The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Brief About the Author:

Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–1996) is often regarded as the most influential and well-
known philosopher, physicist, and historian of science in recent memory. His book 'The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions' is the most read or purchased book in science or
philosophy, with Posterior Analytics and Discourse on Method as the nearest competitors. It
gave rise to the phrase "paradigm shift" (English language).

He was born in Ohio and graduated from Harvard College with a B.Sc. in Physics in
1943. In 1946 and 1949, he received his M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from the same college. He
taught at Harvard, UC Berkeley, Princeton University, and MIT, among others. From 1969 to
1970, he was the president of the History of Science Society.

Overview of the Book

This part provides a quick overview of the book in order to grasp its essentials.

The subject of this book is what are known as "scientific revolutions" in history.
During these phases, our basic understanding of how the universe works is replaced by
various hypotheses that affect our understanding. A scientific field, according to Kuhn, goes
through numerous stages until it is fully developed.

Stage 1: Pre-paradigmatic
Before a scientific field emerges, there is a period of aimless investigation.
Throughout this period, various schools of ideology emerge, each striving to determine the
fundamental criteria by which theories should be appraised.

II. Emergence of Normal Science

One school stands out among the numerous in the early stages. This school of thought
has the potential to solve the bulk of problems in the future. This accomplishment is referred
to as a "paradigm."

A. Two types of “Paradigm” – Exemplar and Disciplinary

Exemplars - Any achievement that sets the direction for future study is
referred to as a "exemplar" by Kuhn. This includes works such as Newton's mechanics
and gravitational theory, Franklin's theory of electricity, and others. These works were
ground-breaking in their fields.

Disciplinary – Kuhn adopted the term "paradigm" later in his career to

describe to a group of problems, methodologies, concepts, assumptions, principles, and
 evaluation standards. It outlines the discipline's fundamental assumptions as well as
how research should be conducted.

B. Nature of Normal Science

Scientific Community: This is the designation given to a group of social
scientists who are linked by education, professional engagement, and communication,
as well as shared interests in issues.

Exemplifiers' Role: Learning from exemplars aids in the resolution of similar

issues. Another goal is to apply the same concepts to a different situation. It enables a
young or inexperienced scientist to learn from the finest in the field. A theory,
according to Kuhn, cannot be taught solely by memorising it; it must also be understood
in its application.

Science as "Puzzle Solving": According to Kuhn, once a paradigm is accepted,

the next stage is to apply the exemplars' methodologies. Because the paradigm has
been accepted, this implies that there is a solution to the problem. Scientific study in the
paradigmatic sciences is described by Kuhn as "puzzle-solving."

III. Emergence of Anomaly and Crisis

Even if a paradigm promises that a solution to a problem exists, there are times when
it is not. If the problem remains unsolvable despite repeated attempts, the researchers feel
frustrated. Researchers may begin to doubt the basics as a result of this. As a result, two
schools of thought have emerged: one that wants to change the basics and the other that
believes in the old paradigm.

IV. Birth of New Paradigm

After several attempts, a rival strategy succeeds in solving the paradigm, and it gains
popularity. This solution is then viewed as concrete and conclusive, and it is recognised as a
scientific breakthrough. This answer is then referred to as a "exemplar."

Linking Theory to Social Epistemology

Change in theories is a major event in science. Two major questions should be raised:
a) How new theories are chosen by scientists
b) How is consensus formed?

In general, philosophers do not approach these concerns differently, but Kuhn

responds in a unique way. The application of epistemic standards (accuracy and consistency)
can explain theory selection, and consensus development can be described through a
sequence of socio-epistemic mechanisms ('wave motion' or scientific pedagogy). Kuhn's
social epistemology is based on these two principles. It emphasises both social interactions
and the evolution of theories from an epistemic standpoint.
 The nature of values, according to Kuhn's "theory of variety of values," allows
equally qualified scholars with the same quantity of evidence to reach different judgments
about what is the best theory in a subject. As a result, there is a schism between individual-
level and community-level questions as a result of such value diversity. As a result, Kuhn
does not respond to the theory-choice dilemma and the challenge of consensus formation in
the same way. The repositioning of epistemology by sociology was an unavoidable
consequence of Kuhn's concept of value variability. Although epistemic values may be useful
in explaining theory selection, they are largely ineffective in explaining consensus
development. Because values do not determine a universal choice, non-epistemic elements
would explain the establishment of consensus. Furthermore, if values are incapable of
prescribing a single option, they will be unable to give the required consensus that science
requires.

Dominance Theory
A theory is said to be dominant if it outperforms all competing theories in every way
and is important in that field. The concept that one theory is dominant could explain why
scientists who use values in different ways don't have to agree (rationally) on which theory is
superior. Individuals may accept a new theory if it dominates its competitors, despite
differing opinions on how ideas should be evaluated. Only epistemic considerations can
account for the presence of dominant theory in theory. Nonetheless, dominance is unlikely to
be adequate in generating community consensus. It's also true that dominant examples are
hard to come by in science, because scientists analyse hypotheses differently, and it's
impossible to picture all of them coming to the same conclusion. Furthermore, dominance is
the only way to achieve consensus.

Scientific Pedagogy
The theory of value variability asserts that scientists can apply values differently. This
does not, however, imply that they should be used arbitrarily. Scientific pedagogy also leaves
an indelible impression on value application. It, in particular, counteracts the potential
openness of epistemic criteria. This process of socialisation homogenises scientists' opinions
and narrows the range of acceptable value applications. Individuals with similar backgrounds
—those who attended the same schools, studied the same literature, and conducted similar
experiments—tend to incorporate scientific practise in similar ways, and thus apply values in
similar ways. It's not difficult to envision myself coming to the same conclusion.
Furthermore, dominance is the only way to achieve consensus.
As a result, scientific pedagogy serves as a vital normalisation tool, particularly in the
aftermath of a revolution.

The Wave Motion

Kuhn describes the wave motion as follows:

A few pioneering scientists decide to adopt a new hypothesis after becoming

convinced of its superiority. While the majority of scientists continue to use the old approach,
proponents of the new theory begin to work with it. They will present arguments and
evidence in support of this position if they are successful. As a result, other scientists in the
field may choose the more modern technique.

Along with the initial adepts, these additional scientists will create the new
hypothesis. Again, if the group can make major contributions, they may be able to persuade
additional people of the new theory's worth. With more proof, other experts' opinions may
change in favour of the new view. Adherence is passed down through the community over
time. When all scientists agree on the new theory, the procedure comes to an end. In the end,
what was once an afterthought becomes a popular choice.

It assumes that epistemic concerns are the agents that lead to scientists gradually
accepting a hypothesis. This method is also reliant on the different effects of arguments and
evidence on different ideas.

Despite the fact that this is a theoretical possibility, Kuhn believes it is doubtful. In
practise, he believes, acceptance of a new theory occurs in phases, with the number of
adherents gradually increasing.

Conclusion
Kuhn's idea is a radical version of social constructivism, aiming to identify the
psychological and social elements that influence scientists' decisions rather than epistemic
considerations. That is, in fact, how his thoughts were frequently perceived. If epistemic
factors aren't enough to induce consensus on their own, some type of external component, it
was argued, would be required. Non-epistemic influences, it appears, would promote
consensus by influencing scientists' conclusions.

References
Kuhn T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2ed (1970), Chicago University of
Chicago Press, 2012

Kuhn T.S. The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science. In: The Road Science
Structure (1992), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000

Pirozelli P., The structure of scientific controversies: Thomas Kuhn’s social epistemology
(2021), Unisions Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22