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The Encirclement at Cherkassy-Korsun - An Assessment of The Winner
The Encirclement at Cherkassy-Korsun - An Assessment of The Winner
ScholarWorks at WMU
12-1994
Recommended Citation
Lutes, Joseph Kent, "The Encirclement at Cherkassy-Korsun: An Assessment of the Winners and Losers"
(1994). Master's Theses. 3838.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3838
by
Joseph Kent Lutes, Jr.
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of History
recovered their men, but lost ground and the use of the
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Hitler at Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Kirovograd Encircled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
German Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
ii
Table of Contents-Continued
CHAPTER
Weather Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
iii
Table of Contents-Continued
CHAPTER
Resistance Toughens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Toward Korsun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
To Take Lissyanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
V. THE BREAKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
iv
Table of Contents-Continued
CHAPTER
The Breakout Order................ 91
One More Supply Drop to the Pocket 94
To Take Hill 239.................. 94
The Final Orders.................. 96
Final Preparations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Dash for Freedom.................. 99
Utter Chaos....................... 105
Crossing the Gniloy Tikich........ 110
Final Preparations for the
Belgians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Lissyanka. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
V
Table of Contents-Continued
CHAPTER
vi
LIST OF MAPS
4. Relief attempts.
Source: Operations of Encircled Forces.
vii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
army.
1
2
the keil und kessel techniques all too well. When the
their own.
3
Hitler at Fault
their own trap. The fault for falling into the cauldrons
ground they .were on, even while the enemy armies were
on the night the Russians formed the pocket, but with the
out the war in Russia and had paid dearly for their suc-
5
6
well. 2
The Russians had battered his four armies, and each re-
the front line long enough for a total refit. The army
front. 5
could not tie his armored units down to the land, that
The Russians would break the German lines, but the panzer
attacks. 8
left. 9
and one tank army of two tank and one mechanized corps
corps.u
torted that the Russians must lose steam soon and that
troops . 15
German resistance. 16
12
one. 17
group that felt the task assigned his men was unrea-
of Kiev. 20
shorter front. 21
14
Russian Breakthroughs
atre and for the Western Front, but that Hitler had never
could break through the German Front, and ravage the rear
Uman. 31
Group South between First Panzer Army and the right wing
Panzer Army and Fourth Panzer Army. The First Tank Army
Kirovograd Encircled
ress city. 37
but would not disobey the order from Hitler turning the
own. 42
21
Bayerlein's advance.~
morning. Before they could bed down for the night, or-
them withdraw from the city. Their pleas met with suc-
in the next day, and occupied the town, ending the German
anized corps (of the First Tank Army) became cut off by
German Reactions
Bug River.B
25
was not well suited for tanks, and the Russian armored
area. 54
ition of strength.
the Bug River and the Dnieper River, which would have al-
ing the time Army Group South occupied this line, German
hold the Bug River line against almost any attack the
east.
28
THE ENCIRCLEMENT
sian thrust hit the German lines just north of the pro-
held with no more than one man for every fifteen yards of
29
30
Guards Tank Army broke through the Eighth Army front and
conversation:
mans could send into the area. The nearest true reserves
from the Dnieper to their new line east of the Bug River
southeast and south, and by the end of the day, the Rus-
sians held the roads leading to the flank and rear of the
believed that the Seventh Corps might still close the gap
that yawned between his corps and the Seventh. But, this
the area . 10
schana, had come under attack from enemy tanks. The di-
tillery.n
Infantry Di vision. 19
lifted the spirits of his men, they now believed that the
to free them.~
39
viet lines open and had to fall back. The rest of Hube's
from the pocket and withdraw. With the new forces, the
relief effort.v
40
not allow the men of his army group to face another di-
permitted. 29
best shape to carry out the relief effort, all the other
line, the division moved south, and into the rear areas
tanks."
43
A as planned. 38
nothing, but the Germans could have made good use of the
attempt. 39
barring the way, but also the slower Russian dive bombers
downed one IL-2 with his cannon before the Russian fight-
groups.~
January 29.
100 men. Lieb also recorded that his units were now re-
shortages.u
tained all the units within the pocket. His new command
his flanks and in his rear. His groups had barely held
31, 1944. The Eighth Air Corps of the Fourth Air Fleet
the pocket.~
port planes."
These two air armies were attached to the First and Se-
the way of the Russians and they killed him during their
who had defected from the Belgians the night before. The
52
was the fact that he found the rest of the pocket too,
of their troops from the Dnieper River line and the Rus-
ing and getting stuck, due to the mud and terrible weath-
All of the diary entries Lieb made for the first few
per day.~
der to evacuate the pocket, that his men could begin the
last hope for moving the vehicles, the railroad line be-
at night.~
push the Germans any farther north, they could shell the
sian forces that faced his units had been in the lines
for a long period of time and were well below their nor-
lief corps. 1
58
59
tacks.2
First snow and then mud delayed the _assembly of the two
panzer corps. Fog delayed the attack and Hitler had just
ted. But, the relief forces did the best they could con-
Third panzer Corps attack due north, that they turn east
pocket could not hold out long enough for a plan of the
believed that he could still hold his ground and that his
Weather Problems
able fields. Even with the reduced air power due to the
Resistance Toughens
Russians. 14
The fog set in during the night and movement the next day
supplies. 16
line had firing emplacements, but had been dug too deep
two panzer corps could not reach the pocket under their
own power and that the men in the pocket would have to
to accept the truth that the mud and Russians might prove
back.n
et per day. In the seven days that the planes were able
sible.u
field. But, the mud and rain became too much for them
ground stayed frozen all the time. The Germans made the
towards Korsun.~
would not break through the Belgian lines which had been
attempt. 33
his troops could carry to the front could not meet the
troops could cut the bogged down trucks out of the mud.
sible and that the forces within the pocket would have to
cuers.n
Stemmermann in Jeopardy
mand post now stood as the only area between the two Rus-
missing.~
reported back that his units could not possibly cross the
and the Russians had again robbed his corps of any of-
ces of the Fifth Guards Tank Army to his front and the
sought to hold the German troops within the town and not
Corps."
the fire.n
got down from their trucks and marched into the city, as
The German pilots had to slow down and fly at very low
would wait until the German pilots began their drop runs
the troops within the pocket could not even pick them up.
but when the chutes hit the ground, they noticed thick
zhentsy or Hill 239, just six miles from the western most
Toward Korsun
Trucks that had move through the mud, became bogged down
former drivers luck and made their way out of the pocket
on foot.s
the impact. The low height and added cushion of the snow
needed. 64
the runway and when the planes came in, they started
525 rockets.~
man front lines along the main highways in the area. The
et. As the German planes circled in the air, the men de-
fending the pocket fired flares into the air to mark the
off target. The supply drop that night fell into the
Lieb, the fault lay with the Luftwaffe, the pilots mis-
the wrong area. Lieb recorded in his diary the fact that
86
To Take Lissyanka
extreme difficulty.TI
Division had stormed the town and drove the Russians off
out and to protect the road they would use to leave the
The 3,000 men of Das Reich moved off to take the next
help him hold their new positions. The fall of the town
corner of town.n
to knock out the tanks, but the weapon caused them many
problems.n
the town from the right. His first company stormed the
out began. 79
his corps moved against Hill 239. His attack broke down
hill. 81
CHAPTER V
THE BREAKOUT
91
92
care to make sure that his group received all the pro-
make sure that they knew each phase of the plan for re-
negotiate the muddy roads and even letting them try would
along with one doctor from each division to stay with the
the air drops put them in good shape, at least well sup-
loads of ammunition. 7
of the hill. The four tanks were no match for the Rus-
the division. 10
and coordination:
The orders went on to give the time for the last expected
attempt. 15
Final Preparations
unable to take the two hills, due to the ice and the ten-
Hill 239, but were forced from the trenches they had just
though they made some headway, they were not able to take
breakout attempt.w
ruary 17. n
heavy machine gun, antitank and tank fire from the edge
drive the Russians back and turned his main effort due
then came under fire from the Russians who still occupied
the unexpected fire from the hill threw the division into
ther south to avoid the heavy tank fire coming from Hill
102
town.
breakout destroyed.~
the Germans who were the rear guard of the column in this
ing tanks and troops, and had been shelled by the Rus-
Utter Chaos
tanks hit the column from one of the rear flanks and be-
gan driving over the horse drawn carts carrying the woun-
aged carts and piled the rest of the carts in the road,
hind them. 38
their horses down the opposite hill and into the rear and
his men to follow him and fell fifteen meters into the
him in the gully and waited for some miracle. The mir-
open plain towards the last of the three tanks. The tank
into the woods at the end of the plain and left the tanks
and the Cossacks behind them. The Russian tanks and cav-
Panzer Corps. 41
lines.
the stream, but the current proved too powerful for the
few carts that had made it that far and they were swept
downstream."
110
vision and learned that there were now no more than one
Oktyabr.ffl
the wounded men who travelled with his group. 53 The men
then sent his men across the stream in groups, with the
Germans and asked for volunteers among all the men with
attempt to rescue the men pinned down, and make the last
his men to stay within the tree line and not to move from
with him charged into the valley under the guns of the
113
ley under the withering fire from the Russian tanks and
charged into the mass of dead and dying men cutting off
haired blue eyed women who did not wish to fall under
carts, who were now shivering with cold and fever. De-
freedom.w
Lissyanka
them. They made use of the bridge which First Panzer and
the town from the north. The commander of this group re-
Lieb also received the report that the rear guard had
Lissyanka. 65
fight, but for the most part, his corps was no longer fit
effort and now the only thing left to accomplish was the
tion his corps faced and that he lacked gasoline for his
from the rear areas to the main rescue area, just west of
haystacks along the route and flush out the Russian in-
fore they came upon the first of the supply depots. The
this far and they were all hungry and thirsty. One or
ens and fight for the front of the line and food. The
lit fires around the tanks to help thaw the mud enough to
to sort out the men, which had arrived all mixed togeth-
Corps held placards in the air with the names and numbers
platoons.n
situation had been dealt with and his men were now
with Hitler.n
assaults all through the day and into the night. In the
though the hill was now to their rear, the Germans wished
to hold it, because from the hill the Russians could fire
Conclusions
les in the pocket made the trek through the mud. The men
some cases. 84
claim 500 tanks, 300 planes and most of the German artil-
claim that only the officers and the lead elements of the
the pocket with three officers and 216 men, out of 1062
sonally visited the men who escaped from the pocket. Ar-
my Group South had to hold their front, now minus the six
IN RETROSPECT
On the Airlift
125
126
during the twenty days they flew missions into the pock-
move and fighting. The loss of the two tank armies could
German Conclusions
came about for the same reasons the Germans were trapped
of his armies. 6
130
ized the full extent of the danger the two corps faced,
the pocket grew weaker. The Germans lost all their heavy
necessary. 7
also made itself felt at the army level because the pock-
nication to find out what each force was doing and the
131
mand, over both the forces of the pocket and the relief
high ground near Hill 239. Brieth would also have been
132
the forces would have meant that the men lost in crossing
that his men ran across. The High Command never made
and that all he could do now was hold the Russian Front
Corps which was still making some headway towards the men
tempt.
divided his relief force into two groups, even though his
two groups, they could not reach the troops within the
tives.
and withdraw from the area. The generals knew that Army
South the use of the two corps within the pocket and the
135
Germans had to send these units into the rear areas for a
136
137
ended in failure.
grad.1
Sixth Army had been in the front lines since the be-
Poland, France and during the first two years of the cam-
ordered the five corps staff and twenty two combat divi-
90,000 prisoners. 4
went into the camps of the enlisted men. The men of the
them pro-Communist. 10
the Reich." 11
macht.12
fighting and save them the fate which befell Sixth Army
Addressing the ss
Degrelle and his men hated the Russians and all they
the hook was too visible under the bait for them to fall
wish to surrender.
The captured men had food and their wounds were cleaned
and dressed.n
ficers existed, but they did not know whether the prom-
stand how von Seydlitz could serve Zhukov. Lieb saw von
The Russians had told the truth about their ring around
ultimatum:
the fact that the 198th Division was not even in the
pocket.~
from the Free Germany Committee and the passes that the
along.~
men and that only around 3,000 men, mainly the officers
claim that the officers were flown out before the men of
of the Russians. 61
the Russians, the German officers did not want their men
that Hitler would let him sacrifice his life for him.M
Differing Stories
ped the entire Eighth Army and the army command element
over 100,000 men.~ The Russians found out the truth, la-
But, the German corps within the pocket had been in the
pocket due to the fact that the pocket contained the rem-
the men in the lines were told the German version of the
that they carried out the order to kill all the wounded.
these men had been treated for their wounds before they
died.~
felt that land was more important than the lives of his
that they might meet the same fate as the German wounded
surrendering. 81
believed that Germany had already lost the war and that
officer.~
of the pocket and the fact that they broke out with the
which he would lead back into Russia, only two months af-
remained high, because they knew how close the relief at-
hated the Russians and knew they would face a hard life
lonien and the Wiking were part of the German elite and
they could hold out and try to make it safely back to the
did not fall the for the propaganda the Russians designed
165
166
realized that the attacks into the flanks and rear of the
the shock army required thinning out the units on the en-
narrow front and that the high command take more control
Problems Develop
ly, his plan "Deep Battle" and presented it for the ap-
attacks used during the first World War, had become ob-
my's goals, and not the fighting for each separate posi-
manders from the rank of marshal all the way down to the
and came down very hard on the new concept. He knew lit-
new theory. 20
Red Army may not have been developed enough to carry out
ioned.
enter the rear areas of two German corps. But, the Rus-
the deep battle operation into effect and the fact that
Russian Mistakes
von Manstein, he was able to free the two corps for re-
rounded and cut off from supply on the ground, and had
rounded and cut off from supply on the ground, and had
zer Corps. The first attack drove Army Group South back
lier. The Russian generals did not obey the laws of war-
Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.
CHAPTER II
6. Ibid, 474-476.
180
181
8. Ibid, 473.
9. Ibid, 474-476.
18. 772.
3 0. . Ibid, 7 3 .
CHAPTER III
THE ENCIRCLEMENT
8. Ibid, 556.
186
47 . Ibid, 2 0.
CHAPTER IV
5. Ibid, 36.
7. Encircled, 36.
9. Ibid, 37.
CHAPTER IV
5. Ibid, 36.
7. Encircled, 36.
9. Ibid, 37.
would arrive. The High Command had set dates for the be-
ginning of the breakout as early as February 1, but kept
moving the date back as the relief efforts ran into prob-
lems due to the Russians, but mainly due to the weather.
CHAPTER V
THE BREAKOUT
2. Ibid, 38.
4. Ibid, 27.
7. Encircled, 25.
8. Ibid, 224.
CHAPTER VI
IN RETROSPECT
4. Ibid, 225.
7. Ibid, 41.
8. Ibid, 41.
9. Ibid, 41.
CHAPTER VII
9. Ibid, 89.
CHAPTER VIII
3. Simpkin, 40.
5. Ibid, 52.
Primary Sources
Memoirs
219
220
Documents
Secondary Sources
Books
Wagner, Ray. The Soviet Air Force In World War II. New
York: Doubleday & co., 1973.
Weinert, Erich. Das Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland"
1939-1945. Berlin: np, 1957.
Weingartner, James. Hitler's Guard: Inside the Fuhrer's
Personal SS Force. New York: Berkley Books, 1974.
Ziemke, Earl. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat
in the East. Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1968.
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