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Gormley - Public Policy Analysis - Ideas and Impacts
Gormley - Public Policy Analysis - Ideas and Impacts
■ Abstract Both economists and political scientists have made important contri-
butions to the field of public policy analysis. Economists have stressed the roles
of competition, natural monopolies, information asymmetries, externalities, incen-
tives, and federalism in promoting or undermining efficiency. Political scientists, in
contrast, have focused more on the mechanics of agenda change, the likelihood of
nonincremental policy change, and how the policy-making process varies across is-
sue areas. Economists have influenced government decisions that led to the creation
of public utility commissions, emissions trading, revenue sharing, and health main-
tenance organizations. Political scientists have influenced government decisions on
the design of political institutions (environmental impact statements, legislative re-
districting) and on the choice of public policies (criminal justice strategies, welfare
reform). In general, the presence of a scholarly consensus facilitates the use of pol-
icy analysis. However, interest group politics and electoral incentives also play an
important role.
INTRODUCTION
The proverbial blind men asked to describe an elephant had something to grasp
or feel—a sharp tusk, a rough hide, or a quivering trunk. A sighted person asked
to describe the field of public policy analysis has a far more difficult task. The
field is ever-changing, with multiple strands, practitioners, goals, and audiences.
Unlike many academic fields, it does not spring from a single discipline. Unlike
many academic fields, it is not the exclusive province of academia but rather an
enterprise shared by universities, think tanks, advocacy groups, and governmental
institutions. Unlike that of many academic fields, its worth resides not simply in its
utility to students but also in its value to public officials and other clients. Unlike
those of many academic fields, its products are widely used and just as widely
distorted by interest groups that have their own claims to promote. Imagine an
elephant enshrouded in mist in a remote jungle accessible only to a few intrepid
explorers. That is the beast I attempt to describe here.
Public policy analysis can be defined narrowly or broadly. A relatively narrow
definition has been advanced by Weimer & Vining (1999, p. 27): client-oriented
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price takers, (c) that factors of production are perfectly mobile in the long run, and
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(d) that firms and consumers have perfect information (Frank 2006, pp. 368–69). In
practice, perfect competition is difficult to achieve or sustain. Nevertheless, many
economists have endorsed privatization, deregulation, and other options that move
in the direction of an unfettered marketplace.
For years, economists have argued that certain services (e.g., electricity) are
best provided by “natural monopolies” (e.g., public utilities), because economies
of scale make it easier for one company to supply this service within a given ju-
risdiction. This thinking, highlighting a form of market failure, led state public
utility commissions to carve out exclusive service areas for electric, natural gas,
and telephone utilities within their states. More recently, however, economists have
challenged the logic behind natural monopolies in certain areas, including tele-
phone service and electricity distribution. This led some economists to recommend
that telecommunications and electricity markets be deregulated to allow greater
competition among firms.
A similar pattern can be discerned in transportation policy. Early in the twen-
tieth century, prominent economists such as John R. Commons recommended the
creation of state commissions to regulate railroad rates because the market was
thought to be failing. The argument was that the railroad industry was too prone
to oligopoly and too vital to the national interest to be left unregulated. Later, in
the 1960s and 1970s, distinguished economists recommended the elimination or
reconstitution of bodies that determined entry and rates in the airline industry, the
trucking industry, and the railroad industry. Their central argument was that regu-
lation of price, entry, and exit often undermined economic efficiency (Meyer et al.
1959, Averch & Johnson 1962, Joskow & Noll 1981). Their preferred remedy was
deregulation, and they were virtually unanimous in that recommendation. Other
social scientists agreed. As economist Roger Noll (cited in Derthick & Quirk 1985,
p. 54) noted, “I know of no major industrial scholarly work by an economist or
political scientist or lawyer in the past 10 years that reaches the conclusion that a
particular industry would operate less efficiently and less equitably (without) than
with regulation.”
Beginning in the 1960s, some economists challenged the primacy of fee-for-
service medicine by arguing that sharp increases in health care costs were inevitable
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so long as consumers had no incentive to seek out less costly care and health
providers had no incentive to offer it. As Enthoven (1978a, p. 651) put it, “The
main cause of the unjustified and unnecessary increase in costs is the complex
of perverse incentives inherent in the tax-supported system of fee for service
for doctors, cost reimbursement for hospitals, and third-party intermediaries to
protect consumers.” The solution, he argued, was to introduce competition and
consumer choice into the health care market. In support of “health maintenance
organizations” as an alternative, Enthoven offered both theoretical arguments and
empirical evidence that HMOs achieved substantial cost savings in markets where
they flourished (Luft 1977 cited in Enthoven 1978b).
A conspicuous form of market failure noted by many economists is the presence
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of information asymmetries between the producers of goods and services and the
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consumers of goods and services. In many markets, consumers possess far less
information about the quality of a product than producers or owners do. The used
car market is a good example, as evidenced by the sale of numerous “lemons”
to unsuspecting consumers (Akerlof 1970). There are, in fact, solutions to this
problem—the provision of information, warranties, etc. To mitigate information
asymmetries, economic policy analysts have recommended better labeling of food
and drugs, consumer product alerts, and other measures to help consumers protect
themselves.
The concept of externalities is very important to economics and to policy anal-
ysis conducted by economists. When a firm produces pollutants as a byproduct
of its regular production process, it imposes uncompensated costs (negative ex-
ternalities) on those who live or work in that area. Unless government intervenes
in some fashion, private firms will generate excessive pollution because they are
not being asked to compensate those who are harmed by their pollution (Baumol
1972). Although some economists stressed that the assignment of property rights
helps to resolve externality problems (Coase 1960), most economists argued in fa-
vor of government intervention, usually through taxes, as first suggested by Pigou
(Cropper & Oates 1992).
The federal government’s approach to environmental protection in the 1970s
moved in a very different direction, as illustrated by the Clean Air Act of 1970, the
Clean Water Act of 1972, and many subsequent laws. In those statutes, the federal
government required polluters to curb their emissions and required state govern-
ments to enforce federal antipollution laws. As Cropper & Oates (1992, p. 675)
have conceded, “The economist’s view had—to the dismay of the profession—little
impact on the initial surge of legislation for the control of pollution.” In fact, some
key environmental laws explicitly prohibited the weighing of benefits and costs in
setting environmental standards. The prevailing approach for approximately two
decades, sometimes known as “command and control” regulation, represented a
triumph for lawyers and environmental groups, a defeat for economists and busi-
ness organizations.
Before and after passage of these laws, economists complained that command
and control regulation is inefficient. A better approach, they argued, would be
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firm. These permits could be traded in an open market, with the expectation that
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firms facing more costly pollution reductions would buy permits and firms facing
less costly pollution reductions would sell them. A tax (or price-based approach)
and emissions trading (or quantity-based approach) should yield identical results,
provided that perfect information is available to regulators and firms (Cropper &
Oates 1992, p. 682). In theory, such trades should result in a lower national price
tag for pollution reduction, because firms that can reduce pollution more cheaply
will do so. Carbon trading, recently promoted as a solution to global warming, is
based on the same premise. In the words of one economist, “The beauty of carbon
trading is that it takes a primal human impulse—greed—and redirects it toward
saving the planet rather than destroying it” (Goodell 2006, p. 36).
Although many propositions within economics are relevant to the design of
public policies, others are more relevant to the design of political systems. An
example is the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis, which says that residents of smaller
jurisdictions (e.g., local governments) are better able to express their preferences
than are residents of larger jurisdictions (e.g., the United States as a whole). If
the residents of Chicago think they are overtaxed, they can move to Bloomington
or Normal or a neighboring state. If the residents of Peoria would prefer more
public goods, they can move to Chicago or St. Louis. Tiebout’s conclusion is
that local governments tend to be more responsive to their citizens than other
levels of government are. This leads him to advocate greater discretion for local
governments.
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who employed the idea of punctuated equilibrium to capture the mix of stability
and change that seems to characterize public policy making in the United States.
According to these authors, the dynamic element of public policy making is most
apparent when images and venues are reconfigured. By “images” they mean the
way an issue is portrayed in the mass media and in legislative hearings; “venues”
are the exact locus of decision making. Changes in images induce changes in
venues and vice versa. The transformation of U.S. pesticides policy illustrates that
public policy agendas can change abruptly at times. During the 1960s, images of
pesticides began to change from very positive (an aid to farmers) to very negative
(a threat to the environment). Venues for decision making also began to shift,
as issues previously confined to the House and Senate agriculture committees
were taken up by committees devoted to environmental protection. These changes
contributed to the passage of important legislation aimed at reducing the use of
pesticides throughout the United States, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, Bosso 1987).
These analytic frameworks represent an important challenge to an older body
of literature in political science that stressed the prevalence of incremental de-
cision making. Studies of congressional appropriations (Wildavsky 1984) and
administrative decision making (Lindblom 1959) had found evidence of strong
institutional bias in favor of the status quo or, at best, modest departures from
the status quo. Although Kingdon and Baumgartner & Jones acknowledged the
power of inertia, they also stressed the reality of nonincremental change. Many
political scientists studying the policy-making process have embraced the ideas
of Kingdon and Baumgartner & Jones, wholeheartedly or with some reservations
(Diehl & Durant 1989, Camissa 1995, Gormley & Weimer 1999).
Whereas some political scientists have attempted to explain the functioning of
the policy-making process as a whole, others have challenged the premise behind
this undertaking. Is there in fact a single policy-making process? According to
some political scientists, the nuances of the policy-making process vary dramati-
cally and predictably. Lowi (1964) put it most emphatically when he declared that
“policy determines politics.” What he meant was not that the adoption of a policy
encourages the formation of new political coalitions (although he undoubtedly
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would agree it does) but rather that consideration of a particular issue or type of
issue by public officials carries important political consequences. For example,
presidential involvement tends to be high when redistributive issues are consid-
ered, low when distributive issues are considered, and moderate or variable when
regulatory issues are considered. Peak associations play a significant role when
substantial income transfers from the rich to the poor are under review, small inter-
est groups play a dominant role when “porkbarrel” projects are at stake, and trade
associations get involved when the government regulates private firms. Redistribu-
tive issues have many of the characteristics of a zero-sum game for society as a
whole, whereas distributive issues have many of the characteristics of a positive-
sum game. Regulatory issues have some zero-sum characteristics but only within a
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particular sector of the economy (e.g., long-distance carriers versus local telephone
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companies).
In a similar vein, Wilson (1973) advanced a different typology. Unlike Lowi,
who focused on issues or issue areas, Wilson focused on policy proposals. He
argued that the politics of a legislative proposal to protect the environment will
differ from the politics of a legislative proposal to pollute the environment. More
specifically, he urged policy analysts to consider whether the costs and benefits
of a policy proposal are widely distributed or narrowly concentrated. If costs and
benefits are narrowly concentrated, interest group politics will result, with com-
peting interest groups clashing over the specifics. If costs and benefits are widely
distributed or dispersed, majoritarian politics will emerge, with the general public
playing a significant role. If benefits are narrowly concentrated but costs are widely
distributed, clientele politics will ensue, with special interest groups dominating
the field. If benefits are widely distributed but costs are narrowly concentrated,
entrepreneurial politics will occur, with policy entrepreneurs championing the in-
terests of the general public.
Many political scientists have utilized, applied, and tested these typologies, with
good results (Wilson 1980, Ripley & Franklin 1991, Sharp 1994). Other political
scientists have developed their own typologies, focusing on salience and conflict
(Price 1978), salience and complexity (Gormley 1986), or other variables. These
typologies have also been tested and applied (Gerber & Teske 2000, Gormley &
Boccuti 2001, Eshbaugh-Soha 2006).
Although political scientists have largely defined the policy-making process
as the public policy–making process, a number of scholars have highlighted the
growing importance of nonprofit organizations and for-profit firms in delivering
services on behalf of the government (Savas 1987, Kettl 1993, Light 1995, Salamon
2002). From this literature, we have learned how attractive contracting out can be
at all levels of government but also how difficult it can be to hold contractors
accountable for what they do or fail to do. Some political scientists have also
drawn our attention to the extraordinary importance of the private sector in the
United States in providing social benefits such as pensions and health insurance to
employees. While acknowledging that the public sector accounts for a lower per-
centage of the GDP in the United States than elsewhere, Hacker (2002) notes that
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the United States looks like many other industrialized countries when one com-
bines public and private social benefits. “What is most distinctive about American
social welfare practice,” he observes, “is not the level of spending but the source”
(Hacker 2002, p. 16). This insight opens up new vistas for research as we think
more broadly about what constitutes the policy-making process.
Commons helped to convince the Wisconsin State Legislature and Governor Robert
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LaFollette to create the nation’s first (or second) public utility commission. He also
made suggestions on how the commission should be structured and later served
on it. Later in the twentieth century, economists made contributions to the design
of public utility commission policies aimed at promoting energy conservation.
Prominent economists recommended the adoption of marginal cost pricing, which
enabled utilities to charge consumers (both industries and residents) higher prices
during periods of peak demand. As chairman of the New York Public Service
Commission from 1974 to 1976, Alfred Kahn, formerly an economics professor
at Cornell University, seized every opportunity available to promote the virtues
of marginal cost pricing. At daily swims, with only his head visible, he would
lecture staff members on the finer points of cross-subsidies, elastic demand, and
peak-load pricing (McCraw 1984, p. 247). By the early 1980s, most state public
utility commissions had incorporated marginal cost pricing principles into their
rate structures (Gormley 1983).
Economic thinking also contributed significantly to debates at the federal level
over airline deregulation (and surface transportation deregulation). In 1975, Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy (D–Massachusetts) held hearings on the airline industry, with
assistance from an able staff member, Stephen Breyer, a Harvard law professor who
took a leave of absence to work on these issues (Breyer is now a Supreme Court
justice). These hearings were instrumental in establishing a connection between
economic theory, empirical evidence, and proposals to deregulate the airline in-
dustry. As Derthick & Quirk (1985, p. 54) have pointed out, deregulation benefited
“from having a broad base of support in academic opinion and analysis. In one way
or another, the intellectual premises of this policy prescription had been adopted
to an exceptional degree by academics, especially in the elite universities.” While
some academics made the case against regulation by invoking “capture theory”—
an idea promoted by both economists and political scientists—others relied more
on marginal cost pricing as the justification. Alfred Kahn, appointed by President
Jimmy Carter to chair the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1977, became a staunch
advocate of deregulating the airline industry and abolishing his own agency. Dur-
ing his tenure as chair, Kahn initiated significant deregulatory policies, including
rate competition, open entry, and new route authority (McCraw 1984, p. 290).
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The passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 represented the triumph of
economic thinking in both the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government. As Derthick & Quirk put it (1985, p. 246): “If economists had not
made the case for procompetitive deregulation, it would not have occurred—at
least not on the scale the nation has witnessed.”
As noted above, the environmental legislation of the 1970s reflected the tri-
umph of legalistic rather than economic thinking. The Clean Air Act of 1970
and the Clean Water Act of 1972 embodied the principle of “command and con-
trol” regulation; both statutes explicitly stated that a benefit-cost analysis was not
to be applied when formulating environmental regulations—a stinging rebuke to
economists. Over time, however, critics contended that such environmental laws
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were overly costly and inefficient. A new approach was adopted with the Clean Air
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in a New Jersey Superior Court case aimed at increasing state outlays on early
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childhood education in poorer school districts. Barnett’s testimony cited two long-
term studies (the Perry Preschool Project and the Abecedarian Project) that had
found substantial long-term benefits from high-quality early-childhood interven-
tions aimed at disadvantaged children. He recommended at least one year of state-
funded preschool for disadvantaged children. In an opinion mandating two years of
preschool for children in disadvantaged school districts, the Superior Court cited
Barnett’s analysis approvingly and at some length (Abbott v. Burke 1998, Appendix
I). Later the New Jersey Supreme Court would affirm the lower court’s decision
(Abbott v. Burke 1998). Thanks to these and other decisions, New Jersey now
guarantees a high-quality pre-kindergarten education to children in poor school
districts (Barnett et al. 2005).
To cite another example, economist Orley Ashenfelter was hired by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to conduct an econometric analysis of the probable
impact of a proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot, two of the largest
office supply firms in the United States. That analysis, which found evidence of
anticompetitive effects and probable price increases, helped to convince the FTC
to oppose the merger (Baker 1999). A federal district court judge, who considered
the case, cited Ashenfelter’s econometric evidence as a key reason for his decision
to ban the proposed merger (FTC v. Staples 1997).
Some of these reforms have proven more durable and more successful than
others. According to Patashnik (2007), the durability of a given reform depends
on two key factors: group investments in favorable institutions (modest or exten-
sive) and group identities and affiliations (stable or unstable). Tax reforms enacted
in 1986 have eroded over time, because social actors failed to make large-scale
investments in the war against tax loopholes and because group affiliations have
remained largely untouched. In contrast, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
has led to a major reconfiguration of the airline industry and customer behavior,
because interest group affiliations and identities have changed and because the in-
stitutional environment changed profoundly as well. As Patashnik (2007, p. 285)
cautions, “Sustaining market-oriented reforms against the threats of erosion and
reversal may be, if anything, an even more challenging political task than winning
the passage of these reforms in the first place.”
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the state of the environment” (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 116). Later in the same Senate
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hearing, the chairman, Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson (D–Washington) told Cald-
well that he would be calling on him “for some specific language to implement
what we have discussed here this afternoon” (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 121).
Based on Caldwell’s advice, Congress included a little-noticed provision requir-
ing federal agencies to prepare an “environmental impact statement” (EIS) when
their proposed rules or actions threatened substantial harm to the environment. The
EIS would become legendary (or infamous, depending on your point of view), be-
cause it sensitized agencies—not just environmental agencies—to environmental
considerations. Eventually, the EIS requirement led federal agencies to hire huge
numbers of professionals who would bring to their job a much greater awareness
of environmental impacts. The EIS requirement also advantaged environmental
groups seeking some leverage with which to file a successful lawsuit to block a
federal agency decision that might adversely affect air quality or water quality.
In his powerful 1969 book The End of Liberalism, Lowi argued that Congress
had delegated too much power to the federal bureaucracy. Congress, it seemed,
preferred delegating to legislating. Not only was that a bad practice, asserted Lowi
(1969), but it was also unconstitutional, a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
Lowi’s constitutional arguments have not impressed the Supreme Court in recent
years, although they have occasionally been articulated (Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations 2001). However, his arguments about legislation seem to
have impressed Congress. During the 1970s, following publication of Lowi’s book,
Congress passed many environmental and consumer protection laws, which were
noteworthy for their detail. Although these statutes were not sufficiently detailed
or specific to satisfy Lowi and other critics, they nevertheless reflected a substantial
shift from the status quo. Lowi’s book, more widely read than most political science
books, probably played a role in that shift.
Political scientists have long been interested in legislative redistricting and
the consequences of reapportionment decisions, especially for minority voters.
One question that has generated interest in recent years is whether the creation
of “majority-minority” districts benefits or harms racial minorities. Some politi-
cal scientists have argued that it is better for minorities to wield some influence
over voting outcomes in a larger number of legislative districts than to be able
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DISCUSSION
In Politics and the Professors, Aaron (1978) offered a bleak assessment of the role
of public policy analysts in evaluating Great Society programs. The Head Start
program, he noted, received some negative evaluations, yet the program remained
enormously popular. The Job Corps program received mixed reviews, yet the
program was curtailed. The college work-study program was not evaluated at all,
yet it remains very popular. The connection between public policy evaluation and
public policy, he argued, was tenuous at best.
I am more optimistic about the capacity of public policy analysis to shape pub-
lic policy outputs. Both economists and political scientists have made important
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How might we explain the adoption of some policy proposals ostensibly sup-
ported by empirical research, and the defeat of others? In thinking about the appli-
cations of public policy research, Esterling (2004) has developed a useful analytic
framework that stresses the extent of consensus among academics and other experts
in the relevant field. According to Esterling, the presence of good, unambiguous
empirical research in support of a policy proposal enables interest group advocates
to make both instrumental and normative arguments in favor of the policy proposal,
whereas opponents must content themselves with normative arguments alone. This
enhances the influence of interest groups that support the policy at the expense of
interest groups that oppose it. Esterling argues that where a consensus exists, public
policy analysis is much more likely to have an impact, and he cites the debate over
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is far less likely to have an impact, as he sees in the debate over school vouchers.
Thus, part of the explanation for the defeat of some ideas is that the empirical
evidence is either weak or inconclusive. The school voucher debate is a classic
example of a policy dispute characterized by dueling experts. Each paper produced
by one of these experts is sure to be skewered by someone from the opposing side.
Under such circumstances, experts are much more likely to provide “ammunition”
to opposing sides in the debate than to change anyone’s thinking on how to proceed.
Of course, providing ammunition is itself an important role. Whiteman (1985)
would call this kind of use of policy research “strategic” rather than “substantive.”
If one side provides better ammunition than another, its views may prevail, at least
at the margins. At both the federal and state levels, the strategic use of policy
information appears to be quite common (Mooney 1992, Whiteman 1995). Even
if empirical research on a particular issue is ambiguous, the failure of one side to
publicize its research can be detrimental to that side’s point of view.
Still, there is much more to policy making than ideas and empirical evidence.
Consider, for example, gun control. A substantial body of empirical literature sup-
ports the proposition that guns account for a high number of fatalities every year
and that gun control laws could diminish the number of homicides considerably
(Cook & Ludwig 2006). Public support for gun control legislation is high. Yet
Congress, under pressure from the gun lobby, has resisted passing meaningful gun
control legislation (Goss 2006). It is here that political science makes a contribu-
tion. Sometimes interest groups matter, not because of their ideas or the evidence
they muster, but because they are well-organized, well-financed, and persistent. Or
consider legislative redistricting. Here the problem is not strong interest groups but
legislators who place reelection above all other goals. In short, Esterling’s frame-
work is useful but incomplete. Evidence and ideas matter more when a scholarly
consensus exists, but they also matter more when public officials are inclined to
pursue the goal of good public policy at the expense of other goals. Policy analysis
flourishes best when public officials are capable of looking beyond the next inter-
est group contribution and the next election. The ability of economics—and other
disciplines—to shape public policy depends in part on the characteristics of the
political system that political scientists take great pains to describe and understand.
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on which public policies should be adopted, how they should be implemented, and
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how the process itself should be restructured. This is a strong foundation on which
to build in the twenty-first century.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author thanks Joanna Mikulski for her helpful research assistance.
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April 9, 2007 10:54 Annual Reviews ANRV312-FM
CONTENTS
STATE REPRESSION AND POLITICAL ORDER, Christian Davenport
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1
BRINGING THE COURTS BACK IN: INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVES ON
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v
P1: JRX
April 9, 2007 10:54 Annual Reviews ANRV312-FM
vi CONTENTS
INDEXES
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1–10 391
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 1–10 394
ERRATA
An online log of corrections Annual Review of Political Science chapters
(if any, 1997 to the present) may be found at http://polisci.annualreviews.org/
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