Rizal Technological University College of Engineering, Architecture and Technology

Rizal Technological University
College of Engineering, Architecture and Technology

Department of Instrumentation and Control Engineering
TOPIC 1: Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Safety

Integrity Levels (SIL)
Collaborated and submitted by:
Manzano, April Joy D.

Plaza, Neema Mariah B.
Rosales, Zild John V.
Tuazon, Kyle Justin V.
Vargas, Jiean S.
BS ICE
First Semester 2021
Submitted to:
Engr. John Yasay

Instructor
Contents
Title Page
I. Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
II. Background ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
A. Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) ------------------------------ 1

1. Different Layers of LOPA ---------------------------------------- 2
Standard ANSI/ISA-84.00.01
2. Initiating Event Frequency (IEF) -------------------------------- 4
3. Independent Protection Layers (IPL) --------------------------- 4
4. Auditability of a Safety Protection System -------------------- 4
B. Safety Instrumented System (SIS) ----------------------------------- 4

1. Safety Integrity level (SIL) --------------------------------------- 5
IEC standard 61508
IEC 61511-1:2016 standard
2. Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) --------------------------- 6

The Importance of SIL to SIS
3. PFD and RRF ------------------------------------------------------ 6
4. SIL Assessment --------------------------------------------------- 7
5. SIL Determination ------------------------------------------------ 7
6. SIL Determination Methods ------------------------------------- 8

Risk Graph / Risk Matrix
Quantitative Assessment (i.e. FTA)
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) and Risk Assessment
7. SIF Loop Verification -------------------------------------------- 10
8. SIL Validation ---------------------------------------------------- 11
C. SIL Calculation ------------------------------------------------------- 11
III. References ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 15

3|Page
I. INTRODUCTION
Process industries have been growing steadily and advancing rapidly together with the
continuous advancement of technology. However, in connection to this, risk never ceases to exist. As
defined by Occupational Safety and Health (OSH), “risk is the likelihood that a person may be harmed
or suffers adverse health effects if exposed to a hazard.” To assess and determine the risks inside the
plant, during a process, engineers use many risk assessment methods such as Layers of Protection
Analysis (LOPA), Safety Integrity Level (SIL), and more. This allows and helps plants to create a
plan that will help in minimizing the risk to tolerable or desired level and keep employees safe and
avoid costly damages.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a method for evaluating high- consequence scenarios
to see if the risk tolerance of a firm is fulfilled by the combination of occurrence probability and
severity of effects. The safety assessment team can utilize LOPA to find flaws and strengths in the
safety systems in place to safeguard personnel, the plant, and the general public. LOPA is a means
to identify the scenarios that present the most significant risk and determine if the consequences
could be reduced by the application of inherently safer design principle.
Figure 1. Scenarios of Layers of Protection Analysis (DEKRA)
The figure above is an example of scenarios of layers of protection from DEKRA that is often
found through a qualitative hazard review, such as a Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) or a Hazard
and Operability study, which frequently involves a mix of equipment and human failures (HAZOP).
1. Different Layers of LOPA

Standard ANSI/ISA-84.00.01.
After that, LOPA is used to do a more thorough analysis of this case. LOPA is a quantitative
screening technique that employs a consistent, objective, and justifiable methodology. To increase
process safety, LOPA can also be utilized to indicate the need for safety instrumented systems
(SIS) or other protective layers.
Safety protection of a facility or chemical plant is broken down into layers:
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Figure2. Layers of Protection Analysis
Layer 1: Process Design

A resilient system can avoid or withstand variations in operating circumstances thanks to good
process design. To decrease the possible consequences of a scenario, such as lowering the
concentration or amount of a hazardous substance in the process, inherently safer design principles
can be used.
Layer 2: Basic Process Control System

To verify that the fundamental control system and process alarms are trustworthy, the safety
engineer must examine it. The feed system was being fixed in this example. As a result, presume
the process feed control loop was turned off, and the PFD for this layer is set to 1.0.
Layer 3: Alarms & Operator Intervention

The rate of temperature rise is one of the most important factors to track in an exothermic
process. It is critical to avoid a situation in which the temperature rises exothermically beyond the
point of no return (the point of runaway or the point where heat generated exceeds the heat removal
rate by cooling systems and vaporization).
Layer 4: Safety Instrumented System

This layer denotes the presence of a safety instrumented system or an emergency shutdown
device that does not require operator input. Burners for boilers are a frequent example. Photo
detectors are present in the event of a flameout, and it instantly cut down the gas flow in
microseconds.
Layer 5: Physical Protection

This is frequently a crucial layer of defense. A relief mechanism, for example, is required on
virtually all boats. This is a necessity in vessel codes, and for good cause. It's a last line of
protection that's kept a lot of vessels from bursting. Another important idea in layer of protection
analysis is the concept of protective layers.
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Layer 6: Physical Containment

In the case of a runaway reaction, this layer is frequently ineffective. However, an
unintentional loss of material within the reactor to the surrounding process region should be
considered. Would constructing a dike or berm around the reactor be advantageous in terms of
containing a nuclear spill? When it comes to keeping a spill from affecting nearby groundwater,
dikes are commonly used as IPLs; nevertheless, it may not be able to prevent a poisonous gas
cloud in the case of a leak.
Layer 7: Plant Emergency Response

In the case of an emergency, workers should know where the muster points are and, if
required, what options it has if the gathering point is endangered. Emergency action to a batch
reactor undergoing a runaway is usually too late to avert the breach and is thus not credited in
LOPA.
Layer 8: Community Emergency Response

This is a layer that should not be relied upon to alleviate a dangerous situation. If this layer is
"demanded," it implies the issue has spread beyond the plant site and requires outside intervention.
It is important that community representatives such as the fire department, ambulance rescue team,
and other emergency response workers participate in emergency response drills.
2. Initiating Event Frequency (IEF)

An initiating event is a failure that starts a sequence of events that, if not interrupted by the
successful operation of a layer of protection, results in a hazardous outcome. Examples of common
initiating events include mechanical failure, operator error, and control loop failure.
3. Independent Protection Layers (IPL)

An Independent Protection Layer (IPL) is defined as a device, system, or action that has the
capability of preventing a scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence, independent
from the initiating event or the action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario.
The main characteristics of IPL are:
• its ability in blocking fault consequence when the IPL functions as designed; and
• it should be auditable where the assumed effectiveness in terms of consequence prevention and
probability of failure on demand (PFD) must be capable of validation (by documentation,
review, testing, and so on).
4. Auditability of a Safety Protection System

Each layer in a safety protection system must have the ability to be audited. In other words, the
layer must be placed under a demand situation and tested for reliability. The testing period of these
different layers will vary. For example, major relief valves within a system are typically tested on
three to five-year cycles. On the other hand, a flammable gas detector might be tested every month.
The testing frequency is specified to maintain the reliability of the IPL at the PFD required of it in
the LOPA.
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B. Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is a prevention or mitigation system specifically made for
the process industries and manufacturing plants with sets of sensors, logic solvers and final control
elements. Its function is to provide monitoring and supervision of potentially dangerous conditions.
SIS will not only protect the process, but also the personnel, equipment, and the environment.
In accordance with the International Electrotechnical Commission, Safety instrumented
systems for the process industry must provide Framework, definitions, system, hardware and
application programming requirements. Within the scope of the IEC 61511-1:2016 it gives
requirements for the specification, design, installation, operation and maintenance of a safety
instrumented system (SIS), so that it can be confidently entrusted to achieve or maintain a safe state
of the process.
1. Safety Integrity level (SIL)

Integrity Level or also known as SIL, is a safety system performance that measures probability
of failure on demand (PFD). It became vital in most process industries for years of operation and
it determines the performance required to maintain and acquire safety levels. In compliance with
International Safety Standards, IEC standard 61508 (consisting of methods on how to apply,
design, deploy and maintain automatic protection systems called safety-related systems also
known as functional safety) was introduced. The term functional safety is used to describe the
safety system that is dependent on the correct functioning of sensors, logic solvers, and final
elements to achieve the desired risk reduction level. It is achieved when every safety function is
carried out successfully and the risks in the process are reduced to the desired level.
The International Electrotechnical Commission is the organization that prepares and publishes
international standards for all electronic, electrical and related technologies.
IEC standard 61508

This standard consists of methods on how to apply, design, deploy and maintain automatic
protection systems called safety-related systems. This concept was developed as a response to the
increasing demand for enhanced safety systems. With the increasing use of electrical, electronic
and programmable electronic systems for carrying out safety functions, it raised awareness and
desire to design systems for safety that can provide a way to prevent dangerous failures or to
control when it occur.
IEC 61511-1:2016 standard

“It gives requirements for the specification, design, installation, operation and maintenance of
a safety instrumented system (SIS), so that it can be confidently entrusted to achieve or maintain
a safe state of the process”. The IEC 61508 is more of a prescriptive standard unlike IEC 61511
where it is more of a performance based standard where it provides good engineering practices for
the application of safety instrumented systems in the process.
The higher the SIL level, the higher the associated safety level, and the lower the probability
that a specific system will fail to operate accurately. In the table below (Table 1) is the SIL Basis
of Safety Ratings.
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Probability of Failure
Safety Integrity Level Risk Reduction Factor
on Demand Reliability
(SIL) (RRF)
(PFD)
SIL 4 10,000 to 100,000 0.0001 to 0.00001 >99.99%
SIL 3 1,000 to 10,000 0.001 to 0.0001 99.90 - 99.99%
SIL 2 100 to 1,000 0.01 to 0.001 99.00 - 99.90%
SIL1 10 to 100 0.1 to 0.01 90.00 - 99.00%

Table 1. Safety Integrity Level Table
Identifying the System Integrity Level (SIL) of a safety system performance, techniques such
as Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) are used to
determine the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)
(Primatech Inc., 2009).
2. Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)

Safety instrumented function is a function to be implemented by SIS to achieve or maintain the
“safe state” of a process automatically with respect to a specific hazardous event. It can be in a
single or series of alarms.
The Importance of Safety Integrity Level to Safety Instrumented System the Safety
Instrumented System is significant to Safety Integrity
Level due to safety measures for the probability of an SIS to fail - which is set as a precaution.
The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a statistical representation of the integrity of the SIS when a
process demand occurs. Where SIL can be defined in terms of the risk reduction factor (RRF).
3. Probability of Failure Upon Demand (PFD) & Risk Reduction Factor (RRF)
Failure on demand occurs when a safety system is called upon to react following an initiating
event but fails to react. For example, the reactor system has an emergency quench water system
piped to the reactor in the event of a runaway. A runaway occurs, and the quench system is called
upon to act. This is considered a demand. Further, it is established, either by separate testing, or
plant history, that this quench system will successfully operate when demanded 9 times out of 10
times. This implies that it fails only one time out of 10. The risk reduction factor, RRF, is 10
(RRF=1/PFD). The PFD for this system will be 0.1. But the equation (RRF=1/PFD) only applies
to a narrow and specific set of circumstances. The Risk Reduction Factor is the number of times
that risk is reduced when comparing one situation against another (Marszal, 2020).
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4. SIL Assessment
According to General Electric Co. (2018), Safety Integrity Level is divided into four (4) discrete
ranks, levels 1 to 4 (as shown in the table above). Each level is determined by the reliability of
safety systems for equipment, units, and systems, and to create a plan of maintenance, operations,
monitoring and procurement. SIL uses numeric rating or value that represents the overall rating
for the instrumented function. This tells us the degree of the instrumented function to meet its
requirements to be able to mitigate the risk. After the value assignment to each instrumented
function, the combination of these values reflects the overall safety integrity of the safety
instrumented systems to which the functions belong.
There are several steps in performing an SIL Assessment:
• Assess the required SIL rating for an instrumented function using the created SIL Assessment
records from LOPA, risk matrix, PHA, or external.
• Associate the correct and appropriate SIL Assessment with the instrumented function.
5. SIL Determination
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Determination is the process of determining the amount of risk
mitigation that is required to reduce the risk caused by a process to a tolerable and accepted level.
It represents the initial step in the development, design, commissioning, and operation of Safety
Instrumented System (SIS). SIL determination consists of the SIL for each Safety Instrumented
Function (SIF) within a SIS. This fundamental process is related to the overall risk from the
exposed hazard that can occur and is guided by the corporate standards to ensure that safety-related
systems acceptably performs the required safety functions under every stated condition within the
specified period.
Incomplete SIL Determination can affect the safety integrity of the process and even put the
integrity at risk. Properly defined SILs result in significant cost improvement across all operating
environments. To maintain SIL performance and optimize the ownership cost, performing regular
tests of SIFs for operational efficacy should be attained.
6. SIL Determination Methods

SIL Determination Methods are analytical methodologies used to assess the SIL level at which
an industrial process or application should be rated so that hazards that are made by applications
or processes can be lessened to a tolerable and accepted or desired level. SILs are only useful to
systems that only require an SIS in order to achieve a necessary level of risk reduction.
In SIL, there are assessment and determination methods that can be used to assess the SIL rating
or value for an instrumented system, these are:
• Risk Graph / Risk Matrix

Risk matrix is an assessment method that is based on two overlapping factors: the likelihood or
probability that the risk event will occur and the potential impact or the severity that the risk event
will have if it occurs.
To determine the risk factor, multiply the Probability of Harm and the Severity of Harm or
consequences (S). As observed in the matrix, as either P or S increases, the risk also increases.
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Table 2: Safety Risk Matrix
• Quantitative Assessment (i.e. FTA)

A Fault Tree Analysis is a fully quantitative approach and tends to be the best method for
complex scenarios or for higher integrity systems (i.e. SIL 3) where a linear approach such as a
LOPA/Risk Graph may not be sufficient; think inter-twining scenarios where some Independent
Protection Layers (IPLs) are only applicable to some initiating events. Perhaps you have
conditional or common events; or maybe you have different SIFs mitigating against different
initiating events for the same hazardous scenario.
Figure 3. Fault Tree Analysis Sample

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• Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

LOPA is a simplified form of risk assessment and a powerful analytical tool used to assess the
adequacy of layers of protection used to mitigate the assessed risk. It uses order of magnitude
categories for initiating event frequency, consequences severity, and likelihood of failure of
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) to approximate the risk scenario.
The basic steps for the LOPA risk assessment typically are:
- Identify the consequence
- Define the Risk Tolerance Criteria
- Define the relevant accident scenario
- Determine the initiating event frequency
- Identify the conditions, conditional modifiers (if applicable) and estimate the PFD
- Estimate the intermediate frequency of unmitigated consequence
- Identify the IPLs and estimate the probability of failure on demand for each IPL
- Determine the Frequency of Mitigated Consequence
- Evaluate the need for additional IPL
Table 3: LOPA Assessment - required number of IPLs
• Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) and Risk Assessment

PHA is a set of organized and systematic assessment
of a potential hazard associated with an industrial process. It provides information intended to
assist managers and employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the
consequences of unwanted release of hazardous chemicals. PHA is directly towards analyzing
potential causes of consequences of fires, explosions, release of flammable or toxic chemicals and
spill of hazardous chemicals, and focuses on equipment, instrumentation, utility, human actions
and external factors that might impact the process.
The most common examples of applied methods include checklists, “what-if” analysis, or a
combination of the two, hazard operability studies and failure mode and effect analysis.
7. SIF Loop Verification

Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) Loop Verification is the process used to calculate the SIF
performance to be able to determine whether it meets with the target SIL. Every SIF loop has SIL
that is typically specified during the classification of SIL done during the design stage.
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In every safety instrumented function, the average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg)
will be computed and the result will be compared with the PFDavg range for the targeted SIL. This
process involves reviewing the loop design and collecting the required information to calculate the
PFDavg for the loop.
The types of information required during the verification includes but is not limited to failure
rate of the hardware, common mode failure percentage, and the coverage of proof test. PFDavg
serves a simple function of instrument failure rates and test intervals for basic SIFs.
8. SIL Validation
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Validation is implemented to build a “fit for purpose” design of
safety instrumented measures that has the capability of mitigating hazards with respect to safety
and consequences, in both the environment and economic loss. This aims to determine if the
specified requirements can be achieved as mentioned in the safety requirement specifications
through tests and inspections of the installed and commissioned SIS and its associated SIFs.
It is carried out prior to the operation phase of the IEC 61511 safety lifecycle to put forth a plan
for routine actions such as proof testing, maintenance override conditions, documentation of
system demand and failure rates consistent with the Safety Integrity Level (SIL), verification
calculations, audit and test documentation, and diagnostic and repair procedures. (Safeopedia Inc.,
2021)
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C. SIL Calculation
Many automated processes are safety critical systems, these are process whose failure could
result in a loss of life, significant property damage or damage to the environment (J. C. Knight,
2002). An SIL Study or SIL Verification in the IEC standards is done to ensure that it meets a
minimum SIL.
A SIL Study helps to determine:
• Type of device
• Hardware architecture
• Voting logic
• Proof Test interval
These are all needed to meet the required Risk Reduction Factor or the Safety Integrity Level
of a Safety Instrumented Function.
Examaple:
A fail-closed PV-100 can lead to overpressure, a High-Pressure Shutdown was added as the
SIF in Figure 1. This consists of the sensor PIT-200, the logic controller PAH/ PAHH and the final
element PV-200. After conducting LOPA, the SIF must meet the requirements of SIL 2 to reduce
the risk by 100 (RRF at 100).
To determine the reliability of the (SIF), calculation of the PFD of each component is
necessary.
Figure 4
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Step 1: Breakdown the SIF Components and Architecture
Figure 5. SIF Components and Architecture
Step 2: Calculate the PFD of each component
Using the equation:

𝑇𝐼
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈 × ( + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅) + 𝜆𝐷𝐷 × 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
2
Where:
𝜆𝐷𝑈 Dangerous Undetected Failure Rate
TI Proof Test Interval
MTTR Mean Time to Repair
𝜆𝐷𝐷 Dangerous Detected Failure Rate
Note that this equation is for 1 out of 1 configuration (i.e. no redundancy), under low demand
operation. There are other equations for different voting logic such as: 1 out of 2 or 2 out of 3. There
are also other equations for safety functions used continuously that are considered as high demand
operations (Icarus-ORM Academy, 2015).
Pressure Transmitter:
𝜆𝐷𝑈 6.0 × 10−7 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠/ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟
TI 48 months or TI = 35,040 hours
MTTR 8 hours
𝜆𝐷𝐷 1.5 × 10−7 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠/ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟
35,040
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑇 = 6.0 × 10−7 × ( + 8) + 1.5 × 10−7 × 8
2
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑇 = 0.010518 or 1% chance in any given chance
Repeat the calculation on each component: PLC input, PLC main processor, PLC power
supply, PLC output, Solenoid, Actuator and Valve.
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Step 3: Combine all the components PFDs to determine the SIL PFD
Element PFD
Pressure Transmitter 0.010518
PLC input 0.004388
PLC main processor 0.000051
PLC power supply 0.000002
PLC output 0.002194
Solenoid 0.010254
Actuator 0.005995
Valve 0.046975
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑆𝐼𝐿 = 0.080376
Step 4: Convert SIL PFD to RRF and compare to the target RRF (which is at least 100)
RRF = 1/PFD RRF = 1/0.080376 RRF = 12.44
The calculated RRF was far from the target of 100. From the SIL Table, the calculated RRF
still falls in the line of SIL 1 where the chances of failure are more than 1% and from our calculation
8%.
Consideration of other alternatives is needed when the SIL requirement is not met:
1. Look at the distribution of failure of the current setup, architectural constraints,
consideration of redundancy or adjustment of the proof test interval.
2. The designer must do a recalculation with another safer architecture (1oo2, 2oo3, etc.) to
meet the SIL requirement of a safety instrumented function (PLCdesign, 2016).
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III. References
https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780080999975/marine-structural-design
https://www.aesolutions.com/post/independent-protection-layers-will-they-work- when-
needed?fbclid=IwAR3JglGGYEm6DNldvo_cAFOcTyP8U2D17sdqVObu-
LZzXizZqcfslxoV-30
https://www.crossco.com/resources/articles/determining-safety-integrity-levels-for- your-
process-application/
https://www.ge.com/digital/documentation/meridium/Help/V43060/IOTBmYjU3MW Yt
MWVhZC00YzQ2LTg3MDEtZmYxNzg4YmFlN2Nj.html
https://www.process-improvement-institute.com/consulting-services/sis-sil-sif-
services/?fbclid=IwAR1rtZAlTJbTwmcD69vWU4d20RQ8-
AmJYdCtNo9wTpjGkY4jem3UecpNCoE
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/24241?fbclid=IwAR1IP_-QP-
4vBkp_AkNjOupMqN6DiX6N3JpBAwROgtGpTqtSdbAixOPUg8Q
https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-standards-
committees/isa84?fbclid=IwAR1nLNLT9O5RVG_21GWkKCP9a2adVRYtw4JtUn
W6u++hh--JaRToXSpX8Lzyo
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1007998
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lopa-layer-protection-analysis-john-kingsley
www.dekra.com/en/layers-of-protection-analysis/ https://www.kenexis.com/risk-reduction-
factor/
https://www.icheme.org/media/9673/xxi-paper-045.pdf
https://processoperations.com/SafeInstrSy/SS_Chp01g.htm
https://www.processindustryinformer.com/application-of-the-sil-analysis-to-process- plant-
safety-systems
https://plcdesign.xyz/en/sil-requirement/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUe1DiybtMk
16 | P a g e
https://www.safeopedia.com/definition/4954/safety-integrity-level-study-sil-study- safety
https://www.safeopedia.com/definition/5009/sil-determination
https://www.safeopedia.com/definition/5010/sil-determination-methods
https://www.safeopedia.com/definition/5017/sil-validation-sil-v
https://forumautomation.com/t/independent-protection-layer- ipl/5877#google_vignette
https://blog.msasafety.com/what-safety-integrity-level-
means/?fbclid=IwAR2aq0_oAZ0K0mWGR64t98JiqtaqhGDmg-
5MDmyALlYinte7pjxZn18Hfu0
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705814017263
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/81971209.pdf
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.522.1335&rep=rep1&type
=pdf
http://www.primatech.com/images/docs/faq_s84_standard_for_safety_instrumented_s
ystems.pdf?fbclid=IwAR09mHoGt1zc-
UJn7UzN6yoE6FbZQtRH5MFS8DhIrNw8ORbYLd_VgWc7oBw
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Philip-Henry/public
YouTube Link
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=orZoS_GcxHE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Af-CbZ7aTCY
TOPIC II: Hazard Operability (HAZOP)
Collaborated and submitted by:
Aloroy, Ralph Geniel T.

Baguyo, Mark Lynton N.
Patingo, Unique D.
Santisima, Cathrina A.
Serapio, Jose Marco G.
Tumamak, Axlrose D.
BS ICE
First Semester 2021
Submitted to:
Engr. John C. Yasay

Instructor
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
History of HAZOP................................................................................................................... 1
IEC 61882 standard ................................................................................................................. 1
II. Hazard Operability .................................................................................................................. 2
A.Objectives of HAZOP.......................................................................................................... 2
B.Common mistakes when conducting a HAZOP .................................................................. 2
C.Types of HAZOP ................................................................................................................. 2
D.Basic team for a process plant may be: ............................................................................... 2
E.When and Where to use HAZOP? ....................................................................................... 3
III. HAZOP Procedure ............................................................................................................................. 3
A.HAZOP Worksheet and Flowchart .............................................................................................. 3
B.Definition of Terms and Flowchart .............................................................................................. 4
C.Structure of the HAZOP Study Procedure .................................................................................. 7
D.Flow Chart of the Study Method ................................................................................................ 10
IV. HAZOP Case Studies ............................................................................................................ 11
V. HAZOP Study Conclusion .................................................................................................... 11
VI. References ............................................................................................................................. 12
I. Introduction
HAZOP, or a Hazard and Operability Study, is a systematic way to identify possible hazards in
a work process. In this approach, the process is broken down into steps, and every variation in
work parameters is considered for each step, to see what could go wrong. HAZOP’s meticulous
approach is commonly used with chemical production and piping systems, where miles of pipes
and numerous containers can cause logistical headaches.
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) is a well known and well documented study. The HAZOP
technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process systems, but has later been extended
to other types of systems and also to complex operations and to software systems. The purpose of
the HAZOP is to investigate how the system or plant deviate from the design intent and create risk
for personnel and equipment and operability problems.
History of HAZOP
The HAZOP technique was initially developed in the 1960s to analyze major chemical process
systems but has since been extended to other areas, including mining operations and other types
of process systems and other complex systems such as nuclear power plant operation and software
development. It is also used as the basis for reviewing batch processes and operating procedures.
Although a number of companies were addressing this issue, the technique is generally considered
to have originated in the Heavy Organic Chemicals Division of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI),
which was then a major British and international chemical company. The history has been
described by Trevor Kletz. who was the company's safety advisor from 1968 to 1982, from which
the following is abstracted.
IEC 61882 standard

The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for
standardization comprising all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees).
The IEC 61882 standard, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP Studies) – Application
Guide, was developed to provide guidance on application of the technique and on the HAZOP
study procedure, including definition, preparation, examination sessions and resulting
documentation and follow-up across many industries and types of systems. Documentation
examples, as well as a broad set of examples encompassing various applications, illustrating
HAZOP studies are also provided. The first edition was published in 2001 and the second edition
was published in 2016.
IEC 61882 defined HAZOP as a Historical approach to risk identification and has been called
a hazard and operability study or HAZOP study for short. This is a structured and systematic
technique for examining a defined system, with the objectives of:
➢ identifying potential hazards risks associated with the operation and maintenance of the
system. The hazards or other risk sources involved may can include both those essentially
relevant only to the immediate area of the system and those with a much wider sphere of
influence, for example some environmental hazards;
➢ identifying potential operability problems with the system and in particular identifying
causes of operational disturbances and production deviations likely to lead to
nonconforming products.
1
II. Hazard Operability
A. Objectives of HAZOP
1. Identify all deviations from the way a system is intended to function: their causes, and all the
hazards and operability problems associated with these deviations.
2. Decide whether actions are required to control the hazards and/or the operability problems,
and if so, identify the ways in which the problems can be solved.
3. Identify cases where a decision cannot be made immediately, and decide on what information
or actions are required.
4. Ensure that actions decided are followed up.
5. Make operator aware of hazards and operability problems.
Pros of Conducting a HAZOP Study

- An efficient, knowledgeable HAZOP team can save the company more money than the
expense of the conducting the study.
- HAZOP studies identify hazards and can thus save lives and decrease employee injuries.
- HAZOP teams provide a multi-disciplinary look at various processes.
Cons of Conducting a HAZOP Study
- HAZOP studies are very time consuming.
- HAZOP teams take a very focused approach to each element of a process and may miss some
of the hazards that are more evident from taking a bigger picture perspective.
- A team that is not led by a competent facilitator and composed of knowledgeable, experienced
members may not investigate the processes thoroughly enough or may fail to identify some of
the potential hazards.
B. Common mistakes when conducting a HAZOP
1. Planning Stage
- Mismanagement of time-allotment issues.
- Incorrect size of HAZOP team.
2. Execution Stage
- Lack of focus during the meeting
- Mistaking the tools for the process.
C. Types of HAZOP
1. Process HAZOP
The HAZOP technique was originally developed to assess plants and process systems.
2. Human HAZOP
A “family” of specialized HAZOPs. More focused on human errors than technical failures.
3. Procedure HAZOP
Review of procedures or operational sequences Sometimes denoted SAFOP – SAFe
Operation Study.
4. Software HAZOP
Identification of possible errors in the development of software.
D. Basic team for a process plant may be:

1. Project Engineer
2. Commissioning Engineer
3. Process Engineer
4. Instrumentation/ Electrical Engineer
5. Safety Engineer
2
E. When and Where to use HAZOP?
Hazard and Operability Study should be accomplished in the design phase or during the early
stages of project development, as well as identifying the potential hazards in existing systems to
identify modifications that should be implemented to reduce risk and operability problems. As a
compromise, the HAZOP is usually carried out as a final check when the detailed design has been
completed. With an effective analysis, potential hazards may be discovered before they result in
injuries and loss.
HAZOP is best suited for assessing hazards in facilities, equipment, and processes and is
capable of assessing systems from multiple perspectives. In design, assessing system design
capability to meet user specifications and safety standards. In physical and operational
environments, assessing environment to ensure system is appropriately situated, supported,
serviced, contained, etc. In operational and procedural controls, assessing engineered controls (ex:
automation), sequences of operations, procedural controls.
III. HAZOP Procedure
A. HAZOP Worksheet and Flowchart

The HAZOP work-sheets may be different depending on the scope of the study. The following
entries (columns) are generally included in HAZOP work-sheets:
Figure 1 Example of HAZOP worksheet
3
Divide section
into nodes
Select a study node
Apply all relevant

Record consequences combinations of guide-words
and causes and and parameters.
suggest remedies YES Any hazards or NO
operating problems?
NOT SURE
HAZOP Report Need more

information
B. Definition of Terms and Flowchart
Design Intent
The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to behave at the node;
this is qualitatively described as an activity (e.g., feed, reaction, sedimentation) and/or
quantitatively in the process parameters, like temperature, flow rate, pressure, composition,
etc.
Node
A node is a specific location in the process in which (the deviations of) the design/process
intent are evaluated. Examples might be: separators, heat exchangers, scrubbers, pumps,
compressors, and interconnecting pipes with equipment.
Guideword
A short word to create the imagination of a deviation of the design/process intent. The
most commonly used guide-words are: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other than, and
reverse. The guidewords are applied, in turn, to all the parameters, in order to identify
unexpected and yet credible deviations from the design/process intent.
Guide-word + Parameter → Deviation
Standard HAZOP Guidewords:

GUIDEWORD MEANING
No (not, none) None of the design is achieved
More (more of, higher) Quantitative increase in a Parameter
Less (less of, lower) Quantitative decrease in a Parameter
As well as (more than) An additional activity occurs
Part of Only some of the design intentions are achieved, some are
not
Reverse Logical opposite of the intentions occurs
4
Other than (other) Complete substitution or miscellaneous - another activity
takes place or an unusual activity occurs or uncommon
condition exists
Additional HAZOP Guidewords:

GUIDEWORD MEANING
Early / late The timing is different from the intention
Before / after The step (or some part of it) is affected out of sequence
Faster / slower The step is done/not done with the right timing
Where else Applicable for flows, transfer, sources and destinations
Alternative HAZOP Guidewords:

GUIDEWORD MEANING
Unclear Procedure written in confusing and ambiguous fashion
Step in wrong place Procedure will lead to actions out of correct sequence or
recovery failure
Wrong action Procedure action specified is incorrect
Incorrect information Information being checked prior to action is incorrectly
specified
Step omitted Missing step, or steps too large, requiring too much of the
operator
Step unsuccessful Step likely to be unsuccessful due to demands on operator
Interference effects from Procedure-following performance likely to be affected by other
others personnel carrying out simultaneous tasks (usually when co-
located)
Parameter Guide-word / deviation

Time Too early, too late
Sequence Wrong sequence, omissions, wrong action
Procedure Not available, not applicable, not followed
Measurement Instrument failure, observation error
Organization Unclear responsibilities, not fitted for purpose
Communication Failed equipment, insufficient/incorrect information
Personnel Lack of competence, too few, too many
Position Wrong position, movement exceeding tolerances
Power Complete loss, partly lost
Weather Above limitations - causing delayed operation
Parameter
The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the process (e.g. pressure, temperature,
composition).
Process parameters may generally be classified into the following groups:
1. Physical parameters related to input medium properties
2. Physical parameters related to input medium conditions
5
3. Physical parameters related to system dynamics
4. Non-physical tangible parameters related to batch type processes
5. Parameters related to system operations
Deviation
A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may depart from their design/process
intent.
Sample Guidewords + Parameter (Deviation):

Guidewords Parameter Deviation Explanation
No Flow No flow Wrong flow path, blockage, diverted
More Flow More Flow More pumps, inward leaks, greater fluid
density
Pressure More Pressure Excess flow, closed valve, blockage
Temperature More Temperature Cooling failure, failed exchanger tubes,

ambient conditions
Less Flow Less flow Blocked suction, vessel drainage, pump
Pressure Less pressure failure
Reverse Flow Reverse Flow Pump failure, wrong routing, pump reverse
Other than Operation Maintenance Isolation, venting, purging, draining
Cause
The reason(s) why the deviation could occur. Several causes may be identified for one
deviation. It is often recommended to start with the causes that may result in the worst possible
consequence.
Consequences
The results of the deviation, in case it occurs. Consequences may both comprise process
hazards and operability problems, like plant shut-down or reduced quality of the product.
Several consequences may follow from one cause and, in turn, one consequence can have
several causes
Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation
Safeguard
Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of the deviation or to mitigate its
consequences.
There are five types of Safeguard that can be used in HAZOP worksheets, including:
1. Identify the deviation
2. Compensate for the deviation
3. Prevent the deviation from occurring
4. Prevent further escalation of the deviation
5. Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation
6
C. Structure of the HAZOP Study Procedure
1. Company PHA/Safety/PSMP Team Meet

2.
Identify the Project for the HAZOP Study
3. Identify the Lead Process Engineer
4. Select the HAZOP Team Leader
5. Define Purpose and Scope of HAZOP
6. Select the Team/Define Roles
7. Pre-HAZOP Meeting
• Lead Process Engineer and HAZOP Study Leader
• Identify and Obtain Required Information
• Plan the Study Sequence
• Plan the Schedule
8. Inform Everyone Concerned
9. HAZOP Study Review and Documenting the Results (Minutes)
10. Preparing and Submitting the HAZOP Study Report
11. Taking the Actions
12. . Close out meeting and Signing Off
1. Company PHA/Safety/PSMP Team Meeting

Each company will have (or should establish), as part of their Process Safety Management
Program, an experienced team or responsible person who will decide which safety route a new
project/an existing process/a process modification/a revamp/or a retrofit should follow. By
deciding which route, then this should automatically state which Process Hazard Analysis
(PHA’s) methods will be used to assess the process hazards.
7
2. Identify the Project for the HAZOP Study
Based on the Safety Team meeting, the Safety Process route selected will specify whether
the project/process will undergo a HAZOP study. If a project is selected there will be some
indication of the time scheduling of the HAZOP because of the timing of the Project Planning
Program.
The decision to HAZOP or not to HAZOP is primarily the responsibility of this team and
will be based on several contributing factors:
• legislation - does local SHE legislation require a HAZOP;
• tradition - has the company a tradition of using HAZOP techniques process;
• conditions - hazardous chemicals, high/low temperatures, high/low pressures, chemical
reactions etc.;
• experience - does the company has wide HAZOP experience? and does the company
want it?
• cost - the project value may be low, in which case a small projects HAZOP group may
handle it.
3. Identify the Lead Process Engineer

If a project has been assigned for a HAZOP then the Lead Process Engineer must be
informed in order that he can plan for it. Duties of the Lead Process Engineer, he should have
a very detailed understanding of the process being reviewed. Apart from voicing questions of
his own he should act as consultant to the team, providing the process descriptions and
answering the bulk of the questions which will be raised by the team. He sometimes will also
act as Technical Secretary although the assignment of this important position decision depends
on company policy and the nature of the project.
4. Select the HAZOP Team Leader

Selecting a HAZOP Study Leader or HAZOP Study Chairperson is a key issue. It
is important that the Study Leader be an experienced engineer who has been trained in the
discipline of conducting HAZOPs and who has a measure of independence – not involved
in design nor maintenance of the plant.
The technical duties of the HAZOP Study Leader take place throughout the various stages
of the whole HAZOP process: Before the HAZOP study, Pre-HAZOP meeting, During the
HAZOP study, and After the HAZOP Study. Sometimes the HAZOP Study Leader
(Chairperson) may also act as Technical Secretary.
The HAZOP Study Leader must control, develop, encourage contributions from all
members of the team. Only some of these valuable characteristics are listed on the table below.
5. Define Purpose and Scope of HAZOP

The purpose, objectives, and scope of the study should be made as explicit as possible. The
objectives are normally set by the person who is responsible for the plant or project; this person
is assisted by the HAZOP study leader. It is important that people work together to provide
the proper direction and focus for the study. It is also important to define what specific
consequences are to be considered. In this case, the HAZOP study should focus on
deviations that result in off-site effects.
6. Selecting the HAZOP Team and Defining the Roles

The HAZOP team leader should ensure the availability of an adequately sized and skilled
HAZOP team. A HAZOP team, at a minimum, should consist of a leader, a technical secretary,
and two other individuals who have an understanding for the design and operation of the
8
subject process. Ideally, the team consists of 5 to 7 members, although a smaller team could
be sufficient for a simpler, less hazardous plant.
The Process Engineer and the Operations or Commissioning Engineer, on the other hand,
should be very familiar with all the details of the plant under review so that they can answer
the questions which will be raised by the HAZOP team. In this case, the core team format will
comprise another specialist/s.
7. Pre-HAZOP meeting
In order to make the HAZOP run effectively a number of pre-HAZOP activities must be
carried out. The pre-HAZOP meeting is an essential component of these activities and
normally involves the following:
• Identifying the Obtaining the Required Information
• Planning the Study Sequence
• Planning the Schedule
A HAZOP Study is review of Process and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs) otherwise

known as Engineering Flow Diagrams. To make the study useful, it is essential to have full
details of the following:
a. All pipeline size, numbers and design parameters.
b. Extent of insulation and electrical tracing.
c. Dimensions of vessels with the rough location of branches.
d. Design and operating pressures and temperatures of these vessels.
e. Definition of all instrumentation, both controllers and trip systems.
f. Delivery characteristics of the pumps. Planning the Study Sequence
8. Inform Everybody Concerned

Inform everybody concerned in the HAZOP study by listing and posting out in advance the
official agenda indicating the topics, times of meetings and a list of required attendees.
9. HAZOP Review and Study Method

The HAZOP Study technique requires that a process drawing or procedure be divided into
study nodes, process sections, or operating steps and that the hazards of the process be
addressed using the guide words, the figure illustrates the typical flow of the activities in a
HAZOP meeting.
Documenting the results and recording process is an important part of the HAZOP study.
The secretary assigned to write the minutes must be able to abstract the pertinent results from
the myriad of conversations that occur during the meetings.
a. Release of material
b. Changes in Material Hazard conditions
c. Energy source exposed
d. Operating limit exceeded
Effects within the plant:

a. Changes within Chemical conditions
b. Changes in the inventory
c. Change in the Chemical Physical characteristics
10. Preparing the Actions

The key document that is produced from the HAZOP Study is a HAZOP Study Actions
Report.
9
11. Taking the HAZOP Actions
This is very straightforward if the action to be taken is obvious and involves the change of
a small detail, which can be implemented by one of the study team.
12. Final HAZOP Close-Out Meeting

In order to make sure that the actions requested at the HAZOP Study have been taken,
and at the same time that the actions requested as a result of the subsequent investigations
have not invalidated the original study, it is desirable to hold a HAZOP Actions Close-Out
Meeting.
D. Flow Chart of the Study Method

Select Line
Select deviation
e.g. more flow
Move on to next NO
Is more flow possible?
deviation
YES
Is it hazardous or does it Consider other
prevent efficient operation? causes of more
flow
YES
Will the operator know that
there is more flow?
YES
What change in plant or methods will Consider other
prevent the deviation or make it less changes or agree
likely or protect against the to accept hazard
consequences?
Is the cause of the change NO

justified?
Agree change(s).
10
Agree who is responsible for the action
IV. HAZOP Case Studies
Reactor System
The reactor is exothermic. A cooling system is

provided to remove the excess energy of reaction. In the
event of cooling function is lost, the temperature of
reactor would increase. This would lead to an increase in
reaction rate leading to additional energy release.
The result could runaway reaction with pressure
exceeding the bursting pressure of the reactor. The
temperature within the reactor is measure and is used to
control the cooling water flow rate by a valve.
Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor

Guide Word Deviation Cause Consequence Action
No No cooling Temperature
increase in reactor
Reverse Reverse cooling Failure of water
flow source resulting in
backward flow
More More cooling Instruct operators on
flow procedure
As well as Reactor product Check maintenance
in coils procedures and
schedules
Other than Another material Water source
besides cooling contaminated
water
Exercise:
Perform HAZOP Study for Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger.
V. HAZOP Study Conclusion

A Hazard and Operability study is a great way to break down complex processes and
consider all the ways they could go wrong. It can allow you to plan for the worst and prepare
for the unexpected, but it's only the first step. Once your HAZOP study has identified potential
risks, those risks need to be addressed and corrected.
11
VI. References
A. Introduction
WHAT IS HAZOP
B. History of HAZOP
Hazard and Operability study
C. Objectives of HAZOP
Risk Assessment
D. Pros of Conducting a HAZOP Study
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP): Why It's Important for Safety Professionals
E. Cons of Conducting a HAZOP Study
F. Common mistakes when conducting a HAZOP
Common Mistakes When Conducting a HAZOP and How to Avoid Them
G. Types of HAZOP
Risk Assessment
H. Basic team for a process maybe:
Risk Assessment
I. HAZOP Worksheet and Flowchart
Risk Assessment 9. HAZOP (ntnu.edu)
J. Definition of Terms
Risk Assessment 9. HAZOP (ntnu.edu)
Risk Assessment
K. When and Where to perform HAZOP
Risk Assessment
WHAT IS HAZOP
Risk Assessment
Hazard & Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
L. HAZOP Study Procedure
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) procedure | TÜV SÜD in India (tuvsud.com)
What Is HAZOP | Graphic Products
09.1 hazop studytrainingcourse (slideshare.net)
M. IEC 61882 Standard
Saiglobal OSH
Primatech_Comparison of HAZOP Application Guide
webstore.iec.ch
AS IEC 61882-2003 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies)-Application guide
(saiglobal.com)
N. HAZOP Case Studies
PPT - HAZOP Case Studies – Example 1 PowerPoint Presentation, free download -
ID:2568493 (slideserve.com)
12
RIZAL TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERISTY
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNOLOGY
INSTRUMENTATIO AND CONTROL ENGINEERING
TOPIC NO.3
INSTRUMENTATION ENGINEERING
CALMA, NORIELLE
HAZARDOUS CAÑAS, CHARLIE JACK F.
AREA
CLASSIFICATION
MARIBAO, ALLYZA
NAZARIO, RYNDEL RAPHAEL
PADRIGON, WILFREDO D.
VERGARA, BRYAN
ENGR. JOHN YASAY

Contents
Title page
I. INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
II. HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION ------------------------------------------------- 4
A. HAZARDOUS LOCATION STANDARDS
B. ZONE SYSTEM
C. CLASS/DIVISION SYSTEM
III. HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSFICATION MAPPING ------------------------------------12
IV. HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS---------------------------------16
V. REFERENCES -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------20
I. Introduction
To prevent any risk of explosion or fire and improve safety of the process and employees, all
potentially hazardous areas must be classified according to the processes conducted in these
areas. It is in responsibility of the end user to define the Hazardous Areas Within the
operations.
Hazardous Area Classifications is the method of analyzing and classifying the environments
that may contain explosive gas atmospheres, as well as assisting in the right selection of
electrical equipment. The concept of analyzing potentially explosive locations is critical for
reducing the risk of electrical equipment installation in potentially explosive environments.
Appropriate areas classification allows preparation of safety procedures for plant operation and
maintenance. Classification varies across the world.
II. Hazardous Area Classification
A. Hazardous Location Standards
Electrical equipment installed in hazardous locationsare subject to regulations and standard.
Different Standards Depending on Installation Location
International Electrotechnical Commission
Global standard outside
Atmosphere Explosive
Adopts IEC standards into series of directives

Law in European Union
North America and European Union
North America
Regulations established by NEC, CEC, OSHA and NFPA NEC 500 is most common and use
d for decades
Explosive Atmospheres Standards
• International - IEC 60 079 series
IEC 60079 Series Explosive Atmosphere Standards
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60079 series of explosive atmosphere

standards covers a wide array of important considerations when it comes to potentially
explosive atmospheres. Dealing with general equipment requirements, gas detectors,
intrinsically safe equipment, a variety of different methods of equipment protection, and
moving on to the classification of areas, material characteristics, and some industry specific
standards, the IEC 60079 series is truly expansive.
• European - CENELEC 60 079 series

• National - USA: ANSI/API RP 505 (zone system)
• Russia - Gost R 51330-X-99 series
Classification of Hazardous Areas according to IEC 60079
The International Electrotechnical Commission has been adopted by countries around the
world (IEC) zoning is the name for this ideology, which is used throughout North America.
To determine the level of safety required, it is divided into Classes, Divisions, and Groups.
The boundaries of a particular hazardous zone are primarily defined by zone classification,
such as the release rate of gas or vapour and duration of release in normal condition.
There are 3 types of zone:
zone 0, zone 1, and zone 2 can be present in any explosive atmosphere according to
IS 5572:2009 (concentration of flammable gas, vapour or mist in air) and IEC 60079-10
Hazardous Area Classification according to IEC 60097 and ATEX
Areas where there is the likelihood of the presence of gases, vapors, dust, and fibers are referred
to as zones. The higher the number in this ‘zonal classification’ the smaller is the risk of an
explosion.
Zones are classified as per IEC 60097 and ATEX shown below
Zones classified as per IEC 60079 and ATEX
Gasses and Vapours Dust and Fibers
Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 20 Zone 21 Zone 22
B. Zone System
Hazardous areas are defined in DSEAR as "anywhere where explosive atmospheres are likely
to occur in such quantities that special precautions are required to protect worker safety. ". In
this context, it is better to take "special precautions" for the equipment's construction,
installation, and use, as indicated in BS EN 60079 101.
Zone classification is a method of analyzing and classifying environments where

explosive gases may occur. The primary purpose is to facilitate the proper selection and
installation of apparatus to be used safely in that environment, considering the properties of
the flammable materials present. DSEAR expands the initial scope of this scan explicitly to
see whether non-electrical ignition sources and portable equipment pose a fire hazard.
Hazardous areas are classified into zones based on an assessment of frequency and
duration of explosive gas atmospheres, as follows:
• Zone 0: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or for long
periods;
• Zone 1: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in regular
operation;
• Zone 2: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in regular
operation and, if it happens, will only exist for a short time.
Various sources have attempted to establish time limits for these regions, but none have
been officially approved. The most commonly used values are:
• Zone 0: Explosive atmosphere for more than 1000h/yr

• Zone 1: Explosive atmosphere for more than 10, but less than 1000 h/yr
• Zone 2: Explosive atmosphere for less than ten h/yr, but still sufficiently likely to require
controls over ignition sources.
A study of the extent and classification of a hazardous area involves reviewing and
documenting the following:
• Have any flammable materials;

• Physical properties and characteristics of each type of combustible material;
• Potential sources of releases and how they can form explosive atmospheres;
• Superior operating temperature and pressure;
• The presence, extent, and capacity of ventilation (forced and natural);
• Dispersion of vapors released below the flammability limit;
• Probability of each release scenario.
These factors allow the appropriate selection of the zone type, extent of the zone, and
as well as the equipment. The IP code provides a method for estimating the release rate of
small diameter holes with a pressurized source. It shows how the buoyancy and momentum of
a drop affect the extent of an area. Otherwise, it sums the values of a mixture of LPG, gasoline,
natural gas, and hydrogen from a refinery for pressures up to 100 bar.
Selection of Equipment:
The DSEAR ACOP describes the provisions concerning existing equipment. There are
different technical means (protection concepts) of building equipment to the other categories.
These, the standard current in mid-2003, and the letter giving the type of protection are listed
below.
Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Electrical
Type 'n' - EN
50021 1999
'd' - Flameproof Non-electrical
'ia' intrinsically safe enclosure EN 13463-1,
EN 50020, 2002 EN 50018 2000 2001
Ex s - Special protection if
specifically certified for Zone 'p' - Pressurized
0 EN 50016 2002
'q' - Powder
filling
EN 50017,
1998
'o' - Oil
immersion
EN 50015,
1998
'e' - Increased
safety
EN 50019,
2000
'ib' - Intrinsic
safety
EN 50020,
2002
'm' -
Encapsulation
EN 50028,
1987
's' - Special
protection
The correct selection of electrical equipment for hazardous areas requires the following
information:
• Hazardous area classification (as in the areas indicated in the table above);
• The temperature class or ignition temperature of the gas or vapor is mentioned
in the table below:
Maximum
Surface
Temperature Temperature, Ignition Temperature
Classification °C of gas or vapour, °C
T1 450 >450
T2 300 >300
T3 200 >200
T4 135 >135
T5 100 >100
T6 85 >85
Although several different combustible materials may be present in a particular area, the
material that gives the highest classification determines the overall type of the area. The IP
code specifically looks at the problem of hydrogen-containing process flows as commonly
found in refineries. Consideration should be given to combustible materials that may be
generated by chemical interactions.
C. CLASS/DIVISION SYSTEM
Hazardous locations per the Class/Division system are classified according to the
Class, Division, and Group.
▪ CLASS – The Class explains the general nature (or characteristics) of hazardous
substances that may or may not be present in sufficient quantities.
Class I – Locations where flammable gases or vapors are present in sufficient

amounts to develop explosive or ignitable combinations.
Class II – Locations where combustible dusts (in suspension, intermittently, or on

a regular basis) may or may not be present in sufficient amounts to generate
explosive or ignitable combinations.
Class III – Locations where ignitable fibers may or may not be present in sufficient
amounts to form explosive or ignitable mixes.
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CLASSES AND DIVISION
CLASS DIVISION
I. Flammable gases or vapors may 1 – Ignitable concentrations of hazards

be present. exist under normal operation conditions
and/or where the hazard is caused by
frequent maintenance or repair work or
frequent equipment failure.
2 – Ignitable concentrations of hazards
exist under abnormal operation conditions.
II. Combustible dust may be 1 – Ignitable concentrations of hazards

present. exist under normal operation conditions
III. Easily ignitable fibers or flyings 1 – Ignitable concentrations of hazards
may be present exist under normal operation conditions
Group definition
Group - define the type of hazardous material and (partly) the location of the surrounding
atmosphere. Group is divided in three groups where Group I is reserved for mining locations.
Group II is for explosive gases (Zone 0, 1 and 2) and Group III is for explosive dusts (Zone
20, 21 and 22).
Group Mines
I susceptible to firedamp (flammable mixture of gases naturally occurring
in a mine).
Group Explosive gas

II atmosphere other than mines susceptible to firedamp. Group II
equipment is subdivided into three subgroups.
A Atmospheres containing propane, acetone, benzene, butane, methane,

petrol, hexane, paint solvents or gases and vapors of equivalent hazard.
B Atmospheres containing ethylene, propylene oxide, ethylene oxide,

butadiene, cyclopropane, ethyl ether, or gases and vapors of equivalent
hazard.
C Atmospheres containing acetylene, hydrogen, carbon disulfide or gases
and vapors of equivalent hazard.
Group Explosive dust

III atmosphere. Group III equipment is subdivided into three subgroups.
A Atmospheres containing combustible flying.
B Atmospheres containing non-conductive dust.
C Atmospheres containing conductive dust.
III. Hazardous Area Classification Mapping
A potentially explosive atmospheres exist where there is a risk of explosion due to mixtures of
gas/air, vapor/air, dust/air or other flammable combinations. Any area that could have a
potentially explosive atmosphere is known as a Hazardous Area. The purpose of area
classification is to identify the extent of the area made hazardous as a result of the presence of
explosive atmosphere and to classify the identified hazardous area on the premise of likelihood
and kind of flammable release expected to be present.
Fig. 1 Area classification example according to International Electrotechnical Committee
(IEC)
Fig. 2 Area classification for storage tanks, by a particular code
Fig. 3 Tank with floating roof with or without protective cone roof
Fig. 4 Area Classification Diagram for a Class I Area (Flammable Liquid)
Fig. 5 Area Classification Diagram for a Class II Area (Combustible Dust)

Determination of hazard radius
3 methods can be used:
• Direct examples limited to common facilities
• A point source approach for all situations
• A risk-based approach.
Hazard radius depend on the following parameters:
Grade of release - Fluid category- Release pressure- Hole release size
Grades of release
3 basic grades of release in order of decreasing frequency and likelihood of the explosive gas
atmosphere:
• Continuous grade of release
Release which is continuous or is expected to occur frequently or for long periods.
• Primary grade of release
Release which can be expected to occur periodically or occasionally during normal

operation.
• Secondary grade of release
Release which is not expected to occur in normal operation and, if it does occur, is likely
to do so only infrequently and for short periods.
Release rate
The greater the release rate, the larger the extent of the zone.
• Geometry
• Release Velocity
• Concentration
• Volatility of flammable liquid
• Liquid Temperature
Openness
An area can be classified in three categories with respect to confinement:
• An open area (basically no roof/ceiling, no walls and floor made of grating)
• A sheltered, partially enclosed, partially confined area (various combinations of solid

floor, ceiling and walls or equivalent obstructions to natural draft).
• An enclosed area.
• The extent of confinement governs the determination of the level of ventilation.
Ventilation
Natural or artificial movement of air and its replacement with “fresh air”.
Degree of ventilation (natural / artificial
• High ventilation (VH)
• Medium ventilation (VM)
• Low ventilation (VL)

Availability of ventilation
• Good: “present continuously”
• Fair: “Present at normal operation. Discontinuities are permitted for short period.”
• Poor: “Discontinuities are not expected to occur for long period.”
IV. Hazardous Area Classification Markings
Marking
The marking criteria for electrical equipment are uniformly given forth in general technical
requirements standards. The equipment must be clearly labeled in accordance with the
classified area in which it is permitted to be installed.
The minimal marking must indicate the following:
• Class
• Division
• Group
• The maximum safe operating temperature or temperature range, based on a 40°C
ambient.
• Any special conditions that have to be observed (such as NEC section 500-5(d))
And according to these Regulation for marking:
• ATEX - European directive 2014/34/EU covers equipment and protective

systems for use in hazardous areas. Directive 99/92/EC (ATEX137)
defines employers’ responsibilities to hazardous area safety.
• IECEx - International Standards on equipment and installations in
potentially explosive areas published by IEC (International
Electrotechnical Commission).
• NEC / CEC - National Electric Code (USA) and Canadian Electric Code
define the standards by which all electrical wiring and equipment must be
installed.
Markings:
EUROPEAN COMFORMITY MARKING

NOTIFIED BODY INDETIFICATION
UROPEAN COMMISION MARK
EQUIPMENT GROUP
EX:
• I - For use in underground mines
• II - For use in all other places
EQUIPMENT CATEGORY
EX:
• 1- Equipment that is intended for use in ATEX Marking (Europe) – 2014/34/EU

areas where an explosive atmosphere is
present continuously, for long periods or 0344 II 3 G Ex d IIB T5 Gc
frequently
• 2- Equipment that is intended for use in
likely to occur in normal operation and
must ensure a high level of protection.
• 3- Equipment that is intended for use in
unlikely to occur in normal operation
and must ensure a normal level of
protection.
SURROUNDING ATMOSPHERE
EX:
• G- Equipment certified for use in

flammable gases
• D- Equipment certified for use where TEMPERATURE
dust is present in the atmosphere
CLASSIFICATION
EX:
EXPLOSION PROTECTED
• T1- 450ºC
PROTECTION TYPE • T2- 300ºC
• T3- 200ºC
EX: • T4- 135ºC
• T5- 100ºC
• d- Flameproof • T6- 85ºC
• Ia- Intrinsically Safe
• e- Increased safety
MATERIAL GROUP EQUIPMENT PROTECTION LEVEL
EX: EX:
First letter:
• I - Mines
• II - Surface above ground industries • G- Gas
• D - Dust
Second letter:
SUB GROUP:
• a – normal
EX:
• b – expected malfunction
• A - Less easily ignited gases e.g. propane
• c – rare malfunction
• B- Easily ignited gases e.g. ethylene
• C- Most easily ignited e.g. hydrogen or acetylene
IECEx Marking (Global) – IEC60079-0 6th edition
EX ic IIB T5 Gc
EXPLOSION PROTECTED
PROTECTION TYPE
EX:
• d- Flameproof
• Ia- Intrinsically Safe
• e- Increased safety
MATERIAL GROUP
EX:
• I - Mines
• II - Surface above
ground industries
SUB GROUP:
EX:
• A - Less easily ignited gases e.g. propane

• B- Easily ignited gases e.g. ethylene
• C- Most easily ignited e.g. hydrogen or acetylene
TEMPERATURE
CLASSIFICATION
EX:
• T1- 450ºC
• T2- 300ºC
• T3- 200ºC
• T4- 135ºC
• T5- 100ºC
• T6- 85ºC
EQUIPMENT PROTECTION LEVEL

EX:
First letter:
• G- Gas
• D - Dust
Second letter:
• a – normal
• b – expected malfunction
• c – rare malfunction
NEC / CEC Marking (North America)
Class l Division 2 AEx Group C, D T5
TYPE OF FLAMMABLE SUBSTANCE

EX:
• Class I-Flammable gas, vapors, and liquids
• Class II-Combustible dusts
• Class Ill-Ignitable fibers and flyings
AREA CLASSIFICATION
EX:
• Division 1-Flammable substances are

continually present or are likely to exist
under normal operating conditions
• Division 2-Flammable substances are not
likely to exist under normal operating
conditions
AMERICAN STANDARD MARKING
GROUP CLASSIFICATION
EX:
Gas :
• GROUP A- Acetylene
• GROUP B- Hydrogen Ethylene,
acrylonitrile, propylene oxide, ethyl oxide
• GROUP C- Cyclopropane, ethyl ether
• GROUP D - Acetone, methane, hexane,
propane
Dust, fibers, flyings:
• GROUP E - Conductive dust,

• metal dust TEMPERATURE
• GROUP F - Coal dust
• GROUP G - Non-conductive dust, grain CLASSIFICATION
dust
EX:
• T1- 450ºC
• T2- 300ºC
• T3- 200ºC
• T4- 135ºC
• T5- 100ºC
• T6- 85ºC
Source:
https://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/techmeasareaclas.htm
https://www.worksafe.qld.gov.au/laws-and-compliance/compliance-and-enforcement/audits-
and-inspections/electrical-safety-audits/hazardous-area-installations-audits
https://www.emerson.com/documents/automation/product-bulletin-hazardous-area-
classifications-protections-en-123358.pdf
https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/hazardous-areas-classification-d_345.html
https://www.grainger.com/know-how/safety/emergency-response/fire-protection/kh-
hazardous-locations-124-qt
https://www.slideshare.net/AniruddhaKulkarni6/hazardous-area-module-zones-
method-of-determination-of-hazardous-area-
radius#:~:text=Hazard%20radii%20may%20be%20determined,IP%20Code%2C%2
0Part%2015).
“Temperature Classification (T Class).” (T Class) - What It Means,

www.controlandinstrumentation.com/resources/temperature-classification.html.
“UL and C-UL Hazardous Areas Certification for North America.” UL,
www.ul.com/services/ul-and-c-ul-hazardous-areas-certification-north-america.
“What Is Temperature Class (T Class) & Why Is It Important?” Pyroban, 17 Dec. 2019,
www.pyroban.com/temperature-class/.
College of Engineering, Architecture and
Technology
Introduction to Instrumentation Engineering
TOPIC 4: FIRE AND GAS INSTRUMENT

AND DESIGN (FGS)
Submitted by:
Andal, Justin Sean

Dalipe, Amiel Joshua
Hilab, Stiphen
Gamban, Katelyn
Garcia, Mikaela
Guiao, Raymart
BS ICE
CEAT-08-701P
CEAT-08-702E
CEAT-08-702P
Submitted to:
Engr. John Yasay

Instructor
I. PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION
A. Fire and Gas System – It is a combined system of components and circuits designed to monitor
and report a fire or gas alarm condition or control devices that trigger an alarm and initiate an
appropriate response to these alarms.
B. Objective of Fire and Gas System

1. Minimize the risk and consequences of an accidental event.
2. Minimize the potential for hazardous occurrences
3. Ensure a safe working environment for personnel
4. Ensure adequate means of escape are provided
5 Provide sufficient safety devices and redundancy to detect, isolate and minimize uncontrolled
releases of flammable and toxic liquids and gases.
6. Provide appropriate fire protection systems to rapidly bring under control and extinguish
any reasonably foreseeable fire which could develop during normal operations.
C. Classifications of fire and gas system

1. Fire detectors are designed to detect smoke, fire, carbon monoxide,
or other fire-related emergencies. The systems work in different ways, but
they all have the common goal of detecting a fire and protecting the building,
its occupants, and valuables. A common fire protection system is a smoke
alarm and a sprinkler. When a fire is started, the smoke activates the detector,
which activates the sprinkler system. Water protects against the spread of fire.
While this is an effective method, automatic fire
suppression systems using clean media are a better
option when dealing with certain critical equipment
or special hazards. These systems detect and
extinguish the fire without leaving any residue.
2. Gas detector are designed to measure or monitor the leakage of

combustible gases, toxic gases and oxygen in an area as part of a safety
system. These detectors are usually alarms and are installed in confined
spaces or locations where exposure to such gas may lead to toxic effects or a
risk of fire.
II. TYPES OF EQUIPMENT
Fire and gas safety (FGS) systems detects and reduce risk in hazardous environments and
industrial processes whether offshore oil platforms, onshore refineries and fuel storage sites,
pipeline compressor stations and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, turbine enclosures and
more. These critical industrial facilities require compliant systems that detect flames or
combustible and toxic gases, identify faults in the equipment and activate notification and fire
suppression equipment in accordance with standards and codes. As a facility’s needs change or
expand, operators may require higher and more reliable risk mitigation risk levels.
A. Fire detector
1. Smoke Detectors
The two most commonly recognized smoke detection technologies are ionization smoke
detection and photoelectric smoke detection.
a. Ionization Smoke Detector
These detectors have an ionization chamber with an 8-particle radiator in the center that
ionizes the air inside the chamber with an Americium-241 foil. When the detector is in its usual
state, an electric voltage is applied to the needle electrode, and a known current pass through
the detection chamber as a result. Small aerosol particles (soot particles, combustion gases,
etc.) attach themselves to the ionized particles when a fire occurs. As a result, the resistance in
the chamber rises, and the current flow within the detecting chamber decreases. The electronics
in the detector register this change, and a fire signal is issued to the Control Panel. Generally,
more responsive to flaming fires.
b. Photoelectric (Optical) Smoke Detector
A transmitter LED and a receiver photo-diode make up the sensor. These two devices are
positioned at an angle and separated by a screen so that light from the LED does not directly
impinge on the receiver diode. Infrared light is emitted by the transmitter LED into the
detection chamber. When a fire occurs, visible combustion products enter the chamber,
scattering some of the light emitted by the LED and causing it to impinge on the receiver diode.
This raises the signal level created by the receiver, which is detected by the detector electronics,
which then activates the alarm. Generally, more responsive to fires that begin with a long
period of smoldering.
2. Heat Detectors
The energy emitted by a fire in the form of heat is detected by thermal or heat detectors.
Conventional currents of heat air or combustion products, as well as radiation impacts, are the
most common ways for the detector to be activated. Thermal detectors are slower to respond to a
fire than other detecting systems since this method of activation takes time to establish.
Fixed temperature and rate of rise are the two most prevalent types of heat detectors. The signal
device is activated by the heat of a fire occurrence in both cases.
a. Fixed Temperature
Fixed-temperature detectors send out a signal or triggers automatically when the detection
element reaches a certain temperature.
b. Rate of Rise
When the temperature rises above a predetermined level, rate of rise detectors sends out a
signal. Rate of rise detection devices can be set to operate quickly, are effective over a wide
range of ambient temperatures, recycle rapidly, and can withstand a moderate rise in ambient
temperatures without sounding an alarm.
3. Flame Detectors
These detectors detect ultraviolet or infrared light and are mostly used to enhance heat and
smoke detectors or to provide broad surveillance of a big switchyard.
Flame detectors are commonly used in open areas outdoors, but they can also be used indoors.
Protects high-risk areas such as oil rigs, fuel stations, petrochemical factories, etc. They work by
analyzing the energy emissions (UV or IR) from a fire rather than the combustion products like
smoke and heat.
3.1 The different types of Flame detector are:
a. Ultra Violet detectors

b. Single Channel IR detectors
c. Combined UV and Single channel IR
d. Dual Channel IR flame detectors
e. Triple Channel IR flame detectors
f. CCTV flame detection
4. Common Fire Detector
The following are some of the most common fire detector devices that are commercially
available and used in the process industries:
a. Fusible plastic tubing (pneumatic)
b. Fusible optical fiber
c. Bimetallic strip or wire
d. Fusible plug (pneumatic pressure release)
e. Quartzoid bulb (pneumatic pressure release)
f. Fusible link (under spring tension)
g. Fixed-temperature detector
h. Rate of rise detector
i. Rate compensated
j. Combination rate of rise and fixed temperature
B. Gas Detectors
1. Flammable Gas Detectors
Detects the percentage by volume of flammable gas in air in terms of LFL and UFL.
a. Lower explosive limit (LEL) or lower flammable limit (LFL) - The lowest concentration
(the lowest percentage of substance in the air), which will create a fire when there is a
source of ignition (heat, arc or flame).
b. Upper explosive limit (UEL) or upper flammable limit (UFL) -The highest concentration
of a vapor or gas (the highest percentage of the substance in air) that will produce a flash
of fire when an ignition source (heat, arc, or flame) is present.
1.1 The three types of Flammable gas detectors are:
a. Catalytic (Pellistor) Gas Detectors - Catalytic gas

detectors determine gas concentration through
oxidization which results in heat, and this is
sensed by a bridge circuit, it follows that
catalytic gas detectors under-read in the low
oxygen atmospheres which exist with gas rich
releases.
Set Point: Catalytic detectors have a typical

recommended minimum alarm setting of 20 %
LFL and 60 % LFL to indicate low and high level
of gas.
Advantages
• Robust.
• Simple to operate.
• Easy to install, calibrate and use.
• Long life with a low replacement cost.
• Proven technology with exceptional reliability and predictability.
• Easily calibrated individually to gases such as hydrogen which cannot be detected using
infrared absorption.
• Can perform more reliably in dusty & dirty atmospheres as they are not as sensitive as optics
to the buildup of industrial contaminants.
• Can perform more reliably in high temperature applications.
• Are less sensitive to humidity and condensation.
• Not as significantly affected by changes in pressure.
• Can detect most combustible hydrocarbons.
Disadvantages
• Catalysts can become poisoned or inactive due to contamination (chlorinated & silicone
compounds, prolonged exposure to H2S and other sulfur &/or corrosive compounds).
• The only means of identifying detector sensitivity loss is by checking with the appropriate
gas on a routine basis and recalibrating as required.
• Requires oxygen for detection.
• Prolonged exposure to high concentrations of combustible gas may degrade sensor
performance.
• If flooded with a very high gas concentration, may show erroneously low or no response,
and sensor may be damaged or rendered inoperable.
b. Infrared Gas Detectors - Infrared Gas Detectors make use of the property of Hydrocarbons
and other gases to absorb infrared energy at certain wavelengths but not others. For HCs
the absorption peak occurs around 3.4 µm. A reference measurement is normally made
close to the measurement wavelength that is not absorbed by expected gases. The ratio
from the two measurements gives the gas concentration free from variations in signal
intensity and detection sensitivity.
Set Point: Infra-red detectors have a

typical recommended minimum alarm
setting of 20 % LFL and 60 % LFL to
indicate low and high level of gas.
Advantages
• Immunity to contamination and poisoning.
• Consumables (source and detector) tend to outlast catalytic sensors.
• Can be calibrated less often than a catalytic detector.
• Ability to operate in the absence of oxygen or in enriched oxygen.
• Ability to operate in continuous presence of gas.
• Can perform more reliably in varying flow conditions.
• Even when flooded with gas, will continue to show high reading and sensor will not be
damaged.
• Able to detect at levels above 100 % LEL.
Disadvantages
• The initial higher cost per point. IR detectors typically are more expensive than catalytic
detectors at initial purchase.
• Higher spare parts cost.
• Gases that do not absorb IR energy (such as hydrogen) are not detectable.
• High humidity, dusty and/or corrosive field environments can increase IR detector
maintenance costs.
• Temperature range for detector use is limited compared to catalytic detectors.
• May not perform well where multiple gases are present.
c. Open Path (Line of Sight) Gas Detectors - Open path gas detectors make use of properties
of gases to absorb infrared energy at certain wavelengths but not others. This property
coupled with high energy sources enables open path detectors to sense gas over relatively
long distances, the wide-area coverage offered by Open Path Gas Detectors make them
excellent instruments for perimeter and cross-sectional monitoring around storage tanks,
off-shore platforms, along loading docks, and fence-line monitoring. Open Path Gas
Detectors provide a high speed of response, they operate in extreme conditions, and require
fewer instruments to monitor large areas.
Set Point: Open path detectors have a typical recommended minimum alarm setting of 0.5
LFL m (50 % LFL extended for one meter)
Advantage
• Much more efficient than fixed point detectors.
• Can be able to replace several fixed-point detectors.
• They require much less maintenance than do fixed point detectors.
• Well-suited for open spaces.
• Able to measure in large spaces.
Disadvantage
• The cost to install open path detectors may cost more than fixed point detectors.
2. Toxic Gas Detectors - Detects the concentration in ppm of toxic gas in terms of TLV.
a. Threshold Limit Value (TLV) - Refers to airborne concentrations of substances, and
represent conditions under which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed day after
day without adverse health effects.
Parts Per Million (PPM) - The mass of a chemical or contaminate per unit volume of water
2.1 There are three categories of TLVs:

a.Time Weighted Average (TWA) - This refers to a time weighted average concentration for a
normal eight-hour day, in a 40-hour workweek in which most workers can be exposed
repeatedly without adverse effect.
b. Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) - If the TWA has not been exceeded then the STEL is
the concentration in which most workers can be exposed continuously for a short period
without suffering from irritation, chronic or irreversible tissue damage or narcosis to the
degree that would impair self-rescue, work efficiency or cause accidents. Further, a STEL
is a 15-minute TWA that should not be exceeded any time during a normal workday even
if the worker is within the 8-hour TWA. Exposures above the TWA and up to the STEL
should not be longer than 15 minutes and should not exceed four times a day.
c. Ceiling - This concentration should not be exceeded during any part of the working
exposure.
3. Major 2 categories are available:

a. Detectors for gases which create an immediate health hazard (eg.H2S, CO, HF, HCl, Cl2)
b. Detectors for gases that create a health hazard on long term exposure (eg. Vinyl Chloride,
Benzene, Toluene etc.)
4. H2S detectors:
The two types of H2S detectors available are:
a. Electro-chemical cell type - This type is based on an
electro-chemical cell, developed to react exclusively to
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S). As a result of chemical reaction of
the cell organic electrolyte with H2S, an electric current is
generated, which is proportional to the H2S concentration in
the sample gas.
b. Metal Oxide Semiconductor (MOS) type –

The semi-conductor type is based on the adsorption of H2S
molecules on the surface of a solid-state semi-conductor
crystal which causes a change in electrical resistance of the
electrical circuit of which the semi-conductor forms the
part.
Set Point: H2S detectors have a typical recommended
minimum alarm setting of 5 ppm. If second stage alarm is
used, 10 ppm shall be used.
III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Fire and Gas System (FGS) Design Considerations
1. Mechanical Considerations
a. Mounting Locations
o Solid and robust mounting location
o Good structure and clearly marked
b. Flexible & rigid conduit specifications

o The systems inevitably accumulate water, seals/breather/drains are needed
o Compliant with requirements
c. Elevation defined to support downward alignment angle

o Make sure the elevation selected for the flame detector enables a slight or
downward angle, we don’t want it looking out into the horizon where it can see
other energy sources that we may not want to respond to.
d. Separation distances support performance spec compliance

o We do not want our detectors in our coverage approach to be so far away, the
distances must support specification compliance.
2. Electrical Considerations (Power Supply)
a. Make sure that the power supply’s power rating/type/and size are appropriate.
b. The location must support the required voltage at the farthest location where we won’t have
a voltage drop below minimum acceptable level.
c. Fused local power distribution so that the commissioning technicians can power up that
system in a logical modular way, keeping it controlled.
d. Power and signal cabling specifications & termination requirements must be properly met
and inspected.
e. Shielded cable must be terminated properly, not grounded at both ends but only on one
end.
f. Ground fault monitoring is a requirement that installers need to be aware of and should be
licensed and qualified for installment.
3. Considerations Commissioning & Test

a. All detectors must have Instrument Tag #s
b. Detector sensitivity settings must be pre-defined by tag #
c. Detector coverage map available showing:
o Tag # install points/elevation, alignment angle, area of coverage
d. DO NOT POWER SYSTEM until double check is completed.
o The power supply feed must be the proper type and size with no gross errors.
o Continuity check must be completed to check for damaged or disconnected
instruments.
o Must have no exposed power conductors or open junction boxes.
e. Achieve fault free system before attempting to align or test detectors.
4. Operations and Maintenance

a. Every system is required to have a system maintenance logbook with all events logged by
instrument tag #, date, time and by operator including
o Visual Inspections, performance tests, alarms, faults, cleaning activities to have a
history on who’s managing our systems in compliance with the best considerations.
b. Every system regardless of manufacturer and regardless of type needs a routine visual
inspection.
o Faceplate LEDS must be inspected for normal or trouble status.
o No foreign material or obstructions are observed that could block view.
o Alignment angles must appear normal.
o Important system inspection points and alarms response testing must be validated.
IV. APPLICATION EXAMPLE
A. Fire Detection
All workplaces should have arrangements for detecting fire. IS 3218 gives a basis for assessing
what type of detection system will be appropriate for a workplace and will also give guidance of
its installation. Consideration must be given to any parts of the workplace where a fire could start
and spread undetected. This could be a storage area or a basement that is not visited on a regular
basis, or a part of the workplace that has been temporarily vacated, for example at mealtimes. Fires
that start and develop unnoticed can pose a serious danger to people in the workplace.
1. Fire Warning
In almost all buildings, a suitable electrically operated fire warning system, with manual
call points positioned both on exit routes and adjacent to final exits should be installed. This
should have sufficient sounders for the warning to be clearly heard throughout the workplace.
The sound used as a fire warning should be distinct from other sounds in the workplace and,
where background noise levels are high or an employee has a hearing impairment, it may also
be necessary to install a visual alarm such as a distinctive flashing or rotating light.
2. Nuclear Power Plant
Traditionally, nuclear power plant designers have utilized a combination of fire codes, test
standards, fire consultant recommendations, insurance agency requests, and detector vendor
suggestions to formulate the design of fire detection systems. Proceeding in this manner,
designers often apply detection principles to nuclear power plants which have been proven in
residential and commercial installations. However, because the ventilation conditions, ceiling
heights, ceiling construction, and types of combustibles existing in nuclear power plants can
differ from those used elsewhere, it is difficult to show that traditional detection system design
approaches will be adequate for 9 nuclear power plants. Also, it is doubtful whether any theory
can be developed and proven in the near future to describe the effects of different installation
conditions on detection system operation.
B. Gas Detection
Gas sensors are critical for monitoring and detecting hazardous inert gases, and ensuring
safety, air quality, or analyzing environments throughout many different industries.
1. Oil and Gas terminal applications

Operators need an integrated fire and life safety system allowing proactive response to
alarms and events and a single real-time view to any potential threat. Industrial plants have
procedures and safety systems designed to bring operations to a safe state in the event of
equipment malfunctions and other operational problems. In the case of a significant security
incident, an integrated system can activate these same procedures and systems. An integrated
system also leads to less expensive implementation and maintenance because all the pieces
work together.
2. Chemical Plants
You may encounter many different types of gas hazards at a chemical plant. Inside a plant,
workers can be exposed to any number of gases:
LEL,O2,NH3,CO,CL2,H2,HCL,H2S,NO,NO2,PH3, and SO2. A PID sensor checks volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) prior to tank entry. Workers may use general four-gas monitors
or other sensors, depending on what gas hazards may be present at the time. At a chemical
plant, you may be expected to record various gas detection data. This data might include low
and high alarms, short-term exposure limits (STEL), time-weighted averages (TWA), time
spent in alarm, areas where the most alarms are occurring, peak levels, and the times when
alarms occur. Collecting this data from gas detectors allows safety supervisors and other
workers to “see” their environment through the information collected.
3. Power Plant
The coal-fired power plant is a highly engineered complex of material handling,
combustion, electrical generation and pollution reduction equipment, all designed for
continuous operation. Power plants have many safety hazards, some of which are addressed
by fixed gas detection. Major plant systems include coal handling, combustion controls,
feedwater and boiler, cooling towers, electrical generators, flue gas cleanup and stacks,
emissions monitoring and the control system. Most areas of the plant have sub-systems or
operations with the potential for personnel exposure to dangerous levels of Combustible and
Toxic gases, plus Oxygen Deficiency, not to mention fire.
4. Boiler Room
Industrial buildings and facilities commonly use natural gas for heating. In these facilities
an undetected gas leak or incomplete combustion could present an explosive hazard or an
influx of carbon monoxide resulting in loss of life, structural damage, or expensive waste of
fuel. Since the boiler is not frequently occupied, leaks often remain undetected. Continuous
gas monitoring and detection system will provide early warning of a gas release and prevent
potentially catastrophic events.
V. REFERENCES
Principle of operation:
Fire and Gas System - instrumentationtools.com
Gas detectors - www.instrumart.com
Fire detector - www.firetrace.com
Types of equipment
Smoke detector - Honewellprocess.com
Three types of flammable Gas detector - instrumentationtools.com
Upper Falmmable Limit - www.archie.org
Catalys Gas Detector - instrumentationtools.com
Infrared Gas Detection - instrumentationtools.com
Open Path Gas Detector - sensidynegasdetection.com
PELS TLVS - gasdetection.com
Electrochemical - sciencedirect.com
Toxic Gas detector- instrumentationtools.com
H2S Detector- sciencedirect.com
Design considerations
Flame detection- youtube.com
Application of Fire Gas System
Gas detector - Honeywellprocess.com

Chemical Plant - indsci.com
Power Plant - sensidynegasdetection.com
Boiler Room - sensidynegasdetection.com
Fire detection - www.hsa.ei
Nuclear Plant - www.ncr.gov
Video that is related to the topic (Fire and Gas System)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A2MGMo0suqM
Fire, Smoke & Gas Detection – 6:20
Heat Detection – 7:13
Smoke Detection – 11:06
Schematic Representation of Ionization Detector – 12:18
Photoelectric – 13:45
Gas Detector – 14.27
Flame Detector – 23:05
Fire Detector – 24:18
Instrumentation Engineering
TOPIC 5:
INSTRUMENT ENCLOSURE/NEMA RATING/ IP RATING
Submitted by:
Cabela, Chiqui Elaine

Fullido, Arriane Charisse
Biares, Jeorgene
Trogue, Kenneth
Maranda, Alexzander
Noarin, Mart Niño
BS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONRTOL ENGINEERING
Submitted to:
Engr. John Yasay
Instructor
I. INSTRUMENT ENCLOSURE
Enclosures are commonly known as „protective housing‟ for a variety of products and
items. According to Oxford Dictionaries, an enclosure is an „artificial or natural barrier that seals
off an area‟ and they are commonly used for electronics product.
Electrical Enclosures are core safety features of a robust electrical system. They have a
two-pronged purpose of not only protecting users from live parts of an electrical system but are
also designed to protect electrical wiring and /or equipment from harsh environments, related to
severe weather conditions or industrial hazards. Today‟s enclosures are built to provide a lifetime
of service when the correct enclosure is used to meet the specific needs for a service or
application (Automation Direct).
Enclosures are designed in a range of shapes and sizes to offer various solutions and
serve various applications. The following enclosure types are the most used enclosures.
A. Types of Electrical/Instrument Enclosures
1. Wall-mount: mounted directly on a wall and to

protect electrical controls, terminals, instruments, and
components while providing protection from dust, dirt, oil,
and water. This are used for many applications available in
NEMA/IP protection ratings.
2. Floor-mount and Freestanding: mounted on the floor with feet

supporters that permit them to stand on a hard surface to be bolted on a secure
location permanently.
3. Junction Boxes: are designed and manufactured to meet Joint

Industrial Council (JIC) standard guidelines that ensure product quality and
uniformity. It is used for surface-mounted junction boxes, service boxes,
switch boxes and cut-out boxes. Many of these junction boxes are NEMA 1 and
NEMA 3R and include pre-punched knockouts for easier cable entry.
4. Pushbutton Enclosures: are design for commercial and industrial

application that require enclosures that mount push buttons, pilot lights and
switches. They are basically enclosures with pre-cut standard 22.5mm or 30.5mm
openings that allow easy mounting of pushbuttons, switches, indicators, and other
pilot devices.
5. RSP Supply Disconnect Enclosures: are designed to have an
electrical shut-off switch outside the enclosure which shuts off the breaker
before opening it. Thus, it is often used for the safety of people working on or
around the enclosure, for the protection of the equipment in the box, and to meet
legal requirements. For wall-mount, floor-mount, or freestanding installations,
models in various NEMA ratings are compatible with disconnects and operating
mechanisms from various manufacturers.
6. Consoles and Consolets: used for housing

instruments and HMIs, pushbuttons, switches, and other pilot
devices. It also allows operators to access the devices and
operate systems and machinery. Consoles and consolets are
heavy duty constructed enclosures that protect contents from
dirt, dust, oil and water, and are available in various types
including freestanding consoles, operator consoles, console tops, pushbutton
consolets, writing desktops, pedestal and bases.
7. Sloped top Enclosures: is intended for use where sanitation concerns

require frequent washdowns. It has a 20° slope top to avoid water accumulation
and debris. Sloped top enclosures are ideal for housing electrical and electronic
components for applications in harsh and dirty environments where dust, dirt, oil,
water, and other contaminants are present and applications requiring washdowns.
8. Windowed and Clear Cover Enclosures: it is used to allow the

operator to view inside the console without opening and exposing the internal
components of the enclosure.
9. Dual Access Enclosures: this enclosure provides additional access

from the rear side of the enclosure if necessary.
10. Flush-Mount Enclosures: this enclosure has an external frame that allows to be
sunken/recessed in wall. Most typically used in applications where external space
is limited or in high traffic area.
II. SELECTION CONSIDERATION
When selecting enclosures, correct size and adequate protection are the priorities. When
considering quality of protection, material type and professional rating systems are the deciding
factors. Additional features such as ventilated sections or insulation may be important depending
on the application.
A. Sizes and Shapes
Electronic enclosures and instrument enclosures are typically rectangular, slanted, t-

shape, or readout style. The top and bottom surfaces of a rectangular enclosure are parallel while
the sides may be angled. Slanted enclosures are also generally rectangular in shape with the top
surface angled relative to bottom surface. T-shaped enclosures are generally used in handheld
applications. The "handle” or lower portion of the enclosure is narrower than the upper portion
of the enclosure. A readout style enclosure is a rectangular enclosure with a section of top
surface sloped, typically for LCD readout.
B. Material Types
The amount of protection and durability an enclosure depends largely on its material
composition. Most electronic and instrument enclosures are made from materials classified as
either metals or polymers.
1. Metals generally exhibit higher conductivity to both heat and electricity than other
material types. Steel is widely used to form enclosures because of its strength and malleability.
Stainless steel is used rather than standard steel in environments requiring corrosion resistance
and lightweight materials. Aluminum is a less expensive, lightweight, and more conductive
metal that exhibits good resistance to oxidation.
2. Polymers are nonmetal materials with varying properties. ABS is a hard, rigid,
inexpensive thermoplastic polymer that has good chemical and creep resistance, but is prone to
cracking under stress. Fiberglass is a strong, durable, reinforced polymer that is resistant to many
caustics and extreme temperatures. Polycarbonate exhibits excellent impact strength and can be
molded to tight tolerances, but has only moderate resistance to chemical corrosion. Polystyrene
is used for its rigidity, hardness, heat, and dimensional stability and because of its ease of
fabrication.
III. NATIONAL ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERES ASSOCIATION
A. NEMA
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) is an organization developed to

form the technical standards for the manufacturing of lectrical equipment and medical imaging
equipment. It works to set industry standards for safety, innovation, interoperability,
environment and market enhancement of our industry.
A standard of NEMA defines a product in reference to its attributes and capabilities. We

produce quality enclosures in a variety of materials, types and NEMA ratings.
B. NEMA RATING
Although the NEMA organization oversees a variety of responsibilities in the electrical

manufacturing industry, they are most closely associated with the term “NEMA ratings” and the
type of enclosure an electrical component is built with.
New NEMA ratings are published every fifth year and are used to protect electrical
equipment from damage due to liquids, dust, and/or corrosive chemicals.
It is not mandatory for all electrical components to be designed or built with a NEMA
enclosure. Instead, NEMA ratings are merely used as an industry standard and are completely
voluntary. At PSI Control Solutions, our electrical equipment is custom-built using NEMA
standards.
Nema Enclosures designs and manufactures electrical enclosures in the following NEMA
standards:
NEMA 1: These are constructed for indoor use and provide

protection against human contact with electrically-charged, live
electrical parts and also protects the equipment from falling
debris (dirt).
NEMA 2: It is for all intents and purposes, the

same as NEMA 1 enclosure. However it has an
additional protection that includes protection from
light dripping or splashing of water (drip-proof).
NEMA 3R, 3RX: This enclosures are engineered for indoor or
outdoor use and protect against rain, sleet, snow, dirt, and prevents
the formation of ice on its enclosure.
NEMA 3, 3X: This enclosures rain-tight, sleep-tight and dust-tight and are made for both indoor
and outdoor. It designates added protection against dust beyond a NEMA 3R or 3RX enclosure.
NEMA 3S, 3SX: Its benefit is the same as a NEMA 3 but

also provides protection when ice forms on the enclosure
and will reain operable when covered in ice.
NEMA 4, 4X: This enclosures are intended for indoor and outdoor
use and provides the same protections as NEMA 3 enclosure with
additional protection against water ingress and/or hose-directed
water. Also, you need not worry about damaging your electrical
components.
NEMA 6, 6P: It has the same protection as NEMA 4 but has a
protection from temporary or prolonged water submersion up to a
designated depth.
NEMA 7: This is built for hazardous locations, explosion proof and made for indoor use
NEMA 8: It offers the same protection as NEMA 7 enclosure and can be used indoor and
outdoor.
NEMA 9: This are dust ignition proof enclosure and is intended

for indoor use in hazardous locations.
NEMA 10: It meets the MSHA (Mine Safety and Health Administration) standards.
NEMA 12, 12K: This enclosures are intended for general

purpose, indoor use. It protects against dripping and splashing
water, rust resistant and do not include knockouts.
NEMA 13: NEMA 13 enclosures are for general purposes and for indoor use. It provides the
same protection as the NEMA 12 enclosures and has added protection against dripping and
sprayed oils and coolants.
NOTE: Enclosures that has “X” indicates corrosion-resistant rating.

IV. INGRESS PROTECTION RATINGS (IP RATING)
IP (or "Ingress Protection") ratings are defined in international standard (British BS EN
60529:1992, European IEC 60509:1989), sometimes referred to synonymously as an
International (or Internal) Protection mark. They are used to define levels of sealing effectiveness
electrical enclosures against intrusion from foreign bodies (tools, dirt, etc.) and moisture.
A. Why have an IP Rating System?
The reason for having a universal IP rating system is so that buyers and users can be
confident of how safe it is to use certain electrical or mechanical goods in specific environments
and applications.
Unlike more vague marketing terms such as “waterproof” - which don‟t necessarily give
a clear definition of precisely where and to what extent an item can resist moisture ingress - an IP
rating is designed to provide a far more specific account.
B. What do the numbers in an IP Rating mean?
The numbers that follow IP each have a specific meaning. The first indicates the degree
of protection (of people) from moving parts, as well as the protection of enclosed equipment
from foreign bodies. The second defines the protection level that the enclosure enjoys from
various forms of moisture (drips, sprays, submersion etc.)
- Protection from solid objects or materials (1st digit)
- Protection from liquid or water (2nd digit)
- Protection against mechanical impacts (3rd digit)

V. IP RATING DIGITS
A. First Digit: Solid
The first digit indicates the level of protection that the enclosure provides against access
to hazardous parts (e.g., electrical conductors, moving parts) and the ingress of solid foreign
objects.
Object Size Protected

Level Effective against
against
0 Not Protected No protection against contact and ingress of objects
Any large surface of the body, such as the back of the
1 >50mm hand, but no protection against deliberate contact with
a body part.
2 >12.5mm Fingers or similar objects.
3 >2.5mm Tools, thick wires, etc
4 >1mm Most wires, screws, etc.
Ingress of dust is not entirely prevented, but it must
not enter in sufficient quantity to interfere with the
5 Dust Protected
satisfactory operation of the equipment; complete
protection against contact.
No ingress of dust; complete protection against
6 Dust Tight
contact.
B. Second Digit: Liquids
Protection of the equipment inside the enclosure against harmful ingress of water.
Object Size Protected

against
0 Not Protected
1 Dripping water Dripping water (vertically falling drops) shall have no
harmfull effect.
Vertically dripping water shall have no harmful effect
Dripping water when tilted
2 when the enclosure is tilted at an angle up to 15° from
up to 15°
its normal position.
Water falling as a spray at any angle up to 60° from
3 Spraying water
the vertical shall have no harmful effect.
Water splashing against the enclosure from any
4 Splashing water
direction shall have no harmful effect.
Water projected by a nozzle (6.3mm) against
5 Water jets enclosure from any direction shall have no harmful
effects.
Water projected in powerful jets (12.5mm nozzle)
6 Powerful water jets against the enclosure from any direction shall have no
harmful effects.
Ingress of water in harmful quantity shall not be
possible when the enclosure is immersed in water
7 Immersion up to 1m
under defined conditions of pressure and time (up to 1
m of submersion).
The equipment is suitable for continuous immersion in
water under conditions which shall be specified by the
manufacturer. Normally, this will mean that the
8 Immersion beyond 1m equipment is hermetically sealed. However, with
certain types of equipment, it can mean that water can
enter but only in such a manner that it produces no
harmful effects.
Protection against high-pressure, high-temperature jet
sprays, wash-downs or steam-cleaning procedures -
9K Higher pressure this rating is most often seen in specific road vehicle
applications (standard ISO 20653:2013 Road Vehicles
- Degrees of protection).
C. Third Digit: Protection against impact damage

1 Protected against impact of 0.225 J.
2 Protected against impact of 0.375 J
Sometimes, there might be a letter at the end of the code like below.
VI. IPX Rating

Ratings that feature an „X‟ somewhere in the code simply denote that a numerical rating
has only been provided for one of the two main ingress types (foreign body or moisture), but not
for the other. Hence IPX7 will indicate a moisture resistance rating of 7, but no assigned rating
against foreign body ingress. Conversely, IP5X will mean the product has been coded 5 against
foreign body intrusion, but no certified level of moisture resistance is stated.
VII. TYPES OF IP RATED PRODUCTS
There are numerous types of IP-rated products available on the market. The standardisation of
these codes is what enables customers and users to gain a clear understanding of each product‟s
abilities and limitations in different scenarios.
In this section, we‟ll look more closely at some of the more common IP ratings you‟ll find on a
majority of everyday item types.
A. Weatherproof & waterproof IP ratings
A „waterproof‟ or „weatherproof‟ IP rating is one of the most frequent examples people

look for in a wide range of everyday products, from mobile phones and Bluetooth speakers to
kitchen and bathroom fixtures, lighting setups, CCTV enclosures and more.
The ratings widely accepted as „waterproof‟ for most general purposes are IP65, IP66 and
IP67. However, one common misconception regarding weatherproofing is that items intended for
prolonged outdoor use require the highest numerical IP ratings for moisture resistance.
B. IP rated enclosures
There‟s a vast range of different IP-rated enclosure types available across all sectors and
industries, including a great many options for all manner of electronics and mechanical systems
aimed at both home and industrial settings.
Enclosure IP ratings are assigned to everything from mobile phone housings to junction
boxes, bathroom/outdoor lighting setups, and instrument cases intended for robust protection in
harsh marine or chemical environments. In the following sections, we‟ll examine some of the
more widely used enclosure types, and consider some of the demanding IP standards each
enclosure type might require to make it suitable for a range of specific applications.
C. IP rated enclosure accessories
When looking into the myriad configurations of enclosures and system housings on the
market, you‟ll find that there‟s an equally wide range of IP-rated enclosure accessories and
optional extra fittings available for most types of housing. IP ratings for these types of add-ons
usually mirror those of the enclosures they‟re designed to be used with.
The majority offer various tweaks and specialisations, each designed to make a generic
enclosure more ideally suited to one particular application or another. These are usually focused
around component-specific mounting solutions, attachment methods or additional security
features, aimed at a particular type of application or enclosure contents.
Popular examples may include:
o Brackets, screws and nuts
o Additional panels, racks or dividers to add to a basic enclosure frame
o Locks, keys and keypads
o Stability accessories, such as self-adhesive feet, for added security or robustness
D. IP rated instrument cases
Instrument cases are another widely used housing type, most often found protecting every
day electrical products from damage by dirt, dust or moisture ingress. Typical IP ratings for
instrument cases might start from around IP40, indicating resistance to particulates only (i.e. not
intended for outdoor use), but it‟s also common to see ratings up to IP67+ for full immersion
resistance.
Instrument cases are usually available in both heavy-duty and more lightweight
configurations, depending on the level of protection and portability required. They can be used
for anything from outdoor LED power supply casings to industrial camera housings, desktop
electronics and measuring/control equipment.
E. Electrical IP ratings
As with all other types of enclosures, IP numbers for electrical applications follow the
same universal coding system for clarity and ease of understanding. However, it‟s even more
important with electrical IP ratings to fully consider the potential exposure types and resistance
protection you might need for any electronic components or systems, as ingress from either
particulates or moisture of any kind can often result in damage or increase hazard risk.
REFERENCES
American Products Contract Manufacturing, (2021, July 30). Types of Enclosures.Retrieved

from https://amprodmfg.com/types-of-enclosures/
EE News Europe. NEMA Type 9 Enclosures for Electronics in Hazardous Locations .Retrieved
from https://www.eenewseurope.com/news/nema-type-9-enclosures-electronics-
hazardous-locations
Electriciancourses4u (n.d). IP Rating Explained. Retrieved from

https://www.electriciancourses4u.co.uk/useful-resources/ip-ratings-explained/
General Digital (n.d). IP and NEMA Ratings Explained. Retrieved from

https://www.generaldigital.com/ip-and-nema-ratings-of-sealed-enclosures-explained
Global Specs. Electronic and Instrument Enclosures Selection Guide: Types, Features,
Applications | Engineering360. (n.d.). Engineering360. Retrieved September 30, 2021,
from
https://www.globalspec.com/learnmore/electrical_electronic_components/enclosures/elec
tronic_instrument_enclosures
NEMA7. NEMA 7 1 DIV 1 Enclosures. Retrieved from https://www.nema7.com/pages/nema7-

enclosures
NEMACO. NEMA 4x Enclosure. Retrieved from https://www.nemaco.com/enclosure-

ratings/nema-ratings/nema-4x-enclosures/
Nema Enclosures. NEMA Ratings for Enclosure.Retrieved from

https://www.nemaenclosures.com/enclosure-ratings/nema-rated-enclosures.html
NEMA Power. ETI offers units that meet NEMA Type 3S Requirement. Retrieved from
https://www.nemapower.com/nema_type_3s.php
OCC Fiber. Enterprise Fiber Optic Enclosures and Adapter Plates. Retrieved from
https://www.occfiber.com/product/nema-3-enclosures/
Phoenix Pumps. NEMA Enclosure Designation. Retrieved from

https://www.phoenixpumps.com/Nema-Enclosures.html
PSI Control Solution.What are NEMA Standards? Retrieved from

https://www.psicontrolsolutions.com/blog-what-are-nema-standards
Reddy, S.B. (2015). Ingress Protection Rating. Retrieved from

https://instrumentationtools.com/ingress-protection-rating
RS Components Corporation (n.d). The Comprehensive Guide to IP Ratings. Retrieved from
https://ph.rs-online.com/web/generalDisplay.html?id=ideas-and-advice/ip-ratings
RSP Supply. (n.d.). Disconnect Enclosures: Free-Standing, NEMA 3R-4X & Stainless Steel or
Fiberglass. Retrieved September 29, 2021, from https://www.rspsupply.com/c-1675-
disconnect-enclosures.aspx
The Enclosure Company (n.d). IP Rated Enclosures Explained. Retrieved from

https://www.enclosurecompany.com/ip-ratings-explained.php
E-Book
Practical Guide to Electrical Enclosures for Industrial Applications. (n.d.). [E-book].
Youtube Video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z935clBMJYU
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aP0aXuqyiwE

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Rizal Technological University College of Engineering, Architecture and Technology

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TOPIC 1: Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Safety

Collaborated and submitted by:

Manzano, April Joy D.

Engr. John Yasay

II. Background ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

A. Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) ------------------------------ 1

B. Safety Instrumented System (SIS) ----------------------------------- 4

2. Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) --------------------------- 6

3. PFD and RRF ------------------------------------------------------ 6

4. SIL Assessment --------------------------------------------------- 7

5. SIL Determination ------------------------------------------------ 7

6. SIL Determination Methods ------------------------------------- 8

7. SIF Loop Verification -------------------------------------------- 10

8. SIL Validation ---------------------------------------------------- 11

C. SIL Calculation ------------------------------------------------------- 11

III. References ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 15

A. Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

Figure 1. Scenarios of Layers of Protection Analysis (DEKRA)

1. Different Layers of LOPA

Figure2. Layers of Protection Analysis

Layer 1: Process Design

Layer 2: Basic Process Control System

Layer 3: Alarms & Operator Intervention

Layer 4: Safety Instrumented System

Layer 5: Physical Protection

Layer 6: Physical Containment

Layer 7: Plant Emergency Response

Layer 8: Community Emergency Response

2. Initiating Event Frequency (IEF)

3. Independent Protection Layers (IPL)

4. Auditability of a Safety Protection System

B. Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

1. Safety Integrity level (SIL)

IEC standard 61508

IEC 61511-1:2016 standard

SIL 3 1,000 to 10,000 0.001 to 0.0001 99.90 - 99.99%

SIL 2 100 to 1,000 0.01 to 0.001 99.00 - 99.90%

SIL1 10 to 100 0.1 to 0.01 90.00 - 99.00%

2. Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)

6. SIL Determination Methods

• Risk Graph / Risk Matrix

Table 2: Safety Risk Matrix

• Quantitative Assessment (i.e. FTA)

Figure 3. Fault Tree Analysis Sample

• Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

Table 3: LOPA Assessment - required number of IPLs

• Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) and Risk Assessment

7. SIF Loop Verification

Step 1: Breakdown the SIF Components and Architecture

Figure 5. SIF Components and Architecture

Step 2: Calculate the PFD of each component

Using the equation:

RRF = 1/PFD RRF = 1/0.080376 RRF = 12.44

TOPIC II: Hazard Operability (HAZOP)

Collaborated and submitted by:

Aloroy, Ralph Geniel T.

Engr. John C. Yasay

IEC 61882 standard

Pros of Conducting a HAZOP Study

D. Basic team for a process plant may be: