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JPF Stability Pact 090309 en
JPF Stability Pact 090309 en
JPF Stability Pact 090309 en
We need a proper Stability Pact
Published in Le Monde, Handelsblatt and Rzeczpospolita
Jean PisaniFerry
Three to four percentage points of GDP expected in 2009 in Germany, five to six percent in France,
around 12 percent in the US. Everywhere deficits are ballooning and the level of concern rising. The
recovery has scarcely begun but are we already to prepare for a period of belt‐tightening?
It would be a big mistake. The lastest data on the business cycle point to a European contraction equally
swift and sharp as in the US, where Congress has just adopted a huge recovery plan set to inject the
equivalent of two percentage points of GDP into the economy in 2009. But the European effort is much
more timid. The Commission has calculated the European stimulus at between three and four
percentage points of GDP. But it only arrives at this figure by topping up the fiscal boost with
government and quasi‐government loans ‐ which merely replace the shortfall in private credit – and with
the action of the automatic stabilisers (ie the fact that no action entails a bigger deficit on account of
reduced revenue). While it is clearly a good thing to allow the stabilisers to do their job, they only serve
to cushion the shock, not to stimulate. A realistic assessment of the budgetary spend in 2009 would be
0.9 percent points of GDP. This is obviously inadequate, especially as the infrastructure investments that
many countries have opted for will only be carried out over time. In Germany, for example, the bulk of
the spending will not occur before summer 2009.
The contrast in approach on either side of the Atlantic is not attributable to the respective fiscal
positions: government debt is virtually at the same level in the two cases. It is primarily a result of
European fragmentation. This means, first, that each country secretly hopes that its neighbours will
stimulate for it (as an Irish minister candidly put it: ‘the best stimulus is that of our commercial partners.
It stimulates our exports but costs us nothing’). Fragmentation is also exposing those countries whose
public finances are the most shaky under market pressure. Greece and now Ireland are having to pay a
premium to borrow. Italy seems so strapped that it has not taken any recovery measure worthy of the
name. This combination of wait‐and‐see and apprehension explains why Germany, which could but
won’t and Italy, which would but can’t, are doing nothing more to support economic activity.
To exit this stalemate all countries should be participating in the stimulus, and it should be up to the
most indebted and the weakest to commit, in return, to take drastic belt‐tightening measures once
growth resumes. The correct fiscal policy at the moment is neither to put the brakes on nor to freewheel
but to spend solidly today (or reduce taxes) in order to boost the economy and, at the same time,
commit just as seriously to saving tomorrow. Contrary to what the advocates of permanent deficit and
the ayatollahs of never‐ending rigour would have us believe, immediate stimulus and future discipline
thus go entirely hand‐in‐hand.
The problem is that government promises are not credible and, in spite of the arsenal of criteria and
procedures of the so‐called Stability Pact, European surveillance is no more credible. Every French
government has for ten years gone through the motions of committing vis‐à‐vis its partners to a
timetable for returning to balance, and its partners have gone through the motions of believing it. In
Greece it is not the future which has been seen through rose‐tinted spectacles but the past. As for Italy,
it has been uniquely creative in its accounting. In short, techniques have varied but the fact remains that,
over the last ten years, no country has been seriously threatened with sanctions. The result is that
markets look upon the Stability Pact as a paper tiger.
If Europeans were really serious, they would agree without delay on a recast of the Stability Pact which
would provide more breathing space in the short term but at the same time keep a tighter mid‐term rein
on government debt. Alas, this is not the likeliest scenario. This being the case, it is up to each country to
set its own rules on fiscal discipline and to invest in institutions and tools which can guarantee that they
are respected. The faster this is done, the better equipped we will be to confront an economic situation
which is getting worse by the day.