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Cetus Devt Inc VS Ca
Cetus Devt Inc VS Ca
* FIRST DIVISION.
*
G.R. No. 77645. August 7,1989.
73
CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS and EDERLINA NAVALTA, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 77648. August 7, 1989. VOL. 176, AUGUST 7, 1989 73
CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of
APPEALS and ONG TENG, respondents. Appeals
*
G.R. No. 77649. August 7, 1989. partakes of an extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued
before resorting to judicial action so much so that when there is full
CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF compliance with the demand, there arises no necessity for court
APPEALS and JOSE LIWANAG, respondents. action.
Same; Same; Same; Existence of cause of action gives the lessor
*
G.R. No. 77650. August 7, 1989. the right under Article 1659 of the New Civil Code to ask for the
rescission of the contract of lease and indemnification for damages
or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force; where
CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF rescission is clearly the option taken, the whole that has been
APPEALS and LEANDRO CANLAS, respondents. followed in our jurisdiction is that both demands to pay rent and to
vacate are necessary to make a lessee a deforciant in order that an
*
ejectment suit may be filed.—As to whether this demand is merely a
G.R. No. 77651. August 7, 1989.
demand to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease or
also a demand to vacate, the answer can be gleaned from said
CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF Section 2. This section presupposes the existence of a cause of
APPEALS and VICTORIA SUDARIO, respondents. action for unlawful detainer as it speaks of “failure to pay rent due
or comply with the conditions of the lease.” The existence of said
*
cause of action gives the lessor the right under Article 1659 of the
G.R. No. 77652. August 7, 1989.
New Civil Code to ask for the rescission of the contract of lease and
indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the
CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF contract to remain in force. Accordingly, if the option chosen is for
APPEALS and FLORA NAGBUYA, respondents. specific performance, then the demand referred to is obviously to
pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease violated. —Petitioner has not shown that its case falls on any of the following
However, if rescission is the option chosen, the demand must be for exceptions where demand is not required: (a) when the obligation or
the lessee to pay rents or to comply with the conditions of the lease the law so declares; (b) when from the nature and circumstances of
and to vacate. Accordingly, the rule that has been followed in our the obligation it can be inferred that time is of the essence of the
jurisprudence where rescission is clearly the option taken, is that contract; and (c) when demand would be useless, as when the
both demands to pay rent and to vacate are necessary to make a obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.
lessee a deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. Same; Same; Same; Same; Demand required in Article 1169 of
Same; Same; Same; There are two requisites for bringing an the Civil Code may be in any form provided it can be proved; This
ejectment suit.—Thus, for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, demand is different from the demand required under Section 2, Rule
two requisites must concur, namely: (1) there must be failure to pay 70 which is merely a jurisdictional requirement.—The demand
rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be required in Article 1169 of the Civil Code may be in any form,
demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods provided that it can be proved. The proof of this demand lies upon
specified in Section 2, Rule 70, namely 15 days in case of lands and the creditor. Without such demand, oral or written, the effects of
5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence default do not arise. This demand is different from the demand
of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers required under Section 2, Rule 70, which is merely a jurisdictional
to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause requirement before an existing cause of action may be pursued.
of action may be pursued. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Record fails to show proof
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the case at bar, no cause of action that petitioner demanded payment of the rentals when the obligation
for ejectment has accrued.—It is very clear that in the case at bar, matured; There being no accrued cause of action for ejectment,
no cause of action for ejectment has accrued. There was no failure petitioner’s demand to vacate was premature.—The facts on record
yet on the fail to show proof that petitioner demanded the payment of the
rentals when the obligation matured. Coupled with the fact that no
74 collector was sent as previously done in the past, the private
respondents cannot be held guilty of mora solvendi or delay in the
payment of rentals. Thus, when petitioner first demanded the
payment of the 3-month arrearages and private respondents lost no
time in making tender and payment, which petitioner accepted, no
74 SUPREME COURT
cause of action for ejectment accrued. Hence, its demand to vacate
REPORTS ANNOTATED was premature as it was an exercise of a non-existing right to
rescind.
Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals 75
part of private respondents to pay rents for three consecutive VOL. 176, AUGUST 7, 1989 75
months. As the terms of the individual verbal leases which were on
a month-to-month basis were not alleged and proved, the general Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of
rule on necessity of demand applies, to wit: there is default in the
fulfillment of an obligation when the creditor demands payment at
Appeals
the maturity of the obligation or at anytime thereafter. This is
explicit in Article 1169, New Civil Code which provides that “(t)hose Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the right of rescission exists,
obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time payment of the arrearages in rental after the demand to pay and to
the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the vacate does not extinguish the cause of action for ejectment.—In
fulfillment of their obligation.” contradistinction, where the right of rescission exists, payment of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner has not shown that the arrearages in rental after the demand to pay and to vacate
the case falls on any of the exceptions where demand is not required. under Section 2, Rule 70 does not extinguish the cause of action for
ejectment as the lessor is not only entitled to recover the unpaid MEDIALDEA, J.:
rents but also to eject the lessee.
Same; Same; Same; Argument that acceptance of tendered This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
payment does not constitute a waiver of the cause of action for dated January 30, 1987 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
ejectment especially when accepted with the written condition that it Nos. SP-07945-50 entitled, “Cetus Development, Inc.,
was without prejudice to the filing of an ejectment suit, correct.— Petitioner vs. Hon. Conrado T. Limcaoco, Presiding Judge,
Petitioner correctly argues that acceptance of tendered payment Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, Ederlina
does not constitute a waiver of the cause of action for ejectment Navalta, et. al., respondents.”
especially when accepted with the written condition that it was The following facts appear in the records:
“without prejudice to the filing of an ejectment suit”. Indeed, it is
The private respondents, Ederlina Navalta, Ong Teng,
illogical or ridiculous not to accept the tender of payment of rentals
merely to preserve the right to file an action for unlawful detainer.
Jose Liwanag, Leandro Canlas, Victoria Sudario, and Flora
However, this line of argument presupposes that a cause of action Nagbuya were the lessees of the premises located at No. 512
for ejectment has already accrued, which is not true in the instant Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, originally owned by the
case. Susana Realty. These individual verbal leases were on a
Same; Same; Same; Same; It could not be said that private
month-to-month basis at the following rates: Ederlina
respondents were in default in the payment of their rentals as the Navalta at the rate of P80.50; Ong Teng at the rate of
delay in paying the same was not imputable to them but to P96.10; Jose Liwanag at the rate of P40.35; Leandro Canlas
petitioner’s omission or neglect to collect.—Petitioner likewise claims at the rate of P80.55; Victoria Sudario at the rate of P50.45
that its failure to send a collector to collect the rentals cannot be and Flora Nagbuya at the rate of P80.55. The payments of
considered a valid defense for the reason that sending a collector is the rentals were paid by the lessees to a collector of the
not one of the obligations of the lessor under Article 1654. While it Susana Realty who went to the premises monthly.
is true that a lessor is not obligated to send a collector, it has been Sometime in March, 1984, the Susana Realty sold the
duly established that it has been customary for private respondents leased premises to the petitioner, Cetus Development, Inc., a
to pay the rentals through a collector. Besides Article 1257, New
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Civil Code provides that where no agreement has been designated
for the payment of the rentals, the place of payment is at the
the Philippines. From April to June, 1984, the private
domicile of the defendants. Hence, it could not be said that they respondents continued to pay their monthly rentals to a
were in default in the payment of their rentals as the delay in collector sent by the petitioner. In the succeeding months of
paying the same was not imputable to them. Rather, it was July, August and September 1984, the respondents failed to
attributable to petitioner’s omission or neglect to collect. pay their monthly individual rentals as no collector came.
On October 9, 1984, the petitioner sent a letter to each of
PETITIONS for certiorari to review the decision of the Court the private respondents demanding that they vacate the
of Appeals. subject premises and to pay the back rentals for the months
of July, August and September, 1984, within fifteen (15) days
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. from the receipt thereof. Immediately upon the receipt of the
76 said demand letters on October 10, 1984, the private
respondents paid their respective arrearages in rent which
were accepted by the petitioner subject to the unilateral
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS condition that the acceptance was without prejudice to the
ANNOTATED filing of an ejectment suit. Subsequent monthly rental
payments were likewise accepted by the petitioner under the
Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of
same condition.
Appeals
77
VOL. 176, AUGUST 7, 1989 77 letter, removes its cause of action in an unlawful detainer case,
even if the acceptance was without prejudice.
Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of “x x x.
Appeals “Furthermore, the court has observed that the account involved
78
For failure of the private respondents to vacate the premises
as demanded in the letter dated October 9, 1984, the
petitioner filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila 78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
complaints for ejectment against the former, as follows: (1) ANNOTATED
105972-CV, against Ederlina Navalta; (2) 105973-CV, Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of
against Jose Liwanag; (3) 105974-CV, against Flora
Appeals
Nagbuya; (4) 105975-CV, against Leandro Canlas; (5)
105976-CV, against Victoria Sudario and (6) 105977-CV,
against Ong Teng. which constitutes the rentals of the tenants are relatively small
to which the ejectment may not lie on grounds of equity and for
In their respective answers, the six (6) private
humanitarian reasons.
respondents interposed a common defense. They claimed “Defendants’ counterclaim for litigation expenses has no legal
that since the occupancy of the premises they paid their and factual basis for assessing the same against plaintiff.
monthly rental regularly through a collector of the lessor; “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing these
that their non-payment of the rentals for the months of July, cases, without pronouncement as to costs.
August and September, 1984, was due to the failure of the “Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise dismissed.
petitioner (as the new owner) to send its collector; that they “SO ORDERED.” (pp. 32-33, Rollo, G.R. No. 77647)
were at a loss as to where they should pay their rentals; that
sometime later, one of the respondents called the office of the Not satisfied with the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
petitioner to inquire as to where they would make such Court, the petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
payments and he was told that a collector would be sent to Manila and the same was assigned to Branch IX thereof
receive the same; that no collector was ever sent by the presided over by Judge Conrado T. Limcaoco (now Associate
petitioner; and that instead they received a uniform demand Justice of the Court of Appeals). In its decision dated
letter dated October 9, 1984. November 19, 1985, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
The private respondents, thru counsel, later filed a motion appeal for lack of merit.
for consolidation of the six cases and as a result thereof, the In due time, a petition for review of the decision of the
said cases were consolidated in the Metropolitan Trial Court Regional Trial Court was filed by the petitioner with the
of Manila, Branch XII, presided over by Judge Eduardo S. Court of Appeals. Said petition was dismissed on January 30,
Quintos, Jr. On June 4, 1985, the trial court rendered its 1987, for lack of merit.
decision dismissing the six cases, a pertinent portion of Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which reads, as follows: petitioner now comes to Us in this petition, assigning the
following errors:
“The records of this case show that at the time of the filing of this
complaint, the rentals had all been paid. Hence, the plaintiff cannot ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
eject the defendants from the leased premises, because at the time
these cases were instituted, there are no rentals in arrears. “I
“The acceptance of the back rental by the plaintiff before the
“RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
filing of the complaint, as in these case, the alleged rental
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
arrearages were paid immediately after receipt of the demand
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IN THESE action against a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to comply with
CASES DID NOT EXIST WHEN THE COMPLAINTS WERE the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay
FILED BECAUSE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TENDERED, AND such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen (15)
PETITIONER ACCEPTED, THE PAYMENT OF THE THREE (3) days or five (5) days in case of building, after demand therefor,
MONTHS RENTAL IN ARREARS WITHIN THE FIFTEEN (15) made upon him personally, or by serving written notice of such
DAY PERIOD FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ RECEIPT OF demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such
PETITIONER’S DEMAND LETTERS TO VACATE THE SUBJECT notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon.”
PREMISES AND TO PAY THE RENTALS IN ARREARS.
It interpreted the said provision as follows:
79
“x x x the right to bring an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer
must be counted from the time the defendants failed to pay
VOL. 176, AUGUST 7, 1989 79
80
Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
“II ANNOTATED
rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there
must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within 82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the periods specified in Section 2, Rule 70, namely 15 days in ANNOTATED
case of lands and 5 days in case of buildings. The first
requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for Cetus Development, Inc. vs. Court of
unlawful detainer while the second refers to the Appeals
jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said
cause of action may be pursued. month arrearages and private respondents lost no time in
It is very clear that in the case at bar, no cause of action making tender and payment, which petitioner accepted, no
for ejectment has accrued. There was no failure yet on the cause of action for ejectment accrued. Hence, its demand to
part of private respondents to pay rents for three consecutive vacate was premature as it was an exercise of a non-existing
months. As the terms of the individual verbal leases which right to rescind.
were on a month-to-month basis were not alleged and In contradistinction, where the right of rescission exists,
proved, the general rule on necessity of demand applies, to payment of the arrearages in rental after the demand to pay
and to vacate under Section 2, Rule 70 does not extinguish reason that would constitute mora accipiendi and warrant
the cause of action for ejectment as the lessor is not only consignation. There was simply lack of demand for payment
entitled to recover the unpaid rents but also to eject the of the rentals.
lessee. In sum, We hold that respondent Court of Appeals did not
Petitioner correctly argues that acceptance of tendered commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
payment does not constitute a waiver of the cause of action jurisdiction in its conclusion affirming the trial court’s
for ejectment especially when accepted with the written decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of cause of
condition that it was “without prejudice to the filing of an action. We do not agree, however, with the reasons relied
ejectment suit”. Indeed, it is illogical or ridiculous not to upon.
accept the tender of payment of rentals merely to preserve ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is
the right to file an action for unlawful detainer. However, hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the decision dated
this line of argument presupposes that a cause of action for January 30, 1987 of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
ejectment has already accrued, which is not true in the AFFIRMED.
instant case. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner likewise claims that its failure to send a
collector to collect the rentals cannot be considered a valid Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino,
defense for the reason that sending a collector is not one of JJ., concur.
the obligations of the lessor under Article 1654. While it is
true that a lessor is not obligated to send a collector, it has Petition denied; decision affirmed.
been duly established that it has been customary for private
Notes.—Possession of land becomes illegal only from the
respondents to pay the rentals through a collector. Besides
time demand to vacate the land is made. (Philippine
Article 1257, New Civil Code provides that where no
National Bank vs. Animas, 117 SCRA 735).
agreement has been designated for the payment of the
Ejectment is the proper remedy for refusal to vacate
rentals, the place of payment is at the domicile of the
premises. (Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877.)
defendants. Hence, it could not be said that they were in
default in the payment of their rentals as the delay in paying ——o0o——
the same was not imputable to them. Rather, it was
attributable to petitioner’s omission or neglect to collect. 84
Petitioner also argues that neither is its refusal to accept
the rentals a defense for non-payment as Article 1256
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
provides that “[i]f the creditor to whom the tender of
payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept ANNOTATED
it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the Dario vs. Mison
consignation of the thing due.” It bears emphasis that in this
case there was no unjustified refusal on the part of petitioner
or non-acceptance without
*
BADILLO, respondents.
90 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Political Law; Constitutional Commissions; Civil Service
Commission; Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Judgments of the Dario vs. Mison
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through
certiorari alone under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.—We reject,
finally, contentions that the Bureau’s petition (in G.R. 85310) raises Same; Same; Same; The Civil Service Commission is the sole
no jurisdictional questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil service.—We
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. We find observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on
that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison’s petition (in G.R. Elections and the Civil Service Commission (or the Commission on
85310) are, indeed, proper for certiorari, if by “jurisdictional Audit for that matter) in terms of the consitutional intent to leave
questions” we mean questions having to do with “an indifferent the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative
disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh to elections, with respect to the former, and the civil service, with
pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational respect to the latter (or the audit of government accounts, with
deliberation,” as distinguished from questions that require “digging respect to the Commission on Audit). As the poll body is the “sole
into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment” which is the judge” of all election cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the
office, on the other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules. single arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil service.
What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Certiorari; The jurisdiction of the
Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs employees
Supreme Court over cases emanating from the Civil Service
Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not only on Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction
the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by the or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.—It
general; these implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the
be said that—assuming that the Civil Service Commission erred— 1973 Charter, “any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
the Commission committed a plain “error of judgment” that Aratuc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari”, which, as
says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari Aratuc tells us, “technically connotes something less than saying
or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc—as that the same ‘shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court,’ ”
regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for review under Rule
Service Commission—which is that judgments of the Commission 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil
may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Aratuc, we declared: It is jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
once evident for these constitutional and statutory modifications excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule
that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role 65.
of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional
body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 6656; Since RA
elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to 6656 provides that judgments of the Civil Service Commission are
have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, final and unappealable, certiorari therefore lies under Rule 65 in the
orders and rulings of the Commission “subject to review by the absence of appeal.—While Republic Act No. 6656 states that
Supreme Court”. And since instead of maintaining that provision judgments of the Commission are “final and executory” and hence,
intact, it ordained that the Commission’s actuations be instead unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence
“brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari”, We cannot insist that of an appeal. Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison’s petition
there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering (G.R. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil Service Commission
that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari,
known in remedial law. although it may not have so stated in explicit terms.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for and should be ordinarily regarded as such.—There are a few points
Reconsideration; A motion for reconsideration should preface a about Arroyo that have to be explained. First, the opinion expressed
resort to a special civil action.—As we stated, under the therein that “[b]y virtue of said provision the reorganization of the
Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty days within which to Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue
challenge “any decision, even after the ratification of this constitution and career civil
service employees may be separated from the service without cause
91 as a result of such reorganization” is in the nature of an obiter
dictum. We dismissed Jose’s petition primarily because it was
“clearly premature, speculative, and purely anticipatory, based
merely on newspaper reports which do not show any direct or
threatened injury,” it appearing that the reorganization of the
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8, 1989 91 Bureau of Customs had not been, then, set in motion. Jose therefore
had no cause for complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the
Dario vs. Mison
92
101
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs
Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of
“Guidelines on the 12
Implementation of Reorganization VOL. 176, AUGUST 8, 1989 101
Executive Orders,” prescribing the procedure in personnel
placement. It also provided:
Dario vs. Mison
1. By February 28, 1988, all employees covered by In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated
Executive Order 127 and the grace period extended to list compiled by the Civil Service Commission so that you may be
the Bureau of Customs by the President of the given priority for future employment with the Government as the
Philippines on reorganization shall be: need arises.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON
a) informed of their re-appointment, or 15
Commissioner
As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients 17. PABLO B. 45. ALBANO,
of these notices: SANTOS ROBERT B.
1. CESAR DARIO 18. FERMIN 46. ALCANTARA,
2. VICENTE 30. LEONCIA RODRIGUEZ JOSE G.
FERIA, JR. CATRE 19. DALISAY 47. ALMARIO,
3. ADOLFO 31. ROBERTO BAUTISTA RODOLFO F.
CASARENO ABADA 20. LEONARDO 48. ALVEZ,
4. PACIFICO 32. ABACA, JOSE ROMUALDO R.
LAGLEVA SISINIO T. 21. ALBERTO 49. AMISTAD,
5. JULIAN C. 33. ABAD, LONTOK RUDY M.
ESPIRITU ROGELIO C. 22. PORFIRIO 50. AMOS,
6. DENNIS A. 34. ABADIANO, TABINO FRANCIS F.
AZARRAGA JOSE P. 23. JOSE 51. ANDRES,
7. RENATO DE 35. ABCEDE, BARREDO RODRIGO V.
JESUS NEMECIO C. 24. ROBERTO 52. ANGELES,
8. NICASIO C. 36. ABIOG, ELY F. ARNALDO RICARDO S.
GAMBOA 25. ESTER TAN 53. ANOLIN,
9. CORAZON 37. ABLAZA, MILAGROS H.
RALLOS NIEVES AURORA M. 26. PEDRO BAKAL 54. AQUINO,
10. FELICITACION 38. AGBAYANI, PASCASIO E. L.
R. GELUZ NELSON I. 27. ROSARIO 55. ARABE,
11. LEODEGARIO 39. AGRES, DAVID MELINDA M.
H. FLORESCA ANICETO 28. RODOLFO 56. ARCANGEL,
12. SUBAER 40. AGUILAR, AFUANG AGUSTIN S., JR.
PACASUM FLOR 29. LORENZO 57. ARPON,
13. ZENAIDA 41. AGUILUCHO, CATRE ULPIANO U., JR.
LANARIA MA. TERESA R. 58. ARREZA,
14. JOSE B. ORTIZ 42. AGUSTIN, ARTEMIO M., JR.
BONIFACIO T. 59. ARROJO,
15. GLICERIO R. 43. ALANO, ALEX ANTONIO P.
DOLAR P.
_______________
16. CORNELIO 44. ALBA, MAXIMO
NAPA F. JR.
15 Rollo, G.R. No. 81954, 24; rollo, G.R. No. 81967, 27; rollo, G.R. No.
82023, 37; see also rollo, id., G.R. No. 85310, 8. 73. BERNARDO, 120. DUAY, JUANA
ROMEO D. G.
102
74. BERNAS, 121. DYSANGCO,
MARCIANO S. RENATO F.
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED 75. BOHOL, 122. EDILLOR,
AUXILIADOR G. ALFREDO P.
Dario vs. Mison
76. BRAVO, 123. ELEVAZO,
60. ARVISU, 107. DE GUZMAN, VICTOR M. LEONARDO A.
ALEXANDER S. ANTONIO A. 77. BULEG, 124. ESCUYOS,
61. ASCAÑO, 108. DE GUZMAN, BALILIS R. MANUEL M., JR.
ANTONIO T. RENATO E. 78. CALNEA, 125. ESMERIA,
62. ASLAHON, 109. DE LA CRUZ, MERCEDES M. ANTONIO E.
JULAHON P. AMADO A., JR. 79. CALVO, 126. ESPALDON,
63. ASUNCION, 110. DE LA CRUZ, HONESTO G. MA. LOURDES H.
VICTOR R. FRANCISCO C. 80. CAMACHO, 127. ESPINA,
64. ATANGAN, 111. DE LA PEÑA, CARLOS V. FRANCO A.
LORNA S. LEONARDO 81. CAMPOS, 128. ESTURCO,
65. ATIENZA, 112. DEL CAMPO, RODOLFO C. RODOLFO C.
ALEXANDER R. ORLANDO 82. CAPULONG, 129. EVANGELINO,
66. BACAL, 113. DEL RIO, RODRIGO G. FERMIN I.
URSULINO C. MAMERTO P., JR. 83. CARINGAL, 130. FELIX,
67. BAÑAGA, 114. DEMESA, GRACIA Z. ERNESTO G.
MARLOWE Z. WILHELMINA T. 84. CARLOS, 131. FERNANDEZ,
68. BANTA, 115. DIMAKUTA, LORENZO B. ANDREW M.
ALBERTO T. SALIC L. 85. CARRANTO, 132. FERRAREN,
69. BARROS, 116. DIZON, FIDEL U. ANTONIO C.
VICTOR C. FELICITAS A. 86. 133. FERRERA,
70. BARTOLOME, 117. DOCTOR, CARUNGCONG, WENCESLAO A.
FELIPE A. HEIDY M. ALFREDO M.
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the VOL. 176, AUGUST 8, 1989 107
Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting
on the motion, the Civil Service 19Commission, on September Dario vs. Mison
20, 1988, denied reconsideration.
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted tion has been docketed herein as G.R. No. 86241. The
certiorari proceedings with this Court, docketed, as above- employees ordered to be reinstated are Senen Dimaguila,
stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this Court. Romeo Arabe, 21Bernardo Quintong, Gregorio Reyes, and
On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission Romulo Badillo.
further disposed the appeal (from the resolution of the On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, “AN ACT TO
Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees, PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL
holding as follows: SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
IMPLEMENTATION 22 OF GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION,” was signed into law. Under Section
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of 7, thereof:
comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of Customs
without loss of seniority rights; and Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service
Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned from
this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may
the date of their illegal termination based on the rates
be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the
under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower than
period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers
their former salaries. This action of the Commission should
and employees, including casuals and temporary employees, who
not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the herein
have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled
appellants from any accusation of any wrongdoing and
thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and
therefore, their reappointments are without prejudice to:
other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the
date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of the
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending
receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be:
administrative cases, if any, and where investigations have
Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no
been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions;
action thereon has been made by the corresponding department or
and
agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month
appellant with derogatory reports or information, if any, and salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement
if evidence so warrants. benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the
23
20 department or agency concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio,
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the customs examiners appointed by Commissioner Mison
Civil Service Commission’s Resolution in this Court; his peti- pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this
controversy, petitioned the Court to contest the validity of
_______________ the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 83737.
18 Rollo, id., G.R. No. 85310, 79; also rollo, G.R. No. 85335, 36.
19 Rollo, id., G.R. No. 85310, 424. _______________
21 Senen Dimaguila and Romulo Badillo earlier instituted in this
government reorganization may 24
be legitimately undertaken,
Court G.R. Nos. 81968 and 81955 but were allowed, by our Resolution of
July 5, 1988, to withdraw and join the appeal subject of the Civil Service
subject to certain conditions.
Commission’s Resolution of November 11, 1988. See rollo, G.R. No. 82023, The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the
169. validity of a reorganization per se, the only question being,
22 84 O.G. Supp. 1-4 (June, 1988).
23 Supra, 3.
as shall be later seen: What is the nature and extent of this
government reorganization?
108 The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
_______________
ANNOTATED
24 CONST. (1987), art. XVIII, sec. 16.
Dario vs. Mison
109
Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders 549, 551-552.
27 Pres. Decree No. 807, sec. 39. The provision reads: “Appeals.—(a)
decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by
lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition
government. It should also be noted that under the present for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided
Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a within fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining
office, which shall forward the records of the case, together with the notice of
appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of the questions that require “digging into the merits and
35
notice of appeal, with its comment, if any. The notice of appeal shall
specifically state the date of the decision appealed from and the date of
unearthing errors of judgment” which is the office, on the
receipt thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the grounds relied other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said
upon for excepting from the decision; (b) A petition for reconsideration shall
be based only on any of the following grounds: (1) new evidence has been
_______________
discovered which materially affects the decision rendered; (2) the decision is
not supported by the evidence on record; or (3) errors of law or irregularities Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the respondent: Provided, matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
That only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained.” for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
28 Rep. Act No. 6656, supra, sec. 8. The provision reads: “Sec. 8. An officer
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
or employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
authority may further appeal within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to the otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
Civil Service Commission which shall render a decision thereon within ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
thirty (30) days and whose decision shall be final and executory.” certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
29 CONST., art. IX, sec. 7. The provision reads: “Sec. 7. Each
thereof.”
30 Rollo, id., G.R. No. 85310, 82.
110 31 Id., 415.
32 CONST. (1987), supra.
33 See Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-49705-09, 49717-21,
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251.
ANNOTATED 34 Supra, 271.
35 Supra.
The records show that the Bureau of Customs had until July
15, 1988 to ask for reconsideration or come to this Court VOL. 176, AUGUST 8, 1989 111
pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 807. The Dario vs. Mison
records likewise show that the Solicitor General 30
filed a
motion for reconsideration on July 15, 1988. The Civil
Service Commission issued its Resolution denying Rules. What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the
reconsideration on September 20, 1988; a copy of this Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of
Resolution was received by the Bureau on September 23, Customs employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has
31
1988. Hence the Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to implications not only on the entire reorganization process
32
elevate the matter on certiorari to this Court. Since the decreed no less than by the Provisional Constitution, but on
Bureau’s petition was filed on October 20, 1988, it was filed the Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are
on time. of such a magnitude that it cannot be said that—assuming
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau’s petition that the Civil Service Commission erred—the Commission
(in G.R. 85310) raises no jurisdictional questions, and is committed a plain “error of judgment” that Aratuc says
therefore bereft of any basis as 33a petition for certiorari under cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. We find that the questions or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc
raised in Commissioner Mison’s petition (in G.R. 85310) are, —as regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of
indeed, proper for certiorari, if by “jurisdictional questions” the Civil Service Commission—which is that judgments of
we mean questions having to do with “an indifferent the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at In Aratuc, we declared:
34
without rational deliberation,” as distinguished from
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of
modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari
independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of under Rule 65.
free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new
While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the
Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what 40
Commission are “final and executory” and hence,
it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission “subject to review by the Supreme Court”. And since unappealable, under 41Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the
instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the absence of an appeal.
Commission’s actuations be instead “brought to the Supreme Court Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison’s petition
on certiorari”, We cannot insist that there was no intent to change (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil Service
the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope 36
of Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject
certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law. of certiorari, although it may not have so stated in explicit
terms.
We observe no fundamental difference between the As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of
Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission time, we reiterate that it has been filed seasonably. It is to be
(or the Commission on Audit for that matter) in terms of the stressed that the Solicitor General had thirty days from
constitutional intent to leave the constitutional bodies alone September 23, 1988 (the date the Resolution, dated
in the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with respect September 20, 1988, of the Civil Service Commission,
to the former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter denying reconsideration, was received) to commence the
(or the audit of government accounts, with respect to the instant certiorari proceedings. As we stated, under the
Commission Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty
_______________ _______________
36 Aratuc, supra, 270. 37 CONST. (1987), supra, art. IX(c), sec. 2(2). To be more precise, the 1987
37
on Audit). As the poll body is the “sole judge” of all election VOL. 176, AUGUST 8, 1989 113
cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the single arbiter of
all controversies pertaining to the civil service. Dario vs. Mison
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution,
as under the 1973 Charter, “any decision, order, or ruling of days within
42
which to challenge “any decision, order, or
each Commission
38
may be brought to the Supreme Court on ruling” of the Commission. To say that the period should be
certiorari,” which, as Aratuc tells us, “technically connotes counted from the Solicitor’s receipt of the main Resolution,
something less than saying that 39the same ‘shall be subject to dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should not have asked
review by the Supreme Court,’ ” which in turn suggests an for reconsideration. But to say that is to deny him the right
appeal by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our to contest (by a motion for reconsideration) any ruling, other
jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service than the main decision, when, precisely, the Constitution
gives him such a right. That is also to place him at a “no-win” twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and
situation because if he did not move for a reconsideration, he the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with
would have been faulted for demanding certiorari too early, regular appointments by him or by the President, as the case may
under the general rule that a motion for reconsideration be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or
43
who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the
should preface a resort to a special civil action. Hence, we
service. Those separated from the service shall receive the
must reckon the thirty-day period from receipt of the order of
retirement benefits to which they may be entitled under existing
denial. laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the
We come to the merits of these cases. equivalent of one month basic salary for every year of service, or the
equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of
G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335: highest salary received but in no case shall such payment exceed
the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin the
The Case for the Employees
separation/replacement44
of any officer or employee effected under
this Executive Order.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario, was one of the
Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have
relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. legally invoked. He avers that he could not have been legally
In essence, he questions the legality of his dismissal, which deemed to be an “[incumbent] whose [position] [is] not
he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of Executive 45
included therein or who [is] not reappointed” to justify his
Order No. 127, supra, hereinbelow reproduced as follows: separation from the service. He contends that neither the
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this
Executive Order (under the second paragraph of the section)
Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in nor the46 staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of
a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and Finance abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner
47
of
responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. Nor can it be
unless in the meantime they are separated from government service said, so he 48further maintains, that he had not been
pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the “reappointed” (under the second paragraph of the section)
Freedom Constitution. because “[r]eappointment therein presupposes that the
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry position to which it refers is a new one in lieu of that which
shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one has been abolished or although an49existing one, has absorbed
hundred that which has been abolished.” He claims, finally, that
under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss
_______________
public50 officials without cause ended on February 25,
42 CONST. (1987), art. IX, sec. 7, supra. 1987, and that thereafter, public officials enjoyed security of
43 Phil.
American Life Ins. Co. vs. Social Security Com., No. L-20383, May 24,
1967, 20 SCRA 162.
tenure under the provi-
114 _______________
44 Exec. Ord. No. 127, supra, sec. 59.
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 45 Supra.
46 Rollo, id., G.R. No. 81954, 36.
ANNOTATED 47 Exec. Ord. No. 127, supra, sec. 34; rollo, id., G.R. No. 81954.
48 Exec. Ord. No. 127, supra, sec. 59.
Dario vs. Mison 49 Rollo, id., G.R. No. 81954, 12; emphasis in the original.
50 CONST. (1986), Supra, art. IX, sec. 2.
115 _______________
51 CONST. (1987), supra, art. IX(B), sec. 2(3).
52 August 8, 1986.
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8, 1989 115 53 Supra, sec. 1(a).
54 G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 68 Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia, No. L-46585, February 8, 1988, 157
SCRA 1; De la Llana v. Alba, No. 57883, March 12, 1982, 112 SCRA
ANNOTATED 294; Cruz v. Primicias, Jr., No. L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998.
Dario vs. Mison 121
No. 127 already prevailing when Commissioner Mison took 130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
over the Customs helm, has not been successfully
85 ANNOTATED
contradicted. There is no showing that legitimate structural
changes have been made—or a reorganization actually Dario vs. Mison
undertaken, for that matter—at the Bureau since
Commissioner Mison assumed office, which would have
the Commissioner of Customs may “appoint all89 Bureau
validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can
personnel, except those appointed by the President.”
therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar
sense, say, of reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison could not
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
have validly terminated them, they being Presidential
functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
appointees.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been
separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them
86 rendered inoperative according to our holding in Palma-
with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent
Fernandez.
to “pack” the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive
defiance of the President’s directive to halt further lay-offs as
87 Order No. 127 had been on a mere holdover status cannot
a consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that
mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In
lay-offs should observe the procedure laid down by Executive
PalmaFernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
Order No. 17. We are not, of course, striking down Executive
Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the Constitution. While the The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner’s term
act is valid, still and
88
all, the means with which it was of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the
implemented is not. performance of her duties merely in a hold-over capacity and could
be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of.— rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over
capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution),
Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof, “[t]hose but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution
incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who became effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra,
are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the 90
said date the
service.” He submits that because the 394 removed personnel provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have
Commissioner Mison from carrying out a reorganization indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a challenge to the validity of
under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued91
that the Act,
such a reorganization should be subject to the criterion of insofar as it strengthens security of92tenure and as far as it
good faith. provides for a retroactive effect, runs counter to the
transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals
_________________ not for cause.
89 Supra. With respect to Vicente Feria, Jr., the records reveal that his
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for
appointment was extended on April 22, 1986. (G.R. No. 81967, id., 7.) For
reinstatement of employees separated 93
without “a valid cause
that reason, he cannot be said to be an “incumbent” for purposes of and after due notice and hearing” is not contrary to the
reorganization, to whom a reappointment may be issued. Because his transitory provisions of the new Constitution. The Court
appointment came after the promulgation of the Freedom Constitution, he reiterates that although the Charter’s transitory provisions
is, to all intents and purposes, an appointee as a result of reorganization.
90 Supra, 757. mention separations “not for cause,” separations thereunder
must nevertheless
131
_______________
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 131 91 Supra, sec. 9.
92 Supra, sec. 13.
Dario vs. Mison 93 Supra, sec. 2.
132
Resume.—
In resume, we restate as follows:
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1. The President could have validly removed ANNOTATED
government employees, elected or appointed, without
cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Dario vs. Mison
Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De Leon v.
Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not
supra); in this connection, Section 59 (on non- come about automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may
reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that the statute itself
127 cannot be a basis for termination; recognizes removals without cause. However, it also
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using the
separation and retirement benefits or upon their artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For
option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing
[1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9); unconstitutional about the Act.
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison’s
right to reorganize the Government resulting in the replacements would sustain. We also commisserate with
separation of career civil service employees [CONST. them. But our concern is the greater wrong inflicted on the
(1987), supra] provided, that such a reorganization is dismissed employees on account of their illegal separation
made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.) from the civil service.
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL
G.R. No. 83737 SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988,
SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED
IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8, 1989, “WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and proper
INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED. changes in the organizational and functional structures of the
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, national and local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities,
AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R. including government-owned and controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, in order to promote economy, efficiency and
NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE DISMISSED.
effectiveness in the delivery of public services
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO
x x x x x x x x x
REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A “Section 2. The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall
RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26, 1988. encompass, as necessary, the reorganization of the national and
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities including
MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS ARE government-owned or controlled corporations and their
ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE subsidiaries.
PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE x x x x x x” (Italics supplied)
PROVIDED BY LAW.
NO COSTS. Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986,
IT IS SO ORDERED. also known as the Freedom Constitution, declaring, in part,
in its Preamble as follows:
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortés, Griño-
WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of the
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Feliciano, Regalado, JJ., We government, x x x” (Italics supplied)
join Justice Melencio-Herrera in her dissent.
Melencio-Herrera, J., Please see attached dissent. and pertinently providing:
Cruz, J., See separate concurrence.
Padilla, J., No part, related to counsel for respondent “ARTICLE II
Abaca in G.R. No. 85310. “Section I
“x x x
133 “The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to:
“(a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 133 and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous
Dario vs. Mison
134
“Section 1. In the course of implementing Article III, Section 2 of “Section 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective
the Freedom Constitution, the Head of each Ministry shall see to it officials or those designated to replace them, presidential
that the separation or replacement of officers and employees is appointees, casual and contractual employees, or officials and
made only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate employees removed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the
dismissals of personnel in the career civil service whose Civil Service Law and rules, and to those laid off as a result of the
qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5.”
of the New Government. (Italics supplied)
“x x x x x x
“The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued by the
procedures for the review and assessment of its own personnel, President “Enlarging the Powers and Functions of the
including the identification of sensitive positions which require Commissioner of Customs”, as follows:
more rigid assessment of the incumbents, and shall complete such
review/assessment as expeditiously as possible but not later than “x x x x x x
February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public “SECTION 1. In addition to the powers and functions of the
service. Commissioner of Customs, he is hereby authorized, subject to the
“Section 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations:
review and assessment shall determine who shall be separated from
a) To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by
the service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee
the President;
concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the
reason/s or ground/s for such separation and the fact that the b) To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise penalize erring
separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for Bureau officers and employees;
reconsideration pursuant to this Order. Separation from the service c) To act on all matters pertaining to promotion, transfer,
shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by detail, reassignment, reinstatement, reemployment and
the official or employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of other personnel action, involving officers and employees of
sufficient discretion. the Bureau of Customs.
“Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/
replacement of personnel: x x x x x x”
136 tion, Culture and Sports); 119 (Health); 120 (Tourism); 123 (Social Welfare and
Development); 124 (Public Works and Highways); 125 (Transportation and
Communication); 126 (Labor and Employment); 128 (Science and Technology; 129
(Agrarian Reform); 131 (Natural Resources); 132 (Foreign Affairs); and 133 (Trade
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS and Industry).
ANNOTATED
137
Dario vs. Mison
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 137
other executive departments. The relevant provisions
relative to the Bureau of Customs read: Dario vs. Mison
“RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is unless in the meantime they are separated from government service
mandated expressly in Article II, Section 1(a) and Article III of the pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the
Freedom Constitution; Freedom Constitution.
“HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 “The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry
(1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one
organizational and functional structures of the government, its hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive
agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services; with regular appointments by him or by the President, as the case
“BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein
Finance to make it more capable and responsive, organizationally or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the
and functionally, in its primary mandate of judiciously generating service. Those separated from the service shall receive the
and efficiently managing the financial resources of the Government, retirement benefits to which they may be entitled under the
its subdivisions and instrumentalities in order to attain the socio- existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid
economic objectives of the national development programs. the equivalent of one month basic salary for every year of service or
“x x x x x x” the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the
“SEC. 2. Reorganization.—The Ministry of Finance, hereinafter basis of highest salary received, but in no case shall such payment
referred to as Ministry, is hereby reorganizaed, structurally and exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
functionally, in accordance with the provisions of this Executive “No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or
Order.” preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin the
“SEC. 33. Bureau of Customs. separation/replacement of any officer or employee affected under
“x x x Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which grants this Executive Order.”
autonomy to the Commissioner of Customs in matters of “Section 67—All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and other
appointment and discipline of Customs personnel shall remain in issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this
effect.” Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
“SEC. 55. Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry.—All units not “x x x x x x “ (Italics ours)
included in the structural organization as herein provided and all
positions thereof are hereby deemed abolished. x x x Their On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect (De
personnel shall be entitled to the benefits provided in the second Leon, et al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31,
paragraph of Section 59 hereof.” 1987, 153 SCRA 602). Reorganization in the Government
“SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern.—Upon approval of this
service pursuant to Proclamation No. 3, supra, was provided
Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in
for in its Section 16, Article XVIII entitled Transitory
a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits Provisions, reading:
“Section 16. Career civil service employees separated from the humane manner possible.
service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant “For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly
to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization followed:
following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits 1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive
accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at Orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the
employees, they may be considered for employment in the a. informed of their reappointment or
Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or b. offered another position in the same department/ agency, or
agencies, including government owned or controlled corporations c. informed of their termination.
and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers
whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has 2. In the event of an offer for a lower position, there will be no
been accepted.” reduction in the salary.
138
x x x x x x
a. be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Civil “SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect
Service Commission. All departments who are recruiting the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the
shall give preference to the employees in the list; and reorganization of the various agencies of the National government x
x x.
140 “SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall
be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and
hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
ANNOTATED redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the
Dario vs. Mison
141
b. continue to receive salary and benefits until February 28,
1988, and
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 141
c. be guaranteed the release of separation benefits within 45
days from termination and in no case later than June 15, Dario vs. Mison
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the 142
Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: ANNOTATED
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of Dario vs. Mison
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or
agency concerned; days from the approval of this Act within which to implement
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing their respective reorganization plans in accordance with the
substantially the same functions is created; provisions of this Act.
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in x x x x x x
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; “SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department
modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall
or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
be retroactive as of June 30, 1987.
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
x x x” (Italics ours)
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided
in Section 3 hereof. Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can now
be addressed.
x x x x x x
“SECTION 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to be
the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full given to the abovementioned Constitutional provision
pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all (SECTION 16, for brevity), which speaks of:
officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees,
who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if “Career civil service employees separated from the service not for
entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and cause
retirement and other benefits under existing laws within ninety but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
(90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case and the reorganization following the ratification of this
may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and Constitution x x x” (paragraphing supplied).
no action thereon has been made by the corresponding department
or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the
a separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month reorganization authorized by Proclamation No. 3; (2) that
salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement such separation is NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of the
benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the reorganization pursuant to said Proclamation; and (3) that
department or agency concerned. the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may be
x x x x x x continued even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
“SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall during the transition period.
implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time
authorized by law. Separation NOT FOR CAUSE
“In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch,
all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service
orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have officer or employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That
ninety (90) means “a guarantee of both procedural and substantive due
process. Basically, procedural due process would require that
suspension Reorganization Pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 to Continue
Transitorily Even After Ratification
143
By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the continuance
of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 even
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 143 after ratification of the Constitution and during the
Dario vs. Mison transition period. The two [2] stages contemplated, namely,
(1) the stage
understanding, with the statement into the records, that 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
this would be applicable to those reorganized out pursuant to ANNOTATED
the Freedom Constitution also.
Dario vs. Mison
“Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a
reorganization before the ratification or a reorganization
after the ratification.” (RECORDS of the Constitutional ployees may be separated from the service without cause as a
result of such reorganization.” (Italics ours)
Commission, Vol. 5, p. 416) (Italics provided)
With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its
It should also be recalled that the deadline for the
conclusion that the foregoing pronouncement is mere “obiter
reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 was “one year from
dictum.”
February 25, 1986” (Article III, Section 2), or up to February
24, 1987. Executive Order No. 17 itself provided that the “An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or
review/assess-ment of personnel be completed “not later than opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement of the court
February 24, 1987.” But, confronted with the reality of the concerning a question which was not directly before it (In re Hess,
23 A. 2d. 298, 301, 20 N.J. Misc. 12). It is language unnecessary to a The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional
decision, (a) ruling on an issue not raised, or (an) opinion of a judge issues presented, particularly, the lapse of the period
which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, mandated by Proclamation No. 3, and the validity of EO 127,
and is made without argument or full consideration of the point cannot be said to be mere “obiter.” They were ultimate issues
(Lawson v. US, 176 F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an
directly before the Court, expressly decided in the course of
expression of opinion by the court or judge on a collateral question
the consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon
not directly involved, (Crescent Ring Co. v. Traveler’s Indemnity Co.
132 A. 106, 107, 102 N.J. Law 85) or not necessary for the decision must be considered as authoritative precedent, and not a
(Du Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So. 2d 709, 712; 211 La. mere dictum (See Valli v. US, 94 F.2d 687 certiorari granted
167).” 58 S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092; See also Weedin v.
Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455). Such resolution would not
In the case at bar, however, directly involved and squarely lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of
before the Court was the issue of whether “EO 127 violates the case was also made on some other ground.
Section 2(3) of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution against
removal of civil service employees except for cause.” “x x x And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions although
Petitioner batted for the affirmative of the proposition, while only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the
regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the
respondents contended that “removal of civil service
final conclusion (Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F.
employees without cause is allowed not only under the Suppl. 1; See also Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit,
Provisional Constitution but also under the 1987 254 NW 119; Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N.W. 598; City of
Constitution if the same is made pursuant to a Detroit, et al. v. Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368). Accordingly,
reorganization after the ratification of the Constitution.” a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent
It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for being because the disposition of the case is made on some other ground.
“premature, speculative and purely anticipatory” inasmuch (Wagner v. Corn Products Refining Co. D.C. N.J. 28 F 2d 617)
as petitioner therein had “not received any communication Where a case presents two or more points, any one of which is
terminating or threatening to terminate his services.” But sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually
that was only one consideration. The Court still proceeded to decides all such points, the case is an authoritative precedent as to
decide all the issues adversatively contested by the parties, every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as
having merely the status of a dictum (See U.S. v. Title Insurance
namely “1) that the expiration date of February 25, 1987
and Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472, 68 L. Ed. 1110; Van
fixed by Section 2 of Proclamation No. 3 on which said Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35) and one point should not be denied
Executive order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and
Executive Order has not been published in the Official more fully argued and considered. (Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v.
Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section U.S. 48 S. Ct. 194, 275 U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)”
11 of the Revised Administrative Code;
It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz(G.R. No.
147
78946, April 15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we had stated:
“The argument that, on the basis of this provision (Section 26 of
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 147 Executive Order No. 119, or the ‘Reorganization Act of the Ministry
Dario vs. Mison of
148
and 3) that its enforcement violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
employees except for cause.”
ANNOTATED
Dario vs. Mison Government), July 25, 1987; EO 297 (Reorganization Act of
the Office of the Press Secretary), July 25, 1987.
Health’), petitioner’s term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and 149
that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a
hold-over capacity and could be transferred to another position
without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 149
occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to
facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February Dario vs. Mison
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2
February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De
Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Esguerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August The Element of Good Faith
1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the said date the provisions of the latter
on security of tenure govern.” The majority concedes that reorganization can be
undertaken provided it be in good faith but concludes that
The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically Commissioner Mison was not in good faith.
differ. In the cited case, Dra. Palma-Fernandez, the The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.
petitioner, had already been extended a permanent Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987,
appointment as Assistant Director for Professional Services specifically authorized the reorganization of the Bureau of
of the East Avenue Medical Center but was still being Customs “structurally and functionally” and provided for the
transferred by the Medical Center Chief to the Research abolition of all units and positions thereof not included in the
Office against her consent. Separation from the service as a structural organization (Section 55).
result of reorganization was not involved. The question then As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of
arose as to whether the latter official had the authority to Customs, Alexander A. Padilla who, on 24 May 1987,
transfer or whether the power to appoint and remove transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval the
subordinate officers and employees was lodged in the proposed “position structure and staffing pattern” of the
Secretary of Health. Related to that issue was the vital one Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the Department of
of whether or not her transfer, effected on 29 May 1987, was Finance. Thereafter, it was transmitted to and approved by
tantamount to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September
the fact that the transfer was basically made “in the interest 1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing pattern,
of the service” pursuant to Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or the there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing
Civil Service Decree, and not because she was being pattern, there are 6,530 positions.
reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the “Reorganization On 2 October 1987 “Malacañang Memorandum Re:
Act of the Ministry of Health,” although the said Act was Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
invoked after the fact. And so it was that SECTION 16 was Executive Orders” provided:
never mentioned, much less invoked in the Palma-Fernandez
case. “By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to for each agency on reorganization shall be:
state that there were no reorganization orders after a. informed of their reappointment, or
ratification. There were, namely, EO 181 (Reorganization Act
b. offered another position in the same department or agency,
of the Civil Service Commission), June 1, 1987; EO 193 or
(Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs), June 10,
c. informed of their termination.” (Italics supplied)
1987; EO 230 (Reorganization Act of NEDA), July 22, 1987;
EO 262 (Reorganization Act of the Department of Local
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for and office as a result of the reorganization of that Bureau as directed in
was granted by the President an extension up to February Executive Order No. 127.
1988 within which to completely undertake the x x x x x x
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. “Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127 is set at rest, after the
On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs
Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari
Memorandum “Re Guidelines on the Implementation of
questioning its enforceability, for lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo,
Reorganization Executive Orders” reiterating the above- et al., supra).” (Opinion No. 41, s. 1988, March 3, 1988) (Italics
quoted portion of the Malacañang Memorandum of 2 October supplied)
1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed uniform The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
Celerina G. Gotladera, likewise periodically consulted by
150
Commissioner Mison, also expressed the opinion that “it is
not a prerequisite prior to the separation of an employee
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS pursuant to reorganization that he be administratively
ANNOTATED charged.” (Annex 16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R. No. 85310)
Moreover, the records show that the final selection and
Dario vs. Mison placement of personnel was done by a Placement Committee,
one of whose members is the Head of the Civil Service
letters of termination to the employees listed on pages 15, 16 Commission Field Office, namely, Mrs. Purificacion Cuerdo.
and 17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February The appointment of employees made by Commissioner Mison
1988, within the extended period granted. was based on
The records further show that upon Commissioner
151
Mison’s official inquiry, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez, rendered the following Opinion:
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 151
“x x x It is believed that customs employees who are reorganized out
in the course of the implementation of E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing Dario vs. Mison
the Department of Finance) need not be informed of the nature and
cause of their separation from the service. It is enough that they be
‘informed of their termination’ pursuant to section 1(c) of the
the list approved by said Placement Committee.
Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of President Aquino, which But the majority further faults Mison for defying the
reads: President’s directive to halt further lay-offs as a consequence
of reorganization, citing OP Memo of 14 October 1987,
“1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive reading:
orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
“Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same
x x x x x x subject, I have ordered that there will be no further lay-offs this
year of personnel as a result of the government reorganization.” (p.
“c) Informed of their terminations. 45, Decision)
“The constitutional mandate that ‘no officer or employee of the The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded by later
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as developments, namely, the grant to Commissioner Mison by
provided by law’ (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-B of the 1987 the President on 22 December 1987 of a grace period until
Constitution) does not apply to employees who are separated from the end of February 1988 within which to completely
undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs, agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote
which was, in fact, accomplished by 28 February 1988. efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public service;” (Italics
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states that supplied)
Commissioner Mison failed to observe the procedure laid
down by EO 17, supra, directing inter alia that a notice of Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6656
separation be issued to an employee to be terminated
indicating therein the reason/s or ground/s for such The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656 entitled an
separation. That requirement, however, does not appear in “Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Section 59 of EO 127, which provides on the contrary “that Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
those incumbents whose positions are not included in the Government Reorganization,” particularly Section 2 thereof,
new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry or to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison.
who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the We are of the view, however, that in providing for
service.” The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be retroactivity in its Section 13, RA 6656 clashes frontally with
informed of the ground for his separation must be deemed to SECTION 16.
have been revoked by the repealing clause of EO 127 (Section 1) SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service
67) providing that “all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, employees separated from the service by reason of the
which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby “complete reorganization of the government” pursuant to
repealed and modified accordingly.” Proclamation No. 3 may be separated NOT FOR CAUSE.
Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite—separation
coverage a reorganization pursuant to EO 5. Thus FOR CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote the provision
again:
“The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those
designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual and “SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be
contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing.
to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and rules, A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
and to those laid off as a result of reorganization undertaken reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
pursuant to Executive Order No. 5.” (Italics ours) redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other
152 lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service law. The existence of any
or some of the following circumstances may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or
ANNOTATED reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
Dario vs. Mison pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office
is
That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in implementation of
153
EO 5, is shown by its introductory portion reading:
“Recalling that the reorganization of the government is mandated VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 153
expressly by Article II, Section 1 (a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution; Dario vs. Mison
“Having in mind that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986),
it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the
abolished and another performing substantially the same
organizational and functional structures of the government, its
functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those
less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the ANNOTATED
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where Dario vs. Mison
the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3
hereof. (Republic Act No. 6156)
should be applied and construed prospectively and not
The standards laid down are the “traditional” criteria for retroactively notwithstanding its explicit provision. Then,
removal of employees from the career service, e.g. valid and only then, would it make good law.
cause, due notice and hearing, abolition of, or redundancy of
offices. Proclamation No. 3, on the other hand, effectuates Effects of Reorganization
the “progressive” type of reorganization dictated by the To be sure, the reorganization could effect the tenure of
exigencies of the historical and political upheaval at the members of the career service as defined in Section 5, Article
time. The “traditional” type is limited in scope. It is IV of Presidential Decree No. 807, and may even result in the
concerned with the individual approach where the particular separation from the office of some meritorious employees.
employee involved is charged administratively and where the But even then, the greater good of the greatest number and
requisites of notice and hearing have to be observed. The the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they
“progressive” kind of reorganization, on the other hand, is themselves have mandated through the vehicle of
the collective way. It is wider in scope, and is the Proclamation No. 3, provide the justification for the said
reorganization contemplated under SECTION 16. injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an
2) By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA employee to security of tenure must yield to the interest of
6656 adds a benefit not included in SECTION 16. The the entire populace and to an efficient and honest
benefits granted by the latter provision to employees government.
separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a consequence of But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His
reorganization are “separation pay, retirement, and other right lies in his past services, the entitlement to which must
benefits accruing to them under the laws of general be provided for by law. EO 127 provides for the same in its
application in force at the time of their separation.” The Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when the latter
benefit of reinstatement is not included. RA 6656, however, specified that career civil service employees separated from
allows reinstatement. That it cannot do because under the service not for cause:
SECTION 16, it is not one of the laws “in force at the time of
their separation.” “shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement
The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof,
must conform. It is from the Constitution that all statutes
at the option of the employees, they may be considered for
must derive their bearings. The legislative authority of the employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions,
State must yield to the expression of the sovereign will. No instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
statutory enactment can disregard the Charter from which it controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also
draws its own existence (Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]). But, the existing policy, has been accepted.”
that is exactly what RA 6656 does in providing for
retroactivity—it disregards and contravenes a Constitutional This is a reward for the employee’s past service to the
imperative. To save it, it Government. But this is all. There is no vested property right
to be re-employed in a reorganized office.
154
“The right to an office or to employment with government or any of being repugnant to the letter and spirit of Section 16, Article
its agencies is not a vested property right, and removal therefrom XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
will not support the question of due process” (Yantsin v. Aberdeen,
54 Wash 2d CRUZ, J., concurring:
155
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr.
Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento. While additional comments
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 155 may seem superfluous in view of the exhaustiveness of his
787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee does not have a 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
constitutionally protected right to his position, which position is in ANNOTATED
the nature of a public office, political in character and held by way
of grant or privilege extended by government; generally he has been Dario vs. Mison
held to have no property right or vested interest to which due
process guaranties extend (See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 44
L Ed. 1187; Angilly v. US (CA2 NY) 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel. ponencia, I nevertheless offer the following brief observations
Baker v. Wilson, 39 lll App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY for whatever they may be worth.
State Civil Service Com., 21 Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89). Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution,
the dissenting opinion considers the ongoing government
To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has been reorganization valid because it is merely a continuation of
separated from the service, there would be no harm, in fact, the reorganization begun during the transition period. The
it could do a lot of good, if the Commissioner of Customs reason for this conclusion is the phrase “and the
reviews the evaluation and placements he has so far made reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution,”
and sees to it that those terminated are included in a that is to say, after February 2, 1987, appearing in the said
consolidated list to be given preference by departments who provision. The consequence (and I hope I have not misread it)
are recruiting (Section 2[a], BOC Memorandum, January 6, is that the present reorganization may still be undertaken
1988). with the same “absoluteness” that was allowed the
revolutionary reorganization although the Freedom
Conclusion Constitution is no longer in force.
Premises considered, and subject to the observation Reorganization of the government may be required by the
hereinabove made, it is our considered view that the legislature even independently of specific constitutional
separation from the service “NOT FOR CAUSE but as a authorization, as in the case, for example, of R.A. No. 51 and
result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 B.P. No. 129. Being revolutionary in nature, the
dated March 25, 1986” of the affected officers and employees reorganization decreed by Article III of the Freedom
of the Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD, and the Constitution was unlimited as to its method except only as it
Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission, dated 30 June was later restricted by President Aquino herself through
1988, 20 September 1988, and 16 November 1988 should be various issuances, particularly E.O. No. 17. But this
SET ASIDE for having been issued in grave abuse of reorganization, for all its permitted summariness, was not
discretion. indefinite. Under Section 3 of the said Article III, it was
Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for allowed only up to February 29, 1987 (which we advanced to
retroactivity, should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution became
effective).
The clear implication is that any government disappeared with the abolished office as an accessory
reorganization that may be undertaken thereafter must be following the principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51 O.G.
authorized by the legislature only and may not be allowed 147; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294; Manalang v.
the special liberties and protection enjoyed by the Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903.)
revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would have This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not
been no necessity at all for the time limitation expressly unlimited. It is essential that it be based on a valid purpose,
prescribed by the Freedom Constitution. such as the promotion of efficiency and economy in the
I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an government through a pruning of offices or the streamlining
authorization for the open-ended reorganization of the of their functions. (Cervantes v. Auditor-General, 91 Phil.
government “following the ratification of the Constitution.” I 359.) Normally, a reorganization cannot be validly
read the provision as merely conferring benefits—deservedly undertaken as a means of purging the undesirables for this
or not—on persons separated from the government as a would be a removal in disguise undertaken en masse to
result of the reorganization of the government, whether circumvent the constitutional requirement of legal cause.
undertaken during the transition period or as a result of a (Eradication of graft and corruption was one of the expressed
law passed thereafter. What the purposes of the revolutionary organization, but this was
authorized by the Freedom Constitution itself.) In short, a
157
reorganization, to be valid, must be done in good faith.
(Urgelio v. Osmeña, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court of
VOL. 176, AUGUST 8. 1989 157 provision grants is privileges to the retirees, not power to the
theory of the public respondent that all officers and
Dario vs. Mison employees
158
government. It is axiomatic that grants of power are not
lightly inferred, especially if these impinge on individual
rights, and I do not see why we should depart from this rule. 158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
To hold that the present reorganization is a continuation ANNOTATED
of the one begun during the transition period is to recognize
the not separated earlier remain in a hold-over capacity only Dario vs. Mison
and so may be replaced at any time even without cause. That
is a dangerous proposition that threatens the security and Appeals, 1 SCRA 663; Cariño v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA 183.)
stability of every civil servant in the executive department. A mere recitation—no matter how lengthy—of the
What is worse is that this situation may continue directives, guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued by the
indefinitely as the claimed “progressive” reorganization has government and the action purportedly taken thereunder
no limitation as to time. does not by itself prove good faith. We know only too well
Removal imports the forcible separation of the incumbent that these instructions, for all their noble and sterile
before the expiration of his term and can be done only for purposes, are rarely followed in their actual implementation.
cause as provided by law. Contrary to common belief, a The reality in this case, as the majority opinion has pointed
reorganization does not result in removal but in a different out and as clearly established in the hearing we held, is that
mode of terminating official relations known as abolition of the supposed reorganization was undertaken with an eye not
the office (and the security of tenure attached thereto.) The to achieving the avowed objectives but to accommodating
erstwhile holder of the abolished office cannot claim he has new appointees at the expense of the dislodged petitioners.
been removed without cause in violation of his constitutional That was also the finding of the Civil Service Commission, to
security of tenure. The reason is that the right itself has which we must accord a becoming respect as the
constitutional office charged with the protection of the civil
service from the evils of the spoils system.
The present administration deserves full support in its
desire to improve the civil service, but this objective must be
pursued in a manner consistent with the Constitution. This
praiseworthy purpose cannot be accomplished by an
indiscriminate reorganization that will sweep in its wake the
innocent along with the redundant and inept, for the benefit
of the current favorites.
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