Flight Attendants (F ASAP) v.
PAL SUPRA a second motion for reconsideration authorizes
2018
General Fule: 2nd MR is prohibited
Exception: Higher interest of justice
(Fernandez)
FACTS;
Wala nang material facts, direct to the procedural
points since this is a Resolution.
Resolving the appeal of F ASAP, the Third
Division of the Court promulgated its decision on
July 22, 2008 reversing the decision promulgated
on August 23, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA)
and entering a new one finding PAL guilty of
unlawful retrenchment (labor).
PAL filed MR - Denied through Resolution
PAL filed MR on the SC Resolution - Denied
PAL filed second MR. Meanwhile, J. Ynares-
Santiago, writer of the resolution retired. Case
was then raffled to Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.. Justice Velasco, Jr. subsequently inhibited
himself from the case due to personal reasons —
was again re-raffled to Justice Arturo D. Brion.
Eventually, Second Division (Brion) denied with
finality PAL’s Second Motion for Reconsideration.
Thereafter, PAL, through Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza, its collaborating counsel, sent a series
of letters inquiring into the propriety of the
successive transfers of the case. — (As you may
have already noticed since 1st year, Estelito
Mendoza is more supreme than the Supreme
Court - So the SC EN BANC recalled Brion’s
resolution.
ISSUE: WON the filing of a 2nd MR is proper.
Yes.
HELD:
With the Court’s resolution of January 20, 2010
granting PAL’s motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration, PAL's Second Motion
for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22,
2008 could no longer be challenged as a
prohibited pleading. It is already settled that the
granting of the motion for leave to file and admit
the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thereby, the second motion for
reconsideration is no longer a prohibited
pleading, and the Court cannot deny it on such
basis alone.
Nonetheless, we should stress that the rule
prohibiting the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration is by no means absolute.
Although Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court
disallows the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration, 59the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court (IRSC) allows an exception, to
wit:
Section 3. Second motion for
reconsideration. - The Court shall not
entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this
rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of justice by the Court en bane
upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its
actual membership. There is
reconsideration "in the higher interest of
justice" when the assailed decision is not
only legally erroneous, but is likewise
patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable
injury or damage to the parties. A second
motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation
of law or by the Court's declaration.
The conditions that must concur in order for the
Court to entertain a second motion for
reconsideration are the following, namely: 1. The
motion should satisfactorily explain why granting
the same would be in the higher interest of justice;
2. The motion must be made before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered attains finality; 3. If the
ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by
the Court through one of its Divisions, at least
three members of the Division should vote to
elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and 4. The
favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court
En Bane’s actual membership must be mustered
for the second motion for reconsideration to be
granted.60
PAL maintains that the July 22, 2008 decision
contravened prevailing jurisprudence 62that had
recognized its precarious financial condition;63
that the decision focused on PAL’s inability to
prove its financial losses due to its failure to
submit audited financial statements; that the
decision ignored the common findings on the
serious financial losses suffered by PAL made by
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, the CA and even the
SEC;64 and that the decision and the subsequent
resolution denying PAL’s motion for
reconsideration would negate whatever financial
progress it had achieved during its
rehabilitation.65 These arguments of PAL sufficed
to show that the assailed decision contravened
settled jurisprudence on PAL’s precarious
financial condition. It cannot be gainsaid that
there were other businesses undergoing
rehabilitation that would also be bound or
negatively affected by the July 22, 2008 decision.
This was the higher interest of justice that the
Court sought to address, which the dissent by
Justice Leonen is adamant not to accept. 66Hence,
we deemed it just and prudent to allow PAL’s
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of July 22, 2008.

WHEREFORE, CA is Affirmed. Abswelto ang

PAL. Estelito Mendoza is king.

Sumiran v. Spouses Damaso
2009
Re: Neypes Doctrine
(Fernandez)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages with prayer for preliminary attachment
(Civil Case No. 93-2588) against respondents
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 73. Petitioner is also the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and
92-8158 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
with respondent Generoso Damaso as accused.
Upon motion of respondents, said civil and
criminal cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
RTC decided in favor of Damasos
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated
March 4, 2003 - denied
On May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that
he received a copy of the decision dated January
16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of the Order
dated May 9, 2003 denying his motion for
reconsideration on May 19, 2003.
- Denied for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE:
WON the appeal was filed on time. YES.
HELD:
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals5 that by virtue of
the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal
and create new procedural rules in all courts, the
Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing or
denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15
days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.6
The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted from receipt of notice of
judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order"
appealed from.
With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period
within which to file the notice of appeal was
counted from notice of the denial of the therein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant
may now file his notice of appeal either within
fifteen days from receipt of the original decision
or within fifteen days from the receipt of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration.
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh
period" rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for
appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it
prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which
an appeal may be made in the event that the
motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower
court. Following the rule on retroactivity of
procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be
applied to pending actions, such as the present
case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. CA reversed.

Ross Rica Sales Center v. Spouses Ong
2005
The [subsequent] filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective
withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.
(Fernandez)
FACTS:
The case originated from a complaint for
ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents.
Petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of
three (3) parcels of land. Petitioners likewise
acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong’s
ownership of the lots previous to theirs. Ross Rica
Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc.
(petitioners) had acquired the lands from
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. In turn, it appears
that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired
the properties from the respondents through a
Deed of Absolute Sale. this latter deed of sale and
The transfers of title consequential thereto were
subsequently sought to be annulled by
respondents.
MTC ordered respondents to vacate.
RTC affirmed.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of
appeal. However, on the following day, they filed
a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Was the RTC was correct when it declared that
the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the
filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how
erroneous the latter mode was? YES.
HELD:
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in
this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for
filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may
file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same
time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful
fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00 for
costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy
of the petition. The petition shall be filed
and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after judgment. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant
an additional period of fifteen (15) days
only within which to file the petition for
review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with
the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
should have filed a Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC. However, we consider this to have been
remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of
right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief.
Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an
effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of
Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the
Motion for Reconsideration and started to run
again from the receipt of the order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for
Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise
filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion
for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request
for additional period, it is clear that respondents
filed their Petition for Review on time.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal
from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the
notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if
no appeal was interposed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January
1998 is REVERSED
Intramuros v. Offshore Construction
2018
The remedy from an adverse decision rendered
by a Regional Trial Court exercising its appellate
jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review
with the Court of Appeals.
(Fernandez)
FACTS:
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties
of the national government, which it
administered to Offshore Construction. During
the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to
pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several
demand letters. 15Intramuros tolerated the
continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore
Construction would pay its arrears. Offshore
Construction continued to fail to pay its arrears.
On March 26, 2010, Offshore Construction
received Intramuros' latest demand letter.
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before
the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court.
Offshore Construction filed a Very Urgent
Motion, 21praying that Intramuros' complaint be
dismissed on the grounds of violation of the rule
on non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over
the case, and litis pendentia.
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that
Intramuros committed forum shopping and that
it had no jurisdiction over the case
RTC affirmed.
On June 16, 2011, Intramuros filed its Petition for
Review on Certiorari, assailing the April 14, 2011
Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
WON Certiorari was the correct remedy. NO.
HELD:
At the outset, petitioner should have filed a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court to assail the Regional Trial Court's ruling
upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court October
19, 2010 Order instead of filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this
Court.
Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the
remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a
Regional Trial Court exercising its appellate
jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review
with the Court of Appeals:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for
filing. -A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees, depositing the amount of
₱500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse
party with a copy of the petition. The
petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision sought to be reviewed or of the
denial of petitioner's motion for new trial
or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket
and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period
of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the
 most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.

Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the

findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court that it
has no jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint
and that petitioner committed forum shopping
when it failed to disclose two (2) pending cases,
one filed by respondent Offshore Construction
and the other filed by respondent's group of
tenant. Both of these cases raise questions of law,
which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a
petition for review under Rule 42.

"A question of law exists when the law applicable

to a particular set of facts is not settled, whereas a
question of fact arises when the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts is in doubt."67 This Court has
ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject matter of a complaint 68and the existence
of forum shopping 69are questions of law.

A petition for review under Rule 42 may include

questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. This Court has recognized that the
power to hear cases on appeal in which only
questions of law are raised is not vested
exclusively in this Court. 71As provided in Rule
42, Section 2, errors of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court
in its decision must be specified in the petition for
review.

Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, instead of

to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review
as sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle
of hierarchy of courts.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is

not inviolable, and this Court has provided
several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these
exceptions is the exigency of the situation being
litigated.Here, the controversy between the
parties has been dragging on since 2010, which
should not be the case when the initial dispute-an
ejectment case-is, by nature and design, a
summary procedure and should have been
resolved with expediency.

Thus, petitioner's resort to this Court is proper

and warranted under the circumstances.

Mackay v. Angeles
(2003)
Suffice it to say that the rule is well settled that in
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only errors of law may be raised.
(Fernandez)
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed as regular administrator
of the intestate estate of deceased Eufrocina G.
Mackay on March 20, 1996. After nearly twenty-
four (24) months following his appointment,
however, petitioner had not submitted the
requisite inventory of estate assets and liabilities,
nor had he paid the taxes due on the estate. This
delay prompted private respondent Antonio G.
Mackay to file an urgent motion on March 10,
1998 for the removal of petitioner as regular
administrator.
Order 9 was issued by Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles on July 15, 1998 relieving petitioner as
administrator of the estate and appointing private
respondent as his substitute.
MR - the court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for utter lack of merit.
Petitioner filed on October 8, 1998, with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. - dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN RESOLVING ISSUES WHICH ARE PROPER
SUBJECT OF APPEAL (ORDINARY APPEAL)
AND NOT RAISED IN THE PETITION. NO.
HELD:
Suffice it to say that the rule is wellsettled that in
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only errors of law may be raised. 20 The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. 21
Certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45
should be distinguished from certiorari as an
original action under Rule 65. In an appeal by
certiorari, the petition is based on questions of
law which the appellant desires the appellate
court to resolve. In certiorari as an original action,
the only question that may be raised is whether or
not the lower court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 22
An allegation of grave abuse of discretion like the
one made by the petitioner here, being beyond
the scope of appeals by certiorari, deserves scant
consideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED

Purcon v. MRM Philippines
(2008)
A petition for relief from judgment is not an
available remedy in the Supreme Court.
(Fernandez)
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by
petitioner for reimbursement of medical expenses,
sickness allowance and permanent disability
benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint for utter lack of
merit —> MR —> Dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. CA dismissed the case
due to formal infirmities. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. On September 29,
2006, the CA resolution became final and
executory.
Petitioner filed with Supremer Court a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 —> denied.
On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant
petition for relief from judgment interposing the
following grounds:
The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed
a GROSS MISTAKE
ISSUE: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure from SC resolution denying his
petition for review? NO.
HELD:
We answer in the negative. A petition for relief
from judgment is not an available remedy in the
Supreme Court.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that
when a judgment or final order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, a party in any court may file a petition
for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
enumerates the original cases cognizable by the
Supreme Court.
In Dela Cruz v. Andres,10 We reiterated Our
pronouncement in Mesina v. Meer,11 that a
petition for relief from judgment is not an
available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. The Court explained that under
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60)
days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order or other proceeding to be set aside and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner’s
good and substantial cause of action or defense,
as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be
filed with the same court which rendered the
decision.
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court,"
it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional Trial Courts. As revised, Rule 38
radically departs from the previous rule as it now
allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court
which decided the case or issued the order to hear
the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a
petition for relief from the judgment or final order
of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court.

Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme

Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court.15 It may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court
nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA.

There is no provision in the Rules of Court

making the petition for relief applicable in the CA
or this Court. The procedure in the CA from
Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45
which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies
the remedies available before said Court such as
annulment of judgments or final orders or
resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a
petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.

If a petition for relief from judgment is not among

the remedies available in the CA, with more
reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in
the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, which are beyond the
concerns of this Court.

Republic v. Spouses Castro
(2011)
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party
can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47,
i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and
resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one
must have failed to move for new trial in, or
appeal from, or file a petition for relief against
said issuances or take other appropriate remedies
thereon, through no fault attributable to him.
(Fernandez)
FACTS:
The Director of the Bureau of Lands, now Lands
Management Bureau (LMB), Manila issued on
July 13, 1955 Free Patent No. V-16555 in the name
of Marcelino Manipon (Manipon).
On the basis of the free patent, the Register of
Deeds of Oriental Mindoro issued on March 5,
1957 Original Certificate of Title.
An investigation conducted by the
representatives of LMB, Manila on the issuance of
Free Patent No. V-16555 showed that the lot is not
an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through
the Office of the Solicitor General, 1 filed in 1998 a
Complaint2 for "Cancellation of TCT No. T-33730
and Reversion" against Manipon and herein
respondents, as well as the Register of Deeds.
Respondents failed to file their answer to the
complaint despite receipt of summons, hence,
they were declared in defaulT.
RTC in favor of the Republic —> became final
and executory. —> RTC issued writ of execution.
On March 15, 2007, respondents filed a petition
for annulment of judgment of the trial court’s
decision of October 9, 2002 before the Court of
Appeals (CA) on grounds that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manipon as he had
been dead when petitioner’s complaint was filed.
- denied.
Respondents maintain that they did not receive a
copy of the trial court’s decision of October 9,
2002 and that they came to know of it only on
September 29, 2005 when the trial court’s sheriff
personally served upon them a copy of the writ of
execution of the decision.
ISSUE: WON Annulment of Judgment is a proper
remedy for Respondents. NO.
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the remedy of annulment
of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a
Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be
availed of where "the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner." A petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a
remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his
part, has failed to avail of the ordinary or other
appropriate remedies provided by law. Such
action is never resorted to as a substitute for a
party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of
the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.

Upon notice of the writ of execution on, by

respondents’ own information, September 29,
2005, respondents – if indeed they were
completely unaware of the trial court’s decision –
had available remedies to question it. They could
have promptly filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution or, in the alternative, a petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38. That they had
ample opportunity to do so is gathered from the
fact that the writ of execution of the decision was
not immediately implemented by the sheriff as it
was satisfied only on July 20, 2006. Having failed
to avail of any of the aforesaid remedies without
any justification, respondents are barred from
resorting to the action for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47.

Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party

can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47,
i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and
resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one
must have failed to move for new trial in, or
appeal from, or file a petition for relief against
said issuances or take other appropriate remedies
thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he
failed to avail of those cited remedies without
sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the
action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for
otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction
or negligence
In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to
avail of the ordinary and appropriate remedies in
assailing the questioned judgments of the trial
court, but he also failed to show to the satisfaction
of this Court that he could not have availed of the
ordinary and appropriate remedies under the
Rules.
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 137122, November 15, 2000
A motion contesting a late appeal may be filed
before the appellate court even after the
transmittal of the records therein—the legality
of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court, and the
latter is not precluded from dismissing the
petition on the ground of its being out of time.
 Respondents filed an action for
reconveyance and recovery of parcels of
land against petitioner Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., and its co-defendants
United Housing Corporation, Victorino
Hernandez, heirs of Aurelio de Leon, and
heirs of Nicolas Gatchalian.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint for that it was barred from assailing the
lack of merit and having been barred by the timeliness of the appeal and in granting
statute of limitations and by laches. respondent's motion for new trial long
 Respondents received a copy of the after the decision of the trial court had
decision on 04 July 1983. On 19 July 1983, already become final and executory.
the last day of the prescribed fifteen-day  The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
period for appeal, private respondents filed on the ground that petitioner was estopped
a motion for new trial and/or by laches from assailing the notice of
reconsideration. The motion was denied by appeal which had meanwhile been given
the trial court in its order of 03 October due course by the trial court.
1989. A copy of the order was received by
respondents on 28 November 1989. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
 On 07 December 1989, respondents filed a erred in disregarding the well-entrenched rule
notice of appeal and, on 11 December in this jurisdiction that the perfection of an
1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal within the time prescribed by law is
appeal and directed the transmittal of the jurisdictional and as such it can be assailed at
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. anytime.
The records of the case were not
transmitted to the appellate court due to HELD:
missing transcript of stenographic notes.
On 23 April 1996, the trial court required
 Petitioner maintains that compliance with
the parties to appear in conference. Almost
the reglementary period for perfecting an
a year had lapsed but the missing
appeal is not merely mandatory but
stenographic notes were still not submitted
jurisdictional, and it is never too late to
to the trial court.
assail the timeliness of an appeal.
 On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a
Respondents urges the Court to sustain the
motion for new trial for the retaking and
assailed decision asseverating that in view
presentation of testimonial and
of the meritorious character of their
documentary evidence on the ground that
appeal, a stringent application of the rules
the reconstitution of the missing
would defeat substantial justice.
stenographic notes was no longer possible
considering that the court stenographers
 This rule has been substantially
who had transcribed the testimony of
reproduced in Section 3, Rule 41 of the
witnesses by then since retired from the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus: "Sec. 3.
service, their whereabouts unknown.
Period of Ordinary Appeal - The appeal
 On 22 April 1997, petitioner filed a motion
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
to dismiss the appeal and an opposition to
notice of the judgment or final order
the motion for new trial filed by
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
respondents contending that the appeal
required, the appellant shall file a notice of
was filed out of time and that the remedy
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
for new trial could not be availed of since it
(30) days from notice of the judgment or
was filed long after the reglementary
final order."The period of appeal shall be
period to appeal had lapsed.
interrupted by a timely motion for new
 The trial court granted the Motion for New
trial or reconsideration. No motion for
Trial of plaintiffs being based on
extension of time to file a motion for
meritorious grounds. the Motion to Dismiss
new trial or reconsideration shall be
Appeal filed by defendant Manila Memorial
allowed."
Park is hereby DENIED.
 Petitioner elevated the matter via a petition
 Accordingly, when respondents filed their
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
motion for reconsideration on the last day
insisting that the trial court had acted
of the fifteen day prescribed period for
capriciously and whimsically, as well as
taking an appeal, which motion was
with grave abuse of discretion amounting
subsequently denied, they only had one (1)
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in holding
day from receipt of a copy of the order
 denying the motion for reconsideration,
within which to perfect their appeal, i.e.,
excluding the day of receipt and including
the next day. Since respondents had
received a copy of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration on 28
November 1989, the filing of the notice
of appeal on 07 December 1989 came
much too late for by then the judgment
had already become final and executory.
 The perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period prescribed by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon
the court a quo, and the failure to perfect
that appeal renders its judgment final and
executory. A fundamental precept is that
the reglementary periods under the Rules
are to be strictly observed for being
considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and an orderly
discharge of judicial business. The strict
compliance with such periods has more
than once been held to be imperative,
particularly and most significantly in
respect to the perfection of appeals. The
finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon
the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal if no appeal is perfected, and the
court loses all jurisdiction over the case,
and it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court concerned to order execution of the
judgment.  After the judgment has become
final and executory, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as the
losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, so also the
winning party has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the
case.
 The Court is not unmindful of highly
exceptional cases where it has allowed a
relaxation of the rules on the application of
the reglementary periods of appeal.
 Not being a natural right or a part of due
process, but merely a statutory privelege,
the right to appeal may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with rules
provided therefor. A failure to perfect an
appeal within the prescribed period has the
effect of rendering final the judgment of a
court, and an appellee's failure to file a
motion for dismissal of appeal in the court
of origin before the transmittal of the
record to the appellate court does not
constitute a waiver on his part to interpose
such objection.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner be now held
estopped from assailing the timeliness of the appeal
after the lapse of almost eight years from the time
the notice of appeal was approved by the trial court
on 11 December 1989?
HELD:
 In Dequito, defendant-appellees moved to
dismiss the appeal after plaintiff-appellant
Dequito had filed his appeal brief with the
appellate court and solely on the ground
that the record on appeal did not disclose
on its face that the appeal was timely
perfected. Similarly, in Carillo, petitioners
had already submitted their brief when the
respondents tried to question the
timeliness of the appeal, and there was no
showing that the appeal was interposed
beyond the reglementary period for its
filing. In the instant case, respondents
had not once denied that their appeal
was, in fact, interposed beyond the
prescribed period.
 The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on,
and has its origin in equity which, broadly
defined, is justice according to natural law
and right. It is a principle intended to avoid
a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly
distinguishable from a waiver of right.
Estoppel, like its counterpart, must be
unequivocal and intentional for, when
misapplied, it can easily become a
convenient and effective means of injustice.
Estoppel is not understood to be a principle
that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but,
as it concededly is, a mere exception from
the standard legal norms of general
application that can be invoked only in
highly exceptional and justifiable cases.
 Petitioner could not be faulted for its
failure to move for the dismissal of the
appeal at an earlier time acting upon the
assumption, albeit erroneously, that the
appeal was filed on time relying on the
order, dated 11 December 1989, of the
trial court declaring that the notice of
appeal had been filed within the
reglementary period. Neither can the
conduct of petitioner's counsel during
the conference called by and held before
 the trial court be regarded as a waiver
of its right to contest the seasonableness
of the appeal. A motion contesting a late
appeal may be filed before the appellate
court even after the transmittal of the
records therein. The legality of the
appeal may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court, and
the latter is not precluded from
dismissing the petition on the ground of
its being out of time. A recognition of the
merit of the petition does not
necessarily carry with it any assumption
or conclusion that it has been timely
filed. Strangely, respondents did not
attempt to explain the reason for the
delay and would, instead, lay the blame
on petitioner for its failure to assail the
timeliness of the appeal.
CONCLUSION: the instant petition is GRANTED, and
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE.
Heirs of Albano v. Spouses Ravanes
G.R. No. 183645, July 20, 2016
The CA Decision is already
Final and Executory
The Execution of the Lease
Contract is not a Supervening
Event
FACTS:
 Respondent Mena Ravanes (Mena),
married to Roberto Ravanes (Roberto)
(collectively, the respondent-spouses), is
the registered owner of a parcel of land. On
about thirty-five (35) square meters of the
property stands the two-storey residential
house of petitioners. Petitioners' father,
Gamaliel Albano, purchased the house in
1986 from a certain Mary Ong Dee.
Petitioners leased the property from Mena
with the agreement that they will vacate it,
regardless of their rental payments, when
the latter and her family would need to use
it.
 In March 2000, respondent-spouses
informed petitioners that their daughter,
Rowena, is getting married and would need
the property to build her house. However,
petitioners refused to vacate the property.
 On September 14, 2000, respondent-
spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment
against petitioners in the MeTC of Pasig
City.
 In their Answer dated October 4,
2000, they countered that respondent-
spouses and their predecessors-in-interest
assured them that they can stay in the
property for as long as they are paying the
agreed monthly rentals.
 MeTC - judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants
who are hereby ordered to vacate.
 RTC -decision is
hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE on
the ground of denial of due process, and
this Court is now tasked to look into the
issue of whether or not the plaintiffs have
met the following requirements of Section
5, (c). Such owner or immediate family
member does not own any other available
residential unit within the city or
municipality. Respondent-spouses
appealed to the CA.
 In its Decision dated August 29, 2007, the
CA set aside the Decision of the RTC and
reinstated the Decision of the MeTC.
 On September 19, 2007, petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Stay the
 Execution of Judgment dated August 29,
2007. They manifested that respondent
Roberto entered into a lease contract with
petitioner Alexander Albano (Alexander)
on September 10, 2007, which meant that
petitioners are now in lawful occupation of
the property. The execution of the CA's
Decision is no longer necessary because the
judgment was mooted by a supervening
event. Petitioners averred that with the
renewal of the expired lease contract, the
ground for judicial ejectment relied upon
by the CA no longer exists.
 Mena filed a comment  to petitioners’
manifestation and motion. Mena assailed
the validity of the lease contract between
her husband, Roberto, and Alexander. She
claimed that Roberto has no personality to
unilaterally enter into a lease contract with
Alexander because the property is her
paraphernal property.
 In its Resolution dated February 20,
2008, the CA denied petitioners'
manifestation and motion. The CA held that
its Decision dated August 29, 2007 attained
finality on September 19, 2007. It found
that the lease contract did not operate as a
novation of its Decision because it was
entered into without the express consent of
Mena.
 On March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied
the Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution dated July 7, 2008. Hence, this
petition for review.
 In their Comment, respondent-spouses
argue that the CA Decision became final
and executory on September 20, 2007
because petitioners neither filed a
motion for reconsideration nor filed an
appeal before us. Accordingly,
respondent-spouses plead that
petitioners' right to file this petition
before us had already lapsed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA Decision is already final and
executory;
2. Whether the execution of the lease contract is a
supervening event that will justily the stay of
execution of the CA Decision; and
HELD: PETITION IS DENIED.
 On September 4, 2007, petitioners received
notice of the CA Decision. On September 19,
2007, they filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Stay the Execution of Judgment, which
the CA denied in its February 20, 2008
Resolution. The petitioners received a copy
of this Resolution on February 22, 2008.
 Thereafter, on March 7, 2008, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
February 20, 2008 Resolution of the CA.
The CA also denied this motion in its July 7,
2008 Resolution, a copy of which was
received by the petitioners on July 14,
2008.
 Subsequently, petitioners filed before us a
Motion for Additional Period to File
Petition for Review, which we granted.
They prayed that they be given additional
30 days within which to file their petition
or from July 29, 2008 to August 28, 2008.
Petitioners filed the petition for review on
August 28, 2008.
 The above narration of material dates gives
a semblance that the present petition was
seasonably filed. However, the records
show that petitioners should have
reckoned the 15-day period to appeal
from the receipt of the denial of the
Manifestation and Motion to Stay
Execution of Judgment, and not from
their receipt of the denial of the Motion
for Reconsideration. Having failed to do
so, petitioners' right to appeal
by certiorari lapsed as early as March 9,
2008 when the assailed CA Decision
became final and executory.
 Petitioners' Manifestation and Motion to
Stay Execution of Judgment is, in actuality,
a motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision. The said manifestation and
motion so alleged:10. In light of the
foregoing, respondents are constrained
to bring the matter of supervening event
to the attention of this Honorable Court
and likewise in the manner of a motion
for reconsideration, by way of
modification of the DECISION.
 Hence, contrary to the allegation of
respondent-spouses and the finding of the
CA, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA Decision, albeit in
the guise of a "Manifestation and Motion to
 Stay Execution of Judgment." In fact, the
relief prayed for by petitioners in this
manifestation and motion is the same relief
obtained once a motion for reconsideration
is filed on time. Rule 52, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court provides that generally, a
motion for reconsideration filed on time
stays the execution of the judgment sought
to be reconsidered. It thus baffles us why
petitioners captioned their motion as a
"Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
Execution of Judgment" when the effect
sought is one and the same -to stay the
execution of judgment. This carelessness
only brought confusion to respondent-
spouses and the CA.
 Since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay
Execution of Judgment is a motion for
reconsideration of the CA Decision,
petitioners' receipt of the resolution
denying it triggers the running of the 15-
day period within which to file an appeal.
Petitioners received a copy of the February
20, 2008 Resolution on February 22, 2008.
Thus, counting 15 days from receipt,
petitioners had only until March 8, 2008 to
file a petition for review.
 On March 7, 2008, however, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
February 20, 2008 Resolution instead. This
motion for reconsideration partakes of the
nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. Here, petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration is just that-a mere
rehash of the arguments raised in their
earlier Manifestation and Motion to Stay
Execution of Judgment, which we found
previously to be their (first) motion for
reconsideration.
 The filing of a second motion for
reconsideration is prohibited under Rule
52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended and the prevailing
1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the
CA (IRCA). Being a prohibited pleading, a
second motion for reconsideration does
not have any legal effect and does not toll
the running of the period to appeal.
 The same principle is likewise
applicable by analogy in the
determination of the correct period to
appeal. Reckoning the period from the
denial of the second motion for
reconsideration will result in the same
absurd situation where the courts will
be obliged to issue orders or resolutions
denying a prohibited pleading in the
first place.
 An appeal is not a matter of right, but is one
of sound judicial discretion. It may only be
availed of in the manner provided by the
law and the rules. A party who fails to
question an adverse decision by not filing
the proper remedy within the period
prescribed by law loses the right to do so as
the decision, as to him, becomes final and
binding. Considering that petitioners
reckoned the period to appeal on the
date of notice of the denial of the second
motion for reconsideration on July 7,
2008, instead of the date of notice of the
denial of the first motion for
reconsideration on February 22, 2008,
the present petition filed only on August
28, 2008 is evidently filed out of time.
The petition, being 173 clays late,
renders the CA Decision final and
executory. Thus, we do not have
jurisdiction to pass upon the petition.
 While there are instances when we relax
the application of procedural rules, the
present petition is not one of them. Liberal
application of the rules is an exception
rather than the rule. In this case,
petitioners failed to address the issue of
finality of the CA Decision when it was
raised in respondent Mena's Comment
to the Manifestation and Motion to Stay
Execution in the CA. Upon the denial of
the manifestation and motion clue to
finality of the CA Decision, petitioners again
ignored the issue of finality in their Motion
for Reconsideration. Up until respondent-
spouses' Comment before us, which again
alleged the finality of the CA Decision,
petitioners continued to be mum on the
issue. Petitioners' silence as to the
timeliness of their appeal is suspect. Thus,
in the absence of exceptional
circumstances and effort on the part of
petitioners to justify the liberal application
of the rules, we are constrained to deny the
petition.
 Petitioners' contentions are untenable. A
supervening event refers to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final
and executory or to new circumstances
which developed after the judgment has
acquired finality, including matters which
 the parties were not aware of prior to or in the execution of the lease contract, the
during the trial as they were not yet in compromise is not binding on her.
existence at that time. Here, the lease  In addition, the compromise is also not
contract was executed after the CA valid even between petitioners and
Decision was promulgated but before it Roberto because the records show that the
attained finality. In fact, petitioners land in question is indeed a paraphernal
executed the lease contract just six days property of Mena. Without an
after they received the adverse ruling of the authorization showing that Roberto is
CA. acting on behalf of Mena, he has no right
 To our mind, instead of a supervening and power to enter into a lease contract
event, the execution of the lease contract involving Mena's exclusive
partakes of the nature of a compromise. A property.Besides, even assuming that the
compromise is a contract whereby the property is conjugally owned by
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, respondent-spouses, this does not bestow
avoid litigation or put an end to one upon Roberto the power to enter into a
already commenced. It is an agreement lease contract without the consent of his
between two or more persons, who, for the wife. We have explained in Roxas v. Court of
purpose of preventing or putting an end to Appeals, that consent of the wife is required
a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual for lease of a conjugal realty for a period of
consent in the manner which they agree on, more than one year, such lease being
and which each party prefers over the hope considered a conveyance and encumbrance
of gaining but balanced by the danger of under the provisions of the Civil Code.
losing. In the case before us, petitioners
claim that they executed the lease contract WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision
before notice of the CA Decision as an and Resolution of the Court of Appeals elated
"amicable settlement of the issues with August 29, 2007 and July 7, 2008, respectively, are
reference to occupancy of the subject hereby AFFIRMED.
property. Thus, petitioners' intention to
end the litigation by virtue of a
compromise is evident.
 A compromise may be entered into at any
stage of the case-pending trial, on appeal
and even after finality of judgment. Hence,
petitioners may enter into a compromise
with the respondent-spouses, even after
the CA Decision was rendered. However,
the validity of the agreement is determined
by compliance with the requisites and the
principles of contracts, not by when it was
entered into. Unfortunately for petitioners,
the compromise that they effected is
wanting of one of the essential requisites of
a valid and binding compromise--consent
of all the parties in the case. We have
consistently ruled that a compromise
agreement cannot bind a party who did not
voluntarily take part in the settlement itself
and gave specific individual consent.
 It is undisputed that only Roberto entered
into a lease contract with petitioners. Mena
did not sign it, but on the contrary,
denounces its execution as being done in
evident bad faith and without authority
from her as the sole owner of the property.
Considering that Mena did not participate

 Petitioner seeks to reverse the aforesaid
 This case stemmed from a Real Estate
 Thereafter, the actual occupants of the
Julian v. DBP, G.R. No. 174193
7 December 2011
The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure and should not
be disregarded without the most compelling of
reasons.
FACTS:
 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals which
dismissed petitioner’s appeal as follows:
Considering that per JRD Report dated
March 30, 2005, the appellant failed to pay
the required docket and other lawful fees,
the instant Appeal is hereby DISMISSED
pursuant to Section [1](c) Rule 50 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Also assailed
is the CA’s Resolution dated July 27, 2006
which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Resolutions of the CA and direct the latter
to admit the payment for the docket fees
enclosed in his Motion for
Reconsideration5 so that his appeal may be
given due course, or, in the alternative, to
remand the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
Mortgage executed by Thelma Julian
(Thelma), mother of herein petitioner
Samuel Julian. Thelma obtained a housing
loan from respondent DBP. To secure
payment of the loan, she executed in favor
of the respondent a Real Estate Mortgage
on the aforementioned parcel of land
registered under her name. A Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing the
respondent and its personnel to sell the
property in the event of extrajudicial
foreclosure was inserted and made an
integral part of the mortgage contract.
Subsequently, Thelma died on January 8,
1982. Because of arrearages in the monthly
amortizations, respondent foreclose the
mortgaged property.
mortgaged property who is likewise
petitioner’s sibling,(spouses De la Cruz),
offered to purchase the property.
Respondent accepted the offer and
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale.
However, spouses De la Cruz failed to pay
72 monthly amortizations resulting in the
rescission of the said deed.
Notwithstanding, spouses De la Cruz
refused to vacate the premises compelling
respondent to file an "Unlawful Detainer"
case against them. Judgment was rendered
in favor of respondent on July 29, 1993.
However, before the Writ of Execution
could be carried out, petitioner filed Civil
Case No. 6387before the RTC of Roxas City
on October 27, 1993, for the cancellation of
respondent’s TCT No. T-19303. He
contended that the SPA which was used to
sell the mortgaged property at public
 auction in 1983 was no longer effective in
view of Thelma’s death in 1982.
 During the course of the proceedings, a
series of postponements were made at the
instance of both parties due to an
impending amicable settlement. Eventually,
the parties were able to reach a settlement.
Thus, in an Order dated October 28, 1998,
the RTC directed both parties to submit a
joint motion to dismiss the case. However,
almost two years passed without the
parties complying with the said Order.
 Consequently, in an Order dated October
11, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for
failure of the parties to comply for an
unreasonable length of time. The dismissal,
however, was set aside in an Order dated
February 12, 2003 in consideration of
petitioner’s payment of ten percent (10%)
of respondent’s claim. The parties were
then given 15 days from notice within
which to submit their compromise
agreement, which was subsequently
extended for 30 days from notice. Despite
the extensions, however, no compromise
agreement was filed in court. As a result, in
an Orderdated July 24, 2003, the trial court
directed the parties to show cause within
15 days from notice why the case should
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, with petitioner’s conformity,
his counsel withdrew her appearance on
August 13, 2003.
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court-on
January 28, 2004 or six months from the
issuance of the show cause Order, the trial
court dismissed the case for failure of the
parties thru counsel to comply with the
Order dated July 24, 2003.
 Petitioner, through his new counsel,
timely filed a Notice of Appeal on April
26, 2004 but failed to pay the docket
and other lawful fees.
 CA dismissed the appeal for non-
payment of the required docket and
other lawful fees pursuant to Section
1(c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Seeking reconsideration, petitioner
attached to his motion Postal Money
Order Nos. A-0620000276, B-
0610000283 and J065000566 in the
aggregate amount of ₱3,020.00 as
payment for the docket fees. He
explained that his failure to pay the
required fees was due to oversight and
non-cognizance of the necessity to pay
the said fees since his counsel did not
inform him of such requirement to pay.
Petitioner prayed for liberal application
of the Rules as according to him, a strict
enforcement would be tantamount to
imposing a penalty not commensurate
to his thoughtlessness or oversight in
not adhering to the procedural
requisite.
 Petitioner’s submission did not move the
CA, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in strictly
applying the rules on the payment of docket fees.
HELD:
 Payment of full docket fees within the
prescribed period for taking an appeal is
mandatory.
 It is well-established that "[t]he right to
appeal is a statutory privilege and must be
exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.
Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must strictly comply with the
requirements of the rules, and failure to do
so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
 The applicable rule for appeals from
judgments issued by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction is Rule
41 of the Rules of Court, Section 4 of which
provides:Section 4. Appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. - Within the period
for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay
to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the
full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of
said fees shall be transmitted to the
appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.The Rules
also provide that failure of the appellant to
pay the docket and other lawful fees is a
ground for dismissal of the appeal.
 The Court has consistently ruled in a
number of cases that the payment of the
full amount of docket fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. It is a condition sine qua non
for the appeal to be perfected and only then
 can a court acquire jurisdiction over the
case. The requirement of an appeal fee is
not a mere technicality of law or procedure
and should not be undermined except for
the most persuasive of reasons. Non-
observance would be tantamount to no
appeal being filed thereby rendering the
challenged decision, resolution or order
final and executory.
 Admittedly, this rule is not without
recognized qualifications. The Court has
declared that in appealed cases, failure to
pay the appellate court docket fee within
the prescribed period warrants only
discretionary as opposed to automatic
dismissal of the appeal and that the court
shall exercise its power to dismiss in
accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play and with great deal of
circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances.
 In the case at bench, the justifications
presented by petitioner for the non-
payment of the docket fees are oversight
and the lack of advice from his counsel.
Unfortunately, the reasons presented are
neither convincing nor adequate to merit
leniency. Petitioner submits that he only
found out about the requirement to pay the
docket fees when he received the CA
Resolution denying his appeal on April 22,
2005 or three days short of one year from
filing of the said appeal. This Court finds
this not to be logically true to human
experience. It is unusual for petitioner’s
counsel not to advice him of the required
docket fees. More often than not, counsels
are aware of the docket fees required to be
paid to the courts, and will ask clients for
the said amount prior to filing pleadings in
court. This is so because counsels are not
expected to shoulder or advance payment
for their clients. Assuming arguendo that
petitioner’s counsel did not inform him of
the requirement to pay the docket fees to
perfect the appeal, what we find incredible
is that petitioner apparently failed to
communicate with his counsel after the
filing of said appeal. This Court has
repeatedly held that "litigants, represented
by counsel, should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case. "It is the duty of a
party-litigant to be in contact with his
counsel from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress of his case.
Moreover, the counsel’s negligence binds
petitioner and, for that reason alone the
loss of his remedy was caused by his own
negligence. Consequently, a relaxation of
the rule cannot be granted. The bitter
consequence of such grave inadvertence is
to render the trial court’s order final and
executory.
 Further, the Court notes that petitioner
only attempted to perfect his appeal on
May 6, 2005 by appending the postal
money orders to his Motion for
Reconsideration, or one year and nine days
too late. By that time, the challenged
 Order has long become final and no longer
open to an appeal. Petitioner’s reliance on
the policy espoused in the case of Yambao
is likewise unavailing. The pertinent
portion relied on by petitioner reads:Thus,
the appellate court may extend the time for
the payment of the docket fees if appellant
is able to show that there is a justifiable
reason for his failure to pay
the correct amount of docket fees within
the prescribed period, like fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar
supervening casualty, without fault on the
part of the appellant.
 Clearly, the case applies to a situation
where payment of the docket fees was
made albeit incomplete. In the instant case,
no payment was made by petitioner at all.
 Likewise assuming for the sake of
argument that consideration be given to
petitioner’s willingness to comply with the
rules since he attached postal money
orders to his motion for reconsideration,
the broader interest of justice will still not
be served if petitioner’s appeal is
reinstated. Petitioner and his sister Ruth
Julian de la Cruz (Ruth) know that their
mother Thelma has already lost ownership
rights to the property in question when the
latter defaulted in her payment to
respondent and none of her successors-in-
interest redeemed the property within the
prescribed period. This is the reason why
Ruth and her husband offered to purchase
the property from respondent. However,
when the said spouses De la Cruz defaulted
in their payment, they refused to surrender
the property to respondent. For his part,
petitioner reinforces such refusal to
 surrender by questioning the validity of the
public auction sale. Now petitioner comes
before this Court praying for leniency in
the interest of justice. It must be stressed,
however, that it is only when persuasive
reasons exist that the Rules may be relaxed
to spare a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. Here, the
Court finds that petitioner is under no
threat of suffering an injustice. On the
contrary, it will be the height of injustice if
the Court accords petitioner leniency and
reinstates his appeal as this would mean
further waiting on the part of the
respondent which has long been deprived
of its right to possess the property it owns.

CONCLUSION: the petition is DENIED. The

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00240 dated April 12, 2005 and July 27, 2006
are AFFIRMED.

Anderson v. Ho
G.R. No. 172590, 7 January 2013
No justifiable reason exists in this case
as to relax the rule on certification
against forum shopping.
FACTS:
 As her petition for review was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals (CA) on a technical
ground, petitioner now invokes the liberal
application of the rules of procedure.
 Assailed in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari is the Resolution of the CA
which dismissed the petition for review of
petitioner Mary Louise R. Anderson
(Anderson) because the certification
against forum shopping attached thereto
was signed by counsel on her behalf
without the proper authority. Likewise
assailed is the CA’s May 4, 2006
Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
  Anderson filed a complaint for ejectment
against Ho for allegedly possessing her
parcel of land in Quezon City unlawfully. Ho
denied the allegations, and presented a
written consent from Anderson allowing
him to stay on the property as payment for
his various services. The MeTC dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action, as
it gave weight to Ho's evidence. On appeal,
the RTC found that the evidence of the
parties stood upon balance, and
considered the dismissal of the complaint
without prejudice depending on the
determination of the genuineness of
Anderson's written consent. On petition for
review, with the CA, Anderson's counsel
twice requested for extension of time to file
the petition. Upon filing of the petition, the
CA found that the certification against
forum shopping was signed by Anderson's
counsel on her behalf, without any
accompanying authority to do so. The CA
dismissed the petition for review. The SC
affirmed the CA's decision to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review on
certiorari will be granted. NO
HELD: The need to abide by the Rules of Court and
the procedural requirements it imposes has been
constantly underscored by this Court. One of these
procedural requirements is the certificate of non-
forum shopping which, time and again, has been
declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for
procedural orderliness.31
In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National
Bank,32 the Court reiterated the guidelines
respecting non-compliance with or submission of a
defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the
relevant portions of which are as follows:
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, x x x, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission
or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’
or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling
reasons’.x x x x
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping
must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her
counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping is due to the fact that a
"certification is a peculiar personal representation
on the part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are
no other pending cases involving basically the same
parties, issues and causes of action." 34 "Obviously, it
is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose
professional services have been retained for a
particular case, who is in the best position to know
whether sheactually filed or caused the filing of a
petition in that case."35 Per the above guidelines,
however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a
certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons,
she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of
record to sign on her behalf. "A certification which
had been signed by counsel without the proper
authorization is defective and constitutes a valid
cause for the dismissal of the petition."36
In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly
dismissed Anderson’s Petition for Review on the
ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping
attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her
behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court
notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by
later submitting an SPA and by explaining her
failure to execute one prior to the filing of the
petition, this does not automatically denote
substantial compliance. It must be remembered
that a defective certification is generally not curable
by its subsequent correction. And while it is true
that in some cases the Court considered such a
belated submission as substantial compliance, it
"did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds
that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding
the effective negation of the intent of the rule on
non-forum shopping."
Unlike in Donato and the other cases cited by
Anderson, no sufficient and justifiable grounds exist
in this case as to relax the rules on certification
against forum shopping.
In Donato, the CA dismissed therein petitioner’s
Petition for Review on the ground, among others,
that the certification against forum shopping was
signed by his counsel. In filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioner submitted a certification
duly signed by himself. However, the CA ruled that
his subsequent compliance did not cure the defect
of the instant petition and denied his Motion for
Reconsideration. When the case reached this Court,
it was held, viz:
The petition for review filed before the CA contains
a certification against forum shopping but said
certification was signed by petitioner’s counsel. In
submitting the certification of non-forum shopping
duly signed by himself in his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the
Court’s attention to the physical impossibility of
filing the petition for review within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal considering that he
is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street,
Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. where he needs to
personally accomplish and sign the verification.
We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically
impossible for the petition to have been prepared
and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for
him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest
Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. in
order to sign the certification before the Philippine
Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the
Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period.
Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately
explained his failure to personally sign the
certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping,
which were precisely designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum-shopping. The
subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by
the petitioner himself should thus be deemed
substantial compliance, pro hac vice.
While at first blush Donato appears to be similar
with the case at bench, a deeper and meticulous
comparison of the two cases reveals essential
differences. In Donato, the Court held that it was
impossible for the petition to have been prepared
and sent to the therein petitioner in the USA; for
him to travel from Virginia to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington D.C.; and for the petition
to be sent back to the Philippines within the 15-day
reglementary period. The same could not, however,
be said in this case. It must be remembered that on
top of the 15-day reglementary period to file the
petition, Atty. Oliva sought and was granted a total
extension of 30 days to file the same. Hence,
Anderson had a total of 45 days to comply with the
requirements of a Petition for Review as against the
15 days afforded to the petitioner in Donato. To this
Court, the said period is more than enough time for
Anderson to execute an SPA before the nearest
Philippine Consulate, which again unlike in Donato,
was located in the same state where Anderson was
(Hawaii), and thereafter to send it to the
Philippines. Anent her allegation that her health
condition at that time hindered her from going to
the proper authorities to execute an SPA, the same
deserves scant consideration as no medical
certificate was submitted to support this. "Indeed,
the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges
must prove his allegations."
rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to
abide strictly by the rules. While in certain
instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of
the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
The liberal interpretation and application of rules
apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit
and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must
be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Party litigants and their
counsels are well advised to abide by rather than
flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the
path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.
CONCLUSION: the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated
July 14, 2005 and May 4, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89793 are AFFIRMED.

Moreover, simultaneous with the filing of a Motion

for Reconsideration, the proper certificate of non-
forum shopping was submitted by the petitioner in
Donato. Notably in this case, the SPA was submitted
two months after the filing of Anderson’s Motion for
Reconsideration. It took that long because instead
of executing an SPA before the proper authorities in
Hawaii and sending the same to the Philippines,
Anderson still waited until she came back to the
country and only then did she execute one. It thus
puzzles the Court why Anderson opted not to
immediately submit the SPA despite her awareness
that the same should have been submitted
simultaneously with the Petition for Review. Hence,
it cannot help but conclude that the delay in the
submission of the SPA is nothing but a product of
Anderson’s sheer laxity and indifference in
complying with the rules. It is well to stress that
"rules are laid down for the benefit of all and should
not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time
and own bidding." They should be faithfully
complied with and may not simply be ignored to
suit the convenience of a party. 43 Although they are
liberally construed in some situations, there must,
however, be a showing of justifiable reasons and at
least a reasonable attempt at compliance therewith,
which unfortunately are not obtaining in this case.
Maza v. Turla
G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
In view of the foregoing, this Court affirms the CA’s
dismissal of Anderson’s Petition for Review. As a
FACTS:
final note, the Court reiterates that:x x x procedural
 This is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with a Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order ;and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners
seek to have the Orders of the Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Cases nullified and
set aside and the criminal cases against
them dismissed.
 Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C.
Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiñ o, and Rafael V.
Mariano (petitioners) are former members
of the House of Representatives. Liza
represented Gabriela Women's Party
(Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro
represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan
Muna), while Rafael represented
Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis).
 Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals,
including Petitioners, who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito
Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo
Felipe. His findings show that the named
individuals conspired, planned, and
implemented the killing of the supporters
of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN), a rival
of Bayan Muna and Gabriela.Carlito
Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were
AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas
Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain
Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter.
 Inspector Palomo recommended that a
preliminary investigation be conducted and
that an Information for each count of
murder be filed against the 19 individuals.
 The panel of prosecutors issued on April
11, 2008 a Joint Resolution, reviewed and
approved by Officer-in-charge Provincial
Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Prosecutor
Florendo). The panel found probable cause
for murder in the killing of Carlito
Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for
kidnapping with murder in the killing of
Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19
suspects. However, the panel considered
one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as
a state witness. The panel recommended
that the corresponding Informations be
filed against the remaining suspects. On the
same day, two (2) Informations for murder
were filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija,
(Palayan cases) and an Information for
kidnapping with murder was filed in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).
 Judge Turla REMANDED the case to the
prosecutor.
 On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A.
Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an
Order on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla
held that "the proper procedure in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation
was not followed in [the Palayan] cases.
 There is no dispute that the two (2)
Informations for murder were filed without
first affording the movants their right to
file a motion for reconsideration. The
denial thereof is tantamount to a denial of
the right itself to a preliminary
investigation. This fact alone already
renders preliminary investigation
conducted in this case incomplete. The
inevitable conclusion is that the movants
were not only effectively denied the
opportunity to file a "Motion for
Reconsideration" of the "Joint Resolution"
dated April 11, 2008 issued by the panel of
prosecutors assigned in these cases, but
were also deprived of their right to a full
preliminary investigation preparatory to
the filing of the Information against them.
 Judge Turla added that her order of
remanding the Palayan cases back to the
provincial prosecutors "for a complete
preliminary investigation is not a
manifestation of ignorance of law or a
willful abdication of a duty imposed by law
but due, to the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in [the cases] and not just
'passing the buck' to the panel of
prosecutors.
 ORDER the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija to conduct the
preliminary investigation on the incidents
subject matter hereof in accordance with
the mandates of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.
 Petitioners pray that the July 18, 2008 and
December 2, 2008 Orders of Judge Turla be
set aside and annulled and that the murder
cases against them be dismissed for failure
to show probable cause. They also ask for
the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin Judge Turla from remanding the
cases to the provincial prosecutors, and
"the respondent prosecutors from
conducting further preliminary
investigation [on] these cases."
  Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order
of remanding the case back to the
prosecutors had no basis in law,
jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had
already evaluated the evidence submitted
by the prosecutors along with the
Informations, she should have determined
the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of arrest warrants or the dismissal
of the Palayan cases.
 Respondents claim that the petition before
this Court violates the principle of
hierarchy of courts.
 Respondents also allege that respondent
Secretary Gonzalez was wrongly
impleaded.
 On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged
on her constitutional duty to determine
probable cause, respondents counter that
she did not abandon her mandate.
Furthermore, respondent prosecutors'
finding of probable cause is correct since
evidence against petitioners show that
more likely than not, they participated in
the murder of the alleged victims.
 Petitioners' Reply
Aside from reiterating their allegations and
arguments in the petition, they added that
direct invocation of this Court's original
jurisdiction was allowed as their petition
involved legal questions.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners violated the
principle of hierarchy of courts in bringing their
petition directly before this Court.
HELD:
This petition is an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts.
This Court thoroughly explained the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts in The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections:
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy
of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the
evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of
law which may include the validity of an ordinance,
statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to
the Constitution. To effectively perform these
functions, they are territorially organized into
regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important
task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these
are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual
case' that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The consequences,
of course, would be national in scope. There are,
however, some cases where resort to courts at their
level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher
courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an
appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is
collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial
court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike
the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may
not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by
breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the
light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents.
Rather than a court of first instance or as a
repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this
court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order
that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Court's role to
interpret the Constitution and act in order to
protect constitutional rights when these become
exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine
in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never
been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an
iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction
[over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons
or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, we have provided
exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when
there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A
direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.
A second exception is when the issues involved are
of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional
issues of transcendental importance prevents
courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties
when clearly faced with the need for substantial
protection.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct
resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower
courts on this matter. In Government of the United
States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the
case as a matter of first impression that may guide
the lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for
all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of
the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as
yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better
decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court
held that:
... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a
becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment
of this Court in the consideration of its validity,
which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion.
Fifth, . . . Exigency in certain situations would
qualify as an exception for direct resort to this
court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a
constitutional organ ...
Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]
... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course
of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct
resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are
"dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest
of justice, or the orders complained of were found to
be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past,
questions similar to these which this court ruled on
immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens' right to bear arms,
government contracts involving modernization of
voters' registration lists, and the status and
existence of a public office.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these
exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
direct resort to this court.
In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point
Management Corp. (PPMC), et al., this Court
reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct
invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the resort to the
extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari.
In this case, the presence of compelling
circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed,
petitioners were incumbent party-list
representatives. The possibility of their arrest and
incarceration should the assailed Orders be
affirmed, would affect their representation of their
constituents in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 18, 2008
and December 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Palayan City, Branch 40 in Criminal Case Nos. 1879-
P and 1880-P are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded
to the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40
for further proceedings with due and deliberate
dispatch in accordance with this Decision.
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and Bienvenido Arcayos

G.R. No. 130866; September 16, 1998

All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P.

No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court are inter-preted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Facts:
 Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily
dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for
misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000
which was supposed to be taxes paid to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging
that the dismissal was illegal, respondent
filed a case against St. Martin Funeral
Homes in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
 Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes)
contention is that the respondent is not an
employee due to the lack of an employer-
employee contract. In addition, respondent
is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
 The labor arbiter ruled in favor of
petitioner, confirming that indeed, there
was no employer-employee relationship
between the two and hence, there could be
no illegal dismissal in such a situation.
 The respondent appealed to the secretary
of NLRC who set aside the decision and
remanded the case to the labor arbiter.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied by the
NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the
Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s
appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in
the Supreme Court. NO
HELD: Historically, decisions from the NLRC were
appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose
decisions are then appealable to the Office of the
President. However, the new rules do not anymore
provide provisions regarding appellate review for
decisions rendered by the NLRC.
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it
upon themselves to review such decisions from the
NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and
balance system and the perceived intention of the
legislative body who enacted the new rules.
“It held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no
right of review is given by statute; that the purpose
of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that
part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
unjust adjudications.”
The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should
have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as
consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts.
As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals.
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever
since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action for certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation
thereto and in the instances we have noted could
have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are
both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts. The important distinction between
them, however, and with which the Court is
particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action for certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that
appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would
not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship
speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
While we do not wish to intrude into the
Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom
of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of
labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not
being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained
to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its
component divisions; and that there is undeniably
an imperative need for expeditious action on labor
cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection
to labor St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 295
SCRA 494, G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9
of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC
to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine
on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum
for the relief desired.
VICTORY LINER, INC. vs. MICHAEL MALINIASG.R.
No. 151170; May 29, 2007
A motion without a notice of hearing is pro
forma, a mere scrap of paper that does not toll
the period to appeal and upon the expiration of
the 15-day period, the questioned order or
decision becomes final and executory.
The Rules mandate that an appeal by notice of
appeal is deemed perfected upon the filing of
the notice of appeal in due time, due time being
within fifteen (15) days after notice to the
appellant of the judgment or final order
appealed from.
FACTS:
 This case finds its origin from a vehicular
collision that occurred in La Union on 19
March 1996 between a bus owned by
petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. and an Isuzu
Truck used by respondent Michael
Malinias. Nobody died, but both vehicles
were damaged from the accident.
 A complaint for sum of money and
damages was instituted by respondent
against petitioner and the bus driver,
Leoncio Bulaong, alleging pecuniary
damage to the truck in the amount of
P47,180.00, representing lost income for
the non-use of the truck as it underwent
repairs in the amount of P15,000.00.
Claims for exemplary damages and
attorney's fees were also lodged in the
complaint,which was filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet. After pre-trial, the bus driver was
dropped as defendant in the case after
summons could not be served on him and
respondent agreed to waive his cause of
action against said driver.
 In the course of trial, respondent finished
presenting his evidence and rested his case.
In the meantime, counsel for petitioner
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, but
the same was denied by the MTC in an
Order dated 15 September 1997 as the
motion did not bear any signature of
conformity from the petitioner. When the
case was called for the reception of
petitioner's evidence on the previously
scheduled date of 27 October 1997, no
appearance was made for the bus company.
Respondent thus immediately moved that
petitioner be declared to have waived its
right to adduce evidence in its favor and
that the case be deemed submitted for
judgment.
 The MTC found merit in respondent's
contention, and ordered the case be
deemed submitted for decision as of 27
October 1997. On 13 January 1998, the
MTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent.
 Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The Notice of
Hearing therein stated: "Please submit the
foregoing Motion for Reconsideration for
hearing before the Honorable Court at a
schedule and time convenient to this
 Honorable Court and the parties. The MTC
ruled in an Order dated 23 February 1998
that the notice did not conform with the
mandatory requirements of Section 5, Rule
15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and that the motion was thus a mere scrap
of paper which did not suspend the period
to appeal. Accordingly, the MTC declared
that its earlier judgment dated 13 January
1998 had become final and executory. In
the same order and upon the same
predicates, the MTC also granted the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
filed by respondent.
 Petitioner responded to the foregoing
developments by filing a Notice of Appeal,
as well as a motion for the inhibition by the
MTC judge which motion was immediately
granted. The case was assigned to a new
MTC judge, who was then tasked with
ruling on the Notice of Appeal. It was only
on 28 September 1999, or eighteen (18)
months after the Notice of Appeal was filed,
that the MTC acted on the same and ruled
that it had been filed beyond the
reglementary period. Again, the MTC
reiterated that the Judgment dated 13
January 1998 had long become final and
executory since the fatally defective Motion
for Reconsideration did not toll the
reglementary period for appeal.
 What then followed was a series of
unsuccessful attempts by petitioner to have
the lower courts set aside or stay the now-
final judgment against it. First, petitioner
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment
with the MTC on 25 October 1999. This was
denied by the MTC in an Order dated 13
March 2000 on the ground that it had been
filed out of time. The MTC explained that
the petition for relief from judgment must
have been filed either within sixty (60)
days from the date petitioner's new
counsel learned of the judgment, or sixty
(60) days after learning that the Motion for
Reconsideration had been denied for
having been filed out of time. Neither
circumstance was met by petitioner.
Subsequently, the MTC likewise denied a
Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is
correct in dismissing outright the petition for
annulment of judgment.
2. Whether or not the abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC in directing the issuance of
the writ of execution even without resolving
petitioner's motion for reconsideration is correct.
HELD:
 It is of importance that, as borne by the
Certificate of Authority executed by
petitioner’s Corporate Secretary,
counsel for petitioner had been
authorized by petitioner’s Board of
Directors to prepare and file with the
Court of Appeals the petition herself as
of 10 July 2001, or seven (7) days before
the petition was indeed filed. We fail to
understand the significance attached by
the Court of Appeals on the prior
authority of the Baguio station manager
to perform the same acts. The
impression left by the disquisition of the
appellate court is that such prior
authority was beyond recall by
petitioner’s Board of Directors, and that
no new person could be similarly
authorized by the corporation to
perform such acts. The fact that the
previous authority may have been
misplaced or lost, thus causing
petitioner to authorize a new person to
file the necessary pleadings or petitions
in the case involving the respondent, is
of no consequence if the new authority
is issued before the filing of the pleading
that requires verification or
certification against forum shopping.
The circumstance is similar to a
situation where the previously
authorized person had died or severed
his or her connection with the corporate
litigant. Juridical persons appearing
before the courts are not perpetually
bound to maintain the same authorized
representatives in the preparation and
certification of pleadings.
 While the lack of certification against
forum shopping is generally not cured
by its submission after the filing of the
petition, and the submission of a
certificate against forum shopping is
 deemed obligatory, the requirement has
been relaxed under justifiable
circumstances under the rule on
substantial compliance. In any event,
the observation of the Court of Appeals
that substantial compliance “will not
suffice in the matter involving strict
observance” of the certification
requirement on non-forum shopping
contradicts our recent jurisprudence
which holds that “[t]he rule of
substantial compliance may be availed
of with respect to the contents of the
certification [against forum shopping].”
While the lack of certification against
forum shopping is generally not cured
by its submission after the filing of the
petition, and the submission of a
certificate against forum shopping is
deemed obligatory, the requirement has
been relaxed under justifiable
circumstances under the rule on
substantial compliance. The same
characteristics hold true as to the
verification requirement.
 Not only did the defect render the
motion for reconsideration itself
unworthy of consideration, it more
crucially failed to toll the period to
appeal. A motion without a notice of
hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of
paper that does not toll the period to
appeal, and upon the expiration of the
15-day period, the questioned order or
decision becomes final and executory.
The rationale behind this rule is plain:
unless the movant sets the time and
place of hearing, the court will be
unable to determine whether the
adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on
his objection, since the rules themselves
do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition.
 Thus, the MTC judgment became final and
executory despite the filing of the Motion
for Reconsideration thereto, as said motion
did not toll the period for filing an appeal
therefrom. Yet that did not mean that
petitioner was left bereft of further
remedies under our Rules. For one,
petitioner could have assailed the MTC’s
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration
through a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the MTC in denying the
motion. If that remedy were successful, the
effect would have been to void the MTC’s
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration,
thus allowing petitioner to again pursue
such motion as a means towards the filing
of a timely appeal. 
 Another remedy for the petitioner is found
under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which governs petitions for
relief from judgment. Indeed, Section 2,
Rule 38 finds specific application in this
case, as it provides that "[w]hen a
judgment or final order is rendered by any
court in a case, and a party thereto, by
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, has been prevented from taking
an appeal, he may file a petition [for relief
from denial of appeal] in such court and in
the same case praying that the appeal be
given due course." Such petition should be
filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment or final
order, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was
entered. The facts of this case indicate that
petitioner could have timely resorted to
this remedy.
 What the petitioner undertook instead
was to pursue the notice of appeal,
despite the unequivocal statement in
the MTC Order of 23 February 1998 that
“the Judgment [sought to be
reconsidered] has now become final and
executory.” The Rules mandate that an
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected upon the filing of the notice of
appeal in due time, due time being
within fifteen (15) days after notice to
the appellant of the judgment or final
order appealed from. While the period
of appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for reconsideration, the
MTC deemed, with legal basis, that the
motion interposed by petitioner could
not have been deemed filed and should
instead be treated as “a mere scrap of
paper.”
 If the consequences for pursuing the
wrong remedial tack in this case seem
harsh, it should be remembered that
there is no innate right to appeal.
Appeal is a statutory right which may be
exercised within the prescribed limits.
 The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for a rational and orderly
method by which appeal can be
pursued, and even contingency
remedial measures if appeal could no
longer be timely pursued. The failure of
petitioner to undertake a timely appeal,
or to engage in the available modes of
relief even if appeal was no longer
possible, simply has to bear
consequence. The lower court rulings
germane to this case were, consistently
cognizant of this fact, transformed to
legal conclusion, and we are hard-
pressed to find any cause for annulment
of any of those judgments. The dismissal
of the petition by the Court of Appeals is
ultimately correct.

CONCLUSION: the petition is DENIED. Costs against

petitioner.
G.R. No. 116100             February 9, 1996 affirmative relief other than what was granted in the
decision of the lower court. The appellee can only
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and advance any argument that he may deem necessary to
SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision
SANTOS, petitioners, that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his
vs. brief if such is required to strengthen the views
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors,
MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents. to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but
not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the
judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other
Issues to be raised on appeal affirmative reliefs.

Sanchez WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing

premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of
FACTS: Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly
REINSTATED.
 Civil Case for the grant of an easement of right
of way was filed by (petitioners) Pacifico
Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R.
Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and
Maria Cristina C. Santos before the RTC.

 The (mabasa) plaintiff owns a parcel of land

with a two-door apartment. The plaintiff was
able to acquire said property through a
contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos
and Teodora Quintero as vendors. Said
property may be described to be surrounded
by other immovables pertaining to defendants
herein.

 When said property was purchased by

Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
remises and who were acknowledged by
plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. 

ISSUE: whether or not the grant of right of way to

herein private respondents is proper

RULING: Petitioners are already barred from raising

the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision
of the court a quo granting private respondents the right
of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with
the adjudication therein. With the finality of the
judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of
propriety of the grant of right of way has already been
laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the

Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the
decision of the trial court. That decision of the court
below has become final as against them and can no
longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal
is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
G.R. No. 142534             June 27, 2006
DONATO SUMAWAY, JOSEPH ALVERO, ASIA
GOLD COAST CORPORATION, AKIGONZ
CORPORATION, RAUL F. REYES, LEOME G. GATA,
ANTONIO HICAP, DOLORES YANGA, IMELDA
MAGAT, HONORIO GUEVARRA, EDGEWATER
ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION , CAROLINA
YUTUC, OSIPHIL, INC. RENATO LAUCHENGCO,
ALEXANDER ANGULO and JOSEPH
JAMBOY, Petitioners,
vs. URBAN BANK, INC. ISABELA SUGAR
COMPANY, INC., MAGDALENO M. PEÑA AND
ERNESTO OCHOA, Respondents.
Period of appeal
Sanchez
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed an action for Reformation of
Contract, Specific Performance, Damages,
Consignation with Injunction, with Restraining
Order, with the RTC of Pasay City.
 Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint
states no cause of action; the claim is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds;
the action has prescribed; and the pendency
of another action.
 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
stating that: "it appearing that the contract of
lease sought to be amended and/or reformed
has expired as early as November 29, 1994
and in view of the motion to dismiss filed by
several of the party-plaintiffs, this case is
hereby ordered dismissed.
 Petitioners’ counsel filed a Notice of Appeal,
which was given due course by the trial court.
Consequently, the trial court ordered the
transmittal of the records of the case to the
CA.
 Respondent Urban Bank filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the appeal
was not perfected within the reglementary
period. Respondent contended that
petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed five days
late, as it should have been filed on April 28,
1997, and not May 3, 1997.
 The CA found merit in respondent’s contention
and granted the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON the appeal was not perfected within the
reglementary period.
RULING: NO. Petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed on
May 3, 1996. At that time the applicable law was
Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, which
provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award
judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided,
however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for
appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of
the judgment appealed from.
Particularly, Section 20 of the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines of B.P. 129 provides for the manner in which
the appeal may be taken, to wit:
20. Procedure for taking appeal. – An appeal from the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts or
municipal circuit trial courts to the regional trial courts,
and from the regional trial courts to the Intermediate
Appellate Court in actions or proceedings originally filed
in the former shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court that rendered the judgment or order
appealed from.
The 15-day period within which to appeal, counted from
notice of the final order, resolution, award judgment, or
decision appealed from, under B.P. 129 was
reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-1-03-SC, which reads:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas
corpus cases. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas
corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48)
hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion of
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Jurisprudence is consistent in ruling that the perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory, although the Court, in exceptional
circumstances,15 allowed the filing of a belated notice of
appeal. Thus, if the Court were to strictly apply the
jurisprudence in petitioners’ case, the inevitable
conclusion is that the CA was correct in dismissing their
appeal. It does not matter whether respondents’ motion
to dismiss was filed after the trial court already
approved their notice of appeal, or that they have
already paid the docket fees and filed their appellants’
brief. It should be borne in mind that the legality of an
appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
in the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded
from dismissing the same on the ground of its being out
of time.

Fortunately, however, for petitioners, the Court recently

modified the rule on the counting of the 15-day period
within which to appeal. In the precedent-setting case of
Neypes v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court categorically
set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal,
thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules

in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified
and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the
Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable
and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals.
These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the

Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal

period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.18 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions dated September 17, 1999 and March 17,
2000 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 53270 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 190660               April 11, 2011
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH DIAZ,
represented by FRANCISCA P. DE GUZMAN as
Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial
Courts/Municipal Trial Courts in Cities/Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (RULES 40 to 41)
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the Regional
Trial Courts (RULE 42)
Sanchez
FACTS:
 Private respondent Elizabeth was the
registered owner of a parcel of agricultural
land. Ten hectares of the land were
expropriated by the Department of Agrarian
Reform
 Not satisfied with the valuation DAR,
Elizabeth, through her attorney-in-fact
Francisca, filed a complaint against the Land
Bank and the DAR before the RTC.
 The SAC, adopted the DAR’s valuation.
Elizabeth’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
 Land Bank and the DAR failed to file their
appellees’ brief. During the pendency of the
appeal, Land Bank filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Defendant-Appellee[’s] Motion to
Dismiss Appeal,6 maintaining that the appeal
should be dismissed because an ordinary
appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode
being by way of a petition for review, citing
Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Hence,
Land Bank concluded that the appellate court
had no jurisdiction over the case, the SAC
decision having attained finality following Land
Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon7 which held
that failure of a party to file the proper remedy
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice
of the assailed decision renders it final.
ISSUE: WON ordinary appeal is a wrong remedy? Yes.
RULING: Yes. Following Land Bank of the Philippines
v. De Leon, the proper mode of appeal from decisions
of Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition
for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not
through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
First, there is no conflict between Section[s] 60 and 61
of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all
prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the
proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts.
Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts
in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition
for review is not permissible for decisions of the said
special courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the
Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-
judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.
What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly
regards a petition for review as the proper way of
appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is
no rule prescribed by this Court expressly disallowing
the said procedure.
Third,considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not
provide the details on how the petition for review shall
be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In fact,
Section 61 uses the word "review" to designate the
mode by which the appeal is to be effected. The
reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court
only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for
petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in
agrarian cases.13 (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The adoption of a petition for review as the mode of
appeal is justified in order to "hasten" the resolution of
cases involving issues on just compensation of
expropriated lands under RA 6657. Thus the Court, still
in the immediately cited Land Bank case, pronounced:
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for
review when appealing cases decided by the Special
Agrarian Courts in eminent domain case is the need for
absolute dispatch in the determination of just
compensation. Just compensation means not only
paying the correct amount but also paying for the land
within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss. Such objective is more in keeping with the
nature of a petition for review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review
dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading
is submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of
fair recompense to deprived landowners for the
government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable
in an ordinary appeal. . . .

Following then the same Land Bank case, resort by

Elizabeth to a wrong mode of appeal was fatal to her
cause as it resulted in rendering the decision appealed
from final and executory. Her notice of appeal did not, it
bears emphasis, stop the running of the reglementary
period to file a petition for review.

Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and

within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party
to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains
finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of
whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court -
not even the Supreme Court - has the power to revise,
review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of
finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at
some definite date fixed by law.15 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 2, 2009
is SET ASIDE.

The Decision dated June 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial

Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court in Agr. Case No. 1194-G is
deemed final and executory.
G.R. No. 186027               December 8, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-
Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent.
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals
Sanchez
FACTS:
Mercadera represented by her sister and duly
constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Oga,, sought the
correction of her given name as it appeared in her
Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar.
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general, as the case may be, is now
authorized to effect the change of first name or
nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical
errors in civil registry entries. The law now excludes
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied"3 and removes "correction or changing of
clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the
ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of
operation of the rules are substantial changes and
corrections in entries of the civil register.4
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City,
however, refused to effect the correction unless a court
order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein
is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment
before he can validly act on petitions for corrections
filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act
9048."5
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For
Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before RTC.  ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
–  (o) changes of name. 
The RTC ruled that the documentary evidence
presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the
circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that
she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since
childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her
Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that
the correction was justified.
The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the
reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It
mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of
Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule
108. In its Brief9 filed with the CA, the OSG argued that
the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for
change of name in a petition for correction of entries;
and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary
evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of
Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous
enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction
as it would modify or increase substantive rights." What
the lower court actually allowed was a change of
Mercadera’s given name, which would have been
proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and
proved any of the grounds therefor. Further, because
Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground
recognized by the Rules, the lower court’s order in
effect allowed the change of one’s name in the civil
registry without basis.
The CA assessed the controversy in this wise:
Appellant’s insistence that the petition should have
been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not
entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial
court was one for the correction on an entry in
petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which
she sought to change her name.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from." To change means "to
replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute.
Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to
the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or
distinguished on the basis of the effect that the
correction or change may be. Such entries include not
only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors.
After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts
recorded therein.
QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN
RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 103.
RULING: No.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376
and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412
and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103
can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In
order to justify a request for change of name, there
must be a proper and compelling reason for the change
and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her
by the use of his official name. To assess the name. What it did allow was the correction of her
sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must misspelled given name which she had been using ever
be adversarial proceedings.33 since she could remember.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 10834 also includes
"changes of name," the correction of a patently
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to
say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are
confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors
may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to
entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors
in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. As explained, Republic v. Valencia is the
authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries
like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be
corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court
under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts
recorded therein."35
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack
of support to the OSG’s assumption that Mercadera
intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that
the petition propounded are swift arguments on the
alleged procedural flaws of Mercadera’s petition before
the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was
brought up to convince this Court that the dangers
sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings
prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case.
Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by
Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had
been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the
possibility that confusion, or a modification of
substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a
single oppositor appeared to contest the petition
despite full compliance with the publication
requirement.
Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and
that compliance with the procedural requirements under
Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot
be denied that Mercadera complied with the
requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the
lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the
notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry
are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact
that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG,
did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial
in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the
petition and the motion to present its evidence ex
parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot
now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become
unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA
correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court
especially in admitting and according probative value to
the evidence presented by Mercadera.
WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is
AFFIRMED.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC

correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a
correction of a misspelled given name. To correct
simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from." To change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute."36 From the
allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for
the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her
registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set
aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to,
"MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of
said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the
clerical error in spelling.
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and
NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
Review of final judgments or final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies
Sanchez
FACTS:
 Petitioner Fabian was the major stockholder
and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation. Private respondent.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of
the First Metro Manila Engineering District
when he allegedly committed the offenses for
which he was administratively charged in the
Office of the Ombudsman.
 PROMAT participated in the bidding for
government construction projects including
those under the FMED, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his
official position, inveigled petitioner into an
amorous relationship.
 Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant
incidents developed between the parties and
when petitioner tried to terminate their
relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against
him in a letter-complaint.
 Graft Investigator issued a resolution finding
private respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law.
 Herein respondent Ombudsman, approved the
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by
finding private respondent guilty of misconduct
and meting out the penalty of suspension
without pay for one year. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman
Guerrero who set aside the Order of
respondent Ombudsman and exonerated
private respondent from the administrative
charges.
 Petitioner points out that under Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), 
when a respondent is absolved of the charges
in an administrative proceeding the decision of
the Ombudsman is final and unappealable.
She accordingly submits that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority under the law to
restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid
Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic
Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review
of this Court. Because of the aforecited
provision in those Rules of Procedure, she
claims that she found it "necessary to take an
alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates
on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
 Respondents filed their respective comments
and rejoined that the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered by the
Constitution and the law to promulgate its own
rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution provides, among others,
that the Office of the Ombudsman can
"(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by
law."
 Respondents consequently contend that,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules
of procedure formulated by the Office of the
Ombudsman governing the conduct of
proceedings before it, including those rules
with respect to the availability or non-
availability of appeal in administrative cases,
such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07.
 Respondents also question the propriety of
petitioner's proposition that, although she
definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing
the same as "an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the
aforequoted ambivalent statement which in
effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule
45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in
the alternative as an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
RULING: No. As correctly observed by private
respondent, the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal
by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with
Supreme Court. — A person desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a question, especially when the case can be decided on
judgment or final order or resolution
of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall
raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth.
(Emphasis ours).
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought
through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies  are now required to
be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review, under the requirements and conditions in
Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies. 21
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43
should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies,
but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
"high constitutional body." We see no reason for this
distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion,
that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43
even includes the Office of the President and the Civil
Service Commission, although the latter is even an
independent constitutional commission, unlike the
Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-
mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of
Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of
both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable
feature. After all, factual controversies are usually
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like
those coming from the Civil Service Commission, and
the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared
than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand,
we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since
it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts.
Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review
therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken
cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as
"acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate
jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is
unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is
not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but
an issue of conferment as a matter of law.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts
generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct.
Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question,
at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper
parties, although there was even no need for that
because the Court can rule on the matter sua
sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it
could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the
jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the
resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously
necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22
The Court appreciate the ratiocination of private
respondent but regret that It must reject the same. That
private respondent could be absolved of the charge
because the decision exonerating him is final and
unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is
precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule
that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of
the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint is not applicable in this administrative case.
That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly
imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of
Rule III is precisely under review here because of some
statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules
and the decisions of this Court on the same issues,
hence to invoke the same would be to beg the
question.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1989) pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
It cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs.
The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that
said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which,
being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by
this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it
results in a diminution, increase or modification of
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law
is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue
against the exercise of the rule-making power of this
Court. This brings to fore the question of whether
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or
procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn
between those rules or statutes which are procedural,
hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making
power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a
particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is
procedural and what is substantive is frequently a
question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic
approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means o implementing an existing right then the rule
deals merely with procedure.[32]
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall
now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereover, relates to procedure only.[33] This is so
because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved
party which is affected by the law. That right has been
preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is
to be made or decided has been changed. The
rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a
particular remedy, which may be changed by
substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he
can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the
remedy.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act
of creating a new right of appeal because such power
of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to
subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and
not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such
transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties
have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to
administer that remedy.
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes
involving a transfer of cases from one court to another,
are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such,
they are applicable to actions pending at the time the
statute went into effect[36] or, in the case at bar, when
its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the
standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the
transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of
Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any
other provision of law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby
declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred
to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said
petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro
hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without
prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional
documents or records as it may deem necessary and
proper.
G.R. No. 119118      February 19, 2001
RUFINO VALENCIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
BO. STA. CRUZ, PAOMBONG,
BULACAN, respondent.
Relief from judgments, orders and other proceedings
Sanchez
FACTS:
Petitioner Valencia entered into a lease agreement with
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos (RCBM)
involving a fishpond, registered in the latter's
Private respondents alleged that they were the true
owners of the fishpond and that RCBM was a mere
trustee.
After presentation of evidence and submission of the
case for decision, Judge Masadao dismissed it motu
propio  for lack of jurisdiction, opining that the case was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board. Both parties moved to reconsider,
which Judge Masadao granted, and the case was
scheduled anew for pre-trial. Petitioner was not
informed thereof, hence he failed to attend the pre-trial.
On that day, Judge Masadao issued an order stating
that the parties adopted the evidence already
presented and considered the case submitted for
decision. Petitioner's former counsel received a copy of
the order but failed to inform petitioner.Judge Masadao
rendered judgment upholding the validity of RCBM's
title and its lease contract with petitioner.
Upon belatedly learning of said judgment, petitioner
moved for execution pending appeal, contending that
since the trial court found him entitled to possession of
the fishpond, it is unfair to deprive him
thereof. Meanwhile, he filed a petition for relief from the
portion of the judgment dismissing his counterclaim,
where he alleged that his failure to move for
reconsideration of or appeal from said judgment was
due to a mistaken belief of his former counsel that he
was no longer interested to pursue the counterclaim.
Petitioner avers that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied the motion on the ground that the
portion of the decision sought to be executed had been
vacated by private respondents' timely appeal.
Petitioner avers that he received the trial court's
decision on July 23, 1993, and he filed the motion on
August 5, 1993, well within the 15-day period for
appeal. Private respondents do not dispute these
averments.
In their Comment, private respondents averred that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to execute pending appeal and deferring its
action on the petition for relief. They claimed petitioner
was forum-shopping when he filed a complaint for
annulment of judgment. They insisted that the trial
court's dismissal of the counterclaim was correct.10
Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion for execution
pending appeal. According to the appellate court, it is
clear from Section 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that
it is discretionary for the trial court to grant or deny a
motion for execution. Thus, it cannot be compelled to
allow execution, after finding that there was no cogent
and good reason for it.
ISSUES:
1) Was private respondents' appeal already
perfected when petitioner filed a motion for
execution? Yes.
2) Was there forum-shopping when petitioner
filed a complaint for annulment of judgment
with the Court of Appeals? Yes.
3) Should execution pending appeal be
allowed?
1. Yes. We find no merit in petitioner's argument. A
petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against
a final and executory judgment.18 In this case, the trial
court's judgment subject of the petition for relief has not
yet attained finality because of the timely appeal by
private respondents. Therefore, petitioner cannot
require the judge to follow the procedure laid down in
Rule 38. The judge did not err nor abuse his discretion
when he deferred action on the petition.
Corollarily, the Court of Appeals did not err in failing to
annul the portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing
petitioner's counterclaim for lack of due process. This
can well be settled in the petition for relief before the
trial court. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court19 provides that parties can avail of the action for
annulment of judgment when a petition for relief is no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In the
present case, the latter remedy was still available.
2. Yes. On the issue of forum-shopping, the rule is,
there is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another20 and that
the actions that were filed involve the same
transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances.21 There must also be identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues in the cases before
the two fora.
The petition for relief in the trial court and the petition
for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals
emanate from the same transaction, which is the lease
contract between petitioner and the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Malolos (RCBM). They also involve the same
facts and circumstances. Recall that upon the
execution of the aforecited contract, petitioner occupied
the fishpond where he invested considerable amount of
money. When private respondents filed their complaint
for cancellation of RCBM's title over the fispond, its
possession was removed from petitioner, who
consequently filed an answer in intervention, with
counterclaim for the damages he incurred. The trial
court disposed the complaint upholding the RCBM's
title. However, the same court dismissed petitioner's
counterclaim. As petitioner failed to move for
reconsideration or appeal the portion of the decision
adverse to him, he filed the petition for relief with the
trial court, which in turn deferred action thereto.
Consequently, petitioner filed the petition for certiorari
with annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals.
Clearly, the two actions resulted from the same facts
and circumstances. The two petitions also
involve identical cause of action. Both were for the
setting aside or annulment of that portion of the trial
court's judgment dismissing petitioner's counterclaim on
the ground of fraud. The two petitions also involve
the same subject matter or issue of whether petitioner
has meritorious counterclaim which, for alleged lack of
notice for the pre-trial conference, he failed to prove.
Clearly, there is forum-shopping and the Court of
Appeals did not err when it declared so in its resolution.
petitioner offered no convincing proof. His insistence –
that the trial court's decision upholding the lease
agreement between him and RCBM already entitled
him to possession of the fishponds even without a writ
and despite appeal – is premature. It is not enough for
him to claim he needed a writ of execution without
detailing cogent and good reasons therefor. The trial
court was within its bounds when it considered his
imagined fears of a bloody confrontation not enough
reason to issue the writ.
On the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, there
are three requisites for the grant of the same: 1) The
invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2) The
right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3) There
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.22 Petitioner merely alleged the
presence of these elements, but did not substantiate
the same with convincing evidence. Consequently, we
find no meritorious reason for the issuance of said writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October
28, 1994 and February 10, 1995, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

3. No. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,

provides that upon motion, the court may, in its
discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order. Petitioner, citing Echauz
vs. CA, et al., 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), states that
generally, execution is allowed when superior
circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the
damages that may result from the issuance of the writ.
Consequently, petitioner says that a writ of execution
should be issued in his favor not only because he is
entitled, under the law, to the possession of the
fishpond, such that he can take possession of the same
without a writ of execution, but also because the
issuance of such writ will prevent a bloody confrontation
between the parties.

Private respondents respond that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion since appreciation of the reasons
for execution pending appeal lies within its sound
discretion.

We agree with private respondents. Other than his self-

serving claim that he would suffer damage with private
respondents' continued possession of the fishpond,
G.R. No. 151170             May 29, 2007
VICTORY LINER, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL MALINIAS, Respondent.
Annulment of Judgments or final orders and resolutions
Sanchez
FACTS:
 This case finds its origin from a vehicular
collision that occurred in La Union between a
bus owned by petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. and
an Isuzu Truck used by respondent Michael
Malinias.
 A complaint for sum of money and damages
was instituted by respondent against petitioner
and the bus driver alleging pecuniary damage
to the truck.
 In the course of trial, respondent finished
presenting his evidence and rested his case.
In the meantime, counsel for petitioner filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel, but the same
was denied by the MTC in an as the motion
did not bear any signature of conformity from
the petitioner. When the case was called for
the reception of petitioner’s evidence on the
previously scheduled date of 27 October 1997,
no appearance was made for the bus
company. Respondent thus immediately
moved that petitioner be declared to have
waived its right to adduce evidence in its favor
and that the case be deemed submitted for
judgment.
 The MTC found merit in respondent’s
contention, and ordered the case be deemed
submitted for decision as of 27 October 1997.
On 13 January 1998, the MTC rendered
judgment in favor of respondent.
 Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The MTC ruled
that the notice did not conform with the
mandatory requirements of Section 5, Rule 15
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
the motion was thus a mere scrap of paper
which did not suspend the period to appeal.
Accordingly, the MTC declared that its earlier
judgment dated 13 January 1998 had become
final and executory.
 Petitioner responded to the foregoing
developments by filing a Notice of Appeal, as
well as a motion for the inhibition by the MTC
judge which motion was immediately granted.
It was only on 28 September 1999, or
eighteen (18) months after the Notice of
Appeal was filed, that the MTC acted on the
same and ruled that it had been filed beyond
the reglementary period. Again, the MTC
reiterated that the Judgment dated 13 January
1998 had long become final and executory
since the fatally defective Motion for
Reconsideration did not toll the reglementary
period for appeal.
 The MTC explained that the petition for relief
from judgment must have been filed either
within sixty (60) days from the date petitioner’s
new counsel learned of the judgment, or sixty
(60) days after learning that the Motion for
Reconsideration had been denied for having
been filed out of time. Neither circumstance
was met by petitioner. Subsequently, the MTC
likewise denied a Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner.9
 The RTC agreed with the MTC that the
Petition for Relief from Judgment had been
belatedly filed.
 Petitioner with the Court of Appeals a "Petition
for Certiorari to Annul Judgment" under the
aegis of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Interestingly, based on the first
paragraph and the express relief prayed for in
this petition, the "judgment" sought to be
annulled was not the final and executory
judgment of the MTC, but rather, the two
orders of the RTC which successively
dismissed the special civil action for certiorari,
and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of respondent.14 However,
in explaining the "nature of the petition,"
petitioner claimed that it was seeking to annul
the judgment and orders of both the RTC and
the MTC,15 although the issues identified in the
petition pertain only to "serious errors" and
"grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the
RTC.16 There is a general allegation that the
acts of the RTC in granting the motion for
execution even before petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was acted upon constituted an
extrinsic fraud,17 but no particular arguments
were offered to explain why that was so.
 The petition for annulment of judgment was
accompanied by a Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping which
was signed by counsel for petitioner. On that
 basis, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition outright in a Resolution18 dated 26 July
2001, stressing the rule that it should be the
petitioner, not its counsel, which should
execute the verification and certification
against forum shopping
 Two sets of arguments are raised. The first
concerns the errors ascribed to the Court of
Appeals in dismissing outright the petition for
annulment of judgment. The second concerns
the alleged grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in directing the issuance of the
writ of execution even without resolving
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment
RULING: No.
As indicated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the two main grounds relied upon for dismissing the
petition for annulment of judgment were petitioner’s
failure to comply with the requirements in the execution
of the verification and certification against forum-
shopping, and the petition’s reliance on the ground of
extrinsic fraud which could have been raised or availed
of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment with
the Court of Appeals. One might presume that the
judgment sought for annulment would have been that
rendered by the MTC. Yet what petitioner expressly
sought to be nullified were mainly the RTC rulings
dismissing the petition for certiorari. The sense of this
remedial action is lost on the Court.
Admittedly, there appears to have been a half-hearted
or incomplete attempt to have the MTC rulings annulled
as well.43 Disregarding for the nonce the merits of the
annulment of the MTC decisions, Section 10 of Rule 48
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes it clear that
"[a]n action to annul a judgment or final order of a
Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the former,"44 and not with
the Court of Appeals. Considering the periods
prescribed under Rule 47 for the filing of an action for
annulment of judgment are quite broad or capable of
discretionary appreciation,45 the petitioner could have
filed such action for annulment of the MTC’s judgment
with the RTC which would not have been lightly
disregarded with timeliness as premise.
Still, it was the RTC rulings which were subject of the
petition for annulment filed with the Court of Appeals
which had jurisdiction over such actions. This recourse
was ill-advised, to say the least, for varied reasons. For
one, the RTC rulings dismissing petitioner’s special civil
action for certiorari could have been the subject of an
ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section
1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since
such dismissals partake of a final order that completely
disposed of the original petition filed with the RTC. It
may have been that petitioner was threatened by the
impending execution of the adverse MTC decision,
despite the fact that it had a pending motion for
reconsideration of the RTC’s dismissal of its certiorari
petition. That notwithstanding, annulment of judgment
still stands as a most incongruous remedy if such
impending execution did impel an active recourse on
the part of the petitioner.
More fundamentally, the annulment of the RTC
decision dismissing the special civil action for certiorari
would not properly engender the annulment of the
adverse MTC judgment. In fact, the annulment of such
RTC decision would not give rise to any viable or useful
right or benefit to the petitioner, since it would not stay
in any way the MTC judgment or its execution. At most,
the only possible implication of the annulment of the
RTC decision is that relief still existed to extenuate the
MTC rulings dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment, the same rulings which were timely assailed
in the petition for certiorari.
We do have to offer some clarification regarding the
citation by the Court of Appeals as ground for
dismissing the petition for annulment the fact that "the
ground raised by petitioner is extrinsic fraud, which
ground petitioner has already availed of in its petition
for relief from judgment in the Municipal Trial Court."
Section 2 of Rule 47 does disqualify extrinsic fraud as a
valid ground "if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief," and such provision would have found
incontestable relevance had the clear object of the
petition for annulment been the MTC judgment. But
petitioner’s action for annulment of judgment did not
provide clarity in that regard, and in fact does devote
considerable effort in imputing errors on the part of the
RTC with the objective of annulling, in particular, the
RTC decision. If that were so, reliance on Section 2 of
Rule 47 would have been misplaced, since the
judgment subject of the petition for relief was different
from the decision subject of the action for annulment of
judgment. Still, given the confused nature of the petition
for annulment of judgment, blame could hardly be
attributed to the RTC.
All told, even if we were to hold that the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
perceived defect in the verification and certification
requirements, the appellate court would have been left
with an action stigmatized by error upon error
interminably. Most frustratingly, for every procedural
misstep committed by petitioner, there existed a
corresponding viable alternative which would have
necessitated a ruling on the merits, and which petitioner
could have chosen with ease. Instead of filing a Notice
of Appeal, it could have instead filed a special civil
action for certiorari or a petition for relief from judgment.
Instead of filing the no longer timely petition for relief
from judgment, it could have instead by then filed a
petition for annulment of judgment. When it did file a
petition for annulment with the Court of Appeals, it
could have instead filed a more feasible petition for
annulment with the RTC.
If the consequences for pursuing the wrong remedial
tack in this case seem harsh, it should be remembered
that there is no innate right to appeal. Appeal is a
statutory right which may be exercised within the
prescribed limits. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for a rational and orderly method by which
appeal can be pursued, and even contingency remedial
measures if appeal could no longer be timely pursued.
The failure of petitioner to undertake a timely appeal, or
to engage in the available modes of relief even if
appeal was no longer possible, simply has to bear
consequence. The lower court rulings germane to this
case were, consistently cognizant of this fact,
transformed to legal conclusion, and we are hard-
pressed to find any cause for annulment of any of those
judgments. The dismissal of the petition by the Court of
Appeals is ultimately correct.
All the errors could have been avoided had petitioner,
at the onset, recognized that the judicial system
deemed the original MTC Judgment dated 13 January
1998 as having become final and executory after no
valid motion for reconsideration was filed thereto. On
many levels, there existed ample remedies to undo
such deleterious consequence, yet petitioner ended up
each time selecting the wrong answer among the
varied options. In the end, all petitioner accomplished
was to persistently water a dead plant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
CITYTRUST BANKING CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 92591, April 30, 2001
CIVIL PROCEDURE
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. Appeals in general
e. issues to be raised on appeal
[Salta]
FACTS:
 Private respondent William Samara, an
American who does business in the PH, filed a
complaint for recovery of a sum of money
against petitioner Citytrust Banking
Corporation and a foreign bank, Marine
Midland Bank, N.A.
 Samara purchased from Citytrust Bank Draft
(bill of exchange) Number 23681 for $40,000,
the payee being Thai International Airways
and the corresponding drawee bank is
defendant Marine Midland.
 On Dec. 23, 1980, Samara executed a stop-
payment order of the bank draft instructing
Citytrust to inform Marine Midland about the
order through telex. Citytrust transmitted the
message the next day and followed it up with
a cable. The bank acknowledged to have
received stating that it has noted the stop-
payment order and has not paid the bank
draft. Citytrust re-debited Samara’s account
for $40 upon discovering that Marine
Midland had already debited Citytrust’s own
account for the same amount.
 TC ruled in favor of plaintiff and adjudged the
two defendants to be jointly and severally
liable as judgment debtors to pay plaintiff
 Marine Midland filed a MR of the decision
but was denied. On the other hand,
petitioner only moved for the
reconsideration of the order of execution of
the judgment against it, which was granted.
The two defendants then filed separate
appeals.
 Petitioner’s appeal, however, was dismissed
for being filed out of time or 51 days (i.e. May
7, 1986) after it received a copy of the TC’s
decision on March 17, 1986. A motion to
reconsider the dismissal was denied by the
CA.
 On Feb. 26, 1988, the petitioner questioned
before the SC the dismissal of its appeal.
 On Feb 23, 1989, while the petition for
certiorari to review the dismissal of the
appeal was still pending before the SC, the CA
affirmed the TC’s decision with modification
 consisting of a reduction of the rate of
interest and attorney’s fees as well as the
exclusion of the exemplary damages.
 On April 10, 1989, the SC denied the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit. Thus, on Aug 7,
1989, the decision became final and
executory.
 On Sept 28, 1989, Samara filed a motion for
execution which the trial court granted.
 On Nov. 6, 1989, the petitioner assailed the
Order of Execution before the CA, which was
denied.
 Private respondent contends that the
petition is barred by res judicata.
ISSUE:
WON the liability of the petitioner should be based on
the original decision of the trial court and not the
modified one.
RULING:
YES.
It is our considered opinion that the issue here is
distinct from the ones raised earlier. In the present
petition, the Court is faced with the issue of the
propriety of the execution of judgments in favor of
private respondent Samara who is entitled to recover
on execution: against the petitioner, the amount of US
$40,000.00 plus 12% compounded interest per
annum, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 attorney's
fees of P50,000.00 and costs; and as against Marine
Midland, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus 6% simple
interest per annum, and attorney's fees of only
P10,000.00.
We are less concerned now with the issues of whether
or not a co-defendant's appeal inures to the benefit of
another who failed to appeal on time and on the right
of a judgment creditor to immediate execution of a
final and executory judgment since such issues have
become moot and academic.
It is worthy to note that the Court was not apprised of
the February 23, 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals
until after we had promulgated a decision denying
Citytrust's petition for certiorari to review the
dismissal of its own appeal. We were so notified
through Citytrust's motion for reconsideration of our
decision n in G.R. No. 82009. It is a sad fact, however,
that the motion did not present sufficiently compelling
grounds to convince the Court to rule otherwise on
the issues presented in G.R. No. 82009 which pertain
to the validity of the dismissal of the petitioner's
appeal.
The present petition was given due course in line with
our settled rule that while a decision has already
become final and executory and can no longer be
challenged, the manner of its execution can be
reviewed by proper appeal (Abbot v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 145 SCRA 206 [1986]). It is not
only the difference in the issue raised that makes us
allow this petition. It is also because of a different
Court of Appeals decision (this time in CA- G.R. SP No.
19176) that is the subject of our review. The petitioner
now assails the affirmation of the order of execution
based on the trial court judgment in spite of the
modified judgment which reduced the liability of co-
defendants to pay private respondent. What bothers
the private respondent is the similarity of the
arguments used by the petitioner in all the pleadings
filed with this Court in G.R. No. 82009 and in the
present petition.
The Court reiterates what it has held in
the Abbot case:
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the instant case, however, what is sought to be
reviewed is not the decision itself but the manner of
its execution. There is a big difference. While it is true
that the decision itself has become final and executory
and so can no longer be challenged, there is no
question either that it must be enforced in accordance
with its terms and conditions. Any deviation
therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal. (pp.
209-210)
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 19176 dated January 18, 1990 as well
as the resolution denying reconsideration are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ordered
to effect execution of its judgment subject to the
modifications supplied by the Court of Appeals in its
judgment on February 23, 1989.
SO ORDERED.
 SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS
GROUP, INC. V. BAYANG
G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015
CIVIL PROCEDURE
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. Appeals in general
f. Period of appeal
[Salta]
FACTS:
 Peittioner SLR, as seller, and respondent Ma.
Cristina Bayang, as buyer, entered into a
“contract to sell” of a 60 sqm lot in Violago
Homes Parkwoods Subd., Q.C.
 Upon full payment of the monthly
amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina
demanded from SLR Builders the execution of
the deed of absolute sale and the lot's
certificate of title but the latter failed to
deliver, prompting Cristina to file a complaint
for specific performance and damages
against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar
Violago (petitioners) before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
 In a decision dated Feb 16, 2004, HLRUB
ruled in Cristina’s favor and ordered SLR,
among others, to execute the Deed of
Absolute Sale of the subject property and
deliver the title thereof.
 Petitioner appealed the decision to the
HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board
dismissed and denied the petitioners’ appeal
and subsequent MR.
 The petitioners then brought their case to the
Office of the President. In a resolution dated
Nov. 17, 2006, the OP dismissed the
petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out
of time:
o A review of the records shows that
the HLURB Decision affirming the
Arbiter's decision was received by
the respondents/appellants
(referring to the petitioners) on July
27, 2005. On that date, the 15-day
prescriptive period within which to
file an appeal began to run. Instead
of preparing an appeal,
respondents-appellants opted to file
a Motion for Reconsideration on
August 10, 2005. Their filing of the
said motion interrupted the period
of appeal by that time, however,
fourteen (14) days had already
elapsed.
On April 17, 2006, respondents-
appellants received the Resolution
denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. Following the
above rules, respondents-appellants
have only one (1) day left, or until
April 18, 2006, within which to file
their notice of appeal to this Office.
Unfortunately, they were able to do
so only on April 27, 2006, or nine (9)
days late8 (Emphasis supplied.)
 The petitioners moved to reconsider and
argued that the "fresh period rule"
enunciated in the case of Domingo Neypes,
et at. v. Court of Appeals, et al. should be
applied to their case.
 The OP, in a resolution10 dated July 26, 2007,
denied the petitioners' motion with finality,
stating that the "fresh period rule" applies
only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals, such as in petitioners'
case. The petitioners then appealed to the CA
via petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
 In its assailed decision, the CA denied the
petitioners' petition for review. The CA,
likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration; hence, the filing of the
present petition for review on certiorari with
this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies to
administrative appeals, such as an appeal from a
decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
Office of the President

RULING:

NO.

We DENY the petition. It is settled that the "fresh

period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals
and not to administrative appeals.

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a

decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus,
the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and

regulations governing appeals from decisions of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section
2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of
2004, in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review

on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision dated July 23,
2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.
 MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998
CIVIL PROCEDURE
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. Appeals in general
i. Appeal from judgments or final
orders of the Regional Trial Courts
(RULE 42)
[Salta]
FACTS:
 On October 16, 1992, respondent Philex
Mining Corporation filed a complaint for
expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili
Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and
Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation,
before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet.
 Based on §53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining
sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of
petitioners' mining areas where the latter's
"Macawiwili claims" are located. Philex
Mining likewise moved for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
petitioners from ejecting it (Philex Mining)
from the mining areas sought to be
expropriated.
 Although a TRO was initially issued by the
RTC, it denied respondent’s application for a
preliminary injunction. On Feb 18, 1993, the
TC acting on the petitioner’s motion,
dismissed the complaint of Philex Mining.
 Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration,
but this was denied. It then appealed to the
CA.
 On February 16, 1994, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that
only questions of law were involved and,
therefore, the appeal should be to the
Supreme Court. However, the appellate court
denied petitioners' motion in a resolution,
dated April 12, 1994. Without filing a motion
for reconsideration, petitioners filed the
instant petition for certiorari.
 Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal
of the petition on the ground that petitioner
should have filed a motion for
reconsideration giving the appellate court an
opportunity to correct itself.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioner should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration
2. WON the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners’ Motion
to Dismiss Appeal
RULING:
1. NO.
It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when
petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion
for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed
before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom
the writ of certiorari is sought.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie
unless, motion for reconsideration is first filed before
the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
correct its assigned errors.
his rule, however, is not without exceptions. In Pajo v.
Ago and Ortiz 5 we held:
Respondent contends that petitioners should
have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order in question, or asked for the dissolution
of the preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court, before coming to us.
This is not always so. It is only when the
questions are raised for the first time before
this Court in certiorari proceeding that the
writ shall not issue unless the lower court had
first been given the opportunity to pass upon
the same. In fine, when the questions raised
before this Court are the same as those
which have been squarely raised in and
passed upon by, the court below, the filing of
a motion for reconsideration in said court
before certiorari can be instituted in this
Court, is no longer prerequisite.

The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are
substantially the same as those asserted by them in
their Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated February 14,
1994, before the Court of Appeals. The argument that
respondent has no right to expropriate petitioners'
mineral areas under Presidential Decree No. 463 has
already been raised, argued, and submitted by
petitioners for resolution by the appellate court in
their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further file a
motion for reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments.
For this reason, we hold that petitioners' failure to file
a motion for reconsideration is not fatal to the
allowance of their action.
2. YES.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in denying their motion to
dismiss the appeal. According to petitioners,
respondent's appeal raises only questions of law and,
therefore it should be brought to the Supreme Court
by means of a petition for review on certiorari and
not, as Philex Mining did, by bringing an ordinary
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that
the question whether respondent has a right to
expropriate petitioners' mining areas under §59 of
Presidential Decree No. 463 is a question of law.
On the other hand, Philex Mining maintains that the
issues raised in its appeal are factual and, therefore,
the appellate court is the proper forum for the
ventilation of such issues.
This procedure is now embodied in Rule 41, §2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which distinguishes the
different modes of appeal from judgments of regional
trial courts as follows:
Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the
Court to Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.
(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where
only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.
On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that appeals from
judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise
of their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the
Court of Appeals, whether the appellant raises
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law.
The rules on appeals from the judgments of the
regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be
summarized as follows:
(1) Original Jurisdiction — In all cases decided
by the regional trial court in the exercise of
their original jurisdiction, appeal may be
made to:
(a) Court of Appeals — where the appellant
raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law, by filing a mere notice of
appeal.
(b) Supreme Court — where the appellant
solely raises questions of law, by filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
(2) Appellate Jurisdiction
All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional
trial courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall
be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
The respondent's arguments may thus be summarized
as follows:
 (1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, expressly grants
respondent the right to expropriate mining
claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by
other persons once the conditions justifying
expropriation are present. The power of
eminent domain expressly granted under
Sections 58 and 59 of P.D. No. 463 is not
inferior to the possessory right of other
claimowners.  petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed
(2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a
mining company to expropriate land
belonging to another mining company.
Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic,  land covered
by mining claims may be the subject of
expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of
the power of eminent domain only means
that the court may inquire into the necessity
of the expropriation. 
hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether
the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of
action in one pleading under Rule 8, §1 of the Rules of
Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are
legal questions whose resolution does not require an
examination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented by the parties but a determination of what
the law is on the given state of facts. These issues
raise questions of law which should be the subject of a
directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals
committed a grave error in ruling otherwise.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the challenged
resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and
the appeal of respondent Philex Mining is DISMISSED.

(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of

forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme
Court's decision in Poe Mining v.
Garcia.  Forum-shopping, which refers to
filing the same or repetitious suits, is not
resorted to in the present case since
respondent seeks to expropriate petitioners'
mining areas, not as operator of the Poe
mining claims, but as operator of the Nevada
mining claims. 

(4) Respondent's expropriation of the land

will not divide the surface from the
subsurface for the reason that respondent
seeks to expropriate all rights that
petitioners, as well as the Pigoro heirs, have
over the 21.9 hectare area. 
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding
respondent's alternative cause of action,
even on the assumption that respondent
does not have the right to expropriate, for
the reason that an alternative statement in a
pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the
insufficiency of the other alternative
statements. 

The first four arguments advanced by respondent

Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has,
under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to
expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining areas where
petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other
 Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.
G.R. No. 177116, February 27, 2013
CIVIL PROCEDURE
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. Appeals in general
j. Appeal from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Appeals
[Salta]
FACTS:
 On October 25, 1995, Contiquincybunge
Export Company loaded 6,843.700 metric
tons of U.S. Soybean Meal in Bulk on board
the vessel MN "Sea Dream" at the Port of
Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A., for delivery to the
Port of Manila to respondent Simon
Enterprises, Inc., as consignee. When the
vessel arrived at the South Harbor in Manila,
the shipment was discharged to the receiving
barges of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc.
(ATI), the arrastre operator. Respondent later
received the shipment but claimed having
received only 6,825.144 metric tons of U.S.
Soybean Meal, or short by 18.556 metric
tons, which is estimated to be worth
US$7,100.16 or ₱186,743.20.
 On November 25, 1995, Contiquincybunge
Export Company made another shipment to
respondent and allegedly loaded on board
the vessel M/V "Tern" at the Port of Darrow,
Louisiana, U.S.A. 3,300.000 metric tons of
U.S. Soybean Meal in Bulk for delivery to
respondent at the Port of Manila. 
 On January 25, 1996, the carrier docked at
the inner Anchorage, South Harbor, Manila.
The subject shipment was discharged to the
receiving barges of petitioner ATI and
received by respondent which, however,
reported receiving only 3,100.137 metric tons
instead of the manifested 3,300.000 metric
tons of shipment. Respondent filed against
petitioner ATI and the carrier a claim for the
shortage of 199.863 metric tons, estimated
to be worth US$79,848.86 or ₱2,100,025.00,
but its claim was denied.
 Thus, the respondent filed with the RTC of
Manila an action for damages against the
unknown owner of the vessels M/V “Sea
Dream” and M/V “Tern”, its local agent Inter-
Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner
ATI alleging that it suffered losses through
the fault or negligence of the defendants.
 In their Answer, the defendants prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of
cause of action and prescription.
 Meanwhile, Petitioner ATI alleged in its
Answer that it exercised the required
diligence in the handling of the subject
shipment.
 RTC – held petitioner ATI and its co-
defendants solidarily liable to respondent for
damages arising from the shortage.
 CA – affirmed the decision of the RTC
 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration but
this was denied by the CA.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition raising the
sole issue of whether the appellate court
erred in affirming the decision of the TC
holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable with its
co-defendants for the shortage incurred in
the shipment of the goods to respondent.
ISSUE:
WON
RULING:
YES/NO
We note that the matters raised by petitioner ATI
involve questions of fact which are generally not
reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, as the Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1
thereof provides that "the petition x x x shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth."
A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.
The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that
only questions of law may be entertained by this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain
exceptions, such as when :
(1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based;
(7) the findings of absence of facts are
contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record;
(8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.
After a careful review of the records, we find
justification to warrant the application of the fourth
exception. The CA misapprehended the following
facts.
First, petitioner ATI is correct in arguing that the
respondent failed to prove that the subject shipment
suffered actual shortage, as there was no competent
evidence to prove that it actually weighed 3,300
metric tons at the port of origin.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that the
subject shipment suffered shortage, for it was not able
to establish that the subject shipment was weighed at
the port of origin at Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A. and that
the actual weight of the said shipment was 3,300
metric tons.
Second, as correctly asserted by petitioner ATI, the
shortage, if any, may have been due to the inherent
nature of the subject shipment or its packaging since
the subject cargo was shipped in bulk and had a
moisture content of 12.5%.
It should be noted that the shortage being claimed by
the respondent is minimal, and is an indication that it
could be due to consolidation or settlement of the
subject shipment, as accurately observed by the
petitioner.
Third, we agree with the petitioner ATI that
respondent has not proven any negligence on the part
of the former.
Considering that respondent was not able to establish
conclusively that the subject shipment weighed 3,300
metric tons at the port of loading, and that it cannot
therefore be concluded that there was a shortage for
which petitioner should be responsible; bearing in
mind that the subject shipment most likely lost weight
in transit due to the inherent nature of Soya Bean
Meal; assuming that the shipment lost weight in
transit due to desorption, the shortage of 199.863
metric tons that respondent alleges is a minimal
6.05% of the weight of the entire shipment, which is
within the allowable 10% allowance for loss; and
noting that the respondent was not able to show
negligence on the part of the petitioner and that the
weighing methods which respondent relied upon to
establish the shortage it alleges is inaccurate,
respondent cannot fairly claim damages against
petitioner for the subject shipment's alleged shortage.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 27, 2006
and Resolution dated March 23, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71210 are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE insofar as petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc. is
concerned. Needless to add, the complaint against
petitioner docketed as RTC Manila Civil Case No. 96-
81101 is ordered DISMISSED.
 LANTING V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 141426, May 6, 2005
CIVIL PROCEDURE
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. Appeals in general
r. Review of final judgments or final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies
[Salta]
FACTS:
 Petitioner Zenaida F. Lanting was the
Administrative Officer IV of the City Council
of Manila. She filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint againt
respondents, then Manila Vice-Mayor Jose
Atienza Jr., now City Mayor, Emmanuel Sison,
Secretary to the City Council, and Charito
Rumbo, Human Resource Management
Officer III, for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). She alleged
that these city officials unlawfully and
feloniously appointed Ernesto Saw Jr., a
chinse citizen working in Taiwan, and
brother-in-law of Charito Rumbo, to the
position of Researcher in the City Council.
 In the same complaint, petitioner further
alleged that respondents fraudulently
effected the publication of a vacant position
(Administrative Officer V) in the City Council,
in violation of Republic Act No. 7041.
Petitioner also questioned the appointments
of Percival Magalong as Utility I; Atty. Flora
Aquino-Togonon as Administrative Officer V;
and three relatives of Charito Rumbo,
namely: Eduardo Antolin, Arlyn M. Rumbo
and Maricar V. Antolin as
Researchers/Consultants. Petitioner likewise
denounced Erlinda Magalong, Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Director II, for "employing"
Percival Magalong, her brother, in her office
at the Civil Service Field Office, GSIS Building,
Manila.
 Respondents city officials filed their joint
counter-affidavit6 denying petitioner’s
charges. They averred that Ernesto Saw, Jr. is
a Filipino citizen as shown by his birth
certificate and Personnel Data Sheet.
Assuming arguendo that he is a Chinese
citizen, such fact alone would not disqualify
him from being employed in the City of
Manila, there being no law prohibiting a
foreigner from being employed as researcher
or consultant in the government.
For her part, CSC Director Magalong also
denied the charge against her, contending
that she was not the one who appointed
Percival Magalong.
Ernesto Saw, Jr. did not file his counter-
affidavit.
 On April 8, 1999, Oscar P. Ramos, Graft
Investigator Officer I, issued a Resolution
recommending that petitioner’s complaint be
dismissed. The Resolution7 was reviewed by
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. and approved by then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on June 25,
1999.
 Petitioner filed a MR of the resolution on the
ground that Investigator Oscar Ramos
"conveniently and intentionally skirted the
issue of falsification of public documents
which are crystal clear in my complaint." She
then prayed for a re-investigation of her
complaint by a Special Prosecutor.
 The Ombudsman denied petitioner’s motion
for lack of merit.
 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
 CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the assailed Ombudsman Resolution.
 Petitioner filed an MR but was subsequently
denied. Petitioner contends that her
complaint before the Ombudsman was not
limited to violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, but likewise includes
“acts constituting ground for administrative
complaint under Sec. 1, Rule III of
 Administrative Order No. 07 of the
Ombudsman." Thus, the Court of Appeals
should have taken cognizance of her petition,
applying this Court’s ruling in Fabian vs.
Desierto.
ISSUE:
WON the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the appeal
RULING:
NO
Petitioner’s complaint-affidavit before the Office of
the Ombudsman is for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an administrative
complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did she allege
administrative offenses, such as dishonesty or
misconduct on the part of respondents.
(of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)." We
reiterated this ruling in Namuhe vs. Ombudsman and
recently in Barata vs. Abalos, Jr. and Coronel vs.
Aniano Desierto, as Ombudsman, and Pedro Sausal, Jr.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals, in issuing its
questioned Resolutions, did not commit grave abuse
of discretion. Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over
petitioner’s criminal action. As earlier mentioned,
jurisdiction lies with this Court.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

It bears stressing that the allegations in petitioner’s

complaint describe respondents’ actuations as "willful,
felonious, unlawful, odious and despicable criminal
activities." In her motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s Resolution, petitioner claimed that
Graft Investigator Ramos "skirted the issue
of falsification of public documents which is crystal
clear in my complaint." Likewise, in her petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54274, petitioner sought "to nullify the
resolution of the Honorable Ombudsman dated April
8, 1999 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for anti-graft
and falsification of public documents and to direct
respondent Ombudsman to give due course to the
complaint."

Considering that petitioner’s complaint is criminal in

nature, this Court has the sole authority to review the
Ombudsman’s Resolutions on pure question of law as
expressly mandated in Section 14, 2nd paragraph of
R.A. 6770, which provides:

"Sec. 14. Restrictions. – x x x.
No court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court
on pure question of law."

In Fabian vs. Desierto, we held that only "appeals from

the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43
 GOMEZ V. MONTALBAN
G.R. No. 174414, 14 March 2008
CIVIL PROCEDURE
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
3. Relief from judgments, orders and other
proceedings
a. Grounds for availing of the
remedy
b. Time to file petition
c. Contents of petition
[Salta]
FACTS:
 Petitioner Elmer Gomez filed a Complaint for
a sum of money with the RTC of Davao City
alleging, among others, that respondent Ma.
Lita Montalban obtained a loan from him in
the sum of P40,000 with 15% interest per
month; that upon receipt of the proceeds of
the loan, respondent issued in favor of the
petitioner, as security, Capitol Bank Check, in
the sum of P46,000 covering the P40,000
principal loan amount and P6,000 interest
charges for one month; that when the check
became due, respondent failed to pay the
loan despite several demands.
 Respondent failed to file her Answer despite
reciept of the Summons, hence, she was
declared in default, and upon motion,
petitioner was allowed to present evidence
ex-parte.
 RTC rendered its decision in favor of the
Petitioner.
 On 28 May 2004, respondent filed a Petition
for Relief from Judgment6 alleging that there
was no effective service of summons upon
her since there was no personal service of
the same. The summons was received by one
Mrs. Alicia dela Torre, who was not
authorized to receive summons or other legal
pleadings or documents on respondent’s
behalf. Respondent attributes her failure to
file an Answer to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. She claimed that she
had good and valid defenses against
petitioner and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction as the principal amount being
claimed by petitioner was only ₱40,000.00,
an amount falling within the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
 After petitioner filed his Answer to the
Petition for Relief from Judgment and
respondent her Reply, the said Petition was
set for hearing.
 After several dates were set and called for
hearing, respondent, thru counsel, failed to
appear despite being duly notified; hence,
her Petition for Relief was dismissed for her
apparent lack of interest to pursue the
petition.
 Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal of her
Petition for Relief, stating that her counsel’s
failure to appear was not intentional, but due
to human shortcomings or frailties,
constituting honest mistake or excusable
negligence.
 On 18 November 2005, the RTC granted
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
 On 20 June 2006, the RTC granted
respondent’s Petition for Relief from
Judgment and set aside its Decision dated 4
May 2004 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
 Petitioner then filed a MR but the same was
denied by the RTC in another Order.
ISSUE:
WON respondent’s relief from judgment is proper
during the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration and appeal.
RULING:
NO
On the propriety of the granting by the RTC of
respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment, the
Court finds and so declares that the RTC did indeed
commit an error in doing so.
First of all, a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court is only available against a final and
executory judgment. Since respondent allegedly
received a copy of the Decision dated 4 May 2004 on
14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for Relief from
Judgment on 28 May 2004, judgment had not attained
finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence,
resort by respondent to a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was
premature and inappropriate.
Second, based on respondent’s allegations in her
Petition for Relief before the RTC, she had no cause of
action for relief from judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 38 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment,
order, or other proceedings. – When a
judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file
a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, the court may grant relief from
judgment only "[w]hen a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is
taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence x x x."
In her Petition for Relief from Judgment before the
RTC, respondent contended that judgment was
entered against her through "mistake or fraud,"
because she was not duly served with summons as it
was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not
authorized to receive summons or other legal
processes on her behalf.
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
"mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which
relates to the case. The word "mistake," which grants
relief from judgment, does not apply and was never
intended to apply to a judicial error which the court
might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be
corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist
in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise
been prevented from interposing an appeal.
"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the
aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his
case to the court, or was used to procure the
judgment without fair submission of the controversy.
This is not present in the case at hand as respondent
was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was
given the opportunity to present her case.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. Under Section 1, the "negligence"
must be excusable and generally imputable to the
party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is
binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and
allow a party to disown his counsel’s conduct would
render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject
to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek
administrative sanctions against the erring counsel
and not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.
Third, the certificate of service of the process server of
the court a quo is prima facie evidence of the facts as
set out therein.37 According to the Sheriff’s Return of
Service, summons was issued and served on
respondent thru one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre.
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over respondent on account of the non-
service upon her of the summons and complaint, the
remedy of the respondent was to file a motion for the
reconsideration of the 4 May 2004 Decision by default
or a motion for new trial within 15 days from receipt
of notice thereof. This is also without prejudice to
respondent’s right to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of
the order of default of the court a quo and the
proceedings thereafter held including the decision, the
writ of execution, and the writ of garnishment issued
by the RTC, on the ground that it acted without
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, however, respondent
opted to file a Petition for Relief from the Judgment of
the RTC, which, as the Court earlier determined, was
the wrong remedy.
In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence that would have
prevented petitioner from filing either a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari
of the 4 May 2004 Decision of the RTC, her resort to a
Petition for Relief from Judgment was unwarranted.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is herby GRANTED.

Consequently, the Decision dated 4 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 13, in Civil Case
No. 29,717-03 is hereby REINSTATED and the Order
dated 20 June 2006 granting the petition for relief
from judgment is hereby SET ASIDE.
 ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80892, September 29, 1989
CIVIL PROCEDURE
R. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
4. Annulment of Judgments or final orders
and resolutions
a. Grounds for annulment
b. Period to file action
c. Effects of judgment of annulment
[Salta]
FACTS:
 On February 15,1984 Freddie and Marconi Da
Silva, as mortgagors, and Islamic Da'Wah
Council of the Philippines (Council for
brevity), as mortgagee, executed a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land located in
Cubao, Quezon City as security for the
payment of a P1M promissory note in favor
of the mortgagee.
 The mortgagors were unable to pay their
obligation, hence, the Council instituted
forclosure proceedings with the RTC.
 Subsequently, the parties submitted a
compromise agreement, which was then
approved by the RTC.
 Jesus Araneta filed with the RD a notice of lis
pends in connection with the civil case for
ejectment. The complaint was converted into
an action for collection of rentals with
damages but was later on withdrawn by the
Council.
 The Council filed with the RTC of QC a
complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of
Possession and Damages with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Araneta.
 While the case was pending, the heirs of
Jesus Amado Araneta filed with the CA a
petition to annul the judgment in the Civil
case for foreclosure.
 CA issued a TRO enjoining the TC judge from
hearing civil case for quieting of title until
further orders from the court.
 The Council filed a motion for
reconsideration of this resolution. Later on
the Council filed a Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss
questioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction
to hear the petition for annulment of a
judgment that had already been fully
executed. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration.
 Petitioner contends the following: first, that
the Court of Appeals should not continue to
hear the petition for annulment of judgment
since it is already fully executed and the
purpose for which the case for annulment
was filed will no longer be served, the parties
having already complied with the decision;
second, private respondents have no right to
question the validity or legality of the
decision rendered foreclosing the mortgage
since they are foreign to the transaction of
mortgage between petitioner and Freddie
and Marconi Da Silva; lastly, petitioner claims
that private respondents have another
remedy in law and that is in Civil Case No. Q-
46196 for Quieting of Title where the
question of ownership may be passed upon.
ISSUE:
Who may properly institute a petition for annulment
of judgment
RULING:
The next issue raised in this petition deals with the
question of who may properly institute a petition for
annulment of judgment. It is petitioner's contention
that the remedy is available only to one who is a party
to the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
is rendered. Private respondents, on the other hand,
allege that "there are sufficient facts and
circumstances sufficient to show prima facie that
[they] have a substantial interest in the ownership of
the property which had been foreclosed without their
knowledge and consent" [Rollo, p. 90]. In fine, the
question deals with whether or not the heirs of
Araneta have a cause of action against the Council.
In Militante v. Edrosolano [G.R. No. L-27940, June 10,
1971, 39 SCRA 4731, an action for annulment of
judgment in Civil Case No. 6216 between Edrosolano
and Belosillo was filed by Militante. The petition
stemmed from a complaint instituted by Militante on
September 6, 1965 against Edrosolano for damages
arising from a breach of contract of carriage. On
January 18,1966 Militante obtained an order of
preliminary attachment on the property of
Edrosolano. Alleging that he purchased all of
Edrosolano's TPU equipment on February 28, 1966,
Belosillo filed a third-party claim. It appears that on
February 25, 1963 Belosillo obtained a judgment by
default against Edrosolano in Civil Case No. 6216 for
collection of amount of P45,000.00, the value of the
promissory note executed by the latter on February 1,
1960. After a recital of these antecedent facts,
Militante, in his petition for annulment of judgment
contended, inter alia, that (1) Civil Case No. 6216 "was
based on a fictitious cause of action because [the]
promissory note was without lawful consideration
whatsoever" [at 476]; (2) Edrosolano did not file any
answer to Belosillo's complaint and allowed the latter
to obtain a judgment by default which judgment
attained finality without the former appealing
therefrom; and, (3) while judgment in Civil Case No.
6216 was promulgated iii 1963 it was "only on January
19, 1966 when . . . Belosillo caused the execution
thereof after [Militante] had already instituted his civil
case for damages against ... Edrosolano and an order
for issuance of preliminary attachment issued" [at
477]. The trial court however dismissed Militante's
action for annulment on finding that it did not state a
cause of action. Thereafter, Militante filed an appeal
to this Tribunal and in setting aside the trial court's
order of dismissal'.
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use
of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.
In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta
are not parties to the foreclosure case. Neither are
they principally nor secondarily bound by the
judgment rendered therein. However. their petition
filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and
connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas
and the Council as would adversely affect them. This
allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of
evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of Civil
Case No. Q-43476.
Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of
annulment of judgment applies only to final and
executory judgment and not to that which had already
been fully executed or implemented.It is the Council's
contention that as the judgment in the foreclosure
case had already been executed evidenced by the fact
that title to the property in question had been
transferred in its name the judgment can no longer be
annulled. The Council's contention is devoid of merit.
In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, supra, the Court affirmed
the trial court's annulment of the judgment on
foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership
of the house and lot subject of the mortgage had
passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed the
mortgage and purchased the property at public
auction to a person who bought the same and finally
to another individual in whose name the Torrens
certificate of title stood by the time the case reached
this Tribunal.
In view of the foregoing the Court finds that the Court
of Appeals neither acted without jurisdiction nor
committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the petition for annulment of judgment as
would warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari in this case.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and
the orders of the Court of Appeals dated November 10
and December 2 and 3,1987 are AFFIRMED.
 DINGLASAN V. CA
Post-Judgment Remedies| MNT | When to file
Blanza
FACTS:
MOA entered between Elmyra Trading (rep. by petitioner
as Pres.) and Antrom Inc. for the latter to extend credit
accommodation. Petitioner issued a check to guarantee
but the same bounced (insufficiency of funds).
BP 22 case filed against Dinglasan; convicted.
MR denied; appeal also denied.
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed in SC denied; MR
denied. Entry of Judgment issued.
WOA issued for his arrest; Petitioner filed the Petition for
New Trial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of
the Case based on newly discovered evidence.
Antrom’s contentionthe same is procedurally and
substantially defective. MNT should be filed at any time
after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected
and before the judgment of the appellate court
convicting the accused becomes final.
OSGthe petition should be dismissed because it was
filed out of time and Dinglasan's evidence sought to be
admitted is neither material nor newly discovered so as
to warrant new trial or reopening of the case. The
alleged evidence if introduced and admitted, would not
in any way alter the judgment.
Petitionerjudgment attains finality only upon the
receipt of the order or resolution denying his second
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the petition was filed on time? (NO)
HELD:
Rule 124 – Procedure in the Court of Appeals.
Section 14. Motion for New Trial. – At any time after the
appeal from the lower court has been perfected and
before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting
the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
material to his defense. The motion shall conform to the
provisions of section 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis supplied.)
Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New
Trial should be filed before the judgment of the appellate
court convicting the accused becomes final.
Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration was denied by this
Court as the subject matter thereof is a prohibited
pleading and that the Motion for Reconsideration was
merely noted without action. This order is issued
pursuant to En Banc Resolution dated 7 April 1999 which
prohibits any motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and was further emphasized by the
provision of the Revised Rules of Court which provides
that:
Rule 52. – Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. –
No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or a final resolution by the same party
shall be entertained.
This prohibition is justified by public policy which
demands that at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts must become final at some
definitive date fixed by law.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from
the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second
motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd
situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders
or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the
first place, in order that the period for the finality of
judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition
of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to
forestall the running of the period of finality of
judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a
situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the
winning party.
The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which
cannot be made to depend on the convenience of the
party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the
purpose of the rule on completeness of service, which is
to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and
processes beyond the power of the party being served to
determine at his pleasure.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
NEYPES V. CA
Post-Judgment Remedies| Period of appeal
Blanza
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part
of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail
of the right to appeal must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads
to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is
fixed by both statute and procedural rules
FACTS:
Neypes, et, al, (petitioners) filed an action for annulment
of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion against private respondents.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed various
motions with the trial court.
Later on, RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the
ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners filed MR but was denied. After 5 days, they
filed their Notice of Appeal
RTC denied their NOA (8 days late); MR for this also
denied.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 filed
also dismissed. MR also denied.
ISSUE: WON petitioners timely filed their NOA? (YES)
What should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of
which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal, the order dismissing the complaint or
the order denying/dismissing the MR?
HELD:
Order denying the MR.
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided,
however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for
appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x (BP 129)
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within
15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the
merits which, considering the evidence presented at the
trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. 
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their
notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section
3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
"or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final
order," which we already determined to refer to the July
1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice
of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt
of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the
new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the
records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings.
REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
V. CA
Post-Judgment Remedies| Perfection of appeal
Blanza
Rules of procedure are tools to facilitate a fair and
orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto
must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice.
So long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no
violation of due process and fair play takes place, the
rules should be liberally construed, especially in
agrarian cases.
FACTS:
Respondents (owners of lands) filed a complaint for
ejectment against petitioners (agri-lessees) for non-
payment of rentals before the DARAB, CSFP.
Regional Adjudicator (RA) ruled in favor of respondents.
Petitioners filed two separate NOA (both not signed by
their lawyer).
Respondents moved to dismiss the appeal claiming that
the NOA failed to state the ground of the appeal and was
filed beyond the reglementary period
RA gave due course to the NOA.
Respondents went to CA insisting that both notices of
appeal were infirm for failure to state the grounds for an
appeal.
CA denied respondents’ petition.
Petitioners pray that their Notices of Appeal to the
DARAB be given due course on the ground that they have
substantially complied with the rules as set forth in
Section 2, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure. They posit that their appeal on "questions of
fact and law" should suffice, even if they omitted the
phrase "which if not corrected would cause grave
irreparable damage and injury to them". They argue that
the stringent application of the rules denied them
substantial justice.
Respondents reiterate that the notices of appeal are
"mere scraps of paper" for failure to state the grounds
relied upon for the appeal and for containing forged
signatures. They insist that giving effect to the Notice of
Appeal would countenance an act which is criminal in
nature. Respondents maintain that there should be strict
adherence to the technical rules of procedure because
the DARAB rules frown upon frivolous and dilatory
appeals.
ISSUE: WON petitioners properly perfected their appeal?
(YES)
HELD:
The defects found in the two notices of appeal are not of
such nature that would cause a denial of the right to
appeal. Placed in their proper factual context, the defects
are not only excusable but also inconsequential.
Alleged failure to specify grounds for appeal
There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings or
processes, their sole purpose being to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules
should be construed liberally. Dismissal of appeals purely
on technical grounds is frowned upon because rules of
procedure should not be applied to override substantial
justice. Courts must proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of statutory appeal; they must ensure
that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from
technical constraints. If the foregoing tenets are followed
in a civil case, their application is made more imperative
in an agrarian case where the rules themselves provide
for liberal construction, thus:
Rule I
General Provisions
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally
construed to carry out the objectives of the agrarian
reform program and to promote just, expeditious, and
inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian
cases, disputes or controversies.
xxxx
Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and
its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as
prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear
and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in
a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance
with justice and equity.
xxxx
Rule VIII
Proceedings before the Adjudicators and the Board
Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before
the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in
nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due
process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the
rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of
evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x
x34
Guided by the foregoing principles, we find that the
Notices of Appeal substantially complied with all that is
required under the 1994 DARAB Rules. The following
provisions are instructive in making this conclusion:
Rule XIII
APPEALS
Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be
taken from an order, resolution or decision of the
Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both,
orally or in writing, within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision
appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the adverse
party, if the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing
by the Adjudicator to be signed by the
appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served
upon the adverse party within ten (10) days
from the taking of the oral appeal.
Section 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to
the Board from a final order, resolution or decision of the
Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:
a) That errors in the findings of fact or
conclusions of laws were committed which, if
not corrected, would cause grave and
irreparable damage and injury to the appellant;
b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Adjudicator; or
c) That the order, resolution or decision is
obtained through fraud or coercion.
xxxx
Section 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The
Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall
state the date when the appellant received the order or
judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the
notice to the adverse party; and
b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos
(₱500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within
the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier
where the Office of the Adjudicators is situated.
xxx
Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requisites
shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Both Notices of Appeal stated that the petitioners were
appealing the decision "on the grounds of questions of
fact and of law," which we find sufficient statement of
the ground for appeal under Section 2(a), Rule XIII of the
DARAB Rules. While the notices omitted to state that
"the decision would cause grave and irreparable damage
and injury to the appellant," we find such punctilious
fidelity to the language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary.
Surely by appealing the Decision of the Regional
Adjudicator, the petitioners were already manifesting
that they will be damaged by the assailed decision.
Requiring a literal application of the rules when its
purpose has already been served is oppressive
superfluity.
It must be stressed that the purpose of the notice of
appeal is not to detail one’s objections regarding the
appealed decision; that is the purpose of the appellants’
memorandum. In the context of a DARAB case, the
notice of appeal serves only to inform the tribunal or
officer that rendered the appealed decision (i.e., the
Regional Adjudicator) of the timeliness of the appeal and
of the general reason for the appeal, and to prepare the
records thereof for transmission to the appellate body
(i.e., the DARAB). Petitioners’ Notices of Appeal contain
everything that is necessary to serve these purposes.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the
assailed June 9, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79304, which gave no legal effect to
petitioners’ Notices of Appeal, is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The August 5, 2003 Order of the Regional
Adjudicator giving due course to the two Notices of
Appeal is REINSTATED. Let the records of the case be
transmitted forthwith to the Adjudication Board which
is DIRECTED to proceed to dispose of the appeal with
deliberate dispatch.
HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA V. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA,
ZAMBALES
Appeal from judgments/final orders of the RTCs (Rule 42)
Blanza
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from
the Court. We have' always looked at appeal as not a
matter of right but a mere statutory
privilege.1âwphi1 As the· parties invoking the privilege,
the petitioners should have faithfully complied with the
requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so
forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality
in the application of the rules of procedure may be
properly invoked only in cases of some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in
cases like now where a liberal application would directly
subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the
utter disregard of the Rules of Court. 
FACTS:
Bueno (tenant-farmer beneficiary) brought an ejectment
suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba
(“MOI”) claiming that the latter had constructed the
public market on a substantial portion of his land without
his consent
MTC ruled in his favor; MOI filed its NOA but the MTC
denied due course.
MOI filed petition for certiorari in the RTC to assail the
denial of due course by the MTCgranted.
Upon Bueno’s death, petitioners substituted him and
moved for a reconsiderationdenied.
Petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review
under Rule 42.
CA dismissed the petition (not being the proper mode of
appeal; that the assailed orders had been issued by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction); MR also
denied.
Petitioners’ contention Although petition for review
under Rule 42 was inappropriate, they substantially
complied with the requirements of an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41, and pray that the Court exercise its equity
jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules
of Court would not serve the demands of substantial
justice.
ISSUE:
WON the mode of appeal (Rule 42) was proper? (NO)
HELD:
An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment
committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of
the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any error
committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. It
was, therefore, very crucial for the petitioners and their
counsel to have been cognizant of the different modes to
appeal the adverse decision of the RTC in the special civil
action for certiorari brought by the Municipality of Iba.
Such modes of appeal were well delineated in the Rules
of Court, and have been expressly stated in Section 2,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court since July 1, 1997, to wit:
Section 2.Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
 the court which rendered the judgment or final other lawful
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof fees with the
upon the adverse party. No record on appeal RTC.
shall be required except in special proceedings When RTC Upon the upon
and other cases of multiple or separate appeals loses perfection of perfection of
where the law or these Rules so require. In such jurisdiction the appeal the appeal
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and filed in due AND the
served in like manner. time AND the expiration of
expiration of the time to
(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the Court the time to appeal of the
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial appeal of the other parties
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction other parties
shall be by petition for review in accordance Effect of Ground for dismissal
with Rule 42. non-
payment of
(c) Appeal by certiorari.-In all cases where only docket fees
questions of law are raised or involved, the Immediate Clerk of court Does not arise
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition transmittal of the RTC is except upon
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule burdened to order of the
45. immediately CA, when
undertake the deemed
transmittal of necessary. 
Rule 41 Rule 42
the records by
Nature of is a matter of is a matter of
verifying the
the appeal right discretion (aka
correctness
“discretionary
and
appeal”)
completeness
refers to the is taken from
of the records
right to seek the decision or
of the case;
the review by final order
the transmittal
a superior rendered by a
to the CA must
court of the court in the
be made
judgment exercise of its
within 30 days
rendered by primary
from the
the trial court, appellate
perfection of
exists after the jurisdiction,
the appeal.
trial in the first may be
instance disallowed by
DISPOSITION:
the superior
court in its
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the
discretion.  (CA
Court of Appeals promulgated on October 28, 2003 and
has the
February 10, 2004 in C.A. G.R.SP No. 78706; and ORDERS
discretion
the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
whether to
due course to
the petition for
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS V. CA
review or not)
Appeal from judgments or final orders of the Court of
How appeal File NOA in the upon the
Appeals| Rule 45 v. Rule 65
is perfected RTC w/in a timely filing of
Blanza
period of 15 the petition for
days from review before
FACTS:
notice of the the CA.
judgment of
the RTC + full Petitioner PBCOM filed for sum of money against private
payment of respondents in the RTC of Makati City.
court docket &
Private respondents moved for the dismissal full aggrieved party is to elevate the matter through a special
payment + RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to the CA's
PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket fees. finding, PBCOM availed itself of the correct remedy in
questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.
RTC ordered PBCOM to pay additional docket fees;
PBCOM paid but its Compliance was filed later thus RTC EXCEPTIONS to the requirement of MR prior filing of the
dismissed the complaint for failure to comply; MR petition under Rule 65:
denied. (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; 
PBCOM timely filed a NOARTC denied due course (said (b) where the questions raised in
appeal is not the proper remedy); PBCOM did not file any the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
MR. passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
PBCOM filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the CAdenied (wrong mode of appeal+mandatory
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or
requirement of a MR)
the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
ISSUE: reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper there is extreme urgency for relief;
remedy in the instant case? (YES) (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
HELD: is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
Rule 45 Rule 65 for lack of due process;
Decisions, final orders or Is a special civil action; is (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
resolutions of the Court of an independent action petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
Appeals in any based on the specific (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
case, i.e., regardless of the grounds therein public interest is involved. 
nature of the action or provided and, as a
proceedings involved, may be general rule, cannot be The first exception applies in this case.
appealed by filing a petition availed of as a substitute
for review, which would be for the lost remedy of an Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
but a continuation of the ordinary appeal, states:
appellate process over the including that under
original case. Rule 45. SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. - Prior to the transmittal of
the original record or the record on appeal to the
When a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on
may be dismissed outright. motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of
time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful
In the assailed Decision, the CA appears to have confused fees within the reglementary period. 
the RTC Order dismissing PBCOM's complaint with the
RTC Order denying PBCOM' s notice of appeal, and In Salvan v. People, this Court held that the power of the
mistakenly ruled that the petition for certiorari and RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances
mandamus filed by PBCOM was a wrong mode of appeal. specified in the afore-quoted provision. In other words,
the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on
Notably, in its petition before the CA, PBCOM assailed an entirely different ground - such as "that an appeal is
the RTC Order denying due course to its notice of appeal. not a proper remedy."
In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, this Court ruled that a trial
court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which is The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper
tantamount to a disallowance or dismissal of the appeal remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the
itself, is not a decision or final order from which an RTC. Rule 50, Section 1 of the same Rules states:
appeal may be taken. The suitable remedy for the
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
xxxx
(i) The fact that [the] order or judgment appealed from
is not appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to
PBCOM's notice of appeal on the ground that it was a
wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order
dated June 2, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56 in Makati City and the assailed Decision dated
July 31, 2014 and Resolution dated May 5, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120884, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 56 in Makati City is DIRECTED to give due
course to petitioner's Notice of Appeal dated May 26,
2011 and to elevate the case records to the Court of
Appeals for the review of petitioner's appeal. No costs.
ALCARAZ V. GONZALES
Review of final judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies
Blanza
FACTS:
This case involves the collision between Gonzales and
Atty. Alcaraz which resulted in the latter to shoot the car
of Gonzales twice.
Gonzalez filed an attempted homicide against Atty.
Alcaraz
Alcaraz moved for the conduct a preliminary
investigationtrial court granted.
After the conduct of PI, investigating prosecutor
maintained his finding of probable cause of attempted
homicide against Alcaraz and to retain the Information.
Alcaraz filed a MR denied.
Alcaraz filed a petition for review with the City
Prosecutor's Office, DOJSOJ Perez granted and ordered
the withdrawal of the information.
Gonzalez filed a MRdenied.
Gonzalez then filed a petition for review under Rule 43
claiming that the Secretary acted beyond his authority;
that by invoking self-defense, Alcaraz thereby admitted
his intention to kill him; the claim of self-defense should
be ventilated during trial on the merits.
CA granted the petition reversing the assailed resolutions
of the SOJ; Alcaraz filed his MR but was denied.
Alcaraz’ contentionthe Justice Secretary is not a quasi-
judicial officer within the context of Rule 43 of the ROC;
CA has no appellate jurisdiction to review the assailed
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by way of a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
the proper remedy being a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
OSGCA erred; the proper remedy from an adverse
resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice is to file a
petition for certiorari under Ruler 65 of the Rules of
Court, not a petition under Rule 43.
Respondentthe Secretary of Justice acted as a quasi-
judicial officer when he reviewed the resolutions of the
City Prosecutor; hence, the same may be reviewed by the
CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court was the proper remedy of respondent?
(NO)
HELD:
It should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
It bears stressing that in the determination of probable
cause during the preliminary investigation, the executive
branch of government has full discretionary authority.
Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal
complaint against the private respondent is necessarily
dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating
Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of
Justice. Courts are not empowered to substitute their
own judgment for that of the executive branch.
The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject
to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and
supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who
may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such
prosecutor. Thus, while the CA may review the
resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.
It bears stressing that the Resolution of the Justice
Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution
of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993
Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations from the
Justice Secretary's resolution, except the aggrieved party,
has no more remedy of appeal to file a motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution of such motion if it
is denied by the said Secretary. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since there is no more
appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course
of law.
In the present case, respondent filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
resolutions of the Justice Secretary. Instead of dismissing
the petition, however, the CA gave due course to it and
thereafter granted the petition, on its finding that the
Justice Secretary erred in reversing the resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor which found probable cause
against petitioner for attempted homicide. Patently, the
ruling of the CA is incorrect.
DISPOSITION:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75589 are NULLIFIED.
MADARANG V. SPS. MORALES
Relief from judgments, orders and other proceedings
Blanza
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief
granted only under exceptional circumstances. To set
aside a judgment through a petition for relief, parties
must file the petition within 60 days from notice of the
judgment and within six (6) months after the judgment
or final order was entered; otherwise, the petition shall
be dismissed outright.
If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of
excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that
their counsel’s negligence could not have been
prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence. The
mere allegation that there is excusable negligence
simply because counsel was 80 years old is a prejudicial
slur to senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted
stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as
empty as the bigotry that supports it.
FACTS:
Sps. Morales filed with the RTC for judicial foreclosure of
the H & L against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo
Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne
Bartolome on account of Sps. Bartolome’s failure to pay
their loan secured by the REM. (the spouses who loaned
died)
Defendants’ answerdefendants assailed the
authenticity of the REM specifically the Spouses
Bartolome’s signatures and that the complaint was
already barred since it had been dismissed in another
branch of the RTC of QC for failure to comply with an
order of the trial court.
RTC ruled for Sps. Morales. MR filed denied.
NOA filed with RTC but was denied due course for having
been filed out of time (their lawyer received the copy of
the order denying the MR on June 24, 2010 thus they
have (15 days) or until July 9, 2010 to appeal but their
NOA was filed only on Aug. 11, 2010)
September 24, 2010defendants filed a petition for
relief from judgment, blaming their 80-year-old lawyer
who failed to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period; arguing that their lawyer’s failure
to appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake
and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer’s
old age DENIED (filed beyond 60 days from the finality
of the trial court’s decision)
Madarang, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA denied, no MR filed prior.
MR filed also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for relief from judgment was
filed out of time? (YES)
HELD:
A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within
60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from
entry of judgment or final order.
HOW TO COUNT THE 60-DAY PERIOD?
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.–
A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections
of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days
after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six
(6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause
of action or defense, as the case may be. (Emphasis
supplied)
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is
jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A
petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the
reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is
because a petition for relief from judgment is an
exception to the public policy of immutability of final
judgments.
. . . the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgments of courts must become final at some definite
date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or ‘last
chance’ of a timely petition for relief from judgment
within the reglementary period (within 60 days from
knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment) under
Rule 38, supra, but such grave period must be taken as
‘absolutely fixed, in extendible, never interruptedand
cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency.
Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a
condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of
grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party
another and last chance’ and failure to avail of such last
chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or
Rules of Court is fatal . . . (Turqueza v. Hernando)
It should be noted that the 60-day period from
knowledge of the decision, and the 6-month period from
entry of judgment, are both inextendible and
uninterruptible. We have also time and again held that
because relief from a final and executory judgment is
really more of an exception than a rule due to its
equitable character and nature, strict compliance with
these periods, which are definitely jurisdictional, must
always be observed. (Sps. Reyes v. CA)
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29,
2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6)
months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010,
to file a petition for relief from judgment.
Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from
judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for relief
from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from
finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied
the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
ALSO...Even if we assume that petitioners filed their
petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary
period, petitioners failed to prove that their former
counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due
to a mistake or excusable negligence.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be
filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or
other proceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable
remedy and is allowed only in exceptional cases. It is not
available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for
new trial or appeal.
To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the
negligence must be so gross "that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against." This is to
prevent parties from "reviving] the right to appeal
[already] lost through inexcusable negligence."
Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to
file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period
was "a mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their
former counsel’s] age." This argument stereotypes and
demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that
a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence.
This cannot be done.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have
been prevented through ordinary diligence and
prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their
counsel’s negligence.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ resolutions dated July 27,
2011 and November 10, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120251
are AFFIRMED.