Vicente Perez vs.

Eugenio Pomar

March 20, 2016

Case Digest:

G.R. No. L-1299 November 16, 1903

VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

EUGENIO POMAR, Agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos, defendant-appellant.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

Facts: On December 8, 1901 Vicente Perez came to an agreement with Eugenio Pomar as an English
interpreter which is not a free service. Perez ask for the payment for the service that he made to Pomar
but the later did not do his part to pay Perez for the service that made to him.

Issues: Should Pomar need to pay the interpretation made by Perez?

Ruling: Yes, he should pay the service of Pomar because it is not a gratuitous one and it is under the
innominate contract of facio ut des which is I do that you give.

Rodrigo Enriquez Et. Al. vs. Soccoro Ramos

March 17, 2016

Case Digest

G.R. No. L-23616 September 30, 1976

Rodrigo Enriquez, Aurea Soriano de Dizon and Urbano Dizon, Jr., plaintiffs-appellants,

Vs.

Socorro A. Ramos, defendant-appellee.

Castro, C.J. :

Facts:

On November 24, 1958 Enriquez and spouses Dizon sold to Ramos 20 subdivision lots in Quezon City for
the sum of P235,056 of which only P35,056 had been paid. The balance of P200,000 was to be liquidated
within 2 years from the date of the execution of the deed of sale, with interest at 6% for the 1st year
and 12% thereafter until fully paid. To secure the payment of that balance, Ramos executed in the same
document a deed of mortgage in favor of the vendors on several parcels of land variously situated in
Quezon City, Pampanga and Bulacan. The deed of mortgage embodies certain stipulations which Ramos
invoked. But according to the appellants the defendant violated the terms of their agreement in the
following respects:

The defendant refuse to pay the sum of P200,000 within the stipulated period.

The mortgage on Bulacan property was never registered and,

The realty tax for 1959 on the lots mortgage were not paid by the defendant.

Ramos admit that she has not paid the realty taxes and has not registered the mortgage on Bulacan
property but argues that it was a minor ones and still her obligation to pay the sum of P200,000 has not
arisen as no previous notice and demand for payment has been made and according to her the road is
not completed because the appellants have not yet planted trees nor put up water facilities as required
by the ordinance.

The court held that the non-payment of 1959 realty taxes as well as the non-registration of the
mortgaged on Bulacan estate by the defendant were minor matters. On the issue of the completion of
road the appellant adduced the testimonies of 2 witnesses that the road was completed on May 9, 1960
in accordance with the ordinances of Quezon City and there is nothing in Ordinance 2969 which would
indicate that a street may be considered completed with water facilities are built on the subdivision and
these activities are definitely segregable. As to be alleged lack of previous notice completion and
demand for payment, the filling of the case is sufficient notice to the defendant of the completion of the
roads in question and of the appellee’s desire to be paid the purchase price of the questioned lots.

Issue: Whether or not Ramos should pay her balance to Enriquez and spouses Dizon even though she is
not yet fully satisfied with her demand?

Ruling: Yes, the effect of such demand retroacts to the day of the constitution of the defendant
obligation as it was stated in Art. 1187 provides that “THE EEFECTS OF A CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION TO
GIVE, ONCE THE CONDITION HAS BEEN FULFILLED, SHALL RETROACT TO THE DAY OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE OBLIGATION.” her demand on the road is already considered completed and the filling of the
case against her is sufficient notice to her therefore she is obligated to pay her balance of P200,000 to
the appellant’s within 2 years from the date the roads in question are completed.

La Compañia General De Tabacos De Filipina vs. Vicente Araza (7 Phil. 455)

March 25, 2016

G.R. No. 3019 February 9, 1907

LA COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

VICENTE ARAZA, defendant-appellant.

T. L. McGirr for appellant.

Domingo Franco for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

FACTS

The plaintiff brought this action in the court below to foreclose a mortgage for 8,000 pesos upon certain
land in the Province of Leyte. The contract send upon was executed on the 11th day of June, 1901. By
terms thereof the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff 8,000 pesos as follows: 500 pesos on the 30th
of June, 1901, and the remainder at the rate of 100 pesos a month, payable on the 30th day of each
month, until the entire 8,000 pesos was paid. The defendant paid 400 pesos and no more. The suit was
commenced on the 12th day of June, 1903.

ISSUE

Whether or not the creditor can recover the said installment and the entire indebtedness.

HELD
There was no provision in the contract by which, upon failure to pay one installment of the debt, the
whole debt should thereupon become at once payable. We are of the opinion that the obligation can be
enforced in this action for only the amount due and payable on the 12th day of June, 1903.

The court below gave no credit for the payment of 400 pesos admitted by the complaint to have been
received by the plaintiff. It is allowed interest upon the entire debt from the 1st day of July, 1901. The
contract does not provide for the payment of any interest. There is no provision in it declaring expressly
that the failure to pay when due should put the debtor in default. There was therefore no default which
would make him liable for interest until a demand was made. (Civil Code, art. 1100; Manresa, Com. on
Civil Code, vol 8, p. 56.) The transaction did not constitute a mercantile loan and article 316 of the Code
of Commerce is not applicable. There was no evidence any demand prior to the presentation of the
complaint. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to interest only from the commencement of the action.

The judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the court below with directions to determine the
amount due in accordance with the views hereinbefore expressed and to enter judgment for such
amount. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Company

March 15, 2016

No. 12191, October 14, 1918

FISHER, J.: (Negligence by employee attributable to employer even in contractual breach)

FACTS

Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo which is
located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. He used to travel by trade to the office located
in Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, on his way home by rail and when the train drew up to the
station in San Mateo, he rose from his seat, making his exit through the door. When he stepped off from
the train, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him to slip off from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. He rolled and was drawn under the moving car. He was
badly crushed and lacerated. He was hospitalized which resulted to amputation of his hand. He filed the
civil suit for damages against defendant in CFI of Manila founding his action upon the negligence of the
employees of defendant in placing the watermelons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as
to be a menace to the security of passengers alighting from the train. The trial court after having found
negligence on the part of defendant, adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use due caution in alighting
from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering, hence this appeal.

ISSUE

Is the negligence of the employees attributable to their employer whether the negligence is based on
contractual obligation or on torts?

HELD

YES. It cannot be doubted that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in piling these
sacks on the platform in the manner stated. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable
for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory
negligence. It is to note that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of carriage. However Art.
1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as the Court cleared on the case of
Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and
control of the servant relieves the master from liability fro the latter’s act. The fundamental distinction
between obligation of this character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the fact that in
cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of
the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. When the source
of obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of
proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other hand, in contractual undertaking, proof
of the contract and of its nonperformance is suffient prima facie to warrant recovery. The negligence of
employee cannot be invoked to relieve the employer from liability as it will make juridical persons
completely immune from damages arising from breach of their contracts. Defendant was therefore
liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual. As Manresa discussed, whether negligence occurs as an
incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-
contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission
productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. The contract of
defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. Contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
as invoked by defendant is untenable. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act- that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger,
and should be considered. It is to be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his
daily routine. Our conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence and therefore
was not guilty of contributory negligence. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED.