Valdez vs.

Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972,
they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until
in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that
effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that
Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for
naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in
March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD:

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code
governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only
needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.

SPOUSES VILLAFRIA V. PLAZO,

G.R. NO. 187524 , [AUGUST 5, 2015]
FACTS: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe
Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a
family home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808,
both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.

In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Possession dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March
1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and other
children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and
Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria,
without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita
acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed evidenced
receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a
previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank. The document actually
evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62 releasing her and
her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom. Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving the
subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When
respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages
in the resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the
premises were padlocked.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial

settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid calledBalita. Because
of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties
before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among
others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the
petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack
of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course
of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they
purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among
others, that respondents’ co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma.
Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort
to petitioners for P650,000.00.

On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to
petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance
offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public who
was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was
undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the typewritten
name “Pedro Riñoza, Husband” on the left side of the document was not signed. The
trial court also observed that both documents were never presented to the Office of the
Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the subject properties were still in
the names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and
buyers of the subject properties were not even presented as witnesses who supposedly
witnessed the signing and execution of the documents of conveyance.

ISSUE:
A. WON THE ACTION IS FOR PARTITION AND NOT FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INTESTATE ESTATE.

B. WON THE RTC HAS THE POWER TO ANNUL THE TITLE OF THE PETITIONER
IN A PARTITION PROCEEDINGS.

HELD:

A. YES. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of

respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for
partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate;
(2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception
of one who is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose;
(3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an
account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro’s estate has
no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent’s
estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for
judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an
action for settlement of estate.

It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if
testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent,
or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court,then the
decedent’s estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint
a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule
74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his estate,
may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending
obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer
the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro
died without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to
petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and
are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
B. YES. The fact that respondents’ complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and
recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very
well be achieved in an action for partition, as can be seen in cases where courts
determine the parties’ rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of
estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership and possession of
property. In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and
partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety of an action for
annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title of the
respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following
manner:

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens
title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that
what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As
pronounced in Lacbayan:

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but
that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot he collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by
law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used.

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment of sale on the
ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio
and Orlando’s title to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the
same.

Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of
ownership.
DIAZ-SALGADO vs. ANSON; G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

FACTS:

1. Luis Anson and Severina de Asis-Anson were common-law husband and wife before their marriage was
solemnized. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa married to Gasto Maya. (Spouses Maya)

2. Severina also had another daughter from a previous relationship named Jo-ann, who was wed to Gerard
Salgado. (Spouses Salgado)

3. Luis and Severina's marriage was held on December 28, 1966, prior to the effectivity of Family Code (E.O.
209 - effectivity: August 03, 1988) and 2 days prior to Maria Luisa's 1st birthday. It was solemnized by their
mayor friend in the latter's house witnessed by the Chief of Police.

5. During Luis and Severina's marriage, which was still governed by the Civil Code, they acquired several real
properties and according to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between them, the above-listed
properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. However, after their cohabitation ended, Luis went to the USA
and married another and had a son with her while Maria was left under the care of Severina.

6. However, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring 3
properties (covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109) in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of
title over the said properties, without Luis' knowledge and consent.

7. Severina died on September 21, 2002.

8. After Severina died, the Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage
(CENOMAR)( Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office.
Maria Luisa Anso-Maya also executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de
Asis on October 25, 2002 (TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003) adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir.

9. Luis alleged that as the surviving spouse, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and
of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina because of the preceding acts. Thus, he filed for the
annulment of the said 3 Unilateral Deeds of Sale and Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate.

10. Jo-ann (Spouses Salgado) countered that they were not aware of the marriage contracted by her mother
with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship that they both
acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement executed in April 1981 and
implemented by another Partition Agreement executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the
properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement.

11. The properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs
covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single
without reference to any husband.

12. Spouses Maya corroborated Spouses Salgado's claim. Maria cognizes that Luis and Severina are common-
law husband and wife which was terminated upon the partition agreement, and not that they were married.
13. During trial, and Luis gave testimony and presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract without
a marriage license number inputted. The lower court ruled in favor of Luis citing the case of Geronimo v. CA
wherein the marriage was still declared valid despite the absence of the marriage license no. in the marriage
contract.

14. The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered
conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.

15. They appealed to CA but CA affirmed RTC's decision. Thus, Spouses Salgado elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court.

Spouses Salgado LUIS

Petitioned that marriage between Luis and
Severina is null and void for want of
marriage license based on the Marriage
Contract presented by Luis which has
adequately established its absence.
The petition raises a question of fact,
which cannot be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. He also countered that
the Spouses Salgado did not present any
evidence to support their theory.64 If the
existence of the marriage license is in
issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses
Salgado to show the lack of marriage
license by clear and convincing evidence

ISSUE:

1. Whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states
that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an
exceptional character.

2. Whether or not Luis and Severina's marriage is valid without a marriage license (and the subject lands as
conjugal properties.)

RULING:

1. YES. The absence of marriage license may be proven with the marriage contract as prima facie evidence.

In the case at bar, Luis and Severina's marriage was declared as VOID AB INITIO.

Luis and Severina's marriage (December 28, 1966) was contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code
and is thus covered by the Civil Code.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof,
save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It
sets forth:
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number
was indicated therein.

The marriage contract, being a public document, is prima facie proof that at the time of their Luis and
Severina's marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that
their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the
regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with
the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely
religious ceremony.

For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that:

(1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law
(civil marriage); and

(2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Since the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this
was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by
the mayor, their marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code.

The requisites of Art. 77 are:

a. prior civil marriage between the parties and

b. a ratifying religious ceremony

were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional
character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

The trial court erred by relying in Geronimo v. CA, because in that case, despite the absence of the marriage
license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was
no statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified
that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the
deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and
Records Section where the marriage license number appears.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the:

1. absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or

2. at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.

Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false
statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was
presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina
was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

As held in In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, a marriage solemnized without a marriage license based
on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. Instead of a marriage license, therein parties to the
marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected
the notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with.

The Court also noted that while Luis contends the validity of his marriage to Severina, he knowingly
contracted a subsequent marriage abroad casting doubt on his credibility. He went to the USA in 1981 and
until Severina's death in 2002. Much less reconciled with her. All those years, he never presented himself to be
the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. Thus, he failed to prove
the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

-------------------------

2. Luis and Severina's marriage is not valid without a marriage license.

With regard to the subject properties, the Partition Agreement which Luis and Severina executed in November
1980 which divided their properties between them without court intervention is VALID.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, the Court held that "in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144
of the Civil Code.

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their
cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license,
Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."

"Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household.

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties
co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is
the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The
thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil
Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x
x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same,
the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

-----

THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES IN LUIS

It is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license. However, instead of proving
that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the
presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence
(marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage
contract was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No
other witness also testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its
issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly
submitted in the Municipal Hall.

It was also established during the cross-examination that prior to going to the house of their friend Mayor for
the solemnization of their marriage, they did not obtain a marriage license.
Fule vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-40502 and L-42670

FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition
for letters of administration alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the
motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of
the

deceased, contending that

1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death
certificate and therefore have an improper venue.

2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.

CFI denied the motion.

CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix.

Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

 ISSUES:

a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present
case?

b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?

c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Held:

1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the
merits or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It
is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is
situated. Venue is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience
purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it may be waived
or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate.
1. “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary.

1. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be
the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
 Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special
administratix.

G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

o The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed
a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but
this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied.
Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI
Quezon.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in
pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of
probate over intestate proceedings

HELD:

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.
RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of
Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before
the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought
the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will,
questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto
of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon
the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving
the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the
Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is
only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative
will.

ERNESTO M. GUEVARA v. ROSARIO GUEVARA, GR No. L-5405, 1956-01-31

Facts:
"This case being the sequel to, and aftermath of, a previous litigation between the parties that
reached the Supreme Court through the former Court of Appeal's, it becomes necessary to
restate the essential antecedent facts to view the issues in... proper perspective. For this
purpose, it is important to recall that on "August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara, a resident of
Bayambang, Pangasinan, executed a will (Exhibit A), distributing assorted movables and a
residential lot among his... children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren,
Vivencio, Eduvigis, Dionista, Candida, and Pio Guevara.
The balance of the 259 odd hectares ho distributed as follows:
100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testator's lifetime and for payment of
his debts and family expenses;
108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein 43.2342
hectares by way of mejora;
21.6171 hectares to 'mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guavara.' Ernesto Guevara
was appointed executor without bond.
On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara,
conveying to the latter the southern half of 'the 259-hectare lot heretofore mentioned, and
expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara ... as owner of the northern half.
Prior to this sale, oh November 1, 1932, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointly applied for
registration of the big parcel (case No. 15174), but in view of the sale from the former to the
latter, the decree was... issued in the name of Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole
tract a certificate of title
Fifteen days previously, i.e., on September 27, 1933, Victorinc Guevara died, but his ¦will was
not filed for probate.
About four years later, Rbsario Guevara, claiming; to be a recognized natural child of the
deceased Victorino, and on... the assumption that he had died intestate, brought' suit
against' Ernesto Guevara to recover. 423,492 square meters
The case reached the former Court of Appeals in due course and was decided in
Rosario Guevara's favor... but upon certiorari, the Supreme Court rnodified the judgment
Judgment of said court insofar as it awarded any relief to the respondent Rosario Guevara, in
this action is hereby reversed and set aside, and the parties are hereby ordered to present the
document Exhibit A to the proper) court for... probate in accordance with law, without
prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal Pangasinan may take against the responsible
party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document, is approve and allowed
by the court as the... last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs
and legatees herein named may take such action, judicial or extra judicial, as necessary to
partition the estate of the testator, taking in consideration. the pronouncements made in...
part II of this opinion No -finding as to costs in any of the three instances.'
Claiming to act pursuant to the foregoing decision Rosario Guevara commenced on October
5, 1945, special proceedings No. 2646 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the
probate of the will of Victorino Guevara.
Notice of the petition having been duly published pursuant to Rule of Court 77,. section
4, Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for
Rosarioin theformer litigation, was ... allowed to intervene in view of his recorded
attorney's lien.
Ernesto. Guevara, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on' the grounds that
(a petition itself alleged that the will was revoked; (b) that 'whatever right to probate the
parties may have has ... already prescribe (Record on Appeal,, p. 14); and (c) that the
purpose of th probate was, solely to have petitioner Rosario declared an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased.
Judge Sotero Rodas denied the motion, to dismiss; but upon motion of reconsideratio Judge
Mainalac of the same court, on June 23, 1937, reconsidaration set aside the previous
resolution and ordered the... petition dismissed on the ground that Rosario Guevara's
petition did not for the probate in toto of the will, contrary to the order of Supreme
Court; that her right to petition for the probate o testament .
of Victorino L. Guevara had prescribed; and that her action for judicial declaration of
acknowledgment had likewise prescribed.
Issues:
(c) Is the petition for probate of the alleged will of the deceased Victorino L, Guevara barred
by the statute of limitations?
Ruling:
(3) The last question for determination in this case is whether or not the petition for probate
of the will of Victorino L. Guevara is barred by the statute of limitations, considering that the
testator died on September 27, 19S3,... and that the petition for probate of said will was filed
twelve (12) years later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945. The Court of Appeals resolved the
question in the negative
"We are of the opinion that the Court below was in error when it declared that the
petition for probate of the will of Victorino Guevara was barred by prescription. The
provision of Article 756 of the old
Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reiterating those of the old
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), point out that the presentation of a decedent's will to the
competent court has always been deemed by our law as more of a... duty than a right, and the
neglect of such obligation carries with it the corresponding penalty; and it is inconsistent
with that policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into
their validity.
The authority... given to testators to dispose freely of a portion of their estate would be
imperfectly safeguarded, unless adequate measures were provided by the state to assure that
the wishes of the deceased would be... carried out. Because the decedent may no longer act
to have his testamentary dispositions duly executed, the state authority must take over the
opposite vigilance and supervision, so that free testamentary disposition does... not remain a
delusion and a dream.
we hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and
no debts 'and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extra-judicial partition of the... estate,
they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance
with the will.
They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to
law.
Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because
such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins
the probate of the will... and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of ¦a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be... done in the instant case. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be
cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to
the partition of the estate... among themselves to the exclusion of others.'
'This excludes the bar of the statute of limitation from consideration as one of the matters
which may be shown in opposition to the probate. This is further emphasized by section
1341 which, in substance, declares that, if upon the... verdict of the jury facts mentioned
in section 1317 as aforesaid appear to be established, the court 'must' admit the will to
probate. Section 1314 makes it imperative that the court shall admit the "will to probate if
the... execution is proven and the grounds of opposition authorized by section 1312 are
not established. This clearly implies that no grounds of opposition other than those
enumerated in section 1312 may be set up, ... and it leaves no place for the application of the
statute of limitations.
'One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to
effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary
wishes of a deceased person
'Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as tot the authenticity and
due execution of the will, none of heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance
with that will without first securing its allowance or... probate by the court: first, because the
law expressly provides that 'no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved
and allowed in the proper court; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a
proceeding in... rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding,
judicial or extrajudicial, with offending against public policy designed to effectuate the
testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to... protect
the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among
which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees.
Nor may the court approve and allow the will... presented in evidence in such an action
for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration
under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for revindicacion or
partition.'
"From whatever angle the case is viewed, a hearing on the allowance of the will is
unavoidable. The persistent, albeit obnoxious, attempts of Rosario Guevara to sidetrack the
will are not remedied by dismissing the petition for probate of will, and allowing
Ernesto to retain a greater interest than that intended by the testator.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF TUGUEGARAO, Petitioner, v. FLORENTINA PRUDENCIO,
NOW DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: EXEQUIEL, LORENZO, PRIMITIVO,
MARCELINO, JULIANA, ALFREDO AND ROSARIO, ALL SURNAMED DOMINGO; AVELINA
PRUDENCIO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND VICTORIANO DIMAYA; ERNESTO PENALBER* AND
RODRIGO TALANG; SPOUSES ISIDRO CEPEDA AND SALVACION DIVINI, NOW DECEASED,
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: MARCIAL, PEDRO AND LINA, ALL SURNAMED CEPEDA,
Respondents.
THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 187942, September 07, 2016
Ponente : JARDELEZA, J.
FACTS:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals .The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
–
Branch 4 of
Tuguegarao City declaring as null and void the sale to petitioner of 96,926 square meters of a
lot
located in Baggao, and ordering petitioner to reconvey the property to Florentina Prudencio,
substituted by her heirs, namely: Exequiel, Lorenzo, Primitivo, Marcelino, Juliana, Alfredo and
Rosario, all surnamed Domingo; Avelina Prudencio, assisted by her husband Victoriano Dimaya;
Ernesto Penalber and Rodrigo Talang (respondents-appellees).
Felipe Prudencio married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife, Elena Antonio he
begot five children, namely: Valentina, Eusebia, Paula, Florentina and Avelina. With his second
wife,
Teodora Abad ,he had two children namely: Felipe Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora. During the
marriage
of Felipe and Elena, they acquired a parcel of land located at Sitio Abbot, Barrio Imurung,
Baggao,
Cagayan (Cagayan lot). When Elena died, Felipe and their children became co-owners of the
property. Felipe then died intestate during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora,
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of the late
Felipe
with Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora .
While the Extra-Judicial Partition acknowledged that the Cagayan lot was acquired during the
marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated that Felipe and Elena did not have any children who
could
inherit the property; hence, Teodora and her children with Felipe are the only living heirs by
operation of law.
Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and Salvacion Divini.
Spouses Cepeda sold the Cagayan lot to petitioner for P16,500.00. Thereafter, petitioner was
issued
TCT No. T-20084.
On September 15, 1972, respondents-appellees filed a Complaint for Partition with
Reconveyance against petitioner, Spouses Cepeda and Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora
before
the RTC. They alleged that they are the children and grandchildren of Felipe by his first
marriage.
Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful shares in
the
estate of Felipe and Elena when the Extra-Judicial Partition declared Teodora as the sole owner
of
the Cagayan lot. Thus, they prayed that they be declared the owners pro indiviso of the
undivided
portion of 10.2512 hectares of the Cagayan lot, and that this portion be reconveyed to them.
Spouses Cepeda maintained that their title over the Cagayan lot was clean and that they had no
knowledge that other persons had interest on it because Teodora's title over the property was
clean.
They asserted that like petitioner, they were purchasers for value and in good faith. Therefore,
petitioner has no cause of action against them.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the excluded heirs could recover what is rightfully theirs from persons who
are innocent purchasers for value
2.Whether the extra judicial partition is binding on respondents-appellees
RULING:
This is a case of exclusion of the rightful heirs in the partition of the estate of the deceased,
followed by the sale of their shares to third persons who claim good faith. Both petitioner
and Spouses Cepeda consistently contend that they were not aware that any person, other
than the seller, has interest over the Cagayan lot. Thus, they are innocent purchasers for
value.
In Segura v. Segura teaches that the answer would not depend on the good faith or bad faith
of the purchaser, but rather on the fact of ownership, for no one can give what he does not
have—
nemo dat quod non habet. Thus, the good faith or bad faith of petitioner is immaterial in
resolving
the present petition. A person can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer can
as a
consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.
The extra-judicial partition is not binding on respondents- appellees. Petitioner's title over
the Cagayan lot was derived from the title of Spouses Cepeda, who in turn obtained their title
from
Teodora. Teodora, meanwhile, gained title over the entire Cagayan lot on the basis of the Extra-
Judicial Partition dated October 20, 1969. Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Civil Code) state that all the children of the deceased shall inherit from him and by
implication should participate in the settlement of his/her estate, to wit:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the
inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead,
survive,
the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
Thus, the children of Felipe in his two (2) marriages should be included in the execution of
the Extra-Judicial Partition. In this case, it is undisputed that respondents-appellees were
children
of Felipe by his first marriage. Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora did not deny respondents-
appellees' relation with Felipe. Despite this, however, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora
declared
in the Extra-Judicial Partition that they are the only living heirs of Felipe by operation of law.
They
claimed that Felipe had no child with his first wife Elena, in effect depriving respondents-
appellees
of their rightful shares in the estate of their parents. They arrogated upon themselves not only
the
share of Felipe in the Cagayan lot but also the shares belonging to respondents-appellees. Thus,
the
Extra-Judicial Partition is void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. As a consequence, it has
no
force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and it cannot be
validated
either by time or ratification
RAMON S. CHING v. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, GR No. 192828, 2011-11-28
Facts:
the respondents filed a Complaint... agains... against... against t... the respondents filed a
Complaint[6] against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business
Bank, Inc... of
(formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar,... Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of
Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching
(Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
the respondents filed a Complaint[6] against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance
Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar,... Asia Atlantic
Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming
rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
nto surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit
of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title... covering two
condominiu... m units in Binondo... which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but
which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph,
Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the...
stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio.
was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global
Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the
certificates of title... covering two condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by
Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also
fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive
their complete shares, exclusive of the... stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the
estate of Antonio.
ex... xecute an Agreement[8] and a Waiver
August
Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs
The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a
Certificate of
Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by
PhilBank to Antonio.
The respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it
be immediately released to them.
the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the Complaint.
the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity.
Petitioner's Contention.

The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the
heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir;
and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the... exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,... An ac... t is
distinguished from an... ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
It... no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned.
does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate
court's... exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged... collective ownership of the
same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs.
the respondents were parties... jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of... the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed
out in a special... proceeding.
Issues:
the respondents filed a Complaint... nst the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company,
Global Business Bank, Inc... the respondents filed a Complaint[6] against the petitioners and
Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the
heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir;
and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the... exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
Ruling:
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action
It is distinguished from an... ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned.
does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate
court's... exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged... collective ownership of the
same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs.
the respondents were parties
Principles:
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of... the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint.