy as an individual nor the
party group can escape domination by government if the deputy’s party is in
power. Government gives direction to the parliament.
The prevalence of government is most evident in the origins of bills the
legislature considers. The RP accord every member the right to submit a leg-
islative proposal. A member is expected to consult with the party group leader-
ship, however, and get approval before submitting the bill to the Office of the
Speaker. Unless there is a legal or procedural error, the latter will accept all
bills and routinely send them off to the relevant committees. The bill is then
simply added to the list of all bills that the legislature will take up, time per-
mitting, during its term of office. The decision as to which bills will be taken
up is technically a decision of the legislature, but in fact the government
parties, following the instructions of their leaders, determine the agenda.
The RP prescribes the establishment of a consultative committee, comprising
the representatives of each party group leader, which has the power to decide
on the specific items that will be brought before the General Assembly for
consideration. If no agreement is obtained there, then the matter may be
taken to the floor where government parties prevail. Briefly, then, the govern-
ment has the legal and political means to decide on the agenda of the TGNA
and it does so.
Table 4 shows the origins of the bills that the parliament has taken up
during the five terms since 1983. The superior position of the government is
evident. While the individual deputies submit far more bills than government,
many more government bills are enacted into law. The relationship becomes
TABLE 4
TYPES OF BILLS AND THEIR ENACTMENT
Types of Bills 1983–87 1987–91 1991–95 1995–99 1999 þ
Government
Proposed 320 369 601 609 657
Enacted 259 259 290 216 358
Private members
Proposed 485 590 1591 1365 874
Enacted 130 100 156 143 67
Decree laws
Total 211 275 301 272 291
Enacted 65 77 35 6 19
Defeated 2 1 – – –
Source: The data has been kindly provided by Dr Şeref İba, Deputy Director, Department of Laws
and Resolutions, TGNA.
even more tipped in favour of the government, when legislative proposals

deriving from decrees having the force of law are taken into account. The
decree power is an innovation that found its way into the 1961 Constitution,
during its significant revision in 1971– 72. It was retained in the 1982 Consti-
tution. Article 91 allows the government to ask the legislature to authorise it to
issue decrees having the force of law in almost all areas. Only laws pertaining
to individual rights and liberties, including political rights, are spared from
constituting the subject of such decrees. The Authorisation Act is required
to specify the intent, the content, the principles, the duration of the
decree(s) and whether one or many will be issued. The decrees are submitted
to the consideration of the TGNA on the day they are published in the Official
Gazette. Table 4 shows that the number of decrees that have come before the
parliament has far exceeded the private members’ bills that have been enacted
into law. Almost none has been rejected.
One might wonder why governments, already in a superior position vis-à-
vis the parliament, have chosen to resort to asking for authorisation to issue
decrees having the force of law. Several reasons stand out. First, the parlia-
ment until recently functioned very inefficiently. For example, during the pre-
ceding legislative term, debate on a law comprised three articles, two of them
routine, on which government and opposition were fully agreed, could not be
completed in one afternoon.29 In important policy areas, the government may
find that it can only move with reasonable speed by issuing decrees. Second,
working with decrees may render it easier to retain policy coherence. In an
environment where a patronage orientation prevails, each legislative proposal
that deals one way or another with the distribution of public resources invites
efforts by a variety of groups to get a piece of the pie, quickly undermining the
possibility of implementing a coherent policy. Third, in coalition governments
it is easier to engage in mutual give and take at the level of government than in
the parliament. Bringing the laws to the floor may serve to display the pre-
existing differences between coalition partners, cause embarrassment and
create tensions. Decrees may help governments avoid these problematical
outcomes.
Are there circumstances under which the government deputies have
rebelled against the party leadership? Occasions when the decision of the
party leaders deviate from the general outlook of the rank and file is always
present. These days, they are somewhat more frequent because of the tensions
between coalition partners and the need to enact legislation rapidly to prepare
Turkey for membership in the EU, which one coalition partner finds ideologi-
cally problematical. But, with the exception of a few instances, all in commit-
tees – where insufficient instruction from the government has allowed some
deputies from government parties to co-operate with opposition deputies,
only to switch their position to bring it back into harmony with the party
position later – violations of party discipline have been untypical. Rather,
other means of adjustment are employed to respond to the demands and pre-
ferences of the government party deputies. Although it is not as effective as it
has been in the past, the party group meeting still constitutes a way for the
party leadership to convince their colleagues by explaining the rationale for
their actions, listening to their criticisms and making adjustments if these
are practicable. A second way is to leave the initiative to the deputies on
specific occasions. As in the case of the pay rises already mentioned, the gov-
ernment may choose simultaneously to avoid a challenge to its authority and
dissociate itself from what the deputies are doing. This is not a way that can be
used often, however, since the party leaders would have scant interest in
developing a tradition of frequently giving the legislative initiative to the
deputies. A third commonly used way that is much in harmony with the
system of patronage is for the deputies to have easy access to ministers to
get their constituent and constituency demands met. Those ministers that
fail come under fire and experience problems keeping their place in the
cabinet.
THE LEGISLATURE AS AN ORGANISATION
As an organisation, the TGNA resembles in appearance parliaments in other

democratic systems. It devises its own RP, it sets up its own agenda, it has
a committee system to facilitate its work and it hires a substantial body of
support personnel. These outward indicators of institutional autonomy, as
has become evident in the preceding discussion, operate within the constraints
of party politics. The major actors within the institution are not individual
deputies but party groups. A party can only form a group if it has 20 deputies.
Only parties that have groups are accorded seats in committees, and they,
especially the government and the major opposition party, are given priority
in parliamentary debate and other activities of the legislature.
Rules of Procedure
The prevalence of party as the basic unit of parliamentary life has rendered the
parliament subject to the general state of relations between political parties.
The proclivity of political parties to have uneasy relations with each other
has rendered it difficult for the legislature as a whole to deal successfully
with generating a set of rules of procedure with which all participants in the
legislative process are content. As already recounted, it has been difficult
to change the RP. Change, so far, has meant the adoption of amendments
without securing the consent of the opposition.
The inability of the TGNA to develop a satisfactory set of RP derives from
two fundamental factors. The first is the expectation that to devise an entirely
new set of rules, understandable in view of the fact that the constitution has
been changed wholesale by military interventions, will set the style for whole-
sale changes in the RP. Yet the preparation of an entirely new document has
proved impossible so far, creating a situation in which rules that everybody
views as temporary are being used. The achievement of some changes in
1996, even if driven only by the government parties, has shown that incremen-
tal change is possible, giving, by default, a more established quality to the
existing RP. The second problem standing in the way of developing new
RP is the inability of government and opposition parties to think in long-
term frameworks and their resultant inclination to opt for solutions serving
their immediate interests. A change in this approach will have to await the
evolution of greater stability in the party system.
The Instruments of Specialisation: The Committee System

The RP lists 16 parliamentary committees. Excepting the Committee on the
Budget and Economic Planning and the Committee on State Economic Enter-
prises, whose size is determined by law, committee size is determined by the
General Assembly. The number of committees has been stable over time, as
has been their size, allowing for occasional adjustments to accommodate
the parliamentary arithmetic. The distribution of membership is according
to the size of the party group. Appointments are made for a two-year period
at the beginning of the term, then renewed for the remaining three years.
Serving on a committee in the first part of the term does not automatically
mean that the same person will be appointed to serve in the same position
during the second part. In 2001, for example, Prime Minister Ecevit declined
to re-nominate a member of the Human Rights Committee from his party who
had achieved national prominence by paying unannounced visits to police
stations and finding in one case instruments of torture. Mrs Pişkinsüt asked
that she continue to serve on the committee, but her pleas went unheeded.
The prime minister probably felt that she had embarrassed the government.
The TGNA committees are not entities that represent accumulated exper-
tise, as is the case in the United States. Accumulation of expertise from service
on the same committee over time is not typical for several reasons, but the
rapid turnover of deputies in the TGNA and the lack of continuity in commit-
tee assignments constitute sufficient explanation without having to analyse
others. The committees do not have access to a staff of experts. Such expertise
as may exist comes from that gained by committee members in their earlier
professions. A systematic study of committees is lacking, but, as Kalaycıoğlu
has observed, ‘the concern for expertise does not go above partisan consider-
ations’.30 This is understandable. The government does not want or expect the
committees to change the substance of legislation that has originated in the
ministries, though minor revisions and corrections may be useful. The job
of the committee is to make sure that a government bill clears it in much the
same form that it was received from the government. To achieve this purpose,
it is more important that committee members behave loyally and have the
political skills to push the bill through a committee. Similarly, opposition
parties rely on the political skills of their members to slow down the
progress of legislation through the committees, to embarrass the government
party and achieve other similar results. With regard to members’ bills, one
would judge that the role of the committee would become somewhat more
important since the input from the bureaucracy would be lacking in the prep-
aration of the original bill, but the question needs to be studied.
The parliament can establish ad hoc committees. In recent years, many
have been set up to investigate charges of corruption against political
leaders (see ‘Legislative investigations’ in Table 3). Even committees
charged with matters of ethics and conscience have not escaped the partisan-
ship that has also characterised the standing committees. While these commit-
tees, generally reluctant to remove the immunity of their colleagues, have
managed to go beyond partisan considerations in non-political crimes such
as assault or manslaughter, regarding charges of corruption they have
pursued strictly partisan lines, usually conforming to the decisions of their
leadership, sometimes against whom corruption charges were made in the
first instance.
Despite their limitations, the committees give the individual deputy an
opportunity to display his oratorical and technical skills, and develop skills
of negotiation and persuasion. On non-contentious issues, give and take is
easier and all members have an opportunity to participate in the activities of
the committee and get a sense of contributing to the activities of the legisla-
ture, in contrast to the general sessions where opportunities to take the floor
are limited and the interactions between parties is much more structured
and formal.
When parliament is in session, the whole house meets from 3pm to 7pm on
Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. Committees often meet in the morn-
ings of those days. The frequency with which the committees meet and the
length of their meetings are closely affected, however, by the nature of the
responsibilities of the particular committee as well as the bills it has to con-
sider at a particular time. Some, like the Constitutional Committee that has
to review each bill from the viewpoint of its constitutionality or the Committee
on Petitions, have to meet regularly. The Committee on Budget and Planning,
on the other hand, becomes active only after the national budget has been sub-
mitted by the government to the legislature but it meets continuously, often
into the small hours of the morning, in November and much of December.
Still other committees have changing volumes of business depending on
what is on the agenda of the government and the legislature at a given time.
Staff Support
The TGNA employs 4,500 people in various capacities. The number in itself
is impressive, and may suggest that the Turkish legislature is a rather well
staffed institution. Recently, the number of personnel has come under
severe criticism since many state establishments have had to reduce their
personnel, but not the legislature. In view of the potential for unfavourable
commentary, the personnel office of the TGNA is reluctant to divulge infor-
mation. However, discussions with staff in the TGNA reveal that in terms
of legislative services the Assembly is in fact understaffed. For example,
800 people work in Istanbul in the National Palaces division. Another 500
are workers in Yıldız Porcelain Works, a tradition inherited from the
empire.31 Similarly, 500 people work at the housing facilities for deputies.
Another 500 work on the premises as gardeners, janitors, cooks, waiters and
in other similar service jobs. Each deputy gets one secretary and one
advisor. Advisor, it turns out, is a statement of intention only. ‘Advisors’
usually run errands for the deputy. Most are high school graduates and do
not possess any particular skills. Advisors and secretaries of deputies total
1,100. The remainder of 1,000 includes all officers, secretaries, a variety of
experts, librarians and administrators, a figure hardly sufficient to meet the
staffing needs of a large legislature.32
THE PLACE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
In political and constitutional rhetoric, the TGNA is treated as a sacrosanct

institution. The Turkish war of independence was fought under its auspices,
its founding symbolised the shifting of the source of political legitimacy to
the nation. Even when it has been dissolved during military interventions
and new constitutions were being written, there was never any fear that the
parliament would be closed for long or that its name would be changed.
The TGNA enjoys high symbolic status in the constitutions of 1961 and
1982 as indicated by the presence of complete parliamentary immunity, par-
liamentary inviolability, procedural independence and freedom of meeting.33
When it was founded in 1920, the TGNA had unrestrained powers of legis-
lation. It came under strong executive control with the Constitution of 1924.
During the early stages of competitive politics, the deputies expected the par-
liament to regain some of its lost power. That has not materialised. As Turkey
has advanced in its experience of competitive politics a system of checks on
the powers of the legislature has evolved and become institutionalised. The
first, the presidential veto, has existed in all Turkish constitutions, but it
began to be used after 1961 when the term of the president and the TGNA
came to be differentiated and presidents began to come from non-partisan
backgrounds. Table 5 shows that successive presidents have asked the
legislature to reconsider its decisions.
A second constraint on the powers of the TGNA has come from the
introduction in 1961 of a Constitutional Court that can declare the acts of
parliament unconstitutional. Established to counter the usurpation of power
of the government and the parliamentary group of the Democratic Party
during the 1950 –60 period, the court initially had powers even to declare
amendments to the constitution unconstitutional if it found them to be
against the general spirit of the constitution as defined in the prolegomena
and the articles defining the fundamental characteristics of the republic.
Such powers as well as access to the court were considerably curtailed
during the 1972 revision of the 1961 Constitution. The same framework has
been retained in the 1982 Constitution.
A third constraint was put into place, first during the 1972 revision of the
1961 Constitution, but was then retained in the 1982 Constitution. The govern-
ment, as discussed earlier, can ask the legislature for decree-making powers in
an area. This power is used extensively by governments to reduce the role of
the legislature in policy-making.
The 1982 Constitution has introduced another element to counter the
power of the legislature: the public referendum. Article 175 requires that
constitutional amendments accepted by more than three-fifths but less than
two-thirds of the house be submitted to a referendum. Article 104 empowers
the president to submit constitutional amendments accepted by the TGNA to a
public referendum. Article 175 has been applied twice. In 1987, the restoration
of the political rights of the pre-1980 political leaders was accepted by only
50.1 per cent in favour. In 1988, however, an attempt to change Article 127
provisions having to do with local elections was rejected by 65 per cent of
the voters. Article 104 has been used only once to submit the changes in the
pay ceilings of deputies to a referendum. The effort was rendered redundant
when the parliament, as explained earlier, restored the article to its original form.
TABLE 5
PRESIDENTIAL VETOES OF LAWS
Name of President Term of office No of vetoes
Cemal Gürsel 1960–66 2

Cevdet Sunay 1966–73 18
Fahri Korutürk 1973–80 13
Kenan Evren 1982–89 26
Turgut Özal 1989–93 19
Süleyman Demirel 1993–2000 14
Ahmet Necdet Sezer 2000– 5
The comprehensive constitutional change at the end of 2001 introduced a

qualified majority requirement of three-fifths for amnesties (Article 87). This
is a response to populist motivated amnesties in recent years that many citi-
zens felt were returning the criminals quickly to the streets.
Finally, the 1982 Constitution, in contrast to earlier ones, contains pro-
visions to complete the election of a president in 30 days, four rounds of
voting or face dissolution (Article 102). In a similar vein, Article 116 empow-
ers the president to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections if the
latter fails to produce a government that gets a vote of confidence within 45
days and it appears unlikely that another government can be established
soon. Both measures are responses to pre-1980 experiences when the parlia-
ment failed to produce governments for a long time and could not elect a pre-
sident after 100 rounds of voting, owing to the government party’s desire to
prolong its caretaker status as long as possible.
The constitutional adjustment process of building a system of checks and
balances is likely to continue. The introduction of constraints to the unlimited
powers of the parliament is taking place over time, the last one as recently as
2001. Rather than undermining a process of democratic consolidation, the par-
ticular measures constitute steps in that direction.
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE TGNA AND ITS ROLE IN DEMOCRATIC

CONSOLIDATION
At the beginning of this article, two questions were raised: Can a parliament
become highly institutionalised in what otherwise is an unstable political
environment? And can it serve as an agent of democratic consolidation
under those circumstances? The preceding discussion has shown that institu-
tionalisation of the TGNA has been negatively affected by the unstable politi-
cal environment and it can continue to be characterised in some ways as still
‘nascent’. The most significant indicator of the fragility of the current state of
institutionalisation may be the inability of the TGNA to rewrite its RP, which
all deputies, parliamentary parties and the interested public seem to agree is
needed. What stands in the way? Two problems have been identified in the
discussion. First, expectation that the change needs to be wholesale and,
second, the inability of the parliamentary actors to think long-term.
The desire to rewrite the RP wholesale derives from the fact that those cur-
rently in force are out-dated, not in conformity with the current consti-
tution and imposed on the legislature by a parliamentary majority which,
not surprisingly, accords a privileged position to the government. The
reasons for desiring wholesale change are understandable, but to expect a
highly fragmented legislature that has failed to work together on other
matters to free itself from the effects of being divided on matters relating to
the institution is unrealistic. The other problem – the inclination to think only
in the short term – derives from conditions of flux and fragmentation, where
small parties, especially those in the opposition, dare not risk making changes
in the rules unless those changes improve their own political positions, an
outcome which they correctly judge to be highly unlikely.
Are we then to conclude that very little institutionalisation has taken place
in the Turkish legislature, and that, if the current conditions continue to
prevail, not much more is likely to occur in the future? Let us begin our evalu-
ation by noting that the RP have now been in force since 1973, almost 30
years. While all may complain about their insufficiencies, the TGNA has in
fact been able to conduct its business under them. The rules have undergone
revisions in 1996 and 2001. As the need arises, it is likely that further incre-
mental revisions will be made rather than wholesale changes. My personal
observation is that expressions of discontent contain a significant ritualistic
aspect. The RP have been in operation for a relatively long time, their pro-
visions are relatively well known and observed in practice. That surely reflects
some level of institutionalisation. Furthermore, our measure of institutionali-
sation should not be limited to one indicator, the RP. For example, it is not
difficult to observe that even phenomena such as unruly behaviour are to a
large extent patterned and routinised. To interpret them as indicating the
absence of institutionalisation may not be wholly accurate. What we encoun-
ter, to a large extent, is ritualised behaviour of a highly predictable kind.
The TGNA has a committee system that has not undergone major changes
over the years. The system processes legislation with reasonable speed. Gov-
ernments feel obliged to operate within the prescribed set of laws and pro-
cedures in matters involving the legislature. The experience of post-1999
government has shown that, if coalition partners agree on questions of
policy, the legislature is capable of producing legislation, including a substan-
tial number of changes in the constitution. Taken together, these observations
lead us to conclude that the TGNA has advanced along further institutionali-
sation during the past two decades.
What then, about democratic consolidation? For almost two decades now,
Turkey has been functioning without the imminent probability of a military
intervention. This is not to say that the military as a political force has
receded totally from the political scene or that it does not, on occasion,
express strong political preferences. Rather, in part by accommodating the
military, in part by generating its own capabilities to address major political
problems including bringing about major constitutional changes, and in part
by the presence of an international environment supportive of democratic
evolution, the democratic regime, including its legislative arm, has become
further consolidated. All political actors recognise that they have to work
through a political system in which the parliament is one of the key institutions
to take into consideration and to work with in achieving their political

agendas. While direct links between civil society organisations and the
parties in the legislature are possibly less developed than in Western European
democracies, many are capable of appealing to public opinion to influence
parliamentary behaviour. Neither the parliament as an institution nor the par-
liamentary parties or the deputies as individuals have the luxury of ignoring
what the voters in general and their special constituencies think, because
they view their future exclusively in terms of electoral politics.
NOTES
1. U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Europe: Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey (London: Pinter, 1990).
2. U. Liebert, ‘Parliament as a Central Site in Democratic Consolidation’, in Liebert and Cotta
(eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Europe, p.14.
3. G. Di Palma, ‘Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalization: A Minimalist View’, in
Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Europe, p.45.
Consolidation in Europe, p.271. G. Pridham makes similar observations in ‘Political
Parties, Parliaments and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Empirical and Theor-
etical Perspectives’, also in Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consolida-
tion in Europe, p.229. Liebert and Pridham rely mostly on E. Kalaycıoğlu’s contribution to the
same volume, ‘Cyclical Breakdown, Redesign and Nascent Institutionalization: The Turkish
Grand National Assembly’, in Liebert and Cotta (eds.), Parliament and Democratic Consoli-
dation in Europe, pp.184–222.
5. Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Cyclical Breakdown, Redesign and Nascent Institutionalization: The Turkish
Grand National Assembly’, pp.184–222.
6. A. Çarkoğlu, T. Erdem and M. Kabasakal have calculated that between 1954 and 1999, an
average of 21 per cent of the voters changed their party preference, ‘Türkiye’de Yeni Bir
Parti Sistemine Doğru: Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, Parti Örgütleri ve Parti İçi Demokrasiden Bek-
lentiler’, in A. Çarkoğlu (ed.), Siyasi Partilerde Reform (İstanbul: TESEV, 2000), p.41.
7. E. Özbudun, in his Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p.149, calls this development the ‘deinstitutionalization
of the party system’. He also argues that there is a growing disillusionment with parties among
the voters, working against party identification, p.79.
8. Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, p.27,
adds that the military rulers of the 1980–83 period, using the constitution and laws, tried
to ‘demobilize the working class and depoliticize society at large’. The weakness of party–
society links should therefore not be surprising.
9. A. Çarkoğlu, ‘Macro-Economic Determinants of Electoral Support for Incumbents in Turkey:
1950–1995’, New Perspectives on Turkey, 17 (1997), p.77.
10. E. Kalaycıoğlu. ‘Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey’, Comparative Political Studies,
27/3 (1994), p.402.
11. The point is frequently made by observers of Turkish politics, for recent observations, cf.
M. Heper and F. Keyman, ‘Double Faced State: Political Patronage and Consolidation of
Democracy in Turkey’, in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), Turkey Before and After Ataturk
(London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp.252 and 268; T. Demirel, ‘Turkey’s Troubled Democracy:
Bringing the Socio-Economic Factors Back In’, New Perspectives on Turkey, 24 (2001),
p.126; Çarkoğlu, Siyasi Partilerde Reform, p.55.
12. Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, p.86,
calls the same phenomenon ‘personalism’, and holds it responsible for producing more
than one party on each side of the political spectrum.
13. The mechanism of how organisation is developed under the control of the party leadership is
described in S. Tuncay, Parti İçi Demokrasi ve Türkiye (Ankara: Gündoğan, 1996), p.173.
14. While these practices have been extensively used during recent years, they are by no means
products of the post-1983 period. In an earlier article, Özbudun notes that deputies are ‘highly
dependent and docile’ in view of the fact that party leaders control nominations and patronage,
adding that this derives from the political culture and historical traditions. E. Özbudun,
‘Turkey: How Far From Consolidation’, Journal of Democracy, 7/3 (1996), p.137.
15. Çarkoğlu makes a similar observation, Siyasi Partilerde Reform, pp.109–10.
16. For an evaluation of the consequences of party changing, see I. Turan, ‘Changing Horses in
Midstream: Party Changers in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Legislative Studies
Quarterly (1984), pp.21–34.
Grand National Assembly’, p.192. More examples and explanation are offered in a later
section entitled ‘Deputies: Survival Takes Precedence Over All’.
18. E. Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Türkiye’de Politik Rejimin Evrimi ve Yasama Sistemi’, in E. Kalaycıoğlu
and A.Y. Saribay (eds.), Türkiye’de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme (İstanbul: Alfa,
2000), p.277. See also Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Cyclical Breakdown, Redesign and Nascent Institutiona-
lization: The Turkish Grand National Assembly’, pp.192– 3.
19. TBMM Kararları, No.24, 16 May 1996.
20. Y. Esmer, reporting on public opinion surveys, notes that between 1990 and 1997 the only
institution to suffer a decline in positive evaluation by the public was the TGNA, the percen-
tage slipping from 58 per cent to 52 per cent. See Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye’de Sosyal,
Siyasal ve Ekonomik Değerler (Istanbul: TESEV, 1999), p.42.
21. Kalaycıoğlu notes that ‘not since 1950 have deputies’ election chances been so dependent on
favorable evaluations of their performance by party leaders’. ‘Cyclical Breakdown, Redesign
and Nascent Institutionalization: The Turkish Grand National Assembly’, p.196.
22. İ. Turan, ‘Parlamentolarin Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’, in I. Turan (ed.),
TBMM’nin Etkinligi (Istanbul: TESEV, 2000), p.24.
23. As already noted, Y. Esmer has found that between 1990 and 1997 the confidence the public
extended to the TGNA declined (pp.20ff.). The legislature belongs at the bottom of trusted
institutions along with political parties and the government. While the study does not dwell
upon the reasons for the decline in the esteem extended to the political institutions in
general and the parliament in particular, an often heard public judgement is that MPs serve
their own interests and those of their political circle rather than the interests of the country.
Similarly, the lack of attendance in the general sessions is explained by suggesting that the
MPs spend their time peddling influence in the corridors of the ministries rather than dischar-
ging their parliamentary duty.
24. Kalaycıoğlu observes that unruly behaviour has in the past enhanced his chances for re-elec-
tion. ‘Cyclical Breakdown, Redesign and Nascent Institutionalization: The Turkish Grand
National Assembly’, p.193.
25. İ.Turan, ‘Parlamentolarin Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’, p.27. As regards the
unwritten rules in the TGNA, very little is known. In interviewing deputies in 1974, this
author discovered that a question about unwritten rules did not constitute an easily compre-
hensible question to most freshman legislators. Taken together with high turnover rates, it
becomes easier to comprehend why behaviour, in addition to the RP, is not constrained by
unwritten rules.
26. Party change has been comprehensively studied by Turan, ‘Horsechangers in Midstream:
Party Changing in the Turkish Parliament’, pp.21–34.
27. Parties are almost in a position to guarantee re-election to a certain number of deputies. In a
system of proportional representation with multi-member districts, some of them very large,
a party is assured of winning a few seats if it successfully clears the national threshold of ten
per cent.
28. The Constitution of 1982 article 84, intending to reduce the instability produced by party
changing as well as to eliminate the ethical problem posed, was initially designed to penalise
those who changed parties. Soon ways were discovered to flout the constitutional provision
and finally, the article was modified in 1995 to eliminate references to party changing.
29. The proposal was about raising the salaries of headmen of villages and urban precincts. See
Turan, ‘Parlamentolarin Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’, p.20.
Grand National Assembly’, p.210; see also Ö.F. Gençkaya, The Impact of Organizational
Attributes on Legislative Performance: A Structural-Functional Analysis of the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey (İstanbul: Department of International Relations and Political
Science, Boğaziçi University, 1990), p.84.
31. The palaces of the Ottoman Empire and the porcelain works were taken over by the TGNA, a
political convenience at the time the empire was ended by an act of parliament.
32. These figures are approximations, but the several officials that were interviewed working in
different parts of the TGNA administration all gave nearly the same figures.
33. E. Özbudun, ‘Parliament in the Turkish Political System’, Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies, 2/1 (1978), p.51, refers to these indicators. He has relied on J. Blondel, Com-
parative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973), pp.30– 43 and 144 –7.
Özbudun’s observations apply to the constitution of 1961 but they are equally applicable to
the 1982 Constitution.
The Impact of Democratic Practice on the
Parliaments of Southern Europe
P H I L I P N O R T O N and
CRISTINA LESTON-BANDEIRA
PARLIAMENT AND CHANGE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
Disregarding the variety of contexts, the parliaments of Southern Europe (SE)

included in this special issue provide us with good clues as to how the practice
of democracy induces change in the process of establishing parliaments. That
some change results from the passage of time is foreseeable. However, what
these parliaments show is the impact that putting democracy into practice
has on the models first adopted when democracy was introduced. Either
through legal amendment or parliamentary practice, all parliaments in the
five countries studied have undergone significant change over the last 15
years. The main areas of change are the relationship with government and
the internal organisation of parliament, followed by constitutional change.
The area with the less visible change is the style of political representation.
Let us consider them in reverse order.
Style of Representation
The relationship between MP and party is seen in all five countries – Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey – as an ‘unresolved’ problem. There is an
inherent conflict. On the one hand, MPs are seen as having little autonomy
from the parties under whose labels they are elected and which (as parliamen-
tary groups – PGs) dominate the parliament. On the other hand, the dangers of
MPs operating as independent entities are all too clear for these new demo-
cracies. Each condition has negative connotations.
This situation is not peculiar to the parliaments of Southern Europe. What
is distinctive though not unique to them, generating complexity and a problem
in the style of representation, is the fact that they have a history of clientelistic
and patronage networks, whereby individual MPs act not according to the
general good of the nation and party but rather to their individual agenda.
Besides leading potentially to situations of corruption, this is a key ingredient
for the pulverisation of parliamentary activity and, therefore, potentially acute
political instability. The development of ‘caciquismo’1 networks in Portugal
and Spain, during the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, is a
clear example of this.2 The instability caused by this autonomic behaviour was
a direct cause of the emergence of dictatorship in Portugal. In the case of
Turkey the existence of patronage networks has been, as İlter Turan has
shown, a prominent feature of parliamentary politics, at least until the election
of a new parliament in November 2002, when the patronage parties were dis-
placed by new, mass-membership parties.
Similarly, the problem of fluidity of MPs between different PGs is still
apparent in Turkey as well as Italy. The Italian case is very interesting as
one would expect considerable change in the style of representation since
the mid-1990s, given the replacement of the proportional representation elec-
toral system by a quasi-majoritarian one. However, as Verzichelli shows, the
new parliaments of the so-called Second Republic appear little different from
the previous republic’s parliaments. If anything, the degree of fragmentation
has increased, as well as the autonomous behaviour of MPs.3 Still, the last par-
liament, elected in 2001, has shown considerable stabilisation and could indi-
cate the start of a majoritarian style of politics. The problems of fluidity have
been less obvious in Greece, Portugal and Spain mainly due to legal provisions
that reinforce the parties’ power over MPs. The transfer of MPs between PGs
is not possible in Portugal and in the case of Spain it has been considerably
restricted since the disruptive experience of the transfugismo in the 1980s.4
Parties have thus been seen as intrinsic to a stable democratic polity. The
wishes and actions of MPs individually have had to be subjugated to the dic-
tates of party. In both Greece and Portugal small amendments have been intro-
duced in order to give MPs individually more freedom of action, but these
have been very timid changes. Although generally there is a sense that MPs
should have more autonomy – as shown by the survey data analysed by
Pablo Oñate – the reality is that party control is much ‘safer’ for the
working of democracy. Autonomous behaviour by MPs is still seen (and
used) as a threat to the stability of the political system, and therefore to democ-
racy. The continuing development of a democratic political culture over the
years may, with time, make possible the integration of more autonomy in
MPs’ actions in the normal functioning of the political system. Likewise,
closer links between MPs and their constituencies may also develop.
Constitutional Change
From a constitutional point of view, the SE democracies show varying degrees
of change. They divide into three groups of countries according to the level of
change introduced: (1) dramatic changes in the case of Italy; (2) incremental
changes in the cases of Greece, Portugal and Turkey; and (3) no change in the
case of Spain.
CONCLUSION 179
Turkey almost falls into the category of no change, as there has been no
revision to the parliament’s internal rules, despite a general acceptance that
they need updating.5 The inability to create a consensus to revise the rules
of procedure (RP) has been mainly due to the parliament’s party fragmenta-
tion. This may change therefore with the less fragmented parliament elected
in 2002. In the case of Spain, though, it may prove more difficult to reach
such a consensus. This consensus would have to bring together not only
the main parties, but also a variety of regionalist representatives; this has
led, in the words of Capo Giol, to a ‘sacralisation’ of the constitution. The
Senate and the regions’ asymmetrical representativeness are the main focus
of the demands for reform that have developed in Spain since the end of the
period of transition to democracy: that is, a problem specific to Spain that
does not apply to the other SE countries. But, like Turkey, this has also
resulted in an inability to revise the parliament’s RP, which have not been
changed since first generated in the democratic era in 1982.
In both Greece and particularly Portugal the introduction of change has not
been as problematic. The existence of unity and a stable party system, provid-
ing occasional majorities, have meant that several changes have been intro-
duced in both the constitution and parliament’s internal rules. In fact, as
Penelope Foundethakis has shown, the ease of introducing changes in
Greece has led to a ‘worrying’ instrumental use of the electoral system by
the governmental parties.
As the oldest democracy in our sample, Italy has unsurprisingly witnessed
the introduction of a considerable number of incremental changes over the
years. These are currently overshadowed though by the dramatic changes to
the political system that took place in the 1990s following the Tangentopoli
scandals. However, Capano and Giuliani show that the changes of the
1990s have not had a very visible impact upon parliamentary practice
(at least up to the 2001 parliament). In a well-institutionalised parliament
such as the Italian one, it would seem that the accumulation of incremental
adjustments (towards a culture of consensualism) has had more impact than
the recent dramatic changes (towards a majoritarian culture). That is, as
noted by Capano and Giuliani, parliament has developed its own ‘viscosity’
in relation to external circumstantial changes. The changes of the 1990s
were more about changing the political actors than changing political
institutions.
Independent of the degree of change introduced, the models first adopted
when democracy was introduced have been generally accepted and assimi-
lated in Southern Europe. If anything, these models developed over the
years. Spain is the only case that denotes some unease with its political
system, due to the unresolved issue of the Autonomous Communities’ rep-
resentation in parliament in what is materially a federal political system
(Capo Giol). However, despite the lack of legal revisions, Spanish parliamen-
tary activity has changed considerably over the last 15 years.
Internal Organisation
Independent of the degree of change introduced, the parliaments have fol-
lowed a very similar pattern of development of their internal organisation:
one of rationalisation of procedures. This rationalisation process has effec-
tively embodied the means to bring efficacy into parliament; as Capano and
Giuliani put it, ‘efficacy rather than tradition, efficiency instead of dispersion
of power’. The rationalisation process has encompassed essentially three main
areas: reinforcement of the committee system, restriction of the timings used
in parliament, and reinforcement of the larger PGs’ power.
With the exception of the Italian Parliament, the committee systems in the
SE parliaments were still rudimentary in the mid-1980s. In the first years of
democracy the emphasis was on the chamber. This is understandable as
work in committee tends to be seen as being distant from the public gaze
and focused on detail. The chamber is the natural symbol of parliament as
the representative institution. It is a public forum that brings together all
factions representative of citizens – that is, the epitome of democracy. It is
the place where the great issues are debated. The chamber concentrates on
the ends, whereas committees are focused more on the means. Committees
are not only seen as more distant than the chamber, they are also resource-
intensive. An adequate committee system requires resources. More than the
chamber, committees are dependent on the availability of administrative
and research staff as well as physical space and facilities. However, resources
are what new democratic parliaments usually lack. Committees develop as the
new parliaments mature.6
The transferral of more powers and competences to committees was per-
ceived as a way of making parliamentary work more efficacious, in particular
when dealing with legislation. The changes to the RP in Portugal and Greece
are a very clear example of this. The 1988 revision of the Portuguese RP trans-
ferred the competence for second reading from the chamber to the committees.
The 2001 revision of the Greek standing orders brought in a considerable
increase in the autonomy given to the committees’ legislative and scrutiny
functions. The committees in Italy have also been reinforced over the years.
Turkey is the only case where the committee system has not developed,
although committees are perceived as providing more opportunities than the
chamber for MPs to intervene in parliamentary work.
The rationalisation of procedures has been particularly clear in these par-
liaments’ efforts to reduce the time consumed by parliamentary proceedings.
Despite no legal revision of procedures in the Spanish Congress, Capo Giol
notes that its work rate has improved over the years, particularly in dealing
CONCLUSION 181
with legislation. In Greece, Italy and Portugal the procedural revisions intro-
duced explicit restrictions in the times available to speak in the chamber or in
the deliberative process. The consequences of this type of restriction are made
clear in the Portuguese case in the notable increase, over the second decade of
democracy, in the proportion of bills that reach the stage of first reading
discussion.
Again, the impact of the practice of democracy is very clear here. The
principle of giving voice to as many people as possible is particularly dear
to the founders establishing a newly democratic parliament. It is only once
that principle is put into practice that the reality of inefficiency sinks in.
After years of parliamentary democratic practice, pragmatism eventually
prevails over representation.
One of the consequences of these time limitations is a general restriction on
the smaller parliamentary groups’ ability to participate in parliamentary activity.
Besides this, the rationalisation process in the SE parliaments has encompassed
other explicit measures reinforcing the power of the larger PGs to the detriment
of the smaller PGs and/or of the individual MP. Again the practice of democracy
has shown that the wider the points of view that need to be taken into account,
the more difficult it becomes to produce outputs. In the 1970s, for instance,
under the RPs of both the Italian and the Portuguese parliaments, a number
of rights were distributed equally amongst all PGs irrespective of their size.
The reform of these RPs in the 1980s and 1990s brought in a differentiation
between PGs relative to their size. The reinforcement of majorities is also
clear in the Greek Parliament.
This reinforcement of the majorities to ensure greater efficiency was inevi-
tably followed by a call for more rights from the smaller PGs and individual
MPs. It is in this context that the rationalisation process was followed in
Greece, Italy and Portugal by some measures opening up new opportunities
for the opposition, minority PGs and/or individual MPs to intervene in parlia-
mentary activity.
Another significant change in the internal organisation of the SE parliaments
in the last 15 years has been in their resources. The Italian Parliament is well
known for its strong resource structure. This was further strengthened in the
period under study, expanding the quantity of the support services offered to
MPs, as well as improving its quality. Although far from achieving anything
on a similar scale, the Greek and Portuguese parliaments have also recently
developed their resources; in particular, the importance of research support
staff has finally been recognised in the latest RP revisions. Foundethakis has
identified the creation of 80 new positions in the Greek Parliament.
The Turkish Grand National Assembly is at the other extreme in its lack of
development of resources. Turan explains that, despite a large number of
employees, the support staff of the Turkish Parliament is not adequate to the
needs of the institution, being mainly administrative. Unusually for a parliament

elected through a system of proportional representation, Turkish deputies enjoy
the privilege of having two support staff ascribed to them on an individual
basis. This is not the case in other SE parliaments, such as the Spanish one,
where all resources are ascribed to parties.
Overall, the development of internal organisation in SE parliaments has
therefore followed a very similar pattern of rationalisation, making parliament
more efficient. In the Greek, Italian and Portuguese parliaments, the extent of
formal changes to procedures have been considerable, with a visible impact on
parliamentary practice. In the Spanish case, parliamentary work has become
more efficient, despite the lack of legal revisions. The Turkish case is the
one where internal organisation has undergone the least change. This is not
surprising considering the unstable political environment of this parliament
during the period here considered. The ability to introduce change in parlia-
ments’ internal organisation can only take place in a context of political stab-
ility (or systemic stability in the case of Italy). Otherwise too many other
political and social priorities prevail over parliament, as primary needs have
to be dealt with. Parliamentary internal change of the sort we have described
is a prerogative of stable democracies, be they developing or established
democracies.
Relationship with Government

In terms of the relationship between parliament and government, again a
pattern emerges from the foregoing chapters: one of reinforcement of the scru-
tiny activities to the detriment of parliament’s legislative function. Again
Turkey is somewhat of an exception.
Government tends to dominate the legislative function in the parliaments
of Southern Europe. What is more, this trend has been accentuated during the
period under consideration. This is true even in the case of Italy, known for the
‘centrality’ of its legislative function, which is now, according to Capano and
Giuliani, ‘blurring’. With very small variations, the factors of government’s
dominance are the same across Southern Europe: an increase in the volume
of delegated legislation whereby government legislates outside parliament,
an increase in the approval rate of government’s legislation, and a less suc-
cessful approval rate for non-government bills.
At a time when democracy is being consolidated, parliament’s centrality
in the legislative function is crucial in creating the basic laws that form the
social and political foundations of the new regime. This is a time when the
legislative function is essentially that of generating basic laws. However, as
primary problems are dealt with and society’s essential structure is established,
the legislative function changes in nature. The need for general basic laws
is substituted by the need for routine and detailed regulation, typically a
CONCLUSION 183
governmental competence. Parliament does not have the time or the bureau-
cratic infrastructure to formulate that type of legislation.
This weakening of parliament’s legislative function has been concomitant
with the development of the scrutiny function. With the exception of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, where there is no particular trend, the
use of control instruments has increased in the last decade across SE parlia-
ments. Not only have parliamentarians become more accustomed to activating
control devices, but also new instruments have been introduced. A noteworthy
example is the recent introduction in Greece, Italy and Portugal of procedures
to question the prime minister on a regular basis.
Again this is indicative of the development of democracy in these
countries. In the first years of democracy, the control function tends to
embody instruments that act as a safeguard of the working of the democratic
regime; typically ex post instruments such as motions of non-confidence. As
democracy develops, the need for routine scrutiny becomes more pressing,
particularly as the government’s power in legislation expands. Besides this,
as MPs become aware of their reduced power in legislating, the focus of
their actions shifts to control activities, as shown by Capo Giol for the
Spanish Congress. The development of scrutiny activity has therefore resulted
partly from parliament’s diminished role in policy-making. As Foundethakis
says, control used to be seen as ‘taboo’ – parliament was there primarily to
legislate; likewise with Portugal and Spain, where control instruments have
developed markedly in the last decade or so. Even in Italy where the effective
importance of ex post instruments has lasted longer, the focus has shifted since
the 1980s to ex ante scrutiny instruments.
The practice of democracy has therefore had a big impact on the relation-
ship between government and parliament in Southern Europe. As democracy
has developed, the centre of policy-making has shifted more and more to
government and simultaneously parliament has expanded its scrutiny of
government. Indicating that this trend is a result of democratic development,
both the Portuguese and Spanish cases show that this shift has taken place
independently of changes in the government’s support in parliament.
The only case where this trend is not clear is Turkey, where nevertheless
government dominates policy-making as elsewhere in Southern Europe.
THE ROLE OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS
The parliaments of SE have therefore changed considerably since the mid-

1980s. From being the focus of public attention in a time of regime change,
they developed into institutions of the regime. The legislative and representative
functions were fundamental roles of the SE parliaments at the time of demo-
cratic consolidation. As democracy was put into practice, the role of these
parliaments adapted to a new reality, one of established democracies. The only

case where this trend is not clear is the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
Confirming that institutionalisation is an ongoing process,7 the parliaments
of SE show a progressive professionalisation over time. While in a first stage
of democracy the procedures need to be put in place, it is with the practice of
democracy that the opportunity to ‘professionalise’ occurs. This is apparent in
the general reinforcement of parliaments’ resources, as well as in the move
towards rationalisation of procedures. The case showing a less obvious insti-
tutionalisation is Turkey. This is to be expected, as Turan says, in an unstable
political environment. Still, Turan recognises some evidence of institutionali-
sation in the development of routine patterns of parliamentary behaviour and
procedures.
The parliaments of SE have had a key role in legitimising the new demo-
cratic regimes. These parliaments were conceived as the very epitome of
democracy by openly embodying the principles of representation and legiti-
macy, integrating them with the idea of transparency in decision-making;
hence the predominance of the chamber and the recognition of extensive
opposition rights. However, as the practice of democracy developed, this
proved to be a somewhat unrealistic model of parliamentary practice. Ration-
alisation took place, the committee systems were enhanced and majoritarian
criteria were reinforced to the detriment of consensual ones.
More than centres of decision-making, the parliaments of SE have devel-
oped as forums of discussion. The expansion of the scrutiny function shows
that in view of the inability to be at the centre of policy and decision-
making, SE parliaments have instead developed their role as legitimising
institutions. Rather than being the centre of decisions, they legitimise the
process of decision-making. Like most developed legislatures, they are not
so much law-making as law-effecting bodies. This change is visible in the
Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and even the Italian parliaments. In the case of
Turkey it is too early to talk about any specific trend; this may change,
though, following the recent emergence of a clear majority elected through
new mass parties. The existence of stability (whether political or institutional)
emerges from our sample of five countries as a favourable condition for
rationalisation and legitimation.
Despite the ability to incorporate change, there is one area that has seen
little modification over the last 15 years in the SE parliaments: the style of
representation. Other than the Italian revision of its electoral system, no
major alterations in this area have taken place. As a consequence, there is a
growing paradox: MPs are expected to act independently, but on the other
hand their activity is effectively controlled by their parties. As relatively
new democracies, this may be the area that will need further years of demo-
cratic practice for any effective change. The Italian reform shows us that
CONCLUSION 185
even institutional change may not result necessarily in different parliamentary
behaviour. At the end of the day, political culture may take much longer to
change than institutional designs.
NOTES
1. Locally based networks whereby MPs obtained votes through an exchange for favours.
2. See J. Magone, ‘Political Recruitment and Elite Transformation in Modern Portugal 1870–
1999: The Late Arrival of Mass Representation’, in H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary
Representatives in Europe 1848–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.341–70;
and J. Linz, P. Gangas and M.J. Mir, ‘Spanish Diputados: From the 1876 Restoration to Con-
solidated Democracy’, in Best and Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary Representatives in Europe
1848–2000, pp.371–462.
3. More than the new electoral system, the restrictions on the secret vote system in the 1980s seem
to have had more consequences in a stabilisation of the parliamentary behaviour of the Italian
MPs.
4. M. Sánchez de Dios, ‘Parliamentary Party Discipline in Spain’, in S. Bowler, D. Farrell and
R. Katz (eds.), Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government (Ohio: Ohio State University
Press, 1999), pp.151–3.
5. The Turkish rules of procedure date back to 1973 and are therefore not harmonised with the
new constitution of 1983; See İlter Turan’s article.
6. Showing the difference with the Southern European cases, many parliaments of Central and
Eastern Europe actually had a well-developed committee system from the beginning. This
came not only in the context of a previous communist regime experience, but also at a later
date where lessons from newly democratic parliaments had been learnt and where influence
from American scholarship has been notable. See contributions to L. Longley and
R. Davidson (eds.), ‘The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees’, special issue, The
Journal of Legislative Studies, 4/1 (1998), and in particular A. Ágh, ‘Changing Parliamentary
Committees in Changing East-Central Europe: Parliamentary Committees as Central Sites of
Policy-Making’, pp.91– 4.
7. S. Patterson and G. Copeland, ‘Parliaments in the Twenty-first Century’, in G. Copeland and
S. Patterson (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World (Michigan: University of Michigan
Press, 1997), pp.6– 7.
INDEX
Araújo, A. et al. 65t Portugal 64, 78; Spain 113, 145;

arena features 5, 80 Turkey 154, 155–6, 156t, 161, 172
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 153 Esmer, Y. 175 n23
Aznar, José Marı́a 112, 113 European Commission 23f
European Economic Community
Bagehot, W. 9 – 10 (EEC) 3, 59 – 60
Berlusconi, Silvio 42, 45 European Parliament 63
Best, H. 79 European Union (EU) 3, 23f, 29, 93,
Bossi, Umberto 42 107, 166
Braga da Cruz, M. 57, 73, 76t expressive function 9, 22 – 4, 29, 30
Ezherli, I. 156t
committee systems 180; Greece 86,
90, 91, 93– 4, 95– 7, 99; Italy 14, financial resources 10, 157
15, 180; Portugal 72, 77– 8, 80; France 39, 51, 67, 134
Spain 124, 133; Turkey 168 – 9, Freire, A. 66f, 67f, 68f, 69f
173, 180 Gallagher, M. 62
constitutional change 4, 99, 178– 80; Gangas, P. 135
Greece 85, 87, 88, 90, 91t, 92, 93, Il Gattopardo 9
178, 179; Italy 9, 12, 13 – 14, 22, Germany 77, 110
28, 29, 30, 34 n6, 178, 179; González, Felipe 112, 113, 123
Portugal 71, 178; Spain 109 – 10, government – parliament relationship
127, 130, 131, 179– 80; Turkey 5, 97 – 9, 182 – 3
151, 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 170, Greece: European Economic
171 –2, 178, 179 Community (EEC) 3; European
context 3 –4 Union (EU) 93; local government
Cotta, M. 4, 8, 79, 146, 151 98; see also Hellenic Parliament
democracies 1, 6, 8– 9, 146, 151, 177 Hellenic Parliament 3– 4, 85– 106;
deputies see MPs/deputies 1985– 2001 85, 87– 8;
Di Palma, G. 36 –7, 151, 152 committees 86, 90, 91, 93 –4,
Dini, Lamberto 55 n23 95– 7, 99; Communist Party 87,
89t; Conference of Presidents 86,
Easton, D. 146 91, 94, 95, 98; constitutional
Ecevit, Bülent 168 revision 85, 87, 88, 90, 91t, 92, 93,
efficacy 1, 2, 85, 95, 146, 180 178, 179; Democratic Renewal
electoral function and systems 9; (‘DIANA’) 88, 89t; dissolution of
Greece 86, 87 – 8, 89t, 90, 179; parliament 88, 103 nn 18 –19;
Italy 9, 15 – 18, 29, 30; effectiveness 85, 95; electoral
INDEX 187
system 86, 87 –8, 89t, 90, 179; system 3, 37– 8; centrality of
government – parliament parliament 12; Chamber of
relationship 97 –9; independent Deputies 3, 10, 13, 14, 47, 48t, 49;
public authorities (IPAs) 98 – 9; Christian Democracy 20, 36, 37,
interpellations 94, 95 –6; 45, 47, 48t, 49t, 55 n23; clean
intra-party democracy 87, 99, hands operation 38; coalitions
100; Koskotas scandal 87, 103 n6; 16 – 17, 28; committees system
legislation 86, 90– 3, 91t; and 14, 15, 180; Communist Party 12,
the media 100, 102; MPs: 16, 36, 37, 44, 45, 47, 48t, 49t;
(antagonism with ministers 97, conclusions 29– 31;
98; political careers 105 n49; role consociational character 16, 36,
90, 95, 97, 98, 99; salaries and 47; constitutional change 178,
funding 100, 105 n57; 179; democracy 8 – 9; Democratic
socio-demographic profile 97; Left Party 48t, 49t, 51; electoral
status 85, 86, 97, 99– 101); function 9, 15– 18, 29, 30;
New Democracy (ND) 87 – 8, 89t; expressive function 9, 22 –4, 29,
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 30; Forza Italia 37, 42, 45, 46, 48t,
(PASOK) 87, 88, 89t; parliament 49t, 50, 55 n23; Greens 47, 48,
as agora 101– 2; parliamentary 48t, 49t; I Democratici 55 n23;
control over executive 93 –4; instability 3, 48, 50; internal
parliamentary groups 85, 181; resources 10– 11; Italian Social
party system 3, 87 –8; President of Movement 37, 45, 48t;
the Republic 87; Presidium of the Legislation Committee 14;
Parliament 86, 95; prime minister legislative role 9 –10, 13, 14,
98; proportional representation 24 – 9, 25f, 26t, 27t, 30, 31;
87; public opinion 23f, 85, 99, Liberal Party 37, 48t, 49t;
100; questions 94, 95, 96, 183; majoritarian trend 13– 14, 15, 16,
‘reinforced’ proportional 23, 28, 30, 31, 38– 9, 50, 51,
representation 87, 88, 103 n11; 52 – 3; ‘majority groups’ 14;
research support 97, 100, 181; Margherita 51, 55 n23; and mass
role of parliament 93; standing media 18; MPs: (pay 11; political
orders 85, 86, 91, 93, 94 –7, 180, careers 43– 6, 44f, 46f; role 21, 24,
181; State Budget 92; structure 25, 36; seniority 40 – 2, 41f;
86; studies 2; transparency socio-demographic profile 67);
101 –2, 106 n65 National Alliance 45, 48t, 49t, 50;
Network (Movement for
İba, Şeref 165t Democracy) 48, 48t; Northern
institutions 9 League 37, 42, 43, 46, 48, 48t,
internal organisation 2, 4 – 5, 180 – 2 49t, 50, 54 n10; ‘opposition
Italian Parliament 8 –34; 1987 –2001 groups’ 14; oversight 9, 18– 21,
3, 35– 55; assemblearism 9, 12, 19f, 21t, 29, 30, 33 n31, 183;
15; breakdown of old party parliamentary party groups
188 INDEX
(PPGs) 37, 46 –8, 48t, 49 –50, 49t, legitimacy 146, 184

50f, 178, 181; partyness of Lewis, P. 1
parliament 40, 46 –52, 53; Liebert, U. 1 – 2, 4, 6, 52, 57, 58,
President of the Republic 17; 80, 151
private member’s bills 15, 24 –5, Linz, J.J. 146
26, 26t, 27t; public opinion 22 – 4, Lobo Antunes, M. 57, 58, 73
23f, 30; questions and local government 63, 69f, 70, 87
propositions 38 –40, 183; Radical
Party 13, 48, 48t, 49t; Maastricht Treaty 71
re-consolidation after 1980s majoritarian rule 13 –14, 15, 16, 23,
39 –40: (degree 40– 43; form 28, 30, 31, 38 –9, 50, 51, 52– 3, 64
43 –46); Re-founded Communist Marsh, M. 62
Party 44, 48t, 49t, 51; media 18, 100, 102, 123
referendums 13, 38; reforms 9, 12, Melissas, D. 91t
13 –14, 22, 28, 29, 30, 34 n46; Miranda, Jorge 60
Republican Party 37, 47, 48t, 49t; MPs/deputies 5– 6, 177– 8;
Rules of Procedure 10, 11– 15, 30, antagonism with ministers 97, 98;
181; scrutiny 183; secret ballots autonomy 98, 178, 184 (see also
13, 32 n18, 47; Senate 3, 10, 13, role); behaviour 159, 163 – 4, 173;
14, 47, 49, 49t; Social Democrats links with citizens 72, 78 –9, 80,
37, 48t, 49t; Socialist Party 37, 137– 8, 163; political careers
48t, 49t; staff 10, 11, 11t; studies 43– 6, 44f, 46f, 67, 68 –70, 69f,
2; traditional parliament 36– 7; 79, 105 n49, 133, 136; role 21, 24,
‘transversal’ candidates 43, 54 25, 36, 72, 90, 95, 97, 98, 99, 134,
n12; trasformismo 51; twenty-first 136– 40, 137t, 138t, 139t, 157– 8,
century challenge 52 – 4; 162; salaries and funding 11, 100,
Unified Christian Democrats 49t, 105 n57, 133, 161 –3, 167;
50 –1; ‘Westminster-like’ system selection 60, 62 –5, 65t; seniority
39, 50, 51 and turnover 40 –2, 41f, 70,
133– 4, 136, 148 n14, 158t, 159,
Kalaycioğlu, E. 151 –2, 168 163– 4, 168; socio-demographic
Karamanlis, Konstantinos 87 profile 66 –7, 66f, 67f, 68f, 79, 97,
134– 6, 135t, 148 nn17 –19; status
legislative role of parliament 9– 10, 85, 86, 97, 99 –101
182 –3; Greece 86, 90 –3, 91t;
Italy 9– 10, 13, 14, 24– 9, 25f, 26t, Norton, P. 75, 145
27t, 30, 31; Portugal 60, 73 –5,
74t, 75t, 80; role of European Opello, W. 57, 58, 72, 80
Union 29; Spain 117– 24, 118t, oversight function 9; see also
120t, 121t, 122f, 122t, 123t; scrutiny
Turkey 160– 2, 165– 6, 165t, Özal, Turgut 158, 161
167 –70 Özbudun, E. 175 n12
INDEX 189
Papandreou, Andreas 87, 88, 98, 105 Republic (CRP) 71, 178;
n48 Constitutional Tribunal 57, 80 n3;
parliamentary groups (PGs) 178, Council of State 80 n3; Council of
181; Greece 85, 181; Italy 37, the Revolution 57, 80 n3;
46 –8, 48t, 49 – 50, 49t, 50f, 178, democracy in the first decade
181; Portugal 60, 61t, 62, 71– 2, 56 – 8; EEC membership 59 –60;
80, 178, 181; Spain 134, 138, electoral reform 64, 78;
178; Turkey 151, 152, 156– 7, legislative role 60, 73– 5, 74t, 75t,
164 –7 80; MPs: (links with citizens 72,
parliamentary staff 10, 11, 11t, 168, 78 – 9, 80; majoritarian rule 64;
170, 180, 181– 2 political careers 67, 68– 70, 69f,
parliaments 2, 151; and democratic 79; right to petition 72; selection
change 1, 177 –83 60, 62 – 5, 65t; socio-demographic
parties and partyness 6; Greece 3, profile 66 – 7, 66f, 67f, 68f, 79);
87 –8; Italy 3, 37– 8, 40, 46 – 52, parliamentary groups (PG) 60,
53; Portugal 58, 62, 63; Spain 3, 61t, 62, 71– 2, 80, 181; Partido
126, 134; Turkey 3, 152, 154 – 8, Renovador Democrático (PRD)
156t 59, 61t; Partido Social Democrata
party government democracies 3 (PSD) 58 – 9, 61t, 64, 71, 76;
patronage 60, 157, 159, 165, 167, Partido Socialista (PS) 59, 61t, 64,
177 –8 65, 66, 71; partyness 3, 58, 61t,
Pişkinsüt, Mrs 168 62, 63; PCP 61t, 65, 66; President
political representation of the Republic 57, 59, 60, 63, 71,
see MPs/deputies 78; private member’s bills 73, 74,
Polsby, N.W. 36 74t, 75t, 77; proportional
Portugal 78– 9, 80; European representation 60, 63; public
Economic Community (EEC) 3; debate 77; public hearings
local government 63, 69f, 70; (audições) 77; public opinion 23f;
MEPs 63, 69f QGs (questions to the
Portuguese Parliament 3 – 4, 56 – 84; government) 75, 76t, 77, 183;
cabinet 63, 64, 70; caciquismo reform 78– 9, 80; regulatory
(patronage) 60, 177– 8; Centro change 70– 3; requerimentos
Democrático e Social-Partido (written questions) 76t, 77;
Popular (CDS-PP) 59, 61t, 65, 69, Revolution of the Carnations 56;
71, 82 n35; Chamber 63, 71, 72, Rules of Procedure (RP) 71, 75,
80; committee system 72, 77– 8, 180, 181; scrutiny 75– 8, 76t, 80;
80; conclusions 79– 80; semi-presidential system 63;
Conference of Representatives 60, stability 56, 57, 58 –60; State
62, 71; Conference of the Budget 60, 78; structure 60 –2,
Committees’ Chairs 72; 79 – 80; studies 2; universal
Constituent Assembly 57; franchise 80 n1
Constitution of the Portuguese Pridham, G. 1
190 INDEX
private member’s bills: Italy 15, (CIS) 133, 134, 137t, 138t, 139t,
24 –5, 26, 26t, 27t; Portugal 73, 143t, 144t; European Economic
74, 74t, 75t, 77; Spain 138, 139; Community (EEC) 3;
Turkey 165, 165t, 169 governments 115t; media 123;
proportional representation 3, 17; transfuguismo 51
Greece 87, 88, 103 n11; Portugal Spanish Parliament 107 – 29,
60, 63; Spain 113; Turkey 154 130– 50, 145; 1977 –82 131 –2,
public opinion: Greece 23f, 85, 99, 133; 1982 –93 132; 1993 – 132;
100; Italy 22– 4, 23f, 30; Portugal Autonomous Communities 3,
23f, 77; Spain 23f, 112, 113, 124, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 116,
140 –6, 143t, 144t; trust in 120– 1, 127; Basque nationalist
national parliaments 23f; Turkey party 112, 113, 114, 116; Catalan
163, 175 n23 nationalist party 112, 113, 114,
116; Centro Democratico y Social
questions to the government: Greece (CDS) 112, 112t, 113, 120t;
94, 95, 96, 183; Italy 38 –40, 183; Coalición Canaria (CC) 112t, 117,
Portugal 75, 76t, 77, 183; Spain 120t; committees of inquiry 124;
77; Turkey 160t conclusions 125 –7, 144, 145 –6;
Congress 108, 111 – 17, 112t, 127,
Rae, D. 156t 131, 140; Constitution 109– 10,
referendums 13, 38, 171– 2 127, 130, 131, 179 –80; control
resources 5, 10–11, 97, 100, 180, 181 mechanisms 124 – 5, 126t, 127,
role of parliament 2, 93, 130 – 3, 153, 183; Convergència i Unió (CiU)
183 –5 112, 112t, 113, 116, 117, 120t,
Rules of Procedure: Greece 85, 86, 122, 123 – 4; decree-laws 118– 19,
91, 93, 94– 7, 180, 181; Italy 10, 118t; electoral system 113, 145;
11 –15, 30, 181; Portugal 71, 75, General Commission of the
180, 181; Turkey 160 –1, 167 –8, Autonomous Communities 110;
172, 173, 179 Izquierda Unida (IU) 111, 112t,
113, 120t, 135; languages 110;
Sampaio, Jorge 78 legislative consensus 117– 24,
Scandinavia 134, 147– 8 n12 118t, 120t, 121t, 122f, 122t, 123t;
scrutiny 5, 182, 183, 184; Greece 94, meetings 124t; MPs: (links with
95 –6; Italy 9, 18 – 21, 19f, 21t, 29, citizens 137 – 8; political careers
30, 33 n31, 183; Portugal 75– 8, 133, 136; role 134, 136 –40, 137t,
76t, 80; Spain 124 –5, 126t, 127, 138t, 139t; salaries 133; seniority
183; Turkey 159 –60, 160t, 169 70, 133 – 4, 136, 148 n14;
Silva, Cavaco 59, 76 socio-demographic profile 134– 6,
Simitis, K. 88, 105 n48 135t, 148 nn17– 19); nationalist
Spain: Basque Country 115t, 127; parties 111, 116, 127; Organic
Catalonia 115t, 127; Centro de Law on the General Electoral
Investigaciones Sociológicas Regime 113; parliamentary
INDEX 191
groups 134, 138, 178; Partido electoral system 154, 155 –6,
Popular (PP) 111, 112, 112t, 113, 156t, 161, 172; EU membership
116, 119, 120, 120t, 121, 123, 166; evolution of parliamentary
125, 132, 135, 141, 148 n17; institutions 152 –4; Felicity Party
Partido Socialista Obrero Español 155; financial support 157;
(PSOE) 111 – 12, 112t, 113, government 164– 7;
115 –16, 119, 120, 120t, 121, 122, institutionalisation 172 –4; Justice
123, 125, 131, 132, 135, 148 n17; and Development Party 155;
parties 3, 126, 134; PNV 112t, Justice Party (JP) 154, 160;
116, 117, 120t; private member’s legislative investigations 159,
bills 138, 139; proportional 160t, 169; legislative role 160– 2,
representation 113; public opinion 165 – 6, 165t, 167– 70, 171;
23f, 112, 113, 124, 140– 6, 143t, military interventions 152, 153–4,
144t; questions to the government 155, 156, 173; Motherland Party
77; role 130 –3; scrutiny 124 –5; (MP) 155; motions of censure
Senate 108 –11, 127; Standing (interpellations) 159 –60, 160t;
Committees 133; studies 2; National Salvation Party 154,
triangular relationship 111, 114; 155; Nationalist Action Party
Unión de Centro Democrático (NAP) 154, 155; oversight
(UCD) 111, 112,112t, 120t, 131 159 – 60, 160t, 169; parliamentary
stability 1, 3, 48, 50, 56, 57, 58 –60 groups 151, 152, 156– 7, 164– 7;
studies 1 – 3, 151 parties in parliament 156t, 158–62;
Suárez, Adolfo 112 party system 3, 152, 154 – 8, 156t;
patronage 157, 159, 165, 167;
transformative type parliaments 5, 80 People’s Party 153; ‘personalism’
Turan, İ. 158t 157, 158, 175 n12; presidential
Turkish Grand National Assembly vetoes 170 – 1, 171t; private
(TGNA) 3, 151– 76; coalitions member’s bills 165, 165t, 169;
155, 156– 7, 159; committee proportional representation 154;
system 168 – 9, 173, 180; public opinion 163, 175 n23;
Constitution 151, 152, 153, 154, referendums 171 – 2; Republican
161, 162, 170, 171– 2, 178, 179; People’s Party (RPP) 153, 154,
Constitutional Court 171; 155; role 153, 184; Rules of
constraint on powers 170 –2; Procedure (RP) 160 –1, 167 –8,
decree-laws 165t, 166, 171; 172, 173, 179; staff support 168,
Democratic Left Party 155; 170, 181– 2; status 170; studies 2,
Democratic Party (DP) 153, 154; 151; True Path Party 155; Virtue
deputies 162 – 4; (behaviour 159, Party 155; Welfare Party 155
163 –4, 173; links with citizens
163; role 157 –8, 162; salaries United Kingdom 67, 77, 134
161 –3, 167; seniority and
turnover 158t, 159, 163– 4, 168); Vitorino, A. 78

(Library of Legislative Studies) Cristina Leston-Bandeira - Southern European Parliaments in Democracy-Routledge (2015)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Library of Legislative Studies) Cristina Leston-Bandeira - Southern European Parliaments in Democracy-Routledge (2015)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Southern European Parliaments in

Southern European Parliaments in Democracy analyses the development

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is a Lecturer in Legislative Studies at the

A series of new and recent books exploring the role of legislature in

Parliaments in Contemporary Western Europe

Delegation and Accountability in European Integration

The Uneasy Relationships between Parliamentary Members and Leaders

Conscience and Parliament

The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees

Members of Parliament in Western Europe

The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe

National Parliaments and the European Union

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

# 2005 Cristina Leston-Bandeira

Typeset in Times by Techset Composition Limited

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

1 Introduction: Southern European

2 The Italian Parliament: In Search Giliberto Capano

3 Much Ado about Something?

4 Internalising the Lessons of

5 The Hellenic Parliament: The New Rules

6 The Spanish Parliament in a

7 Parliament and Citizenship in Spain:

8 Volatility in Politics, Stability in Parliament:

9 Conclusion: The Impact of Democratic

THE STUDY OF SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS

The emergence of new democracies in Southern Europe in the 1970s led to a

THE CONTEXT OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS

VOLUME ORGANISATION AND ISSUES ADDRESSED

The volume is based on country-specific chapters on Greece, Italy, Portugal,

Relationship with Government

Styles of Political Representation

PARLIAMENT’S INTERNAL STRUCTURE: RESOURCES AND RULES

Parliaments are institutionalised organisations leading their own, autonomous

Staff Clerks Staff Senate Clerks

1989 1,864 162 980 114

Source: Senato della Repubblica, Relazione annuale sullo stato dell’Amministra-

THE ELECTORAL FUNCTION

In a parliamentary democracy the executive is accountable to the Assembly.

Note: The present legislature is updated at 13 Feb. 2002.

Legislature Interpellations Motions þ Assembly Resolutions

THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION

Source: Own elaboration on Eurobarometer data EB 48, EB 51, EB 55.1.

discontent may be seen as the result of the poor performance of parliament in

PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Note: The present legislature is updated at 8 Feb. 2002.

Source: Own elaboration on parliamentary data: www.parlamento.it.

opportunity individual MPs have of playing their own ‘symbolic’ game

Legislature Bills assigned Bills approved

10th 11th 12th 13th 14th

Laws approved 1,076 314 295 905 56

Note: The present legislature is updated at 31 Jan. 2002.

the amount of legislative decrees, due to delegated laws,42 exceeded the

The so-called ‘Italian transition’ of the 1990s had a profound impact on

This article deals with the transformation of parliamentary politics in Italy

TOWARDS A NEW FORM OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IN ITALY?

The Contradictory Image of Traditional Parliament in Italy

The Breakdown of the Old Party System

of restoration, which led to significant divisions, and to a remarkable turnover

Questions and Propositions

adaptation rather than any dramatic change in parliamentary recruit-

AFTER THE 1980s: THE SLOW RE-CONSOLIDATION OF THE

What Degree of Consolidation? The Difficult Rise of a New Elite