Austrian Attitudes toward Anschluss: October 1918-September 1919

Author(s): S. W. Gould
Source: The Journal of Modern History , Sep., 1950, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1950), pp. 220-
231
Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1871752

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 AUSTRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANSCGLUSS
OCTOBER 1918-SEPTEMBER 1919
S. W. GOULD
ON OCTOBER 2I, I9I8 a "German-
Austrian' provincial assembly
representing the Germanic prov-
tnces of the still extant Austro-Hun-
garian empire was organized in Vienna
This event signified the dissolution into
its component parts of the old supra-
national Habsburg state. The question
of what was to become of the Germanic
core of the Dual Monarchy at once be-
came 'actual." That is, this question was
transferred from the agenda of theoreti-
cal discussion to the arena of practical
political action.
The Austrians had known for some
time that President Woodrow Wilson's
entourage in Washington was at least
considerLr}g the prospect of Austro-Ger-
man union after the war.t On Septem-
ber 2It I9I8 Robert LansingX Wilson's
secretary of state issued a memo-
randum which instructed American del-
egates to the prospective peace con-
ference that was to convene following
the end of hostilities to propose the in-
clusion of the archduchy of Austria in the
t See Secretary of State Robert Lansing's conver-
sation with Count Tarnowski, Austrian ambassador-
delegate to the United States, May I, I9I7, War
metnoirs of Robert Lansing (Indianapolis and New
York, I935), p. 254; Lansing to Wilson, Aug. I9,
I9I8, U.S., Department of state, Papers relating to
the foreign relations of the United States: the Lansing
papers, II (Washington, I940), I44I; Heinz
PALLER, "Die Entstehung der Anschlussfrage als
Problem der europaischen Politik," Die AnschZgss-
frage in ihrer kulturellen, pol«tischen qxnd wirtschaft-
lichen Bedegtung, ed. F. KLEINWACHTER and Heinz
PALLER (Vienna, I930) (hereafter cited as "Die
A nschlussfrage"), PP. 49-50; J. BRAUNTHAL, In search
of the rrillerznixm (London, 1945), p. 2II; and 0.
BAUER, Die osterrewhische Revolution (Vienna, I923),
p. I46*
220
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federal state of Germany.2 Although the
contents of the Lansing memorandum
hardly could have been known in Aus-
tria, wide circles of opinion in that coun-
try understood that Wilson had modified
the views expressed in his famous four-
teen points of January 8 I9I8, which
had visualized the continued existence of
the Habsburg state. Thomas Masaryk,
founder of postwar Czechoslovakia and
archenemy of Austria-Hungary, was in
the United States in I9I82 and loyalist
elements in the Dual Monarchy had no
illusions as to the influence he might be
able to exert upon Wilson. Masaryk was
one of the first individuals of importance
to advocate the union of Germanic Aus-
tria with the Reich and in the opinion of
some authorities, did more than anyone
else to make the idea of Austro-German
Anschlqsss a European problem.3 In any
case the concept of national self-determi-
nation enunciated by Wilson and Lan-
sing implied the consummation of the
Anschluss idea and caused many Aus-
trians to consider seriously for the first
time the question of Austro-German
union.4
2 R LANSING, The pea4e negottattons: a personal
narrative (Boston and New York, I92I), P. I95
3 See PALLER? loc. cit., pp. 3 7 and 49; T. G. MASA-
RYK, Tke king of a state: memories and observa-
tions I9I4-I9I8 (London, I927), PP. 95-96 and 299;
and the Anschlgss proposals expressed by the Serb
premier, Nicholas Pashitch, as reported by the United
States special agent in Corfu, Eenry P. Dodge, to
Lansing, Sept. I4, I9I7 U.S., Department of state,
Papers relatzg to the foreign relahons of the United
States, I9I7, Suppl. 2, I (Washington, I932) 235-36.
4 See K. F. NOWAK, Der Stqsrz der M#telmachte
(hIunich, I92I), PP. 349-5I; W. P. PRINCIGHER-
 AUSTRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANSCHLUSS
Of the three large political parties in
Austria in I9I8, the Social Democrats,
the German Nationalists, and the Chris-
tian Socialists, the first two had a tradi-
tion of Anschluss agitation in the past.
In so far as the Social Democrats were
concerned, this tradition was a part of
the ideal of a united Austro-German re-
public, a concept which dates back to
the German revolution of I848. Karl
Marx's close collaborator, Friedrich En-
gels, maintained until his death that
the prerequisite to unification was the
elimination of the Habsburg dynasty
and the partition of its dominions. In
the twentieth century the prominent
Viennese socialist, Engelbert Perner-
storfer, represented this Engelian tradi-
tion most adequately.5 The brilliant Mo-
ravian, Otto Bauer, who in I9I7 returned
from a Russian prison camp to become
editor of the Social Democratic party
newspaper, the ArbeiterZeitung, also held
to the Pernerstorfer-Engelian line as
against the policy of preserving Aus-
tria as part of a Danubian federation.
Until October I9I8 the latter solution
to the perennial Austrian problem was
favored by the majority right wing So-
cial Democrats led by Karl Renner, to-
day president of Austria.6 From I9I7 on,
WALT, "Soll Deutschosterreich an Deutschland an-
schliessen?" Osterreichische Rundschau, LVIII
(I9I9), I45-53; H.SVV. V. TEMPERLEY (ed.), A history
of the peace conference of Paris (London, I92I), IV,
96-99 and 263; B . AUERBACH, L'A utriche et l 'Hongrie
pendant la guerre I9I4-I8 (Paris, I925), PP. 34I-43;
and BAUER, PP. IO2-3, I46, and I57.
5 BRAUNAL, P. II6. See also BAUER, PP. 50-52.
60n Renner and the influence eserted by his
circle see BAUER, PP. 52-56; BRAUNTEAL, PP. 8I-82
and 208; Karl REINOLD, Die osterreichische Sozial-
demohratie und der Nationalis?nus (Vienna, I9IO),
P. 27; Karl SCEWECHLER, Die osterreichische Sozial-
demohratie (Graz and Vienna, I908); and RENNER,
Grundlage und Entwicklungsziele der osterreichisch-
ungarische Monarchie (Vienna, I906), d)sterreichs
Erneuerung (Vienna, I916-I7), and Dler Kampf der
oesterreichischen Nationen um den Staat (Vienna,
I902) .
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22I
however, this majority group was on
the defensive owing to the vigorous tac-
tics of "Die Linke" the Bauer-Perner-
storfer faction, which preferred Anschluss
with Germany to Danubian federation.
The Bauer group made much capital out
of its attacks upon the dynasty following
revelation in the spring of I9I8 0i the
emperor's willingness to conclude a sepa-
rate peace.7 Finally, on October 3, I9I8
the club of Social Democratic deputies,
formed by socialist deputies of Germanic
origin in the lower house of the Austrian
reichsrat or parliament, accepted "Die
Linke's" program, which envisaged the
possibility of Austro-German union.
Renner and Viktor Adler, "Grand Old
Man" of the Social Democratic party,
acceded to the Bauer line a few days
later.8
Since by this time everyone in Austria
realized that the war was lost, the Social
Democrats found themselves in a posi-
tion of advantage vis-a-vis both German
Nationalists and Christian Socialists who
were identified more closely with the war
effort than were the socialists. Almost
two decades before, Friedrich Naumann,
apostle of the Mittelexropa idea, had
pointed out that in so far as their desire
for intimate Austro-German relations
was concerned the Social Democrats sub-
stantially agreed with the pan-German-
ists, the element that usually deter-
mined the tone of the policies pursued
by the German National party.9 Georg
7 Kurt TRA1WPLER, Deutschosterreich I9I8/I9
(Berlin, I935), P. 8; and K. G. HUGEL1WANN, "Die
politischen Parteien und die Anschlussfrage," Die
Anschlussfrage, p. 326. For Bauer's own account of
urhy his group felt it necessary to reverse the official
party program see Die osterreichische Revolution, pp.
6I-62 and 75.
8 BAUER, PP. 69-70; and August von CRAMON,
Unser osterreich-ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Welt-
kriege (Berlin, I922), P. I85. For the Social Demo-
cratic party declaration of Oct. 3 see Hans KELSEN,
Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Deutschoster-
reich, Part I (Vienna, I9I9), PP. I-2.
9 Deutschland qanAl d)sterreich (Berlin, I900), P. 2I.
 S. W. GOULD
222

von Schonerer, anti-Semite, leader of cialists

theon October g signified their will-
"los von Rom" movement directed ingness to consider the program advo-
against the Catholic church, and origi- cated by the socialists. This program
nator of the modern version of anti- called for the formation of a ('German-
Habsburg propaganda, which has to be Austrian" state. The Christian Social-
distinguished from the earlier I 848 ists, however, stated expressly that their
brand inspired by the Slovak-Magyar loyalty to the emperor remained unim-
revolutionist, Louis Kossuth,I° had left paired and that the proposed German-
the impress of his personality upon the Austrian state should be only one of a
thought of the most influential section of free federation of nations into which the
the German National group. His ideas Dual Monarchy was to be transformed.I3
were particularly influential among Ger- The two bourgeois parties wanted to
manic Austria's university youth, which form a common national front in the
supplied the bulk of the monarchy's lower house of the reichsrat as the sev-
higher bureaucratic officials.It Now, as eral Czech and Polish parties had done,
the old state palpably approached its but the Social Democrats insisted that
end, the German National deputies in the old parliament had no further task to
the reichsrat hastened to accept the So- perform. On October I6 the emperor is-
cial Democratic program as a basis for sued a manifesto which federalized the
political reconstruction. This step signi- Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.
fied that both Social Democrats and This manifesto legalized the Social
German Nationalists were abandoning Democratic proposal that the Germanic
the idea of a united multinational Aus- representatives in the reichsrat transform
trian state in advance of the formal com- themselves into a provisional provincial
mitment of the other Habsburg nation- assembly. It was in conformity with sug-
alities to independence programs.I2 gestions contained in the manifesto that
Faced with the fait accompli of an ap- the Germanic deputies on October 2 I
parent Social Democratic-German Na- denominated themselves the "Provi-
tional coalition, the Christian So- sional National Assembly of German
I°FranZ SCHICK, "Austria and the Anschluss"
Representatives."
(unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Cali- Public opinion in Germany at once be-
fornia, Berkeley, I939). came cognizant of the possibility of Aus-
II Josef REDLICH, Die osterreichische Regierung
tro-German union. On October 22 the
und Yerwaltgng im Weltkriege (Vienna and New
Haven, I925)X P. 292; Paul MOLISCH, Die deutschen wealthy industrialist and right wing
'sliberal" politician Gustav Stresemann
Hochschule n in Oesterreich und die politisch -nation al e
EntwickAung nach dem Jahre I848 (Munich, I922), spoke in the German reichstag concern-
pp. 73-I36, and Z?sr Geschichte der badensschen
Sprachenverordrungen vom 5 qhnd 22 A pril 1897 (Vi- ing developments in the Dual Monarchy.
enna, I923); and Kurt von SCEUSCHNIGG, Dreitnal He stressed the cultural unity of the Ger-
Osterreich (Vienna, 1937), PP. 32-37. On Schonerer manic inhabitants of the two empires and
see F. HERWIG, Georg Schonerer und die Entwicklung
des Alldeutscht?ms sn der Ostmark (4 vols.; Vienna, expressed his anticipation of the union of
I92I-23); and Franz BRANDL, Kaiser, Politiker, und "German Austria" with the Reich.t4 Two
Menschen (Leipzig and Vienna, I936), PP. 69-72. days later the socialist politician Gustav
I2 REDLICH, PP. 295-96; F. KLEINWACHTER,
Noske informed the reichstag that the
"Deutschosterreichs Kampf um des Selbstbestim-
mungsrecht bis zu den Genfer Protokollen," Die
I3 KLEINWACHTER, loc. cit., p. 64.
Anschlussfrage, PP. 62-69. Even Masaryk admitted
that his program was accepted and he and his col- t4 Germany, Verhandlungen des Rewkst
leagues became "liberators" only after the Dual zeknte Legislaturperwde I9I4-I9I8, CXCIII, 6I73,
Monarchy had disintegrated. OCt. 22, I9I8.

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 AUSTRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANSCHLUSS
Anschluss agitation now coming to the
fore in Austria was viewed sympatheti-
cally by Reich Germans.I5 The speeches
of Stresemann and Noske indicated that
neither Right nor Left would repudiate
en bloc the idea of Austria's inclusion
within the framework of the postwar
Reich. Possibly these utterances encour-
aged the German chancellor, Prince Max
von Baden, to suggest on November 9, in
connection with the announcement of
Kaiser Wilhelm's abdication, that a con-
stitutional national assembly be elected
by popular vote for the purpose of decid-
ing the future form of government for
the German nation "including those
parts of the race which might desire in-
clusion within the boundaries of the
Reich."I6 Undoubtedly the feeling pre-
vailed in some German quarters that at
this hour of deepest military and politi-
cal humiliation the Austrian Anschluss
offered the possibility of a gain to ofiset
the losses and sacrifices of a disastrous sequence of the fall of the Austrian
four years of war. It is interesting to notedynasty.20
that French opinion maintained that the
acquisition of Austria was intended to
balance the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Po-
sen, and Schleswig to France, Poland,
and Denmark respectively.I7
Max von Baden's invitation to An-
schl?ss irritated Austrian patriots.I8 But
the greatest domestic obstacle to Aus-
tria's absorption by the Reich was the
Habsburg dynasty, which, as the dean of
European ruling houses, neither could
I5 Ibid., CXCV, 62I4, Oct. 24, I9I8.
I6 Mas von BADEN, Erinnerungen und Dokumente
(Berlin and Leipzig, I927), PP. 634-35.
I7 See CRAMON, P. I99; Marcel DUNAN, L'Au-
triche (Paris, I92I), PP. I8-I9; Paul DARCY, La rd-
publique pangertnaniste et l'Autrsche (Paris, I9I9);
and TRAMPLER, P. 2I.
I8 See Prince Eduard von und zu LICHTENSTEIN,
"Deutschosterreich," dSsterreichische Rundschau,
LVII (I9I8)) I55I; Rudolf, Count CZERNIN_
MORDZIN, "Nationale Selbstbestimmung," Oster-
reichische Rundschau, LVIII (I9 I9), I-5; PRINCIG-
HERWALT, loc. cit pp. I45-53.
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223
nor would accept a minor role in a united
Austro-German body politic. And as
news arrived of the withdrawal of dy-
nasty after dynasty in the German Em-
pire, the Viennese began to ask one an-
other with cynical resignation: "Who
has abdicated today? The one in Schon-
brunn?" Native observers believed that
Kaiser Wilhelm's abdication and flight
exerted a decisive influence upon many
Austrians who were wavering in their
allegiance to the Habsburg monarchy.t9
Undoubtedly the establishment of a so-
cialist republic upon the ruins of the Ho-
henzollern monarchy discouraged mon-
archist elements in Austria, while at the
same time it enhanced the attraction of
the Arschluss idea in the eyes of the
powerful Social Democratic faction. In
Otto Bauer's own words, a break with
the Habsburger had to come in order to
make Anschluss possible, while, con-
versely, Anschluss was the natural con-
In the meeting of the Provisional Na-
tional Assembly of German Representa-
tives on October 2Ix Viktor Adler de-
clared in the name of the Social Demo-
cratic party that the German Austrian
state would have to join the German
Reich as a federal state if association
with the other parts of the Habsburg
monarchy proved impossible. He also
signified the Social Democratic intention
to establish a republic by legal means.2I
Otto Steinwender spoke for the Union
I9 Leopold KUNSCHAK, Osterreich I9I8-I934 (Vi-
enna, I934), P. 44; Artur ARZ, Rampf und Sturz der
Kasserreiche (Vienna and Leipzig, I934), P. II5; E.
GLAISE VON HORSTENAU, Die Katastrophe (Zurich,
I920), P. 393; F. EXNER, Krieg und Kriminalitat in
d)sterreich (Vienna and New Haven, I927), P. 29; and
AUERBACH, PP. 580-82.
BAIJER, P. IO2.
2r Austria, Stenographische Protokolle uber die
Sitsungen der provisorischen Nationalversammlung
f Deutschosterreich I9I8 und I9I9 (hereafter cited
as "S.P. ), p. 7. Oct. 2I, I9I8.
 S. W. GOULD

of German National Parties, stating three major parties, Franz Dinghofer

224
that his group stood for Austrian inde- (German National), Jodok Fink (Chris-
pendence and remained " convirlced sup- tian Social), and Karl Seitz (Social
porters of the constitutional and mo- Democrat).24 Renner became chancellor,
narchical form of government."22 Repre- and Viktor Adler foreign minister. So-
sentative Ferdinand Maximilian von cialist spokesmen vied with German Na-
Pantz likewise pledged adherence to the tionalists in denouncing the senders of
monarchical form of state on the part the peace note, although on October 24
of the German Austrian Independence the Arbeiter Zeitung had warned Ger-
party, a group composed chiefly of Ger- many that in certain eventualities Aus-
man National Agrarians and Christian tria-Hungary might be compelled to con-
Social dissidents. Similarly Josef Schrafflclude an immediate peace without regard
of the Tyrol indicated the intention of for Reich susceptibilities. The Social
the Christian Social party to hold out for Democrat Wilhelm Ellenbogen told the
the monarchy.23 assembly that his party believed it neces-
The position of the dynasty, still rela- sary to establish a republic, but a consti-
tively strong, was undermined, however, tutional draft prepared by Renner said
by the great Franco-British-Italian nothing about either a republic or An-
drive, which began on October 24, schluss. At the Social Democratic party
against the poorly fed, clothed, and meeting on November I, however, the
equipped Austro-Hungarian army in radical leaders secured a majority deci-
Venetia. By October 27 it had become sion favoring the abdication of the em-
evident that the front was in danger of peror and the creation of a German-Aus-
collapse, owing less to Allied pressure trian republic. It was at this meeting of
than to the departure of Magyar and the socialist representatives that the
Slavic troops for their new national clause proclaiming German Austria a
homelands. Emperor Karl felt that it constituent part (Bestandteil) of the Ger-
was necessary to ask the Allies for a man Reich was prepared; on November
separate peace, a move that caused a I 2 the decision taken by the Social
number of Germanic deputies to pro- Democrats on this date became known
test to the Austro-Hungarian foreign to the world through proclamation of
minister, Count Julius Andrassy, who the new Austrian republic's attachment
composed and dispatched the peace note to Germany.
sent to the Allied governments on Oc- The dissolution of the Austro-Hun-
tober 28. It was under the shadow of the garian army during the course of the
Andrassy note that the provisional as- battle of Vittorio Veneto (October 24-
sembly held its second meeting on Oc- November 4) set the stage for the dy-
tober 3o. nasty's withdrawal from the political
Henceforth, the deputies designated scene. As the Latin, Slavic, and Magyar
themselves the "Provisional National nationalities abandoned the old dynas-
Assembly for German Austria." An tic structure even the Christian Social-
executive committee called the "coun- ists accorded a certain grudging acquies-
cil of state" was chosen. It consisted of cence to Renner's assertion that Austria
twenty members and the chairmen of the should not continue as a Habsburg
crownland. Undoubtedly they feared
22 Ibid-, pp. IO-II-
that the other parties would make politi-
23 Ibid., pp. 8-IO. See also vienna ReichsposG, Oct.
24 S.p., p. II, OCt. 30, I9I8.
22, I9 I8.

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 AUSTRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANSCHLUSS
cal capital out of the socialist argument
that as long as the emperor remained on
the throne there was no prospect of union
with the Reich and accepted the socialist
thesis that the victorious powers would
impose harder conditions upon Austria
if lZarl stayed.25 Located in the capital
city as they were, the representatives of
all parties were sensitive also to the
threat of the urban proletariat which
the Christian Socialists had abandoned
to the socialists following the death of
the great Christian Social leader and
burgomaster of Vienna, Karl Lueger.26
Nevertheless, many Christian Socialists
protested against Renner's confident
statement that Germany would be al-
lowed to make good the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine through the acquisition of Aus-
tria. Monseigneur Ignaz Seipel, promi-
nent Christian Social politician, accused
the Social Democrats of desiring the An-
schluss for purely party considerations.27
Renner was warned not to overestimate
the strength of a temporarily ascendant
social democracy in either Germany and
Austria or in enemy countries such as
Belgium and France.28 Many observers
on the spot thought that the emperor
might have retained his position if he had
2S BRANDL, P. 24I-
26 BAUER, PP. 83, 95, IO3-4; and AUERBACH, PP.
582-83. On Lueger see R. KUPPE, Karl Lueger und
seine Zeit (Vienna, I935); R. KRALIE, Karl LZueger
und der christl«che Sozialismus (Vienna, I925); F.
STAIJRACZ, Dr. Karl Lueger, zeAn Jahre Burgermeister
(Vienna, I907); BRANDL, PP. 72-79; and London
Tiœnes, Mar. I I, I9IO.
27 In tEs connection note the interesting dispatch
of Archibald Coolidge to the Commission to Negoti-
ate Peace, dated at Berne, Dec. 3I, I9I8, U.S., De-
partment of state, Papers relsGing Go the foreign rela-
{ions of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference
(hereafter cited as "Paris Peace Conference"), II
(Washington, I942), 220.
28 See K. F. NOWAK, Chaos (Munich, I923), p.
266; Karl von WERKMANN, Deutschland als Ver-
bundeter (Berlin, I93I), pp. 29I and 305-6; Bruno
BRERM, Weder Kaiser noch Konig (Munich, I933),
pp. 3I2I9; and GLAISE VON HORSTENAU, PP. 438-
42.
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225
wished to use force, but Karl's refusal
to countenance counterrevolution cut
the ground from under the feet of ele-
ments still loyal to the regime.29
On November II Karl announced his
conditional withdrawal from the govern-
ment, although he did not renounce the
throne either for himself or for his fam-
ily.30 Thus the German Austrian na-
tional assembly was able to meet undis-
turbed on the afternoon of November
I2, I9I8, in order to make known to the
world at large the clause declaring the
new state an integral part of the German
republic. It must be remembered that
the Social Democrats were the authors
of this clause, which was inserted in the
law defining the form of government in
response to their direct demand. Renner
declared, "At this moment when it would
be so easy and comfortable and perhaps
not a little tempting to present our ac-
count separately, and perhaps through
such a maneuver to derive advantage
from the enemy, at this hour our German
people in every nation shall know that
we are of one stock and that we have a
common destiny."3t Only Wilhelm Mik-
las, later president of Austria but a mon-
archist by inclination, questioned the
competency of the provisional assembly
to decide such fundamental issues as
29 Artur ARZ, ZUR Geschichte des grossen Krieges,
I9I4-I9I8 (Vienna, I924), pp. 382-83; Paul SZE
MF.RE and Erich CZECH, Habsburgs Weg von WiZhelm
nach Briand (Zurich, Leipzig} and Vienna, I93I),
PP. I76-8I; BRANDL, PP. 253-54 and 260; WERK
1WANN, PP. 334-35; Ludwig WINDISCHGRAETZ, MY
memoirs, trans. Constance VESEY (London and BOS-
ton, I92I), PP. 292-93; Julius ANDRASSY, Diplomacy
and the war (London, I92I), P. 293; E. STREERU_
WITZ, Springt iBber Osterreich (Vienna, I937), PP.
I 34-3 5, I 8 2-89, and I 93-94; NOWAK, Der Stxrz d er
Mittelmachte, p. 348; Anton PITREICH, Der oster-
reichisch-Mzngarische Bundesgenosse itn Sperrfeuer
(}Zlagenfurt, I930), p. 38I; and BAUER, P. 76.
30 For the emperor's legal position see Hans KEL-
SEN, Osterreichisches Staatsrecht (Vienna, I923), pp.
9-I0 and 79. See also NOWAK, Chaos, PP. 267-68.
3I S.P.X p. 66, NOV. I2, I9I8.
 226 S. W. GOULD

definitive regulation of the form of dicated

state Germany's will
and union with a foreign power. Other sent Austrian interes
Christian Socialists, notably Anton Jer-
peace conference. An el
zabek, are reported to have agitated the
un- German provisiona
officially against declaration of the sued
re- on November 3o s
public and of Anschluss.32 the event of Austro-G
Although the assembly's action Austrian parliamentary
seemed to present the world with a fait
who had been elected b
accompli, Count Botho Wedel, German frage should be admitte
ambassador to Vienna, doubted the va- national assembly.36 O
lidity of the Anschluss declaration.33I9I9 the German natio
Legally, Austria could not merge her assembly at Weimar a
identity with that of Germany merelymously a resolution st
through the medium of a unilateral an-many and Austria for
nouncement of adhesion. According to unity." This resolution
the German constitution, "German"formal acceptance of t
Austria remained a sovereign state until
schluss resolution of N
such time as she was accepted formally Meanwhile Bauer had c
into the body of the republic that hadCount Ulrich Brockdo
arisen from the ruins of the Hohenzollern new German foreign m
state.34 The Ebert regime was now in Brockdorff-Rantzau, pa
power in Germany and had other mat- because of his residen
ters to deal with that kept it from ac- earlier stages of his di
knowledging the Austrian resolution ofnonetheless disavowed i
November I2. On November 25, how-
Anschluss attitude of
ever, the new Austrian minister to Ber-
Solf, because he believ
lin, Ludo Hartmann, a Social Democrat
acquisition of Austria
"the supreme ideal of whose life wasvictorious Allies to anne
Anschlgss,"35 participated in an impor-tory in the Rhineland by
tant conference presided over by Chan-sation.37 Currency, tarif
cellor Friedrich Ebert and attended by legal questions affectin
the provincial chancellors of Germany. were discussed in this
Shortly thereafter, Wilhelm Solf, Ger-Bauer and Brockdorff
man foreign minister, accepted Hart-again on March 2 and
mann's credentials, expressed his gov-tive agreement in regar
ernment's satisfaction with Austria's de-ters. A commission of s
cision to join the new republic, and in-pointed to carry the agr
32 Ibid., pp. 67-68. See also SCEICK, P. 92; fect. Points relating t
SCHUSCHNIGG, PP. 29-43; and KLEINWACHTER, ZOC.trafiic, and communicat
cit., p. 7o.
to be taken up in Berlin
33 L.BRUGEL, Geschichte der osterreichische Soxial-
On April IO it was repor
demohratse (Vienna, I922), V, 377. For divergent ac-
counts of Wedel's attitude at this time compare 36 Germany, Reichs-Gesetz
PALLER, loc. cit., p. 60, and KLEINWACHTER, toc. ciX.,
p. I349.
P. 68.
37 PRINCIG_HERWALT, loc. cit., p. I48.
34 KELSEN, Osterreichisches Staatsrecht, pp. 35-36.
38 Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik, Apri
35 BRAUNTHAL, P. 240. 4, p. II8. See also BAUER, PP. I44-45.

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 AUSTRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANSCHLUSS
that an Austrian commission headed by
the socialist privy counselor, Theodore
Korner, was to leave for Berlin to ar-
range the commercial and political de-
tails of the coming Anschluss. Vienna
was to be the Reich's second city accord-
ing to this semiofficial report.39
On February I6, I9I9 the Social
Democratic party of Austria was vic-
torious in the vote for the constituent
national assembly. Naturally the Social
Democratic triumph stimulated An-
schluss sentiment. Women, returned sol-
diers, and youths who had attained their
majority during the war were drawn to
the polls by the novelty of being able to
cast their first ballots. Since public opin-
ion was influenced greatly by the Bauer
line at this time, the bulk of the vote of
this new and inexperienced electorate
went to the Social Democrats and neces-
sarily endorsed their Aznschl?sss pro-
gram.40 But the spring elections for the
provincial Landtage just a few weeks
later indicated that many of the new
voters already had either discarded their
February sentiments or else lost interest
in politics.4I The strength of the con-
servative opposition caused most Social
Democrats to feel that it was inadvisable
to hold a plebiscite on the Anschluss
issue, although Hartmann recommended
this expedient in the Arbeiter Zeitung of
May IO. He also declared in Berlin that,
even though the peace conference might
separate Austria and Germany tempo-
rarily, history would witness the destruc-
tion of the artificial diplomatic and terri-
torial picture that was being pairlted at
39 "Der Anschluss Deutsch-Osterreich an
Deutschland," Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik, April
I9I9, Heft 4, p. I43.
4° SCHICK, P. IOO.
4ISee Austria, Statistische Zentralkommission,
Bundesamt fur Statistik, Beitrage zur Statistik der
Republik Osterreich: Statistik der Landtagswahlex im
Jahre I9I9 (Vienna, I920), pp. 6-I3.
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227
Paris.42 Bauer told the Austrian national
assembly that the country would con-
cern itself with independence only if the
Entente powers openly forbade union,
while Chancellor Renner asserted that al-
though the victorious nations might pre-
vent Anschluss at this time it would be
proved ultimately that the tie of race is
stronger than the ephemeral ascendancy
of a military victor.43
Meanwhile, the Austrian constituent
assembly met for the first time on March
4, I9I9. It adopted verbatim the enact-
ments of the provisional assembly in-
cluding the Anschluss resolution of No-
vember I2, I9I8. Article I of the consti-
tution declared: "German Austria is a
constituent part of the German Reich."44
An official communique stated that An-
schZuss would be effected through a for-
mal treaty which the Austrian and Ger-
man parliaments would ratify. Follow-
ing such ratification the union would be
consummated through the medium of
laws prepared by the collaborative effort
of German and Austrian specialists.45
These developments in Austria took
place despite the fact that at the end of
I9I8, Stephen Pichon, minister for for-
eign affairs in the Clemenceau govern-
ment in France, had vetoed the Austro-
German union project.46 A French mis-
sion came to Vienna to try to induce the
Austrians to assume an independent po-
sition based upon Austria's proud his-
42A1fred VERDROSS, Deutsch-osterreich in Gross
Deutschland (Stuttgart, I9 I9), p. 3 2.
43 S.P., pp. 3I7-I8, May 8, I9I9. See also Arbeiter
Zeitung, May 9, I9I9.
44 Austria, Staatsgesetzblatt fur die Republik
Dextschosterreich, I9I9, Sttick 54, No. I74, p. 399.
45 See Bauer's speech concerning negotiations
with Germany in S.P., pp. 364I, Mar. I2, I9I9.
46France, Debats parleenentaires: annales de la
Chambre des Deputes; IIme legislature, session ordi-
naire de I9I8, Part III, Du g octobre au 3I de*Celnbre
I9I8, p. 3334, Dec. 29 I9I8*
 S. Wh GOIJLD
228

toric traditions, which France offered to

admitted that both Christ
safeguard against German blandish-
and German Nationalists we
ments,47 Georges Clemenceau?s personal
archist at heart and had
hatred of the Austrian aristocracy,, which
experiment of a bourgeois
he regarded as pro-German, blinded him
because of pressure exerted
to the fact that his crude handling of the
'CThe republic was imposed
Austrian separate peace effort embodied
whelming majority of the
in negotiations carried on by Sistus of
trian bourgeoisie by force
Parma in I9I7-I8 had been instrumen-
tradition of the vast majority
tal in the overthrow of the chief ingredi-
man-Austrian bourgeoisie
ent of the Austrian tradition, that is the
dynasty.48
triann Habsburgian.n50 The
weakened their cause by
Actually the monarchist party was the
among themselves as to w
most determined anti-Anschl£ss element
exiled emperor or the popul
in Austria although it enjoyed noEugene
sup- should occupy th
port from foreign quarters which pursued
throne.5t Likewise German
the same end. The legitimist weeklies,
aroused against Karl ever
the Staatswehr and the Politik, together
sure of the Sixtus of Parma
with the Montagsseitgngn fought the idea
looked no opportunity to
of Austro-German union bitterly. anti-Habsburg
Also sentiment.S2
the large Viennese daily Neues Wiener
Lack of organization am
JoXrnal5 sympathized with the monarch-
Anschlgss elements has caus
ists, while the Neue Freie Presse, edited
pression to endure that pr
by the renowned Maurice Benedikt, was
Austrians favored union. Ba
at least internationalist rather than Ger-
however, that the Viennes
man nationalist in outlook. Other semi-
'the carriers of Austrian c
legitimist reviewsn such as the Ne?se
patriotism>n turned again
Reich and the intelligently edited
ArscAluss Social Democrats
Fackel of KarT Kraus "the Austrian
weeks after the November
Maximilian Harden,'7 were the victims
Both bourgeoisie and peasan
of "a conspiracy of silence and did not
"an independent Austria fu
attain the recognition to which their
merit entitled them.49 Ineffective organi-
50 Dis asterreichische RCYOIXtiOn}
sation kept the legitimists from uniting
I3. F. STRONG, Austria (Odober I9I
anti-Anschluss forces under the banner
transitionfrom empire to republic (Ne
P. 294; Franz BOR1HENAU, A?stria and
of Habsburg restoration as an alternative
I938), PP. I38 and I99-20I; C. A. MAC
to Anschluss although even Otto Bauer
soaS rerolutior
ix Agstrza (Cambridge
47 DIJNANY P- r9- and 258; and V. HELLER7 CSThe econo
cal backgound of Austrian reconstTu
48 Note the arg-umentof between Clemenceau
senFal Exropean affasrsX VIand
(I946)
the Italian premier, Vittorio
formerEmanuele Orlandof
Austrian official, in ps
bases his
Pariw Pease Conference, terpretation
V (Washington, I946),
of the public 632-
mind in A
34. On the Sistus of Parma affair
unpublished and by
treatise itsa conse-
pupil d Sig
quences £or the Austrian:Dr. dynast seerecently
Paul Federn, G. de aMAN-
resident
TEYER} A"stria's pexe CIofFer,
tY . I917-IQI8 (Londona
I92I) i Imre BALASSAX SI Death f or empre
BRANDL, (New
P. 306.
York} I9373; HDLICHX P. 279; BAUER, PP. 59-60;
GLAISE VON HORSTENAU PPF 242 and 266; PITREICH7
32Note the Frankfxrter
P. 38I; and WERKMANN7 PP. 25I-66 and 277.
49 DUNANX PP I 2 2-23. 53 Die osterreichische Refi
P- I48)

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 AUSTRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANSCHLUSS 229

of a national life of its own."54 As early cratic organization.57 A rather peculiar

as November I 7 and November 24, I9I8 alliance existed between Austrian Social
the Arbeiter Zeitung complained bitterlyDemocracy and German capitalist in-
that there were no republicans in the terests in regard to the Anschluss issue.
republic. And even one of the most con- There were large German industrial en-
vinced of Austrian republicans points terprises in Austria, many German tech-
out: "In Austria the republic was pro- nicians were employed in Austrian es-
claimed by members of parliament tablishments, and the universities and
elected seven years before.... The Ger- technical schools were crowded with Ger-
man-Austrian republic was the offspring man students. Hugo Stinnes, German
of national revolutions of the Slav peo- industrial magnate, financed such news-
ples."55 At the close of I9I8 the vice- papers as the Wiener Mittag, Dezatsche
president of the International Red Cross, Volksblatt, and Deutsche Tageszeitung,
Adolphe Ferriere, a Swiss, reported that which, together with the Michel of Graz
it was not the people of Austria who and the Alpenland of Innsbruck, carried
wanted AnschZussn but the Social Demo- on the fight for Anschluss.58 The
cratic leaders. The American observer country's desperate economic situation
Stephen Bonsal also thought that the strengthened Anschluss sentiment as the
few Austrians who were ready to accept man in the street came to believe that
the Anschluss proposal were influenced only union with Germany could provide
by despair. On the other hand, he con- him with a better future. Austrians who
sidered that dismemberment of Germany opposed Ansckluss did so in the belief
would induce many Austrians to wel- that the victorious powers would insist
come union with Bavaria.56 upon the maintenance of the old Austro-
The pro-Arschluss group in Austria Hungarian free trade policy in the Danu-
wanted union with Germany in order to bian basin. But when it became apparent
rule out the possibility of a Habsburg that the nation was going to be hemmed
restoration once and for all. This group in by severe customs barriers, the An-
was dominated by the personality of schluss idea seemed more attractive to
Otto Bauer, who viewed the Austrian many people.59
question as a simple alternative between Many Austrians felt, too, that the only
Anschluss and restoration. Intellectuals, way to maintain the old unity between
industrial workers, small shopkeepers, Alpine Austria and the Sudeten terri-
and some farm laborers, "all ranged un- tories of Czechoslovakia was to attach
der the aegis of the Social Democratic Austria to Germany.6° Even Austria's
party," composed the unionist faction; 57 BAUER, PP. I57 and 289; PRINCIG EE:RWALT,
and these elements also desired to secure loc. Cit., p. I48; STRONG, P. 295; and MACARTNEY,
support for the Austrian proletariat from pp . go-g I .

the far stronger German Social Demo- 58 DUNAN, PP . I 2 2-23 -

59 See SCHICK, P. IOO; PRINCIG-HERWALT, loc. Cit.,

541bid.,p.I50.
55 BRAUNTHALX P. 234-
56 Stephen BONSAL, Unfinished business (New
York, I944), pp. I42-43. Note his report of a conver-
sation with Renner at this time, pp. I36-37, and
French sponsorship of the Bavarian project, pp. 94-
95. iFor negotiations between the Tyrol and Bavaria
see S.P., pp. 77-78, Nov. I2, I9I8; and Neue Freie
Presse, Nov. 30, I9I8.
PP. I5I-52; Memorandum by W. GOODE, British
representative, Allied Powers, I9I9, Austrian section
(secret), Anne2: B (tariffs), SA 283 (typewritten
MS., Harper Library, University of Chicago).
60 See BAUER, P. IOI; Paul MOLISCH, Die sudeten-
d eutsche Freikeitsbewegung in den Jahren I 9I 8-I 9I 9
(Vienna, I932), PP. I26-32; and BONSAL, P. 94.
Bonsal noted that Renner was very bitter about the
Czech, Italian, and South Slav claims. See also

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230 S. W. GORD
own provinces flirted with separatistic
ideas once the emperor was no longer
available to serve as a unifying symbol;
the Alpine lands' chief bond of unity
hitherto had been their common status
as hereditary holdings of the House of
Austria, and AnschZuss seemed the best
way to preserve the old ties.6I
Since such sharp divisions of opinion
existed in regard to the Anschlgss issue,
a great deal depended upon the fate
meted out to Austria at the Paris Peace
Conference. When on September 2, I9I9
the final text of the Treaty of St. Ger-
main imposed upon Austria by the vic-
torious powers became known to the na-
tion at large, shame, rage, surprise, and
desperation were the sentiments that
prevailed throughout the country.62 The
St. Germain treaty awarded three mil-
lion former Austrians of Germanic blood
to Czechoslovakia, gave southern Styria
to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and
ceded South Tyrol, a cradle of Habsburg
sentiment, to Italy.
Nevertheless, the Austrian assembly
in its session of September 6, I9I9 de-
cided that article 88 of the St. Germain
document, which provided that Austrian
independence was inalienable except by
Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace,
Vienna, Jan. I2, I9I9, Paris Peace Conference, II,
233-36, and Renner's protest against Czech posses-
sion of the Sudetenland in S.P., PP. 25-27, Mar. 5,
I9I9.
6t See BAUER, PP. 67, IOI, IO5-8, I25, and 222-
23; Reichspost, NOV. 20, I9I8; Neue Freie Presse,
NOV. 30, I9I8; S.P., pp. 77-78, NOV. I2, I9I8. For
the question of Swiss stimulation of the Vorarlberg
separatist movement see Ambassador Thomas Nel-
son Page to I,ansing, Nov. I4, I9I8, Paris Peace
Conference, II, I85-87 and I9I-92; GLAISE VON
HORSTENAU, P. 433; and B&UER, P. I49.
62 A. FOURNIER, "Die Friedensbedingungen von
St. Germain," ()sterreichische Rundschau, LIX
(I9I9), 242. See also "Gegen die Friedensbedingun-
gen von St. Germain," VoGkswirtschaftliche Chronik,
Heft 7, July I9I9, p. 22I; F. OPPENHEI1WER, "Zum
Friedensdiktat," Osterreichische Rundschau, LX
(I9I9), 24I 44.
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consent of the council of the League of
Nations, would have to be accepted lit-
erally. On October I7 the Austrian legis-
lative body formally ratified the treaty.
Bauer characterized this day as marking
the end of proletarian domination in
Austria.63 The Social Democratic atti-
tude up to this time is indicated in his
statement: "Our task was to convince
the statesmen of the Entente that Ger-
man-Austria, if left to herself, was not
capable of existence."64 Renner, in an-
nouncing to the assembly the prohibi-
tion of Anschluss, reiterated his convic-
tion that Austria would unite herself to
Germany in time as the new Austrian
state had nothing to do with the old Aus-
trian tradition, a remark which drew
lively applause from the left.65 On Octo-
ber 2I, however, the assembly passed a
law which repealed the resolutions of
November I2, I9I8 and March I2,
I9I9.
Meanwhile, in response to Entente
pressure, the German government had
issued a protocol stating that all provi-
sions of the constitution of the republic
of August I I, I 9 I 9 which contradicted
the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles
were null and void. Therefore, Austrian
representatives could not be admitted to
the German parliament, "except insofar
as the council of the League of Nations
in conformity with article 80 of the [Ver-
sailles] treaty of peace, should consent to
such a change in the international status
of Austria."67
63 Die osterreichische Revolutizon, p. I6I.
64 Ibid., p. I47-
65 S.P., pp. 763-67, Sept. 6, I9I9.
66 Austria, Staatsgesetzblatt f?sr die Republik dSster-
rezch, I 9 I9, No. 484, p. I I53 .
67 Germany, Verhandlungen der verfassxnggeben-
den deutschen Nationalversamml?sng, Band 340, An-
lagen No. I793, pp. I4-I5. See also Paris Peace Con-
ference, VIII (Washington, I946), I38-40, I55-63,
I65-67, I79-8I, and I92-94.
 AUSTRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANSCHLUSS 23I

Thus the initial phase of the postwar Anschluss. Their policy of opportunism,
Anschluss movement ended in failure. In however, did find room for inclusion of
appraising the reasons for its nonsuccessJ those two familiar phenomenaof post-
it is evident that the strength of the do- war Austrian political life, "rubber-soled
mestic opposition in Austria was such as legitimism" and an indirect, procrasti-
to justify the prohibition enforced by the nating type of opposition to the Austro-
Treaty of St. Germain. Many studies of German union movement.
the Arschluss question have overempha- The too-ready acceptance of the thesis
sized the importance of the Germanic ra- that Austrian public opinion was over-
cial and linguistic tie as motivating fac- whelmingly in favor of the Anschluss in
tors in this first attempt to effect Austro-I9I8-I9 has its roots not only in the
German union. Not the desire for An- failure to distinguish the psychological
schluss for its own sake, but the fact that attitudes which determined the policies
the collapse of I9I8 swept away all the of the major political parties toward this
old familiar landmarks with which the issue. There is also insufficient historical
concept of Austria had been associated appreciation of the fact that the Austro-
for centuries produced a state of mind German Anschluss movement had sev-
favorable to Anschluss among the Aus- eral distinct and almost altogether sepa-
trian people. rate phases. Anschluss sentiment was
The old Austro-Hungarian monarchy had
not so strong in Austria in I9I8-I9 as it
ceased to exist. All Austrians now were deprived became later on; the Anschlqxss move-
of their traditional ideals. The old dynasty to ment in I920-22, for instance, is of quite
which everyone had reverentially looked up did different character from the develop-
not exist any more, and their fatherland was
ment of the same name that took place
gone forever. But they had also lost their faith.
. . . The breakdown of the supernational Habs-
in I9I8-I9. Naturally the advocates of
burg dynasty and at the same time of the "Aus- Anschlqxss were able to draw fresh
trian state idea" in the sense of an unquestioned strength from the external prohibition
dynastic tradition are therefore the deepest of the unification of two branches of the
causes of the growth of the Anschluss movement
old Germanic tribal tree laid down in the
at the start of post-war Austria.68
Treaty of St. Germain. Hence the issue
It is evident that Social Democratic was bound to become acute again in
ideologists bear the major share of re- times of economic or political change.
sponsibility for stimulating and sponsor- As a competent Austrian journalist noted
ing the Anschluss idea in its early stages. two decades later:69
They exceeded the efforts of German
Before the war all eflorts for a union had been
National politicians in this direction. opposed by an undisputed German dynasty, the
The German Nationalists largely fol- Habsburgs, and by their various governments,
lowed the Social Democratic lead, and which, in most cases, had a German maiority in
they did so less from conviction as to the their ranks. When, after the War, the Allied
Powers defeated the first attempt at a union, the
desirability of urlion than from the fear
situation was quite different, as the Anschluss,
of losing ground in the complicated game
now, was forbidden by the dictates of non-Ger-
of party politics that was going on in mans, and from now on it was easier to launch
Austria. As for the Christian Socialists a very vigorous propaganda for the "return of
they simply lacked the courage of their Austria to the German Reich!"
convictions and failed to make a decided CHICAGO ILLINOIS
stand either for the monarchy or against
68 SCEICK, PP. 48-49. See also REDLICE, P. 28I.
69 SCEIICK, P. IOO.

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