JURISDICTION

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGEST

SUBMITTED BY:

OLIDAN, MARIEA C.

SUBMITTED TO:

ATTY. MICHAEL P. PIMENTEL

I.

BELGICA vs. OCHOA

G.R. Nos. 208566, etc., NOVEMBER 19, 2013.

Facts:

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently. G.R. No. 208566
- Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual
"Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the
2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents. UDK-14951 – A
Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease-and-desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing
such funds to Members of Congress.

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and
other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

Ruling:

Yes, Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.” Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993- the phrases:
(a) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. It indicated
purposes adequately curtails the authority of the president to spend the presidential social funds only
for restoration purposes which arise from calamities.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.
It gives the president carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may
so determine is a priority, verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure
development projects and hence, leaves the president without any guidelines to construe the same.

II.

ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. v. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL
CENTERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,

G.R. Nos. 207132 and 207205, DECEMBER 12, 2016.

Facts:

On March 8, 2001, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2001 (AO 5-01) which directed
the decking or equal distribution of migrant workers among the several clinics who are members of
GAMCA. AO 5-01 was issued to comply with the Gulf Cooperative Countries (GCC) States’ requirement
that only GCC-accredited medical clinics/hospitals’ examination results will be honored by the GCC
States’ respective embassies. It required an OFW applicant to first go to a GAMCA Center which, in turn,
will refer the applicant to a GAMCA clinic or hospital. Subsequently, the DOH issued AO No. 106, Series
of 2002 holding in abeyance the implementation of the referral decking system. The DOH reiterated its
directive suspending the referral decking system in AO No. 159, Series of 2004. In 2004, the DOH issued
AO No. 167, Series of 2004 repealing AO 5-01, reasoning that the referral decking system did not
guarantee the migrant workers' right to safe and quality health service.

In Department Memorandum No. 2008-0210, then DOH Secretary Francisco T. Duque III expressed his
concern about the continued implementation of the referral decking system despite the DOH’s prior
suspension directives. The DOH directed the OFC clinics duly accredited/licensed by the DOH and/or by
the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH) belonging to and identified with GAMCA to
forthwith stop, terminate, withdraw or otherwise end the referral decking system.

On March 8, 2010, RA 10022 lapsed into law without the President’s signature. The pertinent portions of
the amendatory provisions read: Sec 16 under Sec 23 of RA 8042, as amended, add new paragraphs (c)
and (d) with their corresponding subparagraphs to read as follows:

1. (c3) no group or groups of medical clinics shall have a monopoly of exclusively conducting health
examination on migrant works for certain receiving countries.
2. (c4) the decking practice which requires OFW to go first to an office for registration and then farmed
out to a medical clinic located elsewhere shall not be allowed.

On Aug 26, 2010, GAMCA filed with the Pasig City RTC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunctions and/or TRO assailing that the DOH’s Aug 23, 2010 letter
order on the ground of abuse of discretion and paragraphs c3 and c4, Sec 16 or RA 10022, as well as Sec
1(c) and (d), Rule XI of the IRR as unconstitutional. RTC granted GAMCA’s certiorari petition and declared
null and void ab initio the DOH CDO letters. It also issued a writ of prohibition directing the DOH
Secretary and all persons acting on his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the assailed Orders
against the GAMCA.

The RTC upheld the constitutionality of Sec 18 of RA No. 10022 amending Section 23 of RA 8042, but
ruled that Sec 16 of RA 10022 does not apply to GAMCA. The RTC reasoned out that the prohibition
against the referral decking system under Sec 16 of RA 10022 must be interpreted as applying only to
clinics that conduct health examination on migrant works bound for countries that do not require the
referral decking system for the issuance of visas to job applicants. GAMCA further claims that its
members made substantial investments to upgrade their facilities and equipment. From this
perspective, the Aug 23, 2010 order constitutes taking of property without due process of law as its
implementation would deprive GAMCA members of their property.

Issues:

Whether or not the RTC legally erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the DOH CDO letters.

Ruling:

No, the court held that the use of petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is a remedy that
judiciaries have used long before our Rules of Court existed. In Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation, it held that a writ is founded on the supervisory jurisdiction of appellate courts over
inferior courts, and is issued to keep the latter within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Thus, the writ
corrects only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and cannot be used to correct
errors of law or fact. For these mistakes of judgment, the appropriate remedy is an appeal.

This situation changed after 1987 when the new Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
providing that -Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.

III.

REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A.

BILLONES AND TEDDY BRWANER BAGUILAT JR vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEL
ET.AL.

GR. No. 231568, etc., JULY 4, 2017

Facts:
President Rodrigo R. Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, effective May 23, 2017 for a period not exceeding
6t0 days. The report submitted by the President to Congress on May 25, 2017 pointed out that for
decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and
worsened with the passing of time. It also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the
crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. The Report also pointed
out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless group. After
submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing full support to the
declaration of martial law, finding Proclamatiion No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law. In the same resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling reason
to revoke the same. The House of Representatives likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support
to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. Various concerned citizens filed
several petitions seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks
sufficient factual basis, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and special jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the same Proclamation.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitions are the appropriate proceedings to invoke the SC’s power of review over
proclamation of martial law.

Ruling:

Yes, Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The Constitution confers the Supreme Court the power to review
martial law proclamations. A petition for certiorari is not the proper petition. The power of the Supreme
Court to review the factual basis of martial law proclamations is not limited by Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII of the Constitution. It's a completely different proceeding not limited by lack of or abuses of
discretion. The factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review. The
power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended the judicial power to review to be exercised independently from the congressional power to
revoke.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Thus, the power to
review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise
independent from each other although, concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be
exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

IV.

CORTAL vs. ANAKI LARRAZABAL

G.R. No. 199107, AUGUST 30, 2017

Facts:
Private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises owned three (3) parcels of land in Sitio Coob,
Barangay Libertad, Ormoc City, these three (3) parcels were placed under the Compulsory Acquisition
Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme,
Emancipation Patents and new transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries,
petitioners included. Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the
Department of Agrarian Reform. It assailed the cancellation of its transfer certificates of title and the
subsequent INAKI LARRAZABAL issuance of new titles to petitioners. It alleged that no price had been
fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just compensation
requirement. In their Answer, petitioners denied non-payment of just compensation.

Regional adjudication ruled in favor of Larrazabal Enterprises and ordered that it be restored to
ownership of the lots. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB... the DARAB reversed the Decision, it ruled
that Larrazabal Enterprises' action, which was filed in 1999, was already barred by prescription and
laches, as the assailed Emancipation Patents were issued in 1988.[18] It likewise gave credence to the
certificates issued by Landbank, which confirmed the payment of just compensation. Larrazabal
Enterprises filed a Motion for Reconsideration. the DARAB reversed its own decision and granted
Larrazabal Enterprises' Motion for Reconsideration. It justified its ruling by saying that Larrazabal
Enterprises had been denied due process when the parcels were taken from it without having been
given just compensation. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues:

whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was justified by the errors noted by the Court of
Appeals.

Ruling:

No, the supreme court explained that the procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases and enjoyed by litigants to strictly follow the rules.

Under rule 1 sec. 6 of the rules of court states that it shall liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing just, speedy and inexpensive disposition for every proceeding. The CA overlooked
more compelling procedural lapse, such the period for filing pleadings and appeals and was harsh in
denying petitioners opportunity to ventilate their case. The CA must give due course to petitioner’s
appeal to enable a better appreciation of the issues.

V.

VIVENCIO MATEO, ET.AL. vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND MARIANO T. RODRIGUEZ, ET.AL.

G.R. No. 186339; FEBRUARY 15, 2017

Facts:

The Mateos were the registered owners of coconut and rice lands with a total area of 1,323,112 square
meters situated at Fabrica, Bacon, Sorsogon and were covered by TCT No. T-22822. A portion of the
lands was brought under the coverage of the CARP of the government and for this reason, the DAR
entered the premises sometime in June 1994. LBP valued the Mateos’ land at fifty-two thousand pesos
(₱52,000.00) per hectare. The Mateos, however, rejected the LBP’s valuation. On April 30, 1997, the
Mateos filed a complaint against LBP, DAR, and the farmer beneficiaries of the land for just
compensation. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-6331 and raffled to the SAC, presided by
respondent Judge Honesto A. Villamor. The LBP and DAR filed their respective answers arguing that
since no summary administrative proceedings to determine the amount of just compensation had been
conducted yet, the complaint of the Mateos was premature.

Pre-trial ensued and was terminated. The SAC granted the request of the parties for the appointment of
two commissioners, namely, Mr. Jesus Empleo and Engr. Florencio Dino (Engr. Dino), to represent the
LBP and the Mateos, respectively. Among the evidence offered by the Mateos during the trial were: (a)
the testimonies of their father, Dr. Eleseo Mateo, Engr. Dino, farmer Manuel Docot and caretaker Danilo
Federio; (b) TCT No. T-22822; (c) Memorandum of Valuation (MoV), Claim Folder Profile and Valuation
Summary of Agricultural Land; (d) deeds of sale covering two parcels of land less than two ha. in size in
Sorsogon, which were purchased for ₱300,000.00 and ₱400,000.00 per ha; (e) newspaper clipping of
Eduardo Cojuangco, who was selling his land in Sorsogon for ₱350,000.00 per ha; (f) Engr. Dino’s Report;
and (g) deed of sale of a lot in Cabi-an, Sorsogon bought by the government for ₱245,000.00 per ha. On
the other hand, the DAR presented: (a) the testimonies of agriculturist Romeo Brotamante, government
employee Ireneo Defeo and farmer Cresenciano Lagajeno; (b) a Field Investigation Report dated March
29, 1996; (c) ledger cards bearing dates from December 2, 1994 to June 9, 1997; and (d) two pass books,
the second of which indicated withdrawals in the total amount of ₱601,789.97. The LBP, on its part,
offered (a) the testimony of Monita Balde, and (b) a Claims Valuation and Processing Form. Fixing the
amount of SEVENTY-ONE MILLION, ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-
THREE (₱71,143,623.00) Pesos, to be the just compensation for the hectares of agricultural land situated
at Fabrica, District of Bacon, City of Sorsogon covered by TCT No. T-22822 owned by the Mateos which
property was taken by the government pursuant to the CARP of the government as provided by R.A. No.
6657.

Ordering the LBP to pay the Mateos the amount of Seventy-One Million, one Hundred forty-three
thousand six hundred twenty-three (₱71,143,623.00) Pesos in the manner provided for by R.A. No. 6657
by way of full payment of the said just compensation after deducting whatever amount was previously
received by the Mateos from the LBP as part of the just compensation. Without pronouncement as to
cost, the LBP and the DAR both filed notices of appeal, but no brief was filed by the latter before the CA.
On August 4, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision setting aside the SAC’s judgment and
dismissing without prejudice the complaint of the Mateos.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in negating the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a SAC, to determine in the first
instance and in the absence of the conduct of prior administrative proceedings, questions of just
compensation to be paid to landowners.

Ruling:

YES, on jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: Section 50 of R.A. No.
6657, in part, provides that the DAR is vested with ‘’primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters” and “exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform” except those falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Section 57, on the other
hand, confers “special” and “original and exclusive” jurisdiction to the SAC over all petitions of
landowners for the determination of just compensation. Anent the application of Sections 50 and 57 of
R.A. No. 6657, in relation to the proper procedure which must be followed in cases involving
determination of just compensation for landowners, Ramon Alfonso v. LBP and DAR is emphatic that in
San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, we explained the reasons why Congress, in its judgment, may
choose to grant primary jurisdiction over matters within the erstwhile jurisdiction of the courts, to an
agency.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction bas been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the
special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the
courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for
its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed
out and determined.

VI.

PRICILLA ALMA JOSE vs. RAMON JAVELLANA

G.R. No. 158239, JANUARY 25, 2012

Facts:

The mother of petitioner Priscilla Alma Jose (Jose) sold for consideration of P160,00 to respondent
Ramon Javellana (Javellana) two parcels of land. They agreed that respondent would pay P80,000 upon
the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000 upon the registration of the parcels of land under
the Torrens System; and that should she die her daughter, would receive the payment of the balance
and proceed with the application for registration. After Priscilla's mother died, the undertaking fell on
here being her mother's sole heir. However, she did not comply with the registration of the properties
under the Torrens System and instead began improving the properties with the intention of converting
them into a residential or industrial subdivisions.

Faced with petitioner's refusal to comply, commenced an action for specific performance injunction and
damages against Jose before the RTC Malolos. In response, Jose filed for a motion to dismiss arguing
that complaint was barred by prescription and the complaint did not state a cause of action. The RTC
initially denied Jose's motion to dismiss however upon motion for reconsideration they reversed their
decision. Javellana moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.

Javellana then filed an appeal to the CA. The CA then promulgated a decision reversing and setting aside
the dismissal of the case and remanding the records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance
with the law. The CA also denied Jose's motion for reconsideration stating that it decided to give due
course to the appeal even if filed out of time because respondent had no intention to delay the
proceedings.

Jose then filed with the Supreme Court averring that the CA erred in not dismissing the complaint
because the motion to appeal had been filed belatedly by three days. She insists that Javellana filed his
notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9,
1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the
RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he
received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within
which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should
have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.

Under Sec. 41 of the Rules of Court, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or
until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for
reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of
appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Jose insists.
Issue:

Whether or not the appeal had been filed on time.

Ruling:

Yes, the appeal is pursuant to Neypes vs CA by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an
adverse judgment or final order is allowed within 15 days withing which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration to with. to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Following the rule retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending
actions, such as the present case. To deny respondent the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount to
injustice since the subject notices of judgment and final order in Neypes were issued in 1998. It will be
incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year
1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as
in the instant case, will not. Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed
pursuant to the fresh period rule.

VII.

ALVERO vs. DELA ROSA

G. R. No. L-286, MARCH 29, 1946.

Facts:

Margarita sold 2 parcels of land to Victoriano which he immediately possessed. Due to the war,
Victoriano failed to complete payment and had to evacuate. Forgetting that she previously sold it,
Margarita then resold the land to Alvero. Victoriano filed a case to enforce the first sale and nullify the
subsequent sale to Alvero. Judge Dela Rosa ruled in favor of Victoriano. Alvero filed a notice of appeal
but the judge ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and
record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late. The lawyer claims
the death of his wife as reason for the late filing.

Issue:

Whether or no the petition is defective in form as well as its substance.

Ruling:

Yes, failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the
judgment to become final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil.,
623; Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36
Phil., 774.)

The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed may,
however, be extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the
original period. (Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.). Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have
the force and effect of law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil.,
333.)

Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure to pay
the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of
the appeal. (Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In the same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil
case to serve his brief, within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to
the appellant, or on its own motion, the court may dismiss the appeal. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)

VIII.

RODANTE GUYAMIN, ET.AL. vs. JACINTO FLORES AND MAXIMO FLORES REPRESENTED BY RAMON
FLORES

GR No. 202189, APRIL 25, 2017

Facts:

Respondents filed complaint against the petitioners to recover their property, because the petitioners
did not cooperate in an amicable settlement. Summon were served to petitioners through Eileen, but
she refused to sign and acknowledge the summon. This was recorded or noted in the court on
September 26, 2006, because of this the respondent filed a motion to declare petitioners in default on
January 9, 2007, because despite service of summons, petitioners failed to file their answer. Petitioners
file their answers with motion to dismiss on May 28, 2007. The RTC’s ordered the petitioners to vacate
the subject property and pay respondents for attorney’s fee and litigation expenses. The petitioners
appeal at CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issues:

Whether or not the RTC validly rendered its decision favorable to the respondents without the filing of
the formal offer of evidence.

Ruling:

No, according to SC since, respondents’ exhibits were presented and marked during exparte hearing and
it was marked as exhibits A-F. if they were not included in the record, the RTC judge could not have
referred to them in arriving at judgement.

This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed
at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the
rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to
enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive
rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Considering that there
was substantial compliance, a liberal interpretation of procedural rules in this case is more in keeping
with the constitutional mandate to secure social justice.

IX.

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA

G.R. No. L-2068, OCTOBER 20, 1948

Facts:

Petitioner Bustos appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of Peace of Masantol,
Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty
or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. The fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108 (defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth), and the objection was
sustained.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the
record of the case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was
denied and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. Petitioner
squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives
him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to
the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision of section
13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial legislation that
diminishes the right of the accused.

Ruling:

No, the Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors is an adjective law and not
a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in
this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion.

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes
the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished Preliminary investigation is
eminently and essentially remedial it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. As a rule of
evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence which is the "the mode and manner of
proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in
judicial proceedings" is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are
enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure
refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the
Rules of Court. We cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing
out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment of the
right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given
evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we
have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It may
be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed
thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a
preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional
right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged.
In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play,
he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against
him. The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact
that this formality is frequently waived. It is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should
step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense,
but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.

For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the
time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system
of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source.

X.

PANAY RAILWAYS vs. HEVA MANAGEMENT

G.R. No. 154061, JANUARY 25, 2012.

Facts:

The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City of a Notice of
Appeal for petitioner’s failure to pay the corresponding docket fees. On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay
Railways Inc., a government-owned and controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage
Contract covering several parcels of lands, in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure ₱20 million
worth of loan and credit accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that
already sold to Shell Co., Inc. Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as the
highest bidder and purchaser. Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the
basis of a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed to exercise the right to
redeem the properties. It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure
included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Partial
Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum, and Declaration of Ownership
of Real Property with Reconveyance plus Damages. Respondents filed their respective Motions to
Dismiss on these grounds: (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an
abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioner's claim or demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a
cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely TRB, was not impleaded. RTC issued an Order
granting the Motion to Dismiss in favor of the respondents. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without
paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal
on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees. RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had No jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice
of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied
procedural rules.

The CA denied the petition. It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA’s Decision, this Court
issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4,
Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41,
the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision in the
present Petition granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration. The CAs action prompted petitioner
to file a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive
effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA had exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of filing.

RULING:

Yes, when this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs
dismissal of the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA
committed no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive
on the matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision. As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, we have
held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection
of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees. Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.

XI.

MARTOS vs. NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS INC.

G.R. No. 192650, OCTOBER 24, 2012

Facts:

Felix Martos, et al. alleged that on various dates, New San Jose Builders, Inc. hired them on different
positions for its San Jose Plains Project (SJPP), also known as the “Erap City.” Sometime in 2000, New
San Jose Builders, Inc. was constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works on the SJPP project
due to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority. Thus, the workers were informed that many of
them would be laid off and the rest would be reassigned to other projects. Juan Villaber, Terso Garay,
Rowell Batta, Pastor Pantig, Rafael Villa, and Melvin Garay were laid off. While on the other hand, Felix
Martos, Ariel Dominguez, Greg Bisonia, Allan Caballera, Orlando Limos, Mandy Mamalateo, Eric
Castrence, Anthony Molina, and Roy Silva were among those who were retained and were issued new
appointment papers to their respective assignments, indicating therein that they are project employees.
However, they refused to sign the appointment papers as project employees and subsequently refused
to continue to work. On different dates, three (3) Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims
were filed before the NLRC by the employees. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Felix Martos (Martos) was
illegally dismissed; and dismissed the claims of other complainants. Both parties appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC dismissed San Jose Builders, Inc.s appeal and partially granted the appeal made by the other
complainants.

On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision. The CA
explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviving the complaints of petitioners
despite their failure to verify the same. Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos verified the position
paper and his counsel never offered any explanation for his failure to secure the verification of the
others. With respect to Martos, the CA ruled that he was a regular employee and his termination was
illegal.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the complaints filed by those petitioners who failed to
verify their position papers.

Ruling:

Yes, according to SC, failure to comply sec. 4 and 5 of the rule 7 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall because for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice.

The sec. 4 of rule 7 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure is the verification requirement, it is intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct. The lone signature of
Martos is not sufficient to represent them because there was no authorization by his co-petitioners to
sign for them.

XII.

Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual vs. Sps Marilyn Lim and George Lim and the Registry of Deeds of
Valenzuela City

G.R. NO. 191837, SEPTEMBER 19, 2012

Facts:

Petitioner, Consolacion Rivera Pascual filed before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication (RARAD) a
petition to be recognized as tenant of the property in Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato. During the
pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to the spouses Lim. The RARAD rendered a judgment
declaring Consolacion as the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her deceased father.
Consolacion then filed a petition against Sps. Lum and the Registrat of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying
for the issuance of an order directing Sps. Lim to accept P10,000,000 declaring the property to be
redeemed. This petition was given due course by the Regional Adjudicator (RA) Miñas and ordered the
Sps. Lim to accept the P10,000,000 and directing the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City to cancel the
registered property in the name of Sps. Lim and issue a new one in the name of Consolacion.

Then, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) on appeal reversed the decision
of RA Miñas. Consolaction moved for reconsideration but was denied. Consolacion then filed a petition
before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA resolved to require Consolacion's counsel to submit within 5
days from his MCLE Certifcate of Compliance or Exemption and and ammended verification and
Certification against Non-Forum Shopping. Apparently, Consolacion's counsel failed to indicate in his
petition the same. Also, the jurat of Consolacion's verification and certification against non-forum
shopping failed to indicate any complete evidence of Consolacion's identity apart from her community
tax certificate. Because of this failure to comply, the CA dismissed her appeal and her motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA's erred in dismissing Consolacion's complaint for her non-compliance of their
orders?

Ruling:

No, the Court finds no merit in the petition. It sees no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing
Consolacion's on the ground of Consolacion's failure to comply with the basic procedural requirements
attendant ot the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion
and her counsel remaind obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify their
lapses. While there was compliance, this took place after the CA had ordered the dismissal of the
petition and without reasonable cause to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed
inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent of valid and
compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the absence of procedural rules appears to
be an afterhought.

XIII.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION (FROMERLY

SOUTHTERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.)

G.R. No. 159593, OCTOBER 12, 2006

Facts:

Respondent Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
power generation and sale. For the period April 1, 1996 to Dec 31, 1996, MPC filed its Quarterly VAT
Returns reflecting an accumulated input taxes in the amount of P39,330,500.85 it paid to the suppliers
of capital goods and services for the construction and development of power generating plant and other
related facilities in Pagbilao, Quezon. It filed an application for tax credit or refund of unutilized VAT paid
on capital goods, pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 7-95. Without waiting for an answer from the BIR
Commissioners, MPC filed an instant petition for review on July 10, 1998, in order to toll the running of
the 2-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund under the law. In an answer, the BIR Commissioner
said the petition is premature since MPC’s claim for refund is still pending investigation and
consideration. He said that tax refund and credit are strictly construed against the taxpayer as they are
in the nature of a tax exemption and in an action for refund or tax credit, the taxpayer has the burden to
show that the taxes paid were erroneously or illegally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is fatal
to the action for refund. It is incumbent upon MPC to show that the claim for tax credit has been filed
within the prescriptive period under the Tax Code, and the taxes allegedly paid by it are presumed to
have been collected and received in accordance with law and revenue regulations.

Pending the resolution of the case, the BIR Revenue District Office recommended the approval of the
said refund but a reduced amount. The MPC availed the services of an independent Certified Public
Accountant pursuant to CTA Circular No. 1-95. Mr. Ruben R. Rubio, Partner of SGV and Company was
commissioned to verify the accuracy of MPC’s summary of input taxes. Based on the audit performed, of
the total claimed input taxes of P39,330,500.85, only the sum of P28,745,502.40 was properly supported
by valid invoices and/or official receipts. The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) ruled in favor of MPC for a
refund amounting P28,744,626.95. BIR appealed to CA arguing that MPC, being an electric utility is
subject to franchise tax under Sec 117 (now Sec 119) of the Tax Code and not to VAT and that since
respondent is exempt from VAT, it is not entitled to the refund of input VAT pursuant to Sec 4.103-1 of
RR No. 7-95.

The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It pronounced that the BIR Commissioner cannot validly
change his theory of the case on appeal, the MPC is not a public utility within the contemplation of law,
the sale of MPC of its generated power to NAPOCOR is subject to VAT at zero percent rate and the MPC
as VAT registered tax payer may apply for tax credit. The BIR Commissioner appealed the case on the
ground that the CA committed reversible error in affirming the decision of the CTA holding MPC entitled
to the refund.

Issue:

Whether or not there is sufficient cause to warrant relaxation of technical or procedural rules in the
instant case.

Ruling:

No, the Court held that there is no sufficient cause to warrant the relaxation of technical procedural
rules in the instant case. The general rules of procedures still apply and the BIR Commissioner cannot be
allowed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. The BIR Commissioner apparently forgets that
there are specific reasons why technical or procedural rules are imposed upon the courts, and that
compliance with these rules, should still be the general course of action. Procedural rules should be
treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the
Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." The adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a
case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances
wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation
and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules
or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of
justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is
discretionary upon the courts.

XIV.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA vs. HON. JUDGE LOBRIGO

G.R. 226679, AUGUST 15, 2017

Facts:
Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for having illegally have in his possession 0.084 gram of shabu. Under Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165, plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases. On June 15, 2016, he filed a Motion
to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea-Bargaining Agreement, pleading guilty to the lesser crime of
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165. The trial court dismissed his
motion, citing Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which specifically forbids plea bargaining in drug cases.
Estipona lodged a Motion for Reconsideration, but the trial court dismissed it. He filed a petition with
the Supreme Court to make Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 unconstitutional, arguing that it encroaches on the
Supreme Court's rule-making authority and thus violates the equal protection clause. The petition was
rejected by the Solicitor General on the grounds that (1) Congress was not impleaded, (2) the law's
constitutionality could not be attached collaterally, (3) the correct course of action could have been a
petition for relief before the RTC, and (4) the petition would not meet the requirements for judicial
review.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the equal rights clause
because other criminals, such as rapists and killers, are permitted to plea deal while drug offenders are
not, despite the fact that rape and murder are more egregious crimes than drug offenses. Second, by
encroaching on the Supreme Court's rule-making authority under the constitution, it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole
prerogative of the Supreme Court.

As a result, our Constitutions have consistently vested this authority in this Court, enhancing its
independence. The power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure was granted under the 1935 Constitution, but it tended to coexist with legislative power
because it was subject to Congress's power to repeal, change, or supplement it. Although Congress has
the power to describe, administer, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, this Court has
exclusive authority to promulgate rules governing the defense and compliance of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.

XV.

SM LAND INC., vs. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 197151, OCTOBER 22, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners and their sister companies paid the additional taxes under protest. Subsequently, petitioners
and their sister companies claimed with herein respondent City Treasurer of Manila a credit or refund of
the increased business taxes which they paid for the period abovementioned. However, the City
Treasurer denied their claim.

Aggrieved, petitioners and their sister companies filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City a
Complaint for Refund and/or Issuance of Tax Credit of Taxes Illegally Collected. The RTC rendered a
summary judgment in favor of herein petitioners, directing the defendants to grant a refund/tax credit.
The RTC held that Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011, which were the bases of the City of Manila in
imposing the assailed additional business taxes on petitioners and their co-plaintiffs, had already been
declared null and void by this Court in the case of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila.
On this ground, the RTC ruled those respondents cannot use the assailed Ordinances in imposing
additional taxes on petitioners and their co-plaintiffs. Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the
RTC denied it in its Order. After the CTA granted their request for extension of time, herein respondents
filed a petition for review with the tax court. The case was raffled to the Second Division of the said
court.

Second Division rendered its Decision ruling of the RTC that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 are null and
void. The CTA Second Division, nonetheless, held that herein petitioners' claims for tax refund should be
denied because of their failure to comply with the provisions of the Rules of Court requiring verification
and submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping.

The CTA Second Division noted that petitioners failed to attach to the complaint filed with the RTC their
respective Secretary's Certificates authorizing their supposed representative, a certain Atty. Rex Enrico
V. Cruz III, to file the said complaint in their behalf. The CTA also observed that in the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint, petitioner SM Land, Inc. was not
included in the list of corporations represented by the person who executed the said Verification and
Certification. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Attached to the said Motion was the
Verification and Certification executed by Atty. Cruz as the representative of petitioner SM Land, Inc.
Also attached were petitioners' Secretary's Certificates authorizing Atty. Cruz as their representative.
The CTA Second Division, however, denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its Resolutiondated
September 30, 2009.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc, contending that the CTA Second
Division committed error in denying herein petitioners' claim for tax refund on the ground that they
violated the rules on verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The CTA En Banc affirmed in
toto the judgment of the CTA Second Division.

Issue:

Whether or not there are compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the rules requiring verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.

Ruling:

Yes, according to supreme court that it must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the
certification of non-forum shopping is mandatory nonetheless, thus, defeat the objective of preventing
the undesirable practice of forum shopping and the rules of procedure are established to secure
substantial justice, these may be liberally construed.

The court has held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against
forum shopping the court may still proceed to decide the case on the merits, pursuant to its inherent
power to suspend its own rules on grounds, as stated of substantial justice and apparent merit of the
case.

XVI.

PINGA vs. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 170354; JUNE 30, 2006

Facts:

The heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago, filed an injunction against Petitioner
Eduardo Pinga allegedly for unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and
bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. As a counterclaim, the petitioner disputed the
respondents’ ownership of the properties in question, asserting that his father, Edmundo Pinga, from
whom defendants derived their interest in the properties, had been in possession thereof since the
1930s. They alleged that as far back as 1968, respondents had already been ordered ejected from the
properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga. The petitioners,
however, failed to attend the hearings. They also failed to present their evidence and failed to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time. On that ground, the Regional Trial Court ordered
the dismissal of said case, but allowed the petitioners “to present their evidence ex-parte.”

Meanwhile, the heirs of respondent Santiago filed a Motion for Reconsideration not to reinstate the
case but to ask for the entire action to be dismissed. They also asked the RTC not to allow the
petitioners “to present their evidence ex-parte.” The respondents claimed that the order of the RTC
allowing petitioner to present evidence ex-parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence citing
particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and Domingo v. Santos, which noted those instances in which a
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent adjudication, as provided for in Rule 17 Section
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that, “if for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
his presentation of his evidence, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the light of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action”.

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal of the original complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaim.

Ruling:

No. the Court held that the above-cited provision has an extended judicial interpretation that the
dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of
the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice
to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim. This doctrine that the complaint may not be
dismissed if the counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not available to, and was not
intended for the benefit of a plaintiff who prevents or delays the prosecution of his own complaint.

The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure necessarily carries
the power to overturn judicial precedents, as above-cited by the respondents, on points of remedial law
through the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such
dismissal is “without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
or in a separate action.” The innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence holding that
the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as well of the compulsory
counterclaim. Thus, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential rule cited the respondents can
no longer stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
XVII.

LADAGA vs. MAPAGU

GR No. 189689, NOVEMBER 13, 2012

Facts:

The case is made up of consolidated petitions for review of the issued orders by the RTC of Davao City.
Petitioners were included in an Order of Battle (OB) List by the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division
supposedly connected to the New People's Army (NPA) from a PowerPoint Presentation. The petitioners
denied their affiliation with the NPA and alleged that the OB List is really a military hit-list as  allegedly
shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of  extrajudicial killing whose violent
deaths can be linked directly to the OB List. Petitioners then separately filed before the RTC a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the RTC Davao. Respondents commenting on the petitions,
argue that the list could not have come from the military because it does not have distinctive marks and
security classifications of military documents. RTC however, denied their petition stating that petitioners
failed to prove by substantial evidence the perceived threat to their lives, hence the petition before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence to
warrant the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Ruling:

No, the alleged threat to herein petitioners’ rights to life, liberty and security must be actual, and not
merely one of supposition or with the likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence adduced
establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a potential one, then, it goes without saying that the
threshold requirement of substantial evidence in amparo proceedings has also been met. Thus, in the
words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be established
from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
is as real a threat as that which brought ultimate harm to victims Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr.
Rogelio Peñera without corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the suspicious
deaths of these three people were, in fact, on account of their militant affiliations or that their violent
fates had been actually planned out by the military through its Order of Battle. The Court may be more
yielding to the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence and logical inferences, but substantial evidence
is still the rule to warrant a finding that the State has violated, is violating, or is threatening to
violate, amparo petitioners' right to life, liberty or security. No substantial evidence of an actual threat
to petitioners' life, liberty and security has been shown to exist in this case.  For, even if the existence of
the OB List or, indeed, the inclusion of petitioners' names therein, can be properly inferred from the
totality of the evidence presented, still, no link has been sufficiently established to relate the subject OB
List either to the threatening visits received by petitioners from unknown men or to the violent deaths
of the three (3) mentioned personalities and other known activists, which could strongly suggest that, by
some identifiable pattern of military involvement, the inclusion of one's name in an Order of Battle
would eventually result to enforced disappearance and murder of those persons tagged therein as
militants.
XVIII.

BP OIL AND CHEMICALS INTERNATIONALS PHILIPPINES INC. vs. TOATAL DISTRIBUTION AND LOGISTIC
SYSTEM INC.

G.R. No. 214406, FEBRUARY 6, 2017

Facts:

Defendant TDLSI has entered into an Agency Agreement with the petitioner BP Oil Singapore on Sept 30,
1997 to be its exclusive agent for the sale and distribution of all BP industrial lubricants in the Philippines
for a period 5 years from 1997 to 2002. A supplemental agreement was executed between the parties
wherein TDLSI shall deposit all proceeds of the sale it made to the account of BP Oil. Thus, on April 27,
1998, BP Singapore assigned its rights to TDLSI effective March 1, 1998. On its 1 st year of the agreement,
TDLSI failed to meet target volume of sales that was agreed upon. Thus, BP Oil informed defendant that
it will appoint other distributor to sell the company’s lubricant products in the Philippines. TDLSI did not
object to the plan but demanded for P10,000 as compensation for the expenses it incurred which was
opposed by the petitioner BP. It also demanded the payment of P40 Million in damages and announced
that it was withholding remittance of the sales until it was paid by the plaintiff.

BP Oil issued a letter notice that it will terminate the Agency Agreement unless it rectified the breaches
it committed within a period of 30 days. It also demanded payment of TDLSI outstanding obligations and
return the unsold stock in its possession. After it did not hear from the defendant, BP issued a formal
notice of termination on Oct 11, 1999. It was then that they found out that TDLSI filed a request for
arbitration with the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI). On Oct 9, 2000, BP Oil reiterated
its demand for payment of unremitted collections and all lubricant products in its possession. It was only
in April 30, 2001 that defendant made its answer through its Chief Finance Officer Miguel de Asis
admitting that they had in their possession collections against sales in the amount of P27,261,305.75,
receivables in the amount of P8,767,656.26 and stocks valued at P1,155,000.00. BP Oil filed the instant
complaint for collection against the defendant which initially filed its motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action pending the arbitration proceeding.

The RTC denied defendant’s motion to dismiss & reconsideration for lack of merit in favor of BP Oil
money claims. TDLSI questions RTC’s decision before the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC. It ruled that the admission made by respondent in Exhibit J that it was withholding money,
receivables and stocks from petitioner, has no evidenciary weight, thus, petitioner was not able to
preponderantly establish its claim.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that TDLSI has made a judicial admission that it has
possession of the stocks, moneys and receivables that BP is seeking to recover.
2. Whether or not the CA seriously erred in not ruling that with or without Exhibit J, BP Oil has met the
quantum of proof required by law to prove its claim.

Ruling:

1.

No, the purported April 30, 2001 letter is not an actionable document per se.  The present complaint is
an action for collection of sums of money arising from the termination of the Agency Agreement
between the parties. Plaintiff-appellee’s cause of action is primarily based on the alleged non-payment
of outstanding debts of defendant-appellant as well as the unremitted collections/payments and unsold
stocks, despite demand. In other words, plaintiff-appellee’s cause of action is not based solely on the
April 30, 2001 letter allegedly stating the “present value of stocks, collections and accounts receivables”
of defendant-appellant. Clearly, said document is not an actionable document contemplated in Section
7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court but is merely evidentiary in nature. As such, there was no need for
defendant-appellant to deny its genuineness and due execution under oath. We thus cannot sustain
plaintiff-appellee’ s contention that the aforesaid Exhibit “J” amounted to a judicial admission because
it’s due execution and authenticity was never denied under oath by defendant appellant.

Verily, an admission is any statement of fact made by a party against its interest or unfavorable to the
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. To be admissible, an
admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be
knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be
self-serving and inadmissible.

2.

Yes, the Court held that to the mind of the Court, Exh J is not an actionable document but is an evidence
that may be admissible, hence need not be denied under oath.

Under Sec 7 and 8 of the Rules of Court, a document is actionable when an action or defense is
grounded upon such written instrument or document. The complaint filed by petitioner is an action for
collection of sums of money arising from the termination of the Agency Agreement with TDLSI. Thus, its
cause of action is not based solely on the April 30, 2001 letter allegedly stating the “present value of
stocks, collections and accounts receivables” of TDLSI. Noteworthy is the denial of respondent TDLSI’ s
Demurrer to Evidence by the RTC because it clearly discussed petitioner’s cause of action and the
sufficiency of the evidence it presented, and the Court is convinced to DENY the demurrer. The record
shows that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that will preponderantly establish its claim against
the defendant. It contains pertinent facts and such evidence will prove that the plaintiff has a cause of
action against the defendant. 

The Court is of the view that the better way to weigh and decide this case based on merits is for the
defendant to present its own evidence to refute the plaintiff’s allegations. It is better that the defendant
be given a day in court to prove its defenses in a full-blown trial. The Court cannot just dismiss the case
on the ground that upon the facts and law presented by the plaintiff it was not able to show a right to
relief when in fact the evidence presented, testimonial and documentary, show otherwise and its claim
appears to be meritorious.

To ensure that justice would be served and that the case be decided on its real merits upon a careful
review and appreciation of facts and evidence presented it would be best that defendant should instead
present its own defenses in a formal trial and not just to dismiss the case allegedly in the absence of
clear proof that plaintiff has no right to the reliefs prayed for. Moreover, the Court noted that this case
has been prolonged for so long and this Court can no longer allow any more delay to this case.

Upon close analysis, therefore, this Court is inclined to believe the findings of the RTC that petitioner
was able to prove its case by a preponderance of evidence and that respondent failed to disprove
petitioner's claim. As such, the CA gravely erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.

Art 2212 of the Civil Code provides that when the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment
of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of
Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
XIX.

DE LIMA vs. GUERRERO

G.R. NO. 229781, OCTOBER 10, 2017

Facts:

After multiple congressional inquiries into the proliferation of drugs inside the bilibid jail, the DOJ filed
criminal charges against Senator De Lima. Judge Guerrero of Muntinlupa released an arrest warrant for
Senator De Lima based on the facts submitted by the DOJ and the complaint affidavits.

The senator then filed a motion to quash the warrant, and while waiting for the motion to be heard, she
also filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, charging that the warrant was issued with gross misuse
of discretion.

On December 2, 2016, the DOJ Panel held a preliminary hearing at which the complainant, through her
counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion. The complainant stated that the Office of the Ombudsman has
exclusive authority and jurisdiction over the four allegations leveled against her. Further, alleging
evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors
should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.

OSG argued that the petition should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy. Furthermore, the OSG stated that the complainant disregarded the court
hierarchy and broke the law against forum shopping. The OSG filed a Manifestation on March 13, 2017,
alleging that petitioner falsified the jurats on the following pages of her petition: (1) Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against forum shopping.

Ruling:

De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, as well as the Affidavit of
Merit, in front of a notary public. This is in contrast to Atty. Tresvalles-jurats Cabalo's notary public
certifications at the end of the instruments, which state that the records were "SUBSCRIBED AND
SWORN to before me."

Although there is precedent to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary
value of a document to that of a private document, requiring proof of its proper execution and validity
to be admissible as evidence," this cannot be used to determine compliance with Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 require that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition must be verified
and accompanied by a "sworn certificate of non-forum shopping."

When petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping in the
presence of the notary, she also failed to properly swear under oath the contents of the document,
making the jurats false and null, and the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping invalid.
The requirement for forum shopping certification is founded on the premise that a party-litigant should
not be permitted to seek concurrent remedies. The essential goals behind these conditions can't just be
ignored unless there's a compelling reason for them to be relaxed.

This Court had reminded parties seeking certiorari's ultimate relief to follow the law, since failure to do
so cannot be dismissed as a "mere technicality." Procedural laws should not be dismissed or ignored
because they ensure that justice is administered in a timely and orderly manner.

XX.

AUDI AG VS.HON. JULES MEJIA

Facts:

Petitioner, is a non-resident foreign company engaged in the manufacture of "Audi" brand cars. It is not
licensed to do business in the Philippines but is suing on an isolated transaction. Auto Prominence
Corporation and Proton Pilipinas Corporation, respondents, are corporations duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws engaged in the business of assembling, buying, selling, distributing, importing,
marketing, and servicing of motor vehicles.

Proton filed a complaint against Audi Ag for specific performance and injunction with application for a
temporary restraining order for terminating the assembly and the distributorship agreements between
them. The respondent Judge Mejia grant the TRO for 20 days from terminating the contracts executed
by the parties and directing it or any person claiming rights under it, to maintain the status quo ante.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition be dismissed.

RULING:

Yes, petition, has ignored the established rule on hierarchy of courts. It must be stressed that the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. The
rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of appeals. Such rule is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court's precious time and attention which are better devoted to matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Thus,
petitioner should have filed with the Court of Appeals its petition, not directly with this Court. While
such rule may be relaxed for special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the
petition, however, in the instant case, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.

Once again, we stress that the rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules
in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective
law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they
help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in
the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance
by the parties of the procedural rules.

XXI.

DELOS REYES vs. PEOPLE;

G.R. No. 138297, JANUARY 27, 2006

Facts:

On August, September and October 1996 in Brgy. Imok, Calauan, Laguna, petitioners Desiderio Delos
Reyes, Myrna Villanueva, and several others, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut
down and processed more or less four hundred forty (440) coconut trees without the required permit to
cut from the Philippine Coconut Authority in gross violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8048 or
the Coconut Preservation Act of 1995. A case was filed against them with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Calauan, Laguna by the Philippine Coconut Authority, which the MTC ordered the petitioners
to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from notice. However, instead of submitting their
counter-affidavits, the petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the MTC denied on
the ground that in cases cognizable by the MTCs, an accused is not entitled to a preliminary
investigation. The petitioners then filed a Motion to Quash the complaint on the ground that the
allegations therein do not constitute an offense. The MTC again issued an Order denying the motion
and requiring them anew to file their counter-affidavits within five (5) days from notice. The petitioners
then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 2494-97-C. They alleged that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied their Motion to Quash.

The RTC, however, dismissed the petition and ruled that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion
considering that the allegations in the complaint, if hypothetically admitted, are sufficient to constitute
the elements of the offense. A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by the petitioners but
was again denied by the RTC. The petitioners then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but the
latter affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied as well the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the MTC did
not gravely abuse its discretion

Ruling:

No, the Court held that what the petitioners should have done was to seasonably file with this Court an
appeal via a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. As can be gleaned from the material facts of the case, what the petitioners filed with this
Court is the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules, wherein, time and again, the Court
holds that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

Even assuming that the instant petition is in order, the Court held that it has to dismiss the same since
the petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. The Court said that they should
have filed their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, as pursuant to Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue, among others, a
writ of certiorari.

Also, even on the merits of the case, the Court held that this petition is vulnerable to dismissal. It is a
dictum that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari, but for
petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom is
the next legal step.
XXII.

COMELEC ET.AL. vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA, PHOTOKINA

G.R. No. 151992, SEPTEMBER 18, 2002

Facts:

Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKiNA) was the declared the winning bidder as the supplier and
installation of information technology equipment for the Voter's Registration and Identification System
(VRIS) Project. The project aimed to envision a computerized database system for the May 2004
Elections pursuant to RA. 8189 or the Voter's Registration Act of 1996. However, then COMELEC
Chairman Harriet Demetriou expressed her objections to the contract due to the funds appropriated to
the COMELEC not matching PHOTOKINA's bid. Because of this PHOTOKINA requested the COMELEC
several for the formal execution of the contract but to no avail. The successor of Chairman Demetriou,
Chairman Alfredo Benipayo then announced that the VRIS Project has been scrapped emphasizing his
intention to replace it. Sen. Edgardo Angara likewise directed the creation of a technical working group
to assist the COMELEC in its modernization program which will just consider the PHOTOKINA contract as
an alternative program for the purpose.

Unsatisfied with the turn of events PHOTOKINA filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages
against COMELEC and its Commissioners before the RTC Quezon City. Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of
the RTC then issued a decision to immediately resume negotiations to formalize the execution of the
contract with PHOTOKINA for the VRIS Project. Petitioners filed an instant petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court praying for the RTC's decision to be nullified. Respondents then filed a Comment
with Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition violates the hierarchy of courts.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of instant petition by petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts?

Ruling:

No, Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is not an iron-
clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of
serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination
of the case. The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to
government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this case,
involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our country’s election process, a
project that has long been overdue

XXIII.

UNITED CLAIMANTS’ ASSOCIATION OF NEA vs. NANITIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

GR No. 187107, JANUARY 31, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their employment with the
implementation of the assailed resolutions. Respondent NEA is a GOCC created in accordance with PD
269 issued in Aug 1973. Sec 5 and 5a empowers NEA Board to organize and reorganize its staffing
structure, fix salaries of personnel and define their powers and duties. On June 26, 2001, RA 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted. It imposed upon NEA the promotion of
the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification. Sec 3 provides for the
restructuring of the electric power industry to include privatization of the assets of NPC. Sec 77 the DOE
was tasked to promulgate the IRR which was issued on Feb 27, 2002. Sec 3b(ii) of said IRR declared all
NEA employees and officers terminated and 965 plantilla positions vacant. Thereafter, President GMA
issued EO 119 directing NEA Board to submit its reorganization plan. In compliance, NEA Board issued
Resolutions No. 46 which provided incentive to those who will avail the early retirement program and
No. 59 which terminated employees effective Dec. 31, 2003. UCAN filed a petition before the Supreme
Court on the grounds that: NEA Board has no power to terminate all its employees, EO 119 did not grant
the NEA Board the power to terminate all employees, and Resolutions Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out
in bad Faith. However, respondent NEA argued that the SC has no jurisdiction over the petition, the
injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions have long been implemented, and
the assailed Resolution were done in good faith. According NEA, petitioners violated the principle of
hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC first
rather than with this Court directly.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition should be filed before the RTC and not the Supreme Court in accordance
with the principle of hierarchy of Courts.

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.

XXIV.

EMMANUEL DE CASTRO vs. EMERSON CARLOS

GR No. 194994, APRIL 16, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner De Castro filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto seeking to oust
Respondent Carlos from the position of assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the MMDA.
Then president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed De Castro as AGMO. His appointment was then
concurred by the members of the MMDA through a resolution and he took oath before then
Chairperson Bayani Fernando. Meanwhile, a memorandum was issued by the Office of the President
which states that all non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive
Service (CES)positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and continue to
perform their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations
have been accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated,
whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime.

De Castro was reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office after a year. Following that, based on
the Memorandum, Chairperson Francis Tolentino appointed Carlos as OIC of the Office of AGMO. De
Castro's name was then removed from the MMDA payroll. De Castro then sought clarification from the
Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper classification of the AGMO position. Executive
Director Allones stated that said position had not yet been classified and could not be considered as
belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). In conclusion, she said that OP Memorandum Circular
did not apply to him. The petitioner was then offered a different job as an MMDA consultant, which he
declined, saying it was a rank reduction. He then requested that his pension be paid and that he be
reinstated. After failing to receive a response from MMDA, he filed a formal request for reinstatement
with the President's Office. President Aquino, on the other hand, appointed Carlos as the new AGMO. As
a result, this petition has been established.

Issue:

Whether or not a direct recourse to the Supreme Court is proper.

Ruling:

No, the urgent demands of public interest, according to the petitioner, warrant a direct appeal to this
Court, especially the veritable need for civil service stability and protection of civil servants' rights.
Furthermore, given that the President of the Philippines is the sole appointing authority, petitioner
doubts that a trial court judge or an appellate court justice with a chance of advancement in the
judiciary will oppose a presidential nomination.

Despite the fact that Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly states that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus petitions, this Court's jurisdiction is not exclusive; rather, it is concurrent with that of the
Court of Appeals and regional trial courts, and does not grant petitioners unlimited freedom of choice.

The judicial system's hierarchy must be strictly adhered to. "The Supreme Court is a court of last resort
and must remain so if it is to satisfactorily exercise the duties given to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial practice," the rule states. In most cases, a petition is dismissed outright if the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is violated.

XXV.

UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATIONS OF NEA vs. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

GR No. 187107, January 31, 2012

Facts:
Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their employment with the
implementation of the assailed resolutions. Respondent NEA is a GOCC created in accordance with PD
269 issued in Aug 1973. Sec 5 and 5a empowers NEA Board to organize and reorganize its staffing
structure, fix salaries of personnel and define their powers and duties. On June 26, 2001, RA 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted. It imposed upon NEA the promotion of
the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification. Sec 3 provides for the
restructuring of the electric power industry to include privatization of the assets of NPC. Sec 77 the DOE
was tasked to promulgate the IRR which was issued on Feb 27, 2002. Sec 3b(ii) of said IRR declared all
NEA employees and officers terminated and 965 plantilla positions vacant. Thereafter, President GMA
issued EO 119 directing NEA Board to submit its reorganization plan. In compliance, NEA Board issued
Resolutions No. 46 which provided incentive to those who will avail the early retirement program and
No. 59 which terminated employees effective Dec. 31, 2003. UCAN filed a petition before the Supreme
Court on the grounds that: NEA Board has no power to terminate all its employees, EO 119 did not grant
the NEA Board the power to terminate all employees, and Resolutions Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out
in bad Faith. However, respondent NEA argued that the SC has no jurisdiction over the petition, the
injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions have long been implemented, and
the assailed Resolution were done in good faith. According NEA, petitioners violated the principle of
hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC first
rather than with this Court directly.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition should be filed before the RTC and not the Supreme Court in accordance
with the principle of hierarchy of Courts.

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.

XXVI.

SINTER CORP. VS. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO.

Facts:

On January 21, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform Policy for
the power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum. Pursuant to such Cabinet Memorandum,
respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise to
distribute electric power to the municipalities of Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of
Cagayan de Oro, all of the province of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a
petition entitled "In Re: Petition for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector." The
petition sought the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power
Corporation (NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area. The ERB rendered a decision
granting the petition. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied. Thereafter,
NAPOCOR filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. On a
petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Judgment was entered, thus rendering final the decision of the ERB. To implement the decision,
CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC), petitioner, and advised the latter of its desire "to
have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC (NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred"
to CEPALCO.

PSC is an entity operating its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. PSC refused CEPALCO's
request, citing its contract for power supply with NAPOCOR. To restrain the execution of the ERB
Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:

Whether injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the ERB.

Ruling:

No, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that
facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in
the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier
narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly
disregard the rule on finality of judgments.

Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a review of its
decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an
appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it
means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and
logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court, being coequal with the ERB, cannot
interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial
courts with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of
justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or
vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

XXVII.

OMICTIN VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No.148004; JANUARY 22, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for
two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati against private respondent George
I. Lagos. He alleged that private respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two
company vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag. On February 26, 1999, public
prosecutor Alex G. Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of private respondent, and on the same
day, respondent was charged with the crime of estafa. On June 4, 1999, private respondent filed a
motion to recuse praying that Presiding Judge Reinato G. Quilala inhibit himself from hearing the case.
However, in an order dated May 28, 1999, the presiding judge summarily denied respondent’s motion
to defer issuance of the warrant of arrest and ordered reinvestigation. On June 24, 1999, private
respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a
pending petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties. It
appears that on January 7, 1999, private respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the declaration of
nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner Omictin as President Ad Interim and
Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of dividends, recovery of share in the
profits, involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, recovery of damages and an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction against Saag, Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo,
Tan and petitioner Omictin.

The RTC denied respondent’s motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse. Hence, the
respondent filed with the CA the petition for certiorari assailing the aforesaid orders. The CA,
meanwhile, rendered its challenged decision that in a case for estafa, a valid demand made by an
offended party is one of the essential elements. It appears from the records that the delay of delivery of
the motor vehicles by the respondent to Saag Corporation is by reason of his contention that the
demand made by petitioner Omictin and Atty. Tan to him to return the subject vehicles is not a valid
demand.

Issue:

Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the resolution of the intra-corporate controversy that was originally filed with the SEC

Ruling:

Yes, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues raised by petitioner
particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the question regarding his
supposed authority to make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the
determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case is the RTC of
Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have been referred to the expertise of the SEC in
accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not been transferred to the RTC of
Mandaluyong.

Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining
technical and intricate matters of fact.

However, while the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the Court believes
that the circumstances in the instant case do not proscribe the application of the doctrine, as the role of
an administrative tribunal such as the SEC in determining technical and intricate matters of special
competence has been taken on by specially designated RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799. Hence,
the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary jurisdiction to
determine the issues under contention relating to the status of the domestic corporation, Saag Phils.,
Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation.

On the criminal case, meanwhile, which in this case the respondent was also charged with a crime of
estafa, the law recognizes that in place of the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal competence to
decide intra-corporate disputes.
XXVIII.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY

G.R. No. 158253. MARCH 2, 2007

Facts:

Carwin Construction, the respondents were awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio Bahay Pare
by the DPWH. They have finished their work which the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando,
Pampanga certified upon inspection. However, the DPWH withheld their payment after COA
disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the respondents license had expired at the
time of the Execution of the Contract.

DPWH sought the advice of their Legal Department. The Legal Department opined that RA. No. 4566 or
the Contractor's License Law does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired
is void and therefore recommended that payment should be made to respondents. Despite such
recommendation no payment was made to the respondents.

Respondents filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages before the RTC while petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint sates no cause of action and that RTC had
no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA. The RTC held
that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has completed the project. Dissatisfied
petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA then likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC, hence this
present petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the COA has the primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent money claims against the
government?

Ruling:

No, while it is undisputed that the COA disapproved respondent's claim against the Government;
however, under Sec. 48 of PD. No. 1445, the administrative remedy available to respondent is an appeal
of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor to the COA itself. The Court holds in view of the
exceptions applied in this the case that the complaint for specific performance and damages was not
prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

XXIX.

GABRIEL ABAD, ABREIL ABAD, PIO AGANON, MARIO ALARCIO, JOSE AQUINO, CESAR AURELIO,
SOTERO BERNARDO, AURELIO CABRAL, JESUS CARREON, ABELARDO CARILLO ET.AL. vs RTC OF
MANILA BRANCH LII – HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN AND PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY INC.

GR No. L-65505, OCTOBER 12, 1987

 Facts:

On Aug 18, 1978, petitioners filed an instant petition for certiorari against private respondent
PHILAMGEN for an enforcement of contract and recovery of loss of money. Petitioners are demanding
payment money value of their respective accumulated sick leave with pay of the employees separated
to the company either thru retirement, retrenchment or resignation. Instead of filing an answer to said
complaint, PHILAMGEN moved for the dismissal of complaint which was granted by the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court which set aside the orders of the respondent court and
reinstated the complaint filed by petitioners and directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings
for the disposition of said Civil Case. Unfortunately, fire destroyed the sala wherein the entire records of
the case were kept. Records of case were reconstituted on Jan 21, 1982 and the case was renumbered.
Thereafter, PHILAMGEN filed its answer to the complaint. However, on January, 1983, judicial
reorganization took place by the passage of EO No. 864 and the case at bar was re-raffled to respondent
RTC of Manila, which was presided over by Judge David G. Nitafan. The RTC motu proprio, dismissed the
complaint in Civil Case No. 82-1324, declaring that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject made being
money claims arising from employer-employee relations.

RTC Judge Nitafan ruled that the jurisdictional issue decided and settled in G.R. No. 50563 cannot be
considered as the law of the case insofar as this proceeding now pending before this Court. What was
there put to rest was the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Sec 1 of EO 864 provides that the
Courts of First Instance shall be deemed automatically abolished upon the constitution and organization
of the courts provided in BP Big, 129 as of 12:00 midnight of Jan 17, 1983, which re-raffled a sentence in
Section 44 of said Act. With the abolition of the said court, which has jurisdiction over the case, the
jurisdiction of said court was abolished with it. It said, the postulate that once jurisdiction is acquired by
a court, the same lasts until the termination of the case, does not apply to this case because it was the
court itself which acquired initial jurisdiction that was abolished so that there is no more court to
continue exercising such initially acquired jurisdiction. Thus petitioners moved to the SC on the
assignment of errors committed by the Manila RTC Judge.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the respondent RTC erred in reversing motu proprio SC’s decision by dismissing their
action for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the RTC erred in holding itself a totally different court from the Court of First Instance
whose cases were merely taken over by it.

Ruling:

1.

No, the Court held that insofar as the reorganized courts vested with general jurisdiction, BP Blg. 129
was and still in the controlling law. When it comes to labor-related actions, such as the one at bar, initial
jurisdiction is vested on the National Labor Relations Commissions and the Labor Arbiters for the
expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes.

As provided for under Art 217 the Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide within 30 working days after subrogated of the case by the parties for decision, the following
cases: l) Unfair labor practice cases; 2) those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment; 3) All money claims of workers, including those based on
non-payment or underscored of wages, purchases compensation, separation pay and other benefits
provided by law or appropriate agreement. Except claims for employee’s compensation, social security,
medicare and maternity benefits; 4) Cases involving household services; and 5) Cases arising from any
violation of article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.

The above provision was in force on Jan 17, 1983 when the judicial reorganization took place. So, there
could have been no doubt in the legislative mind at the time that jurisdiction over labor-related claims
was being initially vested, not to the courts but to administrative machineries. And what is most
important is that the administrative jurisdiction vested by the law upon the Labor Arbiters is "original
and exclusive."

Administrative regulation cannot be interpreted to have the effect of modifying or abrogating

substantive provisions of laws on jurisdiction because by express mandate of the Constitution rule
making power of the Supreme Court is limited to procedural rules in which may not diminish, increase or
modify substantive laws. It was the intention of the legislative body to uncluttered the courts of cases
which may be adjudicated, in the first instance, by officials or bodies exercising quasi-judicial
adjudicatory powers like the Labor Arbiters or the NLRC a specialized body or bodies on labor related
provisions and are not restricted by the technical rules of pleading and evidence.

2.

No, the Court held that the RTC of today are actually the same courts that functioned as Courts of First
Instance before the Judiciary Reorganization Act (Batas Pambansa Bilang 129). There might have been a
change in the name and in some incidental features but essentially, they are the same. However,
whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers and employees appertained to Courts of First
Instance, the same are now to be taken cognizance of by proper entities in the Department of Labor and
Employment.

The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated does not apply when
the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. Thus in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in
holding that Courts of First Instance /RTC no longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid monetary claims of
labor.

XXX.

OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.

GR NO. 183035; JANUARY 9, 2013

Facts:

Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial spaces and buildings to its
tenants. Optima and Respondent Hertz entered into a Contract of Lease over an office unit and parking
slot in the Optima Building for a period of 3 years. However, the lease agreement was modified to
reduce the lease term from two years and five months to two years and five months. Despite the fact
that Optima granted the former's appeal, Hertz failed to pay its rentals from August to December 2005
and January to February 2006. It also defaulted on utility payments. Optima wrote to Hertz, informing
them that they must extend their contract through a new negotiation and written notice from the lessee
to the lessor at least 90 days before the lease period ends. Optima did not extend the lease because
Hertz failed to give written notice renewing its contract and expressing a willingness to negotiate.

MeTC - filed a complaint against Optima seeking specific performance, injunction, damages, and
monetary damages, as well as a TRO and preliminary injunction. It asked for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) to prevent Optima from disrupting its peaceful use and possession of the leased premises,
as well as a preliminary injunction to force Optima to reconnect its utilities. Hertz was ordered to
surrender and vacate the rented premises, as well as pay P420,967.28 in rental arrears, unpaid utility
bills, and other charges, according to Optima. Optima lodged an action in the MeTC for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages with a Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against Hertz due to Hertz's failure to vacate the leased premises.

The MeTC ruled in Optima's favor and ordered Hertz to vacate the premises.   The RTC upheld the
MeTC's decision. The CA overturned and set aside the RTC's decision, ruling that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over respondent's person due to excessive summons service. As a result, this petition for
review on Certiorari under Rule 45 has been filed.

Issue:

Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent won the
unlawful detainer case is barred by LITIS PENDENTIA.

Ruling:

Yes, Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by
the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In this case, the MeTC
acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance
in court. Despite the fact that the summons was served incorrectly, the defendant chose to file an
Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court. Furthermore, in its response with counterclaim, it never
mentioned the protection of inappropriate service of summons. Under the Civil Code, the expiry of the
period agreed upon by the parties is likewise a ground for judicial ejectment.

XXXI.

AFDAL VS. CARLOS

G.R. No. 173379, DECEMBER 1, 2010

Facts:

Respondent Romeo Carlos (respondent) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against
petitioners, Zenaida Guijabar (Guijabar), John Doe, Peter Doe, Juana Doe, and all persons claiming rights
under them before the MTC. Respondent alleged that petitioners, Guijabar, and all other persons
claiming rights under them were occupying, by mere tolerance, a parcel of land in respondent's name.
Respondent demanded that petitioners, Guijabar, and all persons claiming rights under them turn over
the property to him because he needed the property for his personal use. Respondent alleged that
petitioners refused to heed his demand and he was constrained to file a complaint before the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa (Lupon). According to respondent, petitioners ignored the notices and the Lupon issued
a "certificate to file action." Then, respondent filed the complaint before the MTC.

There were three attempts to serve the summons to the defendants. The first indorsement dated 14
January 2004 carried the annotation that it was "unsatisfied / given address cannot be located." The
second indorsement dated 3 February 2004 stated that the summons was "duly served as evidenced by
his signature of one Gary Acob (relative)." The last indorsement dated 18 February 2004 carried the
annotation that it was "duly served but refused to sign" without specifying to whom it was served.
Petitioners failed to file an answer. Hence, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for relief before the RTC. Petitioners pointed out that they never
received respondent's demand letter nor were they informed of, much less participated in, the
proceedings before the Lupon. Moreover, petitioners said they were not served a copy of the summons
and the complaint.
Issue:

Whether the MTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners.

Ruling:

No, An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam. In an action in
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court,
jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons. Service of summons upon
the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served
in person will substituted service be availed of.

In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt and personal service on petitioners was
rendered impossible. It failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. Likewise,
nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the case was it shown that Gary Acob, the
person on whom substituted service of summons was affected, was a person of suitable age and
discretion residing in petitioners' residence. In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons
and the complaint by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioners.

XXXII.

REGALADO VS DE LA PEÑA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 202448; DECEMBER 13, 2017

Facts:

Respondents namely, Emma dela Rama vda. Dela Peña, Jesusa dela Peña, Johnny dela Peña, Johanna
dela Peña, Jose dela Peña, Jessica dela Peña, and Jaime Antonio dela Peña are registered owners of two
parcels of land with an area of 44 hectares located in Murcia, Negros Occidental. Allegedly, in 1974,
petitioner Joseph O. Regalado, without consent, entered the property and took possession of the sugar
canes. Upon failure of the verbal demand and the barangay conciliation, respondents filed for the
recovery of possession and damages against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod on
March 9, 1998. Meanwhile, petitioner contends that back in 1994, respondents already executed their
separate Waivers of Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights and interests over the subject
properties in favour of Jaime Antonio who, in turn, also subsequently waived all his right to him
(petitioner). Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case positing that based on the allegations in the complaint, the action
involved recovery of physical possession of the properties in dispute; that the complaint was filed within
one year from the date the parties had a confrontation before the barangay; and thus, the case was one
for Ejectment and must be filed with the proper Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled in favour of the respondents. It held that it has
jurisdiction over the case because the area of the subject properties was 44 hectares, more or less, and
“it is safe to presume that the value of the same is more than P20,000.00. Both parties appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but the latter, on May 28, 2012, affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case

Ruling:

No, in our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real property: 1)
ejectment (either for unlawful detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not
more than a year; 2) accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of real right of possession when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery
of ownership. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), the proper Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trail Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil action involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property does not
exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila). On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein in
case the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 (or (P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).

Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the assessed value of the
property. It follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real
property is a jurisdictional element to determine the court that can take cognizance of the action. As
such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments in
the complaint, and the law in force at the commencement of the action. This is because only the facts
alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action, and the court that
can take cognizance of the case.

The Court agrees with the petitioner that the case is an accion publiciana. However, it also ruled that
there was no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction
is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied, and must distinctly appear from the law. It
cannot also be vested upon a court by the agreement of the parties; or by the court’s erroneous belief
that it had jurisdiction over a case. The complaint by the respondents failed to specify the assessed
value of the subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC
has jurisdiction over respondents’ action. In the absence of any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be determined which court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the respondent’s Complaint. Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed
value, or even market value of the land. Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all proceedings before the
RTC, including its decision, are void.

XXXIII.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER

G.R. No. 200369. MARCH 1, 2017

Facts:

Union Bank filed a petition for cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) of a
property they own against agrarian reform beneficiaries before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The PARAD dismissed the petition for being premature because there
must be positive act from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary or his representative to
declare the disputed property as exempted from the coverage of the agrarian reform. On appeal to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) then same sustained the PARAD's Dismissal

Union Bank elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). In coming up with their decision, the CA
cited relevant jurisprudence ruling that for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in cases involving cancellation
of the CLOAs, there must be an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants who are recipients of
the CLOAs. The CA also found that the record is bereft of any evidence showing that the petitioner and
private respondents agrarian reform beneficiaries had tenancy relations. It also ruled that cancellation
of the CLOAs can only be affected after the DAR Secretary administratively declares that the land is
exempted or excluded from CARP coverage. Since the DAR Secretary was yet to make such
determination when Union Bank filed its petition with the PARAD, the PARAD correctly dismissed the
petition for being premature. The CA subsequently denied Union Bank’s motion for reconsideration,
hence the petition before the Supreme Court.

Before the Court, Union Bank posits that the DARAB is expressly granted quasi-judicial powers by EO No.
29. It posits that the DAR Secretary was effectively ousted from jurisdiction because the CLOAs were
issued upon his determination that the properties were subject to CARP and that the DARAB cannot
share jurisdiction with the DAR Secretary on the issue of the validity of the issuance of the CLOAs.41 In
response, private respondents argue that the classification and identification of landholdings for CARP
coverage, including petitions for lifting of such coverage, are lodged with the DAR Secretary.42 Hence,
the CA correctly upheld the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction over
petitions for cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award in the case.

Ruling:

No, Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. For the
PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be prima facie showing that there is
a tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties. The records clearly show that the
petitions filed by Union Bank with the PARAD did not involve agrarian disputes. Specifically, Union
Bank's petitions failed to sufficiently any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of
land. Thus, in the absence of a tenancy relationship between Union Bank and private respondents, the
PARAD/DARAB has no jurisdiction over the petitions for cancellation of the CLOAs. Union Bank's
postulate that there can be no shared jurisdiction is partially correct; however, the jurisdiction in this
case properly pertains to the DAR, to the exclusion of the DARAB.

XXXIV.

JONATHAN DEE vs. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE
LIMITED AND ALBERT HONG HIN KAY

GR Nos. 224834 & 224871, MARCH 15, 2017

Facts:

Respondents Harvest All Limited et al are minority shareholders of Alliance Select foods International,
Inc. with Hedy SC Yap Chua acting as a member of the Alliance’s Board of Directors. As per Alliance’s by-
laws, its Annual stockholders’ Meeting (ASM) is held every 15 th of June each year. However, on May 29,
2015, in a special board meeting of directors, the board passed a resolution indefinitely postponing
Alliance’s 2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of
shares with a total value of P1 Billion which was earlier approved in a Feb 2015 Resolution. The reason is
to give the stockholders better representation in the annual meeting following the completion of
subscription of the SRO. As such, Harvest All, et al. filed a complaint with application for the issuance of
writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and TRO involving an intra-corporate controversy against
Alliance and its board with the Pasig City RTC and declaration of nullity of the May 29, 2015 board
resolution. Subsequently, Harvest All, et al. filed an amended complaint praying that the Alliance be
enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition for the holding of the
2015 ASM.

The Alliance raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Harvest All, et al. failed to pay the
correct filing fees. It argued that the filing fees should be P20 Million, more or less, basing it from the
SRO which was valued at Php1 Billion. But Harvest All et al maintained that they paid the correct filing
fees of P8,860 since the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim on
value of the SRO and that they simply relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no
intention to defraud the government.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to pay the correct filing fees. On
appeal, the CA reinstated the case and remanded the same to the RTC for further proceedings after
payment of the proper legal fees. The CA, citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as amended by AM No.
04-2-04-SC and Lu, held that the prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies always involve a
property in litigation. Consequently, it agreed with the RTC's finding that the basis for the computation
of filing fees should have been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et al. should have
paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20 Million and not just ₱8,860.00. However, in the
absence of contrary evidence, the CA held that Harvest All, et al.  were not in bad faith and had no
intention of defrauding the government, as they merely relied in the assessment of the Clerk of Court.
The parties moved for reconsideration, which were however denied in the Resolution. Hence this
consolidated petitions.

Issue:

Whether or not the action filed by petitioner is incapable of pecuniary estimation hence the filing fee
should not be based on the amount of P1 Billion SRO.

Ruling:

Yes, this case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-corporate controversy may be classified as an
action whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A cursory perusal of Harvest All, et
al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that its main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015
ASM on the date set in the corporation's bylaws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully
materialize, so that their voting interest with the corporation would somehow be preserved. Thus,
Harvest All, et al. sought for the nullity of the Alliance Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which
indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM pending completion of subscription to the SR0.37
Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM
as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of
Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to
one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not claim ownership of,
or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was merely narrative
or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting interest as minority
shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end,
a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of Harvest
All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their principal action. Clearly
therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation

The Court said that in determining whether an action is one that subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by the Court of First Instance (now the RTC).

XXXV.

FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F. APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR AP

AREJADO, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT.
EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA
LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE ROM, Respondents.

G.R. No. 171855, OCTOBER 15, 2012

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the orders of the RTC of Masbate. The
respondents are members of the Philippine Army's Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion in Masbate.
The widows of Rapsing, Villanueva, and Aparejado, who were allegedly murdered by the respondents,
are the petitioners. Respondent said they obtained information about the existence of NPA partisans in
Masbate. They coordinated with the PNP and went to the location after receiving the information. They
came across armed elements there, which culminated in a fierce firefight. Following that, seven people
were identified as dead, including the petitioners' husbands. The petitioners argued that no
confrontation occurred. As a result, they demanded that the NBI investigate. The NBI recommended
that the prosecutor of Masbate conduct a preliminary investigation against the respondents for the
crime of multiple murder, based on the statements of witnesses who say that the military massacred
helpless and unarmed civilians.

Then, before the RTC Masbate issued a warrant of arrest for respondents, the AFP's Judge Advocate
General's Office filed an Omnibus Motion requesting that the case against respondents be transferred to
the military tribunal's jurisdiction, which was granted. Petitioners then sought reconsideration of the
order, but was denied by the RTC.

Issue:

Whether Judge Ables abused his discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting the transfer.

Ruling:

Yes, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by statute and decided by the
allegations of the lawsuit, according to procedural law. The essence of the action pleaded as appearing
in the lawsuit decides the court's jurisdiction. In this case, murder is a crime that falls under the RTC's
jurisdiction in this situation. Since the offense alleged does not fall under the definition of "service-
connected offenses or crimes," military tribunals are unable to hear the case.

The following is the complete text of Section 1 of R.A. 7055:

Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural
or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined
before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by
court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or
direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
courts.

As a result of the rules of the R.A. Since the offense with which respondents were charged is not
included in the enumeration of "service-connected offenses or crimes" as provided for in Section 1 of
Article 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over their case.

The law makes it clear that civil courts have authority over employees of the AFP who commit crimes or
offences protected by the RPC that are not service-related. When the statute is explicit and
unambiguous, it must be interpreted literally, and the court has no choice but to ensure that its
mandate is carried out. There is no room for interpretation, but only application. Hence, the RTC cannot
divest itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder.

XXXVI.

MENDOZA vs. GERONIMO

G.R. No. 165676, NOVEMBER 22, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry. After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed
a motion to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in
view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso in his answer.

Issue:

Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

No, it is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 25 the MTC shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Under Section 50 of R.A.
No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Based on the allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the
action in the MTC was for forcible entry. Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative
and/or special defense in his answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the
complaint. It continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had
jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

XXXVII.

ANTONINO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY

G.R. No. 185663; JUNE 20 2012

Facts:

Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino had been leasing a residential property located at
Makati City and owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su. Under the governing lease contract, Antonino
was accorded with the right of first refusal in the event Su would decide to sell the subject property. On
July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking Agreement where Su
agreed to sell to Antonino the subject property for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a disagreement
as to who between them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed
as intended. Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for
the reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages. The
complaint was raffled to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-802. Later that same day,
Antonino filed an amended complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel Su to sell to
her the subject property.

RTC dismissed Antonino’s complaint on the grounds of improper venue and non-payment of the
appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, Antonino’s complaint is one for specific performance,
damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should have been filed in the court of the
place where any of the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila, respectively,
thus Makati City is not the proper venue. Respondent Su filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the
cancellation of the notice of Lis Pendens, which Antonino caused to be annotated on the title covering
the subject property and the issuance of a summary judgment on his counterclaims. Su, among others,
alleged the propriety of cancelling the notice of Lis Pendens in view of the dismissal of the complaint
and Antonino’s failure to appeal therefrom. Antonino, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
claiming that her complaint is a real action and the location of the subject property is determinative of
its venue. Alternatively, she submitted a certification issued by the Commission on Elections, stating that
she is a resident of Makati City. She then prayed for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance of
an order directing the clerk of court to assess the proper docket fees. This was denied by the RTC
holding that there was non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Antonino
thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that there was due observance of the rules on
motions. In a Joint Resolution dated February 24, 2005, the RTC denied Su’s Omnibus Motion and
Antonino’s January 21, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, however, refused to cancel the
notice of Lis Pendens, holding that the Amended Complaint was anchored on two grounds, e.g. (1) for
improper venue and (2) for non-payment of docket fee. Because of this, Antonino said that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that her action for
the enforcement of the Undertaking Agreement is personal and when it deprived her of an opportunity
to pay the correct amount of docket fees. The RTC’s grave abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was
likewise exhibited by its strict application of the rules on motions and summary denial of her motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of Antonino’s complaint.

Ruling:

No, by anchoring her petition on the alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her
complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration, Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the
concept of “lack of jurisdiction”. As this Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. “G”
Holdings, Inc., “lack of jurisdiction” as a ground for the annulment of judgments pertains to lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not
contemplate “grave abuse of discretion” considering that “jurisdiction” is different from the exercise
thereof. As ruled in Tolentino v. Judge Leviste:

“Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where
there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in
the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise
of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.”

In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Antonino’s complaint. The RTC
was correct in classifying Antonino’s cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in
the wrong venue.

XXXVIII.

UNDURAN vs. ABERASTURI

G.R. No. 181284, OCTOBER 20, 2015

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the Talaandig tribe who claimed to have been living since birth on the land
located in Talakag, Bukidnon, which they inherited from their forefathers. Meanwhile respondents
claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land which
appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe. Respondents filed a Petition
for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction with Damages against a petition before the RTC . Petitioners filed their Answer,
alleging that respondents have no cause of action against them. On March 23, 2004, the rest of the
petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case and
instead refer the case to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

The RTC resolved to dismiss the motion for the cases' referral to the NCIP. Petitoners assailed the
decision to the CA. The appellate court held that the RTC correctly granted the amendment of the
complaint and properly refused to refer the case to the RHO (Regional Hearing Office)-NCIP. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the CA, hence the petition before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the land dispute instead of the NCIP.

Ruling:

Yes, a careful review of Section 66 shows that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) only when they arise between or among parties belonging
to the same ICC/IP. Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the
same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the
case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case,
while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral
domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and
decide this case. There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over
such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP.

With respect to unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IP groups and between ICCs/IPs
and non-IPs, petitioners theorize that they fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP pursuant to the
provisions of the IPRA. They cite the concurring opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that the
second and third parts of Section 66 of the law only provide for a condition precedent that is merely
procedural and does not limit the NCIP jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of ICC/IPs. They
contend that such interpretation is consistent with other provisions of the IPRA which lay out NCIP's
jurisdiction under Sections 46(g),62,69,7011 and 72of the IPRA.

XXXIX.

LAMSIS vs. DONG-E

GR No. 173021 October 20, 2010

Facts:

Margarita Semon Dong-e, the respondent in this case, filed a restraining order against the petitioners,
Delfin Lamsis and Agustin Kitma, over an untitled portion of an untitled parcel of land known as Lot No.
1, which measures 80,736 square meters. The property can be found on Km. 5 Asin Road is located in
Baguio City and is part of a larger land parcel measuring 186,090 square meters. Although petitioners
are the current tenants of Lot No. 1, respondent claims ownership of the property and seeks to reclaim
it from petitioners. Dong-E said that her family has owned and occupied Lot No. 1 since 1922, when her
late grandfather, Ap-ap, purchased it, and that her family has paid for the tax declaration since then, and
that when her father died, she paid for it sometime between 1976 and 1978. Lamsis and Agustin, for
their part, were satisfied that Lot No. 1 is public property claimed by Joaquin Smith's descendants (not
parties to the case). The Smiths granted Delfin and Agustin's parents’ permission to live on the property
in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well
as their respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents.

The trial court found in favor of respondent Dong-E in this case. The same was upheld by the Court of
Appeals. The petitioners in this case took the case to the Supreme Court, arguing for the first time that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the land is ancestral, and the initial and
exclusive jurisdiction over conflicts concerning ancestral lands and territories lies with the Supreme
Court under Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA).
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case such that the decision therein is a
complete nullity.

Ruling:

No, Laches is described as "failure or neglect, for an arbitrary and unexplained period of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, should or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the assumption that the party entitled to assert it
has either abandoned or declined to assert it."

IPRA was already in place at the time the respondent lodged the lawsuit. As a result, the petitioners may
have presented the defense of lack of jurisdiction at that time. It didn't do so, and it didn't include it in
its appeal to the appellate court. As a result, the Supreme Court rejected the petition and upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeals.

XL.

CORAZON JALBUENA DE LEON vs CA & ULDARICO INAYAN

GR No. 96107, JUNE 19, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Corazon is the daughter of Jesus Jalbuena who owns 2 parcels of irrigated riceland in
Barangays Guintas and Bingke, Napnod, Leganes, Iloilo. In 1970, Jesus entered into verbal lease contract
with respondent Uldarico Inayan, for one (1) year renewable for the same period. Inayan bound himself
to deliver 252 cavans of palay each year as rental to be paid during the 1 st 10 days of Jan. He was a
godson of Jesus and was allowed to continue with the lease from year to year. In 1983, Inayan ceased
paying the agreed rental and asserted dominion over the land. As a consequence, Corazon asked him to
vacate the land but Inayan refused to do so. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Iloilo RTC for
"Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of Possession, Recovery of Unpaid Rentals and Damages." In
his answer, Inayan claimed that the land had been tenanted by his father since 1938 and that he has
already been issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) for the subject property. These Certificates of
Land Transfer were subsequently canceled by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform upon a finding that
said lands were owned by Jesus Jalbuena and that the CLTs were erroneously issued.  In 1984, RTC
issued an order adopting the procedure in agrarian cases, declaring the lease contract as a civil law lease
and has already terminated due to non-payment of rentals from 1983 up to the present. It orders Inayan
and his privies and successors-in-interest to immediately vacate land and pay Corazon of unpaid rentals,
fees, and for damages. On appeal to the CA, Inayan alleged that the RTC, acting as Court Agrarian
Relations, had no jurisdiction over the action. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision as it held that while
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law, private respondent's attack on the jurisdiction of the lower
court must fail for he is guilty of estoppel. Despite several opportunities to question the jurisdiction of
the lower court, he failed to do so. The CA also held that since RTCs, by express provision of B.P. 129,
Section 24, now have exclusive original jurisdiction over agrarian cases, but still applying the special
rules of agrarian procedure, it was no error for the court below, even if acting as an agrarian court, to
resolve a controversy involving a civil lease.

Inayan moved to reconsideration and the CA granted said motion and set aside its earlier decision and
dismissed the civil case filed by Corazon for want of jurisdiction. It ruled that petitioner's complaint was
anchored on acción interdictal, a summary action for recovery of physical possession that should have
been brought before the proper inferior court. To make private respondent a deforciant (o ne who keeps
out of possession the rightful owner of an estate) so that the unlawful detainer suit may be properly
filed, it is necessary to allege when demand to pay rent and to vacate were made. The court found that
this requisite was not specifically met in petitioner's complaint. Such failure on her part is fatal to her
cause since the one-year period within which a detainer suit may be instituted had not yet elapsed when
Civil Case No. 15628 was filed. Therefore, the court below was devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the
case. Hence, Corazon filed a petition for review contending that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that case is an unlawful detainer action. Since the parties did not confine themselves to issues pertaining
solely to possession but also to the nature of the lease contract, the case is not one of unlawful detainer
but one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Petitioner argues that the issue of lack of jurisdiction should not have been resolved in favor of Inayan
who had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court a quo  and raised the issue only after an
adverse decision was rendered against him. Aside from emphasizing the correctness of respondent
court's ruling that the case below was a mere ejectment case, private respondent raises the issue of  res
judicata in his comment.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has, acting as Court of Agrarian Relations had no jurisdiction over the action.

Ruling:

No, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the court over subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It is determinable on the basis of allegations in the complaint. The error in
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the first time on appeal. Barring highly meritorious
and exceptional circumstances, neither estoppel nor waiver may be raised as defenses to such an error.
A study of the complaint instituted by petitioner in the lower court reveals that the case is, contrary to
the findings of the respondent appellate court, not one of unlawful detainer. Not being merely a case of
ejectment, the RTC possessed jurisdiction to try and resolve the case.

We find that the situation in the case at bench falls within the ambit of justifiable cases where estoppel
may be applied.  The trial court's recourse to agrarian procedure was undoubtedly provoked by private
respondent Inayan's insistence on the existence of a tenancy relationship with petitioner.  Private
respondent cannot now use these same misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction.   He
cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief against petitioner and, after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Participation in judicial proceedings
where the court was devoid of jurisdiction is not normally considered as estoppel because the
jurisdiction of a court is mandated by law.  Estoppel is likewise not appreciated where a mistaken belief
in the court's jurisdiction is maintained. But private respondent's case is different for it does not involve
an honest mistake.  He is directly responsible for the trial court's use of the special rules of agrarian
procedure.  His insistence brought about the want of jurisdiction he conveniently asserted before the
appellate court, and only after an adverse decision was levelled against him.  Private respondent cannot
be allowed to seek refuge under the protective mantle of the law after he has abused and made a
mockery of it.  He is considered stopped from asserting the court's want of jurisdiction to try the case.
Moreover, the case was ostensibly one that involved agrarian matters hence the trial court cannot be
faulted for its use of agrarian procedure.

On the matter of res judicata raised by private respondent, the Court conclude that the same does not
find application in instant petition. The issue involved execution pending appeal granted by the trial
court judge to petitioner. The CA enjoined the respondent judge from enforcing the execution pending
appeal after having found no valid and compelling reason to justify said execution. Then too, private
respondent asserted, and the appellate court found, that an agrarian court has no jurisdiction in a case
where there exists no tenancy relation between the parties.
XLI.

TIJAM VS. SIBONGHAYON

G.R. No. L-21450, APRIL 15, 1968

Facts:

On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a case in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the
sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was
issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the
Surety, on the 31st of the same month. After trial upon the issues thus joined, the CFI rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of
the latter, the CFI issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond against
which the Surety filed a written opposition. The CFI denied this motion on the ground solely that no
previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter, the
necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a
second motion for execution against the counter-bond. Upon the Surety’s failure to file an answer to the
motion, the CFI granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued. Subsequently,
the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the CFI denied the
motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) from such order of denial and from the one
denying its motion for reconsideration. Not one of the assignment of errors raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. The CA decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
After the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that appellees' action was filed in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the
sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the Surety is barred from raising the jurisdictional issue by laches.

RULING:

Yes, A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The facts of this case show that from the time
the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well
as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case
for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that
it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. If such conduct is to be sanctioned, the SC would
in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.

XLII.

CUDIAMAT vs. BATANGAS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK

GR NO. 182403, MARCH 9, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Atty. Restituto G. Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the registered co-owners of a
320square meter parcel of land. Restituto entrusted the custody of the title of the land to Perfecto
since petitioner Restituto and his wife reside in Ozamis City. In 1979, Perfecto, without the knowledge
and consent of Restituto, obtained a loan from respondent Bank. To secure the payment of the loan,
Perfecto mortgaged the property for the purpose of which he presented a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) purportedly executed by Restituto, with the marital consent of his wife-herein co-petitioner
Erlinda Cudiamat. On June 19, 1991, Restituto was informed, via letter dated June 7, 1991 from the
bank, that the property was foreclosed. He thus, by letter dated June 25, 1991, informed the bank that
he had no participation in the execution of the mortgage and that he never authorized Perfecto for the
purpose.

Perfecto died in 1990. In 1998, his widow was being evicted from the property. Petitioner-spouses
Restituto and Erlinda thereafter filed on August 9, 1999 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan
a complaint “for quieting of title with damages” against the bank and the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu
assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did not authorize the encumbrance of the
property. The bank, maintaining the validity of the mortgage, alleged that it had in fact secured a title in
its name, TCT No. T-48405, after Perfecto failed to redeem the mortgage; and that the Balayan RTC had
no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had been placed under receivership and under liquidation by
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Petitioner Cudiamat, meanwhile, argued that the
respondent Bank is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of Balayan-RTC because it actively
participated in the proceedings thereat.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Bank is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of Balayan-RTC.

Ruling:

Yes, the operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the lower
court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction but the case was tried and decided upon
the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal from assailing such jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if it had jurisdiction and the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position, that the lower court had jurisdiction. The Balayan-RTC, sitting as a
court of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint of quieting of title filed by petitioner
Cudiamat on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu-RTC, as a liquidation court, assumed jurisdiction only on May
25, 2000, when the petition for assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and given due course.
While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is not
lost by estoppel by laches, this case is an exception. To compel the petitioners to re-file and re-litigate
their claims before the Nasugbu-RTC when the parties had already been given the opportunity to
present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan-RTC, would be an exercise in
futility and would unjustly burden petitioners Cudiamats’.

XLIII.

FIRST CORPORATION v. FORMER SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 218 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, EDUARDO M. SACRIS, and CESAR A. ABILLAR

G.R. No. 171989, JULY 4, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner, First Corporation convinced private respondent Eduardo Sacris to invest in their business.
Between 1991 to 1997 the total loan extended by Sacris to the petitioner reached the amount of P2.2
million. During that time petitioner failed to convert Sacris' investment/loan into equity or share or
equity. However, they likewise made partial payments to Sacris' leaving an outstanding balance of P1.8
million. Sacris then filed before the RTC of Quezon City filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages to recover his alleged collectible amount of P1.8 million due from the petitioner corporation.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner corporation appealed the
RTC's decision to the CA. The appellate court dismissed the appeal because it did not find any reversible
error in the Decision of the trial court, hence the petition before the Supreme Court. Before the Court,
petitioner, argues that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering their
decision; that it was not supported by preponderance of evidence. On the other hand, respondents
argue that the grounds enumerated by the petitioner corporation for the allowance of its Petition
for Certiorari before this Court clearly call for the review of the factual findings of the RTC of Quezon
City. Respondents further avow that the petitioner corporation is simply using the remedy
of certiorari provided for under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as a substitute for an
ordinary appeal. They claim that certiorari under Rule 65 of the aforesaid Rules cannot be used for the
review of the findings of fact and evidence.

Issues:

Whether or not the public respondents committed a grave of abuse of discretion in rendering their
decision.

Ruling:

No, the Supreme Court denied the petition. Since the issues raised by the petitioner corporation in its
Petition for Certiorari are mainly factual, as it would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the
evidence on which the RTC and the appellate court based their Decisions, the Petition should not be
given due course. Thus, the remedy of certiorari will not lie to annul or reverse the Decision of the RTC.

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.

XLIV.

TGN REALTY CORPORATION vs VILLA TERESA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

GR No. 164795, APRIL 19, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner TGN Realty Corporation owned and developed the Villa Teresa Subdivision on a parcel of land
in Barangays Sto. Rosario and Cutcut, Angeles City Pampanga on Aug 22, 1966. The project soon had
many lot buyers who built or bought residential units there. Respondent Villa Teresa HOA Inc (VTHAI)
was the association of the residents and homeowners of the subdivision. On Sep 2, 1997, through
counsel, it made known to the petitioner various complaints and demands. Allegedly VTHAI tried to
discuss the complaints and demands but the petition failed and refused to meet in evident disregard of
its obligations as the owner and development of the project. A reply was sent by the petitioner on Sep
22, 1997 citing its justification. Thus, in view of the failure and refusal of the TGN to heed the HOAs
demands, VTHAI filed a complaint for specific performance with the HLRUB. TGN filed its answer with
counterclaim. It reiterated the explanations contained in its letter and urged that the complaint be
dismissed. It insisted that it should be granted moral damages of P100,000 for discrediting its goodwill
and attorney’s fees of P30,000 plus P2,000/appearance per hearing because the complaint was
malicious. To verify the status of development in the subdivision an ocular inspection was conducted on
March 13, 1998 and based on recommendation, the HLURB Arbiter rendered its decision on Sep 25,
1998, declaring that respondent has violated Sec 22 of PD 957, otherwise known as subdivision lot and
condominium unit buyer protective decree and PD 1216, the law defining open space in subdivision and
TGN is liable for damages and payments of administrative fines. TGN appealed to the Board of
Commissioners of HLURB which affirmed the decision of the Arbiter with modification deleting the
directive to pay actual damages and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,000 as moderate damages.
The case was elevated to the Office of the President which affirmed the HLURB’s decision. TGN moved
for reconsideration but was denied. The CA affirmed OP’s decision. Hence, this appeal by Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it failed to order the dismissal of the subject
complaint despite the clear showing that the said complaint is bereft of and factual and legal basis.

Ruling:

Yes, the Court held that the issues being raised by the petitioner are essentially factual in nature.
Ordinarily, the appeal of petition for review on certiorari should not involve the consideration and
resolution of factual issues. Sec 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the appeal to questions of law
because the Court should not be expected to re-evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in
the fora below. For this purpose, the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is well
defined. There may be exceptions to the limitations of the review to question of law and yet, none of
said exceptions to the limitation applies to this case. As a consequence, it seems foregone that the Court
would be justified in now rejecting the appeal of the petitioner, and in upholding the CA adversely
against the petitioner. But the attention of the Court has been directed to the conflict in the findings on
the state of the development of the project. According to the decision dated Sep 25, 1998 of the HLURB
arbiter, an ocular inspection of the premises was conducted and violations were confirmed. Being the
agency that has acquired the expertise on the matter in question, the HLURB’s findings should be
respected. However, the Regional Office of the HLURB meanwhile issued the Certificate of Completion
dated Sep 28, 2004 which certifies that a subdivision project has been completed in accordance with the
approval development plan.

The SC held that the Certificate of Completion being the issuance of the HLURB itself cannot be ignored.
Its significance derives from the law itself, Sec 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 957. As
amended by PD 1216, the registered owner or developer of the subdivision who has secured the
certificate of completion and has executed the deed of donation in favor of the city or
municipality “shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space
of the subdivision notwithstanding the refusal of [the] City/Municipality concerned to accept the
donation.” 

The obvious conflict between the earlier findings made by the HLURB arbiter that undoubtedly became
the basis for the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the OP and the CA to successively rule adversely
against the petitioner, and the recitals to the contrary of the Certificate of Completion issued by the
Regional Officer of the HLURB must not be ignored. Justice demands that the conflict be resolved and
settled especially considering that the findings and the Certificate of Completion were both issued by
the HLURB itself, through its agents.

The resolution and settlement of the conflict require the evaluation and re-evaluation of factual matters.
Yet, the Court cannot itself resolve and settle the conflict in this appeal because it is not a trier of facts.
Moreover, the proper resolution and just settlement of the conflict will probably require the conduct of
a hearing to be conducted by an official or office with the competence to determine the factual dispute
involved. That office is the HLURB, the agency of the Government in which the expertise to monitor the
completion of subdivision projects has been lodged by law. A remand to the HLURB becomes necessary,
therefore, in order that an objective but full inquiry into the level of completion of the improvements in
the project can be assured.

XLV.

DE JOYA vs. MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 162416, JANUARY 31, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Chester De Joya asserts that respondent Judge Placido C. Marquez erred in finding the
existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-
accused. Hence, he filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify
and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner. He likewise
continuously refuses to submit to the court’s jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its
jurisdiction.
Ruling:

Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court
acquires such jurisdiction, thus:

Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:

a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by the service of summons.

c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties,
cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.

d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the
case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied
consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as
provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.

e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is
acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in
custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the
power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration
proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.

When the complaint involves the plaintiff's personal status or property in the Philippines in which the
defendant claims an interest, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case even though it has not
gained jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant as long as it has jurisdiction over the res,
as when the action involves the plaintiff's personal status or property in the Philippines in which the
defendant claims an interest.

The service of summons by publication and notification to the defendant is solely for the purpose of
complying with due process provisions in such cases. While a foreign company doing business in the
Philippines without a license cannot sue or engage in any activity here, it can be sued or prosecuted in
our courts or administrative tribunals under Section 133 of the Corporation Code.

Again, there is no compelling justification to authorize petitioner to seek relief from the courts without
submitting to their jurisdiction in this case.

His evasive demeanor reveals a desire to evade and frustrate the legal process's goal. It is important to
note that whoever seeks the court's jurisdiction must first appeal to it.

XLVI.

FERDINAND MARCOS vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. Nos. 189434 & 189505, MARCH 12, 2014 & APRIL 25, 2012

Facts:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision affirming the decision of Sandiganbayan declaring all the assets
of Arelma, S.S., an entity created by the late Ferdinand Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and the properties acquired by the
Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials and that the petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten
wealth, pursuant to Sec. 2 of RA 1379 (forfeiture law). Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of
their petition, reiterating among others, that the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction
over the res or the Arelma proceeds which are held by Merill Lynch in the United States.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds.

Ruling:

Yes, The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held
abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators
who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and their recovery by the
State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions
considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that Jurisdiction over the res
is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within
the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court. The concept of
potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early as Perkins v.
Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held that in order that the court may exercise
power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property,
potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the
action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law.

XLVII.

SUPAPO vs. SPS. DE JESUS ET. AL.

G.R. No. 198356; APRIL 20, 2015

Facts:

Petitioners Spouses Supapo owned a parcel of land in Quezon City valued at Php39,980 (according to
the Declaration of Real Property Value or tax declaration). The spouses do not reside therein, but they
visit the property at least twice a year. In 1992, they discovered that there were two (2) houses built
therein without their consent or knowledge. Because of this, petitioners filed a criminal case against the
owners of the houses, Spouses de Jesus and Macario. They filed said case under Presidential Decree 772
or the Anti-Squatting Law. While the case was pending, however, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
8368 or “An Act Repealing PD 772”. Thus, the criminal case was dismissed, and Spouses Supapo then
moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil liability. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion,
but the Court of Appeals reversed it, saying that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the
respondents’ criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished. Thereafter, the Spouses Supapo filed a
complaint for accion publiciana, but respondents Sps. De Jesus et al contended that the action was not
proper since there is another action pending between the same parties. The respondents furthered that
the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by the statute of limitations and the Spouses Supapo’s
cause of action is barred by prior judgment. The MeTC ruled against respondents, but the RTC ruled
otherwise and agreed with respondents on two grounds: (1) The action has prescribed; and (2) Accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC further held that in an action where
the only issue is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is filed within 1 year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, it should be
filed before the RTC. It also added that the action was filed beyond the 10-year prescriptive period
under Article 555 of the Civil Code.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the action has prescribed.

2. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

Ruling:

1.

No. in a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation
to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].

The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoys panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The
most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states,
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. In addition to the
imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession
thereof.

2.

No, the complaint for accion publiciana is not barred by res judicata. In the present case, there is no
identity of parties as the party in the criminal case is the People of the Philippines, while the party in the
present case is the Spouses Supapo. As to the identity of subject matter, the criminal case involves the
prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law, while the accion publiciana is an action to recover
possession of the subject property. There is no identity of causes of action as well. The people of the
Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting
persons who violated the statute; while in the present case, he Spouses Supapo filed the accion
publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.

XLVIII.

DIAZ- ENRIQUEZ vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. 168065 SEPTEMBER 6, 2017

Facts:
An application for registration of title were filed by the Saclolos before the trial court in 1974. However,
the government thru the Director of Lands filed oppositions to the application arguing that the subject
lands are not disposable and alienable. Meanwhile Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez filed a motion for intervention
during litigation alleging that the Saclolos had sold to her the subject lands in 1976.

The trial court decided that the subject lands are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It
opined that the pieces of evidence presented by the Saclolos proved that their rights over the subject
lands, being private in nature and character, were excluded from the reservation for military purposes. It
then modified its decision by ordering the issuance of the decree of registration to Enriquez

The trial Court's decision was appealed before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court. The appellate court concluded that the subject lands could not be registered
because they lie within a naval reservation and most of them are forest and foreshore lands, thus
disposing the case. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Saclolos, argue that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the RTC's decision, thus, the
facts, pertaining to the registration of titles are already final and settled. The Director of Lands in his
comment counters that issues, though not specifically raised in the pleadings in the appellate court,
may, in the interest of justice, be properly considered by the said court in deciding a case

Issue:

Whether the appellate court may resolve issues which are not raised as errors on appeal.

Ruling:

Yes, the appellate court may reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than
those raised as errors on appeal. As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be
resolved. Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. It provides:

SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided.—No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

The exceptions to this rule have been enumerated in Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals.
These are:

(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;

(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice;

(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored;

(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent.

In this case, there is no doubt that the application for registration of title hinges upon the determination
of whether the subject lands are alienable and disposable. Further, this is consistent with the appellate
court’s authority to review the totality of the controversy brought on appeal.

XLIX.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs CA HON. HONORIO E. GUANLAO, JR., OF MAKATI RTC

BRANCH 56, TRAVELLER KIDS INC, CELY GABALDON-CO. & JEANNIE L. LUGMOK

GR No. 218901, FEBRUARY 15, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner PBCom filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money in the amount of P8,971,118.06
against private respondents before the Makati RTC Branch 56. Respondents moved for the dismissal of
the complaint alleging that their obligation had already been paid in full and that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case because PBCom failed to pay the correct docket fees. On Sept 29, 2010, the
RTC issued an Order directing PBCom to pay additional docket fees in the amount of P24,765.70 within
15 days from receipt of thereof. PBCom made the payment on Oct 21, 2010 but filed its Compliance with
the RTC only on Nov 11, 2010. Thus, on Nov 4, 2010, RTC Dismissed PBCom’s Complaint for failure to
comply with its Sept 29, 2010 Order. PBCom filed a Motion for Reconsideration on Nov 22, 2010 stating
that it paid the required docket fees within the prescribed period as evidenced by the Official Receipt.

The RTC denied its motion there being no proof of payment of the additional fee was submitted to the
Court on or before Oct 23, 2010. Thus, the complaint was dismissed pursuant to Sec 3, Rule 17 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also noted that the subject OR is highly irregular.

PBCom filed a Notice of Appeal on May 26, 2011 and was denied by the RTC. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, it filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA but was also denied. CA
ruled that apart from availing itself a wrong mode of appeal, PBCom failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of a Motion for Reconsideration which is a condition sine qua non for a petition
for certiorari to prosper.

In a petition before the SC, petitioner alleged that respondent CA acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied its MR on the ground that it was filed one day
late; when it denied its Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus on the ground that a prior MR is required;
that respondent RTC judge should be compelled by Mandamus to approve its Notice of Appeal and to
transmit the case records to the CA; and that respondent CA gravely abused its discretion when it rule
that its petition is a wrong mode of appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petititoner’s
petition for Certiorari and Mandamus on the ground that a prior MR is required.
2. Whether or not the RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed petitioner’s
notice of appeal for failure to file it on time.
Ruling:

1.

No, the Court held that it cannot give due course to petitioner's petition for certiorari and mandamus
not only because it is a wrong mode of appeal but it also failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of a motion for reconsideration. Under Rule 65, a petition for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the July 30, 2014 Decision and May 5, 2015 Resolution of the CA. The proper remedy of
a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 54 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for review, which would
be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a
general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including
that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be
dismissed outright.

2.

Yes, the SC held that the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to PBCOM's notice of appeal on the
ground that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.

In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso the Court ruled that a trial court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which
is tantamount to a disallowance or dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final order from
which an appeal may be taken. The suitable remedy for the aggrieved party is to elevate the matter
through a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to the CA's finding, PBCOM availed itself of
the correct remedy in questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.

Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-defined
exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction. Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure states that prior
to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court
may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-
payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

In Salvan v. People, this Court held that the power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the
instances specified in the afore-quoted provision. In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a
notice of appeal on an entirely different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a proper remedy."

The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and
not the RTC under Sec 1 of Rule 50 which states that an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground that the fact that the order or
judgment appealed from is not appealable. 

Unless the appeal is abandoned, the only ground for dismissing an appeal in the trial court is the failure
of the appellant to file on time the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal. A trial court may
not dismiss an appeal as frivolous, or on the ground that the case has become moot and academic, such
step devolving upon the appellate courts. Otherwise, the way would be opened for RTCs to forestall
review or reversal of their decisions by higher courts, no matter how erroneous or improper such
decisions should be.

L.
MERCEDITA C. COOMBS v. VICTORIA C. CASTAÑEDA

GR No. 192353, 2017-03-15, MARCH 15, 2017

Facts:

LRC Case No. 04-035 petitioner Mercedita C. Coombs rendered declaring the lost owner's duplicate copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title [No.] 6715 of the Registry of Deeds of Muntinlupa City as null and void.
She was informed that the real property was no longer classified under her name, and upon further
investigation, she discovered that TCT No. 6715 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 14115,
which was released in the name of herein respondent Virgilio Veloso Santos. The motion for judgment
annulment was denied by the Court of Appeals. Extrinsic fraud is, without a doubt, the basis for the
current action. The complainant, on the other hand, failed to state the evidence that support extrinsic
fraud as a basis. Since the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 was never lost, RTC had no authority
over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035. The Court of Appeals denied the said motion and
explained that the RTC has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving title to real property and land
registration cases. Thus, it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035. Petitioner
Coombs maintains that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035
because the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT sought to be annulled was never lost and had always
been in her possession.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed outright petitioner Coombs’ petition for
annulment of judgment.

Ruling:

Yes, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by petitioner Coombs was clearly grounded on lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case, and not extrinsic fraud. Petitioner Coombs
argued that the RTC Decision was invalid because it was made without jurisdiction. According to her,
since the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 was never lost in the first place, the RTC did not gain
jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035 for the reconstitution of a lost certificate of
title, which claim has been upheld by the Court in a catena of cases.

The above-mentioned arguments represented a prima facie case of judgment annulment, which the
Court of Appeals should view favorably. The fact that the statute has jurisdiction over the content of the
actions or subject matter is doctrinal. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 vests the RTC with jurisdiction
over the judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's duplicate of the certificate of title.
However, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035 was
within the RTC's jurisdiction, being a court of general jurisdiction.

In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the RTC has no jurisdiction when the certificate sought to
be reconstituted was never lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of another person. In other
words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.

First, the applicant does not have to allege that the ordinary remedy of a new trial or reconsideration of
the judgment requested to be annulled is no longer available due to no fault of her own when a petition
for annulment is based on lack of jurisdiction. This is due to the fact that a decision made without
jurisdiction is essentially null and void. As a result, unless laches has a valid defense, it can be challenged
at any time. Second, petitioner Coombs in fact was able to attach to her petition documents supporting
her cause of action. Verily, our ruling in Veneracion required the petitioners to: (a) allege with
particularity in their petition the facts and the law relied upon for annulment as well as those supporting
their cause of action, and (b) attach to the original copy of their petition the affidavits of their witnesses
and documents supporting their cause of action.

The Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Petitioner Coombs was based on a lack of jurisdiction.
She attached to her petition the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 and the RTC Decision, which
sufficiently endorse the petition's cause of action, based on our examination of the documents. Her
allegations coupled with the appropriate supporting documents give rise to a prima facie case that the
RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035. As we ruled in Tan Po Chu
v. Court of Appeals, if allegations of this nature turned out to be true, the RTC Decision would be void
and the Court of Appeals would have been duty-bound to strike it down.

LI.

SULTAN YAHYA “JERRY M. TOMAWIS” vs. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH
A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR

G.R. No. 182434, MARCH 5, 2010

Facts:

The private respondents, Amna Pumbaya, Jalilah Mangopia And Ramla Musor the daughters of late
Acraman Radia filed a complaint at Shari’a Distric Court (SDC) for an action for quieting of title of a
parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City against the petitioner Jerry Tomawis and Mangoda
Radia. The private respondent states that they are the heirs and the absolute owners of the subject lot.
In where Tomawis bought the property to Mangoda Radia who claimed the subject property, that he
inherited it from his late father. Sometimes in 1996 it came to the knowledge of the private respondents
that their property was leveled and removed the houses without their permission. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The court denied the motion to dismiss, asserting that the SDC’s original jurisdiction over the case,
concurrently with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), pursuant to Article 143 (2)(b) of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the SDC has the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Ruling:

Yes, under art. 143 (1)(d) of PD No. 1083, state that the SDC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified
which law shall govern their relations and in (2)(b) state that concurrently with existing civil courts, the
Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over all other personal real actions not mentioned in
paragraph 1(d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the SDC’s and RTC’s with respect to cases involving only Muslims, the SDC
has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims as stated
in the above provision.
LII.

MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE vs. BALINDONG

G.R. No. 193340, JANUARY 11, 2017

Facts:

The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with the Shari’a District
Court of Marawi City (Shari’a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery
of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares located at
Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land,
and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to
“borrow” the land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center
building. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the
value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to
Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the
land within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be
returned to them as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.

The Municipality of Tangkal then filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue
and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or
ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover,
since the complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.

In its Order dated March 9, 2010, the Shari’a District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal’s motion
to dismiss. It held that since the Mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case “is an
action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil
courts.” It added that venue was properly laid because the Shari’a District Court has territorial
jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi
and Iligan. Moreover, the filing of a motion to dismiss is a disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of
Procedure in Shari’a Courts.

The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari’a District Court.
The Shari’a District Court also ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within 10 days. It
timely filed its answer and raised as an affirmative defense the court’s lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the Shari’a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of
possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.

Ruling:

The matters over which Shari’a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an
effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall
provision granting Shari’a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those
for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari’a district courts’ jurisdiction over these matters is
concurrent with regular civil courts, like the municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is,
however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by
regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a
Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts. The present case, which is a real action
involving title to and possession of the land situated at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, was filed by private
respondents before the Shari’a District Court pursuant to the general jurisdiction conferred by Article
143(2)(b). In determining whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold
question is whether both parties are Muslims. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as
plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied because the
mayor of the defendant municipality is also a Muslim.

When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions “wherein the parties involved
are Muslims,” the word “parties” necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. Section 2 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court defines real parties in interest as those who stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the parties who will be directly
benefited or injured are the private respondents, as real party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal,
as the real party defendant. In their complaint, private respondents claim that their predecessor-in-
interest, Macalabo, entered into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal for the use of the land.
Their cause of action is based on the Municipality of Tangkal’s alleged failure and refusal to return the
land or pay for its reasonable value in accordance with the agreement. Accordingly, they pray for the
return of the land or the payment of reasonable rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private
respondents, either allowing them to recover possession or entitling them to rentals, would
undoubtedly be beneficial to them; correlatively, it would be prejudicial to the Municipality of Tangkal
which would either be deprived possession of the land on which its municipal hall currently stands or be
required to allocate funds for payment of rent. Conversely, a judgment in favor of the Municipality of
Tangkal would effectively quiet its title over the land and defeat the claims of private respondents. It is
clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a
representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an action is
defended by a representative, that representative is not-and neither does he become-a real party in
interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest; the representative remains to be a
third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of
complying with the jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To
satisfy the requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a
Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility.

LIII.

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. MONDEJAR

G.R. No. 200804, JANUARY 22, 2014

Facts:

A.L. Ang Network, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule pf Procedure for Small Claims
Cases against respondent. The MTCC ruled in favour of respondent. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 beforre the RTC ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of MTCC in
finding that they failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation and in not ordering the
respondent to pay the full amount to be collected. RTC dismissed the petition citing that the petition
was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases and that it cannot supplant
the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum
than that which has been awarded.
Issue:

Whether or not RTC is correct in denying petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 assailing the MTCC
decision in the small claims case.

Ruling:

Yes, the remedy of appeal is not allowed in the final nature of a small claims case decision. Nevertheless,
the proscription on appeals in small claims cases does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. The RTC could either grant or dismiss
the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.

LIV.

FIORELLO R. JOSE vs. ROBERTO ALFUERTO ET.AL. AND UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS OF OLIVARES
COMPOUND, PHASE II, BRGY. SAN DIONISIO, PARANAQUE CITY.

GR No. 169380, NOVEMBER 26, 2012

Facts:

The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing located in San
Dionisio, Parañaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991 and then leased the property to
petitioner Fiorello R. Jose. The Contract of Lease was neither notarized nor registered with the
Parañaque City Registry of Deeds. The Lease of Contract provided that the lessor transfers all its rights
and prerogative to evict occupants in favor of lessee which shall be responsible for all the expenses that
may be incurred without reimbursement from the lessor. However, there are occupants already
occupying the property even before the contract was executed. Soon after Chua Sing and Jose signed
the least contract, petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30
days and that they pay monthly rental of P1,000 until they fully vacate the property. Respondents
refused to vacate and pay rent. Petitioner then filed an ejectment case against respondents before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque. When Jose brought the case to the Barangay for
conciliation, the Barangay issued a Certification to File Action. Jose claimed that as lessee of the subject
property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully occupied the land.

CA ruled that the respondent’s possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance.
Having been in possession of the land for more than a year, the respondents should not be evicted
through an ejectment case. It emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the
only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of a property. Jose’s claim is
of accion publiciana (for the recovery of the possession), wherein he asserts his right as a possessor by
virtue of a contract of lease. CA dismissed the ejectment case.

Petitioner file a motion for reconsideration which CA denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court can treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana, or accion reivindicatoria
(for the recovery of ownership).
Ruling:

No, the Court held that it cannot treat and ejectment case as an accion publiciana or action
reinvindicatoria. Court could not simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an ejectment
case and decided it as an accion publiciano or accion reinvindicatorio for these cases are different and
not interchangeable. An action for forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. Forcible entry must
be filed within one year after the unlawful dispossession while the latter must be filed a year after the
unlawful dispossession of the real property. Forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the
physical possession while accion publiciana’s subject of litigation is the better right to possession over
the real property. The former is filed in the municipal trial court and summary action, while the latter is
plenary action in the RTC. The cause of action in the ejectment case is different from accion publicana or
accion reinvindicatoria. The ejectment case is brought before the proper inferior court to recover
physical possession only or possession de facto, not possession de jure. MeTC resolves only possession
de facto, ejectment cases are summary in nature, while accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria are
plenary action.

LV.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESPINOSA

G.R NO. 186603, APRIL 5, 2017

Facts:

A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the
name of Espinosa who later sold to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued. Through
Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for annulment of title and reversion of land
with the RTC claiming the property is alienable public land because it fell within the timberland area.

RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of property. CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and
found that the state failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation when she was issued the Original
Certificate of Title. The lone piece of evidence consisting LC Map No. 2978 was not authenticated
pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only as to the
existence of the map, but not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is
admitted in evidence, Espinosa’s rights over the property, which accrued in 1962, should not be
prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24 years.

Issue:

Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at
the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.

Ruling:

No. the State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of
the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government.

Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a
cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite
jurisdictional facts that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence
is considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving
these jurisdictional facts.

Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT
No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No. 91117. Having been granted a decree in a
cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was
able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the
cadastral proceedings.

LVI.

ABAGATNAN vs. CLARITO

G.R. No. 211966, AUGUST 7, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner, Wenceslao Abagatnan the husband of late Lydia Capote acquired a lot property from Mateo
Ambrad and Soterafia Clarito.

Sometimes on 1990, respondent approach the petitioner that they will going to build a light material
house in the subject property and the petitioner agreed and trust the respondent because they were
distant relatives.

Sometimes on 2006, petitioner decided to sell the portions of the said property, where the respondent
occupied. Since they were occupying the subject property, the petitioner offered to sell the subject
property to respondents but they declined.

The petitioner together with his children directly filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages
before MTCC because the respondents refused to vacate the subject property without filing it first to
Barangay Lupon for mandatory conciliation.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject case should be filed first to Barangay Lupon for mandatory conciliation.

Ruling:

No, under section 412 (a) stated that Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or
instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon
or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties.

The exception to the above section, where the dispute parties are not residing in the same city or
municipality or adjoining barangays are not required to submit their dispute to lupon as a pre-condition
to the filing of a complaint in court. Regardless, whether the party who is not residing in the said subject
property authorized an attorney in fact to act in their behalf. This was already reirated in Banting vs.
Spouses Maglapuz and Pascual vs. Pascual.

Therefore, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay
conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.

LVII.

GERAGE vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ARMIE ELMA

G.R. No. 83907; SEPTEMBER 13, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Napoleon Gegare and Armie Elma are disputing over Lot 5989 with an area of 270 sq. m.
situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City registered under the name of Paulino Elma.

A reversion case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Elma in the Court of First Instance of
South Cotabato which resulted to the nullification of the title of Elma and the lot reverted to the mass of
public domain subject to disposition. Preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegara was
given for its disposition. Both Gegare and Elma filed an application for the whole lot to the Board of
Liquidators in 1975. In 1976, the Board passed a resolution disposing the lot in favor of petitioner
Gegare by way of negotiated sale which respondent protested, but another resolution was passed
denying such protest. Elma then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was referred to Mr. Garlit
(liquidator-designee) for verification and investigation of the lot. After the hearing, Mr. Garlit
recommended the division of the lot to the parties upon finding out that the true actual occupant is not
Gegare anymore but in fact Elma himself. On August 14, 1981, since the negotiated sale in favor of
Gegare in paragraph 3 is already perfected, the Board issued another Resolution approving Garlit’s
recommendation and ordered for the division of the lot equally between Gegare and Elma at 135.5 sq,
m. each disposed to them. Elma paid the ½ of the lot and had it registered under his name but Gegare
wanted the whole lot to be given to him. On November 27, 1985, Gegare filed an action for Annulment
and Cancellation of the Partition of the lot against respondent and the Board at the Gensan-RTC.

Respondent Elma asked for it to be dismissed on the grounds that include lack of conciliation pursuant
to Presidential Decree 1506 or the “Katarungang Pambarangay Law” (KPL).

Issue:

Whether or not the case at bar is covered by the KPL.

Ruling:
Yes, although the general rule under Section 2 of PD 1508 states that when the government
(represented by the Board of liquidators) is a party to a case, the case can be filed directly to the Courts
without having gone to the Katarungang Pambarangay.

However, under Section 6 of the same decree, when the government PLUS another private party (in this
case, Elma) are the respondents in the present case, the case must be submitted first for amicable
settlement in the Katarungan Pambarangay.

LVIII.

CLAUDIA RIVERA SANCHEZ vs. HONORABLE MARIANO C. TUPAS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XII of Davao City and Private Respondent ALFONSO ESCOVILLA, respondents.

G.R. No. 76690, FEBRUARY 29, 1988

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent are both occupants of a public agricultural land Identified as Lot 595,
Cad-102 located at Budbud, Tibungco, Davao City. Petitioner claims that the area of 450 square meters,
more or less, has been in her possession since 1947, On the other hand, private respondent claims that
the area being claimed by petitioner is a part of his three-fourth (3/4) of a hectare parcel.

Private respondent filed with the City Court of Davao an ejectment case against petitioner. The City
Court rendered a decision "Judgment by Compromise. Petitioner thereafter then filed with the RTC of
Davao to annul the decision of the City Court. She argues that she was tricked in signing with her
thumbmark a compromise agreement by the respondent's lawyer wherein she recognized private
respondent's prior occupancy of the land in question. The respondent Judge sustained private
respondent's Motion to Dismiss by dismissing the case for lack of cause of action or prematurity for not
having passed the Barangay Court. Hence the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the tiral court erred in dismissing the case due to said action did passing the Barangay
Court.

Ruling:

No, Petitioner contends that respondent Judge erred in dismissing petitioner's action for annulment of
judgment simply because said action did not pass the Barangay Court. This contention is impressed with
merit. Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires that the parties who actually reside in the same city or
municipality should bring their controversy first to the Barangay Court for possible amicable settlement
before filing a complaint in court. This requirement is compulsory (as ruled in the cited case of Morato
vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444), [1983] and non-compliance of the same could affect the sufficiency of the cause
of action and make the complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity (Peregrina vs. Panis, 133 SCRA 75). It must be borne in mind that the purpose of the
conciliation process at the barangay level is to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order
to decongest the clogged dockets and in the process enhance the quality of justice dispensed by courts
(Morato, vs. Go, supra). In the instant case, it will be noted that the ejectment case in the City Court of
Davao, Civil Case No. 17-10-D, was filed on September 18, 1980, when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was
already enforced. However, the records do not show that there was an opposition to the filing of the
said ejectment case on the ground that the dispute had not been submitted to the Barangay Court for
possible amicable settlement under P.D. 1508. The only logical conclusion therefore is that either such
requirement had already been complied with or had been waived. Under either circumstance, there
appears to be no reason, much less a requirement that this case be subjected to the provisions of P.D.
1508. In fact, the present controversy is an action for annulment of a compromise judgment which as a
general rule is immediately executory, and accordingly, beyond the authority of the Barangay

LIX.

PETRA VDA DE BORROMEO vs. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU AND ATTY.
RICARDO REYES

GR No. L-63277, NOVEMBER 29, 1983

Facts:

Petitioner Petra herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of
Cebu from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation. The intestate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building
bearing the deaceased’s name which was leased and occupied by Petra at a monthly rental of P500
payable in advance within the first days of the month. On Aug 28, 1982, Atty. Ricardo Reyes,
administrator of the estate, served upon Petra a demand letter for her to pay the overdue rentals
corresponding to the period from March to Sept 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As Petra
failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted an ejectment case against her on Sept 16, 1982 with the Municipal
Trial Court of Cebu City. On Nov 12, 1982, Petra moved to dismiss the complaint advancing the want of
jurisdiction of the trial court. Petra argued that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for
failure of Respond Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD 1508
otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Respondent Judge Pogoy denied the motion
stating that from the acceptance from filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that
the case was docketed in civil division of this court could be considered as meeting the requirement of
precondition. There is a standing circular from the Supreme Court Justice that civil cases and criminal
cases with certain exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court.

Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, Petra petitioned the SC for certiorari

Issue:

Whether or not going through the Barangay Court or Lupon was necessary.

Ruling:

No, the Court held that the excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147
of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period
is counted from demand to vacate the premises.

In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated Aug 18, 1982, while the letter complaint for ejectment
was filed on Sept 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at
least 11 full months of prescriptive period provided for in Art 1147 of the Civil Code.

Under the procedure outlined in Sec 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding
before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private
respondent 9 months, an ample time indeed, within which to bring his case before the proper court
should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted that his case would be barred by the
Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.
The Court added that PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition
precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies. But Sec 4(a) of PD 108 states
that referral of a dispute to the Brgy. Lupon is required only where the parties are individuals, meaning a
single human being contrasted with a social group or institution.

Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons and not where any of hte parties is a
juridical person such as corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, etc.

In the case at bar, plaintiff Reyes is a mere nominal party who is issuing in behalf of the Intestate of Vito
Borromeo. While it is true that Sec 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate
to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under
administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person plaintiff administrator may file the complaint
directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

LX.

PEREGRINA vs PANIS

G.R. No. L-56011 OCTOBER 31, 1984

Facts:

Spouses Sanchez filed a Civil Action for Damages against Petitioners Peregrina, alleging contempt for the
Spouses' integrity, privacy, and peace of mind in violation of Art.26 of the Civil Code, as well as
defamation in violation of Art.33 of the same code. The parties are neighbors in Olongapo City's
barangay. However, no conciliation proceedings were filed before the Lupon. Petitioners moved for the
dismissal of the Complaint. Before filing an Opposition, Spouses applied for a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment. Following that, Spouses filed their Opposition, claiming that under Section 6(3) of PD 1508,
if the Action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as a Preliminary Attachment, the parties may go
straight to the courts. Respondent Judge originally dismissed the Complaint for Spouse's failure to
comply with the PD 1508 precondition for amicable resolution in addressing the Motion to Dismiss.
However, on Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge denied the Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that under Rule 57, Sec.1 of the Rules of Court, the application for attachment can be
made at the commencement of the action or any time thereafter.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent court’s assumption of jurisdiction, without prior conciliation proceedings
between the parties in the Lupon Tagapamayapa, is valid.

Ruling:

Sec.3 of PD 1508 specifically provides that “disputes between or among persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay.”

Sec.6 of the same law also mandates that “no complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the Lupo shall be filed or instituted in court or any government office for
adjudication unless there has been confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiate” PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the
filing of a complaint in court.

Noncompliance with that condition precedent may jeopardize the plaintiff's cause of action's sufficiency
and expose his case to dismissal for lack of cause of action or prematurity.

The situation is comparable to the exhaustion of administrative remedies or the failure to make sincere
attempts to resolve disputes between family members, all of which may lead to the case being
dismissed. The parties involved are firmly within the scope of PD 1508.

They live in the same barangay and their disagreement does not come under any of the exceptions.
Respondent Judge erred when he reconsidered his previous Order of Dismissal based on the provisional
remedy of attachment being timely filed.

Not only was the application for that remedy merely an afterthought to circumvent the law, but also, a
writ of attachment is not available in a suit for damages where the amount, including moral damages, is
contingent or unliquidated. Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, therefore, was
indubitably called for.

LXI.

AQUINO vs. AURE

GR No. L-63277, NOVEMBER 29, 1983

Facts:

The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated in Roxas District, Quezon City, with an
area of 449 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205447 registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (subject property).7 Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc.
(Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC docketed as Civil Case
No. 17450. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the subject property
from Aquino and her husband Manuel (spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 executed on 4 June
1996. Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the
subject property, they refused to vacate the same. MeTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 17450 in
favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
dismissal of the Complaint on the same ground Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing the
MeTC and RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceeding is a jurisdictional defect that
warrants the dismissal of the complaint.

Ruling:

No, the barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of
cases in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts
which, according to the conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially
arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this primary
objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying
philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
and the policy behind it would be better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached
voluntarily by the parties.

There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such
barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending's Complaint before the MeTC.
The only issue to be resolved is whether non-recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a
jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit filed with the MeTC.

Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment premature
and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial and
even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the MeTC. We do not agree.

It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the
Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies - -
the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not
ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless,
the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot
affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person
of the defendant.

LXII.

MIGUEL vs. MONTEZ

G.R. No. 191336, JANUARY 25, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Jerry Montanez secured a loan of P143.864.00 payable in one (1) year or until February 1,
2002 from petitioner Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel. The respondent gave as collateral for his loan his house
and lot. Respondent Montanez failed to pay the loan that prompted the petitioner to file a complaint
against him. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his
loan in an installment basis in the amount of P2,000.00 per month, and in the event the house and lot
given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in full. The respondent
still failed to pay, and the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of
the petitioner. The petitioner then filed before the MeTC of Makati City a complaint for Collection of
Sum of Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim, the respondent raised the defense of improper venue
considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lives in San Mateo,
Rizal.

The MeTC ordered respondent Montanez to pay the petitioner which was affirmed by the RTC. But the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the former decisions.

Issue:

Whether or not the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos are deemed rescinded because of respondent’s
failure to comply with it
Ruling:

Yes, Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said
agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the petitioner can
insist on his original demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection of sums of money is the proper
remedy.

In the case of Leonor v. Sycip, the Supreme Court had the occasion to explain this provision of law. It
ruled that Article 2041 does not require an action for rescission, and the aggrieved party, by the breach
of compromise agreement, may just consider it already rescinded, to wit: It is worthy of notice, in this
connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same Code, which speaks of "a cause of annulment or
rescission of the compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be annulled or rescinded" for
the cause therein specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said Article 2041
confers upon the party concerned, not a "cause" for rescission, or the right to "demand" the rescission
of a compromise, but the authority, not only to "regard it as rescinded", but, also, to "insist upon his
original demand". The language of this Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article
2039, denotes that no action for rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the party aggrieved
by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved
in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an
action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may "regard"
the compromise agreement already "rescinded".

As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, a party's non-compliance with the amicable
settlement paved the way for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may either
enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, or consider it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. In the instant case, the respondent
did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may
be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by the
terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner has
the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an
action for collection of sums of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos.

Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed rescinded by the non-compliance of the
respondent of the terms thereof, remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of said
agreement is clearly unwarranted.

LXIII.

REMEDIO V. FLORES vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL &
FERNANDO CALION

G.R. No. L-66620, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986

Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Binongcal for refusing to pay P11,643 representing cost
of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner. A second cause of action was filed against
respondent Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions. Binongcal's counsel filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand of P11,643 and under
Section 19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount
of the demand is more than P20,000. It was further averred in said motion that although another
person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. The trial court agreed with this
contention and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the petition before the Supreme
Court. Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"
totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.   Section 6 of Rule 3
which provides, Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs
or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may
be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection
with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.

Issue:

Whether or not trial court erred in dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

No, Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a
plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint.
However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more
defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a
common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.  In other words, in cases of
permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total
of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or
being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded
in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held
that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and
Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears
that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction. 

References:

https://www.lawphil.net

https://www.chanrobles.com