Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung.

Volume 65 (4), 445 – 456 (2012)

DOI: 10.1556/AOrient.65.2012.4.4

SUFISM AS ISLAMIC LEGAL HERMENEUTICS:

THE VIEWS OF AL-SHĀṬIBĪ (D. 1388) AND ZARRŪQ (D. 1493)
ABDESSAMAD BELHAJ

Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Arabic Department

Anselmianum II. em. 211/E
H-2087 Piliscsaba, Egyetem út 1, Hungary
e-mail: belhaj.abdessamad@btk.ppke.hu

In this paper, I attempt to show that Sufism, with respect to Islamic law, assays to envision a legal
interpretation, drawing on the hermeneutic principle of application as well as on the teleological in-
terpretation of law. My contention is that Abū Iṣḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) and Abū’l-‘Abbās Aḥmad
Zarrūq (d. 1493), the Mālikī scholars I treat in this study, accentuate the legal hermeneutic aspect of
Sufism / sharī‘a link. Thus, they rendered deliberative views on how Sufism and law interlace as le-
gal interpretations. By the same token, they recognised a necessary co-existence, and thus pluralist,
approach to legal matters.
Key words: Sufism, Islamic law, legal hermeneutics, al-Shāṭibī, Zarrūq.

Introduction

Scholarship on Islamic intellectual tradition starts to depart from the widely accepted
view that considers taṣawwuf and fiqh as two inherently opposing modes of thought.
For the purpose of challenging the latter assumption, some researchers underlined
conciliatory positions of traditionally anti-sufi milieus (Makdisi 1973, pp. 118– 129).
Others highlighted the interest of Sufi masters in contributing to fiqh either as jurists
by profession or as jurists by experimentation (Winkel 1993, pp. 54– 74). Conse-
quently, what many historians of Islamic knowledge took for granted, namely that
there is an irreconcilable conflict between Sufism and Islamic law, suffered a serious
backlash. Thus, J. van Ess went so far as to assert that “if there was any opposition to
Sufism in these centuries, it always depended on how individual Sufis or certain prac-
tices were perceived. There has never been any clear and uniform pattern of enmity
between the jurists and the mystics” (van Ess 1999, p. 34). I would add that some
highly critical moments of enmity existed indeed between pantheist Sufism and the

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446 ABDESSAMAD BELHAJ

jurists. In this respect, the controversies between jurists and Sufis over Ibn ‘Arabī
(d. 638/1240) demonstrate the unfathomable disagreement between the two antago-
nists. However, these debates do not question the legitimacy of Sufism, but rather a
set of beliefs and practices that undermine the Sunni orthodoxy.
That being the case, inquiry into several synthetic ṣūfī/shar‘ī ways of living or
interpreting legal texts shows the extremely multi-dimensional nature of religiosity in
Islam. Sufism is an everlasting open, fuzzy and disjointed field of knowledge and
practice that has an infinite multitude of webs in connection with almost all aspects
of human life. Therefore, it is expected that variety and complexity would infiltrate
its sphere. To avoid sweeping statements, my scope of investigation is limited to later
Sunni Sufism, which made tremendous efforts to be accepted as an inner dimension
of sharī‘a. Sunni Sufis, through a careful construction of legitimacy and an assay at
approaching law from inside, elaborated a Sufism that seeks, first and foremost,
authority from within Sunnism (Mojaddedi 2000, pp. 37– 50).
The focal point of the available literature on links between taṣawwuf and fiqh
appears to be the common normative content between law and Sufism. In this paper,
I attempt to show that Sufism did not limit itself to developing an ethics of law. Even
more, it assays to provide a legal interpretation, drawing on the hermeneutic principle
of application as well as on the teleological interpretation of law. Here, I consider on
application as a hermeneutic tool in two overlapping meanings. On the one side, I use
Gadamer’s three hermeneutical stages where application is emphasised (Gadamer
2006, pp. 306–307). In his discussion of the hermeneutical problem of application,
Gadamer reminds us that hermeneutics, in the beginning, consisted of understanding
and interpretation and, later on, pietism added a third element, subtilitas applicandi
(application). On the other, I recall Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s (d. 1350) classification
of knowledge, ‘ilm into a narrative knowledge, ‘ilm riwāya, an intellectual knowl-
edge, ‘ilm dirāya, and an applicative knowledge, ‘ilm ri‘āya (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziy-
ya n. d., pp. 135–141).
In order to elaborate a spiritual and applied understanding of legal texts and
regulations, Sufis explored, from within, metaphoric capacities of Arabic legal lan-
guage. Above all, Sufism benefited from the deliberative character of sharī‘a in its
process of formation. Later, it developed a spiritualism that aimed to establish a theory
of law intents, maqāṣid al-sharī‘a. My point is that the two Sunni Sufi authors I will
treat in this study accentuate the legal hermeneutic aspect of Sufism/sharī‘a link.
Thus, Abū Iṣḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) and Abū’l-‘Abbās Aḥmad Zarrūq (d. 1493) ren-
dered deliberative views on how Sufism and law interlace as legal interpretations.
By the same token, they recognised a necessary co-existence, and thus pluralist, ap-
proach to legal matters.
At this point, one of the major questions to be treated is the nature of the inter-
est of Sufis in law and the reason of that attention. My assumption that I try to inves-
tigate is whether the Sufi interest is not, after all, comparable to that of Gadamer’s
hermeneutical project. In other words, Sufism might be an attempt at bridging the
gap between the letter and the spirit of law. At least in early literature, Sufis seem to
refer to sunna as an undissociable unity of law and spirituality. By way of contrast,

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 SUFISM AS ISLAMIC LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 447

and from the Sufi standpoint, most jurists were not preoccupied with linking the let-
ter and the spirit of law. To put it in hermeneutical terms, the jurists did not make ef-
forts to go beyond the mere understanding and the interpretation of law. Conversely,
the legal understanding of sharī‘a by Sufis claims to be a “return” to the unity of the
sunna, by application. In doing so, Sufis assert, primarily, the literary character of
their legal interpretation as well. Thus, Sufis engaged law by using deliberation tech-
niques, such as debates, munāẓarāt to communicate their message. As a result of this
inner reading of sharī‘a, Sufis were able to reach the climax of their legal hermeneu-
tics, through a theory of the intents of Islamic law, maqāṣid al-sharī‘a.

1. Islamic Law and Sufism in Later Islam: Formalism vs Spiritualism

In post-classical Islam, by which I mean historically the post-‘Abbāsid era, sharī‘a

underwent several attempts to control its open field of overlapping relations and
deliberation between the jurists, society and the state. In this respect, one could ob-
serve an increasing process of embodiment and centralisation of sharī‘a. Already in
the 11th century, rulers, mainly from military dynasties, undertook a direct control of
religious schools and institutions. As a result, ‘ulamā’ were “bureaucratised” and had
to accept a more professional role within the institutionalised structures of law and
education. Nevertheless, the new system of madrasas provided an opportunity for an
extended intellectual role of the ‘ulamā’. Ḥanafīs in the Middle East and Central Asia
and Mālikīs in Spain and Africa were those who could respond effectively to the new
challenges of society and state. Although other communities were ruled legally ac-
cording to their own juridical denomination, the Ottomans (1299– 1923) formalised
the Ḥanafī law. In several areas, it was practised only among the urban elite (loyal to
or appointed by the Ottomans). Mamlūk authorities (1250–1517) also showed an af-
firmed interest in the fixation of quasi-official corpuses.
Sharī‘a-in-state was maintained by schools of law and the most flourishing
ones were those to which belong the rulers. In addition, it was preserved by the judi-
ciary system though the latter is not as exclusive and rigid as one might expect. In a
like manner, legal schools followed the same tendency of formalism reaching its final
shape by the end of the 13th century. Thus, each school of law fixed its referential
texts and the juristic activity was restrained, usually, to commentaries and glosses on
these transmitted texts. In the history of Islamic law, this process is called imitation,
taqlīd though individual attempts at renewing methodologies of law are noticeable in
different times and places. In theory, the gate of independent juridical reasoning,
ijtihād was closed. Nonetheless, in practice, society and jurisprudence went on to
accommodate sharī‘a. For this reason, sharī‘a-in-society and sharī‘a-in-state started
to move slightly in distinct though intertwining ways. Society established a direct
relation with the jurists through legal opinions, fatāwā. The authority of the jurist,
muftī operated, in many respects, as a competitor of that of the judge appointed by the
state. The muftī treats daily legal matters and takes into account the customs of his
local context. Thus, several kinds of juristic literature that responds to real problems

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448 ABDESSAMAD BELHAJ

of the community, such as nawāzil, flourished. The nawāzil-type fatwās assay at an-
swering questions which do not have any echo in the transmitted juristic manuals.
In order to provide religious solutions to these social necessities, Mālikīs and Ḥanafīs
had to constantly negotiate the role of local customs and public interest in sharī‘a.
Among Mālikīs, this tendency is accompanied by a strong elitism, granting much at-
tention to the authority of the jurists of certain urban centres, ‘amal especially to the
practice of jurists and judges of Fez in Morocco.
In particular, the study of the purposes of law as part of the assets of the doc-
trine achieved great maturity in the Mālikī school. Mālikīs showed cosiderable inter-
est in legal ethics, especially in the “intents of Islamic law”, maqāṣid al-sharī‘a. The
latter emphasises the role of the Muslim law in preserving public interest perceived
as the ultimate objective of law. This ethics of law was seen as the general interest of
the Muslim community with regard both to their material well-being and eschatologi-
cal beatitude. However, maqāsid al-sharī‘a did not become a positive concept that
expresses the idea of preventing harms or bringing benefits for the community re-
gardless of sharī‘a. To put it another way, it remained dependent on scriptural justifi-
cation. Therefore, there was no transition from divine law to natural law. The divine
was seen as self-sufficient. Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, a Mālikī jurist from Granada and
main theoretician of maqāṣid al-sharī‘a, estimated that the well-being of the commu-
nity was only imaginable within the boundaries of sharī‘a. For him, the latter is, in
all cases, revealed with the purpose of maintaining the major interests of humanity.
These major interests are of five: religion, life, intellect, family and property. These
interests were considered as necessary and reflected the priorities of a mediaeval Mus-
lim society. Al-Shāṭibī also discussed in great detail what he called needy interests,
ḥājiyyāt and complementary interests, taḥsīniyyāt. Other jurists emphasised other nec-
essary interests such as freedom, ḥurriyya or honour, ‘irḍ.
In spite of several juristic attempts to highlight the interests of society, the
formalist tendency dominated law-making. Most jurists paid more attention to the
transmitted verdicts and legal provisions than to the facts and the general purposes of
law. In addition to dependence on scriptures, they relied on specific juridical manuals
regardless of the circumstances. The jurists were aware of their symbolic power
resulting from the sacred character of sharī‘a and had all the interest in maintaining
the sanctity of law. Thus, they asserted the infallibility of sharī‘a as a whole. As a
matter of fact, the ever-changing Muslim societies resisted the formalisation of law,
especially lower classes which often looked at judges and official jurists as state
agents or money-makers.
In this regard, Sufism claimed to be the spokesman of these classes, requiring
a less formal law and emphasising its intents. Gradually, Sufis asserted their true
way, ḥaqīqa to be the inner interpretation of sharī‘a (al-Shushtarī 2004, pp. 53–54).
Among Sunni Sufis, this interpretation was not understood as an abolishment of legal
provisions though it weakened the literal practice of sharī‘a. They certainly gave an
esoteric meaning to rigid rules but they acknowledged that the literal meaning is as
obligatory to the common as it is to the Sufi elite. The mainstream Sufis put emphasis
on two aspects: the first on law intents that should govern law understanding rather

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than forms (contributing largely to maqāṣid al-sharī‘a). The second is thoughtful

practice, which claims that law should be followed not as rigid daily observance of
law, but as a coherent virtuous behaviour. In essence, Sufism could be understood as a
teleological law that attempts at preserving norms beyond frames. However, in their
brotherhoods and social bodies, Sufis practised a loose understanding of sharī‘a,
by-passing many of its rigid provisions.
Sufism played a major role in the development of maqāṣid al-sharī‘a. In this
respect, the views of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 942) in his Kitāb Ithbāt al-‘ilal, and
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) in his Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn are foundational. As has
been stated by Marion Holmes Katz, a synthesis emerged within Sunni Sufism be-
tween the juristic idea of maṣlaḥa and the Sufi model of abandonment (Holmes Katz
2007, pp. 101– 102). This is all the more possible for Sunni Sufis as they combine two
necessary ethical principles for such synthesis to take deep root in a society. On the
one side, Sufis promote sympathy for the poor. Thus, they consider the consequences
of applying sharī‘a on the situation of individuals. On the other, Sufis perceive God
as the ultimate objective of sharī‘a itself. As a result, they tend to weaken the impor-
tance of regulations themselves while they praise the objectives. For them, what mat-
ters after all is whether a regulation makes one closer to God or not. Failing to ac-
commodate sharī‘a with its spiritual character as a whole would lead to fall short of
its partial objectives. M. K. Masud summarises the Sufi attitude as a disagreement
with “performing religious obligation without understanding its objectives and with
those who perform ‘ibādāt to receive reward or to ward off evil” (Masud 2006,
p. 272). Thus, religious obligations stand as the lowest level of the way to God.
It should be performed in accordance with sharī‘a objectives while the ultimate of
these objectives should be God.
The Sunni jurists and Sufis sustained internal scientific deliberations, in quest
for a more inclusive synthesis. Thus, the religious scholars developed disputation as a
scholastic method in education and Islamic law. On the one hand, their method of in-
struction relies on dialectics, preparing the students for religious careers. Mastering
the art of debate became the latest stage in the preparation for the function of scholars
or teachers. On the other hand, deliberation became an integral part of scholarship,
largely contributing to pluralism in Islamic culture, inseparable from a tradition of
ethics of scholarly discussions. That being the case, Sufis benefited from a relatively
tolerant environment to produce several intellectual apologies in order to answer
harsh contestation of Sunni orthodoxy.
Thus, Sufis had to constantly negotiate their place in relation to sharī‘a and to
its authority. Mostly, Sunni orthodoxy accused Sufis of being non-Islamic and of
spreading an imported Christian or neo-platonic set of ideas and practices. Besides,
the cult of saints and the cult of personalities in general, one of the pillars of Sufism,
is another favourable target of the orthodoxy defending strict monotheism. Likewise,
the esoteric and individual character of Sufi knowledge made the difference in under-
standing the Sufi truth acceptable. Thus, Sufis opened the door wide for disputation,
a supportive means on the Sufi path, but certainly not its aim in itself. Further, debates
create competition that helps every Sufi on his own way. In addition, it stimulates

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cooperation during the quest for truth or exchanging knowledge. The loci of debates
among Sufis are mainly the variation in interpreting existence and knowledge in rela-
tion to the Sufi stages. Though it may sound surprising, discussion, munāqara, is a
praiseworthy tradition among early Sufis that was justified as an “invocation of the
name of God in a collective way”, mudhākara (al-Sīrawānī 1991, p. 54). On the other
hand, Sufis were aware of the dialectical character of their knowledge based on op-
positions and antonyms. They fully explored what the duality of apparent/inner
creates in terms of interpretation and ontological perception. As a result, Sufi lan-
guage is an ambivalent structure of antonyms and contradictions that necessitates the
Sufi’s efforts in order to achieve the unity of truth.
In contrast, L. Rosen argues that duality of sharī‘a application as intent
(ethics) and as practice (law), is still observed. Not only that, but he makes the point
that in “Arabic culture” the access to a person’s intent in legal process is only possi-
ble through a person’s social network (Rosen 2006, pp. 109–110). While it is true
that the context of a person helps in many cases to understand his intents, it is not the
only way. One can express his intents through confidence, confessions, simple acts,
separately from a set of connections. Conversely, one can also hide his intents from
his social web. For an individual who acts legally or against the law can do it with
different intent. For example, he can bear a false witness, shahādat al-zūr. For this
reason, al-Shāṭibī and Zarrūq are concerned with hermeneutic disunity. Thus, they at-
tempted to meld the broken hermeneutic unity by bridging the gap between the letter
and the spirit of legal acts.

2. The Elite and the Law of God:

al-Shāṭibī on Sufism and Islamic Law

With regard to his position toward Sufism, al-Shāṭibī is a prey of considerable mis-
understanding. While explaining the motivation of al-Shāṭibī’s achievement, W. B.
Hallaq and M. Holmes Katz hold the claim that the legal writings of al-Shāṭibī seem
to be motivated by his disapproval of Sufi influences on the interpretation of the
sharī‘a. W. B. Hallaq, in his comment on al-Shāṭibī’s legal theory, argued that “the
main thrust of his theoretical exposition is directed at the mystics of his time who
were a powerful force advocating inter alia what he thought to be a rigid and unduly
demanding application of the law” (Hallaq 1997, p. 163). Additionally, M. Holmes
Katz asserts this point of view and affirms that “indeed, one charge against him was
of active enmity toward the Sufis” (Holmes Katz 2007, p. 102). I maintain in this
section that Sufism was, on the contrary, an important asset in the legal thought of al-
Shāṭibī. Often, the latter takes Sufis as the model of practising religious obligations
with an awareness of the purposes of Islamic law.
If Hallaq and Katz are right in emphasising al-Shāṭibī’s criticism of certain
Sufi practices, this fact does not exclude his praise of the Sufi way. Denigration of
specific Sufi practices should be related to its context. In the case of al-Shāṭibī, he
was rather worried about the popularisation of Sufism on the one side and about

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heterodox beliefs on the other. His harsh criticism of heterodox Sufi practices in his
al-I‘tiṣām should be understood as part of his disapproval of innovations, bida‘. Even
Sufi masters stood against uncontrolled Sufi rituals. Furthermore, criticising certain
Sufi practices should not be a priori an indication of an author’s legal theory. For al-
Shāṭibī, in his al-Muwāfaqāt, was rather concerned about the leniency in religious
practice. Since Sufis generally promote rigorousness in the religious practices, al-
Shāṭibī refers to Sufism as a laudable way of applying sharī‘a.
Let us examine now how al-Shāṭibī understood the links between Sufism and
law in his al-Muwāfaqāt fī uṣūl al-sharī‘a. In the first place, he praises the way of
those who care for themselves and avoid the legal permissions, rukhaṣ allowed by
Islamic law (certain indulgences which are valid in certain circumstances such as
travel, illness, age) (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. I, p. 337). In a comparable way to al-Ghaz-
zālī, he explains that the area of legal permissions “is an area of confusion in which
arise the Satan’s deceptions and the temptations of the soul” (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. I,
p. 338). Al-Shāṭibī asserts that “since legal permissions imply certain tolerance and
laxity, the masters of Sufism have recommended their disciples to leave them at
once” (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. I, p. 338). He goes on to say that the Sufis make one of
their assets the adoption of the strict rules of knowledge, ‘azā’im al-‘ilm (al-Shāṭibī
1980, Vol. I, p. 338). He meant that strict Sufi application of religious duties is ac-
companied by a deep awareness. He approves this approach, which he qualifies as a
true and praiseworthy principle, aṣl ṣaḥīḥ malīḥ (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. I, p. 338). The
only legal permissions that al-Shāṭibī seems to accept are those transmitted through
certified chains or which have become legally required such as those found in the
rituals or in the transactions. He justifies these exceptions by the fact that these legal
permissions are needed but not necessary principles. A part from this, one has to stick
to the strict rules, ‘azā’im (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. I, p. 338).
However, al-Shāṭibī knows that many people, whom he calls those who have
not achieved the understanding of the purposes of the law, believe that Sufism is a
different way from the way of the mainstream, jumhūr. For him, this common belief
is based on some of the words and actions of the Sufis. Al-Shāṭibī cited a case where
a Sufi was asked: what should be given as alms, zakāt in the x case? The Sufi an-
swered: according to our school (Sufism) or to yours (fiqh)? If you ask about the po-
sition of our school then everything should be given to God and if you seek the
answer of your school then the amount is x and y (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. II, p. 248).
Such attitudes produce two kinds of reactions among common people:
– Those who believe in the apparent meaning of such statements. They tend to
understand that Sufism has a specific law, sharī‘a khāṣṣa and that the latter is
superior to that of the mainstream of Muslim legal schools;
– Those who criticise Sufis and attack them for their supposed heresy. They per-
ceive the Sufi path as contrary to the best way (the way of the mainstream)
and astray from the sunna.
Al-Shāṭibī adds that both interpretations are extremist because the Sufis ac-
knowledge that Islamic law covers every addressee by the obligations (al-Shāṭibī

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1980, Vol. II, p. 248). So, the question is not whether Sufism is a parallel path to
Islamic law or not, but relates, for him, to the deep understanding of Islamic law, rūḥ
al-mas’ala al-fiqh fī’l-sharī‘a (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. II, p. 248). He approves the Sufi
ascetic attitude of equalising between mandatory acts, wājib and recommended acts,
mandūb on the one hand and between reprobated acts, makrūh, and forbidden acts,
muḥarram on the other hand. The Sufi attitude, al-Shāṭibī says, does not apply to the
mainstream but is specific to the follower of the Sufi path, sālik. Accordingly, the
Sufis established a relationship between them and their disciples, which consists of
hiding their secrets and sticking to privacy in their spiritual practice. In doing so, they
are motivated by fear of causing the misunderstanding of those who do not grasp
their purposes, maqāṣid. Al-Shāṭibī maintains that there is no need to reproach them
of hiding their secrets because we know that this is their principle, aṣl (al-Shāṭibī
1980, Vol. III, p. 335).
At this stage, al-Shāṭibī expects objection on his usage of aṣl since the princi-
ples, uṣūl of Sunnis are supposed to be the same. If the Sufis have their principles,
they should be different from those of the mainstream. To make his point, he goes
back to the beginnings of Islam in a quest for hermeneutic unity. Before the migra-
tion from Mecca to Medina, he reminded his audience, Muslims were attached to the
obligations of the Meccan revelation. They strictly followed its instructions. As a re-
sult, they reached a high level of piety. When they went to Medina, they maintained
their behaviour and have accomplished the elements of faith, shu‘ab al-īmān and the
virtues of morality, makārim al-akhlāq. Because of that, the first generation of Mus-
lims became a light, nūr, a guide and a model for the Muslim community. They kept
in their spiritual struggle and in total submission to the limits of Islamic law. While
they were not moved by the legal permissions, rukhaṣ offered by Islamic law to Mus-
lims in Medina, the majority of Muslims benefit from these indulgences (al-Shāṭibī
1980, Vol. IV, p. 239).
Based on this criterion, al-Shāṭibī calls those who adopted the first way the
blessed ones. For him, those who followed the second way, and decide to enjoy the
legal permissions, simply did what is expected from common people. The Sufis have
followed the first path and the rest of the people followed the second (al-Shāṭibī 1980,
Vol. IV, p. 239). If, mistakenly, some people would think that the Sufis are practising
sharī‘a rigorously, going even beyond what is asked from them, then the Sufis are
innocent, al-Shāṭibī asserts (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. IV, p. 239). He asks rhetorically:
how could they do such things knowing that they established their doctrine, niḥla on
the sunna ? (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. IV, p. 239). His concluding argument is that the
people of the Prophetic tradition, ahl al-sunna agree that the Sufis are the elite of God
among his creatures, ṣafwat Allāh min al-khalīqa (al-Shāṭibī 1980, Vol. IV, p. 239).
Thus, al-Shāṭibī leaves no doubt about his compassion, admiration and esteem for
Sufism.
That being the case, the reasons that might lead al-Shāṭibī to pro-Sufism are
manifold. Markedly, he adopted a rigid moralist view that could be explained by his
Granadian context, his Mālikī juridical school or by his theological conservatism. He
was fascinated by the moral conduct of Sufis, especially by their soul purification,

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altruism, and rigour rather than by the theoretical tenets of Sufism. As such, he could
have been influenced by al-Ghazzālī’s readjustment of the relation between fiqh and
taṣawwuf where the latter assures the purpose of the former. Finally, he could have
been the mirror of his time were a rapprochement took place in most of the parts in
the Muslim world between the Sufis and the jurists.
So far, it has been demonstrated that al-Shāṭibī, who represents the Andalusian
Mālikī juristic school, praises Sufism for being a perfect model of understanding and
applying Islamic law. Let me now turn to al-Shaykh Aḥmad Zarrūq, a Sufi who lived
in the other side of the Gibraltar, to explore his views on the connection between
Sufism and fiqh.

3. Sufism as a Normative Authority of Islamic Law:

The Case of Zarrūq

With Aḥmad Zarrūq, the author of Qawā‘id al-taṣawwuf (Rules of Sufism), Sufism
came even to claim supremacy over fiqh. In this regard, Zarrūq taught a Sufism based
on the “interiority of the behaviour in agreement with Islam law” (Geoffroy 2005, p.
162). Not only Zarrūq went beyond a mere complementarity between fiqh and taṣaw-
wuf, but, as it will be elaborated here, represents a case of Sufism aspiring to the role
of normative authority of fiqh. In addition to his Rules of Sufism, Zarrūq wrote
a famous commentary on al-Muqaddima al-waghlīsiyya by Abū Zayd al-Waghlīsī
(d. 1384), a synthesis of fiqh and taṣawwuf from the Mālikī point of view.
Zarrūq made it clear in the fourteenth rule of Qawā‘id al-taṣawwuf, that he be-
lieves in the superiority of taṣawwuf over the rest of religious sectors of knowledge,
afḍaliyyat ‘ilm al-taṣawwuf ‘alā ghayrih. In his argumentation for this pre-eminence,
he relies on the premise that the value of a thing comes from the value of its purpose.
Knowing that the purpose of taṣawwuf is the fear of God, it follows that there is no
more superior value than that of taṣawwuf. In addition, the fear of God is superior to
rituals (fiqh), as he said, because it is a prelude to the implementation of divine orders
(Zarrūq 2004, p. 27). It is obvious here that Zarrūq uses a purpose based approach,
maqāṣid. He stated the authority of Sufism over fiqh by making the latter an instru-
ment that leads to the former.
In the twentieth rule, Zarrūq concedes that fiqh and taṣawwuf are two siblings
in their guidance to God’s orders and rights. Since both of them have common prin-
ciples, uṣūl, they should be similar in their judgments, aḥkām. Thus, they are governed
by the same rule of perfection and imperfection as neither of them is more entitled in
guidance than the other. Nevertheless, since practice (fiqh) is a requirement for the
perfection of knowledge and not a requirement of its validity, the absence of practice
does not imply the absence of knowledge (taṣawwuf). In fact, for him knowledge may
exist without practice because knowledge is the guide of practice. Thus, it is prior in
its existence, both in judgment, ḥukm, and finality, ḥikma. God affirms knowledge
both for those who fear Him (believers) and those who do not (unbelievers) (Zarrūq
2004, p. 33).

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454 ABDESSAMAD BELHAJ

Even more, Zarrūq argues in the twenty-sixth rule, that “the Sufi among the
jurists is more perfect than the jurist among the Sufis. Fiqh is a matter for the public
since its purpose is to establish institutions of religion, to increase its influence and to
spread its message” (Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). In other words, fiqh helps sharī‘a to rule
the Muslim societies. More importantly, Zarrūq goes on to say that, “taṣawwufis
a particular matter of the elite because it deals with the relationship between the
servant and his Master” (Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). At this point, Zarrūq draws on al-Shāṭi-
bī’s frequent distinction between the public and the Sufi practice of sharī‘a. For this
reason, “it is admissible, for him, that the jurist forbids the wrong whereas the Sufi
cannot do the same” since it goes beyond his sphere of authority. On the one hand,
Zarrūq states that “taṣawwuf needs fiqh in the regulations and realities of things, al-
ahkām wa-’l-ḥaqā’iq” (Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). On the other hand, he makes it clear that
“taṣawwufis higher in rank than fiqh, a‘lā minhu rutba” (Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). His rea-
soning is based on the assumption that the idea is superior to reality. As a jurist, he
knows that taṣawwuf is a normative language but cannot be a pragmatic common dis-
course that can regulate daily matters. Consequently, he asserts that “fiqh is safer and
its interest is more general, aslam wa-a‘amm maṣlaḥa” (Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). There-
fore, if the Sufi among the jurists is more complete, it is “because he accomplished
his mystic experience in his spiritual state, ḥāl, in his practice, ‘amal, and in his spiri-
tual taste, dhawq” (Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). This is not the case of the jurist among the
Sufis who masters his spiritual state and taste but has no accomplishment in practice
(Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). He states that “it is impossible to reach harmony unless one
masters two things: fiqh ṣaḥīḥ, accurate jurisprudence and dhawq ṣarīḥ, a genuine
taste. Neither is useful without the other, just like a doctor who does not rely only on
his experience or his knowledge” (Zarrūq 2004, p. 40). So, both fiqh and Sufism are
required.
Finally, it should be noted here that Zarrūq dedicated his sixty-second rule to
the relationship between legal words and meanings. For him, “a legal term is to be
considered [in light of] its meaning and meaning is to be taken from the term” (Zar-
rūq 2004, p. 89). In this section, Zarrūq provides an example of his legal herme-
neutics. He explicated an interesting analogy where every seeker, ṭālib who takes care
more of words than meanings, loses the grasping of meanings. Similarly, no seeker
who neglects the terms can get the meanings. On the other hand, he who is content to
understand what the term means literally (fiqh), without going deep in his reading,
would get a close and useful understanding. If he adds to the understanding of the
meaning a reflection on its truth, he achieves accomplishment, taḥqīq (Zarrūq 2004,
p. 89). On the scale of hermeneutical stages, the latter is application which is achieved
only by Sufis.

Conclusion

The argument of Zarrūq for the authority of Sufism over fiqh can be seen as a triumph
of the former. As a Sufi and Mālikī jurist, he defends the need for a spiritualised legal

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 SUFISM AS ISLAMIC LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 455

interpretation. While al-Shāṭibī did not endorse overtly Sufism as a way of life and
remained fiqhī oriented, Zarrūq argued for taṣawwuf as an accomplished understand-
ing of legal provisions. With him, Sufism is not only a model of application, as al-
Shāṭibī perceives it, but the inherent spirit of Islamic law. At any rate, both authors
incarnate a Mālikī extension of the Shāfi‘ī– Sufi synthesis achieved by al-Ghazzālī.
Above all, it was shown that the main concern of al-Shāṭibī and Zarrūq was
hermeneutic disunity. Thus, they attempted, each adopting a convenient discourse to
his audience, to meld the broken hermeneutic unity. They identified the cause of
disagreement between taṣawwuf and fiqh in the separation of the letter and the spirit
of law in early Islam. For them, unity should be based on the intents and application.
While, in later Islam, Sufism was no more striving to secure itself as a concurrent
legal interpretation of sharī‘a, it slowly developed from a movement of adaptation
and convergence (toward fiqh) to a necessary component of any Muslim legal
hermeneutics.

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