Jail Show Cause File

Case 3:16-cv-00489-CWR-RHWR Document 126 Filed 02/04/22 Page 1 of 27
____________________
No. 3:16-CV-489-CWR-RHWR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
v.
HINDS COUNTY, ET AL.

Defendants.
____________________
FIRST ORDER OF CONTEMPT

____________________
Before CARLTON W. REEVES, District Judge.

The United States Department of Justice brought this action
to end unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Hinds
County’s Raymond Detention Center (RDC).
In 2016, Hinds County’s Board of Supervisors promised to fix
the problems by agreeing to a Consent Decree. In 2020, facing
the threat of being held in contempt of court, the Board of Su-
pervisors again promised to fix the problems by agreeing to a
Stipulated Order.
It is now 2022. Many of the problems the Board promised to

address have not been corrected. Specifically, the County is
non-compliant with more than two dozen provisions of the
Consent Decree.
As explained below, therefore, Hinds County and its Board of
Supervisors are in contempt of court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
RDC has been troubled since it opened in 1994. From its in-
ception, “the jail designed to improve conditions for detainees
has faced a myriad of problems: structural deficiencies,
chronic understaffing and poor management. But fixing those
problems ha[s] been elusive under whatever sheriff and
Hinds County Board of Supervisors are in elected office at a
given time.” Kayode Crown, One Jail’s Tale: Hinds County De-
tention Center At Risk Of Federal Takeover, Miss. Free Press (Oct.
15, 2021).
Captain Diane Riley testified shortly after RDC’s opening that
“the new jail’s doors were inadequate to provide security.”
Dean v. Thomas, 933 F. Supp. 600, 608 (S.D. Miss. 1996). That
is, the cell doors failed to lock. Nearly three decades later, the
cell doors still fail to lock. See Docket No. 94 at 4 [hereinafter
Fourteenth Monitoring Report]; see also Ruth Ingram, Year after
riot, cell doors at Hinds County jail still don't lock, Clarion-
Ledger (July 23, 2013); Ruth Ingram, Officials: 'Antsy' juvenile
inmates flood area at Hinds jail in Raymond, Clarion-Ledger (July
19, 2013) (“We have doors with no locks,” the Sheriff’s spokes-
man candidly admitted.); Docket No. 31 at 20 (“the Jail con-
tinues to lack even the most basic security and safety features,
such as lockable cell doors . . . .”); Docket No. 60 at 4 (“At RDC,
doors and locks are broken. Prisoners can break out of their
2
cells, break out of their housing units and even enter a jail con-
trol room.”).
A significant riot in 2012 brought the facility’s problems to the
forefront. “[P]risoners destroyed fixtures and walls, sprayed
water hoses and fire extinguishers, and left ceilings in sham-
bles,” the State’s newspaper of record reported. Ruth Ingram,
Jail getting repairs; much more needed, Clarion-Ledger (Nov. 7,
2012). “It’s no secret that the door locks need to be replaced,”
Chief Deputy Chris Picou added. “I don’t know that the jail
has ever been up to industry standards.” Id.
A series of escapes in 2012 and 2013 shed additional light
upon the conditions at the jail. See Ruth Ingram, Escape draws
attention to jail, policies, Clarion-Ledger (Apr. 22, 2013) (“Es-
capes this year and last have been blamed on faulty locks and
security for jail and cell doors. The county last year ordered
emergency repairs in April on doors that had been problem-
atic and a security risk since the facility opened in 1994.”).
Sheriff Tyrone Lewis, who had commissioned a 500-page re-
port on the previous administration, blamed the escapes on
“malfunctioning doors and conditions at the aging facility.”
Monique Valeris, Lewis says he’s not pointing blame at McMillin,
WAPT (Aug. 8, 2012).
In 2013, Hinds County Circuit Judge Tomie Green convened
a special grand jury to investigate conditions at RDC. The re-
porting this time centered on safety concerns:
On Sunday, a SWAT team stormed the facility
after a dozen inmates broke out of their cells, in
part because of faulty locks. Last week, a group
of juveniles flooded a portion of the jail by turn-
ing on a fire hydrant. Reports also surfaced that
3
several inmates were stabbed and a number of

deputies and jailers sustained minor injuries. In
June, one inmate died and another was hurt in
a string of violent episodes that also left three
deputies with injuries.
Emily Le Coz, Grand jury probes Hinds jail issues, Clarion-
Ledger (July 26, 2013). The grand jury concluded that RDC
was “in a deplorable condition and inadequately staffed.”
Docket No. 3-4 at 5.
In 2014 and 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights
Division investigated conditions at RDC and the two other fa-
cilities that comprise Hinds County’s jail system: the Work
Center and the downtown jail. Docket No. 3-1. It concluded
that the County was violating the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by, among other things described in its 29-page
report, failing to provide “minimum levels of protection from
violence,” failing to have “sufficient numbers of trained
staff,” and incarcerating persons “beyond their court-ordered
release dates.” Docket No. 3-3 at 2-3. The problems had re-
sulted in “at least three major riots, two alleged homicides,
and numerous assaults on prisoners and staff members.” Id.
at 2. The Findings Letter resulted in the Mississippi Depart-
ment of Corrections moving its state inmates from RDC. State
inmates removed from troubled jail in Hinds County, Corrections
1 (May 27, 2015). “[W]e believe removing the state inmates is
in the best interest of the State of Mississippi and the in-
mates,” said State Corrections Commissioner Marshall Fisher.
Id.
The Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in 2016. Its com-
plaint described an inability to meet minimum constitutional
standards with respect to detainee-on-detainee violence,
4
staff-on-detainee violence, “dangerously low staffing levels,”

jail policies and procedures, housing and classification sys-
tems, the physical plant, internal investigations, detention of
persons who should have been released, and the treatment of
juvenile and suicidal detainees. Docket No. 1 at 3-5. The De-
partment alleged that the constitutional violations “have been
obvious and known to Defendants for a substantial period of
time.” Id. at 5. The Attorney General herself signed the com-
plaint. Id. at 7, 10.
The parties immediately entered into a Consent Decree.
Docket Nos. 3; 8-1. The Consent Decree required Hinds
County to implement dozens of minimal constitutional stand-
ards. Hinds County expressly stipulated that the Consent De-
cree was “narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary
to correct the violations of federal rights,” and “is the least in-
trusive means necessary to correct these violations.” Docket
No. 8-1 at 61.
A Monitoring Team was also established. Id. at 54; see also
Docket No. 10; Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1321 (5th Cir.
1974). It includes Elizabeth Simpson, David Parrish, Jim
Moeser, and Dr. Richard Dudley. They are subject-matter ex-
perts in corrections, corrections operations, juvenile justice,
and corrections mental health, respectively. The Monitors be-
gan to provide technical assistance, conduct regular site visits,
and serve as the eyes and ears of the Court 1 as the parties at-
tempted to meet the requirements of the Consent Decree.
1 The Consent Decree and Monitoring Team were approved by U.S. Dis-
trict Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. The case was transferred to the under-
signed in December 2018 upon Judge Barbour taking senior status.
5
Hinds County’s efforts have borne fruit at one of its jails—the

Work Center. 2 The Monitoring Team describes the Work Cen-
ter as a functional jail for the citizens of Hinds County. See,
e.g., Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 29. This Court’s own
visits to the facilities confirms that the Work Center largely
operates as a jail should.
The story is not the same for RDC.
In 2019, the Department of Justice filed a Motion for an Order
to Show Cause outlining a litany of ongoing constitutional vi-
olations at RDC. Docket No. 31. It described the County’s
“continued failure to comply with nearly all provisions of the
Settlement, including provisions regarding security, medical
screening, suicide prevention, mental health care, youth ser-
vices, fire safety, sanitary conditions, and release proce-
dures.” Id. at 5. As any elementary school child understands,
the County was flunking, miserably. The result was rioting,
stabbings, a murder, staff-on-detainee assaults, and a “major
disturbance” during a Monitoring Team site visit that re-
sulted in eight emergency room transports. Id. at 7-8, 14. The
Department added that the situation on the ground was
“likely worse” than it could adequately summarize because
of poor record-keeping at RDC. Id. at 8.
Hinds County again avoided significant litigation, and possi-
ble sanctions, by agreeing to a Stipulated Order. See Docket
Nos. 60 and 60-1; accord Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088,
Immediately upon being assigned the case, this Court held a status con-
ference and “received an update as to the progress toward compliance
with the Consent Agreement from the parties and the Court Appointed
Monitor.” See Minute Entry of Jan. 15, 2019.
2 Hinds County’s third facility, the downtown jail, was closed in 2020.
6
1091 (9th Cir. 2010). By the parties’ admission, the Stipulated

Order was “designed by the parties to be additional relief,”
and “d[id] not replace the Court’s original consent decree.”
Docket No. 55 at 5. Instead, the Stipulated Order focused on
the areas of “greatest concern,” i.e., “[t]he locks not working,”
“repairs to the physical plant,” and “staffing enhancements,
the creation of a staffing plan, better use of staff, recruitment,
and retention.” Id. at 16.
At a December 6, 2019 hearing, the parties also addressed the
lack of a qualified jail administrator. Hinds County conceded
that it did not “currently have an administrator who meets
the requirements of Paragraph 38 of the agreement.” Id. at 34.
Accordingly, the Stipulated Agreement mandated “that the
county hire somebody who does have those qualifications.”
Id.
When the Court inquired about the ability of the then-sitting
Board of Supervisors to bind future Boards to the Stipulated
Agreement, the attorney for the County assured the Court
that such concerns were misplaced. He cited to Judge Bar-
bour’s prior observation that “it was irrelevant who the board
was,” as “[i]t’s the county that is the party, and the county has
constitutional obligations that it must obey.” Id. at 55. As an-
other attorney put it, “[y]ou don’t get a fresh slate when you
come into office.” Id. at 56. Regardless of personnel changes,
the County was bound to follow the Stipulated Agreement.
At the close of the hearing, the attorney for the County en-
tered a statement on the record, professing a desire to “make
sure that the incoming supervisors, regardless of who they
choose as counsel, know those words well,” and quoted the
Court’s earlier warning that if the County “’remains uninter-
ested in fixing this problem, the government will be doomed
7
to repeat it and repeatedly have to defend it in federal court.’”

Counsel assured the Court that he and the County did
“wholeheartedly hear” the Court’s concerns regarding condi-
tions at RDC. Id. at 99. He then, “on behalf of the county,”
vowed to “continue doing everything we can for whatever
time we represent the county to make sure that no one is
treated inhumanely at . . . county detention facilities.” Id.
This Court begrudgingly approved their agreement even
though the County had reached sustained compliance “in
only one of the 92 requirements of the Consent Decree.”
Docket No. 60 at 7. “While a finding of contempt is war-
ranted,” the undersigned wrote, “the parties’ stipulated order
outlines what is perhaps the most comprehensive remedial
plan for Hinds County to become compliant that the Court
has seen from the parties.” Id. at 11. “Ten months from today,
the County should have made significant progress on devel-
oping and implementing policies, making repairs to the phys-
ical plant and ensuring incarcerated youth have necessary
programming, among other necessary investments.” Id. Mon-
itoring continued; periodic status conferences were held. The
facility limped along into the present.
The situation deteriorated significantly in 2021. According to
the Fourteenth Monitoring Report,
There were a record number of fights and as-
saults at RDC in May [2021], there continue to
be fires set by inmates, there is an extremely
large amount of contraband in the facility in-
cluding drugs, there have been a number of
overdoses although no deaths from those over-
doses, and there have been three deaths, two by
suicide. Although there is some cause for
8
optimism with the new Detention Administra-

tor being hired3, this is a very disturbing trend.
Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 3 (emphasis added).
The situation became more uncertain when Sheriff Vance, the
elected official with primary responsibility for RDC, passed
away from COVID-19 on August 3, 2021. On August 16, 2021,
the Board of Supervisors appointed Marshand Crisler to be
Interim Sheriff. Marshand Crisler named interim Hinds County
Sheriff, Jackson Advocate (Aug. 16, 2021).
On October 18, 2021, RDC experienced its sixth death of the
year. The Monitoring Team filed an emergency report on Oc-
tober 27 characterizing the pattern of deaths as “especially
alarming.” Docket No. 96 at 2 [hereinafter October 27 Emer-
gency Monitoring Report].
A brief summary of each death is provided here.
The first death, on March 19, 2021, happened when a nurse
ordered an arrestee to be taken to the hospital and no one car-
ried out her order. Id. The arrestee subsequently collapsed. An
3 The Monitoring Team reports that the (now-departed) Detention Ad-

ministrator, Major Kathryn Bryan, is “very well qualified.” Fourteenth
Monitoring Report at 3. Indeed, at a status conference following Major
Bryan’s hiring, counsel for the County declared that Major Bryan “comes
with a wealth of information” and that “[t]he sheriff has 1,000 percent faith
and trust in her.” Docket No. 93 at 52. The County’s attorney went on to
state that “now with the addition of Ms. Bryan, I can represent to the Court
that things are going to be evolving at a very rapid pace, at a very positive
pace, and the safety and security of our inmates and our staff is the num-
ber one priority of the sheriff.” Id. at 67. The Sheriff was even more effu-
sive. Analogizing to basketball, the Sheriff expressed his complete backing
of Major Bryan, emphasizing that “there’s no need in having Michael Jor-
dan on your team if you’re not going to let him shoot the ball.” Id. at 60.
9
oxygen concentrator was obtained but would not turn on be-

cause the electrical outlet was faulty. Someone ran to get an
AED (automated external defibrillator) unit from Medical,
but the AED unit had no pads. The arrestee died. RDC staff
then “took the position that he was not an inmate because he
had not been accepted/booked.” Id. An after-action report has
not been completed for this death. 4
The second death, on April 18, was a suicide by a detainee
being housed in a booking cell, a practice “that the Monitor-
ing Team has repeatedly stated should not be done and is con-
trary to the Settlement Agreement.” Id. The Officer who dis-
covered the body could not enter the unit because he lacked
keys, and the Officer who was supposed to be on duty at
booking was not at his post. “The last documented well-being
check was made at 1105, more than three hours before the in-
cident.” Id. Again, no after-action report was completed.
The third death occurred on July 6. It was another death by
hanging—although the available record is silent on whether
it was a suicide. The Officer charged with performing 30-mi-
nute head counts “left the unit” for unknown reasons. Id. at 3.
When he returned to look in, he did so from a vantage point
“from where he could not possibly see each inmate to conduct
an accurate count.” Id. Again, no after-action report was com-
pleted.
Death number four was a drug overdose on August 3. “An
IAD investigation is still underway, but inmates on the unit
4 An after-action report is a way for officials and monitors to “gather facts,
identify problems, examine staff performance, and develop a plan to pre-

vent future” major disturbances. Depriest v. Walnut Grove Corr. Auth., No.
3:10-CV-663-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL 3795020, at *11 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2015).
10
reported that they had been calling for assistance for five
hours and that there had been no response to their cries for
help.” Id. The condition of the body indicated that the de-
tainee had been dead for some time when he was discovered.
Again, no after-action report has been completed.
The fifth death occurred the next day, when a detainee died
in the hospital from COVID complications. “Although the
death appears to be medically related,” the Monitoring Team
wrote, “there are questions regarding when his symptoms
first appeared and whether they were timely and adequately
responded to as well as . . . the adequacy of the precautions
being taken by the Jail to prevent the spread of the virus.” Id.
No investigation into his death was conducted.
The sixth death warrants a few more details. On October 18,
was an assault in a unit where the doors do not lock and staff
supervision is “minimal.” Id. The Monitors’ description re-
layed the following:
At about 0430 or 0500 in the morning, video
footage showed the inmate being hit in the head
by another inmate. A third inmate then
stomped on his head several times. He was then
dragged across the mezzanine. The video foot-
age shows brief movement by the decedent and
then none indicating that he was probably dead
at that point but a time of death has not been
established. He was eventually dragged back
and propped in a sitting position and then later
laid on a mat. He was not discovered by officers
until 1:45, almost 9 hours later.
11
Id. at 3-4. 5
The Monitoring Team concluded its Emergency Report with
a recommendation “that the Court set a status confer-
ence/hearing to address immediate measures that need to be
taken to address the concerns raised above and prevent the
future loss of life.” Id. at 5.
On November 10, Detention Administrator Bryan submitted
her letter of resignation. She described “a distinct lack of sup-
port” and relayed in detail a recent directive from the Interim
Sheriff that she found “reckless and dangerous.” She had
served for a total of only five months before submitting her
letter of resignation. She planned to leave in mid-February
2022.
On November 23, 2021 a runoff election was held to replace
Sheriff Vance. Interim Sheriff Crisler faced off against Tyree
Jones, a member of Vance’s command staff. That same day,
after the polls closed and before the results of the election
were known, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause di-
recting the County to explain why it should not be held in
contempt of court and why a receivership should not be im-
posed to run RDC.
Tyree Jones won the runoff election later that night. He was
sworn into office in December 2021 and presently serves as
Hinds County Sheriff.
On January 31, 2022, Major Bryan was relieved of her duties.
This Order followed.
5The County submits that “Major Bryan personally investigated the inci-
dent and authored the after-action report” for this death. Docket No. 112
at 5.
12
II. Law
A. Consent Decrees
“A consent decree is akin to a contract yet also functions as an
enforceable judicial order.” United States v. Chromalloy Am.
Corp., 158 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Frew ex rel. Frew
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). Consent decrees are com-
monly used to address ongoing constitutional violations in
jail and prison cases. E.g., DePriest v. Walnut Grove Corr. Auth.,
No. 3:10-CV-663-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL 3795020, at *3 (S.D.
Miss. June 10, 2015).
Although “state and local authorities have primary responsi-
bility for curing constitutional violations,” Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 687 (1978), “[f]ederal courts are not reduced to ap-
proving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once en-
tered, a consent decree may be enforced.” Frew, 540 U.S. at
440.
B. Stipulations
“As a general rule, a stipulation is a judicial admission bind-
ing on the parties making it, absent special considerations.”
Vallejos v. C. E. Glass Co., 583 F.2d 507, 510 (10th Cir. 1978) (ci-
tation omitted). Because a stipulation concedes “the truth of
some alleged fact . . . the fact is thereafter to be taken for granted;
so that the one party need offer no evidence to prove it and the other
is not allowed to disprove it.” Vander Linden v. Hodges, 193 F.3d
268, 279 (4th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up).
The Fifth Circuit strictly construes stipulations:
Before agreeing to a stipulation, a litigant has a
duty to satisfy himself concerning the matters
which his opponent proposes for stipulation.
13
Once the stipulation was made, any error in col-

lating or tabulating its supporting documents
was no longer [the plaintiff’s] responsibility.
The ultimate and underlying facts were ac-
cepted by and binding upon both parties. . . .
Once a matter is stipulated, it should then be
laid to rest and should not be inquired into fur-
ther unless the stipulation is vacated by consent
or set aside by the court.
Downs v. Am. Emp. Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 1160, 1164–65 (5th Cir.
1970) (citing Wigmore on Evidence).
Courts have every right to rely upon stipulations. “The power
of the court to act in the disposition of a trial upon facts con-
ceded by counsel is as plain as its power to act upon the evi-
dence produced.” Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263
(1880).
C. Judicial Estoppel
Judicial estoppel is defined as “taking a position clearly in-
consistent with an earlier position that was accepted by a tri-
bunal in circumstances that would create an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on an opposing party.” Wright
& Miller, 18B Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4477 (2d ed. updated April
2021). As the Supreme Court articulated long ago, “where a
party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter,
simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary
position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who
has acquiesced in the position formerly taken . . . .” Davis v.
Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895).
14
The purpose of judicial estoppel “is to protect the integrity of

the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately
changing positions according to the exigencies of the mo-
ment.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001)
(cleaned up). The doctrine is an equitable one “invoked by a
court at its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).
“In this circuit, at least two requirements must be met before
a party’s argument may be judicially estopped. First, the es-
topped party’s position must be clearly inconsistent with its
previous one, and second, that party must have convinced the
court to accept that previous position.” Gabarick v. Laurin Mar.
(Am.) Inc., 753 F.3d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). That
said, the doctrine “defies inflexible prerequisites or an ex-
haustive formula.” Id.
D. Civil Contempt
“Civil . . . contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with
an order of the court.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336
U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (citations omitted). Courts have inherent
power to enforce their orders. Shillitani v. United States, 384
U.S. 364, 370 (1966). As for consent decrees, courts have “the
power to enforce and modify the terms of the decree and to
penalize the noncomplier through contempt proceedings or
the issuance of injunctive relief.” B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d
294, 300 (7th Cir. 1995).
To hold a respondent in civil contempt, the moving party
must prove by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) that a court
order was in effect; (2) that the order required certain conduct
by the respondent; and (3) that the respondent failed to com-
ply with the court’s order.” Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford En-
ters., 826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 1987).
15
“The contemptuous actions need not be willful so long as the

contemnor actually failed to comply with the court’s order.”
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574, 581 (5th
Cir. 2000). That means “[g]ood faith is not a defense to civil
contempt.” Chao v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 276 F.3d 725, 728
(5th Cir. 2002). “An act does not cease to be a violation of a
law and of a decree merely because it may have been done
innocently.” McComb, 336 U.S. at 191.
“If a state agency refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial
penalty may be the most effective means of insuring compli-
ance.” Frew, 540 U.S. at 440 (citation omitted); see also Am. Air-
lines, 228 F.3d at 585.
III. Discussion
Hinds County’s new attorneys have filed a motion to termi-
nate the Consent Decree. Docket No. 111. After stating for
nearly six years that the provisions of the Consent Decree
were necessary and in conformance with the Constitution, the
County now says that the Consent Decree exceeds “the con-
stitutional minimum necessary to provide the County’s in-
mates with basic sustenance.” Docket No. 112 at 2. In short,
Hinds County says it is no longer violating its citizens’ consti-
tutional rights at RDC.
Needless to say, the available evidence does not support this
proposition. See, e.g., Docket No. 100 at 10-13 and 18-27. The
motion instead appears to be a last-ditch effort to prevent a
federal takeover of the Raymond Detention Center.
Given the evidence contained in the 15 Monitoring Reports,
Hinds County’s newfound position is very concerning. Fifth
Circuit law on stipulations and judicial estoppel, recited
above, does not favor parties changing their positions without
16
evidentiary support. Hinds County decided to commit to the

Consent Decree and the Stipulated Order. Twice it agreed that
their provisions were narrowly tailored and the minimum
necessary. It should have to live with that choice until it fixes
RDC.
To all this, the County’s new lawyers swear that there’s a
“positive, upward trend of operations at the RDC.” Docket
No. 112 at 4. They minimize the number of deaths the facility
saw last year, pointing out that there’s a new Sheriff in town.
And although the Sheriff’s relationship with the Detention
Administrator is “damaged,” as the County concedes—so
damaged that Major Bryan just left her job—it then says “op-
erations and improvements at the RDC continue to take hold
and move forward.” 6 Id. at 5. But this Court visited RDC last
week. It looked substantially the same as when the Court vis-
ited nearly three years ago.
Because the County has invoked the termination provisions
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court will conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine which parts of the Consent
Decree should continue to govern RDC into the future—if
any. The hearing will commence February 14. The public is
invited to attend and learn for itself whether there are ongo-
ing constitutional violations at RDC.
For present purposes, though, the Court confines itself to the
contempt issue. To that end, it now identifies several provi-
sions of the Consent Decree that the County is violating, and
6We do not know whether Major Bryan was fired or resigned. Testimony
at the evidentiary hearing may shed light on the subject.
17
which therefore warrant contempt of Court. 7 See Petroleos

Mexicanos, 826 F.2d at 401.
In this inquiry the Court primarily relies upon the reports of
the Monitoring Team, the subject-matter experts recom-
mended by the parties and charged by Judge Barbour with
being the eyes and ears of the Court. See Eng. v. Cunningham,
269 F.2d 517, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1959). As the Department of Jus-
tice explained in a recent memorandum,
In many cases involving consent decrees and
settlements with state and local governments,
the use of monitors is essential to the successful
implementation of the decree or agreement.
Monitors serve a crucial role as an independent
validator of a jurisdiction’s progress in imple-
menting the reforms required by a settlement.
They are generally selected after an extensive
negotiation between the parties, with approval
by the supervising federal court. Because they
are officers of the court, monitors act as neutral
arbiters of a jurisdiction’s compliance with a de-
cree, a process that can increase the confidence
the Court and stakeholders have in the settle-
ment process.
Memorandum from Attorney General Merrick Garland to
Heads of Civil Litigating Components and United States At-
torneys at 2-3 (Sept. 13, 2021); accord Juan F. By & Through
7 This Order contains the obvious shortfalls—the non-compliant provi-

sions. After the evidentiary hearing, further findings may issue regarding
the 59 requirements on which Hinds County is presently in “partial com-
pliance.”
18
Lynch v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Defendants

had conceded that they could not fully comply with the pro-
visions in the decree, and the monitor’s findings, analysis, and
recommendations to the district court, all based on ample ev-
idence, did no more than ensure compliance with the decree .
. . . [T]he court monitor [ ], under the consent decree as modi-
fied by the monitoring order, is the centerpiece of the alterna-
tive-dispute-resolution process.”).
Also at the Court’s disposal, however, are numerous status
conferences, hearing transcripts, and the County’s response
to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. In that response, the
County begged this Court to delay its decision on contempt
until July 1, 2022, so that it could continue “turning the RDC
battleship towards a new and better heading.” Docket No. 105
at 1. Apparently, the County and its new attorneys decided to
just abandon ship, and instead spent their time engineering a
position antithetical to all of the County’s prior representa-
tions.
Now to the civil contempt analysis.
The first two elements of the civil contempt standard are eas-
ily satisfied. There is no dispute that a Court Order was in ef-
fect that required certain conduct of Hinds County. The
County agreed to a judicially-enforceable contract when its
(previous) attorneys signed the Consent Decree.
The remaining element asks whether Hinds County failed to
comply with the Court Order. Based on the facts contained in
the Fifteenth Monitoring Report, the answer is a resounding
“yes.”
Hinds County’s termination motion claims as victory every
provision for which it is in sustained compliance (three of 92
19
requirements), substantial compliance (zero requirements),

and even partial compliance (59 requirements). See Docket No.
112 at 4. But that leaves more than two dozen provisions
where the County is simply non-compliant with a Court Or-
der. For each of those, the County is in civil contempt.
The non-compliant paragraphs are as follows:
Protection from Harm
41. Ensure that Jail policies and procedures pro-
vide for the “direct supervision” of all Jail hous-
ing units.
42. Ensure that the Jail has sufficient staffing to
adequately supervise prisoners, fulfill the terms
of this Agreement, and allow for the safe opera-
tion of the Jail. . . . (remainder omitted).
43. Include outcome measures as part of the
Jail’s internal data collection, management, and
administrative reporting process. . . . (remain-
der omitted).
48. Install cell phone jammers or other electronic
equipment to detect, suppress, and deter unau-
thorized communications from prisoners in the
Jail. Installation must be completed within two
years after the Effective Date.
49. Develop and implement a gang program in
consultation with qualified experts in the field
that addresses any link between gang activity in
the community and the Jail through appropriate
provisions for education, family or community
involvement, and violence prevention.
20
Use of Force Training

54. The County must randomly test at least 5
percent of Jail Staff members annually to deter-
mine whether they have a meaningful, working
knowledge of all use of force policies and pro-
cedures. The County must also evaluate the re-
sults to determine if any changes to Jail policies
and procedures may be necessary and take cor-
rective action. The results and recommenda-
tions of such evaluations must be provided to
the United States and Monitor.
Use of Force Supervisor Reviews
60. After any Level 1 use of force, responding
supervisors will promptly go to the scene and
take the following actions: a. Ensure the safety
of everyone involved in or proximate to the in-
cident. . . . (remainder omitted).
61. All uses of force must be reviewed by super-
visors who were neither involved in nor ap-
proved the use of force by the end of the super-
visor’s shift. All level 1 uses of force must also
be reviewed by a supervisor of Captain rank or
above who was neither involved in nor ap-
proved the use of force. The purposes of super-
visor review are to determine whether the use
of force violated Jail policies and procedures,
whether the prisoner’s rights may have been vi-
olated, and whether further investigation or dis-
ciplinary action is required.
21
62. Reviewing supervisors must document the

following: a. Names of all staff members, pris-
oner(s), and other participants or witnesses in-
terviewed by the supervisor; . . . . (remainder
omitted)
Incident Reporting and Review
66. Ensure that Jail supervisors review and re-
spond appropriately to incidents. At minimum:
a. Shift commanders must document all report-
able incidents by the end of their shift, but no
later than 12 hours after a reportable incident. .
. . (remainder omitted)
Sexual Misconduct
67. To prevent and remedy violations of prison-
ers’ constitutional rights, the County must de-
velop and implement policies and procedures
to address sexual abuse and misconduct. Such
policies and procedures must include all of the
following: . . . . (remainder omitted)
Grievance and Prisoner Information Systems
72. The grievance system must accommodate
prisoners who have physical or cognitive disa-
bilities, are illiterate, or have LEP, so that these
prisoners have meaningful access to the griev-
ance system.
73. The County must ensure that all current and
newly admitted prisoners receive information
about prison rules and procedures. . . . (remain-
der omitted).
22
Restrictions on the Use of Segregation

74. Within 8 hours of intake, prisoners in the
booking cells must be classified and housed in
more appropriate long-term housing where
staff will provide access to exercise, meals, and
other services.
77. The County must develop and implement
restrictions on the segregation of prisoners with
serious mental illness. . . . (remainder omitted)
Lawful Basis for Detention
94. Jail record systems must accurately identify
and track all prisoners with serious mental ill-
ness, including their housing assignment and
security incident histories. Jail staff must de-
velop and use records about prisoners with se-
rious mental illness to more accurately and effi-
ciently process prisoners requiring forensic
evaluations or transport to mental hospitals or
other treatment facilities, and to improve indi-
vidual treatment, supervision, and community
transition planning for prisoners with serious
mental illness. . . . (remainder omitted).
95. All individuals who (i) were found not
guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought
against them dismissed, and (ii) are not being
held on any other matter, must be released di-
rectly from the court unless the court directs
otherwise. . . . (remainder omitted).
23
96. The County must develop, implement, and

maintain policies and procedures to govern the
release of prisoners. . . . (remainder omitted).
97. The County must develop, implement, and
maintain appropriate post orders relating to the
timely release of individuals. . . . (remainder
omitted).
100. The County must annually review its pris-
oner release and detention process to ensure
that it complies with any changes in federal law,
such as the constitutional standard for civil or
pre-trial detention.
103. The County must require investigation of
all incidents relating to timely or erroneous pris-
oner release within seven calendar days by ap-
propriate investigators, supervisors, and the Jail
Administrator. The Jail Administrator must
document any deficiencies found and any cor-
rective action taken. The Jail Administrator
must then make any necessary changes to Jail
policies and procedures. Such changes should
be made, if appropriate, in consultation with
court personnel, the District Attorney’s Office,
members of the defense bar, and any other law
enforcement agencies involved in untimely or
erroneous prisoner releases.
104. The County must conduct bi-annual audits
of release policies, procedures, and practices. As
part of each audit, the County must make any
necessary changes to ensure that individuals are
24
being released in a timely manner. The audits

must review all data collected regarding timely
release, including any incident reports or Qual-
ity Control audits referenced in Paragraph 102
above. The County must document the audits
and recommendations and must submit all doc-
umentation to the Monitor and the United
States for review.
Continuous Improvement and Quality Assurance
111. Conduct a review, at least annually, to de-
termine whether the incident, use of force,
grievance reporting, and IAD systems comply
with the requirements of this Agreement and
are effective at ensuring staff compliance with
their constitutional obligations. The County
must make any changes to the reporting sys-
tems that it determines are necessary as a result
of the system reviews. These reviews and cor-
rective actions must be documented and pro-
vided to the United States and Monitor.
113. Develop and implement policies and pro-
cedures for Jail databases, tracking systems, and
computerized records (including the Early In-
tervention System), that ensure both functional-
ity and data security. The policies and proce-
dures must address all of the following issues:
data storage, data retrieval, data reporting, data
analysis and pattern identification, supervisor
responsibilities, standards used to determine
possible violations and corrective action, docu-
mentation, legal issues, staff and prisoner
25
privacy rights, system security, and audit mech-

anisms.
114. Ensure that the Jail’s medical staff are in-
cluded as part of the continuous improvement
and quality assurance process. . . . (remainder
omitted).
Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee
117. The Coordinating Committee will priori-
tize enhancing coordination with local behav-
ioral health systems, with the goal of connecting
individuals experiencing mental health crisis,
including juveniles, with available services to
avoid unnecessary arrest, detention, and incar-
ceration.
Policy and Procedure Review
131. The County shall complete its policy and
procedure review and revision within six
months of the Effective Date of this Agreement.
133. No later than three months after the United
States’ approval of each policy and procedure,
the County must adopt and begin implement-
ing the policy and procedure, while also modi-
fying all post orders, job descriptions, training
materials, and performance evaluation instru-
ments in a manner consistent with the policies
and procedures.
135. The County must annually review its poli-
cies and procedures, revising them as necessary.
. . . (remainder omitted).
26
County Assessment and Compliance Coordinator

159. The County must file a self-assessment
compliance report. . . . (remainder omitted).
Imposition of “an appropriate sanction for that contempt” is
reserved for future proceedings. Petroleos Mexicanos, 826 F.2d
at 398 (collecting cases).
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, Hinds County and its Board of Supervisors
are hereby found to be in civil contempt of court.
SO ORDERED, this the 4th day of February, 2022.
s/ CARLTON W. REEVES
United States District Judge
27
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF
VS. NO.: 3:16-CV-489-CWR-RHWR
HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO [100] ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
On November 23, 2021, the day Hinds County voters cast their votes in the run-off election
for their new Sheriff, the Court entered its [100] Order to Show Cause. The Order concluded as
follows:
Within 21 days, Hinds County shall show cause and explain why it
should not be held in civil contempt and why a receivership should
not be created to operate RDC. A hearing will be scheduled shortly
hereafter.
The Order begins by noting Hinds County entered into a Consent Decree with the United
States in 2016 in hopes of correcting on-going issues at the Raymond Detention Center (RDC).
The Court went on to note:
It is now 2021. Much has changed in the world, the United States,
the State of Mississippi and even in Hinds County. Not so for the
RDC. The unconstitutional conditions have not been remediated –
they have no end in sight, in fact. And the County’s failure to
remedy the conditions has caused “needless suffering and death,”
(citation omitted), including six deaths so far this year.
The Court’s frustration over the lack of meaningful changes is clear, and even
understandable, if the Court’s understanding of the situation was correct. Through this Response
and any hearings the Court orders, Hinds County intends to demonstrate that numerous, dramatic
changes have, in fact, occurred and the County is making significant progress in turning the RDC
battleship towards a new and better heading.
PD.36202166.1
A few preliminary points. Neither the monitors nor the DOJ have set foot in the RDC in
over eighteen (18) months. RDC staff has been there every single day during that time period,
working to keep a flawed physical facility with numerous design and construction issues operating.
Since it took office in 2020, the current Hinds County Board of Supervisors (the “Board”) has
poured millions of tax-payer dollars into construction, improvements and increased staff pay with
unanimous support on every expenditure. A new sheriff, Tyree Jones, was just elected and sworn
into office on December 3, 2021, and he immediately met with RDC administrators and the Board
and pledged his support to improve the RDC.
As the Court noted in its [100] Order, Hinds County hired Major Kathryn Bryan, an
experienced, professional detention administrator who was recommended by the monitors and
approved by the Department of Justice (DOJ), as its Detention Administrator.1 Although Major
Bryan was hired in June 2021, she did not move to Mississippi until July 2021, and her first day
on the job was July 19, 2021. During her first week, Major Bryan contracted COVID-19 at the
same time as then-Sheriff Lee Vance. Sadly, Sheriff Vance succumbed to the virus, whereas Major
Bryan suffered through it for two weeks until she started work in earnest on August 9, 2021.
Because Major Bryan and Interim Sheriff Marshand Crisler did not agree on numerous aspects of
jail operations, she tendered her resignation on November 10, 2021, even though it was not to
become effective until February 1, 2020. In the wake of the sheriff’s election, her meetings with
Sheriff Jones and the Board of Supervisors, and the progress she has seen and brought to the RDC,
Major Bryan has re-committed herself to getting the job done at RDC, as has her newly installed
command staff, administrative staff and the employees.
1 Major Bryan also is a American Jail Association Certified Jail Manager. See Decl. of Major Kathryn
Bryan (“Bryan Decl.”) ¶ 2, attached as Exhibit A.
2
PD.36202166.1
While it remains far from a perfect facility, the County has made positive change
throughout the RDC’s structure and operations since the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order was entered
on January 16, 2020. Medical and mental health care have improved immensely. There are no
COVID cases in the RDC as of this filing and there have not been for many weeks. There have
been no suicides on Major Bryan’s watch, although there were at least two (2) attempts. As
mentioned in the Court’s order, there has been one (1) death resulting from violence on Major
Bryan’s watch,2 which she personally investigated and for which she authored an after-action
report. On her watch, there have been no other deaths resulting from unnatural causes.3
Defendants’ design, construction and maintenance partners have completed their work at
the RDC to meet the requirements of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order, Section I(A) entered on
January 16, 2020. Consistent with the requirements of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order, locks,
control panels, and cell doors have been changed or upgraded. RDC command staff intends to
close two of the four units on A Pod while renovating and using the remaining two units on A Pod
as soon as detainee population and staffing make it safe to do so. Long-term plans include
construction of a new detention facility at a different location, and the County has begun
preliminary site work. The logistics of such an undertaking are enormous, but the project is
moving forward.
Sanitation, fire safety and contraband control processes are also being actively addressed.
Staffing remains one of our biggest hurdles. A five (5) percent raise for detention employees was
recently implemented. We have not had time to analyze its impact on recruiting. Ultimately,
2 A brief mention of the death almost seems to trivialize the loss of a human life, even though it is not
meant that way.
3 There was an additional death on November 15, 2021. Although a medical examiner’s report has not
yet been completed, Defendants expect the cause of death to be a pre-existing lung cancer condition.
3
PD.36202166.1
recruiting has to do with more than money. We hope the changes we are making will build a
package that will make the RDC an attractive workplace, but only time will tell. We also have
information technology needs that must be addressed. Issues with timely releasing detainees are
being addressed and detainees are being released upon receipt of release orders from the Court.
Structural issues involving leaking roofs and damaged ceilings are actively being addressed by
maintenance staff and outside contractors.
All this activity is not to suggest the RDC is “fixed.” It is not. The design and construction
of the RDC building itself was flawed from the beginning. But, much has changed at the RDC
over the last two years, and the County has accomplished this significant change in the face of an
ongoing, global pandemic unlike anything we had ever experienced and that hit the County (and
the entire country) less than two months after entry of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order.
Yet, to borrow a phrase from the poet, we “have promises to keep and miles to go before
we sleep.”4 Put differently, turning a battleship is hard and slow. The County has a relatively new
Board of Supervisors, a brand new sheriff (who has been in office a mere eleven days as of this
Response) and a new Detention Administrator (who has been on the job for only four months as
of this filing). None of these individuals created the problems at RDC, and they should be given
a reasonable opportunity (collectively) to change the situation. Their actions thus far, and as will
be detailed in this memorandum, demonstrate their determination to make changes.
The lack of will to make meaningful changes at RDC persisted for years through unstable,
ever-changing leadership combined with an overall lack of political will to make changes. Even
when the will to effect change exists, changes of the magnitude needed at RDC cannot be made
overnight. It will take time. The County cannot conscript citizens to work at RDC. Staffing the
4 Robert Frost, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening.
4
PD.36202166.1
RDC will take a renewed focus and much effort. But a lot has happened at the RDC since the
Board was installed in 2020 and Major Bryan has brought significant operational progress. A
new Board, a new Sheriff, a new Detention Administrator, and her new command staff at the
facility are wrestling with a situation they inherited. They should not be held responsible for their
predecessors’ lack of action and neglect, and they deserve an opportunity to fix the RDC. It will
not be an easy task and it will not be a quick fix. Hinds County taxpayers also need a voice in this
ongoing battle to complete the facility’s turnaround, as those same taxpayers will be asked to foot
the bill. With all due respect, Defendants need space and time to let the substantive improvements
they are making take root, to monitor the situation and make adjustments as needed, and to let
them continue moving forward to solve the problems at hand.
The County thus respectfully requests this Court give them until July 1, 2022 to prove they
can make even more significant, positive change at RDC before the Court decides whether to take
the drastic, extraordinary steps it is considering taking.
I. Relevant Background
Opening in 1994, the Raymond Detention Center is, pursuant to Mississippi law, the direct
responsibility of the Hinds County Sheriff.5 Mississippi law also makes clear that the Board
controls the County’s finances.6
Here, the County is governed by a five-person Board of Supervisors. The current Board
members took their seats effective January 6, 2020,7 and are as follows: Robert Graham (District
5 See Miss. Code § 19-25-69 (providing that a county sheriff “shall have charge of the . . . jail of his
county, of the premises belonging thereto, and of the prisoners in said jail”).
6 See Miss. Code § 19-3-40(1).
7 See generally Minutes, Jan. 6, 2020 Regular Meeting of the Hinds County Board of Supervisors,
available at https://www.co.hinds.ms.us/pgs/BoardMinutes/docs/January%206,%202020.pdf (last visited
Dec. 14, 2021).
5
PD.36202166.1
1), David L. Archie (District 2), Credell Calhoun (District 3), Vern O. Gavin (District 4), and
Bobby “Bobcat” McGowan (District 5).8 Three of the five board members (Supervisors Archie,
Calhoun, and Gavin) were new to the Board in January 2020.9 Thus, a majority of the Supervisors
on the current Board were not in place at the time when the [8-1] Consent Decree was entered on
July 19, 2016 or when the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order was entered on January 16, 2020.
In June 2021, the County hired Major Kathryn “Kat” Bryan to serve as the Detention
Administrator for the RDC.10 The County’s decision to hire Major Bryan was consistent with the
requirements of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order,11 and her first day at RDC was July 19, 2021.12
In the days after starting the job, however, Major Bryan contracted COVID-19 and was out the
weeks of July 26-30, 2021 and August 2-6, 2021.13 As a result, Major Bryan did not effectively
start her position as Detention Administrator until August 9, 2021.14
On November 23, 2021, Tyree Jones was elected Sheriff of Hinds County. Jones replaces
the late Sheriff Lee Vance, who passed away unexpectedly on August 4, 2021.15 Sheriff Jones
was sworn in on December 3, 2021.16 Like a majority of the Supervisors on the Board, Sheriff
8 See Board of Supervisors, http://www.hindscountyms.com/elected-offices/board-of-supervisors (last

visited Dec. 11, 2021). Supervisor Calhoun serves as President and Supervisor Archie serves as Vice
President. Id.
9 See id.
10 See Bryan Decl. ¶ 3.
11 See [60-1] Stipulated Order at 5.
12 Bryan Decl. ¶ 3.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Hinds County Sheriff Lee Vance’s death is coronavirus related, coroner says, Clarion Ledger, Aug.
5, 2021, available at https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/local/2021/08/05/hinds-county-sheriff-
died-covid-19-complications/5495795001/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2021).
16 Hinds County Sheriff Tyree Jones sworn into office 10 days after winning run-off election, Clarion
Ledger, Dec. 3, 2021, available at https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2021/12/03/tyree-jones-
officially-becomes-hinds-county-sheriff-dec-3/8855000002/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2021).
6
PD.36202166.1
Jones was not the Hinds County Sheriff in 2016 when the [8-1] Consent Decree was entered or in
2020 when the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order was entered.17
Consistent with the requirements of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order, the County
contracted with a qualified security contractor and an architect with corrections experience.18
Namely, the County contracted with Benchmark Construction and CDFL Architects and Engineers
to provide construction management and quality control services to the County.19 Benchmark and
CDFL not only have provide management and oversight of the County’s venders as those vendors
make required renovations to RDC,20 but have also assisted the County in developing a master
plan that includes construction of a new detention facility. The Board has considered and approved
the construction of this new facility, and the County has begun initial site preparation for the new
detention center.
Nevertheless, the Raymond Detention Center presently remains the primary detention
center for the County, and it has faced a myriad of problems since opening. These problems have
resulted in the County spending millions of taxpayer dollars on maintenance and improvements to
the facility. But it is no secret that problems persist at the facility. The County, however, remains
committed and engaged in a comprehensive effort to address and improve the various areas of life
at the Raymond Detention Center. Collectively, these efforts demonstrate the County’s
commitment to gaining control of and turning around the facility.
17 At the time the [8-1] Consent Decree was entered, the late Victor Mason was the Sheriff of Hinds
County. After Mason left office in December 2019, see [60] Order at 7, the late Lee Vance took over as
Hinds County Sheriff in January 2020. See Lee Vance: New Sheriff Sets Sights on Addressing Problems
with Hinds County Detention Center, Northside Sun (Feb. 7, 2020) available at
https://www.northsidesun.com/news-front-page-slideshow-breaking-news/lee-vance-new-sheriff-sets-
sights-addressing-problems-hinds#sthash.0gXH1aaj.dpbs (last visited Dece. 11, 2021).
18 See [60-1] Stipulated Order at 2-3.
19 See Decl. of Gary Chamblee (“Chamblee Decl.”) ¶ 3, attached as Exhibit B.
20 See id. at ¶¶ 3-9.
7
PD.36202166.1
A. Ongoing Efforts to Address Staffing at Raymond Detention Center
A critical aspect of serving as a detention administrator is the command staff supporting
the administrator. When Major Bryan arrived at the RDC, she inherited the existing command staff
and did not bring with her a command staff of her choosing.21 Over the next four months, Major
Bryan evaluated the existing command staff, made changes to that staff, and, as of December 1,
2021, Major Bryan now has in place a complete command staff of her choosing, and they have all
been enrolled in training to obtain national certification as jail managers.22
Aside from now having her own command staff in place, Major Bryan has developed an
updated staffing plan for the RDC, consistent with the requirements of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated
Order.23 Pursuant to this updated plan, the facility is to be staffed for direct supervision.24
Because the County cannot simply let just anyone through the door to work at the detention
center and because new recruits must undergo a four week training process,25 hiring new detention
staff for the Raymond Detention Center is a challenge for the County but not one the County
ignores. Before it can assemble and begin training a cadet class, the County must identify and vet
potential new recruits.26 The vetting process naturally renders some recruits ineligible for
employment at the detention center due to failed background checks.27 Even for those recruits
22 Id. Importantly, the newly promoted Chief of Detention Officers for the RDC, Anthony Simon,
previously served as the Work Center’s Facility Commander, and Chief Simon successfully operated the
Work Center given the same limited resources that exist at the RDC. Id.
23 See [60-1] Stipulated Order at 4.
25 Id. at ¶ 6.
26 Id. at ¶ 7.
27 Id. Specific to background checks, the County has achieved “sustained compliance” regarding the
requirement that “no one [be permitted to] work[] in the [RDC] unless they have passed a background
check, including a criminal history check.” See [101] Fifteenth Monitoring Report at 26 (quoting Consent
Decree item no. 40).
8
PD.36202166.1
who do not fail a background check, Major Bryan and her staff must remain vigilant to intercept
and remove recruits who have a previously undetected gang affiliation or who simply are foolish
enough to attempt to bring contraband into the facility.28
Given the importance of detention staff training, the County transitioned responsibilities
for the training program from the Sheriff to Major Bryan, and this allowed Major Bryan, in
conjunction with her training officer, to plan improvements to the training curriculum for detention
staff.29 The County also reassigned recruiter Bernard Moore to Major Bryan in November 2021 to
strengthen recruiting efforts related to the Raymond Detention Center and the Work Center by
giving Major Bryan a dedicated recruiter focusing on identifying and attracting potential new
recruits.30 The County now holds four week long cadet classes for new recruits at least every other
month, with the latest cadet class having started November 18, 2021 and expected to be completed
on December 17, 2021.31
In addition to recruiting new staff, the County has taken key steps toward retaining the staff
it has at the RDC, consistent with the requirements of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order.32 The
Board approved a five percent pay raise for all staff at the RDC along with premium pay.33 Their
November 2021 paycheck included the raise and premium pay.34 In October 2021, Major Bryan
coordinated with Matt Rivera, a third-party consultant recommended by the Department of Justice,
to have Rivera conduct an analysis of and provide a report regarding retention efforts at the
29 Id. at ¶ 6.
30 Id. at ¶ 8; see also [60-1] Stipulated Order at 4 (requiring, at item no. II.B.2., the County to “designate
a full-time Recruitment Officer . . . specifically for recruitment of detention officers”)
32 See [60-1] Stipulated Order at 4-5 (item nos. II.B.1., 3.).
34 Id.
9
PD.36202166.1
Raymond Detention Center.35 Rivera provided a report to Major Bryan in October 2021, and the
two are currently in follow-up discussions related to the report and retention efforts at the facility.36
Beyond these efforts to recruit new staff and facilitate retention of existing staff, the County
reallocated and repurposed existing staff at the Raymond Detention Center to more efficiently
manage the facility. For example, in addition to Moore being reassigned to Major Bryan for
recruiting efforts, Major Bryan tasked Miioka Laster, RDC’s fire safety officer, with additional
responsibility of serving as medical liaison, escorting detainees to and from the medical clinic and
escorting medical staff on pill call at RDC.37 Having a dedicated officer accompany medical staff
during pill call greatly reduced the number of treatment- and medication-noncompliant detainees,
and it similarly increased the ability of medical and mental health staff to interact with detainees.38
Major Bryan and her staff are also working to install a field training officer (“FTO”) program to
help facilitate continued training of existing detention officers, and they currently are preparing a
curriculum and scheduling FTO training for early 2022.39
B. Ongoing Efforts to Protect Detainees from Harm at Raymond Detention Center
The County’s efforts to increase detention staffing and improve training is without a doubt
a major part of the County’s overall commitment to protecting detainees from harm, but there is
more. A fundamental component of these efforts is the County’s commitment to operating the
Raymond Detention Center as a direct supervision facility.40 Major Bryan’s management
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at ¶ 10. Having the fire safety officer assist as medical liaison alleviates command staff from
having to pull other detention staff from their posts to escort medical staff. Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See id. at ¶ 11.
10
PD.36202166.1
philosophy centers on a direct supervision model.41 The County also dedicated significant
resources to renovating the living units at the facility for direct supervision, and as of the filing of
this submission, Benchmark has overseen the County’s vendors complete renovations to each of
the four living units on pod B and those units are nearly ready for direct supervision.42 Benchmark
now is overseeing the County’s construction vendors as they begin to make additional renovations
to the viewing windows on cell doors throughout the units on pod C.43
The County also committed to ensure detention officers conduct security rounds at required
intervals. The County recently approved Major Bryan’s request for funding to purchase and install
an electronic round system, which operates using buttons mounted on the walls throughout a living
unit, to monitor whether and when officers make rounds.44 The system requires officers, each of
whom are assigned an electronic wand to keep with them during a shift, to physically walk to each
button in the living unit to which they are assigned on a given shift and place the wand into contact
with the button. Doing so electronically documents that the officer walked by the button while
making rounds in the units.45 Once installed, the system will allow Major Bryan and her command
staff to identify those officers who are properly conducting rounds and those who are not.46
As another indication of the County’s commitment to protecting detainees from harm,
Major Bryan conducted the first after action review related to a detainee death.47 The County does
41 Id.
42 Chamblee Decl. ¶ 4.
43 Id. The County’s vendors previously completed numerous renovations to C Pod, but, when detainees
were put back into the living units on C Pod, they damaged the renovated living units once again. Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 In the course of reiterating that six detainees have died in 2021, the [100] Order to Show Cause also
mentions violence at the facility and an escalation in violence. While no one on either side of the issues in
this civil action wants to see even one detainee lose his life, it bears noting that only one of the six deaths
11
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not in any way minimize the death of a single detainee, and an important part of keeping detainees
safe is to understand what circumstances led to incidents such as the death of a detainee who was
assaulted on October 18, 2021.48 In November 2021, Major Bryan and her staff completed a
detailed after action report into the circumstances surrounding this detainee’s death, and that report
will be used to aid Major Bryan and her staff in their effort to minimize the potential for a similar
event in the future.49
C. Ongoing Efforts to Improve Medical and Mental Healthcare
With particular regard to medical and mental healthcare staffing at the facility, a new
Health Services Administrator, Ebbonie Taylor-Winfield, was assigned to Raymond Detention
Center in August 2021.50 Since that time, Major Bryan and Taylor-Winfield have developed a
solid working relationship.51 The County also recently renegotiated its agreement with the
contractor providing medical and mental healthcare at the facility, Quality Correctional Healthcare
(“QCHC”).52 Pursuant to the new contract, Raymond Detention Center will have a full-time
mental health nurse practitioner beginning in January 2022.53 The new contract also provides for
an additional mental health practitioner and an additional medical practitioner at the RDC.54
In addition, the importance of addressing issues related to mental health is being
emphasized to detention staff. For example, the County has engaged in a comprehensive effort to
observed on page 18 of the [100] Order to Show Cause was attributable to any form of violence at the RDC.
We are not suggesting that more cannot (and has been) done to prevent overdoses and suicides. But, deaths
by overdose, suicide and violence are distinctly different matters.
48 Bryan Decl. ¶ 13. This after action review is mandated by the [8-1] Consent Decree.
49 Id.
50 Id. at ¶ 14.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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train all detention officers related to handling detainees with mental health issues, and, to that end,
Major Bryant brought in a nationally certified mental health training professional to provide three
separate, intensive sessions of mental health training to all detention officers.55 Major Bryan also
increased collaboration between medical and mental health staff and detention staff, and she points
to this collaboration as leading to increased security for medical and mental health professionals
at the facility and reduced turnover of those professionals.56
The County’s efforts to provide better mental healthcare at RDC include the ongoing
construction of a dedicated mental health living unit, Unit B-1.57 Specifically, Unit B-1 is
undergoing renovations which will allow the unit to serve as the facility’s unit for detainees with
serious mental illnesses, giving the facility much needed dedicated space for detaining such
individuals and proving them therapeutic programming.58 In addition to the renovations to B-1,
the County is also adding mental health office space immediately adjacent to Unit B-1 to facilitate
the provision of care between mental health staff and detainees in Unit B-1. As of this filing, Unit
B-1 is expected to be ready for use as the facility’s mental health unit within sixty (60) days.59
Since being made administrator of the Raymond Detention Center in August 2021, Major
Bryan also has begun holding weekly interdisciplinary team meetings, or “IDT Meetings.”60 These
meetings are attended by Major Bryan and members of the classification staff, mental healthcare
staff, and detention staff.61 The meetings allow these key players to come together on a weekly
55 Id. at ¶ 15. The first of these three training sessions has already taken place, the second sessions is
scheduled for December 21, 2021, and the third is scheduled for early 2022. Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at ¶ 16.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at ¶ 17.
61 Id.
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basis, assess those detainees with mental health issues, and coordinate their efforts to provide care
and security for those detainees.62
D. Ongoing Efforts at Suicide Prevention
The County’s efforts to address and minimize the risk of suicides at RDC are ongoing and
involve both structural changes to the RDC and staffing initiatives. Structurally, two padded rooms
currently are under construction, and once completed, these rooms will be used to aid efforts to
monitor and control detainees who present suicidal threats.63 As the County continues to roll out
the direct supervision model throughout the RDC, Major Bryan suspects the closer supervision
will supplement ongoing suicide prevention efforts.64 Major Bryan believes initiatives such as the
IDT meetings have significantly helped address suicide risk and facilitate continuity of care for at
risk detainees.65 Since September 2021, another staffing initiative has been in place pursuant to
which medical staff no longer simply discharge detainees from suicide watch back into living
units; rather, the facility uses a “step-down” system resulting in medical staff now placing
detainees from suicide watch into medical observation for a limited number of days until the
detainees are evaluated as being ready to return back to the living units.66
E. Ongoing Efforts to Improve Fire Safety at RDC
By its original design, the RDC was constructed with fire hoses installed in each pod such
that fires within a particular living unit could be extinguished using the fire hoses as opposed to an
overhead sprinkler system. These fire hoses were specifically addressed in the [60-1] 2020
62 Id.
63 Id. at ¶ 18.
64 Id.
65 Id. at ¶ 17.
66 Id. at ¶ 18.
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Stipulated Order, which required that the County “reinstall the fire hoses in secured cabinets . . .
.”67 The County has completed the reinstallation of fire hoses throughout all three pods (A, B, and
C) such that each pod now has its own operable fire hose system at the ready.68 The County also
has completed installation of fire alarms throughout each of the four living units in Pod B, and
Benchmark is now overseeing installation of fire alarms in each of the four living units within Pod
C.69 RDC staff test the fire alarms on a monthly basis.70
In conjunction with the reinstallation of fire hoses and installation of fire alarms throughout
the pods and living units, the County is also installing detention-grade light fixtures in the cells
within renovated living units.71 These detention-grade light fixtures are intended to help prevent
detainees from destroying light fixtures in their effort to access the lighting system’s wiring to
create sparks.72 Provided detainees do not devise a way to destroy these new light fixtures, their
lack of access to electrical wires should greatly reduce the likelihood of fires at the RDC.
F. Ongoing Efforts to Stop the Flow Contraband Into the Facility
Major Bryan and her staff have engaged in a concerted effort to combat the introduction of
contraband into the RDC. For example, on November 3, 2021, Major Bryan issued a directive to
all staff related to contraband.73 The key points of the directive include the mandate that all medical
personnel will now be searched upon entry to the facility in the same manner as all security staff.
All personnel are only permitted one bag with them, and all bags (including food bags) must now
67 [60-1] Stipulated Order at 3.

69 Id.
72 Id.
73 Bryan Decl. ¶ 19; see also Nov. 3, 2021, Memo to All Staff re: Contraband Eradication Measures,
attached as Exhibit C.
15
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be clear/see-through.74 In addition, a supervisor will be posted at the facility’s entrance at the
beginning of each shift and will not leave the entrance area until all staff have arrived for that shift
and been searched.75 Lastly, staff are no longer permitted to bring cell-phones into the facility,
their vehicles are subject to search any time without notice, and once they enter the facility they
are no longer permitted to exit the facility until the end of their shift.76
Major Bryan’s directive has not been without impact. Within the last month, detention staff
intercepted and stopped two staff members attempting to bring contraband into the facility.77
What’s more, the County is not simply terminating such staff when caught. Rather, the County is
having those (former) staff members arrested and charged with crimes, and the staff who were
recently caught in the act were no exception.78
The County also now has two investigators dedicated to the Raymond Detention Center,
the second of which has only been at the facility since October 2021.79 Major Bryan expects that
over time the presence of two investigators at the facility will only serve to strengthen the County’s
ability to fight the introduction and possession of contraband at the facility.80
G. Ongoing Efforts to Address Cell Door Locks
Consistent with the terms of the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order, the County is engaged in
ongoing efforts to combat faulty locking mechanisms at the RDC. Namely, the County has
refurbished all doors at the following points, with correct locking mechanisms being installed and
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1-2.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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each door being converted to a swing door: all doors going from the facility’s Great Hall into the
three pods, all doors leading into the living units on all pods, all recreation doors, and all cage
doors.81 This was a project required by the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order.82 The County also has
replaced all sliding doors in living units B-3 and B-4 with swinging doors and reinforced the cell
doors in units C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4, another project required under the [60-1] Stipulated Order.83
The County also has replaced the control panel for the electronic door locks on B pod, C pod, and
central control, as required by the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order.84 The swing doors being installed
have held up much better to detainees’ efforts to defeat the locking mechanisms on those doors.85
The County also moved quickly to vet and approve a contract with Georgia Detention Services,
an experienced detention services contractor, pursuant to which Georgia Detention Services has
replaced the locking mechanisms on various doors throughout the facility, is providing
maintenance to those locks, and will provide maintenance training to County employees.86
H. Ongoing Efforts to Eliminate “Trash Dumpster Cells” and Maintain the Facility
The County continues its work to eliminate “trash dumpster cells” within the Raymond
Detention Center and maintain the facility as a whole. As the Court noted, these are cells which
were welded shut after being damaged by detainees but which they (the detainees) were still able
to throw trash into through the space beneath the welded doors and through broken cell-door
windows.87 As the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Monitoring Reports note, the County opened and
82 See [60-1] Stipulated Order at 3, Nos. I.A.1., 3.
83 See Chamblee Decl. ¶ 7; compare [60-1] Stipulated Order at 3, Nos. A.2., 5.
85 Id.
87 See [100] Order at 21; see also Chamblee Decl. ¶ 8.
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PD.36202166.1
cleaned out these cells, and reduced the number of these cells during the time between the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Monitoring Reports from 30 cells to what the monitors claim are 19
cells.88 Those cell doors that were welded shut had metal plates added to the bottom of the cell
doors and had a plate welded over the cell door windows to prevent detainees from filling the off-
line cells back up with trash and creating new “trash dumpster cells.”89
Aside from these cells, the County is engaged in an significant effort to maintain and
sanitize the RDC. The County has contracted with a third party pest-control company that treats
the RDC on a monthly basis. Detainee-workers perform daily cleaning and sanitizing services
throughout the RDC’s common areas.90 In addition, facility management makes cleaning products
available to detainees in their living units on a regular basis so that detainees can clean their
personal living areas.91
With particular regard to maintenance of the facility, the County recently dedicated and
assigned two maintenance employees to focus exclusively on maintenance issues at RDC.92 In
addition to these County employees, there are vendors onsite helping with facility maintenance
issues as they arise.93 Thus, while some cells remain welded shut, the County is engaged in an
ongoing multifaceted approach to facility sanitation and maintenance.
I. Ongoing Efforts to Stop Detaining Persons Adjudicated “Not Guilty”
The County is engaged in various efforts to address the issue of detainees being held at the
RDC despite being adjudicated “not guilty.” For example, the County is working with Securus, a
88 See [101] Court-Appointed Monitors’ Fifteenth Monitoring Report 3; see also Chamblee Decl. ¶ 8.
89 See id.; see also Chamblee Decl. ¶ 8.
91 Id.
92 Id. at ¶ 22.
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third party contractor, to establish a virtual communications platform through which detainees will
have greater ability to communicate with their attorneys while doing so in a private, secure
setting.94 In addition, RDC staff are conducting an ongoing audit of detainee files at the facility.95
The Monitors’ Fifteenth Monitoring Report sheds additional light on the ongoing efforts
to address detention of persons adjudicated “not guilty.” Namely, the County has achieved “partial
compliance” related to the Consent Decree’s requirement that “[t]he County must ensure that the
release process is adequately staffed[,]” which requirement also mandates training on “[h]ow and
when to check for detainers to ensure that an individual may be released from court after she or he
is found not guilty . . . .”96 Major Bryan, moreover, “has been working on outstanding policies
including the policy on Releasing which would address” issues related to releasing individuals
who are adjudicated not guilty.97
J. Ongoing Efforts to Address COVID-19
The monitors’ Fifteenth Monitoring Report reflects the ongoing efforts of the leadership
and staff at the RDC related to COVID-19. The monitors note that a surge in cases occurred in
July, August, and September,98 but they add that “[i]t appears that the [RDC] ha[s] moved past the
94 Bryan Decl. ¶ 24. Notably, the monitors look favorably on this ongoing development, referring to
the “planned integration of video conferring for attorneys to meet with their clients . . . at the” RDC and
Major Bryan’s “negotiat[ing] with . . . Securis[ sic] to provide additional video terminals to allow for more
accessible attorney visits” to be a “technological solution” made “all the more attractive” in light of the
restrictive protections the County has put in place to guard against COVID-19. See [101] Fifteenth
Monitoring Report at 124 (addressing Consent Decree item no. 105). As a result of this ongoing initiative,
the monitors note “partial compliance” with the Consent Decree’s requirement that the County “ensure that
policies, procedures, and practices allow for reasonable attorney visitation, which should be treated as a
safeguard to prevent the unlawful detention of citizens . . . .” Id. at 123-24.
96 See [101] Fifteenth Monitoring Report at 120-21 (quoting paragraph 99.b.iv.).
97 See [101] Fifteenth Monitoring Report at 117. As of the end of November 2021, the “Release of
Inmates” policy had been provided to the monitors for their review and approval. Bryan Decl. ¶ ##.
98 This surge was nothing unique to the RDC. It was a statewide surge impacting all of Mississippi.
See Sarah Haselhorst, The contracts of health care workers brought to Mississippi during the delta surge
19
PD.36202166.1
recent surge in cases, and so things are more manageable again.”99 The monitors also observe that
“the management of the range of COVID-19 related issues seems to have improved . . . .” While
the monitors also comment that the “percentage of detainees” tested and vaccinated should
increase, they correctly recognize that it is ultimately up to the detainees to “agree to be tested and
vaccinated.”100 Even so, the monitors note “[t]here has been an increase in detainee testing and
vaccinations as a result of education efforts by the Detention Administrator and the medical
staff.”101 As of this filing, there are no active COVID-19 cases at the RDC.
II. Argument and Authorities
The [100] Order to Show Cause makes clear the Court is considering using its inherent
powers to find the County in contempt and appoint a receiver to operate the RDC. The County
respectfully submits that relevant legal authority, as applied to the unique facts before the Court,
militates against such an extraordinary use of the Court’s power just yet.
As a threshold matter, the County contends that there are not sufficient facts on which to
find the County in civil contempt. To find a party in civil contempt, one must “establish[] by clear
and convincing evidence 1) that a court order was in effect, 2) that the order required certain
conduct by the respondent, and 3) that the respondent failed to comply with the court’s order.”
Martin v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 959 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Petroleos Mexicanos v.
Crawford Enterprises, Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 1987)). Evidence of either “mitigating
circumstances that might cause the district court to withhold the exercise of its contempt power,
are expiring, Mississippi Clarion Ledger Oct. 29, 2021, available at

https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2021/10/30/mississippi-state-funded-health-care-workers-
contracts-expire/6191296001/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2021) (describing surge in cases statewide in August
and September 2021 and impact of that surge on Mississippi nurses).
99 See [101] Fifteenth Monitoring Report at 5.
100 See [101] Fifteenth Monitoring Report at 5.
101 Id.
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or substantial compliance with the consent order” are defenses to civil contempt. Little Tchefuncte
River Ass’n v. Artesian Util. Co., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 637, 657 (E.D. La. 2015) (citing Petroleos
Mexicanos v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 1987) and Whitfield v.
Pennington, 832 F.2d 909, 914 (5th Cir. 1987)). Here, the facts and evidence set forth in Section
I, taken together with any evidence the County is permitted to put on at a future hearing, support
a finding of mitigating circumstances emanating from the onset of an unprecedented global
pandemic merely two months after the Court entered the [60-1] Stipulated Order. From these same
facts and evidence, the record supports finding the County is in substantial compliance with the
[60-1] Stipulated Order at this time, thus precluding a finding of civil contempt.
Nevertheless, the Court no doubt has inherent authority to take action to control its docket
and promote efficiency. See, e.g., Coker v. Select Energy Servs., LLC, 161 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494-
95 (S.D. Tex. 2015). This inherent authority, however, must be exercised with restraint. See, e.g.,
Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 48 (2016) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991))
(“Because the exercise of an inherent power in the interest of promoting efficiency may risk
undermining other vital interests related to the fair administration of justice, a district court’s
inherent powers must be exercised with restraint.”); Chambers, 501 U.S., at 44 (“Because of their
very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”).
This is particularly so here, where the action the Court is considering—appointing a
receiver to take over and operate a local county-run jail—is “an extraordinary remedy that should
be employed with the utmost caution . . . .” [100] Order to Show Cause at 15(quoting Netsphere,
Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir. 2012)) (internal marks omitted). A receivership should
be used with “utmost caution” because it is considered a “drastic” form of relief. Bryant v.
21
PD.36202166.1
Matvieshen, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Canada Life Assur. Co. v.
LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Congress, moreover, has expressed a policy against federal courts becoming too involved
in the day-to-day operations of running a prison, and this policy further militates against the already
extraordinary nature of action the Court is contemplating taking through its inherent powers. In
passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA), Congress endeavored to “remove the federal
district courts from the business of supervising the day-to-day operation of state prisons.” Cagle
v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d
178, 189 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also H.R. REP. 104-21, n.2 (1995) (explaining that the PLRA’s
requirement that relief be the “least intrusive means” of curing a violation of a federal right “stops
judges from imposing remedies intended to effect an overall modernization of local prison systems
or provide an overall improvement in prison conditions” and “limits remedies to those necessary
to remedy the proven violation of federal rights”). Without doubt, appointing a receiver to operate
the RDC places the Court squarely at the center of day-to-day operations at the facility, contrary
to the policy underlying the PLRA and relevant Fifth Circuit precedent. See Ridge, 169 F.3d at
189 (explaining that the PLRA advances an “unquestionably legitimate purpose[]—to minimize
prison micro-management by federal courts and to conserve judicial resources”); see also Estate
of Henson v. Wichita Cty., Tex., 795 F.3d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 2015) (warning against courts
becoming “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations”).
Against these legal principles, the numerous changes in the County’s leadership cannot be
overlooked. The ongoing, comprehensive efforts in which this new leadership is engaged to
address the myriad issues at the RDC also cannot be ignored. When the many facts outlined in
Section I, above, are measured against the extraordinary nature of the action the Court is
22
PD.36202166.1
considering taking in an area in which there is a clear policy against courts becoming too involved,
additional time is warranted before appointing a receiver to operate the facility.
To be clear, Hinds County is not saying the Court lacks authority to exercise its inherent
powers, find the County in contempt, and appoint a receiver to operate the Raymond Detention
Center. However, we are a far cry from where the Court was in early 2020 when it entered the
[60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order. At that time, the Court was faced with a situation in which both “the
Sheriff and the Board of Supervisors took actions that were in direct contravention of the Consent
Decree, see [60] Order at 11, and the Court’s frustration at the time is understandable.
Today, the situation before the Court is in stark contrast. There is a new Board in place
with a demonstrated commitment to righting the ship at the RDC, and the County has a newly
elected Sheriff who has been in office less than two weeks. The RDC now is being managed by
Major Bryan, a professional detention administrator who enjoys the trust and confidence of the
Court-appointed monitors, she has been on the job for barely more than four months, she only
recently has put in place a command staff entirely of her choosing. The RDC also has a new health
services administrator who enjoys Major Bryan’s confidence. Moreover, since mid-2020, the
County has contracted with a construction contractor and architecture firm, both of which are
experienced in detention structures and services. These new players and the accomplishments the
County has made to date toward satisfying the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order’s requirements make
the situation vastly different today. The County thus respectfully asks that the Court hold in
abeyance any decision to engage in such an extraordinary use of power until July 1, 2022 to allow
the County additional time to continue its ongoing efforts and to prove it can make even more
significant, positive change at the RDC.
23
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the County respectfully requests that the Court hold in abeyance
any decision whether to hold the County in contempt and appoint a receiver until July 1, 2022.
Dated: December 14, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,
PHELPS DUNBAR, LLP
BY: s/ Reuben V. Anderson

Reuben V. Anderson, MB #1587
W. Thomas Siler, Jr., MB #6791
Nicholas F. Morisani, MB #104970
4270 I-55 North
Jackson, Mississippi 39211-6391
Post Office Box 16114
Jackson, Mississippi 39236-6114
Telephone: 601-352-2300
Telecopier: 601-360-9777
Email: Reuben.Anderson@phelps.com
Tommy.Siler@phelps.com
Nick.Morisani@phelps.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Reuben V. Anderson, hereby certify that I this day filed the foregoing Response with the
Clerk of the Court, using the CM/ECF system, which sent notification to counsel of record.
SO CERTIFIED, this the 14th day of December, 2021.
/s/ Reuben V. Anderson

Reuben V. Anderson
24
PD.36202166.1
____________________
No. 3:16-CV-489-CWR-RHWR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
v.
HINDS COUNTY, ET AL.

Defendants.
____________________
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

____________________
Before CARLTON W. REEVES, District Judge.

In 2016, the United States Department of Justice brought this
action to end unconstitutional conditions of confinement at
Hinds County’s Raymond Detention Center (RDC). The par-
ties entered into a Consent Decree to correct the problems.
It is now 2021. Much has changed in the world, the United
States, the State of Mississippi, and even in Hinds County.
Not so for RDC. The unconstitutional conditions have not
been remediated—they have no end in sight, in fact. And the
County’s failure to remedy the conditions has caused
“needless suffering and death,” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493,

501 (2011), including six deaths so far this year.
Proceedings are therefore necessary to determine whether
Hinds County should be held in civil contempt and RDC
placed into federal receivership.
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. The Political Landscape
The Raymond Detention Center opened in 1994, when Mal-
colm McMillin was the Sheriff of Hinds County. He had been
elected in 1991, replacing J.D. McAdory, who had served as
Sheriff since 1972. Leah Rupp, In the Limelight Again, Clarion-
Ledger (Nov. 18, 2007). McMillin, like McAdory, would re-
main in office for 20 years. Id.
The 2011 election saw the beginning of a series of one-term
Sheriffs. That year, Tyrone Lewis unseated McMillin. Former
Hinds County Sheriff Malcolm McMillin dies, WJTV (Dec. 22,
2016). 1 Four years later, the voters replaced Lewis with Victor
Mason. Jimmie E. Gates, Hinds to settle feds’ OT case, Clarion-
Ledger (Dec. 28, 2016). In 2019 the voters rejected Mason after
only one term, this time in favor of Lee Vance. Jimmie E.
Gates, Lee Vance defeats incumbent Hinds Sheriff Victor Mason in
Democratic runoff, Clarion-Ledger (Aug. 27, 2019). Sadly,
Vance died on August 3, 2021. Therese Apel, Sheriff Lee Vance
Passes Away After A Medical Emergency At Home, Darkhorse
Press (Aug. 4, 2021).
1 As Sheriff McMillian explained in testimony before the Department of

Justice, Office of Justice Programs, the voters “turned him out to pasture.”
Review Panel on Prison Rape, Hearings on Rape and Sexual Misconduct
in U.S. Jails 447 (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter OJP Testimony].
2
The Hinds County Board of Supervisors appointed an Interim

Sheriff until a special election could be held to fill the remain-
der of Vance’s term. On August 16, 2021, the Board appointed
Marshand Crisler to be that Interim Sheriff. Marshand Crisler
named interim Hinds County Sheriff, Jackson Advocate (Aug.
16, 2021).
The special election was held on November 2. Thirteen candi-
dates offered themselves to the voters. Brendan Hall, Meet the
Hinds County Sheriff candidates before casting your vote on Nov.
2, WLBT (Oct. 30, 2021). When no candidate drew a majority
of voters’ support, a runoff was necessary between the top
two candidates: Crisler and Tyree Jones, who was part of
Vance’s command staff.
The runoff election was held earlier today, November 23. At
the time of the release of this Order, the winner has not been
certified.
Like the Sheriff’s Office, in the 27 years that RDC has existed,
there has been considerable turnover in the Board of Supervi-
sors. None of the current members of the Board were Super-
visors when RDC opened. Only two current board members,
Robert Graham and Bobby “Bobcat” McGowan, were Super-
visors in 2014, when the U.S. Department of Justice notified
Hinds County that it was “commencing an investigation into
conditions of confinement at the Hinds County Detention
Center.” Docket No. 3-1. Graham and McGowan were also
the only two sitting Supervisors in office when this action was
filed on June 23, 2016.
B. The Conditions of Confinement
“There is a long tradition of professional excoriation of jail
conditions.” Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L.
3
Rev. 1555, 1686 n.434 (2003). Experts have called jails “the
worst blight in American corrections.” Id. (citation omitted).
They are “more dangerous” and “more chaotic” than prisons,
with less regular routines, more idle time, and detainees who
are more likely to be experiencing a crisis. Id. at 1686–87.
The Supreme Court summed up jails as “generally deplora-
ble” institutions that can have a “destructive effect on human
character.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520 (1972). “The time
spent in jail is simply dead time.” Id. at 532-33.
RDC in particular has been troubled since it opened. As one
writer explained, since its inception, “the jail designed to im-
prove conditions for detainees has faced a myriad of prob-
lems: structural deficiencies, chronic understaffing and poor
management. But fixing those problems have been elusive
under whatever sheriff and Hinds County Board of Supervi-
sors are in elected office at a given time.” Kayode Crown, One
Jail’s Tale: Hinds County Detention Center At Risk Of Federal
Takeover, Miss. Free Press (Oct. 15, 2021).
Captain Diane Riley testified shortly after RDC’s opening that
“the new jail’s doors were inadequate to provide security.”
Dean v. Thomas, 933 F. Supp. 600, 608 (S.D. Miss. 1996). That
is, the cell doors failed to lock. Twenty-seven years later, the
cell doors still fail to lock. See Docket No. 94 at 4 [hereinafter
Fourteenth Monitoring Report]; see also Ruth Ingram, Year after
riot, cell doors at Hinds County jail still don't lock, Clarion-
Ledger (July 23, 2013); Ruth Ingram, Officials: 'Antsy' juvenile
inmates flood area at Hinds jail in Raymond, Clarion-Ledger (July
19, 2013) (“We have doors with no locks,” the Sheriff’s spokes-
man candidly admitted.); Docket No. 31 at 20 (“the Jail con-
tinues to lack even the most basic security and safety features,
such as lockable cell doors . . . .”); Docket No. 60 at 4 (“At RDC,
4
doors and locks are broken. Prisoners can break out of their
cells, break out of their housing units and even enter a jail con-
trol room.”).2
A significant riot in 2012 brought the facility’s problems to the
forefront. “[P]risoners destroyed fixtures and walls, sprayed
water hoses and fire extinguishers, and left ceilings in sham-
bles,” the State’s newspaper of record reported. Ruth Ingram,
Jail getting repairs; much more needed, Clarion-Ledger (Nov. 7,
2012). “It’s no secret that the door locks need to be replaced,”
Chief Deputy Chris Picou added. “I don’t know that the jail
has ever been up to industry standards.” Id.
A series of escapes in 2012 and 2013 shed additional light
upon the conditions at the jail. See Ruth Ingram, Escape draws
attention to jail, policies, Clarion-Ledger (Apr. 22, 2013) (“Es-
capes this year and last have been blamed on faulty locks and
security for jail and cell doors. The county last year ordered
emergency repairs in April on doors that had been problem-
atic and a security risk since the facility opened in 1994.”).
Sheriff Lewis, who had commissioned a 500-page report on
the previous administration, blamed the escapes on
2 The faulty locks have cost the County dearly. In one case, it was reported
that Hinds County “agreed to pay . . . inmate Michael Burnley[] $3 million

after another inmate jimmied open a cell door and attacked Burnley, leav-
ing him paralyzed. . . . The county has spent at least $13 million on repairs
since.” Heather Civil, Jail Conditions, Clarion-Ledger (Aug. 15, 2008). In the
lawsuit, Sheriff McMillin admitted that the locks were faulty and had been
an ongoing problem. A member of the Board of Supervisors, meanwhile,
explained that the settlement “was about the best deal” the County was
likely to get, and he did not know “where the financially strapped county
was going to get the money” to pay the settlement. Mississippi Jail Prisoner
Wins $3,000,000 in Failure to Protect Suit, Prison Legal News (Aug. 2008)
(brackets omitted).
5
“malfunctioning doors and conditions at the aging facility.”

Monique Valeris, Lewis says he’s not pointing blame at McMillin,
WAPT (Aug. 8, 2012).
In 2013, Hinds County Circuit Judge Tomie Green convened
a special grand jury to investigate conditions at RDC. The re-
porting this time centered on safety concerns:
On Sunday, a SWAT team stormed the facility
after a dozen inmates broke out of their cells, in
part because of faulty locks. Last week, a group
of juveniles flooded a portion of the jail by turn-
ing on a fire hydrant. Reports also surfaced that
several inmates were stabbed and a number of
deputies and jailers sustained minor injuries. In
June, one inmate died and another was hurt in
a string of violent episodes that also left three
deputies with injuries.
Emily Le Coz, Grand jury probes Hinds jail issues, Clarion-
Ledger (July 26, 2013). The grand jury concluded that RDC
was “in a deplorable condition and inadequately staffed.”
Docket No. 3-4 at 5.
In 2014 and 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights
Division investigated conditions at RDC and the two other fa-
cilities that comprise Hinds County’s jail system: the Work
Center and the downtown jail. Docket No. 3-1. It concluded
that the County was violating the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by, among other things described in its 29-page
report, failing to provide “minimum levels of protection from
violence,” failing to have “sufficient numbers of trained
staff,” and incarcerating persons “beyond their court-ordered
release dates.” Docket No. 3-3 at 2-3. The problems had
6
resulted in “at least three major riots, two alleged homicides,

and numerous assaults on prisoners and staff members.” Id.
at 2. The Findings Letter resulted in the Mississippi Depart-
ment of Corrections moving its state inmates from RDC. State
inmates removed from troubled jail in Hinds County, Corrections
1 (May 27, 2015). “[W]e believe removing the state inmates is
in the best interest of the State of Mississippi and the in-
mates,” said State Corrections Commissioner Marshall Fisher.
Id.
The Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in 2016. Its com-
plaint described an inability to meet minimum constitutional
standards with respect to detainee-on-detainee violence,
staff-on-detainee violence, “dangerously low staffing levels,”
jail policies and procedures, housing and classification sys-
tems, the physical plant, internal investigations, detention of
persons who should have been released, and the treatment of
juvenile and suicidal detainees. Docket No. 1 at 3-5. The De-
partment alleged that the constitutional violations “have been
obvious and known to Defendants for a substantial period of
time.” Id. at 5. The Attorney General herself signed the com-
plaint. Id. at 7, 10.
The parties immediately entered into a Consent Decree.
Docket Nos. 3; 8-1. The Consent Decree required Hinds
County to implement dozens of minimal constitutional stand-
ards. Hinds County expressly agreed that the Consent Decree
was “narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to
correct the violations of federal rights,” and “is the least intru-
sive means necessary to correct these violations.” Docket No.
8-1 at 61.
A Monitoring Team was also established. Id. at 54; see also
Docket No. 10; Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1321 (5th Cir.
7
1974). It includes Elizabeth Simpson, David Parrish, Jim

Moeser, and Dr. Richard Dudley. They are subject-matter ex-
perts in corrections, corrections operations, juvenile justice,
and corrections mental health, respectively. The Monitors be-
gan to provide technical assistance, conduct regular site visits,
and serve as the eyes and ears of the Court 3 as the parties at-
tempted to meet the requirements of the Consent Decree.
Hinds County’s efforts have borne fruit at one of its jails—the
Work Center. 4 The Monitoring Team describes the Work Cen-
ter as a functional jail for the citizens of Hinds County. See,
e.g., Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 29. This Court’s own
visit to the three facilities in 2019 confirms that something
about the Work Center’s culture is effective; it largely oper-
ates as a jail should.
The story is not the same for RDC.
In 2019, the Department of Justice filed a Motion for an Order
to Show Cause outlining a litany of ongoing constitutional vi-
olations at RDC. Docket No. 31. It described the County’s
“continued failure to comply with nearly all provisions of the
Settlement, including provisions regarding security, medical
screening, suicide prevention, mental health care, youth ser-
vices, fire safety, sanitary conditions, and release
3 The Consent Decree and Monitoring Team were approved by U.S. Dis-
trict Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. The case was transferred to the under-
signed in December 2018 upon Judge Barbour taking senior status. Imme-
diately upon being assigned the case, this Court held a status conference
and “received an update as to the progress toward compliance with the
Consent Agreement from the parties and the Court Appointed Monitor.”
See Minute Entry of Jan. 15, 2019.
4 Hinds County’s third facility, the downtown jail, was closed in 2020.
8
procedures.” Id. at 5. As any elementary school child under-

stands, the County was flunking, miserably. The result was
rioting, stabbings, a murder, staff-on-detainee assaults, and a
“major disturbance” during a Monitoring Team site visit that
resulted in eight emergency room transports. Id. at 7-8, 14. The
Department added that the situation on the ground was
“likely worse” than it could adequately summarize because
of poor record-keeping at RDC. Id. at 8.
The parties again avoided significant litigation by agreeing to
a Stipulated Order. See Docket Nos. 60 and 60-1; accord Plata
v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). This
Court grudgingly approved their agreement even though the
County had reached sustained compliance “in only one of the
92 requirements of the Consent Decree.” Docket No. 60 at 7.
“While a finding of contempt is warranted,” the undersigned
wrote, “the parties’ stipulated order outlines what is perhaps
the most comprehensive remedial plan for Hinds County to
become compliant that the Court has seen from the parties.”
Id. at 11. “Ten months from today, the County should have
made significant progress on developing and implementing
policies, making repairs to the physical plant and ensuring in-
carcerated youth have necessary programming, among other
necessary investments.” Id. Monitoring continued; periodic
status conferences were held. The facility limped along into
the present.
The situation deteriorated significantly in the most recent
monitoring period. According to the Fourteenth Monitoring
Report,
There were a record number of fights and as-
saults at RDC in May [2021], there continue to
be fires set by inmates, there is an extremely
9
large amount of contraband in the facility in-

cluding drugs, there have been a number of
overdoses although no deaths from those over-
doses, and there have been three deaths, two by
suicide. Although there is some cause for opti-
mism with the new Detention Administrator
being hired 5, this is a very disturbing trend.
Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 3 (emphasis added). The sit-
uation became more uncertain when Sheriff Vance, the
elected official with primary responsibility for RDC,6 passed
away unexpectedly on August 3, 2021.
C. The 2021 Death Toll
On October 18, 2021, RDC experienced its sixth death of the
year. The Monitoring Team filed an emergency report on Oc-
tober 27 characterizing the pattern of deaths as “especially
alarming.” Docket No. 96 at 2 [hereinafter October 27 Emer-
gency Monitoring Report].
A brief summary of each death is provided here. 7
The first death, on March 19, 2021, happened when a nurse
ordered an arrestee to be taken to the hospital and no one
5The Monitoring Team reports that the Detention Administrator is “very

well qualified.” Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 3.
6 As Sheriff McMillian explained at his OJP testimony, “I am, as Sheriff,
responsible for safely operating the correctional facilities in Hinds County
and take that responsibility seriously.” OJP Testimony at 445.
7 The Monitoring Report does not identify these individuals by name. But
for that reason, this Court would have given these individuals the dignity
of referring to each by their name. After all, they deserve respect. Deten-
tion does not strip an individual of his inherent dignity.
10
carried out her order. Id. at 2. The arrestee subsequently col-

lapsed. An oxygen concentrator was obtained but would not
turn on because the electrical outlet was faulty. Someone ran
to get an AED unit from Medical, but the AED unit had no
pads. The arrestee died. RDC staff then “took the position that
he was not an inmate because he had not been ac-
cepted/booked.” Id. An after-action report has not been com-
pleted for this death. 8
The second death, on April 18, was a suicide by a detainee
being housed in a booking cell, a practice “that the Monitor-
ing Team has repeatedly stated should not be done and is con-
trary to the Settlement Agreement.” Id. The Officer who dis-
covered the body could not enter the unit because he lacked
keys, and the Officer who was supposed to be on duty at
booking was not at his post. “The last documented well-being
check was made at 1105, more than three hours before the in-
cident.” Id. No after-action report was completed.
The third death occurred on July 6. It was another death by
hanging—although the available record is silent on whether
it was a suicide. The Officer charged with performing 30-mi-
nute head counts “left the unit” for unknown reasons. Id. at 3.
When he returned to look in, he did so from a vantage point
“from where he could not possibly see each inmate to conduct
an accurate count.” Id. No after-action report was completed.
Death number four was a drug overdose on August 3. “An
IAD investigation is still underway, but inmates on the unit
8 An after-action report is a way for officials and monitors to “gather facts,
identify problems, examine staff performance, and develop a plan to pre-

vent future” major disturbances. Depriest v. Walnut Grove Corr. Auth., No.
3:10-CV-663-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL 3795020, at *11 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2015).
11
reported that they had been calling for assistance for five
hours and that there had been no response to their cries for
help.” Id. The condition of the body indicated that the de-
tainee had been dead for some time when he was discovered.
No after-action report has been completed.
The fifth death occurred the next day, when a detainee died
in the hospital from COVID complications. “Although the
death appears to be medically related,” the Monitoring Team
wrote, “there are questions regarding when his symptoms
first appeared and whether they were timely and adequately
responded to as well as . . . the adequacy of the precautions
being taken by the Jail to prevent the spread of the virus.” Id.
No investigation into his death was conducted.
The sixth death, on October 18, was an assault in a unit where
the doors do not lock and staff supervision is “minimal.” Id.
The Monitors’ description relayed the following:
At about 0430 or 0500 in the morning, video
footage showed the inmate being hit in the head
by another inmate. A third inmate then
stomped on his head several times. He was then
dragged across the mezzanine. The video foot-
age shows brief movement by the decedent and
then none indicating that he was probably dead
at that point but a time of death has not been
established. He was eventually dragged back
and propped in a sitting position and then later
laid on a mat. He was not discovered by officers
until 1:45, almost 9 hours later.
Id. at 3-4.
12
The Monitoring Team concluded its Emergency Report with

a recommendation “that the Court set a status confer-
ence/hearing to address immediate measures that need to be
taken to address the concerns raised above and prevent the
future loss of life.” Id. at 5.
On November 10, the Detention Administrator submitted her
letter of resignation. She described “a distinct lack of support”
and relayed in detail a recent directive from the Interim Sher-
iff that she found “reckless and dangerous.” She had served
for a total of only five months before submitting her letter of
resignation.
This Order followed.
II. Law
A. Consent Decrees
“A consent decree is akin to a contract yet also functions as an
enforceable judicial order.” United States v. Chromalloy Am.
Corp., 158 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Frew ex rel. Frew
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). Consent decrees are com-
monly used to address ongoing constitutional violations in
jail and prison cases. E.g., Depriest v. Walnut Grove Corr. Auth.,
No. 3:10-CV-663-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL 3795020, at *3 (S.D.
Miss. June 10, 2015).
Although “state and local authorities have primary responsi-
bility for curing constitutional violations,” Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 687 (1978), “[f]ederal courts are not reduced to ap-
proving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once en-
tered, a consent decree may be enforced.” Frew, 540 U.S. at
440.
13
B. Civil Contempt
“[C]ourts have inherent power to enforce compliance with
their lawful orders through civil contempt.” Shillitani v.
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
To hold a respondent in civil contempt, the moving party
must prove by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) that a court
order was in effect; (2) that the order required certain conduct
by the respondent; and (3) that the respondent failed to com-
ply with the court’s order.” Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford En-
ters., 826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 1987).
“The contemptuous actions need not be willful so long as the
contemnor actually failed to comply with the court’s order.”
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574, 581 (5th
Cir. 2000). That means “[g]ood faith is not a defense to civil
contempt.” Chao v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 276 F.3d 725, 728
(5th Cir. 2002).
“If a state agency refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial
penalty may be the most effective means of insuring compli-
ance.” Frew, 540 U.S. at 440 (citation omitted); see also Am. Air-
lines, 228 F.3d at 585.
C. Receiverships
“[R]eceiverships are recognized equitable tools available to
the courts to remedy otherwise uncorrectable violations of the
Constitution or laws.” Plata, 603 F.3d at 1093–94 (collecting
cases).
A “[r]eceivership is ‘an extraordinary remedy that should be
employed with the utmost caution.’” Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron,
703 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wright & Miller). In
the prison context specifically, receiverships can be necessary
14
“to run institutions where constitutional violations [are] oc-

curring. Such receiverships are generally ordered in the con-
text of ensuring a governmental entity’s compliance with
court orders.” Id. at 306 (collecting cases).
In Plata, a receivership was imposed “after the State admitted
its inability to comply with consent orders intended to rem-
edy the constitutional violations in its prisons.” 603 F.3d at
1097.
The court imposed the receivership not because
it wanted to, but because it had to. After at-
tempting less drastic remedies, and after long
periods of working closely with State authori-
ties to try to bring them into compliance with
the orders to which they had stipulated, the dis-
trict court justifiably concluded that the State’s
personnel simply could not or would not bring
the State into constitutional compliance in the
foreseeable future.
Id.
D. Other Remedies
Judges have occasionally taken creative measures to enforce
consent decrees.
In a famous case in Alabama, Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. ap-
pointed the Governor to serve as the receiver and bring the
correctional facilities into compliance. Newman v. State of Ala.,
466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1979); see also Jack Bass,
15
Taming the Storm 342 (1993). 9 “Time does not stand still, but
the Board of Corrections and the Alabama Prison System have
for six years,” the Judge wrote. Newman, 466 F. Supp. at 635.
“Their time has now run out.” Id.
Decades later, New Orleans is presently struggling to imple-
ment a consent decree regarding its local jail. The United
States moved for an Order to Show Cause. The parties nego-
tiated and agreed to appoint an “Independent Jail Compli-
ance Director” to “temporarily assume the duties and author-
ity of the Sheriff as to all aspects of the jail’s operations.” Jones
v. Gusman, 515 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. La. 2021). Control
was returned to the sheriff four years later. See Nicholas
Chrastil, Sheriff Marlin Gusman to regain control of New Orleans
jail, The Lens (Aug. 5, 2020).
Unfortunately, a recent order reflects the district court’s frus-
tration with the subsequent lack of progress:
The City, over many years and through multi-
ple administrations, has been promising to
abide by its obligation to implement a durable
solution to the problem of housing special pop-
ulations in the jail – to provide “a good and suf-
ficient jail.” Yet here we are in late 2020 with lit-
tle to nothing to show for years of discussion,
debate, handwringing, empty promises, and
court orders regarding the treatment of special-
needs inmates.
9 Judge Johnson’s successor, Judge Robert Varner, later held the Alabama
Attorney General in contempt of court for interfering with implementa-
tion of the remedial order. Bass at 343.
16
Jones, 515 F. Supp. 3d at 525.

Receiverships are not the most drastic action a court can take
to remedy persistent jailhouse constitutional violations. In
one case, the Michigan Court of Appeals observed that the
presiding judge could have simply “closed the jail until the
final judgment was fully implemented.” Wayne Cty. Jail In-
mates v. Wayne Cty. Chief Exec. Officer, 178 Mich. App. 634,
660–61 (1989); accord Newman, 466 F. Supp. at 635 (“There is,
of course, a more extreme alternative to a receivership. . . .
[F]ailure to comply with the minimum standards set forth in
the order would necessitate the closing of several prison facil-
ities.”).
Risks to public safety would be minimized, if not outright
eliminated, if detainees were simply housed in functioning
jails operated by neighboring or co-extensive jurisdictions. In-
deed, in the New Orleans litigation, the parties reached an
agreement with the State of Louisiana to house certain detain-
ees at a state facility pending construction of a new local jail.10
Jones, 515 F. Supp. 3d at 532.
III. Discussion
The concerns with RDC are known all too well. Years of de-
tailed reports from the Monitoring Team document the prob-
lems with precision.
What follows are some of the most significant problems ob-
served in the Thirteenth Monitoring Report, the Fourteenth
10 The Court, however, is not oblivious to the issues being litigated con-
cerning the alleged constitutional deprivations occurring in Mississippi’s
state prison system. See Amos v. Cain, No. 4:20-CV-7-DMB-JMV, 2021 WL
1080518 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2021).
17
Monitoring Report, the September 15 Status Conference, and

the October 27 Emergency Monitoring Report. 11
A. Six People Have Died This Year
The deaths were described in detail above. It is troubling that
they happened in the first place, and it is troubling how the
County has responded—or failed to respond.
Violence at RDC is not new. E.g., Johnson v. Burnly, No. 3:15-
CV-881-CWR-FKB, 2018 WL 1341727, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 9,
2018) (“Shortly after he was transferred to Raymond, Johnson
claims that a group of inmates entered his cell, assaulted him,
and stabbed him.”). The problem is its recent escalation with
no end in sight. The loss of life cannot continue.
B. The Jail Is Severely Understaffed
The First Monitoring Report got right to the point: “The over-
arching problem facing the Hinds County Jail System is the
inability to hire and retain enough qualified personnel (dep-
uties) to staff required positions.” Docket No. 12-1 at 2. “No
matter what other steps are taken to address operational
problems within the facilities,” it concluded, “compliance
with conditions of the Settlement Agreement cannot be
achieved until this matter is successfully addressed.” Id. (em-
phasis added). Years later, a January 2020 Order found that
“RDC has less than half of the staff it needs to run safely.”
Docket No. 60 at 6.
Now in late 2021, the problem remains unresolved. Hinds
County presently has 229 employees for a jail system that re-
quires 318 employees. Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 3.
11 See Docket Nos. 83, 94, 95, and 96.
18
This failure has consequences. As the Monitoring Team ex-

plained,
the C-Pod housing units are routinely left unat-
tended. Consequently, the number of assaults
and fires, as well as the amount of contraband
found during shakedowns, is as high in C-Pod
as it is in A-Pod where staffing is so low that, on
occasion, the only officer present is stationed in
the control room.
Id. at 3-4. The staffing failure has also “resulted in a continu-
ing series of major maintenance problems as inmates destroy
the work of County and contract personnel almost as fast as
it is completed.” Id. at 3.
C. RDC Is at Risk of Burning Down
Indifference to fire safety remains a life-threatening concern.
The Monitoring Team reports that there is no fire alarm sys-
tem in the facility, no sprinkler system in the inmate housing
areas of RDC, and that the sprinkler system at the Work Cen-
ter is only now working after years of not functioning. Docket
No. 83 at 3 [hereinafter Thirteenth Monitoring Report]; Four-
teenth Monitoring Report at 4; see also Gates, 501 F.2d at 1300
(“there is a lack of adequate fire fighting equipment making
it, as stated by the Penitentiary Superintendent, ‘almost im-
possible to put out a fire at Parchman.’”).
This problem is exacerbated by the number of fires at RDC.
One illustrative incident report shows that inmates set three
separate fires in a one-hour time frame, without any officers
present in the area. See Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 29.
19
The potential ramifications are obvious and devastating. Still,

the County has failed, if not refused, to take meaningful cor-
rective action at RDC.
D. The Cell Doors Don’t Lock
It has long been known that many of the security doors and
locks at RDC are not functional. See Part I.B, supra. As best
explained in the Sixth and Seventh Monitoring Reports, the
control system for security doors is beleaguered by electrical
and mechanical problems, rendering it inoperative. Docket
Nos. 24 at 34; 27 at 33.
This is particularly pronounced when it comes to cell doors.
See October 27 Emergency Monitoring Report at 4 (stating
that “[h]ousing inmates in units where cell doors do not lock”
is an ongoing life-threatening safety issue). Because the man-
ual locks are located on the outside of the cell, if an officer
enters a cell, he must leave the cell door propped open.
Docket No. 27 at 33. Otherwise, the officer risks being locked
in the cell. Of course, this is a two-fold issue as it also presents
the inmate a way out. Even so, many of the cell doors simply
do not lock at all. Id. Inmates can open and close the door,
enter and exit, as opportunity permits.
It is true that some of the cell doors have been repaired in re-
cent years. As it stands, however, the Fourteenth Monitoring
Report and the October 27 Emergency Monitoring Report
show that the doors remain in an unacceptable state of disre-
pair. See Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 2; October 27 Emer-
gency Monitoring Report at 4.
E. “Trash Dumpster Cells”
Well over a year ago, the Monitoring Team reported that a
handful of cells had become trash receptacles. See Thirteenth
20
Monitoring Report at 3; see also Fourteenth Monitoring Report

at 4, 30. These “trash dumpster cells” were damaged cells that
RDC chose to weld shut rather than repair. Inmates, mean-
while, were able to deposit trash through the cells’ broken
windows. As a result, the cells served “as a breeding ground
for vermin.” Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 4.
Since this issue was brought to the attention of RDC, the num-
ber of trash dumpster cells increased to 30. Id. Only recently
have some of the cells been emptied and cleaned, while the
majority remain welded shut, awaiting repairs. Id. There is no
indication as to whether measures have been taken to avoid
the same problem from happening again.
“Trash dumpster cells” are one of several unsafe and unsani-
tary housing conditions. See Thirteenth Monitoring Report at
3-4 (reporting on issues with heating, ventilation, and air con-
ditioning, as well as non-functioning lights which left detain-
ees primarily living and operating in darkness for long peri-
ods of time); Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 54 (finding that
the HVAC system at RDC “has been allowed to degenerate to
the point that replacement is a more viable alternative than
repair.”).
F. Unreasonable Levels of Drugs and Contraband
The Monitoring Team reports that increased quantities of
drugs have contributed to “a recent upsurge in serious drug
overdoses and other drug reactions.” Fourteenth Monitoring
Report at 5. The rise in opiate abuse is especially worrisome.
Id. Failure to eliminate the importation of contraband, includ-
ing opiates, into RDC raises the risk of additional fatal drug
overdoses. Such results are as tragic as they are preventable.
21
Recent shakedowns reveal that “almost half of the inmates in

a housing area have contraband cell phones, excessive
amounts of illicit drugs, shanks and even cash.” Id. at 54. Con-
traband comes in through a variety of channels. Some detain-
ees escape the facility solely to transport “the contraband back
in.” September 15, 2021 Status Conference Transcript, Docket
No. 95 at 34; see also Docket No. 60 at 5 (“In one incident de-
scribed in Monitor’s June 2019 report, two prisoners were
found outside RDC, not to escape but to recover three bags of
contraband to bring back into the facility.”). Members of the
public also bring contraband in by, for example, throwing it
over the fence. Sept. 15 Tr. at 34. Staff also smuggle contra-
band into the facility. See id. at 35 (observing that “the sheriff’s
office has been proactive in taking disciplinary action and fir-
ing and charging people who they have found who have done
that.”).
G. Inadequate Medical and Mental Health Care
By all accounts, RDC’s management of medical and mental
health care remains abysmal. As the above discussion indi-
cated, see Part III.A, supra, RDC fails to adequately respond to
medical emergencies and deaths.
Many of the issues related to inadequate provision of medical
and mental health care stem from perennial staffing short-
ages. See Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 32; see also Part
III.B, supra. Personnel shortages often impede, or prevent out-
right, the provision of medical and mental health services, in-
cluding scheduled visits and necessary follow-up care. Four-
teenth Monitoring Report at 34. Indeed, as a result of these
failures, staff report that “procedures performed during med-
ication pass have to be postponed or even canceled,” or are
completed haphazardly. Id. “[T]here is no mechanism for
22
reporting, keeping track of, and/or quantifying” these fail-

ures. Id.
Mental health integration also remains poor. For instance,
“mental health staff are not involved in the decision to place
someone in segregation whether disciplinary or administra-
tive.” Id. at 81. RDC also fails to integrate mental health staff
in forensic evaluations conducted by the state mental hospital
via telepsychiatry. Id. at 114. This, despite the continual in-
crease in the number of detained individuals with mental
health needs, including “a larger percentage of extremely un-
stable, acutely ill detainees.” Id. at 5.
An incident this summer involving a youth detained at RDC
is illustrative. Senior Circuit Judge Green initially transferred
the youth from Henley-Young to RDC, asserting that RDC
was better equipped to respond to the youth’s “numerous at-
tempts of self-harm and suicide attempts.” Docket No. 90 at
1. Tragically, though, the youth again attempted suicide at
RDC. Id. at 2. Multiple subject matter experts from the Sher-
iff’s Office responded by stressing that “‘neither RDC nor
Henley-Young offer appropriate facilities for the mental
health needs of this minor.’” Id. at 4. The youth was ultimately
transferred to a state facility better equipped to support his
mental health needs. His situation highlights the lack of ap-
propriate mental health supports at RDC.
H. Over-reliance on Chemical Spray
The Monitoring Team indicates that “chemical spray is still
being used to coerce compliance.” Fourteenth Monitoring Re-
port at 26. Such usage violates the Use of Force policy, which
“explicitly requires that chemical spray be used as a defensive
23
measure, not as a tool to coerce compliance with officers’ or-

ders.” Id.
Chemical spray incidents also suggest inadequate supervi-
sion. Id. at 56. Prior reports note that officers who inappropri-
ately used chemical spray later received the approval of their
supervisors, who “signed off on the reports.” Thirteenth
Monitoring Report at 25. Indeed, “the Internal Affairs inves-
tigator exonerated the officers.” Id. This conduct is unaccepta-
ble.
As underscored by the Monitoring Team, RDC should de-
velop procedures whereby staff must receive supervisory ap-
proval for using chemical spray. Id. Following use of chemical
spray, staff must produce a use of force report, which should
include a description, as well as the number of discharges, of
the chemical munition cannisters used in the incident. Id. at
58, 61. Most importantly, though, RDC must abate reliance on
chemical spray as a coercive measure.
I. Detainees Run Parts of the Jail
The First Monitoring Report from 2017 was crystal clear: the
lack of staffing “has left prisoners in charge, which resulted in
riots, prisoner deaths and major structural damage to the fa-
cility.” Docket No. 12-1 at 2.
The consequences of detainee control were on full display
during three riots in June 2019. A previous Order recited how
“prisoners effectively took over one of the three pods that
make up RDC.” Docket No. 60 at 3.
The prisoners threatened to stab officers with
shanks and took their keys. At some point, of-
ficers barricaded themselves into a control room
for their safety – ceding control of the pod until
24
help arrived. The officers planned to retreat into

the control room’s bathroom should the prison-
ers breach the control room door, which thank-
fully did not occur.
Id. 12 The risks persisted in the most recent monitoring period.
The Lieutenant in charge of booking and classification re-
ported that some detainees “have developed their own com-
mittee system in which they choose who is accepted into their
unit.” Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 30. A-Pod in particu-
lar was described as “unmanageable.” Id.
In one troubling incident, the control room officers of A-Pod
and C-Pod both left their assigned posts. Id. at 33. The control
rooms were unattended. Detainees could have “easily take[n]
over the control rooms and release[d] the entire inmate pop-
ulation at the RDC.” Id. There is no telling if or when detain-
ees might again take control of a pod, or in fact release every-
one held at RDC.
J. COVID Continues to Be a Challenge
Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, this Court has
been in communication with the County about implementing
adequate measures to protect detainees and staff. See United
States v. Hinds Cty., No. 3:16-CV-489-CWR-JCG, 2020 WL
1892259, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2020).
Unfortunately, as recent as the Fourteenth Monitoring Re-
port, there were still “few to no opportunities [] to quarantine
or isolate individuals who have tested positive or who have been
exposed to positive individuals within the jail system.”
12 This Court has previously condemned prisons officials for ceding con-
trol of the prison to the inmates. See Depriest, 2015 WL 3795020, at *13-14.
25
Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 2. The facility remains “at high

risk for a spike in infections.” Id.
The COVID challenge illustrates an ongoing theme with Con-
sent Decree compliance: RDC adopts policies yet fails to im-
plement mechanisms to ensure that the policies are enforced.
This was particularly apparent during the Court’s last status
conference. The Attorney for the Sheriff’s Office represented
that per RDC policy, all staff must be either vaccinated or
tested for COVID-19 on a weekly basis. When pressed for de-
tail, however, counsel could not point to any mechanism of
enforcement, and simply retorted, “that is the policy.” Sept.
15 Tr. at 63. She finally acknowledged, “Do I represent to the
Court that this may or may not be done 100%? We don’t know
because it’s a new policy[.]” Id.; see also Fourteenth Monitor-
ing Report at 59 (noting that staff are “not able to articulate . .
. meaningful knowledge” of the Use of Force policy that went
into effect 18 months earlier).
K. RDC Detains Persons Adjudicated “Not Guilty”
A fundamental principle of corrections is that persons should
be detained only as long as necessary to resolve the charges
against them. Accordingly, RDC is required to release indi-
viduals found not guilty, acquitted of charges, or who have
the charges against them dismissed, provided that they are
not held on any other matter. Fourteenth Monitoring Report
at 115.
Presumably, the only detainees housed at RDC are those who
have failed to meet their bond obligations or are not entitled
to bond, as one generally has the federal constitutional right
to bond. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
(“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial
26
or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”). The Mis-

sissippi Constitution also recognizes this right. As the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court has explained, “there is a non-discre-
tionary right to bail before conviction for all offenses, except
those offenses punishable by death. . . . The Constitutional
right to bail before conviction, less the exception, has become
so fundamental that it is favored by the public policy of this
State.” Lee v. Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019, 1021 (Miss. 1979). The
Court cannot overlook this principle, which affords each de-
tainee the presumption of innocence.
RDC nevertheless routinely fails to release individuals found
not guilty, acquitted, or who have the charges against them
dismissed. Fourteenth Monitoring Report at 115-16. The Mon-
itoring Team counsels that “the courts will need to develop
the capability to provide a written release order in the court-
room for an individual to be released from court.” Id. at 116.
But RDC also needs to develop a means of identifying and
releasing those for whom no lawful basis of detention exists.
Id.
27
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has affirmed extraordinary federal inter-
vention into correctional operations where constitutional vio-
lations persist “for years” and “remain uncorrected.” Plata,
563 U.S. at 499. The record suggests that is the case today.
Within 21 days, Hinds County shall show cause and explain
why it should not be held in civil contempt and why a receiv-
ership should not be created to operate RDC. A hearing will
be scheduled shortly thereafter.
SO ORDERED, this the 23rd day of November, 2021.
s/ CARLTON W. REEVES
United States District Judge
28
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)
PLAINTIFF, )
)
v. )
) Case No.: 3:16-cv-00489-CWR-RHWR
)
)
HINDS COUNTY, ET AL., )
)
DEFENDANTS. )
____________________________________)
Court-Appointed Monitor’s Fifteenth Monitoring Report
Elizabeth E. Simpson
Court-Appointed Monitor
David M. Parrish Jim Moeser Dr. Richard Dudley

Corrections Operations Juvenile Justice Corrections Mental Health
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, this site visit was once again conducted remotely October
4-8, 2021. The remote site visit was completed through conference calls and video conferencing
with key personnel, members of the Monitoring Team and County and DOJ representatives. The
Compliance Coordinator provided extensive documentation electronically which made it
possible to review many records that are normally examined on site. An off-site document
review does limit the ability to verify some of the information as might be done with an on-site
visit in which more substantial interviews/observations can be completed and additional
documents reviewed. Comments and other information in this report should be considered in
light of that limitation.
Corrections Operations
While recent changes in the administration of the Hinds County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) were
brought about by the untimely loss of Sheriff Vance, Interim Sheriff Crisler and Jail
Administrator Bryan have an opportunity to address the needs of the HCDS in an innovative and
positive manner in their new positions. They should push for the creation of incentives and
practices that will enhance the ability of the HCSO to hire and retain qualified personnel. In
addition, they can help the County to develop more efficient methods of dealing with the
maintenance problems that have plagued the Jail System for years.
As always, the lack of personnel is the single greatest problem facing the Jail System. Without
enough personnel to fill required posts it is unrealistic to expect compliance with the Settlement
Agreement. Direct supervision cannot succeed if there is no officer available to staff each
housing unit around the clock. Unfortunately, rather than improving, the staffing situation has
regressed during the past four months. As of September 30, 2021, there were only 207 filled
positions out of 281 funded slots. In May that figure stood at 229. For the past five years the
number of filled positions has fluctuated between a low of 204 and a high of 256. Retention of
staff has been an ongoing problem and, as a result, the Stipulated Order requires engaging a
recruitment and retention consultant and development of a recruitment and retention plan. A
number of measures to improve retention have been recommended. The County reports that it
has adopted the 5% pay increase for detention personnel although it has not yet been
implemented. The County should immediately adopt the additional recommendations submitted
by the Jail Administrator and Sheriff to implement a career ladder for those officers so that they
do not leave after a few years and to offer nominal incentives such as bi-weekly pay and direct
deposit of paychecks, things that are available to most public service workers.
2
Direct Supervision of all facilities is mandated by the Settlement Agreement, but to date it has
only been implemented successfully at the WC. That facility has become the benchmark against
which the rest of the Jail System must be measured. It has fewer problems, less contraband, and
a better record with regard to the quality of incident reports than the RDC which is located only a
few hundred yards away.
The County’s inability to provide adequate maintenance for the Jail facilities is problematic. The
employment of Benchmark Construction was the best step that has been taken to date to resolve
the issue. Unfortunately, the County still requires an excessive level of review before corrective
action can be taken for routine maintenance projects. Why, for example, should there still be 19
“trash dumpster cells” in A-Pod four months after this matter was brought to the attention of the
Court in the 14th Monitoring Report? They should have been repaired and put back on-line as
quickly as possible.
Some serious problems associated with the Settlement Agreement continue to be unresolved,
even after five years of monitoring. The holding cells in Booking continue to house inmates for
days, weeks, and months. This violation of basic correctional standards needs to cease
permanently.
Although improvements have been made in the area of Classification, it is still not the case that
an objective risk instrument is governing the housing placement of inmates when there continue
to be gang pods, inmate “committees” rejecting housing placements, security moving inmates
without Classification involvement, lack of bed space and limitations on the use of some housing
units. Lack of staffing in Classification does not allow for 24/7 coverage and as a result not all
inmates are classified within eight hours of booking and Classification is not promptly involved
in the movement of inmates by officers.
There continue to be incidences of over-detention with no related incident reports or corrective

action. Although with the implementation of status sheets and records audits, the number of these
has been reduced, but investigation and corrective action following these incidents needs to be
implemented. A log of releases was available for the first time during this site visit which noted
whether the release was timely. However, it did not include the underlying information such as
the date and time of the court order that would allow for effective oversight of whether the
releases were timely.
Of great concern is that there appears to be no functioning PREA officer at this time. A number
of PREA related medical transports were identified by Medical, but there has been no
investigation of these incidents. A number of incident reports also indicated PREA issues for
which there was no follow up. In addition, during this time there has been no education of
inmates on PREA and no training of officers.
3
On a positive note, the Quality Assurance Officer has been producing excellent reports which
should be invaluable to the Sheriff’s Office and command staff in identifying initiatives for
improvement.
More recently, six inmates have died in custody so far this year—two in Booking, one in HU C-1
and another in HU C-4 at the RDC, one at Merit Health Hospital and one in HU A-4 at the RDC.
While definitive causes of death have not yet been reported by the Mississippi Bureau of
Investigation, one case appears to be due to COVID-19, two were due to an apparent drug
overdose, two were suicides and the last was caused by an assault by other inmates. The interim
report filed with the Court on October 28, 2021 provides more detail on these deaths. Subsequent
to the interim report another inmate died of cancer on November 18, 2021. He was hospitalized
at the time of his death. Nevertheless, a mortality review should be completed.
Finally, supervisors need to be held accountable for the actions of their officers. This issue has
been covered in detail in each and every Monitoring Report. It is time for supervisors to be held
to the standards that approved and adopted policies require. It is not sufficient to simply “sign
and send” incident reports and logs which has been the norm in the HCSO for many years. They
need to specify the actions of staff that are not consistent with expected/approved policy and
recommend appropriate corrective action.
Medical and Mental Health
After medical staff logged incidences where the shortage of security staff has impacted on the
delivery of medical and mental health services, an essential element required to assure a safe and
secure facility, it is clear that the impact has been significant. Therefore, despite the shortage of
security staff, a higher priority must be given to assigning security staff to support medical and
mental health staff.
The number of recent deaths in the facility has focused attention on the importance of
performing an interdisciplinary mortality review for each death. Such a review provides an
opportunity to identify any underlying problems that might contribute to similar fatalities and
implement any indicated corrective actions.
Plans for the much-anticipated Mental Health Unit are well underway, as is the renovation of the
designated space for the unit. However, the unit will not be able to open until staffing issues are
resolved, which will require approval and implementation of the QCHC contract by the County
(which includes an increase in the number of mental health staff) and completion of the training
of security officers who will be assigned to the unit.
4
Although the management of the range of COVID-19 related issues seems to have improved,
there is still work to be done to increase the percentage of detainees who agree to be tested and
vaccinated. To accomplish this, a more enhanced educational effort should be undertaken and
the County should fund incentive programs to encourage detainee participation in these life-
saving interventions.
The detention facilities experienced a surge in cases in July, August and September with about
90 inmates and staff testing positive. It appears that the facilities have moved past the recent
surge in cases, and so things are more manageable again. However, during the surge, the
housing of detainees who were infected or otherwise in quarantine was a challenge, due to space
and the shortage of security staff. This was particularly a problem with the female detainees
requiring quarantine, who were housed in segregation cells in the WC. The females ended up
taking all of the segregation cells instead of only half of the cells (usually designated for females
who required placement in segregation) and there was still overcrowding.
There has been an increase in detainee testing and vaccinations as a result of education efforts by
the Jail Administrator and the medical staff. As of November 1st, at RDC 141 (35%) of
detainees were fully vaccinated, 27 (7%) had a first dose, and 232 (58%) have refused
vaccination. At the WC 62 (35%) were fully vaccinated, 10 (6%) had a first dose, and 100 (56%)
have refused vaccination. A broader education effort (group education sessions, posters, a formal
peer education effort lead by those already vaccinated, etc.) is indicated and should be
encouraged. Testing and vaccinations also increased when the Jail Administrator offered
incentives (pizza night, etc.). However, the Jail Administrator has reported that the County has
discontinued funding such incentives. The County should reconsider this decision.
Medical opines that staff mandates (vaccination or weekly testing) seem to be helping. It appears
that staff compliance with mandates has at least decreased the entry of COVID into the facility,
especially since new admissions are being are being tested and quarantined (making new
admissions less of a problem with regard to bringing COVID into the facility). All of the
described initiatives appear to be having a positive effect. It is still recommended that a routine
contact tracing effort which is not currently being done be initiated.
Youthful Offenders
At the time of the October virtual site visit, there were eighteen Juveniles Charged as Adults
(JCAs) placed at the Henley Young facility, including two females. The Average Daily
Population (ADP) since the last reporting period showed a notable decrease which helps alleviate
some of the immediate concerns caused by the rising population reported last time. However,
that does not negate the concerns that any sense of intermediate and/or longer-term planning
related to the JCAs is at best unclear if occurring at all.
5
There has been some reduction in the number of more serious incidents involving JCAs,
including fights, significant disruptions, suicide attempts, and possession of contraband items.
While difficult to fully quantify, this does not alleviate the concerns about Henley Young being
as safe an environment as it had been in the past, particularly given the large number of
vacancies for the Youth Care Professional (YCP) that exist. The YCP staff are the most
responsible for providing day-to-day direct supervision of youth as well as supporting other staff
in providing services. Increased recruitment efforts have been implemented and the job
description has been modified to better reflect the role these staff play in the facility, but
vacancies and turnover severely limit the ability of the program to move forward in meeting
several requirements of the Settlement Agreement. As noted below, seven YCP positions were
eliminated to provide a raise to the current YCP staff. Although these positions were not filled,
they are needed. The vacancy rate based on the staff positions including the seven eliminated
positions is 60% (47% of staff positions excluding the seven positions.
On a positive note, Fernandeis Frazier has continued as Executive Director and all major
leadership roles are filled. In many ways, this is the most complete and solid administrative team
that has been in place over the duration of the monitoring process. The recent addition of a full-
time Treatment Coordinator is an important step forward, as that person will play the lead role in
establishing the vision and implementation strategies for a coordinated and integrated mental and
behavioral management program.
Modular units to provide additional and more appropriate education, program, and treatment
space are technically operational, but staffing shortages have made it difficult to utilize them.
Additional recommendations related to facility plant improvements have not been implemented,
and additional needs related to the security system and water system have been developed and
need to be addressed. The education program remains a concern, hampered largely by COVID
restrictions and staff shortages, although the principal is actively working to improve services to
better meet the needs of a diverse youth population.
Related to the Stipulated Order, as noted above the County has hired a full-time Treatment
Coordinator, a cornerstone position in terms of providing vision and leadership for the mental
health services and integrating those with other aspects of the overall program. However,
continued work needs to be done to secure additional psychological support/consultation to best
meet the intent of the Stipulated Order. A vigorous daily schedule for all programming has been
developed, and some improvements in actual implementation have been reported and
documented. That said, the overall quality and consistency of implementation is better assessed
when the Monitor can be on site.
6
Overall, with a stronger leadership team in place there is some hope that progress can be made in
the months ahead, but the priority remains getting qualified YCP staff on board so that basic
safety, security, and programming can be implemented successfully.
Criminal Justice System Issues

A CJCC meeting was held on October 1, 2021. There was not a quorum and the meeting was
primarily informational. The CJCC continues to be essentially non-functional. It will be
important for the County to provide leadership in the CJCC to work towards solutions to some of
the criminal justice system issues that contribute to length of stay and overcrowding the Jail. The
Monitoring Team has consistently recommended that staff support is essential for a functioning
CJCC but this has not been provided. The length of stay at the Hinds County Jail continues to be
approximately double the national average and puts a significant strain on the limited resources
of staffing and the physical plant. An effective CJCC can assist in addressing this problem but
requires the necessary investment to make it an effective body.
The County has hired a full-time individual to implement the pretrial program. The application to
be a learning site for implementation of the Arnold Public Safety Assessment has been rejected
because of lack of support by the City of Jackson. This would have met the requirement of the
Stipulated Order, although long overdue, to retain a consultant to assist with the development of
a pretrial program. Without technical assistance, development of a pretrial program is unlikely.
There continue to be discrepancies in the understanding of inmates waiting for state hospital
beds. A listing of individuals ordered for a mental health evaluation has finally been initiated at
the Jail but it was incomplete. The listing did not include the current status of the orders and so
included individuals who had completed the evaluation with no explanation of why they were
still in the Jail. The listing was not consistent with the state hospital listing with no
communication about the difference. As the individuals with serious mental illness often stay a
long time in the Jail and often pose significant management problems, this tracking and follow
up should be prioritized.
STIPULATED ORDER UPDATE
On January 16, 2020, the Court entered a Stipulated Order resolving the pending Motion for
Contempt. This triggered the deadlines in the Stipulated Order for remedial measures to move
towards compliance with the Settlement Agreement. All of the provisions of the Settlement
Agreement remain in effect. The following table tracks compliance with the Stipulated Order.
7
STIPULATED ORDER UPDATE
Compliance Stipulations Full compliance When was full Status Update

Due Dates by due date? compliance
(Yes/No/N/A) achieved? (Date)
02-16-20 II. B. 1. Within 30 days, the County shall Consultant was retained through the
retain an appropriately credentialed Monitoring Team. However, there
corrections recruitment and retention was not regular engagement by
consultant, with input from the Monitor. Yes, but not HCDS staff and the contract was
consistently dropped. The new Jail Administrator
utilized 10/2019 is now utilizing the contract
III. C. 1. Within 30 days, the Jail shall Purchase Order submitted on
ensure that handheld video recorders are 1/22/20; cameras were on back
available and planned uses of force are order; they have now arrived. As
video recorded. yet, there have been no video
recordings of planned Uses of Force
(UOF) although there have been
some incidents that should have
No 3/2020 been considered planned UOF.
V. A. Within 30 days, the County will post A full-time Treatment Coordinator
at a locally competitive salary for a full was hired in mid-August 2021. Her
time clinical social worker or psychologist certification is at a master’s level in
to serve as a treatment director or
counseling, and discussions will
coordinator.
continue related to securing
5/22/20-but additional psychologist support
vacant and filled and/or consultation.
in mid-August The opening for a psychologist
No 2021 remains posted.
I. A. The County shall use a qualified The County has entered into a
security contractor, with the assistance and contract with Benchmark
oversight of an architect with corrections Construction (Project Manager and
experience to accomplish the safety and Contractor) and Cooke, Douglas,
8
security measures at RDC. The architect Farr & Lemons Architects &
shall conduct periodic inspections. Engineers (CDFL, PA). This was
reportedly on 4/15/20. The
Monitoring Team has not seen the
contract or documentation of any
No 4/15/20 inspections by CDFL.
03-16-20 II. C. 1. Within 60 days, the County shall Job description revised and posted
adjust the Jail Administrator job description on 2/6/20
as needed to adhere to the minimum
qualifications and post the position at a
locally competitive salary. Yes 2/6/20
III. A.1. Within 60 days, the County shall
provide a Table of Contents listing the
policies and procedures to be developed,
anticipated deadlines for completion of
each draft policy, and deadlines for
submission of each draft policy to the
Monitor and DOJ. The Table of Contents
deadlines shall prioritize policies that are
necessary for safety and security. Yes 3/16/20
3-30-20 III. A. 3. Within 14 days of receiving the
Table of Contents, DOJ will identify
policies that may be disseminated to staff
on an interim basis before the Settlement-
required policy review and approval
process is completed. Yes 3/27/20
04-16-20 II. A. Within 3 months, the County shall The Revised Staffing Plan was
create a staffing plan to increase the developed in April 2020. It
supervision of inmates at RDC. The plan specified direct supervision staffing
shall include the following: for all three pods at the RDC. On
II.A. 1. A plan to provide direct supervision August 1, 2020, the Sheriff issued an
for Pod C when it reopens. order that called for direct
supervision staffing in C-Pod upon
9
its reopening (which occurred on

October 22, 2020). However,
incident reports disclose that C-Pod
is often not staffed according to the
Plan and Order. A updated revised
staffing plan was developed in
October, 2021.
Yes 4/13/20
II.A. 2. A staffing plan which optimizes the The staffing plan does not address
use of available staff to provide supervision this paragraph. The new Jail
at all three facilities including, among other Administrator has identified
strategies, rotation of staff from JDC and individuals at the WC who can be
the WC to RDC to increase the staff reassigned to RDC and is in the
coverage of RDC. No process of implementing that plan.
II.A. 3. An increase in the time that officers Directive issued on 9/27/19 by the
are in the housing units at RDC by having previous Jail Administrator; radios
the control officers fill out the housing unit assigned. Review of incident reports
logs based on radio communication from discloses that the directive is not
the housing unit officers and utilize welfare consistently being followed.
check sheets at the cell doors of those
inmates held in segregation. No
II. A. 4. At the Work Center, installation of The alarms and cameras were
an alarm system on the housing unit fire installed in April 2020. The
exit doors. The County will add a camera operations did not shift to direct
that covers each of the four fire exit doors. supervision with one officer in the
This will allow only one officer to manage unit until September, 2020.
each housing unit and will result in an
opportunity to assign 20.4 positions to other
areas or facilities. This work will be
completed within 3 months. Yes 4/2/20
III. B. 1. Within 3 months of the United New policies have been provided to
States’ and Monitor’s approval of each staff. In service training
policy or procedure, the County shall recommenced in April 2021, but all
10
develop the curriculum and materials for officers have not been trained on all
training on the new policy or procedure. No new approved and adopted policies.
III. B. 2. Within 3 months of the United Training on the Use of Force Policy,
States’ and Monitor’s approval of each adopted 2/1/20, had been postponed
policy or procedure, the County shall several times due to COVID. In the
develop the training plan for training new interim, UOF training has been
and current detention officers and staff on provided to all supervisors as of
the new policy or procedure, with dates for March 2020. In-service training has
completion of each set of training. now recommenced but not all
No officers now new supervisors have
been trained on UOF.
V. B. Within 3 months, Henley-Young A more complete daily schedule has
shall administer a daily program, including been developed that outlines times
weekends and holidays, to provide for more structured activities. Per
structured educational, rehabilitative, staff involved in leading the
and/or recreational programs for youth activities there has been some
during all hours that youth shall be improvement in attendance and
permitted out of their cells. Programming increased expectations for staff to
shall include: encourage attendance by not turning
1. Activities which are varied and that time into “free time” in which
appropriate to the ages of the youth; youth play cards or watch TV. Staff
2. Structured and supervised activities shortages interfere with attendance
which are intended to alleviate idleness and and completion of activities and
develop concepts of cooperation and attendance need to be documented.
sportsmanship;
3. Supervised small group leisure activities,
such as a wide variety of card and table
games, arts and crafts, or book club
discussions; and
4. Hinds County, by and through its County
Administrator and/or Executive Director at
Henley-Young, shall maintain exclusive
control and maintenance of any facilities or
11
technology that promotes compliance with

this provision.
No
V. C. The programming described in The mental health team (Youth
Paragraph B shall include group and Support Specialists and QMHPs)
individual psychosocial skill building have worked to identify and
programs designed to address criminogenic implement evidence-based
needs and promote positive youth curriculum/programs in the areas
development such as: outlined. The frequency and
1. cognitive behavioral programming; duration of those sessions remains a
2. independent living skill training; concern as well as integrating those
3. relationship and positive communication activities into a facility-wide
skills; behavior management and skill
4. anger management; development framework.
5. peer refusal skills;
6. trauma informed programming; and
7. pre-vocational skill building. No
05-16-20 I. A. 1. In any occupied pod, the County This has been completed in C-Pod
will convert all control room doors, housing and A Pod and now in B-Pod.
unit entry doors, recreation yard doors (that Although the security doors in A-
open into the “horseshoe”), isolation doors Pod have been changed from a
and “cage doors” to electronically sliding to a swinging configuration,
controlled swing doors to the control panel and they now lock, their operation is
so they can be electronically operated with still by key, not electronic control.
a CML type locking mechanism. No
I. A. 2. Within 4 months, the County shall
reinforce all C Pod cell doors with a strip of
steel to reduce the risk of tampering as part
of the ongoing renovation of this Pod. Yes 4/30/20
I. A. 3. In B Pod, the County shall modify The work has now been completed
the control room doors, housing unit doors, in B-Pod although other issues
and recreation doors to swinging doors. The prevent B-Pod from being fully
County also shall install a new electronic occupied.
12
control panel so that all doors can be

electronically controlled. The “cage” doors
have a keyway on only one side. The
County also shall upgrade the “cage” doors
so that there is a keyway on each side (as is
currently the case in C Pod). The County
shall repair the primary security door that
controls access between the main corridor
(Great Hall) and B Pod as a part of the B
Pod modifications so that it can be
controlled electronically from master
control. No 9/21
I. A. 4. The County will reinstall the fire Fire hoses have been installed in C
hoses in secured cabinets as part of the Pod during the renovation. They
renovation process of each pod. have not been reinstalled in the other
2 pods the renovation of which is
No now overdue.
I. B. 1. Retain a consultant with experience CDFL and HDR, Architects, have
in master planning to facilitate the process been retained.
of long-term planning The County will
retain the consultant within 4 months. Yes 4/15/20
I. B. 4. Form a committee to develop and County contracted with facilitators
implement the Master Plan, which will and formed a committee to work
include the County Administrator, the with the facilitators. The consultants
Sheriff, the Jail Administrator, the facility completed the master plan
captains, and the Board of Supervisors Yes but not recommendations on January 15,
President. Other members may be included fully because 2021. They are now working on
at the discretion of the County and the facility captains phased implementation of Option 2
Sheriff. not included 4/28/20 of the Master Plan.
II. B. 2. Within 4 months, the County shall There has been frequent turnover in
hire or designate a full-time Recruitment this position. It has been vacated
Officer within the Detention Division several times and is now filled
again.
13
specifically for recruitment of detention No 6/1/20

officers.
II. B. 3. Within 4 months, with the A basic Recruitment Plan has been
assistance of the recruitment and developed by the Recruitment
corrections consultant, the County shall Officer. It did not address retention.
develop a Recruitment and Retention Plan The new Jail Administrator is
to implement the substantive requirements working with the HR consultant to
of the Settlement. No develop a complete plan.
IV. A. The County shall develop a Pretrial The County has not retained a
Services program to provide for long-term consultant. The County has not been
population management which will selected as a learning site with
maximize the options in facility use. The Advancing Pretrial Policy and
program shall include the following: Research because not all
1. Within 4 months, the County shall retain stakeholders agreed to provide a
a consultant experienced in the area of letter of support.
implementation of pretrial services
programs. No
IV. A. 2. Within 4 months, the County shall The County has posted the position.
hire a full time individual qualified to The County has hired a Director
oversee the development and who started on November 9, 2021.
implementation of a pretrial services
program. This individual shall have or
within 12 months shall obtain certification
by the National Association of Pretrial
Services Agencies (NAPSA). No
IV. A. 3. The County shall engage The development of a pretrial
stakeholders in the implementation of a program has been discussed at CJCC
pretrial services program either through the meetings but has not included all
CJCC or a specially formed committee. necessary stakeholders or focused on
No actual implementation.
IV. A. 4. The County shall provide the
technical support for implementation of a
14
risk assessment instrument for purposes of

pretrial release decision-making. No
5-16-20 (1 V. A. If there is a qualified candidate(s) for The position was not posted until
month to HY treatment director or coordinator, the 5/22/20. The position was filled in
post and 3 County will make an offer within 3 months late September, 2020 with the hiring
months to of posting the position. If there is not a of a clinical social worker but she
make an qualified candidate, the County will consult resigned after 8 weeks. The County
offer) with the Monitor and United States to filled the position as of May 30,
determine appropriate adjustments to the 2021 with a half-time person who
recruiting process and will report regularly, left shortly thereafter.
and at each status conference, regarding its A new Treatment Coordinator began
efforts. If a clinical social worker is hired full-time in mid-August.
for the position, the County will contract As of October 2021. the County has
with a psychologist to provide any not yet contracted with a
assessment, therapeutic or consultation psychologist to provide additional
services needed in addition to the services services or consultation.
of the clinical social worker. The County
will consult with the Monitor to set the
appropriate number of contract hours. No 9/2020
06-16-20 III. C. 2. Within 5 months, an individual Training was scheduled but had
experienced in corrections shall train been delayed due to COVID. UOF
deputies on a Settlement-compliant use of training is provided to new recruits
force policy, including Settlement during the basic academy. Now that
requirements for reporting of use of force. in-service training has recommenced
UOF training for existing staff is
being provided but not all officers
No have been trained yet.
III. C. 3. Within 5 months, supervisors shall Training on supervisory review of
be trained on use of force reviews so that UOF incidents was included in the
they include collection and preservation of UOF training of the supervisors.
videos, witness statements, and medical Incident reports indicate that
records. This training shall emphasize supervisors are approving reports
supervisors’ responsibility for ensuring that disclose improper use of force.
15
complete use of force reports and for Since the time of the supervisors’
referring staff for training and investigation, training, new supervisors have been
as required by the Settlement. promoted and need training.
No 9/2020
07-16-20 I. A. 5. The County shall convert the cell
doors in B Pod Units 3 and 4 to swinging
doors with the CML type locking
mechanism that is in place in the sample
cell in C Pod. The County shall also
reinforce the cell doors in Units 1 and 2
with a strip of steel as is being used in C
Pod. These renovations will be completed
within 6 months. No 10/21
I. A. 6. If A Pod is not utilized for housing, Since the renovation of B Pod is still
renovation of A Pod recreation yard and underway, A Pod continues to be
cage doors and the control panel may be used contrary to the time line in the
postponed until such time as it is used for Stipulated Order. However, the plan
housing. If A pod is used even on an is now to continue to use two
occasional basis, these doors will be housing units and A-Pod which will
converted to secure swinging doors and tied require renovation.
to a new control panel. No
I. A. 7. The County shall replace all holding Multiple person cell doors have been
cell doors in the booking area with modern replaced but single cells continue to
full transparent panel (both top and bottom) be used for housing without the
security doors to facilitate deputies required doors. It was anticipated
conducting a documented fifteen-minute that Booking would no longer be
well-being check on each multi-person cell used for housing when C Pod
and occupied single cell. The County will opened. However, it continues to be
discontinue the use of the holding cells that used for housing.
are not directly visible from the booking
station. This will be completed 6 months. No
II. B. 4. Within 6 months, the County shall A draft Career Development Plan
develop and implement a process that has been submitted to the Board of
16
provides criteria for merit-based promotion Supervisors but as of the time of the
and establishes a career ladder. site visit the BOS had not taken
action on it.
No
7-16-20 (2 II. C. 2. If there is a qualified candidate(s) A new well qualified Jail
months to for Jail Administrator, the County shall Administrator was hired in June
post and 4 make an offer to hire an individual to fill 2021.
months the position within 4 months of posting the
after that to position. If there is not a qualified
offer) candidate, the County, Monitor and United
States will confer to determine next steps
and will report to the Court regarding the
same. Yes 6/1/20
8-16-20 (2 II. C. 3. Within 30 days of hiring the The new Jail Administrator has done
months to Settlement-compliant Jail Administrator, an assessment and has a plan to
post, 4 this individual shall evaluate the move some supervisors from the
months to organizational structure of the three-facility WC to RDC.
offer, and 1 jail system and develop a plan to reassign
month staff consistent with any change in the
evaluate organizational structure.
structure No
10-16-2020 IV. A. 5. The County shall authorize the
free attendance at NIC training for pretrial
executives for individuals involved in the
development of the pretrial program within
9 months. No
11-16-2020 II. B. 5. Within 10 months, the County shall
implement a plan for retention pay based on
merit, time in service, or a combination.
No
17
II. B. The County shall improve recruitment A Recruiting Officer is working on

and retention initiatives to ensure adequate initiatives to hire qualified Detention
levels of competent staffing to provide Officers. Retention has not been
reasonably safe living conditions in the Jail. No addressed.
I. B. Within 10 months, the County shall The master plan recommendations
complete a Master Plan to determine the report was completed on 1/15/21.
long-term use of each of the three facilities The Master Planning Committee is
and evaluate the option of building a new now proceeding with planning a
facility or further renovating existing phased implementation of Option 2
facilities. No 1/15/21 of the Master Plan.
I. B. 2. The master plan will include The master plan recommendations
deadlines for other necessary safety and report includes a listing of necessary
security repairs and renovations at all three safety and security repairs. The
facilities, as long as they remain open, 1/15/21 but not report does not include and the
including deadlines for installing necessary fully because County has not adopted a master
fire suppression/prevention systems, all of deadlines for plan with deadlines for making those
which will be conducted by a qualified renovations not repairs.
security contractor. No included
4/16/21 IV. A. 4. The risk assessment tool shall be
implemented within one year after retaining
the pretrial services consultant. No
Ongoing I. B. 3. [The County shall. . .] [w]ork with
the monitoring team to gather the
information that is needed for the long-term
planning process. Yes
III. A. 2. The County’s policy committee The policy development and review
will provide draft policies to the monitoring process has been proceeding with 33
team and DOJ consistent with the timeline policies now approved. Not all
identified in the Table of Contents, will projected deadlines have been met.
notify the Monitor and DOJ of any Progress was stalled but with the
anticipated delays to meeting projected new Jail Administrator progress is
submission dates and will implement an now being made.
identified plan to correct the delays. The
18
monitoring team and DOJ will make a good

faith effort to return comments and
suggestions about the draft policies within a
two-week time frame. The policy
committee will make a good faith effort to
incorporate those suggestions and consider
those comments. No
19
Monitoring Activities
The Monitoring Team conducted a Remote Site Visit October 4, 2021, through October 8, 2021
with some follow up interviews. The site visit schedule was as follows:
Site Visit Schedule
October 4-8, 2021
Date and Lisa Simpson Dave Parrish Dr. Richard Dudley Jim Moeser
Time
(CT)
October Major Bryan and Major Bryan and
4 Captain Simon Captain Simon
9:00 *Zoom *Zoom
10:30 Jamekia Scott, Bob Brown, Gary Mr. Burnside,
Grievance Chamblee and Sgt. Operations Manager and
Coordinator Winter Mr. Dorsey, Quality
*Zoom Assurance Manager
*Conference B
*Google Meet
1:00 Captains Simon, Captains Simon, and

and Conner Conner
*Zoom *Zoom
2:30 Miioka Laster Youth Support
Specialists Tamika
*Conference A Barber and Carleslie
Jones
*Conference B
3:30 Tony Gaylor and Doris Coleman
County
Administrator *Conference A
Jones
*Zoom
Oct. 5 Public Defender Lt. Holmes, Nurse Cable, HSA and Ms. Brenda Frelix
9:00 Conference B Investigators Elkins Nurse Gray, Director (QMHP)
and Edwards of Nursing *Google Meet
Conference A
TEAM (TBA)
10:00 Priscilla Dawson Lt. Cheryl Childs, Mental health Ms. Carol Warfield,
Conference B and Marlo Brinnon team/staff-QMHP’s Treatment Coordinator
*Conference A Ms. Martin and Ms.
Pippins Google Meet
TEAM (TBA)
20
1:00 Inmate Interviews Sgt. from Booking, Discharge Nurse Director Frazier
*Zoom Sgt. from RDC, and Buffington (and Nurse Conference B
Sgt. from WC (one Cable, optional)
after the other)
Google Meet TEAMS (TBA)
3:00 Lt. George Representative from Ms. Young, Youth Care

Zoom Nursing Staff Supervisor
TEAMS Conference A
Oct. 6 Sgt. Mazie Jones Sgt. Mazie Jones Dr. Lot, Nurse
9:00 *Conference A *Conference A Practioner
TEAMS
10:30 County County Dr. Bell Andrea Baldwin,
Administrator; Administrator; TEAMS Program Coordinator
Robert Farr, Bill Robert Farr, Bill
Prindle, Tony Prindle, Tony Conference B
Gaylor, David Gaylor, David
Marsh, and Major Marsh and Major
Bryan (and maybe Bryan, (and maybe
others) to discuss others) to discuss
Master Planning Master Planning
Zoom Zoom
1:00 Sgt. Tillman re Captain Jeff Burnley Major Bryan, Nurse Mr. Caldwell, School
Records and Lt. Neal Knox Cable (HSA), Krista principal
Conference B *Conference A Chick (QCHC Central
Office, Mental Zoom
Health), Dr. Kern
(QCHC Central
Office), Marlo
Brinnen re mortality
reviews
Google Meet
3:00 Claire Barker, Claire Barker, Mr. Caples, QMHP
Sheriff Crisler, Sheriff Crisler, and
and Major Bryan Major Bryan
Zoom Zoom
Oct. 7 HSA and QCHC HSA and QCHC Ms. Foster, Training and
9:00 Central Office Central Office (Krista Learning Development
(Krista Chick and Chick and Dr. Donald Manager
Dr. Donald Kern) Kern) Ms. Martin and Conference B
10:30 Ms. Martin and Tony Hannah Ms. Pippins, and
Ms. Pippins re Conference A
21
Mental Health Major Bryan re

Unit Mental Health Unit
*Zoom
Zoom
1:00 Taneka Moore Bernard Moore, Nurse Cable Exit conference with Mr.
Conference (A) Recruiting TEAMS Frazier
Zoom Google Meet
2:00 Claire Barker, Claire Barker, Claire Barker, Synarus Claire Barker, Synarus
Synarus Green, Synarus Green, Green, Tony Gaylor, Green, Tony Gaylor, and
Tony Gaylor, Tony Gaylor and other attorneys other attorneys (Sheriff
(Sheriff and Board (Sheriff and Board (Sheriff and Board and Board representative
representative representative representative invited) invited)
invited) invited) *Zoom *Zoom
*Zoom *Zoom
Oct. 8 person with full access Carlyn Hicks, Youth
9:00 to EMR Court Judge
TEAMS Zoom
COMPLIANCE OVERVIEW
The Monitoring Team will track progress towards compliance with the following chart. This
chart will be added to with each Monitoring Report showing the date of the site visit and the
number of Settlement Agreement requirements in full, partial or non-compliance. Sustained
compliance is achieved when compliance with a particular Settlement Agreement requirement
has been sustained for 24 months or more. (This was changed from 18 months in order to align
with paragraph 164 which requires 2 years of substantial compliance for termination of the
Agreement). The count of 92 requirements is determined by the number of Settlement
Agreement paragraphs which have substantive requirements. Introductory paragraphs and
general provisions are not included. Some paragraphs may have multiple requirements which are
evaluated independently in the text of the report but are included as one requirement for purposes
of this chart. The provisions on Youthful Offenders are now only evaluated for compliance at
Henley Young. The reason for this is that there are no more juveniles at RDC.
Site Visit Sustained Substantial Partial NA at Non- Total

Date Compliance Compliance Compliance this time Compliant
2/7-10/17 0 1 4 2 85 92
6/13-16/17 0 1 18 2 71 92
10/16- 0 1 26 1 64 92
20/17
22
1/26- 0 1 29 0 62 92
2/2/18
5/22-25/18 0 1 30 0 61 92
9/18-21/18 1 0 37 0 54 92
1/15-18/19 1 1 44 0 46 92
5/7-10/19 1 6 42 0 43 92
9/24-29/19 1 6 47 0 38 92
1/21-24/20 1 6 49 0 36 92
6/8-12/20 1 6 51 0 34 92
10/5-21/20
(corrected) 1 6 54 0 31 92
2/8-11/21 2 6 53 1 30 92
6/7-11/21 2 2 59 1 28 92
10/4-8/21 3 0 59 1 29 92
INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS
Text of paragraphs 1-34 regarding “Parties,” “Introduction,” and “Definitions” omitted.
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
PROTECTION FROM HARM
Consistent with constitutional standards, the County must take reasonable measures to provide
prisoners with safety, protect prisoners from violence committed by other prisoners, and ensure
that prisoners are not subjected to abuse by Jail staff. To that end, the County must:
37. Develop and implement policies and procedures to provide a reasonably safe and secure
environment for prisoners and staff. Such policies and procedures must include the following:
a. Booking;
b. Objective classification;
c. Housing assignments;
d. Prisoner supervision;
e. Prisoner welfare and security checks (“rounds”);
f. Posts and post orders;
g. Searches;
h. Use of force;
i. Incident reporting;
j. Internal investigations;
k. Prisoner rights;
l. Medical and mental health care;
m. Exercise and treatment activities;
23
n. Laundry;
o. Food services;
p. Hygiene;
q. Emergency procedures;
r. Grievance procedures; and
s. Sexual abuse and misconduct.
Partial Compliance
The Stipulated Order calls for a total of 90 policies that need to be developed and implemented.
Of those, 48 are identified as priority policies. Twenty-seven of the priority policies have been
approved by DOJ and adopted by the Sheriff with one recently approved by DOJ but not yet
adopted. So far, 33 policies have been approved by the DOJ and 32 have been adopted by the
Sheriff. Of the 19 policy areas listed above, 16 have been addressed in whole or in part by
policies that have been adopted. One more is addressed in policies currently under review and
“Housing Assignments” has been addressed in a housing plan. Although progress is being made,
the target dates for policy development have not been met. With the change in Jail Administrator
some policies that were previously identified as in the review process are being revisited. At this
time there are four policies actively in the review process.
The development of a complete set of policies, approved by the DOJ and adopted by the Sheriff,
is moving forward but this has been at a less than satisfactory rate. The first two years of the
monitoring process resulted in virtually no progress, but the addition of a coordinator employed
through the Monitor resulted in positive movement. With changes in HCDS personnel there was
less engagement by HCDS staff in the policy development process which slowed the pace. While
the review process has never been accomplished at a satisfactory level, during the last four
months it has slowed even further due to changes in personnel assigned to these duties. Now that
a new Jail Administrator has been put in charge of the Jail System, the effort to review and
approve policies has taken on a new priority and draft policies that have languished in the
process are being moved. This appears to be accelerating the pace of policy development and
should also improve the final product of the policies.
In spite of the problems associated with the COVID pandemic, in-service training sessions
recommenced on approved policies. Between August 31 and September 3, 2021, approximately
half of the current Detention Services work force received instruction on approved policies.
They included: 01-100, Administration; 01-600, Review and Investigations; 04-200,
Information Management; 06-100, Pre-Booking; and 06-200, Booking. The remaining staff will
be scheduled to attend at a later date. While this is a step in the right direction, the shortage of
staff makes it extremely difficult to pull officers from scheduled duties in order to attend training
sessions. In addition, only a few of the approved policies have been covered to date. The
backlog of required training is more than can be reasonably handled in a timely fashion
considering the lack of available staff.
24
As has been previously noted, no Post Orders have been issued to date. Their creation is
dependent upon the implementation of Policies, many of which have yet to be developed. The
memo titled “Detention Officer Duties” that was issued by the previous Jail Administrator on
April 6, 2021, failed to serve as a satisfactory interim measure. While officers at the WC
routinely comply with the standards set forth in the memo, the same cannot be said for the RDC.
This will be explained in greater detail later in the Monitoring Report.
There is still a concern that some of the adopted policies do not appear to be implemented or
fully implemented. Neither the officers or supervisors have received in-service training on the
policies although new cadets receive such training. The WC has been training on policies during
roll call training which although limited in time is of some benefit. The RDC has not been
providing roll call training. Most notably, the Use of Force policy explicitly requires that
chemical spray be used as a defensive measure, not as a tool to coerce compliance with officers’
orders. As described below, chemical spray is still being used to coerce compliance. There are
numerous other examples of the failure to follow or implement adopted policies mentioned
throughout this report such as the failure to provide constant supervision for suicidal inmates. In
some cases, it is not a matter of training but a lack of implementation. An example, is the failure
to create a Classification Committee. The new Detention Administrator will hopefully rectify
these problems.
38. Ensure that the Jail is overseen by a qualified Jail Administrator and a leadership team with
substantial education, training and experience in the management of a large jail, including at
least five years of related management experience for their positions, and a bachelor’s degree.
When the Jail Administrator is absent or if the position becomes vacant, a qualified deputy
administrator with comparable education, training, and experience, must serve as acting Jail
Administrator.
Partial Compliance
The new Jail Administrator who was employed in June 2021, is well qualified for the job. She
meets all of the requirements specified in the Settlement Agreement with regard to education,
experience and technical training. She is the best qualified individual to hold the position since
the monitoring process began.
As has been previously noted, the Assistant Jail Administrator was not qualified to hold his
position based on his lack of education; he did not have a four-year college degree. He was
recently suspended for seven days without pay from September 27 through October 5, 2021, and
now is reportedly terminated for cause on October 20, 2021. The Captain who currently
commands the WC is the acting Assistant Jail Administrator. Although he does not currently
25
meet the education requirement, he has been enrolled in Hinds Community College since
January of 2021.
39. Ensure that all Jail supervisors have the education, experience, training, credentialing, and
licensing needed to effectively supervise both prisoners and other staff members. At minimum,
Jail supervisors must have at least 3 years of field experience, including experience working in
the Jail. They must also be familiar with Jail policies and procedures, the terms of this
Agreement, and prisoner rights.
Partial Compliance
As was noted in Paragraph 37, in-service training has recommenced, starting with a review of
several approved and adopted policies. A concerted effort is required in order to provide that
training to all supervisors on all such policies. That has not been accomplished to date.
In the last Monitoring Report concern was expressed over the fact that in 2021, two officers, who
were promoted to the rank of Sergeant, did not meet the experience requirement. During the past
four months that discrepancy has not reoccurred. Of the three individuals who were promoted to
Lieutenant, Sergeant and the specialty position of Grievance Officer, all were well qualified to
fill the positions.
40. Ensure that no one works in the Jail unless they have passed a background check, including a
criminal history check.
Sustained Compliance
The HCSO continues to comply with the requirement that all applicants have passed a
background check, including a criminal history check. The was confirmed by the Background
Screening Investigator/Recruiting Officer and the Director of Human Resources, as well as by a
review of the personnel files of recently employed Detention Officers. Since Substantial
Compliance has been maintained for 24 months, this paragraph is now upgraded to Sustained
Compliance.
41. Ensure that Jail policies and procedures provide for the “direct supervision” of all Jail
housing units.
Non-Compliant
The HCSO has not addressed the requirements of this paragraph adequately. In the last
Monitoring Report, a lengthy review of design, operation and staffing implications for each jail
explained why this paragraph is carried as Non-Compliant.
26
While the JDC is no longer used for housing, the transfer waiting area on the ground floor needs
to be renovated to eliminate the two existing holding cells and replace them with adequate
holding cells to support the inmates going to and returning from court.
At the WC direct supervision has been in place effectively ever since the second officer was
removed from each housing unit. Not only did that save on manpower, but it allowed the single
housing unit officer to be completely in charge of, and fully responsible for, the operation of
his/her housing unit. The fact that the WC housing units are designed as open bay dormitories,
where the officer does not have the option of locking inmates down in cells for extended periods
of time, actually made compliance with the principles and dynamics of direct supervision easier
than has been the case at the RDC.
At the RDC, which was originally designed and operated as a direct supervision jail, the facility
reverted to “podular remote surveillance” when the officers were pulled out of the housing units
in 2012. Re-establishing direct supervision has not been possible since that time due to the lack
of staff required to keep an officer inside each housing unit continuously. When C-Pod was
reopened in October 2020, after being fully renovated for the second time since 2012, it was
supposed to be staffed for, and operated as, a direct supervision housing area. A year later, that
has still not occurred. Housing units are frequently left unattended and inmates are kept locked
down in their cells for extended periods of time. The end result is that there has been extensive
damage caused by inmates, the existence of contraband is still at an unacceptable level and
assaults and conflicts between inmates are all too common.
Previously, documentation in support of these statements was provided by referencing specific

incident reports. That was particularly important given that the Monitoring Team’s site visits
have been conducted remotely for over a year due to the COVID 19 pandemic. Fortunately, the
recently assigned Quality Assurance Coordinator now publishes a monthly summary report
which provides data and observations made on site. The following quotation is from the August
2021, Monthly Quality Assurance Summary. “Several walkthroughs of Raymond Detention
Center in August have yielded similar or the same results. Staff in C-Pod are not stationed in the
units as required. This pod is a direct supervision unit and should be staffed at all times. In one
instance, detainees were observed sifting through staff’s paperwork that was left in the unit when
staff exited the pod.” See e.g., 210962. There are supposed to be two officers assigned to work
inside C-4. They are not supposed to leave the unit. On July 6th, IR 210983, an inmate
committed suicide on C-4 when no officer was present. The Internal Affairs report disclosed that
the lone Detention Officer assigned to C-4 had a habit of leaving the housing unit and left the
unit that day as reported by other officers. He did not complete an observation log because he
reportedly did not have a log book. He reported head counts every hour, but did not actually go
inside the unit; instead, he looked in from the area of the “cage” from where he could not
possibly see each inmate to conduct an accurate count. It is not always possible to tell from an
27
incident report whether there was an officer on the unit when an incident occurred. However,
numerous incident reports suggest that to be the case. An example is IR #211071, in which on
July 24th, officers entered C-4 to do count and found an inmate hanging in his cell from the light
fixture.
As has been previously reported, officers spend time in the control room instead of being on the
units. This has continued to be a problem. The QA Coordinator reported that when visiting the
units, she often finds the officers sitting in the control room. This is apparent in some incident
reports. On July, 26th, the Lieutenant responded to an assistance call regarding a fire in C-4 ISO.
Upon arrival in C-Pod, she found the entire first shift and supervisor sitting in the control room.
IAD reports disclose that on July 20th several Detention officers and two Sergeants were in A-
Pod Control during the investigated incident. On May 29th, three Detention officers had a food
fight in A-Pod Control with a supervisor present. There are other instances when officers leave
their assigned posts. On September 6th, (IR #211241) an inmate housed in Booking was having
his out of cell time. The officer assigned to Booking stepped away because he had a phone call.
While he was gone, a fight occurred between that inmate and an inmate from the laundry room.
B-Pod has been closed for renovation so that it can be brought up to C-Pod standards. Even
though all required work was not complete, portions of the pod were opened beginning in
August. When the entire pod is brought back on line it is supposed to be operated as a direct
supervision housing area. Considering the fact that C-Pod still does not live up to that standard,
it is unlikely that B-Pod will either. Previously A-Pod was scheduled to be closed once B-Pod
reopened, but now consideration is being given to keeping two housing units in A-Pod
operational. Not only does the County have no plan for renovating A-Pod, but the additional
personnel required to operate any of A-Pod under direct supervision conditions is well beyond
the current staffing level. With only 207 positions filled as of September 30th, HCDS does not
have enough personnel available to fulfill the requirements specified in the Stipulated Order.
• Direct supervision is effective at the WC. IR’s 211421 and 211433 are two examples of
how the presence of an officer in the housing unit makes it possible for him/her to
observe conflicts between inmates and to intervene before serious injury results. IR’s
211313, 211324 and 211358 reflect just the opposite at the RDC where direct supervision
has not taken hold. There the inmates have control of the housing units and staff usually
respond to incidents after the fact.
• IR211313—Inmates in A-2 told the Detention Officer serving breakfast that they
were in fear of their lives and asked to be moved. This is a commonplace occurrence.
• IR211324—An inmate in B-1 ISO got out of his unit and into B-1. From there he
entered the recreation yard and then went into the outside fenced area. He was able to do
so because the outside door could not be locked and the door between B-1 ISO and B-1
was unsecured. He was ultimately located in B-2. This event occurred on September 25,
28
2021, which indicates that B-Pod was still not ready for occupancy, even though inmates
had been held there prematurely since early August.
• IR211358—Jail staff were informed of an assault and the need for protective
custody for an inmate in A-1 by the inmate’s wife and his attorney who called the Jail
with this information. That is how staff located the injured inmate and sent him to the
hospital for treatment.
The lack of control on the part of staff at the RDC is a direct result of the failure to
implement direct supervision at that facility.
42. Ensure that the Jail has sufficient staffing to adequately supervise prisoners, fulfill the terms
of this Agreement, and allow for the safe operation of the Jail. The parties recognize that the
Board allocates to the Sheriff lump sum funding on a quarterly basis. The Sheriff recognizes that
sufficient staffing of the Jail should be a priority for utilizing those funds. To that end, the
County must at minimum:
a. Hire and retain sufficient numbers of detention officers to ensure that:
i. There are at least two detention officers in each control room at all times;
ii. There are at least three detention officers at all times for each housing unit,
booking area, and the medical unit;
iii. There are rovers to provide backup and assistance to other posts;
iv. Prisoners have access to exercise, medical treatment, mental health
treatment, and attorney visitation as scheduled;
v. There are sufficient detention officers to implement this Agreement.
b. Fund and obtain a formal staffing and needs assessment (“study”) that determines
with particularity the minimum number of staff and facility improvements
required to implement this Agreement. As an alternative to a new study, the
September 2014 study by the National Institute of Corrections may be updated if
the updated study includes current information for the elements listed below. The
study or study update must be completed within six months of the Effective Date
and must include the following elements:
i. The staffing element of the study must identify all required posts and
positions, as well as the minimum number and qualifications of staff to
cover each post and position.
ii. The study must ensure that the total number of recommended positions
includes a “relief factor” so that necessary posts remain covered regardless
of staff vacancies, turnover, vacations, illness, holidays, or other
temporary factors impacting day-to-day staffing.
iii. As part of any needs assessment, the study’s authors must estimate the
number of prisoners expected to be held in the Jail and identify whether
additional facilities, including housing, may be required.
29
c. Once completed, the County must provide the United States and the Monitor with
a copy of the study and a plan for implementation of the study’s
recommendations. Within one year after the Monitor’s and United States’ review
of the study and plan, the County must fund and implement the staffing and
facility improvements recommended by the study, as modified and approved by
the United States.
d. The staffing study shall be updated at least annually and staffing adjusted
accordingly to ensure continued compliance with this Agreement. The parties
recognize that salaries are an important factor to recruiting and retaining qualified
personnel, so the County will also annually evaluate salaries.
e. The County will also create, to the extent possible, a career ladder and system of
retention bonuses for Jail staff.
Non-Compliant
The inability of the HCSO to hire and retain enough Detention staff to operate its jail facilities in
compliance with the Settlement Agreement has been the primary shortcoming during the past
five years of monitoring. The number of authorized positions has not changed except for the
addition of nine Food Service slots that were transferred from a private contractor to the HCSO.
That increased the number of funded Detention positions from 272 to 281. That number is far
short of the 329 positions that the Revised Staffing Analysis calls for to operate the RDC, WC
and Transfer Waiting area of the JDC.
The number of filled positions as of September 30, 2021, was only 207. That is down from 229
in May and 231 in February. Since the beginning of the monitoring process the number of filled
positions has fluctuated between a low of 204 and a high of 256. The reason that the work force
numbers have not improved is caused by the low salary, lack of a step plan and dangerous and
frustrating working conditions, particularly at the RDC. The Jail Administrator has added a new
dimension to this situation by suggesting that employees should be paid every two weeks instead
of once a month and that direct deposit of their paychecks should be made available. These are
reasonable accommodations that most public employees enjoy. In addition, the Sheriff and she
proposed a 5% increase in salary. This was passed by the Board, then appeared to be rescinded
and then was passed again. This has not yet been implemented and should be monitored to
ensure that it is implemented in a timely manner and back pay provided to October 1, 2021. The
step pay plan submitted to the Board by the Sheriff has never been acted upon.
Excessive turnover undermines the Detention Recruiter’s best efforts. Based on the number of
resignations during the first nine months of the year, the turnover rate for 2021 is projected to be
approximately 30% which is up an additional 2% over the figure that was projected in the last
Monitoring Report.
30
When the original Staffing Analysis was completed in 2017, it specified a need for over 400
personnel to operate the three jails; RDC, JDC and WC. That report was re-issued as the
Revised Staffing Analysis in April 2020. When the Revised Staffing Analysis was re-issued in
April 2021, it reflected some significant changes. The JDC had been closed because of
plumbing and HVAC problems. In addition, one of the three pods at the RDC had been closed
for renovation. At that time A-Pod was scheduled to remain closed after renovation of B and C-
Pods was completed; however, that is now subject to change. Finally, HCDS transitioned from
an eight-hour shift to a twelve-hour shift schedule and those two schedules have different relief
factors. As a result, the April 2021, Revised Staffing Analysis called for a total of 318 personnel
to staff the Jail System. During the past two months the corrections operations member of the
Monitoring Team and the Jail Administrator have worked jointly to develop another edition of
the Annual Revised Staffing Analysis (October 2021). Recently completed, it calls for 329
personnel to staff all required positions assuming that A-Pod is no longer used after B-Pod
becomes fully operational. In the event that two housing units in A-Pod must continue to be kept
open, that number increases to 351.1. It is understood that this staffing level will be difficult if
not impossible to achieve, but the Jail population continues to grow, now being at close to 600
indicating the need for greater system efforts such as adequate investment in a pretrial services
program to reduce the Jail population.
While inmates at the WC are supervised in accordance with the Settlement Agreement’s
requirement for direct supervision, the same cannot be said for the RDC. There inmates are left
unattended throughout the day and night, even in C-Pod which is supposed to be staffed to
provide direct supervision. As described in paragraph 41, a number of incidents occurred when
housing units were left unsupervised. Officers learn of assaults after the fact when the inmate
comes to the cage seeking help (IR #211068, 7/24/21, A-1), when injuries are observed (IR
#211098, 7/30/21, C-3)), or when other inmates knock on the window for help (IR #211153,
8/14/21, A-1), or as described in paragraph 41 when a family member calls to report the assault.
On July 6th, a detainee was discovered by a Detention Officer during feeding to be bleeding. He
had been stabbed 17 times. He reported that no officer was on the unit, C-3, at the time. IR
#210990. In addition to assaults occurring in the absence of supervision, numerous incident
reports disclose fires being set and on October 13th, IR #211406, a pass-through hole was
discovered between units C-2 and C-3 reflecting that the lack of supervision will lead to the
destruction once again of the renovated C-Pod.
As noted above, the WC is generally operated as a direct supervision facility. However, a failure
to adhere to direct supervision on August 7, 2021 resulted in the escape of two inmates. The
facility was short staffed and the inmates were allowed to be in the Rec yard without supervision.
Two inmates squeezed between the wall and the fence to escape. One was recaptured.
31
Another disturbing situation arose in A-Pod during this monitoring period. During the COVID
surge and the need to dedicate some housing areas for quarantine, inmates were assigned to sleep
on the floor in A-Pod. They had no assigned cell so no access to a toilet. Without an officer
present inmates had to ask the inmates in the assigned cells to use the toilet and sometimes were
required to pay for the use. It was reported that this situation was rectified by designating a cell
for access to the toilet for inmates on the floor. However, IR #211287 indicates that the situation
continued until at least 9/17/21 where an inmate defecated in the shower because he was denied
access to the “detainee toilet” by other inmates.
The shortage of security staff, the apparent failure of at least some security staff to follow
policies and procedures, and unresolved problems with the physical plant continue to
compromise the safety of medical and mental health staff and often make it difficult for staff to
perform their duties. It has been clearly established that the provision of adequate medical and
mental health care is among the major factors that contribute to the development of a safe and
secure environment for prisoners and staff. The shortage of security staff and the apparent
failure of at least some security staff to follow policies and procedures related to supervision
continue to compromise the safety of medical and mental health staff and often make it difficult
for staff to perform their duties.
During prior site visits, all medical and mental health staff interviewed reported multiple
incidences where they were unable to appropriately perform their duties, virtually all of which
occurred at the RDC. In so doing, they gave specific examples of incidences where the shortage
of security staff, the failure of security staff to follow policies or procedures, or problems with
the physical plant made it impossible or at least severely compromised their ability to perform
their duties. In an effort to obtain a better sense of the magnitude of these difficulties, the
Monitor asked the HSA to attempt to keep a log of such incidences. Therefore, for a period of
about 50 days during the period covered by this site visit, the HSA attempted to keep such a log.
It should be noted however that it is quite likely that the log provided to the Monitor under
reports the number of incidences, because there were days (which totaled approximately one
week) when the HSA was at Henley Young and was unable to keep the log for those days.
A review of the 50-day log indicates that at least one such incident/impediment occurred on
about 50% of those 50 days. The most common problem (11 out of 50 days) was no security
staff in the medical department, which meant that it was impossible to do scheduled sick call
visits. Although when this occurred, staff would often try to go do visits on the unit, they were
usually unable to adequately perform those visits on the unit (see below as to why that was
usually the case). The absence of security staff in the medical department is even more of a
problem when there is an inmate in the infirmary. When this is the case, the nurses are unable to
open the cell door and attend to such an inmate (who is in the infirmary because he/she needs a
higher level of nursing care); and this was the case on one of the days when there were no
32
security staff in the medical department. A related problem (3 out of 50 days) was an inadequate
number of security staff on the units who could bring inmates to medical for sick call.
A second common problem (4 out of 50 days) was no security staff to cover medication pass or
perform their responsibilities with regard to some type of medical procedure (such as alcohol or
drug detox, preparation for some type of medical test, etc.). One of these incidences occurred in
connection with one of the inmate deaths, in that as a result of no detention officers on the unit
there was a delay in calling medical to a medical emergency, security staff did not initiate CPR,
and other inmates reported to the nurses that they had been trying to call security staff to help
their fellow inmate for a prolonged period of time before security staff finally responded.
It is also common for medical and mental health staff to experience difficulties when they
attempt to provide services on the units (10 of 50 days). It is not uncommon for mental health
staff to see inmates on the units and, as noted above, the nurse will often try to do sick calls on
the units when there is no security staff in the medical department. Difficulties include no or
inadequate lighting, difficulties with the door locks, and inadequate number of security staff to
allow safe access to inmates, or some problem on the units that has so overwhelmed the capacity
of the security staff that security staff are unable to assist medical and mental health staff.
As noted above, it appears that these difficulties are limited to RDC, and so the Monitor
attempted to elicit the perspective of medical and mental health staff as to why they didn’t
experience these difficulties at the WC. Regardless of whether or not the factors staff identified
actually account for the differences in their experiences at the RDC and the WC, they are the
perceptions of medical and mental health staff, and making administration aware of such
perceptions might be helpful. Factors noted include the differences in the inmate population at
RDC v. WC; better working relationships between security staff and inmates at the WC, due to
staffing levels and the direct supervision model (whereby security staff and inmates have more
and better interaction/relationships with each other); and their sense that the more experienced
security staff are at the WC, which also means that the staff at the RDC have fewer, more senior
role models.
It is well recognized that the shortage of security officers and problems with the physical plant
are major problems that impact on numerous provisions of the agreement, and are also major
problems that demand the attention of senior staff at the facility and County decision-makers. As
previously noted, the above-described effort was undertaken to obtain a better sense of the
magnitude of the impact of these problems on the adequate provision of medical and mental
health services. However, in addition, given the magnitude of the impact, it focuses attention on
the importance of keeping the provision of medical and mental health services as one of the
facility’s priorities when making decisions about the assignment and use of scarce security
resources.
33
During the period covered by this site visit there were fewer incidences where medical or mental
health staff were physically harmed or at serious risk of harm. However, the most significant
incident that did occur was quite disconcerting and is currently under investigation. It is
described in CID Report 21-1470 and allegedly involves a detention officer failing to provide
adequate supervision of a nurse on the unit and subsequently assaulting the nurse. As has been
noted in prior monitoring reports, incidences where medical and mental health staff were harmed
or at serious risk of harm have raised multiple underlying issues and concerns, over and above
the shortage of security staff to support medical and mental health staff. See, for example, the
discussion on incident reporting in paragraph 64 below.
f. Develop and implement an objective and validated classification and housing

assignment procedure that is based on risk assessment rather than solely on a
prisoner’s charge. Prisoners must be classified immediately after booking, and
then housed based on the classification assessment. At minimum, a prisoner’s
bunk, cell, unit, and facility assignments must be based on his or her objective
classification assessment, and staff members may not transfer or move prisoners
into a housing area if doing so would violate classification principles (e.g.,
placing juveniles with adults, victims with former assailants, and minimum
security prisoners in a maximum security unit). Additionally, the classification
and housing assignment process must include the following elements:
i. The classification process must be handled by qualified staff who have
additional training and experience on classification.
ii. The classification system must take into account objective risk factors
including a prisoner’s prior institutional history, history of violence,
charges, special needs, physical size or vulnerabilities, gang affiliation,
and reported enemies.
iii. Prisoner housing assignments must not be changed by unit staff without
proper supervisor and classification staff approval.
iv. The classification system must track the location of all prisoners in the Jail
and help ensure that prisoners can be readily located by staff. The County
may continue to use wrist bands to help identify prisoners, but personal
identification on individual prisoners may not substitute for a staff-
controlled and centralized prisoner tracking and housing assignment
system.
v. The classification system must be integrated with the Jail prisoner record
system, so that staff have appropriate access to information necessary to
provide proper supervision, including the current housing assignment of
every prisoner in the Jail.
34
vi. The designation and use of housing units as “gang pods” must be phased
out under the terms of this Agreement. Placing prisoners together because
of gang affiliation alone is prohibited. The County must replace current
gang-based housing assignments with a more appropriate objective
classification and housing process within one year after the Effective Date.
Partial Compliance
Classification coverage has not changed since the last Monitoring Report. The number of
personnel is the same as was previously reported, with two vacancies still unfilled. This puts a
heavy strain on Classification personnel to provide 24-hour coverage with a limited workforce.
If one individual calls out, there is a lack of coverage. The lack of 24-hour coverage was
apparent in IR #211263 when a Lieutenant moved an inmate on a Saturday and stated that this
was until Monday when he could be seen by Classification.
The issuance and use of wristbands still cannot be determined. It will take an on-site visit to
confirm whether or not they are being issued and utilized.
The Monitoring Team has learned in recent visits that inmates are assigned to housing based on
gang affiliation. This has continued to be the case. While this practice was originally rectified
early on in the monitoring process, it may have received de-facto acceptance once again. The
same applies to the issue of transfers and inmate movement. While policy puts that
responsibility in the hands of Classification, some incident reports make it appear that officers
and supervisors sometimes make those decisions. The Classification Supervisor reported that
security is not moving inmates to a different location without waiting for Classification to
determine new housing. However, there are still reports that suggest that officers move inmates
without consulting Classification (e.g., IR #211107, IR #211183, IR #211229, IR #211383). In
IR #211248, the Housing Unit officer found an inmate in a cell other than the one records
indicated he was assigned to. The officer could not find a Movement Sheet which would have
been completed by Classification but opined that the prior shift moved the inmate.
The Inmate Services Manager and the Classification supervisor indicated that the practice of
unauthorized inmate committees controlling the units had calmed down. However, the QA
Officer stated that they still ran the units in A-Pod and C-3. Several incident reports indicate that
this is the case. In IR #211384, the officer stated that a detainee was being put out of A-4 by
other detainees. They placed his property by the gate. He was moved to C-2. Again, in IR
#211385 in A-3, several detainees called the officer over to say that two other detainees had to be
moved. They then beat one of the detainees. It is not clear from the report if and where the
detainees were moved.
35
Booking holding cells continue to be improperly utilized to house inmates for days, weeks or
months rather than hold them for no more than eight hours. At the time of the remote site visit
there were a total of eight inmates being housed in Booking holding cells. Two were there for
discipline/administrative segregation; two were in protective custody as police officers; one was
from the infirmary but was having behavior problems there; one was in protective custody but C-
4 was full; and one was the individual who engages in sexual activity on the suicide unit. This
practice has gone on for the entire duration of the monitoring process (and for many years prior
to that). The rationale given for violating accepted correctional practice has ranged from (1)
locks which do not work in the housing areas to (2) unmanageable inmates who cannot be dealt
with in population. The Monitoring Team has repeatedly stated that Booking is not appropriate
housing. Now that the cell door windows in C-Pod have been replaced, these individuals should
be housed in C-4 if segregation is needed. The Classification Officer stated that they don’t put
real management problem inmates in C-4 because the officers had trouble putting them back in
their cells. C-4 is supposed to have two officers in the unit. The segregation unit is intended to be
operated and staffed for management problem inmates. The two police officers should be housed
in an ISO unit together. Most recently COVID quarantine requirements have been used to justify
the practice. Once B-Pod becomes fully operational, it would be appropriate for the Jail
Administrator to issue an order specifying that only inmates being processed in and out of the
facility can be held in Booking holding cells, and then for no more than eight hours.
A review of the Classification Log for August indicated that some inmates were not classified in
a timely manner. Nine inmates were classified after three days or more. One inmate was not
classified for 11 days. The Classification Supervisor stated that they had probably been moved
and then lost in the system. Inmates should not be moved until they are classified.
A review of the initial classification scoring sheets for the first two weeks of September was
completed. A number of the practices that previously undermined the use of the objective
scoring system have been rectified. As previously reported Classification is now using the NCIC
to score the criminal history. During the current site visit, there were 4 files where the current
criminal history was not scored correctly. None of these impacted the custody level. One file
showed no criminal history but there was an MDOC hold. Classification ran the NCIC and no
criminal history appeared. Ideally, MDOC should be contacted to determine the nature of the
conviction. Overall, the classification scoring process appears to be going well.
The classification spreadsheet continues to show a number of male maximum security inmates
being assigned to the Work Center. The Work Center being a dormitory style housing facility
with unfortified walls would not be expected to house maximum security inmates. However,
with the ongoing physical plant and understaffing issues at RDC, the direct supervision at the
WC provides staff oversight of these individuals. Nevertheless, the maximum security status
should be overridden if the WC is an appropriate housing assignment.
36
The segregation logs for July and August show no inmates in disciplinary segregation but two in
administrative segregation. A disciplinary process is in place but there do not appear to be any
disciplinary hearings taking place. There is still no Classification Committee. Such a committee
should not only review placements into administrative segregation but all placements in
restrictive housing within 24 hours and then conduct a review every seven days. Although there
is no Classification Committee, seven-day reviews are now being conducted. This is done
weekly by a combination of security and mental health staff. Documentation of the mental health
input is being kept in the EMR. It does not appear that anyone has been moved off of segregation
as a result of this process. This should change with the opening of the mental health unit. See
paragraph 77(i) for further discussion of these reviews. It has also been recommended that the
segregation log have a column added showing the date of the last seven-day review.
Assigning appropriate housing for individuals has been complicated by the COVID outbreak that
occurred during this monitoring period. Classification had stopped holding newly booked
inmates in one of the housing units for 10 days. Instead, inmates are being tested for COVID and
those testing negative are moved. However, with the surge in cases and the effort to quarantine
positive inmates, housing options became limited. As a result, inmates were sleeping on the floor
in A-3 and B-4 was opened where inmates were also sleeping on the floor. In addition, the
population has been rising, further putting a strain on housing inmates appropriately. This
situation will be monitored as having inmates sleeping on the floor is not a viable long-term
solution.
Although improvements have been made in the area of Classification, it is still not the case that
an objective risk instrument is governing the housing placement of inmates when there continue
to be gang pods, inmate committees rejecting housing placements, security moving inmates
without Classification involvement, lack of bed space and limitations on the use of some housing
units.
g. Develop and implement positive approaches for promoting safety within the Jail
including:
i. Providing all prisoners with at least 5 hours of outdoor recreation per
week;
ii. Developing rewards and incentives for good behavior such as additional
commissary, activities, or privileges;
iii. Creating work opportunities, including the possibility of paid
employment;
iv. Providing individual or group treatment for prisoners with serious mental
illness, developmental disabilities, or other behavioral or medical
conditions, who would benefit from therapeutic activities;
37
v. Providing education, including special education, for youth, as well as all

programs, supports, and services required for youth by federal law;
vi. Screening prisoners for serious mental illness as part of the Jail’s booking
and health assessment process, and then providing such prisoners with
appropriate treatment and therapeutic housing;
vii. Providing reasonable opportunities for visitation.
h. Ensure that policies, procedures, and practices provide for higher levels of
supervision for individual prisoners if necessary due to a prisoner’s individual
circumstances. Examples of such higher level supervision include (a) constant
observation (i.e., continuous, uninterrupted one-on-one monitoring) for actively
suicidal prisoners (i.e., prisoners threatening or who recently engaged in suicidal
behavior); (b) higher frequency security checks for prisoners locked down in
maximum security units, medical observation units, and administrative
segregation units; and (c) more frequent staff interaction with youth as part of
their education, treatment and behavioral management programs.
i. Continue to update, maintain, and expand use of video surveillance and recording
cameras to improve coverage throughout the Jail, including the booking area,
housing units, medical and mental health units, special management housing,
facility perimeters, and in common areas.
Partial Compliance
Regarding 42 (g) (i), five hours of outdoor recreation is provided to inmates each week at the
WC based on a review of records and logs. The same cannot be said for the RDC regardless of
what records may show. They cannot be validated because the duty roster does not reflect that
officers are ever assigned to recreation posts. In fact, a supervisor indicated during the remote
site visit that only one sixth of a housing unit comes out for recreation at a time. That is not
consistent with what recreation records show. They reflect that the same inmates are out for up
to six hours making it impossible for all inmates to be given an opportunity for recreation. This
inconsistency will have to wait for a physical on-site inspection to be resolved. One detainee
housed on C-4 stated that he had not been out for recreation for months. This was not confirmed.
Regarding 42 (g) (ii) and (iii), there is no incentive program. There are work opportunities at the
WC, but not paid employment, and the only opportunity at the RDC is to work as a trusty. The
housing units at the JDC are currently closed.
Regarding 42 (g) (iv), again, during the period covered by this site visit, the mental health
caseload has continued to grow; there are now about 193 detainees on the caseload. This means
that over the last several monitoring periods, the case load has increased by almost 50%. In
addition, as was detailed in prior monitoring reports, the acuity of the population has also
increased, meaning that there is a larger percentage of detainees on the caseload who are
38
suffering from acute, extremely serious mental illness. For a significant sub-set of these more
seriously ill and unstable detainees, their illness is having a significant impact on their ability to
function within the facility. Although some of this sub-set of detainees have refused or been
noncompliant with prescribed treatment, others have complications that have rendered them
difficult to stabilize.
Although the Jail Administrator has negotiated with QCHC/the Contract Provider for more
mental health staff, at the time of the site visit, this newly negotiated QCHC contract had not yet
been approved by the County. Since the time of the site visit, the contract has been approved and
includes three additional staff, a Mental Health Practitioner, a Medical Nurse Practitioner and a
Qualified Mental Health Provider. However, at this time the size of the mental health staff has
remained the same. There are still only 2.5 QMHPs and a part time Psychiatric NP/prescriber.
These individuals are responsible for all mental health assessments (which average about
24/week), the development of treatment plans and the regular review of those treatment plans,
the provision of treatment (individual and group therapy and medication management), the
management of mental health emergencies (such as suicidal detainees, with an average of about
10 on suicide watch each week), and the documentation of what they are doing in each
detainee’s medical record. They also have other responsibilities, such as performing weekly
mental health rounds for detainees held in segregation and advocating for the mentally ill
detainees in segregation. In addition, accomplishing these tasks is made all the more difficult by
a variety of factors such as, the need for repeated attempts to assess detainees who continue to
refuse a mental health assessment, the need for repeated efforts to even engage detainees who
refuse or are noncompliant with treatment, and the need to cancel and reschedule appointments
due to the shortage of security staff (i.e., an inadequate number of security staff to make it safe
for mental health staff to work on the units or to prepare and transport detainees to medical in
order for mental health staff to see them there). Staff must also travel between facilities.
Staff are also faced with a high number of mental health emergencies that consume a
considerable amount of staff time. Referrals for suicidal detainees average about 12/week
(although some of these end up being inappropriate referrals and although some detainees assert
that they are suicidal because they are afraid and want to be removed from their unit, all cases
have to be taken seriously and addressed). And over the last about 5 months, there has been a
significant increase in the number of serious emergencies related to the use/abuse of contraband
drugs (although in the last month it appears that there has been somewhat less of a problem).
With regard to the recent increase in serious substance use/abuse-related emergencies, the signs
and symptoms associated with these emergencies, the reports of those involved and the results of
the drug screens performed indicate that the drugs are opiates. This would indicate that opiates
have been recently introduced to the facility or have become significantly more available in the
facility and given the seriousness of an opiate overdose, this finding is a major concern. Finally,
it should also be noted that mental health staff rotate weekend call for mental health emergencies
39
and the supervision of detainees on suicide watch. Given the shortage of mental health staff, they
perform these weekend tasks without compensatory time off during the week; and so the issue of
how best to cover these weekend responsibilities without further unfairly taxing the mental
health staff must also be addressed.
Although the existing mental health staff is working hard to provide as much treatment as they
can, individual treatment sessions are not as frequent as they should be, there are no group
therapy sessions, and the more rigorous set of interventions required for those who refuse
treatment or are not fully compliant with treatment have not been initiated. There are also other
obviously needed interventions that have not yet been initiated, such as specific interventions
designed for those with primary substance abuse difficulties, specific coordinated interventions
for dual-diagnosis detainees (with substance abuse difficulties and other mental health
difficulties), interventions for those with intellectual disabilities and/or other cognitive
difficulties, and interventions for those with severe disabling trauma-related mental health
difficulties.
Obviously, there is a need for more mental health staff. As noted above, the Jail Administrator
has worked out a way to provide more mental health staff with QCHC/The Contract Provider;
the current projection is that this will be enough staff even once the MHU is opened; but the
contract has yet to be signed and implemented. Given that the existing mental health staff is
already overwhelmed with their current responsibilities, attempting to open the MHU without
additional staff would be unconscionable. There is also the need for better security support for
mental health staff, including the identification, training and assignment of a set of security
officers and supervisor(s) for the MHU. It is imperative that these issues be addressed as quickly
as possible, given that it remains extremely important to move towards the opening of the mental
health unit where a program for the most severely ill and unstable population can be
implemented.
Regarding 42 (g) (vi), As has been noted in prior reports, the screening of new detainees for
serious mental illness is part of the Jail’s booking and initial health assessment process. At the
time of this site visit, only 67% of the 193 detainees who are currently on the mental health
caseload were identified during that screening process, which is a significant decrease from the
83% noted at the time of the last site visit, and more similar to the findings of earlier site visits.
It should be noted that there are two parts to that mental health screening process – the initial
health and mental health assessment performed by the intake nurse(s), and the ‘Form 3’, which is
a form completed by each new admission as part of the booking process – and the data is not
collected in a way that allows for a determination of what percentage of that 67% of detainees
were identified during the nurse’s intake screen, identified by the ‘Form 3’, or identified by both
mechanisms. Such an analysis should be considered as part of the quality review process, and
40
the findings of such an analysis could help identify options for further improving the intake
screening process with regard to the identification of new admissions with serious mental illness.
The remaining 63 (about 33%) of the detainees on the mental health caseload were not noted as
having been identified during the booking and intake process. For about 19 of them (about 10%
of the caseload) the referral source was not noted; so, it is unclear whether they were identified at
intake or at some later point; but this high of a percentage does mean that an increased effort
must be made to consistently capture and note the referral source. A review of the remaining 44
detainees who were not identified during the booking and intake process, 16 (about 36%) were
identified when later presenting as suicidal; 7 (about 16%) were self-referred; and the rest were
identified by either mental health or medical staff, while there were no referrals from security
staff. As has always been the case, it is difficult to know if these detainees were suffering from
or had suffered from major mental health difficulties that had been missed during the booking
and intake process, and/or whether their mental health status deteriorated while incarcerated.
This is an issue that clearly requires further exploration once additional mental health staff are on
board to review and assess this issue.
This is the second site visit where it was found that there were no delayed intake screenings
because a new admission would not or could not be interviewed (and the nurse failed to seek
help from mental health). Whether this was due to the fact that there were no new admissions
who were difficult to assess or whether it was due to the fact that the intake nurse immediately
asked for help with any difficult new admission could not be determined without reviewing the
medical records of all new admissions. However, finding again that there were no delays in
performing intake screenings was a very positive finding.
With regard to the initial mental health assessments, performed on detainees referred to mental
health for such an assessment, the timeliness of these assessments or at least the timeliness of
attempts to perform these assessments has been good (with most performed on the day of
referral), and the quality of these assessments has continued to be quite good.
Although the percentage of detainees who at least initially refused a mental health assessment
remained unchanged (about 25%), that means that there is still a significant amount of staff time
consumed by repeated attempts to perform initial mental health assessments on such detainees,
especially since many of those who initially refuse require that staff make multiple attempts
before a mental health assessment is finally performed. Such a delay in obtaining an initial
mental health assessment also delays the initiation of treatment, which can be especially
problematic when the detainee is acutely ill. Once the MHU is operational, such acutely ill
detainees are likely to be placed on the MHU (even in the absence of a full mental health
assessment) where a more rigorous effort to engage them is an integral part of the treatment
program.
41
The requirement of 42(g)(vi) to provide therapeutic housing is addressed in paragraph 77(g)

below.
Regarding 42 (g) (vii), opportunities for video visitation are very limited in the Jail System.
While that is the only form of visitation for family and friends, it has been restricted by the fact
that those individuals cannot go to a free kiosk in the lobby of the RDC to conduct a visit
because that access was shut down due to the COVID pandemic. Instead, they must pay $12.99
for a 20-minute visit conducted by video from their home. That charge has led to a reduction in
the number of visits. An analysis of the video visitation records covering two weeks in late
September and early October revealed that 120 video visits were scheduled, but that only 65
were actually completed. That equates to 4.64 hours per day or 1,693.6 hours when projected
out over a year. Considering the fact that the average daily census is approximately 600, that
means that each inmate has an opportunity to complete only 2.82 video visits per year.
Recognizing that the cost of video visitation has an impact on the ability of family and friends to
visit with inmates, the Jail Administrator has proposed a significant reduction in the cost of video
visits and telephone calls. Under her proposed schedule the cost of a telephone call would drop
from 50 cents per minute to 21 cents per minute, while the cost of a 20-minute video visitation
would drop from $12.99 to $4.99. The recommendation (as well as the recommendation for four
additional video conferencing units) has been included in the recently approved contract with
Securis but has not been implemented.
Regarding 42 (h), suicide watch procedures for men and women are supposed to be consistent
for both even though male suicide watches are conducted at the RDC in C-4 ISO while female
suicide watches are conducted at the WC in Special Housing. It has become apparent, however,
that the standardized procedures, which were put in place once female inmates were moved to
the WC, are not being followed at the RDC. A review of suicide watch logs/well-being check
sheets and interviews with supervisors and command staff has revealed that inmates in C-4 ISO
are sometimes locked inside individual cells and that the watch officer is physically located
outside of the ISO unit making it physically impossible for him/her to have constant supervision
of the inmate(s). Based on discussion with the Jail Administrator, she intends to require inmates
in the ISO unit to be kept in the dayroom area (not inside a cell), but that the assigned Detention
Officer will still be seated outside of the ISO unit, watching what goes on through a window.
Based on past experience, that officer will be called upon to perform other duties, or will take a
break without relief, and will leave his/her post to do so. The practical solution is to post the
officer inside the ISO unit. As was originally envisioned, he/she should be equipped with a desk,
chair, telephone, radio and emergency means of calling for assistance. The circumstances
reported in IR#211075 show what happens when the assigned officer leaves his/her post
unattended. The Detention Officer was inside the C-Pod control room instead of inside C-4 ISO
(or even at the door/window at the entrance to that unit). Consequently, he was in no position to
42
prevent the assault or to take prompt action when two inmates got into an altercation. It is also
noteworthy that the Sergeant who wrote a supplement to the IR never even mentioned that the
officer was in violation of policy by being inside the control room. Another example appears in
a disciplinary report which reflects that a suicidal inmate locked in a cell in the suicide
observation ISO unit used exposed wires to start a fire. The Classification supervisor stated that
the inmates on the suicide unit were locked in cells because some are homicidal. It is not
appropriate for homicidal inmates to be housed in the suicidal unit with suicidal inmates.
The medical and mental health related circumstances where higher levels of supervision is
required, which staff (medical, mental health and security) are responsible for providing such
higher levels of supervision, what their respective responsibilities are, and where a detainee is
housed while being so supervised have all been described in prior reports. As noted below, there
are some areas of compliance with this provision that remain variable.
Some special medical observation (for example, for acutely ill detainees) is managed in the
medical unit, while other less severe situations (for example, uncomplicated withdrawal from
substances) are managed on the detainee’s regular housing unit, with visits to the medical unit as
indicated. In both situations there is an appropriate higher level of supervision provided by
medical staff. However, there are situations where a detainee refuses to comply with the
recommendation that he/she be housed in the medical unit or make frequent visits to the medical
unit. With the possible exception of a life-threatening situation, medical staff cannot force a
detainee to comply and, in such situations, the ability of medical staff to provide adequate
supervision and care is compromised. In addition, due to the shortage of security staff, the
ability of security staff to provide a higher level of supervision to detainees on special medical
observation in the infirmary is variable. More specifically, as noted elsewhere in this report, on
days when there are no security staff in the medical department, such detainees are locked in
their cells within the infirmary and the nursing staff cannot enter their cells in order to attend to
them. If the detainee has to make frequent (such as daily) visits to the medical unit, both the
shortage of security staff in the medical department and the shortage of staff on the units (to
bring detainees to the medical department) can compromise care.
Suicide watch is managed in suicide-resistant cells. There is an appropriate higher level of

supervision provided by mental health and medical staff. Here too, due to the shortage of
security staff, the ability of security staff to provide a higher level of supervision to detainees on
suicide watch is variable. More specifically, there are times when there is no officer available to
provide the supervision/checks of detainees on suicide watch that is required by approved policy
and procedures. See paragraph 42(h) for more detail.
Although suicide watch is usually managed well (except for the above noted concern), the recent
number of completed suicides raises concern about certain other important aspects of the
43
facility’s suicide prevention program and related enhanced supervision issues that have been
raised before. Resultant areas of concern include (1) the capacity of all staff to identify and
manage detainees who might be or are at high risk of becoming suicidal, (2) the management and
supervision of more complicated cases, and (3) the performance of an interdisciplinary mortality
review in instances where there has been a successful suicide.
Concerns about the capacity of all staff (security, medical and mental health staff) to identify and
manage detainees who might be or are at high risk of becoming suicidal have been discussed in
prior reports. This continues to be a staff training and development issue that needs to be
addressed. Similarly, concerns about the capacity to manage and supervise more complicated
cases has also been discussed in prior reports. This too continues to be a staff training and
development issue that needs to be addressed.
The recent suicides and other deaths at the facility has brought more into focus the issues related
to the performance of an interdisciplinary mortality review. As noted in paragraph 114 below,
there have been three mortality reviews completed on three of the deaths this year. These were
completed after the last monitoring report stated that mortality reviews were not being
completed. The reports provided appear to be minimal and pro forma. More specifically, there
has been no mortality review of the type where security, medical and mental health staff meet
together with administration to review everything that each staff unit knew about the deceased,
identify any problems in the treatment and management of the deceased, regardless of whether or
not the problem was directly causative of the deceased’s death, and develop a corrective action
plan to address any identified problems. So, the need for such an interdisciplinary mortality
review process was discussed in some detail during this site visit. Plans were made to move
ahead with such a review process, document such a review and clearly outline and implement
any indicated corrective action, despite impediments to obtaining some of the information that
might be helpful to such a review (such as certain investigation reports) in a timely manner, if at
all.
Until the mental health unit is open/operational, there really is no appropriate housing for
detainees who require special mental health observation due to the fact that they are seriously
impaired as a result of their mental illness. Instead, such detainees continue to be placed on a
segregation unit. Although both mental health and security staff make regularly scheduled
rounds on detainees who are being held in segregation, this does not constitute the higher level of
mental health supervision that such severely mentally ill detainees require (which will hopefully
be made available to them once the mental health unit is operational). Although there are
security staff who manage detainees who are being held in segregation, this does not constitute
the higher level of security supervision that such mentally ill detainees require (which will
hopefully be made available to them once the mental health unit is operational).
44
Regarding 42(i) video surveillance capabilities at the RDC are severely hampered by that fact
that approximately 60 cameras are still out of service, including in Medical. Seven “work
stations” are currently being installed by Benchmark Construction in each control room and
other selected areas. Once they are in place it should be possible to identify which cameras need
to be replaced and what other corrective action is required in order to have a fully functioning
system.
While the CID and IAD investigators now have direct access to the video system, they still have
to go through IT in order to obtain copies of videoed events.
43. Include outcome measures as part of the Jail’s internal data collection, management, and
administrative reporting process. The occurrence of any of the following specific outcome
measures creates a rebuttable presumption in this case that the Jail fails to provide reasonably
safe conditions for prisoners:
a. Staff vacancy rate of more than 10% of budgeted positions;
b. A voluntary staff turnover rate that results in the failure to staff critical posts (such
as the housing units, booking, and classification) or the failure to maintain
experienced supervisors on all shifts;
c. A major disturbance resulting in the takeover of any housing area by prisoners;
d. Staffing where fewer than 90% of all detention officers have completed basic
jailer training;
e. Three or more use of force or prisoner-on-prisoner incidents in a fiscal year in
which a prisoner suffers a serious injury, but for which staff members fail to
complete all documentation required by this Agreement, including supervision
recommendations and findings;
f. One prisoner death within a fiscal year, where there is no documented
administrative review by the Jail Administrator or no documented mortality
review by a physician not directly involved in the clinical treatment of the
deceased prisoner (e.g. corporate medical director or outside, contract physician,
when facility medical director may have a personal conflict);
g. One death within a fiscal year, where the death was a result of prisoner-on-
prisoner violence and there was a violation of Jail supervision, housing
assignment, or classification procedures.
Non-Compliant
The Quality Assurance Coordinator now generates a monthly report that has proven to be very
useful to the Monitoring Team, particularly since site visits have been conducted remotely due to
COVID considerations. Visual and quantitative analyses help to supplement reports and logs.
45
As of September 30th, 74 of the 281 funded Detention positions were vacant. The number of
filled positions has fluctuated between 204 and 256 for the duration of the monitoring process.
Currently that figure stands at 207, a staff vacancy rate based on needed staff of 37%. (The staff
shortage is not equal between the facilities with the staff vacancy rate based on needed staff at
RDC is 47%) Detention Services has never come close to filling all of the funded positions, let
alone the number that are required to operate the Jail System in its current configuration (329).
Based on the number or terminations/resignations that have occurred during the first nine months
of the year, a turnover rate of 30% is projected for 2021, well over the 10% threshold of
budgeted positions.
According to the Detention Recruiter and the Training Director, new recruits are now put to
work immediately upon employment, not when the next academy begins. This is done to
prevent approved candidates from moving on to another position instead of waiting for the
academy to commence. While this is a practical step toward retaining candidates, it will only be
a successful alternative when the Field Training Officer (FTO) program is in place and pending
candidates can be placed with a qualified FTO until recruit training begins. In the interim better
than 90% of all Detention Officers have completed basic training.
Inmate on inmate assaults continue at a high rate. Particularly concerning is the indication that
many assaults go unreported. It may be that in some cases staff do not know that they have
occurred since they are not in the housing units, but upon learning of the assault, an incident
report should be prepared. See, e.g., IR# 210981 referencing an earlier assault for which there is
no incident report and IR #211113 inmate taken to hospital to see if jaw broken, no incident
report on the assault identified as the cause by medical. Medical reported that the jaw was broken
and it was a result of an assault. That leaves some doubt as to the extent of underreporting of
assaults. Even so, in July 13 assaults were reported at RDC; in September 12 assaults, and
October through the 26th, 10 were reported.
During the current calendar year there have been six inmate deaths in the Jail System.
1. The first occurred on March 17, 2021, in Booking. An inmate who had been brought into
the jail by law enforcement ultimately passed away. A drug overdose is suspected as the
cause of death. The HCSO took the position that because he had not been “booked” into
the facility he was not an inmate. After this conflict with the Settlement Agreement was
brought to the attention of the HCSO an IAD investigation was conducted which
ultimately resulted in the resignation of one involved officer.
2. The second occurred on April 18, 2021, in Booking. In this case an inmate, who was
being housed in a Booking holding cell, committed suicide by hanging. An IAD
investigation resulted in the termination of one involved officer for failing to conduct
required well-being checks.
46
3. The third occurred on July 6, 2021, in Housing Unit C-4 at the RDC. In this case an
inmate committed suicide by hanging in his confinement (lockdown) cell. He was found
by a Sergeant and the officer assigned to the unit when they were conducting a well-
being check. An IAD investigation resulted in the termination of the officer, because
video evidence supported the fact that he had not conducted 30-minute well-being check
inside the unit as required. Instead, he merely looked into the housing unit from where it
was impossible to observe what was going on inside the individual cells. While the
Sergeant was exonerated, the incident reports and supplements indicated that he left the
inmate hanging in his cell and went to C-Control in order to call the on-duty Lieutenant
in Booking. Only then did he return to the cell and help take the inmate down. When
questioned during the remote site visit, the IAD investigator stated that the Sergeant’s
statements during the investigation did not reflect that. It appears that this conflict of
written record and later statement need to be compared and validated so that appropriate
disciplinary action can be taken or else the Sergeant’s name be cleared.
4. The fourth occurred on August 3, 2021, when an inmate died of an apparent drug
overdose in C-1 at the RDC.
5. The fifth occurred on August 4, 2021, when an inmate died at Merit Health Hospital,
apparently of COVID.
6. The sixth occurred on October 18, 2021, when an inmate was found unresponsive in his
cell in A-4 at the RDC. The information available to the Monitoring Team in the form of
an incident report and supplement is sketchy at best. According to those documents, an
officer entered the housing unit and found an inmate in his cell. That officer did not
generate an incident report; rather it was written by the control room officer. His report
was titled “Medical Report – Injury”. The officer who opened the doors to the housing
unit in order to allow entry wrote a supplement which provided the most information.
Far more information was provided by two news media reports within 24 hours, one on
television and the other in the local newspaper. They revealed that the “unresponsive”
inmate was apparently beaten to death by other inmates. Supplemental verbal reports
describing the video footage revealed that approximately nine hours passed from the time
of the incident until the victim’s body was found. During that time two meals were
served and hourly well-being checks were supposedly conducted.
In all of these cases the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation (MBI) has assumed
responsibility for conducting an investigation, but they have not provided a copy of any that
has been completed to date. The explanation provided via IAD is that they (MBI) are
waiting for an autopsy report before they will file anything with the HCSO. There have been
no After-Action Reports provided to the Monitoring Team to date. Mortality Reviews were
conducted on three cases, the third, fourth and fifth above, but the information that they
contain appears to nominal and pro-forma.
47
44. To complement, but not replace, “direct supervision,” develop and implement policies and
procedures to ensure that detention officers are conducting rounds as appropriate. To that end:
a. Rounds must be conducted at least once every 30 minutes in general population
housing units and at least once every 15 minutes for special management
prisoners (including prisoners housed in booking cells).
b. All security rounds must be conducted at irregular intervals to reduce their
predictability and must be documented on forms or logs.
c. Officers must only be permitted to enter data on these forms or logs at the time a
round is completed. Forms and logs must not include pre-printed dates or times.
Officers must not be permitted to fill out forms and logs before they actually
conduct their rounds.
d. The parties anticipate that “rounds” will not necessarily be conducted as
otherwise described in this provision when the Jail is operated as a “direct
supervision” facility. This is because a detention officer will have constant, active
supervision of all prisoners in the detention officer’s charge. As detailed
immediately below, however, even under a “direct supervision” model, the Jail
must have a system in place to document and ensure that staff are providing
adequate supervision.
e. Jail policies, procedures, and practices may utilize more than one means to
document and ensure that staff are supervising prisoners as required by “direct
supervision,” including the use and audit of supervisor inspection reports,
visitation records, mealtime records, inmate worker sheets, medical treatment
files, sick call logs, canteen delivery records, and recreation logs. Any system
adopted to ensure that detention officers are providing “direct supervision” must
be sufficiently detailed and in writing to allow verification by outside reviewers,
including the United States and Monitor.
Partial Compliance
As has been previously reported, the Settlement Agreement calls for a higher standard for well-
being checks than is required by the American Correctional Association’s “Model Jail
Standards” issued by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections. In an effort to move
Detention Services forward, the Monitoring Team has approved the standard which is now
incorporated into Policy 9-200, Supervision and Post Operations. It calls for a documented 60-
minute well-being check for inmates in general population, a 30-minute well-being check for
inmates in lockdown status and a 15-minute well-check for inmates held in Booking.
Since the JDC has been closed for over a year, there is no need to address compliance at that
facility. It will be necessary, however, for the officers assigned to the Transfer Waiting area on
the ground floor to document well-being checks for inmates temporarily held in the holding cells
48
Monday through Friday while waiting to go to court or to return to the RDC and WC. The
standard for those checks is every 15 minutes.
Inmates under suicide watch are supposed to be constantly monitored, but log entries are
required only every 15 minutes. A review of suicide watch logs for inmates held in Special
Housing at the WC revealed that officers there continue to monitor inmates appropriately.
Watch entries are noted at actual time, not exactly on the quarter hour. At the RDC the same
standard is not maintained. While specific discrepancies were noted in the last Monitoring
Report, a new problem has arisen. Inmates who have been designated as problematic/homicidal
by staff are locked in single cells inside the C-4 ISO unit making it physically impossible for the
assigned Detention Officer to maintain constant supervision. The problem is made worse by the
fact that the officer is physically located outside of the ISO unit. These practices were confirmed
by interviews with supervisory staff during the remote site visit. A review of suicide watch logs
revealed that most entries are made properly within the 15-minute observation time frame, but
some are consistently entered precisely on the quarter hour. One officer acknowledged that he
was required to handle other duties even though he was supposedly constantly monitoring a
suicidal inmate. The following notation is a direct quote from the Comments section of his log.
“At beginning of shift officer was counting C-4, C-3 and C-1 until 1715.”
In Booking, 15-minute well-being checks are required on all inmates placed in holding cells,
regardless of the duration of their stay. Records reflect that most well-being checks are recorded
appropriately, however, a number of log sheets indicate that the inmate being monitored is on a
suicide watch which should have required constant supervision. At least one incident report
(IR211227) supports the fact that an inmate was placed on a suicide watch in a Booking holding
cell, where he was already being housed.
In confinement housing (C-4, C-1 ISO, A-1 ISO and A-4 ISO) inmates are supposed to be
monitored every 30 minutes. Records reflect that, with some exceptions, well-being checks are
entered timely in those areas. When a well-being check is missed some log entries in the
Comments section of the forms reflect why more than two hours passed between well-being
checks—“Short of Staff”. The logs do not, however, disclose if well-being checks are being
done appropriately.
General population inmates are supposed to be monitored every hour. In direct supervision
housing units, entries do not have to be made during daytime hours when inmates are off their
bunks (WC) or out of their cells (RDC). Those entries have to be made only during night time
hours. At the WC the unit officers still make hourly well-being check entries in their logs
throughout the day. While this creates a bit of extra work it ensures consistency. At the RDC
the A-Pod control room log reflects that some well-being checks are called in hourly, but there
are no such checks recorded for eight hours during the 24 hour time frame that was provided for
49
October 21, 2021. For C-Pod Control 10 hourly well-being checks were not recorded during the
same time frame on October 21, 2021. The unit logs for C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4 reflect that the
majority of the hourly well-being checks were recorded during night time hours, but they also
indicated that there was no officer on duty for most units during the midnight shift.
It appears that even if rounds are recorded, they are not made adequately as in the case of the
suicide death on July 6th where the officer described doing his round by looking through the
cage. Rounds are supposed to be made by going from cell to cell. This does not appear to be
standard practice as evidenced again by the death on August 3rd where the deceased inmate was
not found until rigor mortis had set in or the most recent death on October 18th when the
deceased inmate was not discovered for nine hours.
45. Ensure that all correctional officers receive adequate pre- and post-service training to provide
for reasonably safe conditions in the Jail. To that end, the County must ensure that the Jail
employs Qualified Training Officers, who must help to develop and implement a formal, written
training program. The program must include the following:
a. Mandatory pre-service training. Detention officers must receive State jailer
training and certification prior to start of work. Staff who have not received such
training by the Effective Date of this Agreement must complete their State jailer
training within twelve months after the Effective Date of this Agreement. During
that twelve month period, the County must develop an in-house detention training
academy.
b. Post Order training. Detention officers must receive specific training on unit-
specific post orders before starting work on a unit, and every year thereafter. To
document such training, officers must be required to sign an acknowledgement
that they have received such training, but only after an officer is first assigned to a
unit, after a Post Order is updated, and after completion of annual retraining.
c. “Direct supervision” training. Detention officers must receive specific pre- and
post service training on “direct supervision.” Such training must include
instruction on how to supervise prisoners in a “direct supervision” facility,
including instruction in effective communication skills and verbal de-escalation.
Supervisors must receive training on how to monitor and ensure that staff are
providing effective “direct supervision.”
d. Jail administrator training. High-level Jail supervisors (i.e., supervisors with
facility-wide management responsibilities), including the Jail Administrator and
his or her immediate deputies (wardens), must receive jail administrator training
prior to the start of their employment. High-level supervisors already employed
at the Jail when this Agreement is executed must complete such training within
six months after the Effective Date of this Agreement. Training comparable to
50
the Jail Administration curriculum offered by the National Institute of Corrections

will meet the requirements of this provision.
e. Post-service training. Detention officers must receive at least 120 hours per year
of post-service training in their first year of employment and 40 hours per year
after their first year. Such training must include refresher training on Jail policies.
The training may be provided during roll call, staff meetings, and post-assignment
meetings. Post-service training should also include field and scenario-based
training.
f. Training for Critical Posts. Jail management must work with the training
department to develop a training syllabus and minimum additional training
requirements for any officer serving in a critical position. Such additional
training must be provided for any officer working on a tactical team; in a special
management, medical or mental health unit; in a maximum security unit; or in
booking and release.
g. Special management unit training. Officers assigned to special management units
must receive at least eight hours of specialized training each year regarding
supervision of such units and related prisoner safety, medical, mental health, and
security policies.
h. Training on all Jail policies and procedures including those regarding prisoner
rights and the prevention of staff abuse and misconduct.
Partial Compliance
The HCSO continues to provide mandatory pre-service training for all new recruits, but for some
it now follows a brief period of employment while they wait for the next academy to begin. This
change was brought about by the fact that some approved candidates moved on to other
employment opportunities rather than wait for the academy to start. This discrepancy with 45 (a)
should be mitigated once the Field Training Officer (FTO) program is in place and new recruits
are assigned to individual FTO’s during the waiting period. The high failure rate of new recruits
continues to be a problem. Approximately one third of each academy class fails to graduate due
to attendance problems or resignation.
Regarding 45 (b), there has been no change in post order training. Since there are no approved
post orders, the only training ever provided was on those post orders that were in place at the
beginning of the monitoring process.
Regarding 45 (c), direct supervision training, which began in 2020, is part of the pre-service
training program for new personnel. Existing personnel are no longer involved in this
component, but it is readily apparent that sending RDC officers and supervisors through the
program would be beneficial—even if they have been through it previously. This
recommendation is based on the fact that supervisors and officers at the RDC continue to display
51
a lack of understanding of how direct supervision is supposed to work. This was confirmed by
interviews with individual staff at the RDC during the most recent remote site visit.
Regarding 45 (d), the new Jail Administrator is in compliance with this paragraph based upon
her experience as a trainer and instructor through the National Institute of Corrections.
Regarding 45 (e), in-service training on some approved and adopted policies was held from
August 31st through September 3rd. Approximately half of the available Detention staff attended.
Another block of training will be scheduled to accommodate those personnel who were unable to
attend the first session.
Regarding 45 (f), As noted in prior reports, there is no additional training for security staff
assigned to the medical department, which includes the small infirmary, the medical clinic and
the mental health clinic. As has also been noted in prior reports, given the security problems that
can arise and have arisen when physically and/or mentally ill detainees are off their units/brought
to the medical department, security staff assigned to the medical department would benefit from
additional training, focused on the best security management of that critical post, including
assuring the safety of medical and mental health staff. It should again be noted that at present,
there are an inadequate number of security staff assigned to the medical department (i.e., one
security officer); then, due to the shortage of security staff, there are days when there are no
security officers in the medical department; and there are also days when there is a shortage of
security staff to transport detainees to and from the medical department. Therefore, until the
medical department is adequately staffed with security staff, any additional training that might be
developed and provided will have to take this issue into consideration.
In anticipation of the opening of a mental health unit, security staff and security staff supervisors
who will be assigned to that unit will have to be given additional training. Twenty five officers
have been identified for possible assignment to the mental health unit. They have all received an
initial training session for the assignment. A more detailed update on progress towards this goal
is outlined in the paragraph 77 (g) below.
As noted in paragraph 42(h), some special medical observation is carried out on regular units;
even once the mental health unit is operational, there will continue to be seriously mentally ill
detainees on regular units. Since there will continue to be detainees with special medical and
mental health needs on all units, it is important for all security staff to have a reasonable amount
of training on serious medical and mental health difficulties and the management of detainees
with such difficulties. In addition, since security staff will continue to play an important role
with regard to identifying detainees who might require special medical or mental health services,
their training should also focus on enhancing their ability to suspect that a detainee might have
52
special medical or mental health needs and how to facilitate their access to the medical or mental
health services that they might require.
The mental health expert on the Monitoring Team has previously raised concern about the
adequacy and appropriateness of some of the training on mental health included in the training
on ‘special needs inmates’ and has urged a review of that training. The concerns raised in this
report regarding the facility’s suicide prevention program focuses additional attention on the
issue of mental health training for security staff. During the June site visit, it was reported that
the mental health staff is scheduled to present a different mental health training unit that was
developed by QCHC, which is a significant step in the right direction. However, a review is still
recommended of other training that is being made available to all security staff in order to assure
that all training on mental health issues provides security staff with a consistent perspective on
the identification and management of detainees with mental health difficulties.
46. Develop and implement policies and procedures for adequate supervisory oversight for the
Jail. To that end, the County must:
a. Review and modify policies, procedures, and practices to ensure that the Jail
Administrator has the authority to make personnel decisions necessary to ensure
adequate staffing, staff discipline, and staff oversight. This personnel authority
must include the power to hire, transfer, and discipline staff. Personal
Identification Numbers (PINs) allocated for budget purposes represent a salaried
slot and are not a restriction on personnel assignment authority. While the Sheriff
may retain final authority for personnel decisions, the Jail’s policies and
procedures must document and clearly identify who is responsible for a personnel
decision, what administrative procedures apply, and the basis for personnel
decisions.
b. Review and modify policies, procedures, and practices to ensure that the Jail
Administrator has the ability to monitor, ensure compliance with Jail policies, and
take corrective action, for any staff members operating in the Jail, including any
who are not already reporting to the Jail Administrator and the Jail’s chain of
command. This provision covers road deputies assigned to supervise housing
units and emergency response/tactical teams entering the Jail to conduct random
shakedowns or to suppress prisoner disturbances.
c. Ensure that supervisors conduct daily rounds on each shift in the prisoner housing
units, and document the results of their rounds.
d. Ensure that staff conduct daily inspections of all housing and common areas to
identify damage to the physical plant, safety violations, and sanitation issues.
This maintenance program must include the following elements:
i. Facility safety inspections that include identification of damaged doors,
locks, cameras, and safety equipment.
53
ii. An inspection process.

iii. A schedule for the routine inspection, repair, and replacement of the
physical plant, including security and safety equipment.
iv. A requirement that any corrective action ordered be taken.
v. Identification of high priority repairs to assist Jail and County officials
with allocating staff and resources.
vi. To ensure prompt corrective action, a mechanism for identifying and
notifying responsible staff and supervisors when there are significant
delays with repairs or a pattern of problems with equipment. Staff
response to physical plant, safety, and sanitation problems must be
reasonable and prompt.
Partial Compliance
The Jail Administrator’s lack of authority to comply with this paragraph has long been a
significant problem. Now, with a new Sheriff and new Jail Administrator, there is an
opportunity to resolve the matter satisfactorily. While the Sheriff is the chief executive of the
HCSO, the Jail Administrator needs to be involved, and have a say, in all matters related to the
employment of new personnel, disciplinary and promotional recommendations, and management
decisions. To that end, the Sheriff has agreed to provide all CID and IAD investigative reports to
the Jail Administrator and the reports have been made available to her. It should then be
incumbent upon her to make appropriate recommendations regarding their disposition. It would
be also be appropriate for the division commander associated with a disciplinary action to be a
participant in the HCSO Disciplinary Review Board.
Detention supervisors do not maintain a separate log to indicate whether or not they have made
rounds on a daily or shift basis. Rather, they sign off on logs, well-being check sheets and other
documents that are maintained throughout the Jail. As a matter of practice, they simply sign, and
virtually never make comments on those documents. As stated in paragraph 44, well-being
checks are often not being made or made appropriately. The QA officer states that the logs are
not consistent with what she observes when she walks through the units. The supervisors should
be providing similar oversight and providing correction although it is not apparent that they are
doing so.
Facility and maintenance problems continue to plague RDC. The problem of “dumpster cells” in
A-Pod at the RDC was included in the 14th Monitoring Report. At that time 30 such cells were
opened, 11 were put back on-line and 19 were welded shut again after being cleaned out. To
date the status of those cells has not changed. Rather than repair them, they have been allowed
to remain vacant and unusable. This is a particularly serious failing on the part of the HCSO and
County in that cells in B-Pod had to be opened in order to deal with the increased average daily
census even though the work in B-Pod was not complete. Numerous physical plant issues have
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been detailed in prior reports particularly in A-Pod which continues to be used such as doors that
don’t lock, electrical and plumbing problems and the HVAC system. In addition, there are
physical plant issues related to medical staff safety, such as inadequate lighting on the units,
problems with door locks, and inoperable security cameras in the medical department.
As has been pointed out in previous Monitoring Reports, there has been little incentive for
supervisors to keep track of maintenance issues, but at least they are now being tracked by the
Chief Safety and Security Officer, who coordinates all work orders with Benchmark
Construction. The County’s archaic system of review and approval of maintenance needs has
not been streamlined beyond the employment of Benchmark Construction. While that was a step
in the right direction, the County should approve a substantial line item in the Sheriff’s budget to
handle routine maintenance. Although this was previously recommended, the Board of
Supervisors has not addressed the issue. One concern with respect to safety equipment is
reflected in IR #211373. An inmate housed in Booking while out on rec time grabbed the fire
extinguisher which should have been in a locked cabinet and sprayed it. Although not a
maintenance issue, a related concern is reflected in IR #211374 in which there was a fire in one
of the Booking cells and the officer sprayed the fire extinguisher through the flap in the cell
without removing the detainee.
47. Ensure that staff members conduct random shakedowns of cells and common areas so that
prisoners do not possess or have access to dangerous contraband. Such shakedowns must be
conducted in each housing unit at least once per month, on an irregular schedule to make them
less predictable to prisoners and staff.
Partial Compliance
This paragraph is downgraded from Substantial Compliance and returned to Partial Compliance
because conditions have reverted to their previous standard at the RDC. An unacceptable level
of contraband is still found when shakedowns are conducted, the frequency of shakedowns has
not been accomplished in compliance with this paragraph. In fact, in C-4 (a high security
confinement/lockdown housing unit) a shakedown was not conducted for a period of four
months. When shakedowns are conducted, there is little difference between what is found in A-
Pod and C-Pod even though C-Pod should have a much better record because it is supposedly a
direct supervision housing area. As an example of the seriousness of the problem at the RDC, on
August 18th inmates broadcast a video via social media from within A-Pod utilizing contraband
cell phones. This is something that has occurred previously. When cell phones are found by
individual officers or as a result of formal shakedowns, no effort is made to determine how the
items were introduced to the facility prior to referring the matter to CID. Housing unit C-3 was
known to have significant contraband yet the shakedown that was conducted on September 21,
2021 was the first shakedown since April. On October 21, 2021, a mass shakedown of A-Pod
and HU C-2 and C-3 was conducted at the RDC. According to IR #211444, the following items
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were found—22cell phones, 30 phone chargers, 21 dollars in cash, several shanks and
unspecified loose pills.
48. Install cell phone jammers or other electronic equipment to detect, suppress, and deter
unauthorized communications from prisoners in the Jail. Installation must be completed within
two years after the Effective Date.
Non-Compliant
This paragraph was previously upgraded from Non-Compliant to Partial Compliance because the
County had issued a request for proposal (RFP) which resulted in multiple bids being received,
as was noted in the last Monitoring Report. Since that time the County has not provided any
additional information. With no change since then, it is now returned to Non-Compliant.
49. Develop and implement a gang program in consultation with qualified experts in the field
that addresses any link between gang activity in the community and the Jail through appropriate
provisions for education, family or community involvement, and violence prevention.
Non-Compliant
There has been no change in the status of this paragraph for the past four years. Since the JDC is
closed due to maintenance problems, only the RDC and WC are currently affected. Regardless,
after an officer was initially assigned in 2017, to work on this issue, nothing further has been
done.
USE OF FORCE STANDARDS
Consistent with constitutional standards, the County must take reasonable measures to prevent
excessive force by staff and ensure force is used safely and only in a manner commensurate with
the behavior justifying it. To that end, the County must:
50. Develop and implement policies and procedures to regulate the use of force. The policies
and procedures must:
a. Prohibit the use of force as a response to verbal insults or prisoner threats where
there is no immediate threat to the safety or security of the institution, prisoners,
staff or visitors;
b. Prohibit the use of force as a response to prisoners’ failure to follow instructions
where there is no immediate threat to the safety or security of the institution,
prisoners, staff, visitors, or property;
c. Prohibit the use of force against a prisoner after the prisoner has ceased to resist
and is under control;
d. Prohibit the use of force as punishment or retaliation;
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e. Limit the level of force used so that it is commensurate with the justification for
use of force; and
f. Limit use of force in favor of less violent methods when such methods are more
appropriate, effective, or less likely to result in the escalation of an incident.
Partial Compliance
Changing the culture of the Jail has not been easy. In some individual cases, the officers
involved have adequately documented the actions of the inmates involved and their responses.
Incident Report #211108 is a case in point. An inmate failed to comply with the officer’s
directive to put on his jumpsuit, but OC was not deployed until the inmate “took a stance” to hit
the officer and a Sergeant had already attempted to guide him to his cell. However, there are
numerous instances when force was used (most frequently OC) in violation of the UOF policy.
IR’s 211315 211387, 211403, 211418 and 211449 document the inappropriate UOF (OC) when
inmates failed to comply with verbal orders from staff. The most egregious case of this violation
of policy is recorded in IR 211376 regarding a search for contraband that occurred at the RDC.
When an inmate, who was already prone on the floor, refused to put his hands behind his back to
be handcuffed, the CID Investigator used his taser to gain compliance. This was done in the
presence of multiple officers and supervisors who could have assisted.
51. Develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure timely notification,
documentation, and communication with supervisors and medical staff (including mental health
staff) prior to use of force and after any use of force. These policies and procedures must
specifically include the following requirements:
a. Staff members must obtain prior supervisory approval before the use of weapons
(e.g., electronic control devices or chemical sprays) and mechanical restraints
unless responding to an immediate threat to a person’s safety.
b. If a prisoner has a serious medical condition or other circumstances exist that may
increase the risk of death or serious injury from the use of force, the type of force
that may be used on the prisoner must be restricted to comply with this provision.
These restrictions include the following:
i. The use of chemical sprays, physical restraints, and electronic control
devices must not be used when a prisoner may be at risk of positional
asphyxia.
ii. Electronic control devices must not be used on prisoners when they are in
a location where they may suffer serious injury after losing voluntary
muscle control (e.g., prisoner is standing atop a stairwell, wall, or other
elevated location).
iii. Physical strikes, holds, or other uses of force or restraints may not be used
if the technique is not approved for use in the Jail or the staff member has
not been trained on the proper use of the technique.
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c. Staff members must conduct health and welfare checks every 15 minutes while a
prisoner is in restraints. At minimum, these checks must include (i) logged first-
person observations of a prisoner’s status while in restraints (e.g. check for blood
flow, respiration, heart beat), and (ii) documented breaks to meet the sanitary and
health needs of prisoners placed in emergency restraints (e.g., restroom breaks
and breaks to prevent cramping or circulation problems).
d. The County must ensure that clinical staff conduct medical and mental health
assessments immediately after a prisoner is subjected to any Level 1 use of force.
Prisoners identified as requiring medical or mental health care during the
assessment must receive such treatment.
e. A first-line supervisor must personally supervise all planned uses of force, such as
cell extractions.
f. Security staff members must consult with medical and mental health staff before
all planned uses of force on juveniles or prisoners with serious mental illness, so
that medical and mental health staff may offer alternatives to or limitations on the
use of force, such as assisting with de-escalation or obtaining the prisoner’s
voluntary cooperation.
g. The Jail must have inventory and weapon controls to establish staff member
responsibility for their use of weapons or other security devices in the facility.
Such controls must include:
i. a sign-out process for staff members to carry any type of weapon inside
the Jail,
ii. a prohibition on staff carrying any weapons except those in the Jail’s
tracked inventory, and
iii. random checks to determine if weapons have been discharged without
report of discharge (e.g., by checking the internal memory of electronic
control devices and weighing pepper spray canisters).
h. A staff member must electronically record (both video and sound) all planned
uses of force with equipment provided by the Jail.
i. All staff members using force must immediately notify their supervisor.
j. All staff members using a Level 1 use of force must also immediately notify the
shift commander after such use of force, or becoming aware of an allegation of
such use by another staff member.
Partial Compliance
Regarding 51 (a), incident reports still do not reflect that supervisory approval is obtained before
less than lethal weapons are accessed and used.
There is no change in the status of the following sub-paragraphs.
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Regarding 51 (b), there is no contact with Medical regarding health risks and any information on
their medical condition, or other circumstances that may increase the risk of death or serious
injury from the use of force is not included in IR’s
Regarding 51 (c), Detention Services does not utilize the restraint chair. Handcuffs are
sometimes used when physical restraint is required, but most frequently, when inmates need to
be restrained, they are placed in a single cell.
Regarding 51 (d), Medical staff routinely examine inmates when a UOF incident results in them
being referred to Medical. The problem that persists is that Medical staff do not have the
capability of making JMS entries. Not only should they be able to do so, but they should be able
to initiate incident reports and prepare supplements. Under the existing system, their critical
information lost. This problem has been pointed out in previous Monitoring Reports.
Regarding 51 (e), there is no documentation to support supervisory approval of a planned use of
force. To date, incidents which should have categorized as “planned” have been routinely
treated as operational matters.
Regarding 51 (f), there is no record of a cooperative process being followed. Security staff and
Medical/Mental Health staff have not worked together in advance of a documented planned use
of force.
Regarding 51 (g), the Jail has an inventory form that shows when less than lethal weapons are
checked out and returned to the armory.
Regarding 51 (h), the Jail now has Go Pro equipment that should make the video recording of
planned UOF cases possible. This capability has been utilized most frequently during
shakedowns; however, in the September Quality Assurance Compliance Report it was noted that
these cameras no longer function. “The cameras are still inoperable due to full memory cards
and their inability to maintain a charge. As a result, none of the shakedowns conducted at RDC
in September 2021 were recorded. New cameras are on order.”
Regarding 51 (i), supervisors are routinely notified after an incident escalates to the point that
force must be used.
Regarding 51 (j), shift commanders are also routinely notified whenever incidents require the use
of force.
USE OF FORCE TRAINING
52. The County must develop and implement a use of force training program. Every staff
member who supervises prisoners must receive at least 8 hours of pre-service use of force
training and annual use of force refresher training.
Partial Compliance
Use of Force training was previously provided to 135 officers prior to June 2021, but it was not
included in the most recent round of in-service training that was conducted from August 31 to
September 3, 2021; therefore, this paragraph’s requirement has not been fully met.
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53. Topics covered by use of force training must include:

a. Instruction on what constitutes excessive force;
b. De-escalation tactics;
c. Methods of managing prisoners with mental illness to avoid the use of force;
d. Defensive tactics;
e. All Jail use of force policies and procedures, including those related to
documentation and review of use of force.
Partial Compliance
There has been no change since the last reporting period. The UOF training includes a
continuum of appropriate force responses to escalating situations, de-escalation tactics and
defensive tactics, but it does not yet include specific measures for managing inmates with mental
illness.
54. The County must randomly test at least 5 percent of Jail Staff members annually to determine
whether they have a meaningful, working knowledge of all use of force policies and procedures.
The County must also evaluate the results to determine if any changes to Jail policies and
procedures may be necessary and take corrective action. The results and recommendations of
such evaluations must be provided to the United States and Monitor.
Non-Compliant
The UOF policy was adopted by the HCSO on January 27, 2020. Training has been provided to
the majority of supervisors and staff, but testing of five percent of staff is not yet a practicality;
nor is it possible to make recommendations regarding changes to the UOF policy.
55. The County must update any use of force training within 30 days after any revision to a use
of force policy or procedure.
Not Applicable
This paragraph is not applicable at this time. The UOF policy was adopted almost two years
ago, but it has not been reviewed or revised since that time; therefore, UOF training has not been
updated.
USE OF FORCE REPORTING
To prevent and remedy the unconstitutional use of force, the County must develop and
implement a system for reporting use of force. To that end, the County must:
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56. Develop and implement use of force reporting policies and procedures that ensure that Jail
supervisors have sufficient information to analyze and respond appropriately to use of force.
Partial Compliance
The Use of Force Policy, 5-500, was adopted almost two years ago. It complies with the
requirements of the Settlement Agreement, but even after a year and half of training, it is
questionable whether or not supervisors realize that they are to do more than sign off on reports.
They should make comments, recommendations and approve or disapprove of the force use.
That information is not contained in the UOF incident reports generated by officers and
supplements, which are often written by supervisors.
Although the problems associated with the content and quality of UOF reports has been covered
in previous Monitoring Reports, the same issues and shortcomings continue. The incident
reports do not document use of force incidents as required. There is a check box to indicate
whether force is used. This then requires additional information regarding the use of force. The
box is rarely checked even when the narrative of the report is clear that force was used. As a
result, the additional information required for instances of use of force is not provided.
At the WC the quality of UOF reports (and incident reports in general) has improved. They are
generally properly titled and identified according to content. At the RDC many UOF reports are
not identified as such. Unique tracking numbers and the officers involved are routinely included,
but witness statements are seldom noted. A description of the injuries is sometimes listed. The
classification of the housing or where the incident occurred is never specified. This applies to
both facilities. Location is generally noted, but sometimes the facility is not even identified.
57. Require each staff member who used or observed a use of force to complete a Use of Force
Report as promptly as possible, and no later than by the end of that staff member’s shift. Staff
members must accurately complete all fields on a Use of Force Report. The failure to report any
use of force must be treated as a disciplinary infraction, subject to re-training and staff discipline,
including termination. Similarly, supervisors must also comply with their documentation
obligations and will be subject to re-training and discipline for failing to comply with those
obligations.
Partial Compliance
While it is not yet possible to determine when a UOF incident report was generated from the IR
itself, that information is now available on the Incident Reporting Spreadsheet. A review of that
document reflects UOF incident reports are completed by the end of the staff member’s shift.
Although that is an improvement, this paragraph is still carried as being in Partial Compliance
because some incident reports involving the use of force continue to be titled as something other
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than UOF and the use of force check box is not checked resulting in the additional required
information not being provided.
58. Ensure that Jail use of force reports include an accurate and detailed account of the events.
At minimum, use of force reports must document the following information:
a. A unique tracking number for each use of force;
b. The names of all staff members, prisoner(s), and other participants or witnesses;
c. Housing classification and location;
d. Date and time;
e. A description of the events leading to the use of force, including what precipitated
or appeared to precipitate those events.
f. A description of the level of resistance, staff response, and the type and level of
force (including frequency and duration of use). For instance, use of force reports
must describe the number of discharges from electronic control devices and
chemical munitions canisters; the amount of discharge from chemical munitions
canisters; whether the Staff Member threatened to use the device or actually
discharged the device; the type of physical hold or strike used; and the length of
time a prisoner was restrained, and whether the prisoner was released from
restraints for any period during that time;
g. A description of the staff member’s attempts to de-escalate the situation without
use of force;
h. A description of whether the staff member notified supervisors or other personnel,
including medical or mental health staff, before or after the use of force;
i. A description of any observed injuries to staff or prisoners;
j. Whether medical care was required or provided to staff or prisoners;
k. Reference to any associated incident report or prisoner disciplinary report
completed by the reporting officer, which pertains to the events or prisoner
activity that prompted the use of force;
l. A signature of the staff member completing the report attesting to the report’s
accuracy and completeness.
Partial Compliance
The accuracy and quality of UOF reports has improved over time, but this paragraph is still
carried as being in Partial Compliance because of significant discrepancies. UOF reports are not
always properly identified as such. The reports do have a unique tracking number and do
identify the officers involved, but witness statements are generally not included. A description
of the injuries is sometimes included. The classification of the housing area where the incident
occurred is never specified although the location of the incident is almost always noted. While
some reports are clear and comprehensive, all too often the lack of clarity and failure to provide
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details (and witness statements) makes it hard to determine whether or not appropriate procedure
was followed.
Incident Reports 211108 and 211229 are examples of reports that reflect the shortcomings noted
above. IR 2121108, titled “Comply - Failure to Obey/Comply with Lawful Order of a Detention
Officer”, should have been titled Use of Force because a Sergeant deployed OC on an inmate
who “became aggressive” to an officer. In this case OC was actually used to coerce an inmate
into complying with an officer’s order, which is contrary to HCSO policy. The report does not
state whether or not there were inmate witnesses. The originating officer’s statement did not
indicate in what jail or housing unit the incident occurred, but the Sergeant’s supplement did list
the location at “Unit C2”, but did not specify the facility. IR 211229, titled “Assault – Assault
or Attempted Assault (i.e., Sexual, Physical, etc.)”, may or may not have actually covered a UOF
incident. The initiating officer said that he “was working C4” (the facility was not identified)
when an inmate climbed out through his cell window and attacked another inmate who was in
the dayroom. The officer then stated that he, two other officers and a Sergeant “…went into C4
and seen inmate (name deleted) and (name deleted) fighting.” This makes it apparent that the
Sergeant and officers were not actually inside C-4 when the incident occurred. There are
supposed to be two officers physically located inside C-4 at all times according to the direct
supervision staffing standard for that lockdown/confinement unit. Whether or not the three
officers and Sergeant were required to use force to separate the inmates is not noted, but the
report does state that one inmate was transported to Merit Health for treatment. The lack of
clarity and completeness in incident reports, particularly at the RDC is not consistent with the
requirements of this paragraph.
USE OF FORCE SUPERVISOR REVIEWS
59. The County must ensure that Jail supervisors review, analyze, and respond appropriately
to use of force. At minimum:
a. A supervisor must review all use of force reports submitted during the
supervisor’s watch by the end of the supervisor’s watch.
b. A supervisor must ensure that staff members complete their use of force reports
by the end of their watch.
c. Reviewing supervisors must document their findings as to the completeness of
each staff member’s use of force report, and must also document any procedural
errors made by staff in completing their reports.
d. If a Use of Force report is incomplete, reviewing supervisors must require Staff
Members to provide any required information on a revised use of force report, and
the Jail must maintain both the original and any revised report in its records.
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e. Any supervisor responsible for reviewing use of force reports must document
their use of force review as described in Paragraph 62 sufficiently to allow
auditing to determine whether an appropriate review was conducted.
f. All Level 1 uses of force must be sent to the shift commander, warden, Jail
Administrator, and IAD.
g. A Level 2 use of force must be referred to the shift commander, warden, Jail
Administrator, and IAD if a reviewing supervisor concludes that there may have
been a violation of law or policy. Level 2 uses of force may also be referred to
IAD if the County requires such reporting as a matter of Jail policy and
procedure, or at the discretion of any reviewing supervisor.
Partial Compliance
The following comments appeared in the 14th Monitoring Report but they are still appropriate for
this Monitoring Report. There has been no noticeable change in the status of this paragraph
since the last reporting period. On a day-to-day basis, supervisors are actively involved in
dealing with incidents, sometimes more so than would be expected. That is primarily due to the
fact that supervisors at the RDC tend to handle routine matters, such as well-being and security
checks, that should be the responsibility of Detention Officers. This situation is primarily
attributable to the shortage of personnel. Supervisors follow through on UOF cases by notifying
the appropriate chain of command and investigative authorities. As has always been the case,
however, supervisors do not evaluate incidents, reach conclusions and make recommendations.
Future training for supervisors needs to concentrate on the fact that a signature is not sufficient.
A finding is required.
The above referenced improper use of OC spray and a taser should have resulted in corrective
action by the supervisors. However, it appears that the supervisors approved the reports with no
corrective action recommended or provided being noted in the reports.
60. After any Level 1 use of force, responding supervisors will promptly go to the scene and
take the following actions:
a. Ensure the safety of everyone involved in or proximate to the incident. Determine
if anyone is injured and ensure that necessary medical care is or has been
provided.
b. Ensure that photos are taken of all injuries sustained, or as evidence that no
injuries were sustained, by prisoners and staff involved in a use of force incident.
Photos must be taken no later than two hours after a use of force. Prisoners may
refuse to consent to photos, in which case they should be asked to sign a waiver
indicating that they have refused consent. If they refuse to sign a waiver, the shift
commander must document that consent was requested and refused.
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c. Ensure that staff members and witnesses are identified, separated, and advised
that communications with other staff members or witnesses regarding the incident
are prohibited.
d. Ensure that victim, staff, and witness statements are taken confidentially by
reviewing supervisors or investigators, outside of the presence of other prisoners
or involved staff.
e. Document whether the use of force was recorded. If the use of force was not
recorded, the responding supervisors must review and explain why the event was
not recorded. If the use of force was recorded, the responding supervisors must
ensure that any record is preserved for review.
Non-Compliant
The following statement from the 14th Monitoring Report still applies. There has been no change
in the status of this paragraph since the last reporting period. While supervisors have taken steps
to improve their compliance with standards, they have not met the requirements of this
paragraph. Specifically, they do not require that photographs be routinely taken, nor do they
ever indicate that an inmate has refused to sign a waiver when photographs are refused.
Witnesses are seldom identified, nor are witness statements taken. Finally, they do not explain
why an incident was not recorded if there is no video evidence.
61. All uses of force must be reviewed by supervisors who were neither involved in nor
approved the use of force by the end of the supervisor’s shift. All level 1 uses of force must also
be reviewed by a supervisor of Captain rank or above who was neither involved in nor approved
the use of force. The purposes of supervisor review are to determine whether the use of force
violated Jail policies and procedures, whether the prisoner’s rights may have been violated, and
whether further investigation or disciplinary action is required.
Non-Compliant
There has been no change in the status of this paragraph for the past several reporting periods.
While the spread sheet on incident reports frequently reflets the supervisor’s approval, there is
little or no indication of findings or recommendations in the spread sheet or separate reports.
Command level Detention staff indicate that they review incident reports, but there is no record
of their recommendations for change, update or action.
62. Reviewing supervisors must document the following:

a. Names of all staff members, prisoner(s), and other participants or witnesses
interviewed by the supervisor;
b. Witness statements;
c. Review date and time;
d. The findings, recommendations, and results of the supervisor’s review;
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e. Corrective actions taken;

f. The final disposition of the reviews (e.g., whether the Use of Force was found to
comply with Jail policies and procedures, or whether disciplinary action was
taken against a staff member);
g. Supporting documents such as incident reports, logs, and classification records.
Supervisors must also obtain and review summary medical and mental health
records describing –
i. The nature and extent of injuries, or lack thereof;
ii. The date and time when medical care was requested and actually
provided;
iii. The names of medical or mental health staff conducting any medical or
mental health assessments or care.
h. Photos, video/digital recordings, or other evidence collected to support findings
and recommendations.
Non-Compliant
There has been no change in the status of this paragraph for the past several reporting periods.
The incident report summary spreadsheet has a column for supervisors’ notes. While this would
be an appropriate place for them to make comments/recommendation, their notes are generally
limited to personal involvement in the incident(s).
INCIDENT REPORTING AND REVIEW
To prevent and remedy violations of prisoners’ constitutional rights, the County must develop
and implement a system for reporting and reviewing incidents in the Jail that may pose a threat
to the life, health, and safety of prisoners. To that end, the County must:
63. Develop and implement incident reporting policies and procedures that ensure that Jail
supervisors have sufficient information in order to respond appropriately to reportable incidents.
Partial Compliance
This paragraph was upgraded from Non-Compliant to Partial Compliance because Policy 1-500,
Incident Reports, was approved and adopted on April 14, 2021. Unfortunately, in service
training that was conducted from August 31 through September 3, 2021, did not include training
on this policy. The HCSO needs to put emphasis on proper training for supervisory personnel.
64. Ensure that Incident Reports include an accurate and detailed account of the events. At
minimum, Incident Reports must contain the following information:
a. Tracking number for each incident;
b. The names of all staff members, prisoner, and other participants or witnesses;
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c. Housing classification and location;

d. Date and time;
e. Type of incident;
f. Injuries to staff or prisoner;
g. Medical care;
h. All staff involved or present during the incident and their respective roles;
i. Reviewing supervisor and supervisor findings, recommendations, and case
dispositions;
j. External reviews and results;
k. Corrective action taken; and
l. Warden and Administrator review and final administrative actions.
Partial Compliance
A year and a half ago the approved and adopted policy regarding incident reports (1-500), was
put in place. In spite of that formal action little has changed. Tracking numbers (incident report
numbers) are listed, as are the names of staff and inmates involved. Witnesses are seldom noted.
The housing classification is never noted, but the housing unit location generally is (even though
the facility is not). The date and type of the incident are always listed, but the type is often
subject to question. As an example, a report may be listed as a “Failure to Comply” when in fact
“Use of Force” would be more appropriate. Injuries to staff and inmates are sometimes listed, as
is the requirement for medical care. All staff involved are generally listed, but supervisory
findings, recommendations and case dispositions are not. External review, corrective action
taken and command staff review, along with final administrative actions, are not noted.
As previously noted, there is concern that incident reports are not prepared for all reportable
incidents. In IR #210960, an inmate is taken to Medical after an alleged assault in A-1. An
incident occurred while in Medical which is described in the incident report. However, there is
no incident report on the alleged assault in A-1. Similarly, in IR #211113 there is an incident
report stating that an inmate was transported to the hospital to see if his jaw was broken. There is
no information in that incident report and no prior incident report on the events that caused the
injury to his jaw. According to Medical, it was an assault and his jaw was broken. Similar
questions arise from IR #211062 where an inmate was sent to the hospital with a broken wrist.
According to the August QA report, there is a similar problem with fires being reported. Staff
find fire extinguishers to be low or empty without a related incident report being prepared.
Many incident reports do not provide the information needed for an understanding of what
actually happened. IR #211304 is an example. It was reported that a detainee approached the
officer and said he needed to go to Medical. The officer noticed that the detainee seemed to have
“a cup of blood” that “seemed to be coming from his mouth area.” He was sent to Medical where
he tested positive for some drugs. A supplement by a Sgt. stated that he went to Medical and the
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detainee stated he was in a lot of pain. Medical stated that they were going to keep the detainee
overnight and send him for X-rays in the morning. There is no additional information regarding
why the inmate was bleeding, why he had a cup of blood, why X-rays were warranted, or what
the outcome was. Another example is IR #211318. The incident begins in the courtroom. The
detainee leaves the courtroom without permission and goes to an undisclosed location where he
is asked by another inmate to open his door which he did. The officer tells the second inmate to
get back behind the door and calls for assistance. The responding officer escorts the first inmate
back to A-2. There is no explanation as to how the first inmate left the courtroom and got to the
undisclosed location where another inmate asked him to open his door, or how the first inmate
was able to open another inmate’s door. There was no supplemental report by the second officer
involved.
A frequent omission discovered during this monitoring period was that officers were not entering
the date and time of the incident. The date was often in the narrative but was not entered in the
appropriate field. This impacted the accuracy of electronic reports listing incidents because they
are run for specific dates and if the date isn’t input in the correct field the report is not picked up
in the electronic report. This impacts the accuracy of internal and monitoring reports. In June, 14
reports were missing; in July, 20 reports were missing; in August, 24 reports were missing. In
September, 10 reports were missing. However, IT made those fields mandatory and this problem
appears to be corrected as of mid-September. Prior QA and Monitoring Reports may have
underreported areas of concern as a result of this problem.
An indication of supervisory review, or the lack thereof, is included in the Monthly Incident
Narratives Report. For the month of August virtually all IR’s were carried as “approved” in spite
of some obvious discrepancies which were ignored by the reviewing supervisor. IR#211128 is
an example. Two officers entered HU C-3 at the RDC and stomped out a fire with their shoes.
Obviously, there was no officer inside the unit at the time of the fire, but being a direct
supervision housing area, it should have been staffed at all times. This fact was not even
mentioned by the supervisor who wrote a review of the incident.
Discussions about the most appropriate way for medical and mental health staff to report
incidences raised the question of whether or not medical and mental health staff should have
access to and directly file such reports in JMS. This discussion has now evolved to a much
broader discussion about medical and mental health access to JMS for various reasons (for
example, assuring knowledge of all new admissions, confirming the classification and housing of
detainees, discharge planning, etc.), whether or not there is ever a reason why medical and
mental health staff should actually directly enter anything into JMS (instead of simply, or
possibly more appropriately providing medical and mental health information to security staff
who are responsible for JMS reports). These discussions have further broadened the discussion to
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include a wide range of issues related to the role(s) of medical and mental health staff in incident
reporting.
At present, incident reports filed by security staff may reference the direct involvement of
medical or mental health staff and/or the transfer of a detainee to medical, but the reports
virtually never include medical or mental health findings. In addition, there are times when a
review of related medical records provides additional information that should be included in the
incident report (for example, that injury was the result of an assault that was not included in the
incident report submitted by security staff, or the detainee’s altered mental status was the result
of a drug overdose that was not noted in the incident report submitted by security staff).
Therefore, these larger issues regarding how best to include information available from medical
and mental health staff in incident reports need to be more fully explored and addressed.
65. Require each staff member directly involved in a reportable incident to accurately and
thoroughly complete incident reports as promptly as possible, by the end of the staff member’s
shift. At minimum:
a. Staff members must complete all fields on an Incident Report for which they have
responsibility for completion. Staff members must not omit entering a date, time,
incident location, or signature when completing an Incident Report. If no injuries
are present, staff members must write that; they may not leave that section blank.
b. Failure to report any reportable incident must be treated as a disciplinary
infraction, subject to re-training and staff discipline, including termination.
c. Supervisors must also comply with their documentation obligations and will also
be subject to re-training and discipline for failing to comply with those
obligations.
Partial Compliance
The discrepancies and shortcomings identified in the previous Monitoring Reports are still
apparent, but policy 1-500, even though not properly implemented, sets forth standards that are
appropriate. As has been noted previously, supervisory review seldom includes witness
statements and findings. Photographs are more frequently included in documentation.
Approval/disapproval statements and recommendations by supervisors are routinely missing. IR
#211318 mentioned in paragraph 65 is an example of where an officer responding to an
assistance call did not write a supplemental report. The recent death of an inmate also involved
missing property when his family came to pick up his property. There is no incident report on the
missing property. There were also at least two late releases for which there is no incident report.
As previously reported, there are seldom reports on late releases or lost property.
66. Ensure that Jail supervisors review and respond appropriately to incidents. At minimum:
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a. Shift commanders must document all reportable incidents by the end of their shift,
but no later than 12 hours after a reportable incident.
b. Shift commanders must report all suicides, suicide attempts, and deaths, no later
than one hour after the incident, to a supervisor, IAD, and medical and mental
health staff.
c. Any supervisor responsible for reviewing Incident Reports must document their
incident review within 24 hours of receipt of an Incident Report sufficiently to
allow auditing to determine whether an appropriate review was conducted. Such
documentation must include the same categories of information required for
supervisor use of force reviews such as names of individuals interviewed by the
supervisor, witness statements, associated records (e.g. medical records, photos,
and digital recordings), review dates, findings, recommendations, and case
dispositions.
d. Reportable incidents must be reviewed by a supervisor not directly involved in the
incident.
Non-Compliant
The discrepancies and shortcomings identified in previous Monitoring Reports are still apparent.
Incident reports do reflect that supervisors respond to incidents and that inmates who need to be
checked or treated are appropriately referred. However, supervisory review seldom includes
witness statements, photographs and findings. Approve/disapproval statements and
recommendations are routinely missing. Incident Report 211659 is a case in point. An officer
reported that he was in C-Pod control and heard a disturbance coming from C-4 ISO (Suicide
Watch). After responding, it was determined that one inmate had assaulted another.
Consequently, inmates were (inappropriately) placed in single cells in the C-4 ISO unit. No
officer was working inside the ISO unit as he/she should have been. The Supervisor who
reviewed this incident made no mention of that fact, nor did she disapprove the actions of the
officer (who should not have been inside C-Pod control) or make recommendations.
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
67. To prevent and remedy violations of prisoners’ constitutional rights, the County must
develop and implement policies and procedures to address sexual abuse and misconduct. Such
policies and procedures must include all of the following:
a. Zero tolerance policy towards any sexual abuse and sexual harassment as defined
by the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15601, et seq., and its
implementing regulations;
b. Staff training on the zero tolerance policy, including how to fulfill their duties and
responsibilities to prevent, detect, report and respond to sexual abuse and sexual
harassment under the policy;
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c. Screening prisoners to identify those who may be sexually abusive or at risk of

sexual victimization;
d. Multiple internal ways to allow both confidential and anonymous reporting of
sexual abuse and sexual harassment and any related retaliation, including a
mechanism for prisoners to directly report allegations to an outside entity;
e. Both emergency and ongoing medical and mental health care for victims of sexual
assault and sexual harassment, including rape kits as appropriate and counseling;
f. A complete ban on cross-gender strip searches or cross-gender visual body cavity
searches except in exigent circumstances or when performed by a medical
examiner;
g. A complete ban on cross-gender pat searches of women prisoners, absent exigent
circumstances;
h. Regular supervisory review to ensure compliance with the sexual abuse and
sexual harassment policies; and
i. Specialized investigative procedures and training for investigators handling sexual
abuse and sexual harassment allegations.
Non-Compliant
This paragraph has been changed to non-compliant. The PREA Coordinator has been out since
mid-July. It is reported that several officers have been assigned the PREA duties but there is no
documentation that they have been trained on PREA or are undertaking those duties. There are
no PREA reports for July, August, or September. During this reporting period there were three
inmates transported to the hospital for the stated reason of “PREA evaluations.” The July Quality
Assurance report indicates that there was a PREA complaint in July. There are no PREA reports
on these incidents. There were a number of incident reports during this time frame that should
have been referred to the PREA Coordinator but no documentation of any referral or
investigation. This indicates the need for continued in-service training of officers. The June
Quality Assurance report states that there was a PREA training in June attended by 13 officers.
There was no reported training of new cadets or any in-service training of current employees
after that. It is essential that the status of the PREA position be determined.
Nursing staff continue to be involved in the screening of newly admitted detainees in an attempt
to identify those who may be sexually abusive or at risk of sexual victimization as part of the
intake screening process, and new admissions so identified are referred to the PREA officer.
If/when the PREA officer refers any so identified new admissions to mental health, mental health
will perform an assessment and provide any treatment that might be indicated.
If medical or mental health staff identify a PREA eligible detainee who was not previously
identified at intake, that detainee is referred to the PREA officer. If there is an actual PREA
defined incident, medical staff will perform or facilitate the performance of any indicated
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assessment and provide any medically indicated treatment, mental health staff will perform an
assessment and provide any indicated mental health treatment, and medical and mental health
staff will confirm that the PREA officer is aware of the incident.
It should be noted that for much of the period covered by this site visit, the PREA Coordinator
has been out on leave, and the medical and mental health staff have been unclear about who has
assumed the responsibilities for PREA. Therefore, although both medical and mental health staff
have continued to identify PREA-related cases and provide the above-described services to such
identified individuals, there has not been any real coordination with a PREA officer.
Both medical and mental health staff continue to provide any clinically indicated emergency and
ongoing medical and mental health care for victims of sexual assault and/or sexual harassment.
It should be noted that if a detainee alleges having just been raped, the detainee is immediately
sent to the hospital emergency room for a full, forensic medical assessment, which includes the
use of a rape kit. It should also be noted that when indicated, medical and mental health services
are also provided to alleged detainee perpetrators of sexual assault or sexual harassment.
The MOU with the Mississippi Coalition Against Sexual Assault is in effect and was being
utilized at the time of the 15th Monitoring Report. An outside line has been implemented such
that inmates can call the Coalition directly from the kiosk in the unit without charge. A PREA
report in June states that an inmate was referred to MCASA when he did not want to talk with
the PREA Coordinator. DOJ has highlighted a problem with reporting through the Coalition in
that if the Coalition receives certain federal funds, it cannot pass on any PREA reports without a
written release from the inmate. Third party reporting is still available through friends and
family. PREA complaints can also be reported through the kiosk directly to the PREA
Coordinator or through submitting a grievance at the kiosk.
The PREA Coordinator was not available during the site visit. As a result, there is no update on
inmate education on PREA. There were no PREA education activities reported. The education
process needs to be expanded and the new Detention Administrator will no doubt be a valuable
resource in this area. There were no CID or IAD investigations on PREA complaints despite the
incidents mentioned above.
One concern related to the ability to provide for sexual safety and adequately investigate
allegations is that in February, the prior Detention Administrator reported that at the RDC, 56
cameras were not working, 14 were missing and 10 needed adjusting. The cameras were still not
functioning at the time of the October site visit.
At the time of the June site visit, there was also concern about the PREA Coordinator’s access to
IAD investigations. She was informed by the Undersheriff that her referrals to IAD had to be
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approved by the Undersheriff or the Sheriff. The PREA Coordinator was also informed by IAD
that she could not have access to the reports/findings of the IAD investigation. Both of these
directives are contrary to the Sexual Safety Policy and PREA. Because of the PREA
Coordinator’s absence, the status of these directives could not be confirmed.
There is one individual housed in Booking who is there because he alleges suicidal thoughts in
order to be placed in the suicide ISO unit where he engages in sexual behavior. The Monitoring
Team has repeatedly stated that Booking is not appropriate for housing. The suicide ISO unit
needs to be under constant supervision by an officer in the unit such that it is safe for inmates. It
is essential for the sexual safety of staff and inmates that the housing units be adequately
supervised and that Booking not be used for housing.
Given the various above noted roles and responsibilities that medical and mental health staff
assume with regard to PREA and PREA-involved detainees, staff may have knowledge about and
an understanding of any given PREA-involved detainee that is not readily available elsewhere.
Therefore, when there is a PREA investigation, the investigator should fully gather and integrate
information obtained from medical and mental health staff into the investigation. As has been
noted in prior reports, although a considerable amount of such information will be available in the
detainee’s medical records, in many instances, actual investigatory interviews of medical and/or
mental health staff might also be indicated.
One of the PREA cases that occurred during the period covered by this site visit demonstrates the
fact that medical and mental health staff may have information that might be extremely relevant
to a PREA investigation. In this case, a detainee (detainee A) presented to medical, alleging that
he had been sexually assaulted that day by another detainee (detainee B). A review of medical
and mental health records, along with interviews of medical and mental health staff revealed a
more complicated story. Essentially, detainees A and B had had a consensual sexual relationship
that soured. The night before detainee A’s allegation, detainee A had physically assaulted detainee
B and then on the day of detainee A’s allegation, detainee B responded to the prior nights assault
by physically assaulting detainee A. Both detainees have been receiving mental health services.
Most of the above noted information is based on mental health records and interviews with mental
health staff. The findings of detainee A’s sexual assault assessment (performed on the day he was
allegedly sexually assaulted by detainee B) were negative.
INVESTIGATIONS
68. The County shall ensure that it has sufficient staff to identify, investigate, and correct
misconduct that has or may lead to a violation of the Constitution. At a minimum, the County
shall:
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a. Develop and implement comprehensive policies, procedures, and practices for the
thorough and timely (within 60 days of referral) investigation of alleged staff
misconduct, sexual assaults, and physical assaults of prisoners resulting in serious
injury, in accordance with this Agreement, within 90 days of its Effective Date.
At a minimum, an investigation will be conducted if:
i. Any prisoner exhibited a serious injury;
ii. Any staff member requested transport of the prisoner to the hospital;
iii. Staff member reports indicate inconsistent, conflicting, or suspicious
accounts of the incident; or
iv. Alleged staff misconduct would constitute a violation of law or Jail policy,
or otherwise endangers facility or prisoner safety (including inappropriate
personal relationships between a staff member and prisoner, or the
smuggling of contraband by a staff member).
b. Per policy, investigations shall:
i. Be conducted by qualified persons, who do not have conflicts of interest
that bear on the partiality of the investigation;
ii. Include timely, thorough, and documented interviews of all relevant staff
and prisoners who were involved in or who witnessed the incident in
question, to the extent practicable; and
iii. Include all supporting evidence, including logs, witness and participant
statements, references to policies and procedures relevant to the incident,
physical evidence, and video or audio recordings.
c. Provide investigators with pre-service and annual in-service training so that
investigators conduct quality investigations that meet the requirements of this
Agreement;
d. Ensure that any investigative report indicating possible criminal behavior will be
referred to the appropriate criminal law enforcement agency;
e. Within 90 days of the Effective Date of this Agreement, IAD must have written
policies and procedures that include clear and specific criteria for determining
when it will conduct an investigation. The criteria will require an investigation if:
i. Any prisoner exhibited serious, visible injuries (e.g., black eye, obvious
bleeding, or lost tooth);
ii. Any staff member requested transport of the prisoner to the hospital;
iii. Staff member reports indicate inconsistent, conflicting, or suspicious
accounts of the incident; or
iv. Alleged staff misconduct would constitute a violation of law or Jail policy,
or otherwise endangers facility or prisoner safety (including inappropriate
personal relationships between a staff member and prisoner, or the
smuggling of contraband by a staff member).
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f. Provide the Monitor and United States a periodic report of investigations

conducted at the Jail every four months. The report will include the following
information:
i. a brief summary of all completed investigations, by type and date;
ii. a listing of investigations referred for administrative investigation;
iii. a listing of all investigations referred to an appropriate law enforcement
agency and the name of the agency; and
iv. a listing of all staff suspended, terminated, arrested or reassigned because
of misconduct or violations of policy and procedures. This list must also
contain the specific misconduct and/or violation.
v. a description of any corrective actions or changes in policies, procedures,
or practices made as a result of investigations over the reporting period.
g. Jail management shall review the periodic report to determine whether the
investigation system is meeting the requirements of this Agreement and make
recommendations regarding the investigation system or other necessary changes
in policy based on this review. The review and recommendations will be
documented and provided to the Monitor and United States.
Partial Compliance
Policy 1-600, Investigations, was approved and adopted a year and a half ago (March 25, 2020).
It calls for thorough CID and IAD investigations that are consistent with the requirements of the
Settlement Agreement. As was noted in the last Monitoring Report, the number of CID
investigations has risen substantially since 2017. Consequently, a second investigator was
assigned to handle Jail cases in early October. This should allow for more emphasis to be placed
on taking witness statements. With upwards of 60 cameras malfunctioning or out of service at
the RDC, the job of the investigators has been seriously hampered. Without a video record of
many incidents, they could not be definitively resolved. This technical problem should be
corrected before the next site visit.
A review of the CID spreadsheet for investigations conducted during June, July, August and
September 2021, revealed that there were 69 cases. The majority of those were Assaults at the
RDC (25), followed by assaults at the WC (12). There were 11 investigations regarding
contraband at the RDC while there were none at the WC. Likewise, there were five arson
investigations at the RDC but none at the WC. Beyond that, there was one assault on a law
enforcement officer at the RDC and there were two inmates involved in an escape from the WC.
The location of these events within the respective facilities is not adequately documented on the
spreadsheet. At the WC the actual housing unit is listed (1, 2, 3 or 4), but at the RDC only the
pod is noted (e.g., A-Pod or C-Pod), not the individual housing unit. The specific housing unit
should be indicated. At the WC there was one investigation in HU-1, there were five in HU-2,
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seven in HU-3 and two in HU-4. At the RDC there were 21 investigations in C-Pod and 17 in A-
Pod. The importance of this is that C-Pod is supposed to be operated under the principles and
dynamics of direct supervision. If that were the case, one would expect to see fewer incidents in
C-Pod than A-Pod where officers are not assigned inside the housing units and the actual level of
staffing is lower than in C-Pod. The statistics confirm that direct supervision is not in place in C-
Pod. There were two incidents in Booking and one in Medical.
Of the CID investigations during this three month period, eight were referred to IAD, two were
referred to an Outside Agency, 12 were transferred to the Grand Jury, four were referred
internally, and none resulted in criminal indictment. Considering the significant number of
assaults, the fact that none resulted in a criminal indictment is unusual.
There is a significant delay in IAD reports being made available to the Monitoring Team. This
was also a concern with IAD reports being made available to the Jail Administrator, timely if at
all. This has reportedly been rectified. In IR #210962 there was an incident that occurred in C-2
with no officer present. When officers arrived, an inmate had and used a canister of OC spray.
As of the time of the site visit this incident was still being investigated. The IAD spread sheets
show multiple incidents “currently under review” with subsequent spreadsheets showing no
resolution.
The IAD spreadsheet tracks investigations according to most of this paragraph’s criteria. From
June through August 2021, a total of 34 cases were investigated. Among the most significant, 15
involved UOF, two were inmate deaths, one was an escape of two inmates from the WC, one
was a fire and four involved unbecoming conduct on the part of staff. As a result of all
investigations, three officers were terminated and two resigned, but the disposition of some
investigations is still pending.
IAD investigations were predominantly centered on events that occurred at the RDC. Only three
were at the WC. At the RDC the majority of investigations dealt with events in C-Pod (13), A-
Pod (8) and Booking (6). It is noteworthy that there were more investigations on events in C-4,
the lockdown/confinement unit, than in any other housing unit.
GRIEVANCE AND PRISONER INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Because a reporting system provides early notice of potential constitutional violations and an
opportunity to prevent more serious problems before they occur, the County must develop and
implement a grievance system. To that end:
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69. The grievance system must permit prisoners to confidentially report grievances without
requiring the intervention of a detention officer.
Partial Compliance
There has been no change in the status of this requirement. As stated in the 12th, 13th, and 14th
Monitoring Report, it will be necessary to track whether there is a concern about the
confidentiality of the use of the grievance system once there is an officer consistently on the unit
as required in C Pod by the Stipulated Order. As previously stated, the incident reports indicate
that this is still not the case. Until then, it will not be possible to know if the physical setting of
the kiosks which does not allow for privacy results in issues with the confidentiality of filing a
grievance. However, it should be noted that inmates are using the system and there has been no
stated concern about officers observing the use of the kiosk. There are some gaps in access to the
kiosks. There are no kiosks in Booking where people are inappropriately housed as well as no
kiosks in the ISO units.
The grievance policy provides that an inmate may submit a written grievance and will be
provided a form and an envelope that can be sealed. This can be given to the housing officer or
the area supervisor when he or she is doing their rounds. This would allow an additional avenue
to submit a grievance confidentially although not without some involvement of a Detention
Officer. The grievance officer was not able to confirm that there were paper forms in the housing
units, booking or the ISO unit. She did not think there were envelopes but agreed to get some to
the units. One inmate housed in the ISO unit indicated he would use the kiosk if there was one in
the ISO unit. The grievance policy also requires that if there are cognitive or communication
barriers, the Detention Officer refers the issue to the Area Supervisor for communication
assistance or problem resolution. It does not appear that this provision of the policy has been
implemented or that the inmates have been informed of it. In addition, without an officer
regularly on the unit in A Pod, an inmate would not have easy and confidential access to a
Detention Officer. Non-English speaking persons and persons with disabilities still require the
intervention of another inmate or officer.
70. Grievance policies and procedures must be applicable and standardized across the entire
Jail.
Partial Compliance
A Grievance Policy has now been approved and adopted. The Grievance Coordinator now has a
copy of the policy and has reviewed it. There are still some aspects of the policy that are not fully
implemented. Once the policy is fully implemented, it would be applicable and standardized
across the entire Jail. At present, the kiosk system works the same across facilities. The
Grievance Coordinator stated that she now reviews all grievances including those at the WC,
determines whether they are grievances and then assigns the grievance to staff for a response.
However, a review of the grievance responses indicates that the Grievance Officer at the WC is
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receiving grievances that she denies as not being a grievance even though this is supposed to be
the role of the Grievance Coordinator. It appears that the system of having the Grievance
Coordinator determine whether the grievance presents a grievable issue which is according to
policy, is not being consistently followed leading to inconsistency in this area. This appeared to
be the case through August. However, in September, there were very few grievances denied by
the WC Grievance Officer as not a grievance. There is inconsistency in how grievances are
responded to once assigned. In addition to some responders not providing any response through
the system, described below, some responders research the grievance and respond substantively
whereas others simply say the matter will be looked into. The Grievance Coordinator stated that
she advised staff to respond substantively to the grievances. There appears to be some
improvement in this area but some responses are still inadequate. Even with the policy in place,
there will need to be training on how to properly respond and ensure promised response to
grievances are implemented in order to achieve consistency. The grievance policy requires that a
percentage of grievance responses be audited on a periodic basis. Once this is implemented, it
will be possible to target appropriate training and corrective action.
71. All grievances must receive appropriate follow-up, including a timely written response by
an impartial reviewer and staff tracking of whether resolutions have been implemented or still
need implementation. Any response to a medical grievance or a grievance alleging threats or
violence to the grievant or others that exceeds 24 hours shall be presumed untimely.
Partial Compliance
As previously reported, the Grievance Coordinator maintains a spread sheet to track the
grievances and grievance responses. Many of the fields are pulled electronically from the
Securus system. However, she has to manually add the type of grievance, the date of response,
and the date of an appeal. The Grievance Coordinator previously reported that some officers do
not respond to grievances through the Securus system and, as a result, there is no documentation
of a response to some grievances. This appears to be a significant problem. During this reporting
period there appeared to be some improvement until September. The timeliness of responses is
also an issue. Standard grievances are supposed to receive a response within 7 days. Emergency
and medical grievances are supposed to receive a response in 24 hours. The chart below reports
the findings for late and no responses.
Number No Response Late Late Late

Assigned Response Response Response
Standard Medical Emergency
June 57 9 (1 medical) 6 3 14
July 119 10 (2 medical) 19 3 31
August 89 2 3 7 22
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September 123 28 (2 2 9 9
emergency, 4
medical)
In the review of grievances and responses for the month of August, it appears that many of the
emergency grievances were not emergencies. It will be important to educate the inmates on what
constitutes an emergency so that true emergencies aren’t overlooked among the many emergency
grievances. There appeared to be some improvement in September in this area. The Grievance
Coordinator has also suggested that a timely response to emergency grievances could be better
ensured if the system had an alert signal for emergency grievances. The Grievance Coordinator
works regular business hours and will not see an emergency grievance submitted in the evening
or on the weekend until the next business day.
Although the new system should ensure responses, there needs to be some training on what
constitutes a grievance as opposed to a request, what is an adequate response, oversight to
determine that promised actions are taken and then some quality assurance to check the adequacy
of responses. It has been previously reported that one concern is grievances being denied as not a
grievance when they actually are grievances. As reported in the 14th Monitoring Report, in
February 25% of grievances were denied as not being a grievance; in March, 33%. This
increased dramatically in April to 57% and in May to 64%. The percentage has dropped during
this reporting period with 48% in June, 35% in July, 49% in August, and 36% in September. The
Quality Assurance Officer and the Grievance Coordinator reviewed this issue during this
reporting period and a review of the grievances for August indicates improvement. There are still
some grievances that were denied as non-grievable but in fact were. This included issues of
alleged over-detention, failure to get prescribed medications, missing money, and failure to get
an approved special diet. Another example of a legitimate grievance being denied because it was
said to be a request was a grievance regarding not getting medications. This was denied as being
a request, not a grievance. Although a request for some items might be simply a request; a
complaint that prescribed and needed medications were not being provided would constitute a
grievance.
There are still some grievances where the adequacy of the response needs improvement but this
appears to be improving. There were still a few responses stating that the officer “will look into
it.” There is no way of knowing whether the promised action was completed. When possible, it
would be better to address the grievance and then report what was done. There was one where
the response was “resolved.” One troubling area is the issue of alleged missing or the wrong
laundry being returned. The response is routinely, “your laundry did come back” or “did not get
mixed up.” There should be some inquiry as to whether an inmate has clothing or clothes that fit
and in the long term, a system for tracking laundry. The new grievance policy requires that the
Quality Assurance Officer do a monthly audit of grievances and responses to determine the
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timeliness and appropriateness of the responses. This has not been implemented yet but should
provide some oversight in this area.
As mentioned, a number of medical grievances had no or late responses in the system. Medical
and mental health related grievances are triaged by the HSA. A review of the HSA’s grievance
file indicates that medical and mental health related grievances are responded to in a timely
manner, and when it appears to be an emergency, the response is immediate. However, for the
period covered by this site visit, the grievance file/system indicates that there were 7 medical
grievances during this period that were never responded to and 22 medical grievances that were
responded to but not in a timely manner (i.e., the response was not within 24 hours). Since the
reason(s) for this inconsistency between the file maintained by the HSA and the file/system
maintained by the grievance coordinator is unclear, the HSA and the grievance coordinator
should meet in an effort to identify and address the problem(s).
In addition, although a file of medical and mental health grievances and written responses is
maintained by the HSA, there is still no attached documentation of a final resolution of each
matter (i.e., whether or not the response to the grievance actually resolved the grievance matter).
Therefore, such documentation of resolution must be added to the records maintained by the
HSA.
72. The grievance system must accommodate prisoners who have physical or cognitive
disabilities, are illiterate, or have LEP, so that these prisoners have meaningful access to the
grievance system.
Non-Compliant
The grievance policy requires that if there are cognitive or communication barriers, the Detention
Officer refers the issue to the Area Supervisor for communication assistance or problem
resolution. Under this system non-English speaking persons and persons with disabilities would
still require the intervention of an officer which is not ideal but at least there is a specified means
to address this issue. There is no indication that this provision of the policy is being implemented
or that inmates have been informed of this option. An inmate on B-4 who stated he was unable to
work the kiosk asked a Detention Officer for assistance but had not received assistance. He was
recently booked, his medication had been changed and he was having trouble with his
medications. Prisoners are assisting one another but that carries the risk of them accessing and
using another prisoner’s PIN number in addition to the potential of having to disclose private
information. This may inhibit the use of the grievance system and also allows access to the
prisoner’s funds.
The Securus system should at some point be programmed to include the most common foreign
languages.
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73. The County must ensure that all current and newly admitted prisoners receive
information about prison rules and procedures. The County must provide such information
through an inmate handbook and, at the discretion of the Jail, an orientation video, regarding the
following topics: understanding the Jail’s disciplinary process and rules and regulations;
reporting misconduct; reporting sexual abuse, battery, and assault; accessing medical and mental
health care; emergency procedures; visitation; accessing the grievance process; and prisoner
rights. The County must provide such information in appropriate languages for prisoners with
LEP.
Non-Compliant
The inmate handbook, which is given to all detainees during the booking process, is out of date
and is not available in Spanish or any other language. This shortcoming has been brought to the
attention of the HCSO since the very first Monitoring Report. Over the past five years, various
command staff were assigned the task of updating the handbook, but it was never accomplished.
The new Jail Administrator is aware of the problem and has now assumed responsibility for
completion of the project.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF SEGREGATION
In order to ensure compliance with constitutional standards and to prevent unnecessary harm to
prisoners, the County must develop and implement policies and procedures to limit the use of
segregation. To that end, this Agreement imposes the following restrictions and requirements:
74. Within 8 hours of intake, prisoners in the booking cells must be classified and housed in
more appropriate long-term housing where staff will provide access to exercise, meals, and other
services.
Non-Compliant
The Jail System is in compliance with the requirement that newly arrested inmates must be
processed through Booking within eight hours. However, it is not in compliance that those
individuals are actually classified in that time frame. As noted above, the Classification log for
August indicates that eleven inmates were classified two days or more after booking, up to
eleven days. The explanation is that they are moved and then are lost in the system for some
time. It is also clear from the incident reports that Classification does not consistently provide
24/7 coverage and so cannot be classifying all individuals within eight hours. Inmates should not
be moved before they are classified. They may be moved to Intake Orientation Housing if further
observation (or COVID precautions) require but they should still be seen by Classification.
Incoming individuals are moved out the holding cells and placed in Intake/Orientation Housing,
which most recently was changed from C-2 to B-4. However, at least two incident reports
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indicate that officers moved inmates to B-4 who were not incoming inmates. (IR #211229 and
211383)
The reason that this paragraph was downgraded from Partial Compliance to Non-Compliant in
the 14th Monitoring Report is because, throughout the five years that the Settlement Agreement
has been in effect, inmates have routinely been housed in Booking holding cells for extended
periods of time. Various excuses have been offered to explain why, including locks that don’t
work, and a lack of lockdown/confinement space. Most recently it was because of COVID 19
quarantine and separation requirements. Regardless, during the October remote site visit it was
determined that eight inmates were being housed in Booking holding cells. Inmates housed in
eight hour holding cells do not have access to video visitation services or outside recreation.
They are simply let out of their cells periodically in order to shower and make phone calls.
At present, some new admissions for whom ‘appropriate long term housing’ would be a mental
health unit are not moved to more appropriate long term housing. This is because there is no
mental health unit; there is no unit that even approximates ‘appropriate’ for such new
admissions; and those who are most unstable and unpredictable are likely to end up being placed
in segregation, which is clearly not appropriate housing. However, once the mental health unit
becomes operational, this should all change; it will be possible to immediately place seriously
mentally ill detainees in more appropriate housing, directly from intake Mental health and
classification staff have been working out the details for how this will be accomplished.
75. The County must document the placement and removal of all prisoners to and from
segregation.
Partial Compliance
Segregation logs submitted for the recent site visits reflect better record keeping than had been
maintained in the past, but there were inconsistencies noted between files from the WC as
compared to the RDC. Command staff need to set and enforce uniform procedures as well as
standardized forms and documentation throughout the Jail System.
The Segregation Log now has a column to list the charge against an inmate, when he was placed
in segregation, when a disciplinary hearing was held and when the inmate was returned to
general population and to what location. The WC appears to routinely include the charge and
usually indicates the date of a disciplinary hearing and the number of days imposed; RDC does
not. During the current site visit it was learned that RDC had discontinued including disciplinary
segregation in the Segregation Log. Because of the shortage of bed space, discipline less often
includes segregation but these still need to be included in the Segregation Log. This was clarified
with staff. The Monitoring Team has recommended that the log include the date of the most
recent seven-day review so that compliance with that policy requirement can be tracked.
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76. Qualified Mental Health Professionals must conduct mental health rounds at least once a
week (in a private setting if necessary, to elicit accurate information), to assess the mental health
status of all prisoners in segregation and the effect of segregation on each prisoner’s mental
health, in order to determine whether continued placement in segregation is appropriate. These
mental health rounds must not be a substitute for treatment.
Partial Compliance
Mental health staff continue to perform weekly rounds for detainees who are being held in
segregation. When indicated, staff offers mental health services to a detainee who is not already
on the mental health caseload. When indicated, staff makes available adjustments in the
treatment that is being provided to a detainee who is already on the mental health caseload, but
however currently (i.e., until the mental health unit becomes operational), available adjustments
in treatment may be far less than what the detainee requires.
As has been noted in prior reports, the long-standing issue has been the failure to develop and
implement a formal mechanism whereby any findings from these weekly mental health rounds
(such as a deterioration in a detainees mental health status) can be shared with security staff
responsible for the placement in and removal of detainees from segregation and thereby possibly
have an impact on any decisions made by security staff regarding the continuation or termination
of a detainee’s placement in segregation. Then, even after the development and approval of a
classification policy that would establish such a mechanism (seven-day reviews), there was an
unexplained delay in implementing the policy. The seven-day review process has now been
implemented. (See paragraph 42 and 77(i) for additional information). It should be noted
however that while awaiting the implementation of that policy, In the context of that working
relationship, increased attention was beginning to be paid to some of the more seriously
mentally ill detainees who are being held in segregation and in the context of that working
relationship, mental health and classification also developed an understanding about and moved
towards the development of a policy and procedures for how detainees who are appropriate for
transfer from segregation to the mental health unit (once the unit is operational) will be identified
and managed.
77. The County must develop and implement restrictions on the segregation of prisoners with
serious mental illness. These safeguards must include the following:
a. All decisions to place a prisoner with serious mental illness in segregation
must include the input of a Qualified Mental Health Professional who has
conducted a face-to-face evaluation of the prisoner in a confidential setting, is
familiar with the details of the available clinical history, and has considered
the prisoner’s mental health needs and history.
b. Segregation must be presumed contraindicated for prisoners with serious
mental illness.
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c. Within 24 hours of placement in segregation, all prisoners on the mental

health caseload must be screened by a Qualified Mental Health Professional to
determine whether the prisoner has serious mental illness, and whether there
are any acute mental health contraindications to segregation.
d. If a Qualified Mental Health Professional finds that a prisoner has a serious
mental illness or exhibits other acute mental health contraindications to
segregation, that prisoner must not be placed or remain in segregation absent
documented extraordinary and exceptional circumstances (i.e. for an
immediate and serious danger which may arise during unusual emergency
situations, such as a riot or during the booking of a severely psychotic,
untreated, violent prisoner, and which should last only as long as the
emergency conditions remain present).
e. Documentation of such extraordinary and exceptional circumstances must be
in writing. Such documentation must include the reasons for the decision, a
comprehensive interdisciplinary team review, and the names and dated
signatures of all staff members approving the decision.
f. Prisoners with serious mental illness who are placed in segregation must be
offered a heightened level of care that includes the following:
i. If on medication, the prisoner must receive at least one daily visit from a
Qualified Medical Professional.
ii. The prisoner must be offered a face-to-face, therapeutic, out-of-cell
session with a Qualified Mental Health Professional at least once per
week.
iii. If the prisoner is placed in segregation for more than 24 hours, he or she
must have his or her case reviewed by a Qualified Mental Health
Professional, in conjunction with a Jail physician and psychiatrist, on a
weekly basis.
g. Within 30 days of the Effective Date of this Agreement, A Qualified Mental
Health Professional will assess all prisoners with serious mental illness housed
in long-term segregation. This assessment must include a documented
evaluation and recommendation regarding appropriate (more integrated and
therapeutic) housing for the prisoner. Prisoners requiring follow-up for
additional clinical assessment or care must promptly receive such assessment
and care.
h. If a prisoner on segregation decompensates or otherwise develops signs or
symptoms of serious mental illness, where such signs or symptoms had not
previously been identified, the prisoner must immediately be referred for
appropriate assessment and treatment by a Qualified Mental Health
Professional. Any such referral must also result in a documented evaluation
and recommendation regarding appropriate (more integrated and therapeutic)
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housing for the prisoner. Signs or symptoms requiring assessment or

treatment under this clause include a deterioration in cognitive, physical, or
verbal function; delusions; self-harm; or behavior indicating a heightened risk
of suicide (e.g., indications of depression after a sentencing hearing).
i. The treatment and housing of prisoners with serious mental illness must be
coordinated and overseen by the Interdisciplinary Team (or Teams), and
guided by formal, written treatment plans. The Interdisciplinary Team must
include both medical and security staff, but access to patient healthcare
information must remain subject to legal restrictions based on patient privacy
rights. The intent of this provision is to have an Interdisciplinary Team serve
as a mechanism for balancing security and medical concerns, ensuring
cooperation between security and medical staff, while also protecting the
exercise of independent medical judgment and each prisoner’s individual
rights.
j. Nothing in this Agreement should be interpreted to authorize security staff,
including the Jail Administrator, to make medical or mental health treatment
decisions, or to overrule physician medical orders.
Non-Compliant
Regarding 77(a), at present, there is no participation by a QMHP in the decision to place
someone with serious mental illness in segregation and there is no policy that would address this
provision. As noted in prior monitoring reports, this provision applies to all detainees who are
already on the mental health caseload. It also applies to those who are not already on the mental
health caseload but their behavior could reasonably lead security staff to suspect that they might
be suffering from a mental illness.
The mental health assessment performed in connection with security’s review of a detainee’s
incident(s) should be performed by a mental health clinician who is NOT the detainee’s primary
therapist, in order to avoid complicating the treatment process. The assessment should be
focused on the following:
• Whether or not the detainee’s mental status is such that he/she cannot credibly participate
in the disciplinary review process or classification process
• Whether or not the detainee’s infraction/behavior is actually a symptom(s) of or the result
of his/her mental illness
• Given the detainee’s mental status, whether or not the detainee is actually able to learn
anything (or otherwise benefit) from being placed in segregation
• Whether or not placement of the detainee in segregation is likely to be harmful to the
detainee/cause further deterioration of his/her mental status
• Whether or not, given the detainee’s mental illness and current mental health status, there
is an intervention that is more appropriate than placement in segregation, such as altering
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the detainee’s mental health treatment plan and/or a punishment that doesn’t include
placement in segregation
The exception to this policy would be detainees who will be housed on the mental health unit. If
a detainee on the mental health unit commits an infraction, the treatment team (which includes
security staff) will have the responsibility and authority to decide what should be done, the
team’s decision should be documented in the detainee’s medical records, and an emergency
treatment plan should be generated to further document the team’s decision.
Regarding 77 (b) given the number of individuals with serious mental illness in segregation and
the lack of process surrounding their placement and continued placement, it cannot be said that
segregation of individuals with serious mental illness is contraindicated. As has been noted in
each prior report, there are detainees with serious mental illness housed on the segregation unit
and held in segregation in the isolation sections of other units. Housing in segregation can and
has led to decompensation of those with mental illness. It is anticipated that the program design
for the mental health unit will be such that these detainees can be moved to the mental health unit
once it is operational.
Regarding 77 (c) at present, individuals on the mental health caseload are not being screened
within 24 hours of being placed in segregation. In fact, mental health staff are not even notified
when a detainee is placed in segregation, even when the detainee is known to be on the mental
health caseload. As explained in prior reports, mental health staff review the housing location of
those on the mental health caseload to determine if someone has been moved to segregation.
Regarding 77 (d) and (e) As noted in paragraphs 77(a) and 77(c), the mental health staff are not
being offered the opportunity to assess any detainees prior to their placement in segregation.
Therefore, the security policy and procedures that would address this provision must be
developed and implemented.
Security staff are aware of the fact that there are seriously mentally ill detainees being held in
segregation. However, there is no specific documentation regarding the ‘extraordinary and
exceptional circumstances’ that have required their placement in segregation. In addition, the
placement of these detainees in segregation has not been short term. Furthermore, there is only
one situation within the last two years where an individualized plan was developed to get a
detainee out of segregation as quickly as possible.
Although the opening of the mental health unit will provide a more appropriate housing option
for seriously mentally ill detainees who are currently placed in segregation, it will still be
important to develop and implement policies and procedures that would address this provision.
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Regarding 77(f)(i) as part of medication pass, the nurses offer daily visits to detainees being held
in segregation who are on medication. However, as noted in other sections of this report, there
are times when nurses are attempting to pass medication that they are unable to actually even see
some detainees due to the fact that there are not enough security staff available to support the
medication pass function.
Regarding 77(f)(ii) detainees on the mental health caseload who are being held in segregation do
have therapeutic sessions with a QMHP, but due to the shortage of mental health staff, these
sessions are not consistently scheduled on a weekly basis. Then, due to the shortage of security
staff, the therapeutic sessions that are scheduled do not always occur. There are times when this
is all further complicated by problems with the physical plant (for example, cell doors that don’t
lock, which makes it virtually impossible for security staff to assure the safety of the mental
health staff who were scheduled to come on the unit) and although such cancelled sessions are
rescheduled, this can take a while due to the shortage of mental health staff. In addition, when
scheduled sessions do occur, due to the shortage of security staff they are often not out-of-cell
sessions, but rather sessions held at the detainee’s cell door.
Regarding 77(f)(iii) as noted in paragraph 44(a), a QMHP makes weekly rounds for all detainees
being held in segregation, during which each detainee’s mental status and need for mental health
services is assessed. However, as has been repeatedly noted in prior reports, there is no on-site
jail medical physician or psychiatrist. The responsibilities that might be assumed by such
physicians are assumed by a medical/primary care nurse clinician/practitioner and a psychiatric
nurse clinician/practitioner, both of whom have physician collaborators. Therefore, the parties
need to come to some sort of agreement about how this provision will be addressed.
Regarding 77(g) all detainees with serious mental illness housed in long-term segregation have
been assessed by a QMHP, but to date, there has been no appropriate housing for such detainees
that could be recommended based on those assessments. However, as noted in prior reports and
in paragraph 77(b) of this report, it is anticipated that the new mental health unit will provide
appropriate alternative housing for this population, at which point this provision can be more
fully addressed.
Why the development of a mental health unit is required in order to address the needs of the
seriously mentally ill detainee population and comply with this provision and many of the other
provisions of this agreement has been outlined in prior reports. The various issues that need to
be addressed in order to get to the point where the mental health unit becomes operational have
also been outlined in prior reports. Therefore, all of the above noted will not be outlined again
here, and instead, a status update is offered.
The planning process for the mental health unit is well underway, and it is clear that information
provided by the consultant obtained by the monitor and the information obtained during the
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virtual site visit to a well-established jail mental health unit helped focus the planning process.
There is a fully interdisciplinary planning team for the mental health unit. The team meets on a
monthly basis, with full participation; and more detailed planning goes on in between the
monthly meetings. Based upon a review of the meeting minutes and interviews conducted
during the site visit, critical operational policies and procedures are being finalized; the clinical
program/menu of therapeutic interventions is being more fully developed, designed to meet the
needs of the population that is expected to be housed on the unit, and a staffing plan has been
finalized, including medical and mental health staff (a contract that includes additional mental
health staff has been approved by the County). The planning process has not yet included any
consideration for therapeutic housing for women who will not have access to the MHU.
Initially, the plan was to have designated security staff and supervisory security staff for the
MHU. However, given the shortage of security staff, the current plan (which is already
underway) is to provide additional mental health training to 25 security officers (phase one of the
training has occurred), which will allow for more flexibility with assignments to the MHU on
any given shift, and then to eventually provide this additional training to all security officers,
which will allow for even greater flexibility with shift assignments to the MHU. It should be
noted however that although this approach does help to assure security coverage for the MHU
despite the shortage of security staff, not having security officers who are fully designated to
work on the MHU does mean that there will not be a set of security officers who will benefit
from the type of on-the-job training that will come with consistent placement on the MHU.
Finally, it is anticipated that finalized written documents concerning most of the above (for
example, policies and procedures, menu of treatment services available, and the security staff
training program) will soon be completed and submitted to the monitor.
The renovation of the space for the mental health unit is also well underway. The MHU
planning team did have an opportunity to provide input into how the space would be renovated in
order to make it as usable for this purpose as possible, and at the time of the site visit, a full
review of the final stages of the renovation was about to occur. This input had previously been
given but not incorporated into the renovation process. The new Jail Administrator ensured that
this renewed input was incorporated. A projected date for completion of the renovations was not
provided, but it was generally anticipated that the space might be available within the next
couple months but will not be operated as an MHU until additional mental health staff have been
hired (the positions are posted). Even when the space becomes available, the unit cannot be
opened until sufficient mental health staff are approved and hired, and sufficient security staff
have been identified and fully trained. In addition, it should be noted that although still off in the
future, a mental health unit is in the first phase of the County’s plan to build a new jail, and so
hopefully, lessons learned while operating a mental health unit in the repurposed space at RDC
can help inform the design of the proposed MHU for the new jail.
Regarding 77(h) when it has been discovered that a detainee’s mental health status has
deteriorated while being held in segregation, this has usually been discovered by mental health
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staff during weekly segregation rounds or during an individual session with a detainee. Nursing
staff have also identified such detainees during their weekly segregation rounds or during
medication pass. It does not appear that security staff identify such deteriorating detainees. The
reason(s) for this is unclear, and so this issue requires further assessment and then the
development of a corrective action plan. During the course of such an assessment, a lack of focus
on this issue by security staff and/or the need for additional mental health training for security
staff should be considered as possible contributing factors.
When it has been found that a detainee’s mental health status has deteriorated while being held in
segregation, mental health staff assess additional mental health treatment needs. If the detainee is
already on the mental health caseload, any indicated changes to his/her treatment plan are made
(when an ‘indicated’ treatment option is not currently available at the facility, the best available
option is employed) and if the detainee is not already on the mental health caseload, he/she is
added to the caseload and an appropriate treatment plan is developed. Although this is
documented in a detainee’s medical records, it is not consistently documented in the records of
segregation review meetings.
See paragraphs 76 and 77(a) with regard to the implementation of policy/mechanisms whereby
mental health staff would have input into housing decisions being made for mentally ill detainees
who are being held in segregation, including those who have deteriorated while being held in
segregation. Ideally, the implementation of that policy will also help to establish an improved
working relationship between classification, security staff responsible for disciplinary review and
segregation review, and mental health staff, whereby appropriate housing for any given detainee
who has deteriorated while being held in segregation can be discussed and addressed at any time
(not just during a regularly scheduled meeting), especially when the deterioration is severe
enough that the need for action has become urgent.
If a detainee’s deterioration in mental status is such that the detainee is suicidal, alternative
housing/placement is available in the form of suicide watch in a suicide-resistant cell. However,
as noted in prior reports and in other sections of this report, until the planned mental health unit
is operations, there is no appropriate, alternative housing/placement for other acutely mentally ill
and unstable detainees.
Regarding 77 (i) during the June site visit, it at least appeared that a mechanism for
interdisciplinary review of detainees who are being held in segregation was finally being
implemented. Essentially, based on a review of documentation forwarded to the monitoring
team, there is now a seven-day review by security, classification and mental health, in the form
of a joint MAC (Medical Administration Committee)/IDT (Interdisciplinary Team)/SEG
(Segregation) review meeting. However, although it appears that each detainee is discussed, the
documentation simply indicated that the detainee’s behavior (a product of the detainee’s mental
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illness) was such that he couldn’t be removed from segregation and housed in general
population.
As noted in various sections of the Settlement Agreement, no seriously mentally ill detainee
should be held in long-term segregation. Even placement in short-term segregation should only
be for some documented, extraordinary reason and when a seriously mentally ill detainee is
being held in segregation, there must be an interdisciplinary plan developed for removing
him/her from segregation as quickly as possible. The above-described review documentation
does not reflect compliance with any of these provisions or principles that underlie the need for
an interdisciplinary review of seriously mentally ill detainees being held in segregation. More
specifically, there was no indication of the impact, if any, of segregation on the detainee’s mental
status, there was no indication of whether or not the detainee even understood why he/she was
placed in segregation, and so ultimately, there was no sense obtainable from the documentation
whether placement in segregation was helpful or harmful to the detainee. The seven-day review
documents/forms do not include a plan for removal of each detainee from segregation (even such
as altering the approach to treating an unstable detainee in an effort to better stabilize the
detainee, or identifying an alternative “safe” but less restrictive placement for a vulnerable
detainee) or some explanation as to why an implementable plan cannot be developed (for
example, the absence of a mental health unit that would be a suitable alternative placement).
Instead, the review documents appear to indicate that segregation is the most appropriate place
for each detainee, and there is not even a discussion about whether or not any adjustments could
or should be made (like more out of cell time or increased access to more services or activities).
There is also no evidence that any effort was made to engage each detainee in the review process
of his/her case, and there was no indication that each detainee had been found to be so
incompetent (due to mental illness, intellectual disability or other cognitive difficulty) that he/she
was unable to credibly participate. In addition, for any of the detainees who had refused
treatment and were considered to be too dangerous to be housed in general population, there was
no discussion about whether or not the degree of danger to others that they posed was enough
that a plan should be made to initiate involuntary treatment.
Regarding 77(j), it does appear that security staff understand that they cannot make mental health
treatment decisions or overrule physician medical orders.
YOUTHFUL PRISONERS
As long as the County houses youthful prisoners, it must develop and implement policies and
procedures for their supervision, management, education, and treatment consistent with federal
law, including the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. Within
six months of the Effective Date of this Agreement, the County will determine where it will
house youthful prisoners. During those six months, the County will consult with the United
States, the monitor of the Henley Young Juvenile Detention Center Settlement Agreement, and
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any other individuals or entities whose input is relevant. The United States will support the
County’s efforts to secure appropriate housing for youthful prisoners, including supervised
release. Within 18 months after the Effective Date of this Agreement, the County will have
completed transitioning to any new or replacement youthful prisoner housing facility.
Except for the three-week placement of a youth under 18 at the Raymond Detention Center
(RDC) as noted in the prior report, there have been no youth placed at RDC since February 2019.
The court may recall the unique circumstances of that youth’s (T.G.) placement but given the
overall nature of the county’s response it is appropriate to rate the status of this item to Sustained
Compliance (vs. “restarting the clock”).
The prior report includes a substantial discussion of potential changes in federal juvenile justice
requirements that may impact future discussion of where the juveniles charged as adults (JCAs)
are held, but there remains a lack of clarity of any intermediate or long-term plan related to
housing JCAs. Henley Young remains the best short-term/intermediate option for holding JCAs,
but the absence of physical plant improvements suggests that the county does not intend that to
be an intermediate or longer-term solution. On the other hand, the County has opted to move
forward with a limited option included in the overall facility Master Plan that does not include
housing JCAs, suggesting that Henley Young does appear to be a longer-term plan. This seeming
lack of an intermediate and/or longer-term plan leaves Henley Young as an “afterthought” in
overall County planning.
The prior report also highlights the concerns expressed by the current Youth Court Judge, Judge
Carlyn Hicks, that housing JCAs with youth under her jurisdiction is contraindicated by state
statutes and the housing complications that result when there are JCA girls as well as Youth
Court girls held at the same time because of limited options to maintain separation between
JCA’s and non-JCA’s. On almost all days between May 15 and September 15 this year, there
was at least one adult court girl in placement, and on 77 of the 124 days (62%) there were both
adult court and youth court girls in the facility. That is a significantly higher percentage of “dual
use” than has been experienced in prior reporting periods. Although the overall number of youth
in placement has stabilized and been reduced, the challenge of appropriately separating youth
court and adult court residents, particularly girls, remains. That challenge has been exacerbated
by staffing shortages that will be discussed later in this report.
Concerns about the length of placements for JCAs at Henley Young remain, although there was
some movement over the last reporting period. In fact, nine youth that had been admitted prior to
this reporting period were released since June, the majority (but not all) released as the result of
turning 18 and transferring to RDC. Of fourteen youth admitted since June, nine remain in
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placement as of the time of this site visit. The slowness of the court process that impacts all
confinement facilities in Hinds County remains a particular concern for youthful offenders.
After noting some progress in the prior report related to the speed of indicting JCA youth, Chart
1 below illustrates the indictment status of youth, with 50% of the total youth placed longer than
90 days still not indicted (note: three youth have been at HY less than 90 days).
CHART 1: HY INDICTMENT STATUS 10.5.21
3, 17%
9, 50%
6, 33%
<90 DAYS > 90 DAYS YES >90 DAYS NO
There are multiple factors that are contributing to court delays, including limited judicial and
judicial support staffing, limited prosecution/public defender staffing, delays in processing
needed evidence at the state level, and others; all of which have been complicated by the effects
of the spread of COVID-19. While not unique to the JCA population, it remains a
recommendation that the court system continue to find ways to expedite court cases. It is true for
both Henley Young and the adult facilities that the average daily population of the facilities is a
function of the number of individuals admitted and their length of stay. It remains likely that the
number of JCAs held, as well as adult inmates, will be reduced as much, if not more, by
shortening the length of stay than may occur through any reduction in admissions. Ultimately
that will have both a fiscal and operational benefit for the overall system.
As of October 5, there were 18 JCAs and no non-JCAs held at Henley Young. Some basic data
includes:
• Sixteen JCAs were male, two were female.
• As noted above the daily roster indicated that only six of the JCAs held for at least 90
days have been indicted.
• In terms of length of stay, the number of days in confinement ranges from 19 to 755, with
three youth being held for over one year.
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• The ages of JCA youth in custody is illustrated in the chart below, showing that one-half
of JCA youth are 17, most of whom will turn 18 before the end of 2021. Depending on
the number of youth admitted to HY, this may portend a further reduction in the overall
JCA population yet this year.
• Chart 3 shows the Average Daily Population (ADP) at Henley Young from June through
September 15.
CHART 2: HY YOUTH AGES 10.5.21
1, 6%
4, 22%
9, 50%
4, 22%
14 15 16 17
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CHART 3: HY ADP JUNE-SEPT 15, 2021

35.0
30.0 1.3
3.3
25.0 1.0 0.7 1.6
1.8
2.1 2.6
20.0 1.0 4.3
1.2 2.0
15.0
22.6
10.0 19.9
17.4 17.7
5.0
0.0
JUNE JULY AUG SEPT*
Non-JCA female 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.6
Non-JCA male 3.3 2.1 4.3 2.6
JCA Female 1.8 1.0 1.2 2.0
JCA male 22.6 19.9 17.4 17.7
JCA male JCA Female Non-JCA male Non-JCA female
Personnel Changes
Key leadership and programming positions are now filled with the start of Ms. Warfield taking
the role of Treatment Director. Mr. Fernandeis Frazier has continued as Executive Director, Ms.
Baldwin as Program Coordinator, and Ms. Foster as Learning/Development Manager. Added to
the on-going leadership provided by Mr. Burnside as Operations Manager and Mr. Dorsey as
Quality Assurance Coordinator, this represents the most complete and stable leadership team that
has been in effect over the course of this agreement. A recent QMHP vacancy on the mental
health treatment was filled quickly, and there have been several recent promotions of in-house
staff to Senior and/or Supervisory Youth Care positions.
Based on multiple conversations with Mr. Frazier, it does seem that he is focused on addressing
many of the challenges facing Henley Young and is taking a proactive approach in appropriate
performance expectations and moving all aspects of the program forward. The more support that
can be given for Director Frazier’s efforts, the better.
The more immediate, and critical, staffing issue remains the large number of vacant Youth Care
Professional (YCP) positions. An organizational outline provided on October 7 shows 18 of 42
YCP positions vacant (42% of currently authorized positions). However, that does not include an
additional seven YCP positions that were recently eliminated to provide funds for a minimal
raise for existing YCP staff. If those positions were included, as was true in the prior report, then
there would in fact be 25 vacant YCP positions, a vacancy rate of a completely unworkable 60%.
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The decision to eliminate needed YCP positions was in part necessitated when the County
decided to raise the pay of adult detention officers without addressing the low pay for YCP staff.
The raise for adult detention officers was done without requiring eliminating vacant adult
detention officer positions, and there has been no indication from the County that the eliminated
YCP positions will be reauthorized in the future or that additional compensation is being
considered for YCP staff beyond the minimal raise resulting from eliminating YCP positions.
This is patently unfair to the YCP staff at Henley Young, and budget reductions (personnel
and/or operational) at Henley Young increase the potential for problems to occur and reduces the
likelihood that conditions of this agreement can be met in the future. The constant “churning” of
YCP staff severely hinders the ability of Henley Young to achieve success in providing adequate
supervision and programming.
It is relevant to note the concerns of Youth Court Judge Carlyn Hicks that she is aware of
situations in which the staff shortage also has a detrimental effect on the Henley Young youth
under her jurisdiction; that the needs for adequate supervision, programming, and safety of youth
Court youth is overwhelmed simply by the need to attend to the much larger number of JCAs.
While those youth are not included in this agreement, they are clearly being monitored under the
SPLC agreement and meeting the requirements of that agreement are equally important as the
County allocates resources.
During the most recent court Status Conference, the County attorney proffered that the YCP
positions were not permanently eliminated, although it remained unclear what their status was.
There was also an indication that some sort of “staffing analysis” was going to be completed
prior to any further action related to Henley Young staffing, but no one has indicated that to be
the case to Mr. Frazier and the county has not provided confirmation as to who is doing any
purported study or a timeline related to such an analysis.
The original configuration and complement of positions for Henley Young is appropriate to
sustain their operations. Therefore, the specific recommendation is that the County restore the
budget for the positions that were eliminated, increase the base pay for YCP staff, and develop a
pay progression system across the board for staff at Henley Young to help recruit and retain
qualified personnel.
If not already clear, being able to meet many of the requirements of this agreement depends on
being able to recruit, train, and retain an adequate number of well-qualified Youth Care
Professional staff as well as successfully filling (and keeping) qualified individuals in key
leadership and program positions.
Physical Plant Changes
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Work on the modular program units has been completed and the units are available for use.
While the units have been used up to two times/week, staffing shortages have prevented
movement to/supervision of youth for programming purposes in those units on any consistent
basis. Staff indicate that the units are much more appropriate for conducting group discussion
and other activities that too often are conducted on the living units. As noted in prior reports, the
actual housing/living units are not properly furnished to make them a suitable space in which to
conduct meaningful youth development activities. The living unit acoustics are worse than
functional, furniture is not movable, and youth not directly participating in a scheduled activity
distract those that are participating.
Additional physical plant changes that have been recommended in the past have not been
addressed, including (1) dealing with limited use of outdoor recreation space related to weather
(e.g., cold, rain, darkness). Whether one of the four new modular “rooms” created can help
address this issue remains to be seen; (2) making changes in the living units to improve acoustics
and furnishings to make those units more “livable” and appropriate for adolescents, particularly
youth placed for long periods of time; and (3) creating more flexible use spaces that can be used
for “cooling off periods” or alternate supervisions spaces so youth can be safely supervised
without having to be placed in confinement for disciplinary purposes. Considerable reference has
been made in prior reports about the importance of making these living unit changes and the
benefit they will bring to overall program operations, including behavior management.
The last report included reference to the “breakdown” of the master controls that allow remote
operation of doors within the facility, requiring that all doors be operated manually. Per Director
Frazier that project has largely been completed, and the system is operational.
For any youthful prisoners in custody, the County must:
78. Develop and implement a screening, assessment, and treatment program to ensure that
youth with serious mental illness and disabilities, including developmental disabilities, receive
appropriate programs, supports, education, and services.
Partial Compliance
Prior reports have outlined the basic screening and mental health services provided for youth at
Henley Young, including the use of initial screening tools (MAYSI-II and interviews conducted
by qualified mental health clinicians), the provision and documentation of one-on-one counseling
and therapeutic services performed by the two qualified mental health practitioners (QMHP), and
the group work and counseling provided by the three (one position currently vacant) Youth
Support Specialists (YSS). At the time of the last report, one of the two QMHPs had just left for
another job, but that position was filled quickly.
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As was expected, Ms. Riddley who had stepped in temporarily to fill the Treatment Coordinator
role did leave, but Director Frazier was able to hire Ms. Carol Warfield, Licensed Counselor, to
fill that role. She began work in August on a full-time basis. The County continues to hold open
a position for a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, and we have had initial discussions about the
need to develop additional resources (most likely on a contractual basis, as needed and/or part-
time regular consultation) with a Licensed Psychologist to assist Ms. Warfield in ensuring that
there is adequate assessment and treatment for youth in care. This may include reinstituting the
use of a strength/needs type assessment that helps identify more detailed elements for a case plan
as well as provide some ideas for how to program for youth more successfully.
Through resources secured by SPLC, Henley Young has engaged some additional technical
assistance from R. Monique Khumalo (f/k/a Marrow), a co-author of the well-recognized Youth
in Custody Practice Model (Georgetown University Center for Juvenile Justice Reform) and
someone with extensive experience applying best practices for working with youth in custody.
That technical assistance is just beginning and should be helpful as Ms. Warfield moves forward
in developing a framework to ensure good assessment and case planning and integrating mental
health and behavioral management components of the program at Henley Young. The frequency
and duration of that technical assistance is not yet finalized.
Ms. Warfield estimated that approximately 75+% of youth are taking some form of psychotropic
medications, suggesting a need for more time provided through the County’s health care contract
in which services are provided by Dr. Bell. She is viewed positively by staff, but her availability
is limited due to the large scope of her responsibilities in other facilities. Again, as Ms. Warfield
can fully assess the need for those services, it may be necessary to advocate for an increase in
that support.
During the period since the last visit, most of the programming provided by the mental health
team members continued, including holding regular treatment team meetings and the provision
of group programming by YSS and the Qualified Mental Health Clinicians (QMHC). The
content of these group programs is appropriate but still evolving as they continue to gather
materials and curriculum to use with youth. Ms. Warfield has focused initial efforts on ensuring
that case plans are individualized and that sufficient documentation is done to capture the work
that is going on. The YSS staff have begun experimenting with different ways to deliver some of
the group programs, hopefully moving forward with increasing the duration of group treatment
programming. Staff did provide some documentation of youth attendance, but issues remain
with attendance and being able to conduct groups in an appropriate environment. Staff shortages
have often resulted in groups either not being conducted or having to be done on the unit. That
said, the general expectation remains that each youth participate in 2-3 group sessions each
week, but those sessions mostly remain noticeably short (i.e., 30 minutes), which is simply not
enough time to achieve any significant results.
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In sum, while efforts by YSS and QMHC staff to implement these group programs are positive,
(1) having to conduct groups on the living units is a significant barrier to effective program
delivery, (2) limiting groups to 30 minutes (staff indicate that previous attempts to run groups
longer led to more behavior issues) reduces the quality of programming, (3) YCP staff could
benefit by learning to help facilitate some of the groups, but they are minimally involved in
doing so at this point; and (4) there is not an overarching program framework into which these
groups “fit” so that all aspects of the facility program work together so as to send a consistent
message to youth.
That programming has been augmented by the activities developed by Ms. Baldwin, the Program
Coordinator. To her credit, Ms. Baldwin has continued to evolve appropriate materials and
curriculum that fit into the Unit Activities included in the daily schedule and are coordinated
with the recently hired Recreation Coordinator. Examples of themes/concepts covered by these
activities include Emotional Intelligence, Understanding/Managing Anger, health and physical
fitness, creative writing, Life Skills, etc. With the support of two recreation staff Ms. Baldwin
seems to have developed a solid plan to engage most of the youth in many of these activities,
although again they are often conducted on the living unit. Attendance seems to have improved
for some of the programs, most likely the result of either identifying more “desirable” activities
and/or providing added incentives for participation. In any case, the daily schedule “on paper”
provides a full day (especially weekdays when school is in session) of a variety of programs for
youth to be involved in. That is less true on weekends or at other times when school is not in
session, and continued documentation of what groups are completed needs to be reviewed by
Director Frazier and Ms. Warfield.
Ms. Baldwin has worked with others to again modify the daily “point” system, primarily by
identifying more specific and observable behaviors that should be recorded. That system has
been in place for about one month and there are varying reactions to it from staff. Some staff
apparently report it to be “more work” to record, while others appreciate the specificity of what
needs to be observed. From an outside viewpoint, given the current makeup of staff and
rotations of staff, developing a system that expects and tracks more specific behaviors is a
positive step and provides a basic framework for an incentive-based system. The “Yes-No”
nature of reporting on a series of behaviors also allows the “scoring” to be done in a way that fits
into a “reward-level” system. Continued work on this system should include: (1) expanding the
number and nature of incentives that youth can earn, (2) adding at least one individualized
weekly goal for each youth that is consistent with their overall treatment plan, and (3) training
staff in how to use the “tool” to help shape youth behaviors rather than view it simply as a
“checklist” to complete at the end of a shift.
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Also on a positive note, the mental health team has continued holding treatment team meetings
regularly, i.e., at this point every Wednesday, focusing on the individual assigned to the various
YSS staff. That team meeting includes the YSS assigned, the assigned QMHP, Mr. Caldwell
from the school program, the youth, and when possible, a YCP staff member. Ms. Warfield’s
commitment to more fully engaging YCP staff members in the treatment team is a positive.
Those meetings have been opened recently (post-covid restrictions) for in-person attendance of a
parent/guardian as well, which is positive. Those team meetings provide an opportunity for all
parties to review the youth’s progress toward meeting treatment goals, set new goals as
appropriate, identify ways in which progress can be supported, answer questions the
parent/guardian may have, and offer the youth an opportunity to provide input on how things are
going at Henley Young.
79. Ensure that youth receive adequate free appropriate education, including special
education.
Partial Compliance
As noted in the previous report, adequately assessing the school program is perhaps the most
challenging aspect of conducting a virtual visit. That said, conversations with the School
Principal, Mr. Caldwell, were positive and reflected a strong and energetic commitment on his
part to continually improve the program for youth. This is reflected in that he reports the two
new teachers brought into the program have been a positive addition to the overall team and his
efforts to better individualize programming for youth. He seemed to be particularly committed to
identifying the older youth who may have a chance to become graduation-eligible before they
turn 18 and leave Henley Young and has apparently identified some form of accelerated credit
track such that there have been a few youth that have made it to being graduation-eligible, and he
is focusing current efforts on those youth that are nearing 18 and may have enough past credits
so an accelerated credit option could work for them. Mr. Caldwell brings a notable increase in
energy and creativity to the program compared to prior years and appears to be ready to “break
down” some of the institutional barriers of Jackson Public Schools to advocate for the youth at
Henley Young.
Subsequent to the initial drafting of this report, one of the teachers at Henley Young is alleged to
have inappropriately touched one of the youth and passed contraband items to him. The incident
was reported to the Sheriff’s Office, and the teacher in question was immediately barred from the
facility and has since been charged. The youth in question has since turned 18 and is now placed
at RDC.
Unfortunately, the described progress remains offset by the challenges created by limited staffing
at Henley Young and the inadequate education space of the facility. The program is further
complicated by the variance between the needs of the Youth Court, short-term youth, and the
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adult court JCAs. While the focus of this Settlement Agreement is on the JCAs, it is important to
remember that the Youth Court youth also need adequate educational programming, which is
difficult to deliver in a “mixed” environment and on such a short-term basis (i.e., 21 days
placement limit).
The staff shortage and challenges of the facility itself has resulted in the unfortunate continuation
of an “alternate day” school program for JCA youth in which one unit of JCAs receive classroom
instruction on one day while youth in the other unit work on the unit with “homework” and other
written materials. Those units alternate on what is simply referred to as an “A/B” schedule, and
there is no way for this to be considered an adequate educational program until all youth receive
the required 27.5 hours/weekly of direct instruction every day.
As noted in the last report, Mr. Caldwell has: (1) continued and hopes to expand the “Safe
Serve” certification program that teaches youth basic skills related to food service, a certification
that they can carry with them going forward if/when the seek employment. Even if that is not
something that comes to fruition in the foreseeable future for youth, the notion that they can
accomplish and be recognized for learning certain new skills is positive for them; (2) reached out
to the community for speakers that can come in and work with youth, especially reinforcing the
importance of an education; (3) worked with the district to provide more Chromebooks for the
fall term, something that can help provide more individualized instruction with access to a
variety of educational software; (4) worked with Director Frazier to increase the wireless
capacity of the facility in the multi-purpose space (so that can be used for education and other
programming), (5) brought Positive Behavior Intervention Supports (PBIS) concepts to the
school program; (6) regularly attended the weekly treatment team meetings for youth, a forum
that helps maintain communication and coordination across the mental health and staff team at
Henley Young; and (7) connected with key leadership in the Jackson Public School (JPS) system
to advocate for support in making improvements to the program at Henley Young (recognizing
that JPS continues to be challenged to meet multiple demands across all its programs/levels).
Finally, as previously reported, unless additional information is provided by the County and
verified by the Monitoring Team, young adults held in the Jackson or Raymond Detention
Center(s) who are legally eligible for continued special education services are not receiving that
support. Whatever progress youth have made in their education program while at Henley Young
stops when they are transferred to RDC which does provide some GED preparation
programming but little else. That fact has, in part, spurred Mr. Caldwell’s strong interest in
accelerating youth’s progress as fast as possible while confined at Henley Young.
80. Ensure that youth are properly separated by sight and sound from adult prisoners.
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As noted earlier, the last youth “aged out” of RDC in February 2019, so as of this report, this
complete separation has been in effect for over two years (with the brief exception for youth T.G.
who was housed at RDC pursuant to a court order noted in the last reporting period).
Transitioning Henley Young to serve these long-term youth has not been without substantial
challenges but remains a significant achievement, even if viewed as a temporary solution.
81. Ensure that the Jail’s classification and housing assignment system does not merely place
all youth in the same housing unit, without adequate separation based on classification standards.
Instead, the system must take into account classification factors that differ even within the youth
sub-class of prisoners. These factors include differences in age, dangerousness, likelihood of
victimization, and sex/gender.
Partial Compliance
There has been no change related to compliance with this requirement although staff purport that
Policies/Procedures have been updated and documentation of classification is occurring. A copy
of the most recent Classification Policy has now been provided along with a copy of the form
used to document the classification information gathered that is intended to guide which of the
JCA housing units the youth is assigned to. While the policy is appropriate and staff purport that
they are considering relevant factors, use of the form to document placement decisions is still not
being done. This then falls under the category of “…if it’s not documented, it didn’t happen,” so
until the use of the form can be observed and/or verified, full compliance is not possible. This
can best be done via an on-site visit.
Note however, that classification at Henley Young is less of an issue than is true at RDC or a
larger facility in that all youth essentially receive the same programming regardless of any
classification. Additionally, Henley Young does have a well-documented process to classify
youth related to levels of precautionary status in the event of suicidal ideation and/or attempts.
That status can range from a low alert status in which staff are to be more aware of a particular
youth’s demeanor/behavior up through the highest level in which there may be one staff member
assigned to always observe/monitor a youth. Appropriately, a youth can be placed on a
precautionary status by a supervisor but only removed from that status by/after consulting a
member of the mental health team.
82. Train staff members assigned to supervise youth on the Jail’s youth-specific policies and
procedures, as well as on age-appropriate supervision and treatment strategies. The County must
ensure that such specialized training includes training on the supervision and treatment of youth,
child and adolescent development, behavioral management, crisis intervention, conflict
management, child abuse, juvenile rights, the juvenile justice system, youth suicide prevention
and mental health, behavioral observation and reporting, gang intervention, and de-escalation.
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Partial Compliance
The Learning and Development Manager, Ms. Jacqueline Foster, began employment with
Henley Young on February 1, 2021. Since that time Ms. Foster has continued to be active in
scheduling and conducting trainings to help ensure that all staff receive adequate basic training in
Policies/Procedures, Crisis Prevention Institute (CPI) (basic and refresher), Suicide Prevention
(Basic and Refresher), and CPR. COVID-19 precautions made some of the group training,
particularly of new staff, more difficult and only recently was a full new YCP “group” training
completed. Additional training has been in smaller groups and by Ms. Foster being proactive in
providing training even on a one-to-one basis as needed. Director Frazier and Ms. Foster also
appear to promote a good team approach to training, including (1) having Mr. Burnside (the
Operations Manager) in conducting the CPI training (he is certified to lead that training), which
provides an opportunity for that training to be consistent with facility-specific
policies/procedures; (2) utilizing Ms. Andrea Baldwin, the Program Coordinator, in working
with staff to help outline what programs are being developed for youth and what role YCP staff
can play in supporting those programs; and (3) utilizing the expertise of Ms. Warfield and Ms.
Frelix, QMHP, in training related to youth development and suicide prevention.
Ms. Foster reports that Director Frazier has been involving her in in weekly consultation calls
with Anne Nelson, the Monitor for the SPLC agreement, and that in those discussions there are
additional training needs identified, for example working to improve report writing skills for
identified staff members who can benefit from that support. Additionally, expanding training
opportunities through on-line resources could be done despite the challenges of the poor network
services/access at Henley Young.
Salary challenges aside, discussions with both Mr. Frazier and Ms. Foster reinforced the notion
that the Youth Care Professional (YCP) position needs to be seen and reinforced as a profession
defined by the knowledge, skills, and abilities (in essence the tools) to work proactively with
youth to prevent and successfully respond to behavior challenges youth may present. The re-
written job description for that position noted in the prior report signified a step forward in how
that job is perceived and what can be expected of those that take the YCP position. Hopefully,
that is followed up by an increase in pay and opportunities for advancement.
Ms. Foster also provided a copy of the On-the-Job Training (OJT) form that will be used going
forward to identify some of the basic required skills for duties related to Supervision of Youth,
Central Control operations, Booking/Intake procedures, and Transporting Residents. Apparently
use of that form to document training has been inconsistent over the recent months, and it is
recommended that Ms. Foster carefully monitor its utilization and completion in a timely
manner. The overall structure of the basic training program and expectations seems appropriate
but getting new staff on board has been difficult which means that getting a solid complement of
well-trained staff on the units has been even more difficult. Having new staff with limited
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training covering a lot of the shifts/units is a recipe for problems. Importantly, that also does not
begin to address the need for the beyond basic training components outlined in this agreement.
83. Specifically prohibit the use of segregation as a disciplinary sanction for youth.
Segregation may be used on a youth only when the individual’s behavior threatens imminent
harm to the youth or others. This provision is in addition to, and not a substitute, for the
provisions of this Agreement that apply to the use of segregation in general. In addition:
a. Prior to using segregation, staff members must utilize less restrictive techniques such as
verbal de-escalation and individual counseling, by qualified mental health or other staff
trained on the management of youth.
b. Prior to placing a youth in segregation, or immediately thereafter, a staff member must
explain to the youth the reasons for the segregation, and the fact that the youth will be
released upon regaining self-control.
c. Youth may be placed in segregation only for the amount of time necessary for the
individual to regain self-control and no longer pose an immediate threat. As soon as
the youth’s behavior no longer threatens imminent harm to the youth or others, the
County must release the individual back to their regular detention location, school or
other programming.
d. If a youth is placed in segregation, the County must immediately provide one-on-one
crisis intervention and observation.
e. The County must specifically document and record the use of segregation on youth as
part of its incident reporting and quality assurance systems.
f. A Qualified Medical Professional, or staff member who has completed all training
required for supervising youth, must directly monitory any youth in segregation at least
every fifteen (15) minutes. Such observation must be documented immediately after
each check.
g. Youth may not be held in segregation for a continuous period longer than one (1) hour
during waking hours. If staff members conclude that a youth is not sufficiently calm to
allow a break in segregation after one hour, they must contact a Qualified Mental
Health Professional. The Qualified Mental Health Professional must assess the youth
and determine whether the youth requires treatment or services not available in the Jail.
If the youth requires mental health services that are not provided by the Jail, the
Qualified Mental Health Provider must immediately notify the Jail Administrator and
promptly arrange for hospitalization or other treatment services.
h. If a youth is held in segregation for a continuous period longer than two (2) hours, Staff
Members must notify the Jail Administrator.
i. Any notifications or assessments required by this paragraph must be documented in the
youth’s individual record.
Partial Compliance
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Although issues remain, it is reasonable to return this rating to Partial Compliance, in large part
as the result of a notable decrease in the overall use of what is called Due Process Confinements
(DPC). As part of the monitoring process, Henley Young staff provide a log of these
confinements and the Incident Reports associated with them. The log shows the use of DPC only
once in June, six times in July, and once in August. There were no DPCs reported for the first
half of September (the end date for which information was requested). This is a considerable
reduction from levels reported in the prior reporting period and is hopefully reflective of two
things: (1) better staff intervention in preventing the kinds of incidents that result in the use of
DPC, and/or (2) some of the youth that were frequently involved in incidents in the earlier period
have been released from custody/transferred to RDC after turning 18. In any case, this is a
positive step forward.
Two issues remain that need continued work and monitoring: (1) the period of DPCs in almost
all cases was for 24 hours, which is within the time frame of the SPLC agreement but well
beyond the one-hour limit of this Agreement; (2) there was an unreported number of
administrative confinements in which youth are confined to their rooms for an extended period
of time (most often as the result of a fight of some kind) pending development of a safety plan in
which youth can be returned to their normal status on the unit; and (3) staff can implement a
Behavior Management Isolation (BMI) confinement as may be necessary to separate youth for a
brief period of time or allow a youth time to calm down after an incident. The Incident Report
form does provide for documentation of whether a BMI is used, but there is no central log of
those brief confinements. Staff reference one incident over the summer in which Administrative
Confinement was used, but in the absence of documentation it is difficult to confirm that was the
only time. Again, the limited number of staff and the inflexibility of the facility are likely
contributors to a decision to keep youth in their room under this administrative confinement time
period.
The Monitor’s request has included a request for Due Process Confinements, but future requests
will be for documentation of any room confinement, regardless of what it is called, that is
implemented for more than the one hour.
Prior reports also note that staff indicate that during this period of confinement youth are allowed
out of their cells for specific programs and activities (e.g., school, groups, meals, recreation) and
in fact there are some Observation Reports that reflect some limited times youth have been out of
their room during this period. However, the accuracy of those reports remains questionable.
More specific information related to each of the sub-items in the requirement are addressed as
follows:
• Section a: (1) Policies and training do reinforce that staff should be utilizing less
restrictive techniques, and undoubtedly there are situations in which that is done properly.
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In fact, based on conversations with leadership, there are some staff who do a good job
observing and intervening in situations, reducing the likelihood of an incident that
requires the use of segregation. Since more serious incidents are prevented, it is not
possible to fully evaluate how frequently staff prevent incidents, but it is fair to suggest
they are in Partial Compliance at times; and (2) Situations that end up in written Incident
Reports and ultimately the use of confinement rarely document substantive efforts to use
verbal or other interventions beyond something along the line of “…directed youth A to
do ….” Or “…Told youth A to stop….”
• Section b: Approved Policies/Procedures are consistent with explaining to youth the
reason for segregation, but it is difficult to tell whether staff follow through on this
requirement. There is an expectation that some additional documentation (beyond any
Incident Report) be made in the Unit Log, but those will have to be inspected on an on-
site vs. virtual visit to determine whether/how consistently that documentation is done.
• Section c: Approved Policies/Procedures are consistent with this requirement that youth
be held in segregation only as long as it takes for the individual to regain self-control, and
there are some notes in Observation records and the confinement log that there are, in
fact, times when a shorter length of time is used. To properly track compliance with this
item, future requests will include a log of any administrative-type confinements,
specifically those that exceed one hour.
• Section d: It is not clear what constitutes “crisis intervention” for this section, but general
policies and practices do include involving one of the YSS or QMHP staff if the youth is
agitated or evidencing some mental distress. Also, Room Observation logs do seem to be
used routinely when a youth is placed in confinement, albeit there are some concerns
regarding consistent accuracy of the observation times as noted in Section f below.
• Section e: Staff are expected to record the use of segregation/isolation, and Mr. Dorsey
does track it over time. This is information provided to the Monitors prior to the virtual
visit.
• Section f: Observation logs are kept and a sample of them was provided for review. Note
that (1) Policies provide that the log be kept on the door so the time can be noted as the
observation is made, but it is not clear whether that is actually what happens; (2) As
noted above, there are often notations made that are exactly 15 minutes apart, calling into
question the accuracy and reliability of reporting; and (3) The goal for training is that
YCP staff complete their basic training prior to assuming a full role on a shift, but given
staff shortages and turnover, confirmation that this (staff doing the observation have
completed all training) is always the case could not be done. Overall, it seems unlikely
that these logs are documented immediately as required.
• Section g: This section has multiple layers/contingencies designed to limit, if not
eliminate, the use of segregation beyond what may be needed to ensure the immediate
safety of youth and staff. Observations of practices includes:
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o The use of Behavior Management Isolations (BMIs) as a short-term (up to one

hour), immediate response to issues in which some form of separation/segregation
may be required to provide the youth a cooling off period from an incident and
staff time to problem-solve with the youth on how to reintegrate the youth onto
the unit. The most recent Policy/Procedure provided is consistent with the intent
of limiting use of this kind of time out to less than one hour and some of the
records (e.g., Observation Logs, Incident Reports) do seem to reflect that there are
situations in which short-time confinement is used to separate youth. There are a
few notations on Observation Logs that a QMHP is engaged to see or assess the
youth during these periods of confinement. Historically, any checks/assessment
made by YSS/QMHP staff were kept in their records which were not available for
review on a virtual visit.
o There does seem to be good communication between the QMHP staff and the
Executive Director as it relates to youth that might need more intensive mental
health services. The treatment team meetings (each youth is reviewed at least one
every 3 weeks) provide an opportunity to discuss what the youth’s needs are and
whether those needs can be met at Henley Young.
o The intent of the DPI(C) Policy is that during this 24-hour period youth are
allowed out of their room for school and some other programming opportunities.
The Observation Logs have been modified to add a code if the youth is out of
their room, and there are some “out of room” times documented. Practice should
include that staff remind/offer youth the opportunity to participate in appropriate
programming during the shift and make a note to that effect on the Observation
Log along with any note that the youth chose not to come out of their room. That
reminder could be done, for example, at the start of school, after lunch, as
programming is starting, etc. Equally important, absent good documentation that a
youth remaining in their room continuously for more than an hour is their choice
and not one imposed on them, the use of DPI(C)s cannot be in compliance.
Ultimately the goal must be to move away from using room confinement as a
disciplinary tool, but that will require modifications in the facility, improved
staffing, and developing alternative means of responding to incidents.
• Section h: Policies and Procedures should be modified to reflect the requirement that
youth held in segregation longer than 2 hours require notification to the Jail
Administrator, and completion of the proper notifications needs to be documented and
made available for monitoring. The most recent policy reflects that the Supervisor is
engaged/involved on BMIs that exceed one hour and that any time longer than two hours
is required the Operations Manager should be notified. Due Process Isolations operate on
a different track, with a Due Process Hearing typically conducted by the Quality
Assurance Manager, but both the Operations Manager and Executive Director are in
receipt of Incident Reports and Due Process Hearing results.
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Facility leadership needs to remain vigilant in ensuring that documentation related to the use of
isolation, both for initial behavioral reasons or disciplinary reasons, is accurately completed and
reviewed and made available for review on subsequent visits. This includes documentation of
whether youth do, in fact, take the opportunity to be out of their room during any disciplinary
period and whether required mental health checks are being made.
84. Develop and implement a behavioral treatment program appropriate for youth. This
program must be developed with the assistance of a qualified consultant who has at least five
years of experience developing behavioral programs for institutionalized youth. The Jail’s
behavioral program must include all of the following elements:
a. The behavioral program must include positive incentives for changing youth
behavior, outline prohibited behaviors, and describe the consequences for
prohibited behaviors.
b. An individualized program must be developed by a youth’s interdisciplinary
treatment team, and properly documented in each youth’s personal file.
Documentation requirements must include the collection of data required for
proper assessment and treatment of youth with behavioral issues. For instance,
the County must track the frequency and duration of positive incentives,
segregation, and targeted behaviors.
c. The program must include safeguards and prohibitions on the inappropriate
use of restraints, segregation, and corporal punishment.
Partial Compliance
Although it was not possible to review youth’s point sheets during this offsite visit, the latest
modification of the point sheet that is used by staff to document daily behaviors was provided.
As noted earlier, this most recent modification provides more observable, somewhat less
subjective, measures of behavior for staff to track over the course of a shift and is hopefully a
step forward in helping both staff and youth identify specific desired behaviors. The format is
broken into appropriate time periods/shifts throughout the day, and there is a complementary tool
used for tracking youth’s behaviors in school.
The point sheet does maintain similar incentives as the prior format, although continued work
can be done to expand the type of incentives that youth can earn as a reward. Most of the items
are properly framed in terms of the desired behavior vs. the often more common “do not”
behaviors that one sees in a correctional program, including in many youth correctional
programs. This positive frame is consistent with best practices, as it is often easy for youth to
understand what not to do but substantive behavior change occurs only when they understand
what that means they “should” do.
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Three specific recommendations related to this aspect of the behavioral system remain: (1)
increase and reinforce staff training in how best to use the point tool to shape youth behaviors,
most often by actively engaging youth directly as behaviors are being observed and scored; and
(2) adding one or more individualized goals for each youth that is/are consistent with their
treatment plan, thus making this aspect of the program more integrated with other aspects of the
overall mental health/behavioral program. Reinforcing youth for new and improved behaviors is
critical to successfully gradually shaping behaviors and moving youth closer to a situation in
which they are more proactively involved in managing their own behavior vs. relying on outside
forces/reinforcers; and (3) the format provides for written comments that staff can include to
further explain what they observed, both positively and negatively. A simple “No” for example
tells the youth little about what they did wrong” and conversely a simple “Yes” can be reinforced
with additional comments so a youth can understand what needs to be repeated.
The QMHP and YSS staff do maintain and regularly review individualized treatment goals
during treatment team meetings held every three weeks for each youth. That meeting includes
the school principal, when possible, a parent/guardian, and more recently a YCP staff if someone
is available. It is important that a YCP staff member attend when staffing levels permit, and there
has been discussion about the important role they can play in the treatment team. YCP staff are,
in fact, the staff that have the most contact with youth and can be critical in providing input to
the treatment team as well as helping to reinforce treatment goals on a daily basis. YCP
participation in the past has been rather passive, but Ms. Warfield is hoping to gradually train
and support YCP staff to be a more integral part of the discussion going forward. That is a good
step toward more fully integrating treatment goals on a system-wide basis. Those treatment goals
are documented in the youth’s mental health record(s), although review of those records was not
done on this off-site visit.
Discussions over the past few weeks and during this off-site visit with Director Frazier and Ms.
Warfield have reiterated (from last report) that although there are some elements of a behavioral
program partially developed, there is not what could be considered a behavioral treatment
program in place, and they have not engaged sufficient technical assistance to adequately put
together a treatment program. There are competent and committed staff in many of the positions,
and there seems to be mostly appropriate communication across staff. However, there is not an
articulated overarching treatment model/approach that ties together various program elements;
the incentive/point system remains essentially disconnected from treatment goals established for
youth; YCP staff are largely unaware of what the individual youth’s treatment goals are; it
remains difficult to train staff in responding to youth in a consistent and trauma-
informed/preventive approach; and there is no articulated way in which discipline (particularly
the use of DPIs) fit with other treatment elements.
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As it relates to the requirement to develop the program with the assistance of a qualified
consultant, that had simply not been done, albeit there was some technical assistance provided by
both Mr. Leonard Dixon and Ms. Anne Nelsen, the monitors through the SPLC agreement.
Since bringing Ms. Warfield on board there has been some progress, in particular (1) Both Ms.
Nelsen and the juvenile expert of the Monitoring Team (Moeser) have had a number of
discussions with Ms. Warfield and Director Dixon about this component and have provided her
with a number of resource links (written and individual) that she can use to help develop a
coordinated vision for a behavioral program; and (2) As referenced earlier, SPLC has secured
funding to engage Ms. Monique Khumalo, someone who clearly meets the criteria above to
provide some technical assistance for Ms. Warfield and Director Frazier in how to improve the
mental health and behavior management programs, from the point of initial assessment through
implementing various program components. The extent of this technical assistance is limited but
is a good step forward.
Ultimately, the full-time Treatment Coordinator, Ms. Warfield, should be tasked by the
Executive Director to lead a team of staff (e.g., YCP staff, YSS, QMHP, a leadership staff
person, Learning/Development Coordinator, Program Coordinator) to develop a written
Behavior Management plan that weaves together how each of the program elements and roles fit
within a treatment model appropriate for youth held for longer periods of time in a youth facility
such as Henley Young. Progress toward that goal can be assessed over the course of the next 4-6
months.
LAWFUL BASIS FOR DETENTION
Consistent with constitutional standards, the County must develop and implement policies and
procedures to ensure that prisoners are processed through the criminal justice system in a manner
that respects their liberty interests. To that end:
85. The County will not accept or continue to house prisoners in the Jail without appropriate,
completed paperwork such as an affidavit, arrest warrant, detention hold, or judge’s written
detention order. Examples of inadequate paperwork include but are not limited to undated or
unsigned court orders, warrants, and affidavits; documents memorializing oral instructions from
court officers that are undated, unsigned, or otherwise fail to identify responsible individuals and
the legal basis for continued detention or release; incomplete arresting police officer documents;
and any other paperwork that does not establish a lawful basis for detention.
Partial Compliance
As was the case during the previous remote site visits, the quality of the inmate records was
difficult to evaluate during the June 2021 remote site visit. Typically, the Monitoring Team is
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able to review the paper files and determine whether the appropriate paperwork is in the file.
These are too voluminous to have scanned in for review. The documents requested were the
status/summary sheet showing the detention status and the chronology sheet showing the activity
related to the inmate’s status. This was for approximately 30 randomly selected inmate files. In
addition, a selection of grievances and program requests are reviewed for over detention issues
and the status sheets for probation violations are reviewed.
The status sheet is required by policies and procedures and should greatly assist in both the Jail
staff and the Monitors assessment of whether the paperwork supports the booking and ongoing
detention. It is a face sheet that lists each charge and the status of the charge such as whether
there is a bond, an indictment, a next court date, a dismissal etc. It would also list any
detainers/warrants with the jurisdiction and contact information. The status sheets for the
October 2021 site visit continued to have some in the incorrect format and some chrono sheets
that were incomplete. In one case, the face sheet indicated that a hold had been lifted. It had not
and the individual should have been sent to the Brandon jail to complete 90 days there.
Hopefully, this individual will get credit in Brandon for the time he spent in Hinds County. It
continues to be unclear whether sentences are tracked in RDC. This is particularly important in
that it was reported that the JMS system does not accurately track sentences as a result of
different release dates showing on different screens. The WC tracks release dates on a
spreadsheet and reports to Records when an inmate is due to be released. It is unclear if anyone
is tracking release dates for sentenced individuals at RDC. A related concern is that individuals
who have fines and fees are not getting credit towards them when at RDC on a new charge. For
the inmates waiting for a mental health evaluation or commitment, the Court Liaison has started
to keep a tracking log although it is still incomplete. However, it does not currently include the
current status of the individuals who have had a mental health order of some kind. As a result, it
can’t be used at this time to compare to the state hospital list for people currently waiting for a
state hospital bed. This situation needs to be clarified as described below. Once again there
appeared to be individuals believed to be waiting for a state hospital bed that were not on the
state hospital waiting list. However, the use of status sheets and their overall content reflected
significant improvement in this area. The file audits completed during this reporting period
indicate that all of the files had the status sheet.
It should be noted that since monitoring began there has been significant improvement in the
quality of the records, the accuracy of the JMS system, and the presence of paperwork
supporting booking and detention. There continue to be improved systems in place to track
individuals and release them timely. However, a few of the files were missing some orders
supporting detention. One individual was released two months late. The release order was
entered in the system but he was not released until two months later after submitting a program
request asking about his release. Another individual was released a week after the 21 days had
expired on a probation hold. There were no incident reports on these late releases. There
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continues to be some difficulty in locating holds in the system when the hold is placed
subsequent to booking. The records clerks have no way of knowing if a hold has come in. These
holds are identified when the individual is otherwise entitled to release, but this causes some
delay in determining whether the other jurisdiction wants to pick up the individual. Any holds
coming in after booking should be provided to the records clerks to ensure timely release. This
provision will remain in partial compliance until an on-site visit can be completed and the actual
files reviewed.
86. No person shall be incarcerated in the Jail for failure to pay fines or fees in contravention of
the protections of the United States Constitution as set forth and discussed in Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) and Cassibry v. State, 453 So.2d 1298 (Miss. 1984). The County
must develop and implement policies consistent with the applicable federal law and the terms of
this Agreement.
Partial Compliance
This paragraph had been listed as in substantial compliance because even though some unlawful
fines and fees orders were received, there were other charges holding the individual. No one had
been held solely on an unlawful order. It was previously recommended that these orders be
presented for revision even though they weren’t holding the individual. The reason for this was
clearly seen during the June site visit. One individual was entitled to release on his felony charge
but he could not be released because of an unlawful mittimus on fines and fees. These orders
should be corrected so that release is not delayed if release conditions change or the felony
charges are dropped. The County had previously arranged for education of the judges which
should be considered again. It is beneficial to the individual to be able to get credit towards fines
and fees if they are otherwise being held and in getting the orders corrected this should be
specified. At RDC, inmates have not been receiving credit towards fines and fees when they are
otherwise held on a felony. This should be clarified with the judges and credit given. Reportedly,
credit is given for individuals held at the WC although this does not appear in the spreadsheet
maintained at the WC. As previously reported, policies on Pre-Booking, Booking, and Records
have been completed and adopted. The Pre-booking policy provides that no person can be
committed at the Jail absent documentation that a meaningful analysis of the person’s ability to
pay was conducted and written findings that any failure to pay was willful. It will be necessary to
implement the process described below to ensure that this policy is followed.
87. No person shall be incarcerated in the Jail for failure to pay fines or fees absent (a)
documentation demonstrating that a meaningful analysis of that person’s ability to pay was
conducted by the sentencing court prior to the imposition of any sentence, and (b) written
findings by the sentencing court setting forth the basis for a finding that the failure to pay the
subject fines or fees was willful. At a minimum, the County must confirm receipt from the
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sentencing court of a signed “Order” issued by the sentencing court setting forth in detail the
basis for a finding that the failure to pay fines or fees was willful.
Partial Compliance
See paragraph 86. When the change in practice requiring a finding of willfulness was introduced,
the County was pro-active in ensuring that valid court orders were utilized. It appears that
education in this area will need to be revisited. The policy on pre-booking is consistent with this
paragraph and at the time of the four site visits prior to the June site visit there was no one in the
facility for failure to pay fines and fees. However, as described above, during the June site visit
one individual was confined on an unlawful order to pay fines and fees because the order was not
timely corrected.
88. If the documentation described in paragraph 87 is not provided within 24 hours of

incarceration of a person for failure to pay fines or fees, Jail staff must promptly notify Jail
administrators, Court officials, and any other appropriate individuals to ensure that adequate
documentation exists and must obtain a copy to justify continued detention of the prisoner. After
48 hours, that prisoner must be released promptly if the Jail staff cannot obtain the necessary
documentation to verify that the failure to pay fines or fees was willful, and that person is
incarcerated only for the failure to pay fines or fees.
Partial Compliance
See paragraph 86.
89. If the documentation described in paragraph 87 is not provided within 24 hours of

incarceration of a prisoner for failure to pay fines or fees, and if that person is incarcerated for
other conviction(s) or charge(s), other than the failure to pay fines and/or fees, Jail staff must
promptly notify Jail administrators, Court officials, and other appropriate individuals to ensure
that adequate documentation exists and to ascertain the prisoner’s length of sentence. If Jail staff
cannot obtain a copy of the necessary documentation within 48 hours of the prisoner’s
incarceration, Jail staff must promptly arrange for the prisoner’s transport to the sentencing court
so that the court may conduct a legally sufficient hearing and provide any required
documentation, including the fines or fees owed by the prisoner, and an assessment of the
prisoner’s ability to pay and willfulness (or lack thereof) in failing to pay fines or fees.
Partial Compliance
See paragraph 86.
90. Jail staff must maintain the records necessary to determine the amount of time a person must
serve to pay off any properly ordered fines or fees. To the extent that a sentencing court does not
specifically calculate the term of imprisonment to be served, the Jail must obtain the necessary
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information within 24 hours of a prisoner’s incarceration. Within 48 hours of incarceration, each

prisoner shall be provided with documentation setting forth clearly the term of imprisonment and
the calculation used to determine the term of imprisonment.
Partial Compliance
The WC continues to maintain a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet reflects that there are no
individuals currently incarcerated with an order to pay fines and fees. It is reported that
individuals otherwise incarcerated for a new felony but have an order for fines and fees receive
credit towards those at the WC but that is not reflected in the spreadsheet. At RDC, inmates have
not been receiving credit towards fines and fees when otherwise incarcerated. There was no
documentation that prisoners were provided with documentation of their release date although
they do typically have the orders from the court and the case manager typically provides court
information upon request.
91. No pre-trial detainee or sentenced prisoner incarcerated by the County solely for failure to
pay fines or fees shall be required to perform physical labor. Nor shall any such detainee or
prisoner receive any penalty or other adverse consequence for failing to perform such labor,
including differential credit toward sentences. Any physical labor by pre-trial detainees or by
prisoners incarcerated solely for failure to pay fines or fees shall be performed on a voluntary
basis only, and the County shall not in any way coerce such pre-trial detainees or prisoners to
perform physical labor.
Partial Compliance
This has become a limited issue now that there are no individuals solely working off fines and
fees. The stated policy was that if Medical determined that the individual could not perform
physical labor the individual got full credit. This is carried as partial compliance because there
needs to be a written policy requiring that individuals who cannot work because of a medical or
mental health condition or other disability receive full credit towards fines and fees.
92. The County must ensure that the Jail timely releases from custody all individuals entitled to
release. At minimum:
a. Prisoners are entitled to release if there is no legal basis for their continued
detention. Such release must occur no later than 11:59 PM on the day that a
prisoner is entitled to be released.
b. Prisoners must be presumed entitled to release from detention if there is a court
order that specifies an applicable release date, or Jail records document no
reasonable legal basis for the continued detention of a prisoner.
c. Examples of prisoners presumptively entitled to release include:
i. Individuals who have completed their sentences;
ii. Individuals who have been acquitted of all charges after trial;
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iii. Individuals whose charges have been dismissed;

iv. Individuals who are ordered released by a court order; and
v. Individuals detained by a law enforcement agency that then fails to
promptly provide constitutionally adequate, documented justification for
an individual’s continued detention.
Partial Compliance
As described in paragraph 85, there were two late releases that were discovered during this
reporting period. Given the random review of a limited number of files, there may be others that
were not identified. The Monitor reviews a random selection of inmate records as well as record
audits, incident reports, grievances, the probation spreadsheet and Quality Assurance reports.
Those documents that appear to raise questions are reviewed with the Records supervisor. The
late releases identified were found by piecing together information from these sources. Pursuant
to paragraph 101, the Jail is supposed to keep a log of the date and time an inmate was entitled to
release and the date and time of release. This would provide much greater assurance that timely
releases are consistently occurring. The Lieutenant over Inmate Services has started keeping a
log. It does not provide all the information as described below so cannot be used to confirm that
there are no late releases at this time. Paragraph 101 also requires that incident reports be
prepared for late releases. Neither of the two late releases identified had an incident report. Also,
as mentioned in paragraph 85, it is reported that the JMS system does not accurately track
sentences and it was unclear whether sentences were manually tracked at RDC. No one was
identified as being held beyond a sentence completion. However, this process should be clarified.
Although there has been ongoing improvement in the area of releasing, these incidents require
ongoing work in this area.
93. The County must develop and implement a reliable, complete, and adequate prisoner records
system to ensure that staff members can readily determine the basis for a prisoner’s detention,
when a prisoner may need to be released, and whether a prisoner should remain in detention.
The records system must provide Jail staff with reasonable advance notice prior to an anticipated
release date so that they can contact appropriate agencies to determine whether a prisoner should
be released or remain in detention.
Partial Compliance
As previously stated, the condition of inmate files has improved since monitoring began. As
described in paragraph 85, the new Records policy establishes the use of a status/summary that
should greatly improve the reliability of the prisoner record system. With the ongoing pace of
auditing files, a review of all files should soon be completed. There are problems relying on the
JMS system to accurately track the status of inmates. Holds that come in subsequent to booking
are not routinely brought to the attention of Records staff. As a result, they are not able to contact
the jurisdiction prior to the release date potentially causing a delay in releasing. Similarly,
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Records staff cannot reliably use the JMS system to identify people with a probation hold and, as
a result, they create a manual spread sheet to track this. This has the potential to miss individuals.
Reportedly the JMS system does not accurately track sentences and cannot run a report for
anyone entitled to release on a sentence each day. At present, the Jail is still partially reliant on
inmate requests and grievances to identify people who are being over detained as was the case
with the inmate released two months late during this reporting period. The auditing process,
however, has greatly improved since the June 2020 site visit and should help correct errors
involving entry into the JMS system.
94. Jail record systems must accurately identify and track all prisoners with serious mental
illness, including their housing assignment and security incident histories. Jail staff must
develop and use records about prisoners with serious mental illness to more accurately and
efficiently process prisoners requiring forensic evaluations or transport to mental hospitals or
other treatment facilities, and to improve individual treatment, supervision, and community
transition planning for prisoners with serious mental illness. Records about prisoners with
serious mental illness must be incorporated into the Jail’s incident reporting, investigations, and
medical quality assurance systems. The County must provide an accurate census of the Jail’s
mental health population as part of its compliance reporting obligations, and the County must
address this data when assessing staffing, program, or resource needs.
Non-Compliant
The electronic medical records system and the various tracking logs that are maintained by
medical and mental health have been described in prior reports. The various ways these records
and logs can be used has also been previously described. Essentially, this data collection record
keeping and use of data addresses the section of this provision of the Agreement that are totally
within the purview of medical and mental health. It should be noted however that although these
data and records are used by the Monitor to assess compliance, there is not an internal,
formalized review of these data and records as part of a medical/mental health self-assessment
process, largely due to the extreme shortage of staff. It is anticipated that once additional
medical/mental health staff are brought on board, a staff person can be designated to perform this
more internal, ongoing, formalized self-assessment.
With regard to prisoners requiring forensic evaluations, these evaluations are performed by staff
at the state mental hospital; medical and mental health staff are not informed when a court orders
such a forensic evaluation; and medical and mental health staff are only made aware of the fact
that a forensic evaluation will be done shortly before it is to be done/when the state mental
hospital submits a request for the detainee’s medical records. Historically, detainees waited an
unacceptably long time for such forensic evaluations due to a shortage of beds at the state mental
hospital. However, at the time of the October 2020 site visit, the state mental hospital had begun
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to perform forensic evaluations by way of telepsychiatry; this practice has continued but the
limited role played by the facility’s medical and mental health staff has remained the same.
Information recently provided by the state mental hospital (at the end of September 2021)
indicates that there is no longer a backlog of detainees awaiting initial competency evaluations.
The information does indicate however that there is a small list of detainees (i.e., 4 detainees)
who are awaiting the filing of a second court order for further evaluation and treatment at the
state hospital (i.e., the further evaluation and treatment required cannot occur until the second
court order has been filed), thereby asserting that the backlog in these cases is due to delays in
obtaining a court order, not problems at the state hospital.
Neither medical nor mental health staff play a significant role in the incident reporting and
review process, and staff are rarely even consulted or interviewed as part of those processes
(although there have been times when a section of a detainee’s medical/mental health records
were requested), even when an incident might indicate that medical and/or mental health staff
were involved at some point during the incident or it was apparent that medical and/or mental
health was involved with or had information about the detainee(s) who was involved in the
incident. Therefore, there continues to be incident reports that do not include all potentially
available and relevant information from medical and/or mental health, gathered at the time of the
incident or during the incident review process.
Consistent with the prior recommendations from the Monitoring Team the Court Liaison had
obtained a list from the state hospital list of inmates from Hinds County waiting for an evaluation
or a state hospital bed. However, this list was not consistent with the list provided by the state
hospital to the Monitor which listed many more individuals. Both lists appeared to be
inconsistent with the internal tracking log that the Court Liaison had started. However, her list
did not show the current status of mental health orders and it appeared that some on her list had
an evaluation and were not waiting for one. It will be important to add to the tracking log the
current status so that the Jail’s list can be compared to the state hospital list. Again, during this
site visit, the Jail records indicated that there are some individuals with an order for an evaluation
that were not on the state hospital list. Because there were multiple state hospital lists and since
these individuals often have long waiting list times and present some of the most difficult
management issues in the Jail, it is imperative that there be frequent communication and
coordination with the state hospital. Communication with treatment facilities is also critical to
move inmates with special needs and court orders to treatment into more appropriate settings.
Finally, several inmates had charges remanded so civil commitment could be commenced. There
is still a lack of clarity as to who is responsible for pursuing civil commitment and whether those
proceedings are initiated. It is most likely the defense attorney but these cases should be tracked.
As these inmates present some of the most challenging inmates and are in need of a more
appropriate therapeutic setting, their status in the process should be tracked more closely.
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95. All individuals who (i) were found not guilty, were acquitted, or had charges brought against
them dismissed, and (ii) are not being held on any other matter, must be released directly from
the court unless the court directs otherwise. Additionally:
a. Such individuals must not be handcuffed, shackled, chained with other prisoners,
transported back to the Jail, forced to submit to bodily strip searches, or returned
to general population or any other secure Jail housing area containing prisoners.
b. Notwithstanding (a), above, individuals may request to be transported back to the
Jail solely for the purpose of routine processing for release. If the County decides
to allow such transport, the County must ensure that Jail policies and procedures
govern the process. At minimum, policies and procedures must prohibit staff
from:
i. Requiring the individual to submit to bodily strip searches;
ii. Requiring the individual to change into Jail clothing if the individual is not
already in such clothing; and
iii. Returning the individual to general population or any other secure Jail
housing area containing prisoners.
Non-Compliant
Individuals are not being released from the Court at this time and they are returned to the Jail as
other inmates. In connection with the drafting of policies and procedures, Jail staff are working
on a process of releasing individuals from the downtown facility, JDC. Further collaboration
with the courts will be necessary to allow for release from the court. In particular, the courts will
need to develop the capability to provide a written release order in the courtroom for an
individual to be released from court. In addition, HCDS staff will need to have a system to
identify individuals with holds at the time of the court order releasing the individual to ensure
that the individual does not have some other basis for detention. The new Jail Administrator has
been working on outstanding policies including the policy on Releasing which would address
these issues.
96. The County must develop, implement, and maintain policies and procedures to govern the
release of prisoners. These policies and procedures must:
a. Describe all documents and records that must be collected and maintained in Jail
files for determining the basis of a prisoner’s detention, the prisoner’s anticipated
release date, and their status in the criminal justice system.
b. Specifically, detail procedures to ensure timely release of prisoners entitled to be
released, and procedures to prevent accidental release.
c. Be developed in consultation with court administrators, the District Attorney’s
Office, and representatives of the defense bar.
d. Include mechanisms for notifying community mental health providers, including
the County’s Program of Assertive Community Treatment (“PACT”) team, when
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releasing a prisoner with serious mental illness so that the prisoner can transition
safely back to the community. These mechanisms must include providing such
prisoners with appointment information and a supply of their prescribed
medications to bridge the time period from release until their appointment with
the County PACT team, or other community provider.
Non-Compliant
The Jail does not yet have an adopted policy on Releasing. A draft policy has been reviewed and
is in the process of being finalized. This has been delayed in an effort to address the requirement
of the prior paragraph that individuals be released from the court. However, with the new
Detention Administrator on board, there is a planned effort to at least get an interim policy in
place.
With regard to medical and mental health, the various different activities/tasks that need to be
performed in order to comply with this provision have been described in prior site visit reports.
Therefore, all of that will not be described in detail here, and instead, the Monitor will simply
offer a status report.
As was noted in the last monitoring report, the discharge nurse who had the primary
responsibility for compliance with this provision of the agreement left the facility; a new
discharge nurse was designated but reportedly, since documents and reports generated by the
prior discharge nurse, including a list of contacts for community-based medical and mental
health services, were unavailable, the new discharge nurse was starting over.
Given the above noted, during the last site visit (June 2021) the Monitor focused on outlining the
roles and responsibilities of the discharge nurse and attempted to identify priorities (to help the
new discharge nurse and her supervisor appreciate the scope of the discharge nurse’s
responsibilities). The most urgent priorities noted included:
• The identification of community-based medical and mental health service providers who
will accept released detainees who require medical and/or mental health services
(including regular outpatient treatment, day treatment and residential treatment); obtain a
clear sense of the range of services they provide and/or the type(s) of individuals they are
prepared to treat; and identify a person(s) at each place who can be contacted to discuss
new referrals and make intake appointments
• In cooperation with the detainee’s provider(s) of medical and/or mental health services
and the detainee, develop a discharge plan for each detainee (focused on where he/she
will go for community-based treatment services as well as other services he/she might
require to make a successful return to the community, such as housing, etc.)
• Develop discharge planning groups, and work with other staff to develop other groups
that prepare detainees for discharge, such as educational groups regarding illness, the
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need for ongoing treatment, medication management, and how to best participate in one’s
treatment, etc.
• Prepare a discharge packet for each detainee who is likely to be discharged that includes
(in writing) important information that he/she will need (such as the program(s) to which
he/she is referred, scheduled appointment information, contact information, and what to
do if there is an emergency prior to the scheduled appointment, as well as information
about where to go to activate benefits or seek other assistance that might be required)
• Continue to work with security staff to assure that ALL detainees stop by medical as part
of the release process in order to pick up their discharge packet and enough medication to
carry them until their scheduled appointment with a community-based provider
• Track successful and unsuccessful referrals (i.e., track whether or not released detainees
actually follow-through with appointments made for them), and attempt to determine
what might be done to increase the percentage of successful referrals
Other more medium-range tasks and goals were also briefly reviewed. For example, following
up with discussions that had been held with Hinds Behavioral Health, regarding sending a staff
person to the jail to meet with detainees who will be referred to Hinds Behavioral Health upon
their release, in order to begin to develop a working relationship with these detainees (in an
effort to increase the possibility of a successful referral). In addition, exploring whether there
might be steps that can be taken prior to a detainee’s release to facilitate the establishment or re-
establishment of needed benefits (in an effort to help detainees stabilize more quickly upon their
release and have coverage for community-based treatment services as quickly as possible). And
also, establishing a practice of interviewing those who return to the jail, regarding why they did
or did not follow-through with obtaining the treatment services they required (in an effort to
identify what discharge planning efforts work and what efforts could be improved upon).
During this site visit it was clear that the new discharge nurse had done a lot to begin to address
the above noted. The new Jail Administrator had also negotiated a revision to the Securis
contract that would provide additional video conferencing units that should allow for better
communication with community providers (as well as attorney and family visits). This contract
has been signed but not yet implemented. It was also clear that the new discharge nurse had
begun to identify some of the same impediments to discharge planning that had been identified
by the prior discharge nurse. So, at this point, it seems reasonable to say that substantial efforts
are underway to rebuild the discharge planning process with regard to medical and mental health,
and it seems reasonable to wait until the next site visit to more formally assess progress.
97. The County must develop, implement, and maintain appropriate post orders relating to the
timely release of individuals. Any post orders must:
a. Contain up-to-date contact information for court liaisons, the District Attorney’s
Office, and the Public Defender’s Office;
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b. Describe a process for obtaining higher level supervisor assistance in the event the
officer responsible for processing releases encounters administrative difficulties in
determining a prisoner’s release eligibility or needs urgent assistance in reaching
officials from other agencies who have information relevant to a prisoner’s
release status.
Non-Compliant
The County has not yet developed post orders in this area. The Records Supervisor and the
individual working with County Court appear to have developed working relationships with
individuals in the court systems.
98. Nothing in this Agreement precludes appropriate verification of a prisoner’s eligibility for
release, including checks for detention holds by outside law enforcement agencies and
procedures to confirm the authenticity of release orders. Before releasing a prisoner entitled to
release, but no later than the day release is ordered, Jail staff should check the National Crime
Information Center or other law enforcement databases to determine if there may be a basis for
continued detention of the prisoner. The results of release verification checks must be fully
documented in prisoner records.
Partial Compliance
At the time of the February 2020 site visit, the Booking staff reported that they run an NCIC
check for outstanding warrants at the time of booking and again at release. When inmate files
were last reviewed on site (February, 2020) NCIC reports run at the time of booking were in the
inmate files. The files reviewed at that time did include a copy of the NCIC report at the time of
release. The last four site visits and the present one, being remote, did not permit a review of the
files.
As mentioned above holds coming in after booking may not come to the attention of Records. As
a result, they are identified when the inmate is otherwise entitled to release. The process of then
contacting the jurisdiction with the hold and determining if they want to pick up the inmate can
delay the release.
99. The County must ensure that the release process is adequately staffed by qualified detention
officers and supervisors. To that end, the County must:
a. Ensure that sufficient qualified staff members, with access to prisoner records and
to the Jail’s e-mail account for receiving court orders, are available to receive and
effectuate court release orders twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
b. Ensure that staff members responsible for the prisoner release process and related
records have the knowledge, skills, training, experience, and abilities to
implement the Jail’s release policies and procedures. At minimum, the County
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must provide relevant staff members with specific pre-service and annual in-
service training related to prisoner records, the criminal justice process, legal
terms, and release procedures. The training must include instruction on:
i. How to process release orders for each court, and whom to contact if a
question arises;
ii. What to do if the equipment for contacting other agencies, such as the
Jail’s fax machine or email service, malfunctions, or communication is
otherwise disrupted;
iii. Various types of court dispositions, and the language typically used
therein, to ensure staff members understand the meaning of court orders;
and
iv. How and when to check for detainers to ensure that an individual may be
released from court after she or he is found not guilty, is acquitted, or has
the charges brought against her or him dismissed.
c. Provide detention staff with sufficient clerical support to prevent backlogs in the
filing of prisoner records.
Partial Compliance
There are now policies and procedures on Booking, Pre-Booking, and Records. A policy on
Releasing has been circulated and returned with comments. These policies will assist in coming
into compliance in this area. In addition, a staff member has updated and expanded the Booking
and Release Manual which will provide the detailed guidance required by this paragraph. It is not
clear that the updated Booking and Release Manual has been approved and is being utilized. The
Records Supervisor appears to be knowledgeable in her duties and has good relationships with
the courts and other agencies. There is no record of formal initial or in-service training for the
booking and records clerks. As has been previously recommended, training of the relevant staff
on the process on mental health related orders would be useful. As noted above, there is still an
issue with detainers that come in after booking such that releasing is not delayed.
100. The County must annually review its prisoner release and detention process to ensure that
it complies with any changes in federal law, such as the constitutional standard for civil or pre-
trial detention.
Non-Compliant
At the time of the site visit, there had not been an initial review of this process to determine
consistency with federal law.
101. The County must ensure that the Jail’s record-keeping and quality assurance policies and
procedures allow both internal and external audit of the Jail’s release process, prisoner lengths of
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stay, and identification of prisoners who have been held for unreasonably long periods without
charges or other legal process. The County must, at minimum, require:
a. A Jail log that documents (i) the date each prisoner was entitled to release; (ii) the
date, time, and manner by which the Jail received any relevant court order; (iii)
the date and time that prisoner was in fact released; (iv) the time that elapsed
between receipt of the court order and release; (v) the date and time when
information was received requiring the detention or continued detention of a
prisoner (e.g., immigration holds or other detainers), and (vi) the identity of the
authority requesting the detention or continued detention of a prisoner.
b. Completion of an incident report, and appropriate follow-up investigation and
administrative review, if an individual is held in custody past 11:59 PM on the
day that she or he is entitled to release. The incident report must document the
reason(s) for the error. The incident report must be submitted to the Jail
Administrator no later than one calendar day after the error was discovered.
Partial Compliance
This paragraph has been changed to partial compliance because of the improvement in the
internal auditing process and the implementation of the status summary sheet. The Lieutenent
over Inmate Services has started keeping a release log. It does not include all of the items
required by subparagraph (a), most notably when the court order was entered and when it was
received. It does include a column for whether the release was timely but this cannot be
confirmed by the other information on the log. This is a time-consuming process for the
lieutenant because she is not routinely involved in the release process and has to look up the
information for each individual. It is recommended that the Booking Sergeant or Records
Supervisor enter the information in real time. Incident reports are not routinely prepared for over
detention although over detention appears to happen less frequently than previously. As
mentioned above, the use of a log consistent with this paragraph and the completion of incident
reports for over detention and erroneous releases would greatly assist command staff and the
Monitor in tracking and addressing late releases or mistaken releases.
102. The County must appoint a staff member to serve as a Quality Control Officer with
responsibility for internal auditing and monitoring of the release process. This Quality Control
Officer will be responsible for helping prevent errors with the release process, and the
individual’s duties will include tracking releases to ensure that staff members are completing all
required paper work and checks. If the Quality Control Officer determines that an error has been
made, the individual must have the authority to take corrective action, including the authority to
immediately contact the Jail Administrator or other County official with authority to order a
prisoner’s release. The Quality Control Officer’s duties also include providing data and reports
so that release errors are incorporated into the Jail’s continuous improvement and quality
assurance process.
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Partial Compliance
The Sheriff’s Office hired an individual with the title of Quality Control Coordinator in June
2020. Her list of duties includes monitoring records to ensure that inmate files are current. She
has developed a timeline for the audits required by the Settlement Agreement and policies
including inmate records. This work does appear to be on the right track. As described
elsewhere, she has developed checklists to gather information for a very useful monthly Quality
Assurance report. During this reporting period, her QA report indicates that she audited 10
inmate record files. This is a good beginning for this process and this paragraph has been
changed to partial compliance. It is recommended that the QA Coordinator review the Release
Log once revised to include the required information. Understanding the court system and related
paperwork is a formidable task and training for the QA Coordinator in this area is recommended.
103. The County must require investigation of all incidents relating to timely or erroneous
prisoner release within seven calendar days by appropriate investigators, supervisors, and the Jail
Administrator. The Jail Administrator must document any deficiencies found and any corrective
action taken. The Jail Administrator must then make any necessary changes to Jail policies and
procedures. Such changes should be made, if appropriate, in consultation with court personnel,
the District Attorney’s Office, members of the defense bar, and any other law enforcement
agencies involved in untimely or erroneous prisoner releases.
Non-Compliant
There were at least two untimely releases discovered during monitoring. Neither had an incident
report or an IAD investigation. This has been an ongoing deficiency. There should be
clarification as to who has the responsibility for completing the report. It was recommended by
the corrections expert of the Monitoring Team that the Detention Administrator issue an HCDS
Order requiring documentation of all such mistaken or untimely releases.
104. The County must conduct bi-annual audits of release policies, procedures, and practices.
As part of each audit, the County must make any necessary changes to ensure that individuals are
being released in a timely manner. The audits must review all data collected regarding timely
release, including any incident reports or Quality Control audits referenced in Paragraph 102
above. The County must document the audits and recommendations and must submit all
documentation to the Monitor and the United States for review.
Non-Compliant
There has been no annual review pursuant to this paragraph.
105. The County must ensure that policies, procedures, and practices allow for reasonable
attorney visitation, which should be treated as a safeguard to prevent the unlawful detention of
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citizens and for helping to ensure the efficient functioning of the County’s criminal justice
system. The Jail’s attorney visitation process must provide sufficient space for attorneys to meet
with their clients in a confidential setting and must include scheduling procedures to ensure that
defense attorneys can meet with their clients for reasonable lengths of time and without undue
delay. An incident report must be completed if Jail staff are unable to transport a prisoner to
meet with their attorney, or if there is a delay of more than 30 minutes for transporting a prisoner
for a scheduled attorney visit.
Partial Compliance
The most recent change in the status of this paragraph is related to the planned integration of
video conferencing for attorneys to meet with their clients as an adjunct to meeting with them
face to face at the RDC and WC. While there is little problem with connecting attorneys with
their clients at the WC, communication problems and excessive delays at the RDC have made
video conferencing a desirable alternative. The restrictions imposed by COVID 19 requirements
make this technological solution all the more attractive. The Jail Administrator negotiated with
the video communication provider, Securis, to provide additional video terminals to allow for
more accessible attorney visits via video. This contract has been approved by the Board but only
after a two month delay. It is still to be implemented. In person visits at RDC continue to present
delays and difficulties with insufficient staff available to move inmates to visitation areas. With
direct supervision these difficulties would be minimized.
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
The County must develop an effective system for identifying and self-correcting systemic
violations of prisoner’s constitutional rights. To that end, the County must:
106. Develop and maintain a database and computerized tracking system to monitor all
reportable incidents, uses of force, and grievances. This tracking system will serve as the
repository of information used for continuing improvement and quality assurance reports.
Partial Compliance
The Monitoring Team has received the electronic monthly reports on incidents which include the
complete narrative of the primary report and supplemental reports. There is a field in JMS which
appears on the spread sheet for checking use of force. However, this field is frequently not
checked when force is used. For example, in July the incident reports indicate that OC spray was
used 6 times. The use of force column was not checked for any of the 6. A separate use of force
report is supposed to be completed when force is used. However, this is also frequently not
completed even though force has been used. Although the spreadsheet is helpful in that it
provides a computerized listing of incidents including use of force, it does not include all of the
information listed in paragraph 107 and 108 below and that would be needed to provide the
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information that could inform continuing improvement or quality assurance reports. More
problematic is that it has not been complete or accurate. The Quality Assurance Coordinator
began creating a master spreadsheet with information on incidents, use of force, training activity
and other areas. For the incident reports and use of force she was pulling the information from
the JMS. However, it quickly became apparent that this was inaccurate. The use of force field
was often not checked and the type of incident listed is inconsistent. The Quality Assurance
Coordinator now uses checklists for the different departments. The checklist has boxes to fill in
with the information needed. For example, the use of force checklist goes to the Lieutenant over
Investigations. Because Investigations reviews every incident report for use of force, they can
provide an accurate number of uses of force.
However, there still appears to be some discrepancies. In June, the QA spreadsheet shows 8
assaults. A review of the incident reports indicates 18 assaults. The August QA report indicated
no use of OC. However, there is at least one incident report showing the use of OC spray. One
issue was discovered during this site visit that may be part of the problem. A number of incident
reports were missing from the spread sheet. In June, there were 14 missing reports; July 20; and
August 24. It was discovered that the spread sheet is created by pulling all incident reports in a
date range. If the officer has not entered a date on the incident report, the report will not be
pulled into the spread sheet. Anyone relying on the spread sheet to quantify types of incidents
will not get an accurate count. This may be why the use of OC spray in August was missed. It
was in one of the missing reports. The IT personnel have now made that a mandatory field which
should improve the accuracy going forward. Even though the checklists provide greater accuracy
in the quality assurance process, it does not constitute an ongoing data base that could be used to
run a statistical report. To do that, the information in the JMS system would have to have
improved accuracy. Officers should be encouraged through training to check use of force in the
JMS system and to accurately characterize incidents. There should also be some consideration
of whether the JMS system could allow multiple incident types so that, for example, when an
inmate burns county property both fire and destruction of property could be listed. There
continues to be a concern because of the lack of reports or the small number of reports that some
types of incidents are underreported including late releases, use of force, and lost money and
property. There were at least two late releases in this reporting period neither of which had an
incident report and, as a result, there was nothing in the JMS to identify them.
The computerized grievance system does not allow for the compilation of a useful summary
grievance report. However, the data in the system can now be pulled into an Excel spreadsheet
which can be used to generate reports. The spreadsheet generated by Securus does not include
some critical fields that are in the system but can’t be pulled into the spreadsheet such as type of
grievance and date of response. The Grievance Officer manually creates a separate spreadsheet
that pulls the information from Securus and then manually inserts the type of grievance, the date
of response and the date of the response to an appeal. There is also a limitation in that some staff
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do not respond to grievances assigned to them in the system. The Grievance Officer clears these
out of the system when the inmate is released, but it is not possible to determine whether the
grievance was responded to and what the response was. The policy to reject grievances that are
actually inmate requests and direct inmates to use the inmate request category appears to be
effective. This policy allows a more accurate depiction of grievances although, as mentioned
above, a number of the grievances rejected for this reason should have been considered
grievances. The inmates seem to be using the Emergency Grievance form when in many cases, it
is not an emergency but is a grievance. For an accurate picture of grievances, it would be
preferable if the system could reflect that a submitted emergency grievance was a grievance but
not an emergency rather than rejecting it. The Quality Assurance Coordinator does have a
checklist from the Grievance Coordinator but this does not include an assessment of the
adequacy of the responses. This type of audit is required by the Grievance Policy but has not yet
been implemented.
107. Compile an Incident Summary Report on at least a monthly basis. The Incident
Summary Reports must compile and summarize incident report data in order to identify trends
such as rates of incidents in general, by housing unit, by day of the week and date, by shift, and
by individual prisoners or staff members. The Incident Summary reports must, at minimum,
include the following information:
a. Brief summary of all reportable incidents, by type, shift, housing unit, and date;
b. Description of all suicides and deaths, including the date, name of prisoner, housing
unit, and location where the prisoner died (including name of hospital if prisoner
died off-site);
c. The names and number of prisoners placed in emergency restraints, and segregation,
and the frequency and duration of such placements;
d. List and total number of incident reports received during the reporting period;
e. List and Total number of incidents referred to IAD or other law enforcement agencies
for investigation.
Partial Compliance
The Quality Assurance reports now being prepared are a major step forward in compliance with
this requirement and appear to have the envisioned effect of helping to guide quality
improvement. As mentioned above, the Quality Assurance Coordinator is using checklists to
compile accurate data so that trends and problem areas can be identified. She prepares a narrative
that evaluates that data. The reports appear to be thorough and contain good analysis. Under the
last Sheriff, the reports have been reviewed by the Sheriff‘s Office and discussed in a monthly
meeting. This prompted focus on a number of problem areas such as report writing and training.
Hopefully, this process will be continued with the current Sheriff. With action directly by the
Quality Assurance Coordinator and support from the Sheriff, additional areas are being
addressed.
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This paragraph envisions a narrative like what is now being produced. It also envisions back up
statistical data. As noted above, it will be difficult to produce that kind of data until the JMS
system information is more reliable. With the checklists being utilized, the information in the
report is more reliable but discrepancies still exist. The spreadsheet currently being provided has
the text of the narrative of the initial incident report and the text of the supplemental reports.
Additional information includes the date and time of the incident, the location, the type of
incident, the name of the inmate involved, the name of the initial responding officer, a field for
use of force, the supervisor reviewing the report, the date and time of review, and whether the
report was approved. At this time, it does not include all of the information required by this
paragraph (e.g. use of restraints, segregation, referral to IAD) including information that would
be necessary to be fully informed regarding the nature of the incident. (The segregation log could
provide the needed information for segregation).
Most importantly, the spreadsheet does not have an actual summary of the incident. The
spreadsheet now pulls in the first incident report and all supplements. This provides more
information than was previously available. A brief summary of the incident that incorporates
information from the various narratives and includes information from medical, which is often
not included in the narratives, should be incorporated. The JMS system includes a field for
supervisor’s notes. This does not appear in the current spreadsheet but would be a good location
to include a brief summary of the incident as required by this paragraph (and findings or
recommendations as required by paragraph 64).
Additional types of incidents that could be identified should be explored. For example, “assault”
is used whether it is an inmate-on-inmate assault or an inmate on officer assault. Only by reading
the narrative, can that be discerned. The spreadsheet also does not include the incidents or the
total number of incidents referred to investigation. RDC and the WC are now using the same
form for segregation. This is not in Excel but could be drawn from manually to create the same
type of trend analysis envisioned by this paragraph. At this time, there is no report tracking the
use of restraints.
108. Compile a Use of Force Summary Report on at least a monthly basis. The Use of Force
Summary Reports must compile and summarize use of force report data in order to identify
trends such as rates of use in general, by housing unit, by shift, by day of the week and date, by
individual prisoners, and by staff members. The Use of Force Summary reports must, at
minimum, include the following information:
a. Summary of all uses of force, by type, shift, housing unit, and date;
b. List and total number of use of force reports received during the reporting period;
c. List and total number of uses of force reports/incidents referred to IAD or other
law enforcement agencies for investigation.
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Partial Compliance
The monthly Incident spreadsheet has a column for whether or not force was used. As noted
above, this is not routinely checked when force is used so can’t be relied upon for this
information. The checklist being used by the Quality Assurance Coordinator should be
producing more accurate data which is incorporated in her spread sheet and the narrative
summary report. However, as described above, there are still concerns about the accuracy of the
QA spread sheet when compared to a review of the incident reports. This paragraph envisions
back up statistical data which ideally would be run from the JMS system. Also as noted above,
the JMS system does not provide for a summary of the use of force. Neither does it have a field
for referral for investigation. The spreadsheet being created by the CID and IAD investigator
could be used to provide that listing. Ideally, if relying on different documents to provide
information required by this paragraph, those documents should at some point be brought
together in a single packet for review.
109. Compile a Grievance Summary Report on at least a monthly basis. The Grievance
Summary Reports must compile and summarize grievance information in order to identify trends
such as most frequently reported complaints, units generating the most grievances, and staff
members receiving the most grievances about their conduct. To identify trends and potential
concerns, at least quarterly, a member of the Jail’s management staff must review the Grievance
Summary Reports and a random sample of ten percent of all grievances filed during the review
period. These grievance reviews, any recommendations, and corrective actions must be
documented and provided to the United States and Monitor.
Partial Compliance
As mentioned above, the limitations of the reporting from the Securus system have led the
Grievance Coordinator to manually create a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet has the location of the
kiosk terminal where the grievance was submitted although this might not reflect the location of
the event giving rise to the grievance. Neither system can generate a report by location, shift, or
persons involved. There are additional limitations. Any inmate response is treated by the system
as an appeal when often the inmate has just responded by saying thank you. Again, this makes
tracking what is actually happening difficult unless it is done manually. Also, as mentioned
above, some of the staff are not entering responses in the system. One option would be to expand
the manual spreadsheet kept by the Grievance Coordinator to include the information required by
this paragraph. This should enable staff to generate a report consistent with this provision.
However, even though the volume of grievances has been reduced, maintaining an expanded
manual spreadsheet would be a very time intensive process. At the present time, there is no
management review process in the grievance system. The Quality Assurance Officer is
reviewing the Grievance Coordinator’s spreadsheet but is not yet reviewing and reporting on a
review of a random sampling of grievances.
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110. Compile a monthly summary report of IAD investigations conducted at the Facility. The
IAD Summary Report must include:
a. A brief summary of all completed investigations, by type, shift, housing unit, and
date;
b. A listing of investigations referred for disciplinary action or other final disposition
by type and date;
c. A listing of all investigations referred to a law enforcement agency and the name
of the agency, by type and date; and
d. A listing of all staff suspended, terminated, arrested or reassigned because of
misconduct or violations of policy and procedures. This list must also contain the
specific misconduct and/or violation.
Partial Compliance
The IAD spreadsheet tracks investigations according to most of this paragraph’s criteria. From
June through August 2021, a total of 34 cases were investigated. Among the most significant, 15
involved UOF, two were inmate deaths, one was an escape of two inmates from the WC, one
was a fire and four involved unbecoming conduct on the part of staff. As a result of all
investigations, three officers were terminated and two resigned, but the disposition of many
investigations is still pending. Since the first of June IAD has initiated 18 investigations where
OC was used. Only five of those have been resolved; two were “sustained”, two were
“exonerated” and one was never finalized because the officer involved was terminated on
another charge. Of the 18 investigations, 13 are still under review.
IAD investigations were predominantly centered on events that occurred at the RDC. Only three
were at the WC. At the RDC the majority of investigations dealt with events in C-Pod (13), A-
Pod (8) and Booking (6). It is noteworthy that there were more investigations on events in C-4,
the lockdown/confinement unit, than in any other housing unit.
111. Conduct a review, at least annually, to determine whether the incident, use of force,
grievance reporting, and IAD systems comply with the requirements of this Agreement and are
effective at ensuring staff compliance with their constitutional obligations. The County must
make any changes to the reporting systems that it determines are necessary as a result of the
system reviews. These reviews and corrective actions must be documented and provided to the
United States and Monitor.
Non-Compliant
There has been no annual review pursuant to this paragraph.
112. Ensure that the Jail’s continuous improvement and quality assurance systems include an
Early Intervention component to alert Administrators of potential problems with staff members.
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The purpose of the Early Intervention System is to identify and address patterns of behavior or
allegations which may indicate staff training deficiencies, persistent policy violations,
misconduct, or criminal activity. As part of the Early Intervention process, incident reports, use
of force reports, and prisoner grievances must be screened by designated staff members for such
patterns. If misconduct, criminal activity, or behaviors indicate the need for corrective action,
the screening staff must refer the incidents or allegations to Jail supervisors, administrators, IAD,
or other law enforcement agencies for investigation. Additionally:
a. The Early Intervention System may be integrated with other database and
computerized tracking systems required by this Agreement, provided any unified
system otherwise still meets the terms of this Agreement.
b. The Early Intervention System must screen for staff members who may be using
excessive force, regardless of whether use of force reviews concluded that the
uses complied with Jail policies and this Agreement. This provision allows
identification of staff members who may still benefit from additional training and
serves as a check on any deficiencies with use of force by field supervisors.
c. The Jail Administrator, or designee of at least Captain rank, must personally
review Early Intervention System data and alerts at least quarterly. The
Administrator, or designee, must document when reviews were conducted as well
as any findings, recommendations, or corrective actions taken.
d. The County must maintain a list of any staff members identified by the Early
Intervention System as possibly needing additional training or discipline. A copy
of this list must be provided to the United States and the Monitor.
e. The County must take appropriate, documented, and corrective action when staff
members have been identified as engaging in misconduct, criminal activity, or a
pattern of violating Jail policies.
f. The County must review the Early Intervention System, at least bi-annually, to
ensure that it is effective and used to identify staff members who may need
additional training or discipline. The County must document any findings,
recommendations, or corrective actions taken as a result of these reviews. Copies
of these reviews must be provided to the United States and the Monitor.
Partial Compliance
The previously created Quality Assurance spreadsheet indicated an initial implementation of an
Early Intervention program. However, there has been no indication that such a program is
currently active. This will be further evaluated during the next site visit.
113. Develop and implement policies and procedures for Jail databases, tracking systems, and
computerized records (including the Early Intervention System), that ensure both functionality
and data security. The policies and procedures must address all of the following issues: data
storage, data retrieval, data reporting, data analysis and pattern identification, supervisor
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responsibilities, standards used to determine possible violations and corrective action,

documentation, legal issues, staff and prisoner privacy rights, system security, and audit
mechanisms.
Non-Compliant
The initial P&P Manual that was issued in April, 2017 did not include policies and procedures
covering this matter. There is no draft of such a policy at this time.
114. Ensure that the Jail’s medical staff are included as part of the continuous improvement
and quality assurance process. At minimum, medical and mental health staff must be included
through all of the following mechanisms:
a. Medical staff must have the independent authority to promptly refer cases of
suspected assault or abuse to the Jail Administrator, IAD, or other law
enforcement agencies;
b. Medical staff representatives must be involved in mortality reviews and systemic
reviews of serious incidents. At minimum, a physician must prepare a mortality
review within 30 days of every prisoner death. An outside physician must review
any mortalities associated with treatment by Jail physicians.
Non-Compliant
Medical staff are not included in the review of serious incidents. Mortality reviews have been
completed on some of the deaths during this calendar year. However, as noted above these
appear to be minimal and pro forma. There has been little communication between medical and
security staff regarding interrelated issues involved in assaults or deaths. The incident reports and
mortality reviews reflect this lack of communication. The Jail Administrator reportedly is
preparing an After-Action report on the death on October 18th. Ideally, this will reflect
information obtained from medical staff.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
115. Hinds County will establish a Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee (“Coordinating
Committee”) with subject matter expertise and experience that will assist in streamlining
criminal justice processes and identify and develop solutions and interventions designed to lead
to diversion from arrest, detention, and incarceration. The Coordinating Committee will focus
particularly on diversion of individuals with serious mental illness and juveniles. Using the
Sequential Intercept Model, or an alternative acceptable to the Parties, the Coordinating
Committee will identify strategies for diversion at each intercept point where individuals may
encounter the criminal justice system and will assess the County’s current diversion efforts and
unmet service needs in order to identify opportunities for successful diversion of such
131
individuals. The Committee will recommend appropriate changes to policies and procedures and
additional services necessary to increase diversion.
Partial Compliance
Hinds County had previously contracted with Justice Management Institute (JMI) to provide
consulting and assist in implementing a CJCC. Those efforts were primarily focused on getting
the CJCC implemented and developing a strategic plan. The CJCC discontinued meetings when
COVID hit and has not been functional since then. The term of the prior CJCC chairperson
expired and for a period there was no one serving as chair. The County Administrator has agreed
to serve as chair until the CJCC is functioning again. A meeting was held on October 1, 2021.
There was not a quorum and the meeting was primarily informational. It will be important for the
County to provide leadership in working towards solutions to some of the criminal justice system
issues. This will encourage broader participation and begin to effectuate needed changes. The
Jail Administrator has received approval for a Jail and Justice System Assessment to be
completed by the National Institute of Corrections. The previous Sheriff declined to move
forward with the assessment. This would greatly benefit the work of the CJCC and should be
revisited.
As has been previously reported, this paragraph is carried as partial compliance because it also
requires that Hinds County establish a CJCC that has the subject matter expertise and experience
to identify and develop solutions and interventions. Although the stakeholders that do participate
have expertise within their areas, the participants do not have the expertise in criminal justice
system reform including diversion that would allow the CJCC to meet the requirements of this
paragraph. As both JMI when they were providing consultation and the Monitoring Team have
recommended, in order to have a CJCC with sufficient subject matter expertise and experience to
carry out the mandate of this paragraph, the County will need to provide staff support. Among
other duties, staff duties will include collection and analysis of data, facilitation, research and
analysis, presentation, project management, consultation, and distribution of information to the
policy makers on the committee so that they have the information they need to make policy
decisions. The County has designated the Criminal Justice and Quality Control staff person
(sometimes called the Court Liaison or Facilitator) to be the CJCC Coordinator. To date, she has
not performed the duties described above. This may be because she is also filling a number of
other roles. She oversees GPS monitoring, tracks mental health evaluations and commitments,
responds to queries regarding court cases, and has been overseeing efforts to implement a pretrial
services program. A pretrial services program director has now been hired. This may give the
Court Liaison/Facilitator more time to focus on the CJCC but she still has a number of other
duties that so far have not allowed her to provide the staff support needed by the CJCC. The
requirement that the Committee identify opportunities for diversion and recommend measures to
accomplish has not been achieved. At this time, the County will need to drive the process of the
CJCC identifying opportunities for diversion.
132
As previously reported the Sequential Intercept Mapping required by this paragraph took place
under a grant to the Hinds County Behavioral Health from the GAINS Center on August 16-17,
2017. The Sequential Intercept Model provides a conceptual framework for communities to use
when considering the interface between the criminal justice and mental health systems as they
address concerns about the criminalization of inmates with mental health illness. The GAINS
center completed the report for Hinds County Behavioral Health. It includes recommendations
for creating or improving intercepts in the Jail and at release. This provides a useful road map for
CJCC and for achieving compliance with the diversion and discharge planning requirements of
the Settlement Agreement. However, staff support will still be needed to drive this effort. An
update of the Sequential Intercept Map should be considered as the initial mapping is now almost
four years old. This would be a useful activity for the CJCC.
116. The Coordinating Committee will include representation from the Hinds County Sheriff’s
Office and Hinds County Board of Supervisors. The County will also seek representation from
Hinds County Behavioral Health Services; the Jackson Police Department; Mississippi
Department of Mental Health; Mississippi Department of Human Services, Division of Youth
Services; judges from the Hinds County Circuit, Chancery, and County (Youth and Justice)
Courts; Hinds County District Attorney Office; Hinds County Public Defender Office; relevant
Jackson city officials; and private advocates or other interested community members.
Partial Compliance
As noted above the CJCC met on October 1, 2021. A quorum was not met and the meeting was
primarily informational. Not all of the identified agencies have been invited or represented at
prior meetings. The reported intention is to expand representation after further development.
Although the County cannot control the participation of others, staff support and active
participation by the County and the Sheriff’s Office will assist in engaging other stakeholders.
117. The Coordinating Committee will prioritize enhancing coordination with local behavioral
health systems, with the goal of connecting individuals experiencing mental health crisis,
including juveniles, with available services to avoid unnecessary arrest, detention, and
incarceration.
Non-Compliant
The CJCC adopted its strategic plan. Enhancing behavioral health services for justice involved
individuals is included as a strategic priority. Hinds County Behavioral Health has participated in
the CJCC in the past but there has not been much recent activity. Further observation of the
CJCC and the County’s leadership in the CJCC will be necessary to determine if behavioral
health services are a priority in CJCC actions and deliberation. This paragraph has been down
133
graded to non-compliant due to the lack of any effort in this area since the strategic plan was
adopted three years ago.
118. Within 30 days of the Effective Date and in consultation with the United States, the
County will select and engage an outside consultant to provide technical assistance to the County
and Coordinating Committee regarding strategies for reducing the Jail population and increasing
diversion from criminal justice involvement, particularly for individuals with mental illness and
juveniles. This technical assistance will include (a) a comprehensive review and evaluation of
the effectiveness of the existing efforts to reduce recidivism and increase diversion; (b)
identification of gaps in the current efforts, (c) recommendations of actions and strategies to
achieve diversion and reduce recidivism; and (d) estimates of costs and cost savings associated
with those strategies. The review will include interviews with representatives from the agencies
and entities referenced in Paragraph 116 and other relevant stakeholders as necessary for a
thorough evaluation and recommendation. Within 120 days of the Effective Date of this
Agreement, the outside consultant will finalize and make public a report regarding the results of
their assessment and recommendations. The Coordinating Committee will implement the
recommended strategies and will continue to use the outside consultant to assist with
implementation of the strategies when appropriate.
Partial Compliance
The County did contract with an outside consultant, JMI, to provide technical assistance in
developing the CJCC. However, that contract did not encompass the requirements listed above
regarding an assessment of and recommendations for strategies to reduce recidivism and increase
diversion. That contract ended over two years ago and the County has not renewed the contract
with JMI. Hinds County applied to be a learning site with Advancing Pretrial Services. The
application has not been accepted because necessary stakeholders have not provided a letter of
support. Even if acceptance can be obtained, that assistance does not include the breadth of the
efforts included in this paragraph.
IMPLEMENTATION, TIMING, AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
Paragraphs 119 and 120 regarding duty to implement and effective date omitted.
121. Within 30 days of the Effective Date of this Agreement, the County must distribute copies
of the Agreement to all prisoners and Jail staff, including all medical and security staff, with
appropriate explanation as to the staff members’ obligations under the Agreement. At minimum:
a. A copy of the Agreement must be posted in each unit (including booking/intake
and medical areas), and program rooms (e.g., classrooms and any library).
b. Individual copies of the Agreement must be provided to prisoners upon request.
134
Partial Compliance
The booklet sized version of the Settlement Agreement is provided to new staff as they go
through basic training. Existing staff previously received this booklet, and they have access to
the same document on-line; however, some officers and supervisors have indicated that they do
not have a copy when questioned during remote site visits. It will take an on-site inspection to
make a definitive determination.
POLICY AND PROCEDURE REVIEW
130. The County must review all existing policies and procedures to ensure their compliance
with the substantive terms of this Agreement. Where the Jail does not have a policy or procedure
in place that complies with the terms of this Agreement, the County must draft such a policy or
procedure, or revise its existing policy or procedure.
Partial Compliance
An initial attempt to draft policies and procedures was made in early 2017. The Monitoring
Team and DOJ provided comments but the policies really needed to be rewritten. The plan to
hire outside consultants fell through and there was no apparent progress. Since that time, Jail
staff has been working with Karen Albert retained through the Monitoring Team to develop
policies and procedures. A number of draft policies have been provided and at this time, 33
policies have been approved and 32 have been signed. It does not appear that there is a system in
the policy development process to incorporate requirements of the Settlement Agreement. There
are some concrete requirements in the Settlement Agreement that could be addressed in the draft
policies that get missed. A systematic approach to incorporating Settlement Agreement
requirements in the draft policies would be valuable. As noted above, there is the additional
concern about the actual implementation of policies that have been adopted. The new Jail
Administrator recently has been working on drafting policies and they are being submitted for
review much more quickly than previously. This should result in significant progress towards the
provisions regarding policies and procedures. There is still a major concern that even once
adopted officers are not being trained on the policies and the policies are not being implemented.
131. The County shall complete its policy and procedure review and revision within six months
of the Effective Date of this Agreement.
Non-Compliant
Thirty-three policies and procedures have now been approved and several others have been
drafted and circulated. There are many outstanding policies to be written but progress is being
made. This does not meet the deadline set by this provision.
135
132. Once the County reviews and revises its policies and procedures, the County must
provide a copy of its policies and procedures to the United States and the Monitor for review and
comment. The County must address all comments and make any changes requested by the
United States or the Monitor within thirty (30) days after receiving the comments and resubmit
the policies and procedures to the United States and Monitor for review.
Partial Compliance
Draft policies are being provided to DOJ and the Monitor for review. As noted above, many
policies still have to be written.
133. No later than three months after the United States’ approval of each policy and
procedure, the County must adopt and begin implementing the policy and procedure, while also
modifying all post orders, job descriptions, training materials, and performance evaluation
instruments in a manner consistent with the policies and procedures.
Non-Compliant
In addition to completing the development of policies, this paragraph also requires that all the
steps necessary to appropriately implement the new policies be undertaken. Not all policies have
been developed and training has not been completed on the ones that have been adopted. The
training process for the new policies will require extensive effort to develop training materials
and provide training to all staff. Although training is hampered by COVID and understaffing, it
is concerning that some supervisors seem unfamiliar with the requirements of newly adopted
policies or disinclined to ensure those policy requirements are implemented even those adopted
long before COVID began.
134. Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, all new or revised policies and procedures
must be implemented within six months of the United States’ approval of the policy or
procedure.
Partial Compliance
There have been thirty-three policies approved by DOJ and thirty-two adopted. It does not
appear that the policies have been fully incorporated into the training curriculum and some of the
procedures have not yet been implemented. Most importantly, there are many policies yet to be
drafted.
135. The County must annually review its policies and procedures, revising them as necessary.
Any revisions to the policies and procedures must be submitted to the United States and the
Monitor for approval in accordance with paragraphs 129-131 above.
Non-Compliant
136
This paragraph is now carried as non-compliant instead of not applicable because under the
timeline established by the consent decree an annual review would now be due.
COUNTY ASSESSMENT AND COMPLIANCE COORDINATOR
Paragraphs 136 through 158 on Monitor duties omitted.
159. The County must file a self-assessment compliance report. The first compliance self-
assessment report must be filed with the Court within four months of the Effective Date and at
least one month before a Monitor site visit. Each self-assessment compliance report must
describe in detail the actions the County has taken during the reporting period to implement this
Agreement and must make specific reference to the Agreement provisions being implemented.
The report must include information supporting the County’s representations regarding its
compliance with the Agreement such as quality assurance information, trends, statistical data,
and remedial activities. Supporting information should be based on reports or data routinely
collected as part of the audit and quality assurance activities required by this Agreement (e.g.,
incident, use of force, system, maintenance, and early intervention), rather than generated only to
support representations made in the self-assessment.
Non-Compliant
At the time of the October 2017 site visit, the County provided its first self-assessment. The self-
assessment was not provided prior to the May 2018 site visit. A self-assessment was provided the
week prior to the September 2018 site visit. The assessment was a significant step forward but
did not include the level of detail required by this paragraph. A self-assessment was not
provided prior to the January, May, or September, 2019 or the January, June or October 2020 or
February, 2021, June 2021or October site visit. This paragraph is now carried as Non-Compliant
based on this history. It should be noted that this requirement is not intended to be merely a
bureaucratic requirement. Internal tracking of the Settlement Agreement requirements, remedial
efforts, and progress towards the goals is a useful, if not essential, strategy in achieving
compliance. The County has provided a self-assessment of the requirements of the Stipulated
Order. However, this provision of the Settlement Agreement requires a self-assessment of
compliance with the requirements of the entire Settlement Agreement.
160. The County must designate a full-time Compliance Coordinator to coordinate compliance
activities required by this Agreement. This person will serve as a primary point of contact for
the Monitor. Two years after the Effective Date of this Agreement, the Parties may consult with
each other and the Monitor to determine whether the Compliance Coordinator’s hours may be
reduced. The Parties may then stipulate to any agreed reduction in hours.
137
The County has designated a full-time Compliance Coordinator who is coordinating

compliance activities.
EMERGENT CONDITIONS
161. The County must notify the Monitor and United States of any prisoner death, riot,
escape, injury requiring hospitalization, or over-detention of a prisoner (i.e. failure to
release a prisoner before 11:59 PM on the day she or he was entitled to be released), within
3 days of learning of the event.
Partial Compliance
Immediate notifications are being provided. Recently, the immediate notifications have not
been uploaded in a timely fashion. This has been brought to the attention of the County. The
County is not preparing incident reports or providing immediate notification of over-
detention.
Paragraphs 162-167 regarding jurisdiction, construction and the PLRA omitted.
138

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Case 3:16-cv-00489-CWR-RHWR Document 126 Filed 02/04/22 Page 1 of 27

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

HINDS COUNTY, ET AL.

FIRST ORDER OF CONTEMPT

Before CARLTON W. REEVES, District Judge.

It is now 2022. Many of the problems the Board promised to

several inmates were stabbed and a number of

staff-on-detainee violence, “dangerously low staffing levels,”

Hinds County’s efforts have borne fruit at one of its jails—the

1091 (9th Cir. 2010). By the parties’ admission, the Stipulated

to repeat it and repeatedly have to defend it in federal court.’”

optimism with the new Detention Administra-

3 The Monitoring Team reports that the (now-departed) Detention Ad-

oxygen concentrator was obtained but would not turn on be-

4 An after-action report is a way for officials and monitors to “gather facts,

identify problems, examine staff performance, and develop a plan to pre-

Once the stipulation was made, any error in col-

The purpose of judicial estoppel “is to protect the integrity of

“The contemptuous actions need not be willful so long as the

evidentiary support. Hinds County decided to commit to the

which therefore warrant contempt of Court. 7 See Petroleos

7 This Order contains the obvious shortfalls—the non-compliant provi-

Lynch v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Defendants

requirements), substantial compliance (zero requirements),

Use of Force Training

62. Reviewing supervisors must document the

Restrictions on the Use of Segregation

96. The County must develop, implement, and

being released in a timely manner. The audits

privacy rights, system security, and audit mech-

County Assessment and Compliance Coordinator

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF

VS. NO.: 3:16-CV-489-CWR-RHWR

HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS

BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO [100] ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The Court went on to note:

battleship towards a new and better heading.

and pledged his support to improve the RDC.

command staff, administrative staff and the employees.

maintenance staff and outside contractors.

be detailed in this memorandum, demonstrate their determination to make changes.

4 Robert Frost, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening.

them continue moving forward to solve the problems at hand.

the drastic, extraordinary steps it is considering taking.

controls the County’s finances.6

start her position as Detention Administrator until August 9, 2021.14

8 See Board of Supervisors, http://www.hindscountyms.com/elected-offices/board-of-supervisors (last

2020 when the [60-1] 2020 Stipulated Order was entered.17

commitment to gaining control of and turning around the facility.

A. Ongoing Efforts to Address Staffing at Raymond Detention Center

A critical aspect of serving as a detention administrator is the command staff supporting

been enrolled in training to obtain national certification as jail managers.22

enough to attempt to bring contraband into the facility.28

on December 17, 2021.31

curriculum and scheduling FTO training for early 2022.39

B. Ongoing Efforts to Protect Detainees from Harm at Raymond Detention Center

Raymond Detention Center as a direct supervision facility.40 Major Bryan’s management

As another indication of the County’s commitment to protecting detainees from harm,

event in the future.49

C. Ongoing Efforts to Improve Medical and Mental Healthcare

Health Services Administrator, Ebbonie Taylor-Winfield, was assigned to Raymond Detention

In addition, the importance of addressing issues related to mental health is being