Northeastern Political Science Association

The Use & Abuse of Hobbes: The State of Nature in International Relations
Author(s): Mark A. Heller
Source: Polity, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 21-32
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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The Use &Abuseof Hobbes:
The Stateof Naturein
InternationalRelations*

MarkA. Heller
Boston College and Tel-Aviv University

The near anarchy of international relations has led many students to

look to the national society for remedies on the assumption that the
condition of the state is analogous to that of man in the state of nature.
Not surprisingly, the search for a solution has frequently turned to the
logic of Hobbes's analysis of the human condition in the Leviathan and
his prescription for moving into organized society. In this article Mark
Heller shows the misleading implications of that analogy. Not only does
it distort the Hobbesian logic, but it is bound practically to raise un-
realistic expectations ending in frustration.

Mark A. Heller is Senior Research Associate at the Center for Strategic

Studies, Tel-Aviv University. His essays and reviews on Middle Eastern
and international politics have appeared in various journals, including
Foreign Policy and the American Political Science Review.

I.
Hobbes wrote Leviathan1 against the background of civil war, to warn
Englishmen of the horrible consequences of disobedience. So vivid and
powerful was his depiction of the state of nature that it has become, in
the three centuries since, a central fixture in the lexicon of politics. The
state of nature has been described as "an imaginative reconstruction of

* I would like to thank Sanford A. Lakoff, David Laitin, J. Roland Pennock,

David Lowenthal, and Donald Hafner for their critical comments and suggestions
on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a CommonwealthEcclesiastical
and Civil in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury,vol. 3, ed. Sir
William Molesworth (1834, reprinted ed., London: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1966),
hereaftercited as Leviathan.

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22 The Use & Abuse of Hobbes

a recurrenthuman possibility,a reconstructionintended to illuminate

the meaningof human events and to point out the desirablepath of
humanactions."2 Anarchythereforeis a recurrentpossibility,a danger
inherentin man's nature avoidable only by absolute submissionto a
commonauthority-the sovereignLeviathan.
The relevanceof Hobbes'slogic to the debate over the domesticpo-
litical orderis self-evident.Since the absenceof commonauthoritygives
free rein to aggressive-defensive behavioramongstates, as among men,
it is not surprisingthat solutionsto the problemof internationalinsecu-
rity should also have been soughtthroughHobbesiananalysis.Indeed,
the movementtowardglobal political order throughsome principleof
law and/or organizationtranscendingthe internationalsystem of sov-
ereign states has often preoccupiedpolitical philosophers,responsible
statesmen,andutopianvisionariesalike.3
Hobbes himselfcontendedthat the state is merelyartificialman, and
that metaphorhas been used to explainthe globalistimpulse.However,
the extensionof the logic of Leviathanto relationsamong states rests
on a misleadinganalogy.Because of vast differencesbetweenmen and
states, anarchyposes differentkinds of dangersto them and requires
differentmodesof deliberationand action.
These differenceshave too often been ignoredor submergedin the
analytical-prescriptive literatureon internationalinsecurity.Hans Mor-
genthau,for example, endorses the idea of a world authority"which
wouldbe as sovereignoverthe individualnationsas the individualnations
are sovereignwithintheirrespectiveboundaries,"and he concedesonly
that it is unattainablein our time.4Clarkand Sohn's elaboratescheme
for generaldisarmamentand world peace stressesthe need for world-
scale institutions"corresponding to those which have been found essen-

2. Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western

Political Thought (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 264.
3. From the vast literature on global political order the following references are
cited only to demonstrate the range of approaches to the problem. The philos-
opher's perspective is representedby Kant's proposals for a "universalcivic consti-
tution" elaborated in his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point
of View and, more modestly, the "Federationof Free States"outlined in Perpetual
Peace. The efforts of Woodrow Wilson to change the modern state system are
treated sympathetically in Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1957). For an example of the visionary approach, see the
program of the "World Peace Brigade" in Lincoln O. Bloomfield, The Power to
Keep Peace (Berkeley, California: World Without War Council, 1971), pp. 240-
243.
4. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3d ed. (New
York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 501-502, 539.

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 Mark A. Heller 23

tial for the maintenanceof law and order in local communitiesand

nations."5 Even Inis Claude,who devotes considerableattentionto the
inadequaciesof the man-stateanalogy,occasionallyresortsto arguments
that collapsethe analyticaldistinctionbetweenman and state and draw
directly from Hobbes's logic. Concerningcoercion and order, for ex-
ample, he writes: "Hobbesianmen need governmentto suppressanti-
socialbelligerence;Lockeanmen need governmentfor the less strenuous
but equallyvital functionof regulatingand lubricatingthe relationship
which stems from their very sociability .... All this applies to the inter-
nationalrealm."6
In recent years, problemsother than securityin the narrowphysical
sense have also stimulatedglobalistthinking.WolframF. Hanrieder,for
example, has argued that, as the prioritiesof nation-statesshift from
territorial-securityissues (the "high politics" of indivisible collective
goods) to economicand welfaredemands(the "lowpolitics"of divisible
privategoods), the moder nation-statehas been compelledto accept
"the logic of interdependence" and condone restraintson sovereignbe-
havior.7Hanriederis aware of changes in the nature of international
politics, but he does not foresee integrationas the inexorableoutcome.
In contrast,Lester R. Brown does pursue the alleged functionalobso-
lescenceof the sovereignstate to its logicalconclusionby postulatingthe
indispensabilityof "newsupranationalinstitutions"and a "participatory
world order"if pressingeconomic, demographic,and ecological prob-
lems are to be solved and, not incidentally,removedas potentialsources
of internationalconflict.8
In short, the Hobbesiansolution-common authority-continues to
appealas an escapefromthe insecurityor the socioeconomicdeficiencies
of the internationalstate of nature. It is the seductive power of the
Leviathan'slogic that accountsfor its persistentinfluenceon the theory
of internationalrelations. A clearer appreciationof its limitationsis
thereforenecessary.

5. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, 2d
ed. rev. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. xi.
6. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of
InternationalOrganization,3d ed. rev. (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 198
(my emphasis). The same imagery reappears on pages 256 and 396. But for
Claude's conscious rejection of the analogy, cf. Power and InternationalRelations
(New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 255-271.
7. "Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-State," Amer-
ican Political Science Review 72 (December 1978): 1276-1287.
8. World WithoutBorders (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).

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24 The Use & Abuse of Hobbes

II.
Accordingto Hobbes, men, in their naturalcondition,are equally en-
dowedwiththe facultiesof mindand body. Fromthis equalityof endow-
ment,men deriveequalityof hope in gainingtheirobjectives.Sincethese
objectivesare attainableonly for some, the only means of gainingsatis-
factionin the absenceof commonauthorityis competitiveviolence.This
violence is exacerbatedby the fear producedby each man's knowledge
that every other man is equallyable and equallyhopeful of gaininghis
objective.Men attemptto alleviatetheir insecurityby preemptivemea-
sures,but this only intensifiesthe insecurityof all. These traitsof man's
nature togetherwith his lust for glory combine to make the state of
nature, "duringthe time men live without a common power to keep
themall in awe,"a conditionof warwhichpits "everyman, againstevery
man." Hobbes's famous descriptionof the meaningof anarchyleaves
little to the imagination:
In such condition,there is no place for industry;because the fruit
thereofis uncertain;and consequentlyno cultureof the earth;no
navigation,nor use of the commoditiesthat may be importedby
sea; no commodiousbuilding;no instrumentsof moving, and re-
moving, such things as requiremuch force; no knowledgeof the
face of the earth;no accountof time;no arts;no letters;no society;
and which is worst of all, continualfear, and danger of violent
death,and the life of man, solitary,poor, nasty,brutish,and short.9
With rare exceptions,men have not lived in such a conditionbecause
they have organizedin politicalordersthat providea commonpower to
keep them all in awe. But the horrorsof the state of naturecontinually
remindmen of the inevitableconsequencesof subvertingthose orders.
In relationsamongstates,however,the absenceof commonauthority
has been a permanentcondition.Indeed, it is the state of international
relationsthat providesthe most compellingevidence of the dangersof
anarchyfor Hobbes."Inall times,"he writes,
kings, and persons of sovereignauthority,because of their inde-
pendency,are in continualjealousies,and in the state and posture
of gladiators;having their weaponspointing, and their eyes fixed
on one another;that is, their forts, garrisons,and guns upon the
frontiersof their kingdoms;and continualspies upon the neigh-
bourswhichis a postureof war.10

9. Leviathan,p. 113.
10. Ibid., p. 115.

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 Mark A. Heller 25

The internationalstate of nature,then, is a conditionof war, that is, "a

tractof time, wherethe will to contendin battleis sufficientlyknown."11
It does not follow that states are perpetuallyengagedin violenceagainst
one another,but the absenceof common authoritydoes mean that war
remainsa permanentthreat.
This condition,however,is very differentfrom the terrifyingwar of
every man againstevery man. Even betweenstates in an overt "posture
of gladiators,"like the United States and the Soviet Union, industry,
navigation,arts, culture,and commercego on. And Hobbes himself ad-
mits that in this formal state of war, states are still able to "uphold
thereby,the industryof theirsubjects;theredoes not follow from it, that
miserywhich accompaniesthe libertyof particularmen."12
Why shouldthis be so? Why is the state of naturenot so intolerable
for states as to impel them to renouncetheir right of sovereigntyand
erect a Leviathanover them all, as Hobbestells us men "have"done?
One explanationis the axiomatictruththat states,unlikemen in their
naturalcondition,are not equalin capability.Hobbesdeducesthe physi-
cal equality of men from the capacity of the weakest, either through
"secretmachination"or by "confederacywith others,"to kill the strong-
est. But this Hobbesianequalityhas never existed among states. Dis-
paritiesin size and resourceshave been too great for any organization,
leadership,morale, or conventionalmilitarytechnologiesto overcome;
and the universalinsecurityof individualsin the state of nature has
thereforebeen absentin internationalrelations.
Some observers have suggested that the universal proliferationof
nuclear weapons would create the "equalityof fear," in which case
states would logicallyaccept Hobbes'sprescriptionto individuals.13 The
implication is that possession of a nuclear device confers on a state the
abilityto "kill" other states. Like the Colt .45 on the American frontier,
a nuclearweapon is expected to play the role of the "greatequalizer."
But this assumptionbetraysa serious misunderstanding of the Hob-
besian meaningof "life"and "death"for states. In Hobbes'smechanis-
tic philosophy,"life" for states has a very precise meaning.It is the
maintenanceof sovereignty,the "artificialsoul," which gives "life and
motion to the whole body."14 A state is killed, not when some critical

11. Ibid., p. 113.

12. Ibid., p. 115.
13. See, for example, David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral
and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969),
p. 207; and, Howard Warrender,The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory
of Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 119.
14. Leviathan,p. ix.

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26 The Use & Abuse of Hobbes

proportionof its populationor infrastructureis destroyed,but when

force dissolves the commonwealthand "thereis no furtherprotection
of subjectsin their loyalty."15 In other words, a state loses its sover-
eignty when it is deprivedof the final authorityover its law-givingand
law-enforcingactivities.16Such a conditionmay come about througha
minimalapplicationof force or even by threatalone. We must therefore
understandHobbesto mean that, in a situationof war, the state remains
alive so long as the governmentis able to maintainits authorityover
its citizensand its abilityto protectthem more effectivelythan any alter-
native governmentor they themselvescan do.
The maintenanceof sovereignty,in this sense, is a joint function of
two elements-the degree of force applied against the state and the
degreeof cohesion withinthe state. In each case, there is some level of
punishmentand destructionthat the state presumablycan tolerate.Be-
yond that level the state begins to lose its cohesion;its sovereigntydis-
integrates;and it "dies." Hobbes's condition of equality of ability is
satisfiedonly if that criticallevel of force can be appliedby the weakest
state, for only then can the weakestactually"kill"the strongest.
In the calculusof nuclearcapability,a state'sforce residesin its war-
heads-their number,yield, and deliverability.It is, of course, conceiv-
able that the force of the weakestnuclearpower could be sufficientto
cause the destructionof the sovereignty,that is, the "death,"of the
strongest.But this is by no meansa necessaryconsequenceof universal
proliferation.There is no reason, for example, to suppose that the
acquisitionby Nicaraguaor Nepal of one or two atomicbombswould so
frightenthe UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion that they wouldlay down
theirrightof naturein exchangefor the freedomfromfear that the world
Leviathanpromises.And until that is the case, even universalprolifera-
tion will not bringabout equalityof abilityand equalityof fear.
It may be arguedthat the preoccupationwith the notion of "life"and
"death"for states is unrealistic.After all, Hobbes'semphasison death
as the ultimatefear in individualsmay have been mistakenor unneces-
sary to his formalpsychology.Men have at times acted as if they pre-
ferredsome other value (for example,honor, the survivalof others) to
their own conservation.17 And it is only when death is a source of de-
spair, that is, when death frustratesone's ability to satisfy his appetites

15. Ibid., p. 321.

16. Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations, p. 318.
17. M. M. Goldsmith, Hobbes's Science of Politics (New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 123.

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 Mark A. Heller 27

or avoid his aversions,that the state of nature,with its constantthreat

of death, is intolerable.There are situationsin which survivalis not a
"necessaryvalue"for individuals.18
But in the case of states,no such interpretationsare required.Hobbes
declaresexplicitlythat the chief end of men "in the introductionof that
restraintupon themselves"and the establishmentof commonwealth"is
the foresightof their own preservation,and of a more contented life
thereby."1I The raisond'etreof the state is to providesecurityfor men
by restrainingthem. Men have covenantedunder the law of nature to
restrainthemselves,but only the maintenanceof the sovereignassures
that this covenantwill be observed.Hobbes thereforedefinesthe life of
the state as the existenceof the sovereign.Sincethe functionof the state
and its life are coterminous(Hobbes might borrowfrom geometryand
say "congruent"),the survivalof the state must be a "necessaryvalue"
for it, and death must be its ultimateaversion.As an artificialcreation
of man, it must survivein order to attain its objective (the securityof
its subjects), and it must attainits objectivein orderto survive.
This strictconstructioncalls in questionHobbes'soptimisticappraisal
of the capacity of states to tolerate the state of nature. After all, the
"death"of states is not such a rareoccurrencein history.Not only have
sovereigntiesas diverse as imperialRome and modem Czechoslovakia
been obliterated,but whole nationshave literallydisappeared.One can-
not, therefore,conclude that the internationalstate of nature has per-
sisted simplybecause it has not been intolerable.For its victims,it has
not only beenintolerablebut fatal.
The essentialpoint is that since states are not by natureequal, they
do not find the state of nature equally intolerable.Only the weakest
states fear death at the hands of all others;only for them does the state
of natureapproximatea conditionof war of everyoneagainsteveryone;
and, consequently,only for them does sufficientinsecurityexist to in-
duce them to get out of the state of nature.But the willingnessof some
is not enough.Small states can lay down their rightonly if such action
is universaland simultaneous,that is, only if strongstates do so as well.
If this conditionof reciprocityis not satisfied,then such a step, far from
providingany advantage,would only furtherunderminethe alreadyten-
uous capacityof the stateto defenditself.
Weakerstatesmightagreeto a Leviathanif strongones would.Strong

18. F. S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan (London: Macmillan, 1968),

pp. 178-181.
19. Leviathan,p. 153.

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28 The Use & Abuse of Hobbes

states might do so if they found the state of natureintolerable.Strong

states do not live in fear of weak ones, but they do live in perpetualfear
of each other.Why, then, is this fear not sufficientto inducethem to get
out of the stateof nature?
The most compellingexplanationmay be the limitednumberof states
strongenoughto threatenthe survivalof any one strongstate.Each state
can thereforedeterminewho its potentialenemiesare, and this provides
an elementof predictability.Withinthis subsystemof strongstates,there
may indeed exist a state of war of all against all; but, since the "all"
involves a relatively small number, the absolute uncertainty,which
makesthe state of natureintolerablefor individuals,in fact tormentsonly
some states-the weakestones.
Furthermore,exceptinga situationin whichone state is strongerthan
all the others combined (in which case one would expect a world sov-
ereignty to have already been established), competition for relative
power never ceases. Each individualstate can always hope to improve
its position and thereforeits chances of survivalvis-a-vis its potential
enemies.
These considerationsmay mitigatethe extreme dangersof the state
of nature,but they do not make it an attractivesituationeven for the
strongestof states. Even in an internationalstate of nature, which is
ratherbenign comparedto the horrorsof anarchyfor individuals,the
threat to the securityof each state is always present. But what is im-
portantis Hobbes'sreminderthat there is nothinginherentlyappealing
about the state of civil society. For sovereigntydenotes the absolute,
unlimitedpower of the commonwealth,and in such circumstancesthe
life of the subjectis apt to be "verymiserable"indeed. When men opt
for civil society,they are actingcontraryto theirnature;and they do so,
not becauseof the positiveinducementswhichlife in civil societyoffers,
but only becausethe incommoditiesand inconveniencesare less painful
thanthose of the stateof nature.20
But for states the afflictionsof internationalcivil society would not
only be more severe than those of the state of nature, they would be
terminal.For from Hobbes's descriptionit is clear that the rights of
sovereigns,especiallythose of makingrules, decidingcontroversies,and
makingwar and peace, are designedto ensurethe indivisibilityand ab-
solute characterof the sovereign'spower.21Absolutepower cannot tol-
erate intermediatelevels of independentauthority.Hobbes insists that

20. Leviathan,p. 195.

21. Ibid., pp. 165-168.

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 Mark A. Heller 29

dividedsovereignty,such as is enshrinedin federalconstitutions,is really

no sovereigntyat all.22Therefore,the idea of a world commonwealth,
with states as subjects,is untenable,since it envisagesthe state as the
intermediarybetweenthe world sovereignand individualmen. But any
such derogationfrom the authorityof the world sovereignwould in fact
mean its destruction.By the same token the existenceof a superiorsov-
ereigntywould be inconsistentwith the continuedexistence of the in-
dividualstates.
Man, as a naturalbeing, can, in establishinga commonwealth,re-
nounce his naturalright to all things, that is, his claim on the rightsof
others, and still ensure his own survival.In fact, only such an arrange-
ment can ensure his security,since the Leviathanis institutedfor the
very purpose of subsumingthe naturalright of all others against him.
In the state of naturenot only does a man's own sovereigntynot safe-
guardhis survival,but the two are actuallyincompatible.
The state'ssurvival,however,dependson the maintenanceof its sov-
ereignty.In renderingitself subjectto another,even to a world sover-
eign, it is renouncingits own sovereignty;but, unlikeindividuals,it does
not receive an assuranceof its securityin exchange.On the contrary,by
deliveringits own subjects"fromtheir formerobligation,"23it is com-
mittingformal suicide. Its reservedright to defend itself after the insti-
tutionof the world sovereignis meaningless,since, by dissolvingits own
sovereignty,the state as an artificialentity ceases to exist. This is a
crucial distinctionbetween individualsand states. For the former, sur-
vival and sovereigntyare mutuallyexclusive;for the latter, sovereignty
defines survival.To ask a state to transcendits nature is to ask it to
kill itself.
It may well be true that throughvoluntarydissolution,the state better
attainsits primaryobjective-the securityof its subjects.Even in strong
states,whichhave little reasonto fear for their artificiallives in the state
of nature, individualsubjectshave sufferedenormousloss to life and
"the means of so preservinglife, as not to be weary of it." What is the
use of states preservingtheir survivalif they can do so only by means
of warsin whichvast numbersof subjectsare killed?If a commonwealth
of states as subjectsis inconsistentwith effectivesovereignty,why not

22. Ibid., p. 172. Nevertheless, Clark and Sohn propose a world organization
which is to be simultaneously endowed with a monopoly of military force and
restricted in its law-makingpower to the "limited field of war prevention,"without
authority to interfere in the "domestic affairs" of nations. World Peace Through
World Law, pp. xvi-xvii, xxii.
23. Leviathan,p. 209.

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30 The Use & Abuse of Hobbes

abolishstatesaltogetherand simplyestablisha singleworldgovernment?

For individualsthis would merely mean exchangingone sovereignfor
anotherand gainingan increasedmeasureof securityin the bargain.
It is here, at the outer reaches of logic, that Hobbes's geometrybe-
comes tangentialto politics. Hobbes calls his Leviathanmany things-
commonwealth, state, civitas, artificial man, mortal God-but never
does he use the term "community."The relationsbetween the parts of
his artificialman are purelyfunctional.If Hobbes can assert that even
family ties revolve around the protection-obediencenexus,24it is not
surprisingthat feelingsof collectiveemotionshouldplay so insignificant
a role in his commonwealth.But sentimentsof solidaritydo exist; and
people often prefer to be ruled by one of their own, however badly,
ratherthan by a foreigner,howeverwell.25Hobbesmay have been indif-
ferent to the nationalityor religionof his sovereign,but world govern-
ment would be conceivableonly if most men were like Hobbes. In fact,
they are not.
In additionto the barriersof collective sentiment,there is another
impedimentto world government-the process by which states decide
on policy. Accordingto Hobbes, individualdecision-makingis simply
rationalcalculation:men balanceall the appetitesand aversions,hopes
and fears impliedby a given action, and the sum of this exercise-posi-
tive or negative-is their decision.26If states deliberatedin a similarly
rationalmanner,they might well decide that their chief end-the pro-
tection and defense of their subjects-would best be served if they dis-
establishedthemselvesand instituteda world Leviathan.After all, the
internationalstate of war that exposes subjectsto insecurityand death
resultsfrom the very existenceof these states and not from some defect
in theirconstitution.
But this kind of deliberationis precludedby Hobbes'sdefinitionof the
liberty of sovereigns."So in states,"he says, "and commonwealthsnot
dependenton one another,every commonwealth,not every man, has an
absoluteliberty,to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man,
or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing to their
benefit."27 The stipulationthat state policy is made by individualmen
or assembliesis a reminderof the mechanicalnature of the common-
wealth'ssoul. For the appetitesand aversions,hopes and fears are not

24. Ibid., pp. 187-188.

25. Hence, the persistence of "psychological"nationalism despite the diminish-
ing functional utility of the sovereign nation-state. Hanrieder, "Dissolving Inter-
national Politics."p. 1286.
26. Leviathan,p. 48.
27. Ibid., p. 201, emphasis added.

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 Mark A. Heller 31

really the collectivepassions of the state so much as the wills, that is,
the last deliberativeappetites,of the rulingindividuals.A contradiction
may always exist between the privatewills of these men or assemblies
and the publicinterestof the subjects.If the publicinterestis servedby
the dissolutionof the commonwealth,this contradictionbecomes irrec-
oncilable, since dissolutionwould mean the extinction of the honors,
privileges,and power of those in positionsof authority.In effect, then,
the voluntaryrenunciationof sovereignty,which is the preconditionfor
world government,involves not only institutionalsuicide, which might
be "rational"from the point of view of the state as an artificialentity,
but also the voluntary diminutionof the power of the monarch or
assembly-member. Hobbes'sassessmentof the behaviorof a man in such
circumstances-that "for the most part, if the public interestchance to
cross the private, he prefers the private" 28-is consistent both with his
psychologyand with actual experience.Therefore,states will have nei-
ther the desireto accept worldgovernmentnor the deliberativecapacity
to concludethatthey should.

III.
These political realitieshave confrontedefforts to escape the interna-
tional state of nature with a "halfwayhouse" argument:29if states are
to get out of the state of nature,they must agreeon the laws of nature;
but, if states could agreeon the laws of nature,there would be no need
to get out of the state of nature.30It is this ironythat explainswhy prac-
tical attemptsto applyHobbes'slogic to internationalrelationshave usu-
ally ended in pious expressionsof hope for the greatersociabilityand
moralityof nations.31
How much the relevanceof Hobbes's analysisis underminedby the
"halfwayhouse" reasoningis illustratedby the ill-fated efforts of the
League of Nations and then the United Nations to establish"collective
security."The doctrineof collective securityrequiresstates to alienate
their sovereigntyby committingthemselvesin advanceto participatein
the applicationof sanctionsagainst any other states, friends and allies

28. Ibid., p. 173.

29. Stanley Hoffmann, "Rousseauon War and Peace," in his The State of War:
Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Praeger,
1965), p. 70. Hoffmann borrows the phrase from Walter Schiffer, The Legal
Community of Mankind (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
30. See Goldsmith, Hobbes's Science of Politics, p. 137; and Gauthier, The Logic
of Leviathan,p. 210.
31. Gauthier,p. 212.

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32 The Use & Abuse of Hobbes

included,which have been condemnedby the internationalorganization

for aggression.
Collectivesecuritywas enshrinedin the Covenantof the League at
a time of postwareuphoria.Unfortunately,its effectivenesspresupposed
a fictitiouscommunityof nations,ratherthan a supra-nationalentity to
which state sovereigntyhad been transferred.The alienationof sover-
eigntywas merelyformal,not substantive.It had to be so for the reasons
discussedabove. Like world government,collectivesecuritycould work
only if states had been able to alienatetheirsovereigntyin actuality,that
is, if they had all been able to agreeon the laws of nature.In that event
therewould, of course,have been no need for collectivesecurity.
The state of natureis a convenientmetaphorfor the fragmentation
of authorityamongstates. Since this is the most conspicuouscharacter-
istic of internationalrelations,it is perhapsunderstandablethat writers
shouldapplythe conceptwithoutdetailedattentionto Hobbes'spremises
and implications.But the state is not simply a man writ large. Because
of vast differencesbetween the two, the logic of Leviathan,so com-
pelling when appliedto individuals,loses its rationalewhen applied to
relationsamongstates.
This conclusiondoes not, however,mean capitulationto the security
or social-welfaredilemmasof fragmentedorder. It does mean that fa-
miliar but much disparagedresponsesto those dilemmas-diplomacy,
multilateralcoordination,alliances, economic assistance,arms control,
even balance-of-powerstrategy-must be pursued more imaginatively
and effectivelyin the futurethan they have been in the past. Compared
to Leviathan,that is a more modestthoughmore realizableobjective.
Hobbeshas been criticizedfor confusingthe social man with the nat-
ural man.32Analysts of internationalrelationsmust not follow Hobbes
into the equally serious fallacy of confusingthe naturalman with the
politicalstate.
32. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 166.

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