1. Right to enjoy (jus utendi); (NCC, Art.

428)
2. Right to the fruits (jus fruendi);
3. Right to abuse (jus abutendi);
4. Right to dispose (jus dispodendi); (NCC Art. 428)
5. Right to recover (jus vindicandi); (NCC. Art. 428)
6. Right to accessories (jus accessiones); and
7. Right to possess (jus possidendi).
8. Right to exclude (NCC, Art. 429)
9. Right to enclose (NCC, Art. 430)
Lease merely follows the property as a lien or encumbrance
Q: On April 15, 1991, Nicolasa authorized her daughter, Carmelita, Artemio's sister, to mortgage the
subject property to Jose, the predecessor-in-interest of Jose, Jose Jr. and Virginia in order to secure a
loan in the amount of P112,000.00. As Nicolasa failed to settle her loan obligation when it fell due,
Jose, led an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 72 (RTC), docketed as Case No. 07-0-91. After the requirements of posting,
notices, and publication were complied with, the subject property was sold at a public auction, where
Jose emerged as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thus issued in his favor. The period of
redemption expired without the subject property being redeemed; hence, a Final Bill of Sale was
issued and registered in Jose's name. Thereafter, the latter executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership. This notwithstanding, Nicolasa persisted in her occupancy of the subject property and
refused to deliver possession to Jose. Is the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued by the RTC
is valid?
A: Yes. "It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the
absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one [(1)] year from the registration of the
certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem. As absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership
over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, not least of which is possession, or jus
possidendi[.]"
It should be clarified that the purpose of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the mortgagee who has already shown a prima facie
right of ownership over the subject property (based on his consolidated title over the same) his incidental
right to possess the foreclosed property. To reiterate, " [p]ossession being an essential right of the owner with
which he is able to exercise the other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right."
Thus, it is only upon a credible showing by a third party claimant of his independent right over the foreclosed
property that the law's prima facie deference to the mortgagee's consolidated title should not prevail. Verily,
a mere claim of ownership would not suffice. As jurisprudence prescribes, the demonstration by the third
party-claimant should be made within the context of an adversarial hearing, where the basic principles of
Evidence and Civil Procedure ought to be followed, such as: (1) it is the claimant who has the burden of
proving his claim; (2) the claim must be established through a preponderance of evidence; and (3) evidence
not presented or formally offered cannot be admitted against the opposing party. In this case, none of these
principles were followed for the CA considered evidence that were not only submitted in a totally different
case against an entirely different party, but are also innately inadequate to — at least — prima facie show the
source of the third party claimant's independent title, all to the detriment of the mortgagee who had already
consolidated his title to the contested property.(Heirs of Peñaflor v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 197797, August 8, 2017)
REMEDIES TO RECOVER POSSESSION
Legal remedies to recover possession of one’s property
1. Personal property – Replevin
2. Real property
a. Accion Interdictal;
i. Forcible entry; or
ii. Unlawful detainer.
b. Accion Publiciana; or
c. Accion Reinvindicatoria.
3. Ancillary remedies common to both
a. Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; or
b. Writ of possession.
Q: Spouses Gregorio and Rosario Centeno previously owned the subject lots, which they mortgaged in
favor of Rural Bank of Sta. PROPERTY
145
Barbara, Inc. as security for a P1,753.65 loan. Sps. Centeno, however, defaulted on the loan, prompting
the bank to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Consequently, the subject lots were
sold to the bank, being the highest bidder at the auction sale.Sps. Centeno failed to redeem the subject
lots within the one-year redemption period pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135. Yet, they still
continued with the possession and cultivation of the aforesaid properties.
Gerry Centeno, son of Sps. Centeno, later on purchased the said lots from his parents. Accordingly,
Rosario paid the capital gains taxes on the sale transaction and tax declarations were eventually
issued in the name of Gerry.
On March 19, 1998, Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara, Inc. filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the trial court, claiming entitlement to the said writ by virtue of the Final Deed of
Sale covering the subject lots. Gerry opposed the petition, arguing that he purchased and has, in fact,
been in actual, open and exclusive possession of the same properties for at least 15 years. Is the Rural
Bank of Sta. Barbara, Inc. is entitled to a writ of possession over the subject lots?
A: Yes. It is well-established that after consolidation of title in the purchasers’ name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a
confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of
title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it
appears that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor.
Gerry Centeno acquired the subject lots from his parents, Sps. Centeno, on March 14, 1988 after they were
purchased by Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara, Inc. and its Certificate of Sale at Public Auction was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City in 1971. It cannot therefore be disputed that Gerry is a mere successor-in-
interest of Sps. Centeno. Consequently, he cannot be deemed as a third party who is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor under legal contemplation.(Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara, Inc. v.
Gerry Centeno, G.R. 200667, March 11, 2013)
Q: On June 26, 2003, petitioner Teodorico A. Zaragoza (petitioner) bought a 3,058-square meter (sq.
m.) parcel of land. His father leased a 1,000-sq. m. portion of Lot 937-A (subject land) to respondent
Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc. (respondent. This notwithstanding, petitioner allowed the lease to subsist
and respondent had been diligent in paying its monthly rent amounting to P10,000.00 per month.
Petitioner claimed that when his father died, respondent stopped paying rent. On the other hand,
respondent maintained that it was willing to pay rent, but was uncertain as to whom payment should
be made. Respondent made a consignation on the RTC br. 24 for the amount of P521,396.89
equivalent for the rent of February 2007 to March 2011. Petitioner averred that the amount was
insufficient to cover the unpaid rentals plus interests from February 2007 to May 2011. Petitioner
clarified that his earlier demand to pay was for the period of February 2007 to May 2011. Thus,
petitioner posited that respondent had continuously failed and refused to comply with the terms and
conditions of the lease contract concerning the payment of monthly rental. May petitioner eject
respondent from the subject land?
A: Yes. For an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first, initially, the
defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease contract; second, such
possession eventually became illegal, either due to the latter's violation of the provisions of the said lease
contract or the termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained in possession of the leased
premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor enjoyment thereof; and fourth, there must be a
demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and that the suit is brought within one (1) year from the last
demand.
In this case, all requisites have been indubitably complied with, considering that at the time the suit was instituted
on June 21, 2011: (a) there was a subsisting lease contract [46] between petitioner and respondent; (b) , respondent
was not updated in its monthly rental payments, as there is no evidence of such payment for the months of April,
May, and even June 2011-- said omission constitutes a violation of the lease contract on the part of respondent; (c)
respondent was still in possession of the subject land; and (d) the case was filed within one (1) year from
petitioner's letter dated May 24, 2011 demanding that respondent pay monthly rentals and at the same time,
vacate the subject land. (Teodorico Zaragoza