Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Integrating lean principles and fuzzy bow-tie analysis for risk

assessment in chemical industry
Faisal Aqlan a, *, Ebrahim Mustafa Ali b
a
Industrial and System Engineering, University of New Haven, West Haven, CT 06516, USA
b
Department of Paints Production, Yemen Company for Paints & Derivatives Ltd., Taiz, Yemen

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In this research, a framework combining lean manufacturing principles and fuzzy bow-tie analyses is
Received 21 November 2013 used to assess process risks in chemical industry. Lean manufacturing tools and techniques are widely
Received in revised form used for eliminating wastes in manufacturing environments. The five principles of lean (identify value,
20 January 2014
map the value stream, create flow, establish pull, and seek perfection) are utilized in the risk assessment
Accepted 21 January 2014
process. Lean tools such as Fishbone Diagram, and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) are used for
risk analysis and mitigation. Lean principles and tools are combined with bow-tie analysis for effective
Keywords:
risk assessment process. The uncertainty inherent with the risks is handled using fuzzy logic principles. A
Risk assessment
Lean manufacturing
case study from a chemical process industry is provided. Main risks and risk factors are identified and
Bow-tie analysis analyzed by the risk management team. Fuzzy estimates are obtained for the risk factors and bow-tie
Fuzzy logic analysis is used to calculate the aggregated risk probability and impact. The risks are prioritized using
Chemical industry risk priority matrix and mitigation strategies are selected based on FMEA. Results showed that the
proposed framework can effectively improve the risk management process in the chemical industry.
Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Risk assessment in today’s manufacturing environments is of
increasing importance due to the occurrence of internal and
external risk events that can affect the manufacturing environ-
ments. Risk management methodology provides processes for
determining risks and prepares the company to respond to them.
Risk management includes risk identification, analysis, evaluation,
mitigation, and monitoring. To maintain their profitability, com-
panies must be able to quickly respond to external and internal risk
events, and keep their business efficient and dynamic. Further-
more, companies have to be resilient to unexpected catastrophic
events. However, this requires a deep understanding of supply
chain risks and how to manage them. What makes risk manage-
ment challenging is that today’s supply chains are rapidly changing
and time frames of decision-making are getting smaller.
According to Chopra and Sodhi (2004), there is no silver-bullet
strategy to protect supply chains against risks and managers need
to choose the proper mitigation strategy for each risk. Mitigation
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 203 479 4209.
E-mail addresses: faqlan@newhaven.edu, faqlan1@binghamton.edu (F. Aqlan).
strategies can be divided into four main categories (Zsidisin &
Ritchie, 2009): (1) eliminate the risk, (2) reduce the frequency
and consequences of the risk, (3) transfer the risk by means of in-
surance and sharing, and (4) accept the risk. Managers typically
choose the proper mitigation strategies based on several factors,
such as nature of the risk, origin of the risk, company resources, etc.
To manage supply chain risks, the risk is considered in the form of
event so that they can be modeled, analyzed, mitigated, and
monitored. Event is caused by a set of risk factors and can lead to
different impacts. Events represent a change in the state of a pro-
cess or a trigger for processing and future execution (McGovern,
Sims, & Jain, 2006). Risk events can be characterized by their
probability or frequency of occurrence, impact, and correlation
with other risk events. A supply chain risk occurs because of the
uncertainty about the future that unexpected risky event may affect
the supply chain operations (Waters, 2007, p. 13).
Chemical industry is an important part of today’s economy.
The number and diversity of products manufactured by chemical
process industries have grown rapidly in the last few decades.
Furthermore, the chemical process systems are becoming more
complicated and many risks can occur in these systems. The
production processes in chemical industries are continuous and

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.01.006
0950-4230/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
40 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48
require sever safety control. Chemical supply chains are exposed
to internal and external risks that can impact the supply chain
operations. Today’s chemical industries are processing more
hazardous substances within densely populated areas and the
risks emerging from the storage, processing, and distribution of
these hazardous materials are becoming more and more complex
(Reniers, Ale, Dullaert, & Foubert, 2006). To deal with the
growing importance of safety issues faced by the chemical plants,
several chemical risk management techniques have been devel-
oped. These techniques range from checklists to simulation
toolkits.
The research problem discussed in this study is that risk
assessment in chemical manufacturing industries, especially
painting industry, lacks quantitative frameworks that take into
consideration risk uncertainty and mitigation. Work environments
in chemical manufacturing industries are exposed to different risks
that should be clearly identified and prevented. Quantifying such
risks makes it easy to analyze prioritize the risks and develop the
proper mitigation strategies. This study provides a framework for
risk assessment based on integrating lean manufacturing principles
and fuzzy bow-tie analysis. Risks and risk factors are identified by
the risk management team and estimated values of probability and
impact are collected. Bow-tie analysis is then used to calculate the
aggregated risk scores for probability and impact that will be used
to determine the location of risk in the risk priority matrix. Risk
mitigation strategies are assessed and prioritized using Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique.
2. Related literature
Many risk assessment methods have been designed for risk
arising in manufacturing and service industries. Some of these
methods have proven to be useful for assessing all kinds of risks.
An example of a method that can be used to assess all kinds of
risks is bow-tie analysis (Jacinto and Sliva, 2010). Bow-tie analysis,
which is a combination of fault tree analysis and event tree
analysis, is very popular because it incorporates both causes and
consequences of the accident scenario. Khakzad, Khan, and
Amyotte (2012, 2013) used bow-tie approach in a dynamic envi-
ronment in which the probability of occurrence changes. Baye’s
theorem is used to update the failure probability of safety barriers
as new information becomes available. Jacinto and Silva (2010)
proposed a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology
based on bow-tie analysis to assess risks in ship building industry.
Markowski and Kotunia (2011) used bow-tie analysis for risk
assessment in layer protection in process industry. Other appli-
cations of bow-tie analysis include: risk management of sea ports
and offshore terminals (Mokhtari, Ren, Roberts, & Wang, 2011),
incident and accident analysis in a pharmaceutical production
plant (Chevereau, Wybo, & Cauchois, 2006), and risk analysis in oil
and gas industry (Shahirar, Sadiq, & Tesfamariam, 2012).
Some recent studies have focused on improving bow-tie anal-
ysis by reducing the uncertainty in information utilizing fuzzy sets,
evidence theory, Bayesian approach, and other techniques. For
example, Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte, and Veitch (2012) pro-
posed a methodology to characterize the uncertainties and updated
the evidence when new data become available for the bow-tie
analysis. The proposed methodology, which is based on
combining fuzzy set and evidence theory, was applied to a case
study for a typical offshore process facility. A Bayesian approach to
construct bow-tie diagrams was proposed by Badreddine and Ben
Amor (2013). The proposed approach improves the bow-tie dia-
grams by adding a new numerical that allows the implementation
of preventive and protective barriers in a dynamic manner. Yang,
Khan, and Lye (2013) proposed a framework that uses a
precursor-based Hierarchical Bayesian Approach (HBA) for rare
event frequency estimation in event tree analysis. The proposed
HBA consists of three steps: building the event tree, data collection,
and hierarchical Bayesian updating. The proposed framework was
demonstrated by the BP Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of
Mexico. Results showed that the proposed framework is able to
effectively model the variability that can exist among different
sources of data. Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte, and Veitch (2013)
proposed a methodology to accommodate expert’s knowledge to
overcome missing data in bow-tie analysis. Furthermore, the pro-
posed approach incorporated fuzzy set theory and evidence theory
to assess uncertainty. The proposed approach was applied to the BP
Texas City accident.
Risks in chemical and gas and oil industries have been given
more attention during the last few decades because of the in-
crease occurrence of risk events and their impacts on chemical
industry supply chains. Pejic, Torrent, Querol, and Lebecki (2013)
proposed a new risk assessment tool for underground coal mines
using semi-quantitative estimation and assessment methods.
Explosion risk index was obtained as a product of frequency of
individual scenarios, associated severity consequences, and
exposure time. A risk matrix is then developed for risk estimation
and risk assessment. A quantitative risk management framework
for mitigating dust explosion risk was proposed by Abuswer,
Amyotte, Khan, and Morrison (2013). The proposed framework
consists of a safety management protocol, dust explosion simu-
lation, Fault Tree Analysis, and hierarchy controls. Mabrouki,
Bentaleb, and Mousrij (2014) used a multi-criteria decision
making approach to assess and analyze the operational risk
within port terminals at the roll-on/roll-off activity. Analysis of
the risk factors in the oil and gas industry in 34 countries was
presented in Ramos and Veiga (2011). Assessment of operational
risks in chemical industries by exploiting accident databases was
discussed in Meel et al. (2007). Khan and Abbasi (1998) pre-
sented a review of the available techniques and methodologies
used for risk assessment in the chemical process industries. The
techniques and methodologies include checklists, Hazard and
Operability Study (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), and Hazard Indices. Si, Ji, and
Zeng (2012) proposed a qualitative risk assessment model for
hazardous chemicals leakage. The study proposed a Fire-
Explosion-Poisoning Qualitative Model (FEPQPM) which uses
probability analysis to analyze the accidents caused by chemical
leakage. Yang and Mannan (2010) developed a methodology for
dynamic operational risk assessment (DORA) in chemical in-
dustries. Khan and Abbasi (2001) presented a risk assessment
study of a typical chemical process industry using optimal risk
analysis (ORA). ORA involves four steps: i) hazard identification
and screening, ii) hazard assessment (both qualitative and
probabilistic), iii) quantification of hazards or consequence
analysis, and iv) risk estimation. Khan and Abbasi (1999) devel-
oped a computer-based application for risk analysis of a typical
chemical industry engaged in the manufacture of linear alkyl
benzene. The application generates different credible accident
scenarios and quantifies the damage they can cause. Reniers et al.
(2006) discussed the results of a survey of decision support tools
for analyzing major hazards in chemical industry. Survey results
showed that the risk decision step of performing a quantitative
risk assessment and risk ranking can be dealt with by the same
risk software. Although it is one of the main chemical industries,
painting industry has not been given enough consideration to
assess risks and their impacts. A few studies in the literature have
discussed risk management in painting industry. For example,
Gade, Heiaas, Thomas, and Hylland (2011) presented a method to
determine the exposure from airless spray application of
 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48
anticorrosive paint. Bjoring and Hagg (2000) studies the ergo-
nomic risks of manual spray painting in the woodworking in-
dustry and provided recommendation to eliminate the risk
factors. Shahirar et al. (2012) used fuzzy based bow-tie analysis
for risk assessment in oil and gas industry. In order to deal with
the vagueness of the data, the study utilized fuzzy logic to derive
fuzzy probabilities of basic events and estimate fuzzy probabili-
ties of output event consequences. Even though many studies in
the literature have discussed risk assessment in process industry
and used bow-tie models for risk calculations, a limited number
of studies discussed the entire management cycle of risks
including risk identification, measurement, prioritization, miti-
gation, and monitoring and control. In this study, lean principles
are combined with fuzzy bow-tie analysis to build and effective
framework for risk manages. A case study from a chemical pro-
cess industry is presented to illustrate the validity of the pro-
posed framework.
3. Proposed framework
The proposed framework (see Fig. 1) for risk assessment com-
bines lean principles and fuzzy bow-tie analysis for effective risk
management in chemical industry. The framework utilizes the five
principles of lean manufacturing for risk assessment (see Table 1).
Risks are identified by the risk management experts and they
should be agreed upon by the organization. However, if the risks
are not agreed upon, they can be identified by either collecting and
analyzing historical data or using what-if analysis. If the risk is
agreed upon, the root causes and potential mitigation strategies for
the risk are identified.
In order to perform the bow-tie analysis, the risk factors related
to each risk are identified. For each risk factor, a fuzzy estimate for
the probability of occurrence (or the likelihood) of the risk factor
and its impact are obtained. Probability of occurrence or likelihood
is calculated based on the estimated ratings shown in Table 2. Fuzzy
Fig. 1. Proposed Framework for risk assessment based on lean and fuzzy bow-tie.
41
Table 1
Utilizing lean principles for risk assessment.
Lean principle How it is applied in risk assessment framework
1. Identify value Identify risks, root causes, and risk mitigation strategies
2. Map the value Measure the risks and identify their interactions
stream and impacts
3. Create flow Create risk flow using fuzzy bow-tie analysis
4. Establish pull Establish risk preventive and proactive reduction
strategies
5. Seek perfection Continuous monitoring and control of risks
scale ratings which correspond to triangular fuzzy numbers are
used to reduce the uncertainty in risk estimates.
The impact of each risk is also identified. Table 3 shows the
fuzzy estimates for risk impact. Estimating the impact and
probability of occurrence values are often not accurate because
enough data is difficult to acquire. For this reason, fuzzy sets and
probability theories can be used to improve the estimation
accuracy.
To reduce the uncertainty in the estimated risk parameters,
fuzzy set theory is utilized. Assuming that the probability of
occurrence of a given risk factor i is estimated by n different
number of experts, the fuzzy probability can be rewritten as P ~ ðtÞ ¼
i
ðai  c1i ; ai ; ai þ c2i Þ where i ¼ 1, 2,., n; (ai  c1i,) is the minimum
value of the fuzzy number, ai is the mid value of the fuzzy number,
and (ai þ c2i) is the maximum value of the fuzzy number. The fuzzy
estimates can be aggregated by one single fuzzy probability defined
as p~A ðtÞ ¼ ðb  d1 ; b; b þ d2 Þ that best fits all experts’ estimates.
The values of b, d1 and d2 are estimated in such a way that p ~A has
minimum variance with all p ~i ðtÞ’s. The smallest resulting triangle
fuzzy probability, p ~A ðtÞ  p
~i ðtÞ; represents the best approximation
~A ðtÞ. Since the triangle’s height cannot be reduced (always 1),
for p
the focus will be on the triangle base. The square of deviations (S)
can be calculated based on Tyagi, Pandey, and Tyagi (2010) as
follows:
42 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48

Table 2
Linguistic variables and fuzzy numbers for risk likelihood.

Linguistic assessment Corresponding Characteristic function

variables fuzzy numbers of fuzzy numbers

Excepted e
0:9 (0.7,0.9,1.0)
Possible e
0:7 (0.5,0.7,0.9)
Unlikely e
0:5 (0.3,0.5,0.7)
Very unlikely e
0:3 (0.1,0.3,0.5)
Not expected e
0:1 (0.0,0.1,0.3)

Table 3
Linguistic variables and fuzzy numbers for risk impact.

Linguistic assessment Corresponding Characteristic function Fig. 3. Fault tree analysis OR gate.
variables fuzzy numbers of fuzzy numbers

High ~
9 (7,9,10)
Medium ~
7 (5,7,9)
Low ~
5 (3,5,7)
Very low ~
3 (1,3,5)
None ~
1 (0,1,3)

X
n
S1 ¼ ½2ðd1  c1i Þ2 (1)
i¼1

X
n
S2 ¼ ½2ðd2  c2i Þ2 (2)
i¼1

and the minimum deviation is obtained by having
P P
d1 ¼ 1=n ni¼ 1 c1i and d2 ¼ 1=n ni¼ 1 c2i . The parameter b can be
determined by having:
D ¼ max1in jb  ai j
where D is the absolute deviation. Then, D will be the minimum for
b ¼ min1  i  n ai þ max1  i  n ai/2.
Bow-tie analysis has been used for analyzing occupational risks
(e.g., Jacinto & Silva, 2010; Khakzad et al., 2012, 2013) and it can also
be used for mapping other types of risks in process industries. The
three main components of the risk are shown in the diagram; risk
probability of occurrence (in terms of risk factors) to the left, risk
event in the middle, and risk impact to the right (see Fig. 2). Risk
reducers can be divided into two categories: (1) preventive barriers,
which are means used to prevent/reduce the probability of
Fig. 4. Fault tree analysis AND gate.
(3) occurrence of the risk event and hence they come before the risk
event, and (2) protective barriers, which are means to prevent/
reduce the effect of the risk event and hence they come after the
risk event. Risk mitigation should focus on both means for risk
reduction and/or prevention.
Given the estimated probabilities of occurrence for risk factors,
the probability of occurrence for the corresponding risk event can
be calculated assuming that the risk factors are independent. If the
factors are not independent, then conditional probability can be
used. Assuming that the probability of occurrence for risk factor i,
~i , is represented by triangular fuzzy numbers (ai1, ai2, ai3), the
p
probability for AND gate (Fig. 3) can be calculated as follows:

Fig. 2. Bow-tie analysis for risk assessment.

 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48 43

Table 4 Y
n
Identified risk in the chemical products plant. ~ ðtÞ ¼ ð1; 1; 1ÞQ
P ðð1; 1; 1ÞQp
~i ðtÞÞ
k
i¼1
Identified risk Agreed upon? Quantitative What-if
data available? required? Yn
¼ ð1; 1; 1Þ  ð1  ðai1 ; ai2 ; ai3 ÞÞ
Non-conforming product (R1) Yes Yes No i¼1
Personal injuries (R2) Yes Yes No !
Fire risk (R3) No No Yes Y
n Y
n Y
n

Exposure to toxic materials (R4) Yes Yes No

¼ 1 ð1  ai1 Þ; 1  ð1  ai2 Þ; 1  ð1  ai3 Þ
Leakage of chemicals (R5) Yes Yes No i¼1 i¼1 i¼1
Explosion risk (R6) Yes No Yes (5)
Occupational ergonomic risk (R7) No No Yes
where P ~ ðtÞ is the fuzzy probability of occurrence of risk event k at
k
during the planning horizon t and pi(t) is the probability of occur-
rence of risk factor i.
Y
n Y
n
Similar equations can also be developed for trapezoidal fuzzy
~ ðtÞ ¼
P ~i ðtÞ ¼
p ðai1 ; ai2 ; ai3 Þ
k
numbers. If risk has multiple impacts ~Lj ðtÞ, each with probability
i¼1 i¼1
! ~j ðtÞ, the fuzzy impact can calculated based on the event tree dia-
p
Y
n Y
n Y
n
¼ ai1 ; ai2 ; ai3 (4) gram as follows:
i¼1 i¼1 i¼1 PN ~
~
j¼1 pj ðtÞ5Lj ðtÞ
For OR gate (Fig. 4): ~L ¼ PN (6)
k
~
j¼1 pj ðtÞ

Table 5
Risk factors, impacts, and mitigation strategies for the identified risks.

Identified risk Risk factors Risk impacts Preventive barriers Protective barriers

Non-conforming B Release of wrong raw B Customer dissatisfaction (L11) B Materials are issued via computerized B Materials are revised by line Q.C.
product (R1) materials (F11) B Loss of reputation (L12) system (V11) before releasing them from ware-
B Addition of the wrong B Waste of money (L13) B Materials are released with an identi- house (C11)
chemical into a certain B Waste of time (L14) fication sticker on pallet by line Q.C. su- B Continuous supervision by the
batch by mistake (F12) pervisor (V12) Q.C. supervisor during production
B Insufficient cleaning of B Perform a checklist for the line prior to (C12)
tanks & pipes (F13) production and adding cleaning as the B Q.C. inspection during filling
last step in a batch filling (V13) (C13)
Personal injuries B Safety procedures are B Absence of work (L21) B Application of warnings and penalties B Periodic inspection by safety
(R2) not followed by an B Compensation (L22) to those who doesn’t follow the safety supervisor and installing cameras to
employee (F21) B Medication costs (L23) procedures and incentives to those who continuously monitor any unsafe
B Lack of awareness and follow them (V21) acts (C21)
supervision (F22) B Increase awareness through periodic B Installing safety signs to contin-
training courses (V22) uously bring attention to safety
procedures (C22)
Fire risk (R3) B A cigarette is lighted by a B Fire (L31) B Training sessions to visitors before B Installation of firefighting alarms
visitor in the production B Explosion (L32) entering hazardous areas (V31) and systems (C31)
area (F31) B Insulating materials and clothes used
B Electrostatic spark (F32) along with proper earthing of equipment
B Electrical spark (F33) (V32)
B Installation of safety electrical equip-
ment and connections along with peri-
odic inspections (V33)
Exposure to toxic B Dealing with hazardous B Acute infection to operators B Personal protective equipment along B Switching workers to perform
materials (R4) chemical for long periods (L41) with increasing workers awareness (V41) tasks of no exposure to hazardous
(F41) B Compensation (L42) B Warnings and penalties to those who materials (C41)
B Suitable safety equip- B Medication Costs (L43) don’t follow safety procedures and in- B Installation of bag filters and gas
ment are not wore by the centives to those who follow them (V42) hoods (C42)
worker (F42)
Leakage of B The float valve didn’t B Loss of money because of spills B Installing emergency button to imme- B Installation of a container to
chemicals (R5) close (F51) (L51) diately stop the pump along with per- collect the excess paint from the
B Unfastened camlock B Severe injuries due to slipping forming periodic maintenance to the head of the filling machine (C51)
(F52) (L52) valve (V51) B Installation of a sensor that will
B Clogged filter or pipeline B Checking all the valves are opened stop the pump in case of high/low
(F53) before operating the pump to avoid high pressure (C52)
pressure that can lead to unfastening the B Installation of a sensor that will
camlock (V52) stop the pump in case of high/low
B Cleaning the filter prior to every filling pressure (C53)
process (V53)
Explosion risk B Flammable materials are B Explosion of the material due to B Following the storage instructions as B Periodic inspection to the stor-
(R6) stored under direct sun reactivity under direct sun heat mentioned in the MSDS (V61) age conditions by the safety super-
heat (F61) (L61) visor (C61)
Occupational B Extreme bending (F71) B Decrease of productivity (L71) B Training worker on proper work pro- B Periodic inspection by produc-
ergonomic risk B Lifting of heavy mate- B Absence of work (L72) cedures and movements (V71) tion and safety supervisors (C71)
(R7) rials (F72) B Disability (L73) B Replacing heavy bags/containers B Installing safety signs describing
B Medication costs (L74) (50 Kg) with lighter ones (25 Kg) along the proper working positions (C72)
B Compensation (L75) with using lifting tools (V72)
44 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48

Table 6
Estimated fuzzy probabilities of risk factors.

Risk Factors Respondents

RESP 1 RESP 2 RESP 3 RESP 4 RESP 5 Aggregated

R1 F11 Unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely (0.2,0.4,0.6)

F12 Unlikely Not expected Very unlikely Unlikely Unlikely (0.12,0.3,0.5)
F13 Unlikely Unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Possible (0.3,0.5,0.7)
R2 F21 Possible Possible Unlikely Possible Possible (0.4,0.6,0.8)
F22 Possible Expected Unlikely Expected Possible (0.5,0.7,0.86)
R3 F31 Not expected Not expected Not expected Not expected Not expected (0.0,0.1,0.3)
F32 Not expected Not expected Not expected Not expected Not expected (0.0,0.1,0.3)
F33 Unlikely Unlikely Very unlikely Very unlikely Very unlikely (0.2,0.4,0.6)
R4 F41 Unlikely Expected Unlikely Possible Unlikely (0.4,0.7,0.88)
F42 Very unlikely Possible Possible Possible Unlikely (0.3,0.5,0.7)
R5 F51 Possible Possible Unlikely Possible Possible (0.4,0.6,0.8)
F52 Possible Possible Unlikely Unlikely Possible (0.4,0.6,0.8)
F53 Possible Possible Unlikely Unlikely Possible (0.4,0.6,0.8)
R6 F61 Unlikely Very unlikely Very unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely (0.2,0.4,0.6)
R7 F71 Very unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely (0.2,0.4,0.6)
F72 Not expected Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely (0.12,0.3,0.5)

Once the risks are measured using the fuzzy bow-tie analysis, The significant risks are considered for mitigation where miti-
risks are prioritized using the risk priority matrix. Root cause gation strategies are selected based on FMEA. Continuous
analysis is performed before identifying the mitigation strategies. monitoring and control is required to ensure risks are within
The risks are then prioritized using Risk Priority Matrix (RPM). control.

Table 7
Estimated impacts of identified risks.

Risk Factors Impact/probability Respondents

RESP 1 RESP 2 RESP 3 RESP 4 RESP 5 Aggregated

R1 L11 Impact Very low High Low High Very low (4,6,7.6)
Probability Very unlikely Expected Very unlikely Expected Very unlikely (0.4,0.6,0.76)
L12 Impact None Medium Very low High None (3.4,5,6.8)
Probability Not expected Possible Unlikely Possible Not expected (0.24,0.4,0.6)
L13 Impact Very low Medium None Low Very low (2.2,4,6)
Probability Very unlikely Possible Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely (0.2,0.5, 0.7)
L14 Impact Medium High High High High (6,8,9.2)
Probability Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected (0.7,0.9, 1.0)
R2 L21 Impact Low High High High Low (5,7,8.4)
Probability Unlikely Expected Unlikely Possible Unlikely (0.5,0.7,0.88)
L22 Impact None Medium Low Very low None (2.4,4,6)
Probability Not expected Possible Very unlikely Very unlikely Not expected (0.24,0.4,0.6)
L23 Impact Very low High Low Low None (3.2,5,6.8)
Probability Not expected Expected Unlikely Possible Not expected (0.34,0.5.0.68)
R3 L31 Impact High High High High High (7,9,10)
Probability Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected (0.7,0.9, 1.0)
L31 Impact High High High High High (7,9,10)
Probability Very unlikely Possible Very unlikely Possible Very unlikely (0.3,0.5,0.7)
R4 L41 Impact Medium Low High Low Medium (5,7,8.8)
Probability Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Possible Unlikely (0.4,0.6,0.8)
L42 Impact None Low Very low Very low None (1.4,3,5)
Probability Not expected Possible Very unlikely Unlikely Not expected (0.24,0.4,0.6)
L43 Impact None Medium Medium Medium None (2.4,4,6)
Probability Not expected Expected Possible Possible Not expected (0.34,0.5.0.68)
R5 L51 Impact Medium High Low High Medium (4,6,7.6)
Probability Possible Expected Expected Expected Possible (0.6,0.8,0.94)
L52 Impact Low Medium Very low Very low Very low (3,5,7)
Probability Very unlikely Possible Possible Unlikely Very unlikely (0.3,0.5,0.7)
R6 L61 Impact High Low High High High (5,7,8.2)
Probability Very unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Very unlikely (0.2,0.4, 0.6)
R7 L71 Impact Medium Medium Low High Medium (5,7,8.8)
Probability Very unlikely Expected Possible Possible Very unlikely (0.4,0.6,0.78)
L72 Impact Low High Medium High Low (4,6,7.6)
Probability Possible Expected Possible Possible Possible (0.6,0.8,0.98)
L73 Impact Very low Medium Medium Very low Very low (3,5,7)
Probability Very unlikely Possible Very unlikely Very unlikely Very unlikely (0.2,0.5, 0.7)
L74 Impact None Medium High Medium None (3.4,5,6.8)
Probability Not expected Possible Expected Possible Not expected (0.34,0.5.0.68)
L75 Impact None Medium Medium Low None (2.4,3,5)
Probability Not expected Possible Expected Very unlikely Not expected (0.34,0.5.0.68)
 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48 45

Preven ve Barriers Protec ve Barriers

Release of wrong Customer

raw materials Dissa sfac on
Materials are (L11)
(F11)
issued via Materials are
computerized revised by line
system Q.C. before
(V11) releasing them
Loss of
from warehouse
Reputa on
(C11)
Materials are (L12)
Non-
Addi on of the released with an Conforming
OR
wrong Chemical iden fica on Product Con nuous
(F12) s cker Q.C. (R1) supervision by
supervisor the Q.C. Waste of
(V12) supervisor Money
during (L13)
Risk Event produc on (C12)
Perform a
checklist and
adding cleaning Q.C. inspec on
as the last step during filling Waste of Time
Insufficient in a batch filling (C13) (L14)
cleaning of tanks & (V13)
pipes
(F13)

Risk Factors Risk Impacts

Fig. 5. Bow-Tie analysis of non-conforming product risk (R1).

Table 8 Industrial Paints. The major risks identified include: product

Calculated total probabilities and impacts of identified risks.
quality risk, fire risk, explosion risk, personal injuries, ergonomic
risk, exposure to toxic materials, and leakage of chemicals. The
identified risks are summarized in Table 4. The risk factors, im-
pacts, and preventive and protective barriers are shown in
Table 5.
Table 6 shows the estimated fuzzy likelihoods for the identified
risk factors and the aggregated likelihood. The estimates were ob-
tained by five respondents as follows:

Respondent 1: Head of Research & Development, Work Experi-

4. Case study
The proposed framework is applied in a chemical process
industry to assess the risks and identify proper mitigation stra-
tegies for them. The company considered in this study manu-
factures and markets all types of decorative paints, adhesives,
industrial paints and printing inks. The main products of the
company include: Enamel & Emulsion paints, Wood Finishes &
Varnishes, Wall & Wood Putties, Anti-Corrosive Paints, External
Surface Paints, Glue Products, Ink Products, Printing Inks, and
ence >10 yrs.
Respondent 2: Production Manager, Work Experience >10 yrs.
Respondent 3: Quality Supervisor, Work Experience >10 yrs.
Respondent 4: Head of Paints Production, Work Experience
>5 yrs.
Respondent 5: Head of Health Safety & Environment, Work
Experience >10 yrs.
The aggregated likelihood for each risk factor was calculated
based on Equations (1) and (2). The aggregated values for risk

Table 9
Risk priority matrix for the identified risks.
46 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48

factors are then used in Bow-Tie chart to calculate the likelihood of

the risk. According to Assarudeen and Gani (2012), the fuzzy division
An example for calculating the aggregated fuzzy probabilistic for operation can be defined as follows:
the risk factors: Let Ab ¼ ða ; a ; a Þ and B b
b ¼ ðb ; b ; b Þ then if DPð AÞ=MPð b 
AÞ
1 2 3 1 2 3
b
DPð BÞ=MPð b
BÞ/ b B
A= b ¼ ða =b ; a =b ; a =b Þ otherwise A= b B b ¼
1 1 2 2 3 3
F12: (0.3,0.5,0.7), (0.0,0.1,0.3), (0.1,0.3,0.5), (0.3,0.5,0.7), (0.3,0.5,0.7) ða1 =b3 ; a2 =b2 ; a3 =b1 Þ where b ¼ a þ a =2,
MPð AÞ b ¼
DPð AÞ
3 1
a3  a1 =2MPð BÞ b ¼ b þ b =2, and DPð BÞ b ¼ b  b =2. And MP
3 1 3 1
denotes the Midpoint and DP denotes Difference point of the
~ ðtÞ ¼ ða  c ; a ; a þ c Þ/ð0:5  0:2; 0:5; 0:5 þ 0:2Þ;
P Triangular fuzzy number.
i i 1i i i 2i
The total probability and impact of the risk are used to find the
 ð0:1  0:1; 0:1; 0:1 þ 0:2Þ; ð0:3  2; 0:3; 0:3 þ 0:2Þ;
risk scores based on the risk priority matrix shown Table 9.
 ð0:5  0:2; 0:5; 0:5 þ 0:2Þ; ð0:5  0:2; 0:5; 0:5 þ 0:2Þ Dividing the risk in low, medium, and high in the risk priority
matrix showed in Table 9 is based on Merna and Al-Thani (2005, p.
70). Based on the calculated risk scores, it can be noted that R3 is
1X n
0:2 þ 0:1 þ 0:2 þ 0:2 þ 0:2 high and all the other risks are medium. However, all the risks
d1 ¼ c ¼ ¼ 0:18; d2
n i ¼ 1 1i 5 need to be reduced so that the scores are low. To reduce the risk
level, preventive and protective mitigation strategies were iden-
1X n
0:2 þ 0:2 þ 0:2 þ 0:2 þ 0:2
¼ c ¼ ¼ 0:2 tified. Failure mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is used to select the
n i ¼ 1 2i 5
best strategies. The mitigation strategies (barriers) for the risk
were selected based on four factors: risk reduction, ease of
min ai þ max ai implementation, strategy cost, and probability of success. The ease
1in 1in 0:1 þ 0:5
b ¼ ¼ ¼ 0:3 of implementation and strategy cost are almost the same for most
2 2 of the strategies. Furthermore, it was assumed that all the risk
mitigation strategies will have the same probability of success. The
~A ðtÞ ¼ ðb  d1 ; b; b þ d2 Þ ¼ ð0:3  0:18; 0:3; 0:3 þ 0:2Þ
p risk reduction was then given the highest priority when selecting
¼ ð0:12; 0:3; 0:5Þ the mitigation strategies. If, for two different strategies, the risk
reduction is the same, the other factors are used to decide which
The estimated impacts and associated probabilities for the strategy should be selected. The selected strategies are highlighted
risks are shown in Table 7. Risk estimates are obtained from five in Table 10.
respondents and are aggregated as shown in the previous The last step in the proposed risk management framework is
example. Bow-tie analysis is conducted for each risk to identify developing a control plan for the risks. Risk monitoring and control
the risk factors and impacts and their relationship. Fig. 5 shows is required to ensure the execution of mitigation strategies and
the bow-tie diagram for non-conforming product risk (R1). For evaluate their effectiveness. It is also used to keep track of identified
all the identified risks, the relationship among the risk factors is risks and ensure all risks are below predefined targets and check if
OR which means that any risk factor can lead to the risk event. new risks have occurred that were not previously identified.
On the other hand, the relationship among the risk impacts is
AND.
Table 8 shows the calculated total probability and impact for the 5. Conclusions
risks. The calculation is based on equation (6). The following
example shows how the calculation is performed: This study presented a framework for risk assessment utilizing
For Risk1: lean manufacturing and fuzzy bow-tie analysis. The five principles
Y
n of lean manufacturing are used to assess the risks. Fuzzy bow-tie
~ ðtÞ ¼ ð1;1;1ÞQ
P ðð1;1;1ÞQp
~i ðtÞÞ analysis is used to calculate the risk scores so that they can be
k
i¼1 prioritized and mitigated. Failure mode and effect analysis is then
Yn used to identify the best mitigation strategies taking into consid-
¼ ð1;1;1Þ  ð1  ðai1 ;ai2 ;ai3 ÞÞ eration risk reduction, mitigation cost, ease of implementation, and
i¼1
! probability of success. A case study from a chemical process in-
Y
n Y
n Y
n
dustry is used to validate and test the proposed framework. Results
¼ 1 ð1  ai1 Þ;1  ð1  ai2 Þ;1  ð1  ai3 Þ
indicate that all the identified risks are significant and need to be
i¼1 i¼1 i¼1
reduced to an acceptable level. Risk management team in the
¼ ½1 ð1  0:2Þð1  0:12Þð1  0:3Þ;1 company was asked to identify the possible mitigation strategies
 ð1  0:4Þð1  0:3Þð1  0:5Þ;1  ð1  0:6Þð1  0:5Þð1 0:7Þ for each risk and their associated attributes. Strategies were then
selected based on FMEA. The selection of mitigation strategies can
¼ ð0:51;0:79;0:94Þ
be improved using an optimization model that takes into

PN ~
~
j¼1 pj ðtÞ5Lj ðtÞ ð0:4; 0:6; 0:76Þð4; 6; 7:6Þ þ ð0:24; 0:4; 0:6Þð3:4; 5; 6:8Þ þ ð0:2; 0:5; 0:7Þð2:2; 4; 6Þ þ ð0:7; 0:9; 1:0Þð6; 8; 9:2Þ
~L ¼ PN
k
~
j¼1 pj ðtÞ
ð0:4; 0:6; 0:76Þ þ ð0:24; 0:4; 0:6Þ þ ð0:2; 0:5; 0:7Þ þ ð0:7; 0:9; 1:0Þ
 
ð1:6; 3:6; 5:78Þ þ ð0:82; 2; 4:08Þ þ ð0:44; 2; 4:2Þ þ ð4:2; 7:2; 9:2Þ ð7:06; 14:8; 23:26Þ 7:06 14:8 23:26
¼ ¼ ¼ ; ;
ð1:54; 2:4; 3:06Þ ð1:54; 2:4; 3:06Þ 1:54 2:4 3:06
¼ ð4:58; 6:17; 7:60Þ
 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48
Table 10
FMEA analysis of risk reduction and mitigation strategies selection.
consideration the mitigation cost and risk reduction. Even though
the study focused on risk assessment in chemical industry, the
proposed framework can be applied in other manufacturing or
service environments.
References
Abuswer, M., Amyotte, P., Khan, F., & Morrison, L. (2013). An optimal level of dust
explosion risk management: framework and application. Journal of Loss Pre-
vention in the Process Industries, 26(6), 1530e1541.
Assarudeen, S., & Gani, A. (2012). A new operation on triangular fuzzy number for
solving fuzzy linear programming problem. Applied Mathematical Sciences,
6(11), 525e532.
Badreddine, A., & Ben Amor, N. (2013). A Bayesian approach to construct bow tie
diagrams for risk evaluation. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 91(3),
159e171.
Bjoring, G., & Hagg, G. (2000). Musculoskeletal exposure of manual spray painting
in the woodworking Industry e an ergonomic study on painters. International
Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 26(6), 603e614.
Cheverau, F., Wybo, J., & Cauchois, D. (2006). Organizing learning process on risks
by using the bow-tie representation. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 130(3),
276e283.
Chopra, S., & Sodhi, M. S. (2004). Managing risk to avoid supply-chain breakdown.
MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(1), 52e61.
Ferdous, R., Khan, F., Sadiq, R., Amyotte, P., & Veitch, B. (2012). Handling and
updating uncertain information in bow-tie analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in
the Process Industries, 25(1), 8e19.
Ferdous, R., Khan, F., Sadiq, R., Amyotte, P., & Veitch, B. (2013). Analyzing system
safety and risks under uncertainty using a bow-tie diagram: an innovation
approach. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 91(1e2), 1e18.
Gade, A., Heiaas, H., Thomas, K., & Hylland, K. (2011). REACH exposure assessment
of anticorrosive paint products e determination of exposure from application
and service life to the aquatic environment. Regulatory Toxicology and Phar-
macology, 61(3), 332e339.
Jacinto, C., & Silva, C. (2010). A semi-quantitative assessment of occupational risks
using bow-tie representation. Safety Science, 48(8), 973e979.
Khakzad, N., Khan, F., & Amyotte, P. (2012). Dynamic risk analysis using bow-tie
approach. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 104(1), 36e44.
47
Khakzad, N., Khan, F., & Amyotte, P. (2013). Dynamic safety analysis of process
systems by mapping bow-tie into Bayesian network. Process Safety and Envi-
ronmental Protection, 91(1), 46e53.
Khan, F., & Abbasi, S. (1998). Techniques and methodologies for risk analysis in
chemical process industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,
11(4), 261e277.
Khan, F., & Abbasi, S. (1999). Assessment of risks posed by chemical industries e
application of a new computer automated tool MAXCRED-III. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, 12(6), 455e469.
Khan, F., & Abbasi, S. (2001). Risk analysis of a typical chemical Industry using
ORA procedure. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 14(1), 43e
59.
Mabrouki, C., Bentaleb, F., & Mousrij, A. (2014). A decision support methodology for
risk management within a port terminal. Safety Science, 63, 124e132.
Markowski, A., & Kotunia, A. (2011). Bow-tie model in layer of protection analysis.
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 89(4), 205e213.
McGovern, J., Sims, O., & Jain, A. (2006). Enterprise service oriented architectures:
Concepts, challenges, recommendations (pp. 317e355). Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Springer.
Meel, A., O’Neill, L., Levin, J., Seider, W., Oktem, U., & Keren, N. (2007). Operational
risk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases. Journal
of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 20(2), 113e127.
Merna, T., & Al-Thani, F. F. (2005). Corporate risk management: An organizational
perspective. West Sussex, England: John Wiley and Sons.
Mokhtari, K., Ren, J., Roberts, C., & Wang, J. (2011). Application of a generic bow-tie
based risk analysis framework on risk management of sea ports and offshore
terminals. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 192(2), 465e475.
Pejic, L., Torrent, J., Querol, E., & Lebecki, K. (2013). A new simple methodology for
evaluation of explosion risk in underground coal mines. Journal of Loss Pre-
vention in the Process Industries, 26(6), 1524e1529.
Ramos, S., & Veiga, H. (2011). Risk factors in oil and gas industry returns: interna-
tional evidence. Energy Economics, 33(3), 525e542.
Reniers, G., Ale, B., Dullaert, W., & Foubert, B. (2006). Decision support systems
for major accident prevention in the chemical process industry: a de-
velopers’ survey. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 19(6),
604e620.
Shahiar, A., Sadiq, R., & Tesfamariam, S. (2012). Risk analysis for oil and gas pipe-
lines: a sustainability assessment approach using fuzzy based bow-tie analysis.
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 25(3), 505e523.
Si, H., Ji, H., & Zeng, X. (2012). Quantitative risk assessment model of hazardous
chemicals leakage and application. Safety Science, 50(7), 1452e1461.
48 F. Aqlan, E. Mustafa Ali / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 29 (2014) 39e48

Tyagi, S. K., Pandey, D., & Tyagi, R. (2010). Fuzzy set theoretic approach to fault tree
analysis. International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology, 2(5), 276e283.
Waters, D. (2007). Supply chain risk management: Vulnerability and resilience in lo-
gistics. London, UK: Kogan Page Ltd.
Yang, M., Khan, F., & Lye, L. (2013). Precursor-based hierarchical Bayesian approach
for rare event frequency estimation: a case of oil spill accidents. Process Safety
and Environmental Protection, 91(5), 333e342.
Yang, X., & Mannan, M. (2010). The development and application of dynamic
operational risk assessment in oil/gas chemical process industry. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, 95(7), 806e815.
Zsidisin, G., & Ritchie, B. (Eds.). (2009). Supply chain risk: A handbook of assessment,
management, and performance (p. 93). New York, NY: Springer.