The Third Forensics Images and Allusions

Evison, M.P. (2015) The Third Forensics—images and allusions.
Policing and Society: An International Journal of

Research and Policy, 25, 521-39. DOI: 10.1080/10439463.2014.895347.
Evison, M.P. (2015) The Third Forensics—images and allusions. Policing and Society: An International
Journal of Research and Policy, 25, 521-39. DOI: 10.1080/10439463.2014.895347
This text is the Accepted Manuscript. The journal article can be found here
Evison, M.P. (2015) The Third Forensics—images and allusions. Policing and Society: An International Journal of
Title
The Third Forensics—images and allusions
Martin Paul Evison

Northumbria University Centre for Forensic Science
Northumbria University
Northumberland Road
Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 8ST
+44 191 243 7631
martin.evison@northumbria.ac.uk
Abstract
The London Riots of August 2011 were notable for the prominence of CCTV images of offenders in
news and social media, as well as in investigation, prosecution and conviction. The Metropolitan
Police Service relied on specialist units that had in fact been established in the five years prior to the
riots, which had been tasked with acting systematically upon CCTV image evidence: a procedural
approach deemed so effective it had been termed the ‘Third Forensics’. This article discusses the
significance of this claim and its implications for the justice system. The use of images in the
investigations of the riots was highly effective, suggesting claims for substantially improved impact in
investigation and prosecution are valid, and earlier scepticism regarding both utility and surveillance
society agendas in public area CCTV studies was justified. Systematic procedural use of CCTV footage
is not new, however, as demonstrated following riots in Vancouver, Canada, and earlier in Bradford,
UK. Furthermore, identification in the ‘Third Forensics’ is eyewitness recognition, not scientifically or
technologically comparable to fingerprints or DNA. The article suggests this difference affects risks of
prejudice and miscarriages of justice, and the ‘profiling’ of individuals and social categories images
appear to represent. The article concludes that while forensic investigation of CCTV images may not
meet scientific criteria of a third forensic discipline, it does define a nascent development in police
investigation where improvements in procedure have combined with proliferating CCTV systems and
social media. This has led to a novel set of circumstances, which raises a number of unexplored
issues of such significance that ‘Third Forensics’ is a suitable term to use to define them.
Keywords
CCTV; surveillance; forensic; identification; social media
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Introduction
In London on 4th August 2011 Mark Duggan was shot by police. Protest surrounding this fatal
shooting culminated in several days of rioting that affected the capital and a number of other British
cities. These riots were extremely serious, leading to several further deaths and other incidents of
violence, arson attacks and looting.
In the aftermath, the response of the police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was assiduous.
London’s Metropolitan Police Service (the ‘Met’) launched a major criminal inquiry into the riots in
the form of ‘Operation Withern’. Of overwhelming prominence was the use of closed-circuit
television (CCTV) footage: in the media, in police publicity, and in investigation. The use of CCTV
images in investigation and prosecution was so prominent claims were made a third forensic
discipline had arisen.
The contention that forensic investigation of CCTV images constitutes the ‘Third Forensics’ arises by
comparison with dermatoglyphic fingerprinting and DNA profiling, presently the two principal
scientific methods of individual human identification used in the justice system. The aim of this
article is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this claim.
Procedures employed in forensic investigation of CCTV images by the Met prior to and during
Operation Withern are summarised qualitatively using portrayals in the popular news media and
reports in specialist periodicals. Quantitative measures originating from these publications are used
to assess the impact of these procedures on investigation and their utility in the justice system is
appraised with reference to existing models of efficacy in forensic science.
In order to examine the extent to which CCTV evidence constitutes the ‘Third Forensics’, the
technical and scientific basis of dermatoglyphic fingerprinting and DNA profiling are briefly
compared with those of identification from CCTV images.
Finally, the findings are discussed with reference their implications to open space CCTV and the
‘public safety versus surveillance society’ debates, and to issues of due process and ‘human rights’ in
criminal investigations.
Although the procedures used by the Met are not without parallels in the UK and elsewhere, and
may not withstand direct comparison with dermatoglyphic fingerprinting and DNA profiling, it is
contended that Operation Withern nevertheless represents a watershed in the forensic investigation
of CCTV images. The combination of comprehensive investigative and prosecutorial procedures,
accompanied by the burgeoning availability of CCTV images and their use in social media and
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‘crowd-sourced policing’ is a distinctive new development with important corollaries which the term
‘Third Forensics’ serves well to define.
Forensic investigation of CCTV images prior to and during Operation Withern
A systematic procedure for the investigation of CCTV and other image evidence by the Met was
developed during the five years preceding the London riots and is frequently attributed to detective
Michael Neville. In an interview with Police magazine in 2008 (Jenkins 2008), Neville describes when
investigating a series of robberies he realised there was no proper mechanism for dealing with CCTV
image evidence. Unlike fingerprint identifications, which are recorded on a national database and
reported officially, images of suspects or offenders—Neville observed—were not then subject to
systematic recording and analysis. Another Met detective, Steve Hubbard, is reported to have been
investigating why “25 per cent of all the Met’s trials were cracked or discontinued because of issues
relating to CCTV”. As a consequence, the two detectives are said to have collaborated to establish a
specialist Visual Images Identifications and Detections Office (VIIDO) at Southwark Police Station in
London in September 2006.
The VIIDO was intended to support a standardised administrative approach to CCTV images in
investigation and prosecution that ensured admissibility of identification evidence in the courtroom
and performance management in their use (Jon 2009, Jenkins 2008). The procedure for dealing with
CCTV image evidence attributed to Neville (Jon 2009, Jenkins 2008) proceeds as follows:
1. Crime Reports are reviewed and potential sources of CCTV or other image evidence
investigated
2. Images gathered are logged and supported by a statement from the provider
3. Images depicting the suspect and their actions near the scene and of the offence, if captured
on camera, are placed on a DVD ‘story disc’. These images chosen because they are
anticipated to be those of most evidential value, and can be made available for use in
interview and at court.
4. Dissemination of images is controlled by the Met Circulation Unit (MetCU), from where they
are circulated via a variety of mechanisms, including:
a. the intranet journal Caught on Camera
b. to police officers, local authority CCTV control rooms and police informants
c. via posters in public areas and in police stations, and via local newspapers
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d. via local television and online media hotlines (e.g. Crimestoppers)
e. via the external police Web
f. via the UK Police Gazette, which is also read by prison officers
g. via national television (e.g. BBC Crimewatch UK)
5. Individuals recognised in images are compared with any existing arrest photographs
6. A summary ‘Ident Docket’ concerning the subject is passed to the investigating officer,
containing:
a. Images
b. Logs
c. Statements by image provider and identifying witness
d. Home address, previous criminal record and intelligence reports of offending of

suspect
7. All identifications and other actions relating to images are recorded on the Crime Report
Quantitative measures of impact
Operation Javelin
From the outset, the initial expectation was for VIIDO units to have special value in the investigation
of robbery and volume crime (Vallance 2007, Jon 2009). The original VIIDO established in Southwark
in 2006 was reported to have quickly acquired 2,300 images and claimed 550 positive identifications
(Jenkins 2008). Its success led to ‘Operation Javelin’: the implementation of VIIDO units at eleven
other London boroughs with the specific aim of “catching individuals caught on camera”. Operation
Javelin is claimed to have yielded a further 1,000 identifications from 5,260 image acquisitions
(Smith 2009). These successes led Neville to assert that investigative use of CCTV images amounted
to “The Third Forensics” (Jon 2009, Jenkins 2008).
Operation Withern
Although ample quantitative measures of outcome were already attributed to Operation Javelin, it
was the London riots and Operation Withern that drew national and international attention to the
investigative use of CCTV by the Met. The launch of Operation Withern on 7th August 2011, three
days after the death of Mark Duggan, attracted extensive media coverage (BBC 2010, BBC 2011,
Hough 2011, Telegraph 2012b) conspicuously featuring CCTV footage of the riots. These reports
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commonly incorporated police publicity surrounding the effort involved in investigating CCTV images
and the determination of the police to bring those responsible to justice however long it took. In the
months following the riots it was reported, for example, that 125 detectives were involved in
Operation Withern (Hough 2011) and one South London detective was quoted as describing CCTV as
“a crucial weapon in enabling police to identify the rioters” and declaring “we will not rest until we
have caught everyone who took part”. The amount of CCTV footage reported as being viewed by
police grew during the course of the investigation from 10,000 hours (Hough 2011) to 60,000 (Gould
2012), and included images and video stream from smart phones and posted in social media on the
Web.
By August 10th 2012, 3103 people had appeared before the courts as a consequence of Operation
Withern, resulting in 2646 courtroom finalisations—including 2138 guilty verdicts and 508 acquittals
(MOJ 2012). Even a year later, another detective is reported as saying “from this footage we are still
identifying, arresting and bringing to justice large numbers of offenders” and “these latest arrests
demonstrate our work is far from done” (Sabey 2012). Investigations were expected to continue well
into 2013 (Gould 2012).
Met and CPS CCTV investigation procedures and models of efficacy in forensic science
If quantitative measures of increased impact can be identified, can corroborative evidence

explaining improved performance also be identified which conforms to established models of
efficacy in forensic science? Police magazines, and the journals and online publications of CCTV users
and providers claim a number of management and performance benefits on behalf of VIIDO units
(Jon 2009, Jenkins 2008, Smith 2009) in investigation, prosecution, and crime detection and
prevention:
1. Specialisation improves the speed and quality of investigations by increasing awareness of

local CCTV positioning and data retention practices, facilitating communication with image
providers, and raising technical and procedural expertise in the collection and processing of
image evidence.
2. Specialist investigators release front line officers to other duties.
3. Systematic dissemination of CCTV image evidence promotes sharing of information between

police districts and balances opportunities for identification between cases.
4. Specialist investigators increase the prospect of guilty pleas.
5. Specialisation offers a route for training and career development.
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6. VIIDO units and specialist investigators promote informed liaison with lawyers.
7. Technical specialisation expedites presentation of image evidence in court, allowing hearings

to proceed more rapidly and reducing the risk of losing witnesses.
8. Supervision of Ident Dockets and Crime Reports allows progress to be monitored and
deficiencies addressed within an investigation.
9. VIIDO procedures permit performance to be monitored and managerial accountability to be

imposed via comparison of productivity within and between units and districts.
10. VIIDO units promote a community strategy for CCTV by enabling partnership with public and
private sector users and evidence providers, and promoting installation and technological
development that is directed toward crime and detection and prevention.
On the basis of the specialist practices described above, VIIDO unit procedures do appear to address
a number of issues commonly discussed in the literature concerning efficacy in forensic science.
Attrition models (Tilley and Burrows 2005), for example, allow points in investigative procedures to
be identified where cases fail to progress to detection, prosecution or courtroom finalisation. Like
other performance management models (SWIM 2007), the VIIDO unit procedures are structured to
overcome attrition—or “loss”—at a number of points in an investigation. These include attendance
at the scene and gathering of CCTV evidence, dissemination of images, recording and actioning of
identifications, and collection and presentation of admissible evidence in court. Furthermore, VIIDO
procedures claim to move beyond an assumption that the forensic process ends with identification
to an expectation that a courtroom finalisation is required. In Operation Withern, the investigative
process was further supported by a “Prisoner Processing Strategy” (Guardian 2011), which
mandated how prisoner and evidence, and liaison with the CPS were to be dealt with. VIIDO
procedures seek convictions that are expected to lead to a public benefit—namely, crime reduction
(Burrows 2004, Burrows and Tarling 2004). In the words of one CCTV advocate (Jon 2009), they aim
for “deterrence through detection”. Recent discourse concerning efficacy in forensic science (Tilley
and Townsley 2009) suggests it should be a factor in proactive or preventative policies. Claims on
behalf of VIIDO units assert that they do function as part of a community strategy for effective CCTV
use involving providers and local authorities, which targets criminals, demonstrates effective use of
public and private expenditure on CCTV, and reassure the public that CCTV is not “Big Brother” (Jon
2009). Procedures link image acquisition from CCTV providers to prosecutors in court in an end-to-
end process. Offenders, it is claimed, see and face the consequences of their actions as result of
being captured on CCTV.
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The ‘Third Forensics’ and the analogy drawn with dermatoglyphic fingerprinting and DNA analysis
The assertion that CCTV image analysis is the third forensic discipline rests in part on the similarity of
VIIDO procedures to those followed in the investigative and prosecutorial use of dermatoglyphic
fingerprinting and DNA profiling evidence. Fingerprint and DNA evidence form part of systematic
processes of evidential collection and analysis in investigation, which have relied increasingly on very
large computerised database systems. The historical development of these methods of human
identification and various contentions that surround their courtroom application have been
discussed extensively—by Cole (2001) and Lynch et al. (2008), for example.
DNA profiles are typically generated from biological material recovered via a scene-of-crime ‘swab’.
Fingerprints are obtained in the form of a latent fingerprint ‘lift’. In both cases, the questioned
evidence from the scene is compared with a reference sample from the suspect in order to obtain a
putative identification and both methods have become increasingly reliant on the use of large
computerised databases. The interpretation of evidence and its presentation in court follows rigid
standards, which are peculiar to each of the methods (Campbell 2011, Butler 2010). The standards
concerned have evolved to avoid errors in procedure and interpretation, and optimise impact. They
are not ostensibly complex, and it is perhaps the absence of standardised procedures in the Met
prior to VIIDO that tends to offer support for the claims made on behalf of the latter.
The inference that CCTV image analysis is forensic science might again be examined by comparison
with the paradigms of dermatoglyphic fingerprinting and DNA profiling, and the means of
identification used in VIIDO procedures. All three of these technologies are ultimately directed at
solving the problem of individual human identification. Although the development and scientific
claims of fingerprinting and DNA profiling have been critiqued individually and comparatively and in
some detail by sociologists of science and technology (Cole 2001, Lynch et al. 2008), these are the
least contentious of all of the forensic science sub-disciplines. Forensic DNA profiling is founded on
knowledge of both the molecular biology of the relevant genetic loci and the causes of their
diversity, and the known variation at these loci inferred statistically and confirmed empirically in
various population studies (Butler 2010). Much debate in contemporary forensic science and has
arisen precisely because of the high scientific standard of DNA profiling, leading to the scientific
validity of various sub-disciplines of forensic science being called into question by scientists and
other experts in the law’s use of science (NRC 2009). Although well established as a reliable method
of human identification dermatoglyphic fingerprinting, it transpires, is poorly understood
scientifically. Unlike ‘DNA fingerprints’, the genetics of dermatoglyphic fingerprints and the
underlying molecular mechanisms of their physical variation are not understood. Dependable
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though it may be, fingerprint evidence is evidence of opinion and not science—as the recent Scottish
Fingerprint Inquiry emphasised (Campbell 2011).
The basis of DNA identification is a comparison between two sets of values: the variants found at the
scene and those of the suspect (Butler 2010). Similarly, fingerprint identification is based on a
morphological comparison between finger marks left at the scene with those of the suspect
(Ashbaugh 1999). DNA matches are supported scientifically by a statistical estimation of the
frequency of the DNA profile in the general population. As fingerprint identifications are evidence of
opinion, they rely on the experts claim that they have never seen such a mark deposited by two
different individuals—that the marks in question must have been made by the same individual is
implicit. As a consequence of the method of identification, computerised searches of DNA databases
can reliably yield exact matches between profiles. Searches of fingerprint databases made using
automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) cannot do so. They generate a ranked list of
potential or probable matches. Identification of one individual from a number of candidate matches
arising from this list again relies on the opinion of a human expert.
Nevertheless, dermatoglyphic fingerprinting and DNA profiling are the most reliable forms of
forensic human identification. DNA profiling, in particular, has been shown to be invaluable in
exoneration (Saks and Koehler 2005, Gross and Shaffer 2012) as well as conviction.
What can be said about the nature and reliability of identification evidence arising from VIIDO
procedures? CCTV image evidence relies on identification by recognition of the face, clothing and
other attributes of an individual depicted in the CCTV footage. Typically, it is police officers or
members of the public who claim to recognise the individual depicted and no technical examination
is undertaken. The Police magazine article (Jenkins 2008) emphasises the role of the police in
recognising offenders in CCTV images circulated by the Met, including officers from other London
boroughs. Distinctive clothing may also be important. Some officers are significantly more active in
recognising individuals from CCTV images: a single officer from the Met’s Transport Operational
Command Unit (now Safer Transport Command) is credited with identifying between 10 and 15 per
cent of images on Caught on Camera (Jenkins 2008). In Operation Withern, the public put forward
the names of many offenders. Nevertheless, some police officers were responsible to such an extent
that they have been labelled “super-recognisers”. The top ten were responsible for recognising
about one in 16 of 3,060 individuals in images of the riots (Grimston 2011). CCTV image
identification relies on eyewitness recognition—rather than forensic analysis. DNA profiling evidence
is evidence of fact supported within a comprehensive experimental and theoretical scientific
paradigm. Dermatoglyphic fingerprinting evidence is based on rigorous empirical comparison
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between marks, but the conclusion that the two marks were made by the same individual is
evidence of opinion and not of fact—scientific or otherwise. In the VIIDO process, identifications are
made by facial recognition. They are evidence of opinion supported neither by empirical comparison
nor empirical science.
Open space CCTV and the ‘public safety versus surveillance society’ debates
Current discourse concerning public space CCTV is almost entirely concentrated within the
framework of the public safety versus surveillance society debate. One of the earliest systems in the
UK was installed by a small local government authority (Borough Council of King's Lynn and West
Norfolk 2013) in 1987. By 1994, the public safety agenda for CCTV expansion was actively promoted
by the UK Home Office, as reflected in its publication CCTV: looking out for you (Home Office 1994).
Scepticism regarding the public safety value of CCTV—as opposed to its power to reassure the
public—was evident at an early stage—see Graham et al. (1995), for example. Claims regarding the
value of public area CCTV systems are frequently challenged on the grounds that there is little
empirical evidence to support the assertion that they deter or reduce crime, except in certain very
specific circumstances (Griffiths 2003, Gill and Spriggs 2005, Gill et al. 2006). While the basis of
some studies have themselves been criticised, a series of recent meta-analyses confirm benefits
seem to accrue in certain localities and types of offence, but that such benefits are only maintained
if public awareness is also sustained (Welsh and Farrington 2008, Justice Analytical Services 2009).
Put in simple terms, CCTV cameras in a shop tend to deter shoplifting in the shop and CCTV cameras
in a car park tend to deter motor vehicle theft in the car park. The deterrence effect diminishes with
time.
These rather disappointing conclusions are reflected in the reported views of Michael Neville who at
the very outset of the establishment of VIIDO units observed that CCTV policy of the past 17 years
had “failed utterly” (Jenkins 2008) in relation to volume crime and that “vast amounts of money
have been spent on CCTV, which often has little, if any impact, on volume crime” (Jon 2009).
Neville’s comments may have led to some difficulty with the Home Office, despite the findings of the
above reviews—which appear to offer substantial corroboration. They are also supported by the
remarkable reported claim that CCTV issues were compromising 25 per cent of the Met’s trials—as
mentioned above (Jenkins 2008)—perhaps relating to the difficulties that police then faced in using
CCTV images in the courtroom (Levesley and Martin 2005), which appear to have been overcome by
Neville and colleagues (Vallance 2007).
Doubts about efficacy compound debate about public space CCTV, where it is frequently declared to
be a technology of surveillance. The UK’s Information Commissioner, for example, has suggested the
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country might be sleepwalking into a surveillance society (BBC 2006, Thomas 2006). Assertions that
the UK is the most “spied on nation in the world” (Johnston 2006) are commonplace and supported
by studies that purport to demonstrate the vast number of cameras in the country and the
frequency with which UK citizens are captured on CCTV. These surveillance studies are problematic
from a number of perspectives. They tend to make sensational claims regarding the number and
density of cameras that are questionable in relation to the statistical representativeness and wider
relevance of the samples from which they are derived. In 2003, for instance, the number of CCTV
cameras in the United Kingdom was reported as 4.29 million (McCahill and Norris 2003)—a figure
recently revised to 1.85 million (Gerrard and Thompson 2011, Lewis 2011)—and British citizens, it
has been claimed, are caught on camera an average of 300 times a day (Norris and Armstrong 1999,
Frith 2004)—a figure again recently reassessed at 70 times (Gerrard and Thompson 2011). It is
interesting to note that the number of cameras and the frequency with which an individual is
captured on CCTV is an early and persistent feature of debate in the UK (Graham et al. 1995).
Recent discussion of the development of CCTV as a tool in safety policy (Germain et al. 2012) has
drawn attention to weaknesses in both efficacy arguments and in the counter-claims framed in the
sinister language of surveillance. These authors remind us that the notions of ‘panoptica’ (Norris and
McCahill 2006) presented in surveillance studies are based on ethereal structures of observation and
naïve concepts of power (Germain et al. 2012). The proposition that more than a small percentage
of CCTV cameras can be actively monitored is impracticable; it would require a proportionally
massive number of operators. The proposition that large numbers of individuals are being identified
and traced by CCTV as they walk around British cities is similarly fanciful. In reaction to their
perception that debate surrounding CCTV expansion has hung on public safety and surveillance
society arguments that appear to lack substance, Germain, Douillet, and Duoulin (2012) advocate
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as an alternative means to structure analysis of how the histories of
municipal CCTV implementation have evolved differently in French cities, permitting the dynamics of
alliance building and the integration of interests to be scrutinised. The development of the VIIDO
procedures and the role of Michael Neville and other Met actors played in implementing them and
the challenges they faced, perhaps from within the Home Office itself, would appear to offer a
particularly valuable opportunity to raise the question of whether institutional agendas based on
popular perceptions risk overriding evidence-based public safety policies.
Implications for due process
The reliability of identification from CCTV images
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Identification from CCTV is overwhelmingly based on face recognition—by a police officer, prison
officer, a member of the public and so on. The psychology of face recognition has been researched
extensively in terms of the general mechanisms of face perception (Bruce and Young 2012) and with
regard to the significance to criminal investigation (Davies 1996, Jenkins and Burton 2008), where its
reliability remains controversial. Psychologists have used photographic images and CCTV footage of
various qualities to convincingly demonstrate that people are remarkably good at recognising
familiar faces, but consistently very poor at recognising unfamiliar ones (Bruce et al. 2001, Kemp et
al. 1997)—students and police offers have performed similarly poorly (Bruce et al. 1999). Changes in
viewpoint or expression can increase error, but surprisingly colour images and video clips do not
appear to improve performance (Hancock et al. 2000).
While the existence of true super-recognisers is a novel proposition in psychology (Russell et al.
2009) and academic experts are reported to be sceptical (Grimston 2011), the idea that some people
are better than others at recognition is not questioned. Furthermore, it is to be anticipated that
officers who have encountered individuals depicted in CCTV images before and are familiar with
them, will be able to recognise many of them (Grimston 2011). Popular accounts of police super-
recognisers quote custody officers as being particularly effective—and Ministry of Justice figures
indicate that 78 per cent of Operation Withern defendants had a previous caution or conviction and
47 per cent had more than five previous offences (MOJ 2012). It could be anticipated, therefore, that
custody officers and others familiar with the offenders captured on CCTV are able to recognise them.
Eyewitness identification, however, is acknowledged by the courts to be a particularly problematic

form of evidence. It was as direct consequence of a case of repeated eyewitness misidentification
that the UK Court of Appeal was established in the early twentieth century. The case concerned was
that of Adolf Beck, a man twice wrongfully convicted on the basis of being misidentified as a prolific
fraudster who called himself Lord Willoughby (Anon 1999). As well as being misidentified by a dozen
victims, Beck was also mistaken for the fraudster by a police officer who had encountered him
previously. This officer stated “there is no doubt whatever he is the man. I know what’s at stake on
my answer, and I say without doubt he’s the man”.
More recently, the courts have paid further attention to the flaws in eyewitness identification, again
as a consequence of a miscarriage of justice. The ‘Turnbull’ guidelines (Turnbull 1977) arose in the
1970s from the Devlin report (Devlin 1976) into the wrongful conviction of Laszlo Virag, who had
been misidentified as armed robber Georges Payen. Again, a police officer who misidentified Virag
stated “his face is imprinted on my brain”.
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Eyewitnesses, including police officers, are sometimes capable of making highly confident
misidentifications, even of people with whom they have been familiar. While comparison of
offender images from CCTV with arrest photographs may have some investigative value, this is
counteracted by the risks that context and confirmation bias will arise—as has been shown to occur
in fingerprint comparison (Dror et al. 2006) and in the interpretation of some forensic DNA profiles
(Thompson 2009).
Certain rudimentary technical methods of forensic facial comparison are available—so-called ‘facial
mapping’, for example, but these have been criticised from the perspective of lack of scientific
credibility and validation, and their potentially prejudicial nature (Mallett and Evison 2013, Ward
2012, Edmond 2011, Edmond et al. 2009). New biometric technology is also far from offering a true
forensic science of facial identification (Dessimoz and Champod 2007, Evison 2011, Jain et al. 2011)
and attempts to establish a statistical approach to facial comparison so far been limited (Mardia et
al. 1996, Yoshino et al. 2000, Evison and Vorder Bruegge 2010). Media reports on technological
innovations indicate automatic identification of logos on clothing were helpful in investigations
(Grimston 2011), but biometric facial recognition systems were not “up to the task” of identifying
offenders in the riots (Saenz 2011)—more than a decade after Norris, Moran, and Armstrong (1998)
warned of ‘algorithmic surveillance’, a future of automated visual surveillance.
Eyewitnesses, automated recognition systems and expert analysts are fallible. A particularly
disturbing case of a miscarriage of justice involving flawed testimony arising from CCTV evidence is
that of Amiliton “Nico” Bento (Bento 2009), who was wrongfully convicted of killing his girlfriend
when an expert mistook a shadow in the footage as the woman’s handbag. Whilst Bento was
eventually exonerated, the devastating effect of this error can hardly be overstated (BBC 2012).
Image evidence is often compelling, but where it is weak, it is highly prejudicial.
The risk of prejudice and miscarriages of justice
CCTV footage may offer a source of recognition, but that does not amount to identification. There is
a self-evident risk that a misidentification will be made when an individual—like Adolph Beck and
Laszlo Virag—resembles the offender. Then, the weight of the evidence of a “super-recogniser” and
the supporting Ident Docket and list of previous convictions could offer evidence which is powerfully
incriminating, but lacking in scientific substance.
The Third Forensics operates in a much wider social context than other forms of physical evidence,
however. It relies on evidence collected and disseminated in public spaces, and depicts individuals
who may be easily recognised—whether correctly or incorrectly.
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The London riots are notable for the prominence of social media, as sources of evidence—social
media were actively used in the riots (Rutledge 2011)—and as means of publicising images in
investigations via Caught on Camera, for example (Jon 2009). Operation Withern also disseminated
images via the Met’s ‘photostream’ on the image sharing Web site flickr® (Flickr 2012). More than
7.8 million hits were reported on [New Scotland] “Yard’s Flickr page” established to “name and
shame” suspected rioters and looters (Hough 2011). Traditional media reports too had the effect of
giving further exposure to footage of the incidents themselves and hence in playing an immediate
role in investigation.
Dissemination of images on posters and “in police stations where criminals can easily see them —
perhaps in the fingerprint room and cells” is claimed to help generate the names of suspects,
whether put forward by the public or by offenders—where it “encourages them to identify
themselves or other criminals” (Jon 2009). It is further claimed that when confronted with images
by trained investigators 70 per cent of suspects admit guilt and, conversely, CCTV evidence
correlates with longer sentences—acting as a disincentive to a not guilty plea (Jon 2009).
Dissemination of images has a powerful contribution to make in criminal investigation and

prosecution, but their compelling nature carries with it an inherent likelihood that misidentifications
will occur. One such misidentification is reported to have occurred early in the investigation of the
Peter Falconio murder case in Australia (Bowles 2005), for example. In this case, more than one
individual and the pick-up truck he drove resembled those depicted in CCTV images of the supposed
offender.
Mistaken eyewitnesses evidence, false confessions, investigator’s ‘tunnel vision’, flawed forensic
science and jailhouse informants are classic factors in miscarriages of justice (Saks and Koehler 2005,
Gross and Shaffer 2012). The nature and use of image evidence in the Third Forensics process
involves exposure to each of these risks. The Adolph Beck case—where several women familiar with
the offender all misidentified Beck—suggests multiple recognitions from social media will not be
immune from gross errors that are overtly compelling. There is particular danger that policies calling
for “naming and shaming” will result in the harassment of innocent individuals misidentified from
CCTV.
Outside of the United Kingdom, the use of CCTV images in the Stanley Cup Riot (VPD 2011) may offer
a source of comparison regarding the phenomenon of “crowd sourced" policing—and the related
problem of where members of the public harass suspected offenders on social media sites (Crawford
2012), potentially hampering the police investigation (Schneider and Trottier 2012). Similarly, in the
2013 protests in Brazil, in the city of Ribeirão Preto a photograph of the driver of a car alleged to
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have driven over and killed a protestor was rapidly and widely disseminated in social media by
members of the public (Anon 2013)—outside of the control of the police service.
Crowd-sourced images of alleged offenders create a risk of a return in some respects to a pre-
scientific age. In The Killer of the Little Shepherds, for instance, Starr (2011) describes the frequency
with which guilt-by-accusation plagued criminal investigation in late nineteenth century France—a
problem for which the advent of forensic science provided the antidote. The importance of
corroborative physical evidence can hardly be overstated—nor indeed can the value of exculpatory
evidence in to a criminal investigation. VIIDO specialists are trained to actively seek corroborative
evidence (Michael Neville personal communication). The recent quashing (Telegraph 2012c) of the
convictions of two men convicted of offences arising from the London Riots on the basis of
anonymous eyewitness evidence (Telegraph 2012a) offers a salutary warning that CCTV images are
as likely to fall victim to the problems of mistaken identification as any other form.
Furthermore, unlike the fingerprint or DNA profile, a face will always be far more than an “empty
signifier” of identity (Burney and Pemberton 2012, Cole 2001). The face has long been regarded as a
potential signifier of ethnicity in forensic identification (Bertillon 1885), as it is understood to be
commonly. A facial image can imply a great deal about the individual or group the face represents—
or appears to represent—uniting the criminological and the criminalistics—or identity and
identification—in a way unprecedented in the modern era (Burney and Pemberton 2012). A ‘racial’
dimension was evident in the incidents in Bradford and London, and in Ribeirão Preto the alleged
killer of a protestor was Japanese-Brazilian. In crowd-sourced policing from images, the risk of
prejudice moves beyond the danger of misidentification and prosecution of the innocent individual
to a further risk of impugning an entire social category to which the individual is perceived or
asserted to belong on the basis of images disseminated in visual and online media.
Implications for ‘human rights’
While the public appear to be reassured by the presence of public space CCTV and are not generally
persuaded by surveillance society counter-arguments, these are nevertheless seen as real concerns
by policy makers. Recently, the installation of high definition (HD) CCTV—and the improved image
quality and detail that this will entail—has raised further privacy concerns, including those of the
UK’s interim CCTV Regulator, who remarks “It is the Big Brother scenario playing out large”
(Hastings 2012, Bond 2012).
Examination of the views of offenders indicates that deterrence relies on potential wrong-doers
being aware that cameras are present and that they will be identified from them, and then works
15
only if the consequences of detection are sufficient to deter an individual who is prepared to learn by
their mistakes (Gill et al. 2006, Justice Analytical Services 2009). It is dependent upon “the individual,
and their own personal beliefs and previous experience of CCTV within the criminal justice system”
(Justice Analytical Services 2009). Interestingly, the results of a study of offenders indicate would-be
wrong-doers recognise the weaknesses of poor image resolution:
“Generally speaking, it was clear that the respondents did not perceive cameras as
particularly threatening. One offender reported an incident in which he was caught on
camera and subsequently arrested for shop theft, but where the CCTV evidence was not
clear enough to allow for a conviction” (Justice Analytical Services 2009).
CCTV image evidence is often poor and the Interim CCTV regulator, who at present is also the
Forensic Science Regulator, appears—on privacy grounds— to be inviting steps that would ensure it
remains so. It is not only attrition in prosecutions that will arise from poor quality images, however.
One wonders, for example, whether HD CCTV footage might have permitted the shadow mistaken
for Nico Bento’s girlfriend’s handbag to have been properly distinguished, saving him from
incrimination her murder and the ordeal of the wrongful conviction discussed above (Bento 2009,
BBC 2012). It may be important to consider the potential for real harm caused by not acquiring the
best possible image quality (Hastings 2012, Bond 2012) and hence the best available evidence. This
argument may apply to the other two leading methods of forensic human identification—and
policies affecting them—as well (see below).
Dermatoglyphic fingerprinting arose as the predominant form of forensic human identification

evidence in the late 19th Century and DNA profiling as a powerful alternative in the 20th (Cole 2001,
Lynch et al. 2008). The parallel growth of CCTV and other sources, the forensic analysis of facial
images and the use of social media—both by the public and by police—strongly predict an influential
role for the ‘Third Forensics’ in the 21st. In all three cases, however, growing civil-libertarian concerns
have been raised that these methods pose unjustifiable threats to privacy.
In 2008 the European Court of Human Rights through its judgement in S and Marper v United
Kingdom (2008) ruled that the retention of arrestee DNA profiles beyond certain stages in an
investigation constituted a breach of the individual’s right to a private life. This ruling has caused the
UK Government to reassess policy regarding the retention of both DNA and dermatoglyphic
fingerprint evidence, in both physical and digital database form. In this ruling, the European Court of
Human Rights found that an abstract harm—the breach of an individual’s right to a private life—
outweighed tangible harm consequent on a reduction in the effectiveness of DNA and
dermatoglyphic fingerprint databases. Undetected offences result in offenders being at further
16
liberty to commit crime—and cause real physical and material harm. There is no doubt that CCTV
contributes to the investigation of crimes involving very tangible harm arising from incidents of
extreme violence—see The Guardian (2012) for a recent example.
The real harm caused by non-retention of an arrestee’s DNA profile and the merits of the European
Court’s decision are beyond the scope of this article, but the ruling affecting the first two forensics
may have unanticipated ramifications in relation to the third.
Investigators are bound to seek to identify offenders by some means and image evidence is bound
to grow as its availability from CCTV, mobile devices, cameras, social media and so on continues to
multiply. Image evidence, however, will lack the rigorous standards of a DNA profile—further
compounding the possibilities of erroneous matches.
In the context of forensic investigation of CCTV images, the ‘known database’ is essentially the
memory of custody officers, police officers or members of the public who recognise the offender
image. Unlike DNA and fingerprint databases, however, the fidelity of the memory and reliability of
matches derived from it will diminish with time. Paradoxically, memories will be immune from
erasure—even by the European Court of Human Rights—irrespective of whether a conviction is
secured or the individual exonerated. The European Court judgement carries with it the danger that
the two most reliable forms of human identification will be rendered less effective, while a third
method of less certain reliability—known to be compelling, but prone to certain types of mistake
and bias—will proliferate in their place.
Perhaps symbolic of the risk of favouring CCTV image evidence over fingerprints and DNA is the case
of the ‘Good Samaritan’ robbers, where – during the London riots – a man was robbed by two
individuals he believed to be assisting him. The assault was captured on camera and shared on
YouTube. Two men—John Kafunda and Reece Donovan—were consequently identified and
convicted of this assault, but were ultimately released on appeal when the judges found that the
original anonymous eyewitness identification evidence was unreliable (Davies 2012, Greenwood
2012).
Recent pronouncements arising from the UK government appear to be abandoning public safety
arguments with regard to both DNA and CCTV. The CCTV regulator’s claim that “It is the Big Brother
scenario playing out large” (Hastings 2012)—discussed above—has been followed by a report from
the DNA database regulator criticising the “excesses of the previous DNA retention regime” (Home
Office 2013). Efforts to reassure the public appear to have undergone a volte face, moving from a
17
crime prevention agenda to one ostensibly based on efforts to pre-emptively secure the civil-
libertarian ground.
Neither agenda, however, has involved thorough evidence-based analysis of tangible benefit versus
tangible—as opposed to abstract—harm. This observation begs the questions of what this analysis
would reveal and why it has yet to be undertaken, and why policy formulation is deflected away
from such critical enquiry.
Summary
Procedures for forensic investigation of CCTV images used by the Met have shown substantial
impact on the justice system, both prior to and during Operation Withern. They represent a shift
from an ad hoc and contingent approach to images to one in which their use is proactively and
stridently pursued with the aim of securing convictions and reducing crime. Prior to the
implementation of VIIDO units and procedures, CCTV image evidence played a disappointing role in
criminal prosecutions. The extent of improvement lends credence to earlier scepticism regarding the
utility of public space CCTV in crime reduction and—in the absence of systematic procedures to
identify individuals and act upon that information—surveillance society agendas.
Whether these procedures amount to a new third forensic discipline is more problematic. VIIDO
units arose largely as a result of the moral entrepreneurship of a single practitioner. This observation
and the extent of public space CCTV in London and the riots of 2011 further combined to create a
unique set of circumstances. The London VIIDO units do have regional counterparts in the UK—West
Yorkshire Police Imaging Unit (West Yorkshire Police 2009), however. West Yorkshire also
experienced serious riots in 2001 (Demetriou 2001), police investigations of which also involved
systemic use of CCTV and other image (Anon 2001) evidence [the author was asked to provide
reports on the instruction of defence counsel in cases arising from the riots]. Given the size of the
capital and the organisation of its police service, it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons
between the Met and other regional police practices. In the United States, dedicated digital
evidence processing laboratories (LEVA 2012) have been established and in Canada image evidence
was extensively used in the investigation of the Vancouver “Stanley Cup Riot” of 2011 (VPD 2011).
The expansion of public area CCTV in the UK since 2001 confounds specific comparison in these
cases, however.
Technically and scientifically, forensic investigation of CCTV images withstands only limited scrutiny
by comparison with dermatoglyphic fingerprinting and DNA profiling. Procedures for identification
from images are not founded in science, but based on eyewitness identification. This distinction
18
affects evidential reliability, and increases risks of prejudice and miscarriages of justice. CCTV images
offer compelling evidence which, in the absence of corroboration, may be weak and prejudicial.
Questions of reliability in eyewitness evidence have led to many procedural safeguards (Richardson
2012, Roberts 2008), but new forms of image evidence undoubtedly demand new safeguards in
investigation and in court (Edmond 2012, Ward 2012, Costigan 2007). Identification is a post hoc
process relying on retention of CCTV images, their collection and dissemination in news and social
media, and eyewitness recognition by the public as well as state actors—the police, prison officers,
public employees, and so on. Facial image evidence is representative of individuals and wider social
groups, and entails new risks of misidentification and harassment arising from media dissemination
and crowd-sourced policing.
The relevance of new technology and new media phenomena can be predicted to remain a key
driver in the prevalence and investigative use of images. Without the power of prophesy, automatic
or ‘robotic’ electronic surveillance systems as predicted by some authors (Norris et al. 1998) cannot
be ruled out, but development of reliable public space automated facial recognition systems has
continually failed to meet expectations. More plausible technology that may enhance the efficiency
of investigation, but also carry with them new implications for due process include social media-
related developments—such as mobile apps (BAPCO 2012) and CCTV and image data management
systems such as the Forensic Image Linking and Management system used by the Met (FILM 2013).
As Ward (2012) notes “the storage of images in searchable databases raises the question of whether
somebody could be prosecuted solely on the basis of a facial resemblance discovered in this way”
(Ward 2012 p. 43).
Conclusions
While the Met’s use of forensic investigation of CCTV images may not fully meet objective criteria of
an entirely new forensic science, the term ‘Third Forensics’ serves to symbolise a new set of
circumstances where procedural developments in investigation and prosecution combine within a
novel technological and social environment. Prior to the Third Forensics, public area CCTV does not
appear to have posed a very active threat—either to criminals or to civil liberties. While debate on
public space CCTV has focused on the utility and the surveillance society agendas, more productive
avenues of enquiry may have been neglected. More nuanced studies examining public policy
development surrounding CCTV as a socio-technical tool in crime detection and prevention are
required, and regulation and legislation might focus on quality and safeguards in practice. More
consideration might be given to the question of whether abstract concepts of harm are driving
potentially misconceived human rights agendas that may inhibit technology, and serve to diminish
19
the quality and reliability of forensic identifications—whether from DNA, fingerprints or CCTV. In
doing so, such policies may increase the frequency of missed or mistaken identifications, leading to
risks of tangible harm to public safety and unwarranted invasions of privacy—things of a kind these
agendas would claim to seek to avoid.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Michael Neville of the Metropolitan Police Service and my colleagues in Northumbria
University Centre for Forensic Science for comments on early drafts of this article.
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Evison, M.P. (2015) The Third Forensics—images and allusions.

Policing and Society: An International Journal of

The Third Forensics—images and allusions

Martin Paul Evison

CCTV; surveillance; forensic; identification; social media

Forensic investigation of CCTV images prior to and during Operation Withern

a. the intranet journal Caught on Camera

d. via local television and online media hotlines (e.g. Crimestoppers)

e. via the external police Web

f. via the UK Police Gazette, which is also read by prison officers

g. via national television (e.g. BBC Crimewatch UK)

c. Statements by image provider and identifying witness

d. Home address, previous criminal record and intelligence reports of offending of

Quantitative measures of impact

If quantitative measures of increased impact can be identified, can corroborative evidence

1. Specialisation improves the speed and quality of investigations by increasing awareness of

2. Specialist investigators release front line officers to other duties.

3. Systematic dissemination of CCTV image evidence promotes sharing of information between

4. Specialist investigators increase the prospect of guilty pleas.

5. Specialisation offers a route for training and career development.

7. Technical specialisation expedites presentation of image evidence in court, allowing hearings

9. VIIDO procedures permit performance to be monitored and managerial accountability to be

Implications for due process

The reliability of identification from CCTV images

Eyewitness identification, however, is acknowledged by the courts to be a particularly problematic

The risk of prejudice and miscarriages of justice

Dissemination of images has a powerful contribution to make in criminal investigation and

Implications for ‘human rights’

Dermatoglyphic fingerprinting arose as the predominant form of forensic human identification

average-briton-is-caught-on-camera-300-times-a-day-572781.html# [Accessed 8th October

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