COMMANDER,

NAVAL BEACH GROUP ONE

TACMEMO 3-02.1-08

Coordinating the Defense of the Navy

Support Element
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
 TM 3-02.1-08

AdministrativeCover
Title: Coordinatingthe Defenseof the Navy SupportElement
Originator: Commander,NavalBeachGroup ONE
NWPs Affected: NWP 3-02.1, Shrp-fo-ShoreMovement, May 2007
References: See page ii
Purpose: This TACMEMOprovidestactics,techniques,and proceduresfor the
integratedcoordinationof landwardand seawarddefenseof Navalforces
ashorein supportof MaritimePrepositioningForces,AssaultFollow-On
Echelon,and LogisticsOver-the-Shoreoperations.This TACMEMOwas
publishedin supportof TAC D&E Project07-06 sponsoredby Amphibious
ConstructionBattalionONE.
This TACMEMOshould be employedand referencedat every opportunity
in the planningand executionof Fleetexercisesand during real-world
operations.Recommendedchanges,additions,or deletionsare
encouragedand shouldbe sent via the chainof commandto:
CommandingOfficer,AmphibiousConstructionBattalionONE
2524 Eniwetok Road
San Diego,CA 92155
CommercialPhone(619)437-3383/DSN 577-3383
Email: Callfor emailaddress

Commander,NavalBeachGroupONE
3600 Tarawa Road
San Diego,CA 92155
CommercialPhone (619)437-3436/DSN577-343G
Email: Callfor emailaddress

Promufgation Date: 21 July 2008

Review Date: 21 Julv 2010

T. S. WETHERALD
Commander,NavalBeachGroupONE

Distribution: Seepageiii
 TM 3-02.1-08

References
The following references were used in the preparation of this TACMEMO:
(a) NWP 3-02.1M, Ship-to-Shore Movement, May 2007
(b) NWP 4-04.1/MCWP 4-11.5, Seabee Operations in the MAGTF, November 1997
(c) NWP 4-04, Naval Civil Engineer Operations, November 97
(d) NWP 3-10/CGP 3-10, Naval Coastal Warfare, November 2003
(e) NWP 3-07.2 (Rev A), Navy Doctrine for Antiterrorism/Force Protection, March 2004
(f) NTTP 3-21.6.29, Tactical Boat Operations, January 2007
(g) NTTP 3-07.2.1, Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism / Force
Protection, May 2007
(h) NTTP 3-10.1, Naval Coastal Warfare Operations, April 2005
(i) NTTP 3-02.3M, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, January 2004
(j) NTTP 4-01.3, Tactical Convoy Operations, March 2005
(k) NTRP 3-02.1.2, Naval Beach Group Support Element Operations, October 2004
(l) PHIBCBONEINST 3501.1, Amphibious Construction Battalion One Tactical Standard
Operating Procedures (TACSOP), April 2007
(m) PHIBCBTWOINST 3000, Amphibious Construction Battalion Two Tactical Standard
Operating Procedures (TACSOP), February 2007
(n) COMUSFLTFORCOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS), U.S. Navy Maritime
Expeditionary Security Force (MARSECRON), Apr 2007
(o) COMPHIBGRUTHREEINST 3120.14, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Staff
Organization and Operational Employment, 7 Nov 2002
(p) COMNCWGRUONE INST 3500.3, Naval Coastal Warfare Group One Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP), September 2002
(q) COMNCWRON FOUR 132122Z APR 07: Joint Operation Humanitarian Support Over -
the -Shore (HSOTS), 2007
(r) JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April
2001 (Amended through June 2007)
(s) JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-
Shore (JLOTS), August 2005
(t) JP 3-34, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, February 2007
(u) JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, August 2006

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Distribution
Fleet Commands

PART 1 ACTIVITY COPIES

24D SURFACE FORCE COMMANDERS 1

24J MARINE CORPS FORCES COMMAND 1
26A AMPHIBIOUS GROUP 1
26C BEACH GROUP 1
26E AMPHIBIOUS UNIT 1
26F3 COMOPTEVFOR 1
26J AFLOAT TRAINING GROUP AND DETACHMENT 1
26KKK TACTICAL TRAINING GROUP 1
28C1 COMSURFWARDEVGRU 1
28L AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON 1
31G AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK (LPD) 1
31H AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP (LHA) (LPH) 1
31I DOCK LANDING SHIP (LSD) 1
31N MULTI-PURPOSE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP (LHD) 1
39C CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT 1
39D MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION 1
39E AMPHIBIIOUS CONSTRUCTION BATTALION 1
39F CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE AND BATTALION AND DETACTMENT 1
39H CONSTRUCTION BATTALION UNIT 1
39I CONSTRUCTION BATTALION MAINTENANCE UNIT 1
39K1 SEABEE READINESS GROUP ATLANTIC 1
39K2 SEABEE READINESS GROUP PACIFIC 1
39S CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT 1
39T MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION AND FORCE SUPPORT UNIT 1
41L MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRON 1

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Shore Commands

PART 2 ACTIVITY COPIES

A3 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (N51) 1

A6 COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 1
C4EE CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS 1
FA31 EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE TRAINING GROUP LANT 1
FB32 EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE TRAINING GROUP PAC 1
FF44 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1
FF44A NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 1
FT1 CHIEF OF NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING 1
V12 COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, MARINE CORPS 1
V14 HEADQUARTERS BATTALION HQMC 1
V25 AIR-GROUND COMBAT CENTER, MARINE CORPS 1
V28 SYSTEMS COMMAND, MARINE CORPS 1

Available for download from following web site:

www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil

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Coordinating the Defense of the Navy Support

Element
Table of Contents
Cover Letter ................................................................................................................................... i
Reverences................................................................................................................................... ii
Distribution ....................................................................................................................................iii
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................... v
List of Illustrations ........................................................................................................................vii
Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... ix
Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1 OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................1-1
1.2 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................1-1
1.3 PURPOSE......................................................................................................................1-1
1.4 TYPES OF OPERATIONS .............................................................................................1-2
1.5 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................1-3
1.6 THREAT.........................................................................................................................1-3
1.7 FORCE STRUCTURE AND UNITS ...............................................................................1-4
1.7.1 Navy Support Element ...................................................................................................1-4
1.7.2 Maritime Expeditionary Security Force ..........................................................................1-6

CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1 OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................2-1
2.2 MPF STAND ALONE OPERATION ...............................................................................2-2
2.3 MPF AUGMENT OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT........................................................2-3
2.3.1 MARSECRON Providing Primary Defensive Responsibility ..........................................2-3
2.3.2 MPF Augment of an Amphibious Assault (without MARSECRON Support) ..................2-5
2.4 ASSAULT FOLLOW-ON ECHELON .............................................................................2-7
2.4.1 AFOE Operations Following or During an MPF Augment Operation .............................2-7
2.4.2 AFOE Immediately Following an Amphibious Assault (No MPF Augment) ...................2-8
2.4.3 AFOE with JSA Established...........................................................................................2-9
2.5 JLOTS ............................................................................................................................2-9
2.6 DEFENSIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL..................................................................2-10
2.6.1 Security Control Centers ..............................................................................................2-10
2.6.2 Assignment of SSO and Boat Control ..........................................................................2-13
2.6.3 Assignment of LSO ......................................................................................................2-13
2.6.4 Exercise of Landward Control ......................................................................................2-13

CHAPTER 3 – OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

3.1 OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................3-1
3.2 SEAWARD SECURITY ..................................................................................................3-1
3.2.1 Harbor Defense..............................................................................................................3-2
3.2.2 Patrol Boat Operations...................................................................................................3-2
3.2.3 Augmenting Boats..........................................................................................................3-4
3.2.4 Lighterage Defense........................................................................................................3-5

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3.3 LANDWARD SECURITY ...............................................................................................3-9

3.3.1 Base Camp Defensive Force Structure..........................................................................3-9
3.3.2 Defensive Procedures..................................................................................................3-10

CHAPTER 4 – TRANSITION TO DOCTRINE

4.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................4-1
4.2 OBJECTIVE ...................................................................................................................4-1
4.3 EVALUATION REPORT ................................................................................................4-1
4.3.1 Report Address ..............................................................................................................4-1
4.3.2 Evaluation Report Format/Content.................................................................................4-2

APPENDIX A – COMMUNICATIONS
A.1 COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE........................................................................ A-1
A.1.1 NSE Defensive Communication Nets ........................................................................... A-1
A.1.2 Security Force Nets....................................................................................................... A-3

APPENDIX B – NSE WEAPONS

B.1 NSE WEAPONS ASSIGNED ........................................................................................ B-1
B.1.1 Amphibious Construction Battalion ............................................................................... B-1
B.1.2 Navy Beach Group........................................................................................................ B-1
B.1.3 Beach Master Unit......................................................................................................... B-2
B.1.4 Assault Craft Unit (Displacement / LCU) ....................................................................... B-2
B.1.5 Assault Craft Unit (Non-Displacement / LCAC)............................................................. B-2
B.1.6 Navy Cargo Handling Battalion ..................................................................................... B-3

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1-1. Levels of Threat..................................................................................................1-4
Figure 2-1. Interaction of MPF and AFOE Operations..........................................................2-1
Figure 2-2 MPF C2 Organization, Stand Alone Operation...................................................2-2
Figure 2-3. Landing Force Shore Party ................................................................................2-3
Figure 2-4 MPF Operation C2 – Augment of an Amphibious Assault (MARSECRON Primary
Defensive Responsibility) ...................................................................................2-4
Figure 2-5. Commanders’ Sectors of Responsibility.............................................................2-5
Figure 2-6 MPF Operation C2 – Augment of an Amphibious Assault without MARSECRON
Support (MAGTF Primary Defensive Responsibility) .........................................2-6
Figure 2-7. MPF Operation C2 – Augment of an Amphibious Assault without MARSECRON
Support (NSE Primary Defensive Responsibility)...............................................2-6
Figure 2-8. AFOE C2 Following or During MPF Offload Operation ......................................2-8
Figure 2-9. AFOE C2 Immediately Following an Amphibious Assault ..................................2-8
Figure 2-10. AFOE C2 with JSA Established..........................................................................2-9
Figure 2-11. JLOTS C2 Structure .........................................................................................2-10
Figure 2-12. Security Control Centers ..................................................................................2-11
Figure 2-13. Landward Security C2 Structure.......................................................................2-13
Figure 3-1. Three-Boat Patrol ...............................................................................................3-3
Figure 3-2. Lighterage Moving Through a Screen Defense (Notional) .................................3-6
Figure 3-3. Lighterage Escort Through a Sector Defense (Notional)....................................3-7
Figure 4-1. TACMEMO Evaluation Decision Tree ................................................................4-3
Figure A-1. NSE Defensive Communication Nets Guard Chart ........................................... A-2
Figure B-1. Weapon Capabilities of an ACB ........................................................................ B-1
Figure B-2. Weapon Capabilities of a NBG.......................................................................... B-1
Figure B-3. Weapon Capabilities of a BMU.......................................................................... B-2
Figure B-4. Weapon Capabilities of an ACU (Displacement / LCU)..................................... B-2
Figure B-5. Weapon Capabilities of an ACU (Non-Displacement / LCAC) .......................... B-2
Figure B-6. Weapon Capabilities of a NCHB ....................................................................... B-3

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

A E
AAA Arrival and Assembly Area ECP Entry Control Point
ABFS Assault Bulk Fuel System ELCAS(M) Elevated Causeway System,
ABLTS Amphibious Bulk Liquid Modular
Transfer System EMCON Emission Control
ACB Amphibious Construction ESG Expeditionary Strike Group
Battalion
ACU Assault Craft Unit F
AE Assault Echelon FHA Foreign Humanitarian
AF Amphibious Force Assistance
AFOE Assault Follow-on Echelon FPO Force Protection Officer
AFP Adaptive Force Package FSO Force Security Officer
AO Area of Operations
APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation H
ASF Army Strategic Flotilla HDC Harbor Defense Commander
ATF Amphibious Task Force HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle
B HN Host Nation
BMU Beachmaster Unit HVA High Value Asset
BOATDIV Boat Divisions (MARSECRON)
BPG Beach Party Group I
BSC Beach Support Commander IBU Inshore Boat Unit
BSC Beach Support Center IED Improvised Explosive Device
BSWO Beach Support Watch Officer IGO Intergovernmental
Organizations
C
C2 Command and Control J
C3 Command, Control, and JFC Joint Force Commander
Communications JFMCC Joint Force Maritime
C4I Command, Control, Component Commander
Communications, Computers JHOCC Joint Harbor Operations
and Intelligence Control Center
CATF Commander, Amphibious Task JLCC Joint Lighterage Control Center
Force JLOTS Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore
CHOP Change of Operational Control JOPES Joint Operational Planning and
CLF Commander, Landing Force Execution System
CLOTS Commander, Logistics Over- JP Joint Publication
The-Shore JSA Joint Security Area
CMPF Commander, Maritime JSC Joint Security Coordinator
Prepositioning Force
CNSE Commander, Navy Support L
Element LCAC Landing Craft, Air-Cushion
COMPSRON Commander, MPSRON LCC Lighterage Control Center
CP Command Post LCU Landing Craft, Utility
CS Civil Support LEDET Law Enforcement Detachment
CSW Crew-Served Weapon LFSP Landing Force Support Party

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LNO Liaison Officers P

LOTS Logistics Over-the-Shore PHIBCB Amphibious Construction
LSO Landward Security Officer Battalion (see ACB)
PSU Port Security Unit
M
MAGTF Marine Air- Ground Task Force R
MAST Mobile Ashore Support RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade
Terminal
MARSECRON Maritime Expeditionary S
Security Force SA Situational Awareness
MESG Maritime Expeditionary Security SDV Swimmer Delivery Vehicle
Group SLRP Survey, Liaison,
MIUW Mobile Inshore Undersea Reconnaissance Party
Warfare SPOD Seaport Of Debarkation
MOCC Mission Operations Command SSO Seaward Security Officer
Center
MP Military Police T
MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force TOC Tactical Operations Center
MPS Maritime Prepositioning Ship TTP Tactics, Techniques, and
MPSRON MPS Squadron Procedures
MSC Military Sealift Command
MSRON Maritime Expeditionary Security U
Squadron USA United States Army
MSST Maritime Safety and Security USCG United States Coast Guard
Team (USCG) USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
N
NAVELSG Navy Expeditionary Logistics
Group
NAVFOR Navy Forces
NBG Navy Beach Group
NCC Naval Component Commander
NCHB Navy Cargo Handling Battalion
NCW Naval Coastal Warfare
NECC Navy Expeditionary Combat
Command
NGO Non-Government
Organizations
NMCB Naval Mobile Construction
Battalion
NSE Navy support element

O
OIC Officer In Charge
OPCON Operational Control
OPDS Offshore Petroleum Discharge
System
OPP Offload Preparation Party
OTC Officer In Tactical Command
OUB OPDS Utility Boats

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Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION
A Navy Support Element (NSE) supports those operations in which pre-positioned or arriving
equipment and supplies must be offloaded from either Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) or
Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) shipping and be moved from ship to shore in support of
further inland operations. The NSE is comprised of units under the Navy Beach Group (NBG)
and the Navy cargo handling battalions (NCHB) under Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support
Group (NAVELSG). NSE operations are challenging due to an environment where multiple
units - some of which are responsible to different chains of command – are in the area of
operations (AO) and have responsibilities for various pieces of the total defensive plan.
Paramount to the success of NSE operations is a clearly defined command and control (C2)
organization which effectively provides for the defense of the forces involved and which
minimizes the risk of fratricide (blue-on-blue).

BACKGROUND
While a NSE has some self-defense capability that is primarily resident in the Amphibious
Construction Battalions (PHIBCB), it is usually supported, in both Navy and Joint operations, by
separate defensive forces. The existence of a “supported/supporting” relationship between
NSE and assigned defensive forces under a common commander enables the NSE to focus on
its primary mission. Depending on the phase and nature of an operation, these defensive
forces may be Marine, Army, or – most often – Navy Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces
(MARSECRON). The common commander is also situation dependent. Doctrine describing
roles/responsibilities, C2, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for landward defense
of Naval forces ashore and defense of logistics connector ship-to-shore sea lanes is evolving.
Recent operations and exercises have defined a need to clarify how NSE and other defensive
forces form a cohesive C2 organization well versed in camp defense, convoy security, entry
control point (ECP) operations, and ship-to-shore sea lane defense.
During MPF/JLOTS operations at the Kuwaiti Naval Base in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, C2 for both security and force defense issues was often unclear and subject to
frequent changes. During recent JLOTS exercises, coordination between NSE and Navy
Coastal Warfare (NCW) security units in support of camp defense, convoy security ECP
operations, and ship-to-shore sea lane defense defined a need for established doctrine and
procedures to reduce the risk of blue-on-blue fire.
Since that time, NCW units have transitioned into the MARSECRON. This transition will solve
many of the difficulties associated with NSE forces operating without sufficient security
personnel or support infrastructure. The MARSECRON provides the Navy operational
commanders with a more capable, adaptable, and ready force that can more easily mobilize
and quickly arrive in theater to aid NSE forces. The realignment will reshape current structure
into a mission focused organization with the capability to meet operational requirements. The
new organization will form, train, prepare, certify, deploy, and employ as adaptive force
packages to meet mission requirements, vice continuing today’s model of deploying pre-
packaged units to meet every security mission. This should ensure that NSE forces always
have MARSECRON units assigned to provide security in the operational theater.

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PURPOSE
The purpose of this TACMEMO is to provide:
1. TTP for staffs and commands for the integration of C2 for landward and seaward
defense of NSE forces.
2. Background information relating to NSE capabilities.
3. Information regarding equipment required for successful C2 integration.
4. Basic TTP for defensive operations specific to multiple units operating in close proximity
during NSE operations.
The target audience for this document includes the following:
1. Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders (JFMCCs) having OPCON of MPF,
AFOE, or JLOTS forces and subordinate commands to include Commander, MPF
(CMPF) and Commander, JLOTS (CJLOTS)
2. Land Component Commanders commanding the Landing Force Support Party (LFSP),
beach, and rear area security forces
3. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
4. Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces (MARSECRON) and their subordinate groups.

SCOPE
The process of conducting NSE missions in today’s operational environment is intense and
extremely challenging for U.S. forces conducting a wide range of missions. The introduction of
TTP to help alleviate some of the C2 ambiguity and facilitate the rapid exchange of information
is essential. In today’s military, situational awareness (SA) and the ability to effectively
communicate are mission essential. For the successful integration of landward and seaward
forces ashore in support of NSE missions, the following changes to existing TTP must be
developed:
1. An integrated C2 structure utilized by NSE commanders to integrate MARSECRON or
other defensive units when they are present across the full spectrum of tactical
environments.
2. A coordination of perimeter defense of the landward area of operation and integrated
tactics for the use of crew served weapons, tactical convoy security, entry control point
procedures, and defensive patrolling.
3. An expansion of existing doctrine for seaward security to include ship-to-shore connector
sea lane defense and the transition from sea-to-shore (i.e., integration between the
landward and seaward forces).
4. Coordinated procedures for moving units through security transition points, where
responsibility for defense may shift from one unit to another.

TACMEMO ORGANIZATION
Chapter 1 “Introduction” provides an overview of NSE operations. Critical to this chapter is a
discussion of the types of operations that NSE forces may be called upon to conduct. This is
followed by a brief discussion of the operational environment that NSE operations encompass.
The threat that may be encountered is also discussed in Chapter 1. Units and unit commanders

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will often have a changing role as they move between areas of the operational environment. A
clear understanding of these dividing lines is essential. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of units that may be tasked with defensive operations, including MARSECRON,
during NSE missions and a brief discussion of their defensive capabilities.
Chapter 2 “Command and Control” provides information regarding possible force structures for
a NSE mission and how the defensive units of an NSE operation fit in with the existing chain-of-
command during MPF, AFOE, and JLOTS missions. It includes a discussion of seaward and
landward defensive C2, including the choices for landward and seaward security officers (LSO
and SSO).
Chapter 3 “Operational Procedures” examines the execution of defensive operations across the
spectrum of NSE mission areas. Tactics for using small boats in a defensive role during an
NSE mission are discussed. This includes escorting lighterage from the offload area to the
beach as well as using augmenting boats from other units to assist designated security boats.
The chapter also discusses landward defense and special considerations for defending the
base camp during NSE operations. It also covers special requirements in a multi-unit
environment for defensive patrolling and convoy escort missions.
Chapter 4 “Transition to Doctrine” provides a road map for commenting upon the TACMEMO
and its further development. Evaluation comments and feedback are strongly encouraged and
should be submitted to the Project Sponsor, Commanding Officer, Amphibious Construction
Battalion ONE (PHIBCB ONE).
Appendix A “Communications” presents a unified guard chart of communications nets required
for defensive operations by NSE and associated commands. It includes a brief discussion of
the uses of each communications net and the type of equipment needed for each.
Appendix B “Weapons” presents charts of the medium caliber weapons typically deployed with
NSE units.

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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 OVERVIEW
A Navy Support Element (NSE) supports those operations in which pre-positioned or arriving
equipment and supplies must be offloaded from either Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) or
Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) shipping and be moved from ship to shore in support of
further inland operations. The NSE is comprised of units under the Navy Beach Group (NBG)
and the Navy cargo handling battalions (NCHB) under Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support
Group (NAVELSG). NSE operations are challenging due to an environment where multiple
units - some of which are responsible to different chains of command – are in the area of
operations (AO) and have responsibilities for various pieces of the total defensive plan.
Paramount to the success of NSE operations is a clearly defined command and control (C2)
organization which effectively provides for the defense of the forces involved and which
minimizes the risk of fratricide (blue-on-blue).
1.2 BACKGROUND
While a NSE has some self-defense capability that is primarily resident in the Amphibious
Construction Battalions (PHIBCB), it is usually supported, in both Navy and Joint operations, by
separate defensive forces. The existence of a “supported/supporting” relationship between
NSE and assigned defensive forces under a common commander enables the NSE to focus on
its primary mission. Depending on the phase and nature of an operation, these defensive
forces may be Marine, Army, or most often – Navy Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces
(MARSECRON). The common commander is also situation dependent. Doctrine describing
roles/responsibilities, C2, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for landward defense
of Naval forces ashore and defense of logistics connector ship-to-shore sea lanes is evolving.
Recent operations and exercises have defined a need to clarify how NSE and other defensive
forces form a cohesive C2 organization well versed in camp defense, convoy security, ECP
operations, and ship-to-shore sea lane defense.
Integrated defensive procedures must be easily understood and routinely practiced by NSE and
other forces to ensure effective defense of the landward and seaward areas.
1.3 PURPOSE
The purpose of this TACMEMO is to provide:
1. TTP for staffs and commands for the integration of C2 for landward and seaward
defense of NSE forces.
2. Background information relating to NSE capabilities.
3. Information regarding equipment required for successful C2 integration.
4. Basic TTP for defensive operations specific to multiple units operating in close proximity
during NSE operations.

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1.4 TYPES OF OPERATIONS

The NSE is a versatile force, capable of accomplishing diverse offloading and support tasks
across a spectrum of missions. Similarly, the forces assigned to provide and augment
defensive support must be resilient and capable of demonstrating an ability to adapt to changing
tasks and environments.
While, the NSE may be present during seabasing or amphibious landing operations, the focus
of this TACMEMO are the following:
1. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Offload Operations - conducted separately or as
part of a larger operation
2. Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) Offload Operations - to include Logistics Over-the-
Shore (LOTS) and Joint LOTS (JLOTS)
Note
JLOTS can be used to support both MPF in-stream offload
operations and AFOE in-stream offload operations.

An MPF operation includes the airlift of personnel with selected equipment into an arrival and
assembly area (AAA) at an aerial port of debarkation (APOD) to join with equipment and
supplies carried aboard maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) that have arrived off the coast or at
a seaport of debarkation (SPOD). It involves a rapid deployment and assembly of a Marine air-
ground task force (MAGTF) in a secure area using a combination of inter-theater airlift and
forward-deployed MPS Squadrons (MPSRON), the number of which is dictated by the scope of
the operation. These are civilian-owned ships chartered by the Military Sealift Command (MSC)
and crewed under the direction of a Navy staff. The ships are loaded with pre-positioned
equipment and 30 days of supplies to support the MAGTF, the NSE, a Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion (NMCB) and Naval Construction Regiment (as part of the MAGTF), and
an Expeditionary Medical Facility. Since a pier-side offload using port facilities requires minimal
NSE assets (C2 staff and lighterage crews), the MPF operations discussed in this TACMEMO
are all in-stream offload operations.
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary defines the AFOE as follows: “In amphibious
operations, that echelon of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies that,
though not needed to initiate the assault, are required to support and sustain the assault. In
order to accomplish its purpose, an AFOE is normally required no later than five days after
commencement of the assault landing.”
Since defensive operations during Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Support
(FHA/CS) missions are largely dependent upon the operational environment considerations,
planning for every contingency is difficult. Therefore, for a FHA/CS operation, tactics and a C2
structure can be derived from those presented for the MPF and AFOE missions. While the
emphasis of these operations is on moving cargo from ship-to-shore, security/antiterrorism is
always a critical planning factor.
Specific MPF and AFOE mission tasks which must be defended include:
1. Offloading and ship-to-shore movement of troops and supplies
2. Installation, operation, and maintenance of Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer Systems
(ABLTS)

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3. Deployment, assembly, installation, and operation of Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facility

(RRDF)
4. Establishment and operation of a support camp for the NSE that, where possible, is
integrated as part of a larger joint or regional camp
5. Installation, operation, and maintenance of Offshore Petroleum Discharge Systems
(OPDS) and OPDS Utility Boats (OUB)
6. Deployment and operation of Elevated Causeway System Modular (ELCAS [M])
7. Deployment, assembly, installation, operation, and maintenance of causeway ferries for
offload
8. Deploy, assemble, install, operate. and maintain floating causeway pier.
1.5 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
With the potential for many different units to be operating in a coordinated effort inside of an AO,
it is important to understand the different areas in the amphibious environment in which an NSE
operation will be conducted. The following areas, described in JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-
the-Shore (JLOTS), must be considered when planning an integrated defensive plan around an
NSE operation:

1. Littoral waters
2. Anchorage/offload areas
3. Boat lanes and offshore ABLTS floating fuel and water hose lanes
4. Beaches and safe havens/harbors for offload craft
5. Base camp
6. Convoy routes to and from the marshalling area
7. Staging/Marshalling Area.
An important consideration when planning the integrated defense of an MPF or AFOE offload
area is the positioning of the ships to be offloaded. Often, this may be geographically
constrained. As discussed in NTTP 3-20.6.29, Tactical Boat Operations, and NTTP 3-07.2.1,
Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism/Force Protection, the operational
limit of small security boats is highly dependent on sea state. Additional precautions must be
considered if boats are required to be operating on the open water and out of sight of land.
Beyond that distance, the JFMCC or appropriate Task Force Commander may be required to
task other available assets to protect the offload ships.

1.6 THREAT
A permissive environment is the desired condition for offload and sustainment operations.
Unfortunately, in an era when third world countries and terrorist organizations are capable of
using tactics and weaponry ranging from sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IED) and
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) to suicide bombers, NSE operations are vulnerable to attack.
The enemy will likely assess NSE operations as “high value” targets. Accordingly, asymmetric
attacks should be expected, and the concept of a “rear area/benign environment” should always
be viewed with some skepticism. The NSE AO is vulnerable to infiltration and may be targeted
for attack unless careful and meticulous defensive coordination occurs among participating

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commands. The base camp may be subject to insurgent activity, civil unrest, acts of terrorism,
or guerilla warfare. Mortar attacks, detonation of IEDs, ambushes, sniper activity, and small unit
attacks are just some examples of tactics that may be employed by the enemy. Objectives of
the enemy may be to disrupt C2, degrade morale, disrupt lines of supply by interfering with ship-
to-shore movement, or simply to draw attention away from the enemy’s main effort. Figure 1-1
shows the levels of threat and examples of threats that could be faced at each level.
Intelligence preparation of the operational environment must define this threat early in the
mission planning process. Refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, for further
guidance.

Figure 1-1. Levels of Threat

1.7 FORCE STRUCTURE AND UNITS

1.7.1 Navy Support Element
The NSE is comprised of a core Naval Beach Group (NBG), staff and subordinate unit
personnel, a detachment of Navy cargo handling force personnel, and other Navy components,
as required. The multi-unit nature of NSE operations means that the NSE will often be
operating with combat units as well as with forces from other branches of the military. They
may be called upon to provide liaison officers (LNO) or support various other government
organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGO), or non-government organizations (NGO)
in the continental United States (CONUS), outside CONUS (OCONUS), or host nation (HN)
governing authorities in the local AO. Experience has shown that the NSE may be required, at
the direction of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), to liaise directly with HN authorities during an
FHA operation.
1.7.1.1 Naval Beach Group
Each of the two NBGs is a permanently organized naval command within an amphibious force
comprised of a commander and staff, two Assault Craft Units (ACU), one Beachmaster Unit
(BMU), and one PHIBCB. The NBG will conduct offload operations in support of Marine Corps,
joint, or combined forces ashore. The NBG and its subordinate commands will work closely
with the JFMCC and Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), as well as the owners
and users of offloaded equipment and material to facilitate the offload and to coordinate force

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protection, medical services, camp services, and other support. NBGs possess the
communication assets for C2 up and down the chain of command.
For the successful integration of defensive operations between navy units and non-navy
entities, it is essential to understand the goal and primary function of each, as well as what
defensive capabilities each brings to the AO. For additional information refer to NTRP 3-02.1.2,
Navy Beach Group Support Element.
1.7.1.2 Assault Craft Unit
Of the two ACUs in a NBG, one contains displacement craft (LCU 1600, MPF UB, and LCM 8)
and the other non-displacement landing craft, air-cushion (LCAC). Typically, the displacement
ACUs are deployed as part of the NSE. The LCAC ACU is generally not deployed with an NSE.
ACU craft have the equipment to communicate up and down the chain for command, but no
additional C2 capabilities. ACU personnel provide the manpower for ACU lighterage required
during an amphibious operation.
1.7.1.3 Beachmaster Unit
The BMU provides a Navy component, known as the beach party team, to conduct beach party
operations that facilitate landing and moving of troops, equipment, and supplies across the
beach. It has the communications equipment and C2 organization needed for a Beach
Operations Center (BOC).
1.7.1.4 Amphibious Construction Battalion
The PHIBCB provides personnel and equipment, formed in tactical elements and made
available to appropriate commanders to operate causeway ferries, warping tugs, ship-to-shore
ABLTS, and to meet light surf-salvage requirements of the naval beach party. PHIBCBs have
the capability to erect elevated causeway systems, install ship-to-shore fuel and water transfer
systems, and assemble and operate causeway ferries for ship-to-shore logistic operations.
PHIBCBs units can operate as task-organized detachments. This flexible C2 structure allows
PHIBCBs to respond with the right level of engineering expertise. PHIBCBs possess the C2
equipment and organization needed to set up and operate the Beach Support Center (BSC).
1.7.1.5 Navy Cargo Handling Battalions
NCHBs are mobile logistic support units capable of worldwide deployment in their entirety or in
specialized detachments. The NSE assumes TACON of an NCHB detachment from
NAVELSG. It is organized, trained, and equipped to load and offload Navy and Marine Corps
cargo carried in MPS and merchant break-bulk or container ships that may be part of an AFOE.
Specifically, the NCHB provides the hatch teams and crane operators to operate ships’ cranes
and conduct lift on / lift off operations. An NCHB detachment has communications capabilities
for internal and administrative use only.
1.7.1.6 Defensive Capabilities of Navy Support Elements
NSE forces possess a self-defense capability. They are equipped with small arms as well as
crew-served weapon (CSW) machineguns. They have the ability to defend the beach, seaward
approaches, and associated base camp from enemy attacks of up to platoon size, as well as
defend convoys traversing to forward marshalling areas.
Note
The NSE does not have the capability to conduct full defensive
operations without negatively impacting its capability to conduct
ship-to-shore movement.

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NSE units have the ability and resources to set up defensible camp ECPs and man a defensive
perimeter. Upon arrival at the camp, locations for crew served weapons, and company fire and
barrier plans are developed. Locations are assigned for command posts, listening posts,
observation posts, and fighting positions. The NSE security element provides interior guard,
convoy support, and reaction forces, as required or directed. For additional information on
crew-served weapons that NSE units are equipped with, see Appendix B.
The defensive role of the NSE significantly compromises its capability to perform its primary
mission due to additional personnel needed to man defensive positions vice performing their
specialty tasks. Therefore defensive combat operations responsibilities should be relinquished
to other supporting forces as soon as practical.
1.7.2 Maritime Expeditionary Security Force
Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM) Concept of Operations
(CONOPS), U.S. Navy Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MARSECRON), describes the
MARSECRON as a subordinate command of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
(NECC). They are under the OPCON of the numbered fleets and control is transferred to the
JFMCC during an operation.
A Maritime Expeditionary Security Group (MESG) consists of a headquarters (HQ) staff and
subordinate Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadrons (MSRON). The MESG HQ staff can
deploy as a battle staff when required.
1.7.2.1 Maritime Security Squadron
The MSRON is normally the largest MARSECRON unit to deploy and may operate
independently or in support of other security forces. Two or more MSRONs may combine under
a single commander if mission scope requires. Each MSRON consists of a HQ staff and
Maritime Expeditionary Security, Boat, and C2 Divisions. The divisions can be broken down
into smaller detachments or elements which make up the adaptive force package (AFP) tailored
for a specific MPF, AFOE, or LOTS mission. This construct augments and relieves the NSE of
a majority of its defensive roles, permitting it to focus on its primary mission. While this
TACMEMO addresses the MARSECRON AFPs as a separate entity, future force construct may
incorporate these forces directly into the NSE organization as the concept of an NECC
Expeditionary Element evolves.
1.7.2.2 Defensive Capabilities of Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces
MARSECRON will be manned, equipped, and capable of defense against Level I and II threats
and will augment other forces in a Level III threat environment. The number and type of
weapons MARSECRON deploys with depends on the type of mission and what is specified in
the Request for Capabilities.
The introduction of the MARSECRON into an AO in support of a JFMCC, Commander
Amphibious Task Force (CATF) or sea base Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) must be
carefully planned and timed to ensure optimum utilization of these unique resources. The
MARSECRON counters a wide range of threats, including surface craft, swimmer delivery
vehicles (SDV), swimmers, and land forces. The objective of these threats may include the
destruction or disabling of military vessels, port infrastructure, or the collection of intelligence.
The ability for the MARSECRON to detect and act upon any of these threats is dependent upon
the force mix and deployed assets.

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For the types of operations addressed in this TACMEMO the MARSECRON provides:
1. Ground, point and area defense
2. Rapid response
3. Land convoy escort
4. Waterborne point and zone defense
5. Port security/harbor defense
6. Harbor approach defense
7. Vessel escort
8. Visit, board, search and seizure
9. Embarked security
10. Surveillance/reconnaissance.
The MARSECRON Commander ordinarily serves as the Force Security Officer (FSO) and is
assigned forces to carry out the security mission. Refer to JP 3-10, Naval Coastal Warfare, for
more guidance on the duties of FSO.

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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CHAPTER 2
Command and Control (C2)
2.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter discusses the C2 procedures during NSE missions where defensive combat
operations can be anticipated, suggesting the C2 architecture for a coordinated defensive
operation. Additionally, a discussion of the communications architecture is presented. Two
types of operations are addressed – MPF and AFOE. LOTS/JLOTS operations are discussed
as a subset of AFOE operations. Figure 2-1 shows the interaction of MPF and AFOE
operations.

Figure 2-1. Interaction of MPF and AFOE Operations

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2.2 MPF STAND ALONE OPERATION

Scenario 1 in Figure 2-1 is an independently executed MPF operation. In this case, the
operation includes the airlift of assigned personnel with selected equipment into an AAA at an
APOD to join with equipment and supplies carried aboard MPS which must be offloaded across
the beach. The C2 structure required for defensive operations is shown in Figure 2-2 and is as
follows:
1. Since there is no amphibious assault and no CATF, the Commander of the
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) accompanying the MPSRON assumes duties as
Commander of the MPF (CMPF). The ESG commander may delegate CMPF
responsibility to the NBG Commander (CNBG) or the NSE Commander (CNSE). In the
absence of an ESG, CNSE assumes duties as CMPF.
2. If the CNSE assumes the role of CMPF, the Commander PHIBCB assumes the duties of
CNSE.
3. The CMARSECRON assumes duties as FSO and reports to the CNSE.
4. The landward security officer (LSO) and seaward security officer (SSO) billets are also
filled by MARSECRON personnel.
If a MARSECRON AFP is not deployed, the FSO, LSO, and SSO billets are filled from the
CNSE force structure. In this case:
1. The beach support commander (BSC) assumes duties as LSO
2. The lighterage control center (LCC) watch officer assumes the dual responsibility of
SSO.

Figure 2-2. MPF C2 Organization Stand Alone Operation

Note
The LCC in this and all subsequent C2 organization charts is a
watch organization, not an individual.

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2.3 MPF AUGMENT OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

In Figure 2-1, scenario 2, the MPF operation immediately follows an amphibious assault made
by the assault echelon (AE) of the amphibious force. MPF offload occurs concurrently with the
offload of ATF shipping. The initial C2 organization pertaining to the beach landing area
security is shown in Figure 2-3. Security of the beach is the responsibility of the amphibious
MAGTF security element in the landing force shore party (LFSP). The LFSP, under the
OPCON of the amphibious MAGTF, is comprised of Marine Shore Party Group and Navy Beach
Party Group personnel.

Figure 2-3. Landing Force Shore Party

2.3.1 MARSECRON Providing Primary Defensive Responsibility

Navy security personnel are drawn from MARSECRON personnel and supplemented by the
PHIBCB camp support platoon personnel, as required. The LFSP establishes the security of
the area, manning the perimeter in a line defense or making up the react force if a garrison has
already been established around a base camp area. This organization is discussed in detail in
NTTP 3-02.1, Ship-to-Shore Movement, and is condensed here to facilitate the transition
discussion. At the appropriate time, with the completion of the amphibious assault and transfer
of operations to the MPF, the C2 transitions to the structure shown in Figure 2-4.

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Figure 2-4. MPF Operation C2 – Augment of an Amphibious Assault (MARSECRON Primary

Defensive Responsibility)

The CATF becomes the CMPF. The commander, MPSRON (COMPSRON) is the principal
advisor to the CMPF regarding offload/onload operations. The CMPF has OPCON over the
CNSE.
The amphibious MAGTF commander establishes a supported/supporting relationship with the
CMPF and remains responsible for arrival and assembly operations, including the reception and
through-put ashore of MPF equipment, supplies, and personnel. As shown in Figure 2-4,
coordination between the MAGTF and the LSO is required for defense of marshalling areas,
convoy routes, and rear area patrols. This coordination is particularly geared toward the
prevention of fratricide.
The CNBG or the PHIBCB Commanding Officer (CO) transitions to the CNSE, exercising
OPCON of NSE forces. The CNSE staff is comprised of the NBG command element (CE),
complete with its organic C2 capabilities.
Upon CNBG assuming the role of CNSE, the PHIBCB CO becomes the Deputy CNSE and/or
the BSC, reporting to the CNSE. In the event that the PHIBCB CO does not deploy, the
PHIBCB Operations Officer (S3), or other designated officer, assumes the BSC role.
As specified in the MARSECRON CONOPS, the MARSECRON Commander assumes FSO
duties from the LFSP security officer. The FSO works directly for the CMPF with the LSO and
SSO as subordinates. The SSO (normally the MARSECRON Boat Detachment OIC)
coordinates closely with the LCC for seaward defensive matters. The LSO (normally the
MARSECRON Security Detachment OIC) coordinates with the MAGTF for landward security.
Figure 2-5 shows a geographic representation of a sample MPF operating area and the above
commanders’ sectors of responsibility.

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Figure 2-5. Commanders’ Sectors of Responsibility

2.3.2 MPF Augment of an Amphibious Assault (without MARSECRON Support)

MARSECRON should always be on scene to assume control of security operations. In the rare
case that an MPF amphibious assault augment operation is being conducted without
MARSECRON support, a modification to the C2 organization of Figure 2-4 is required for
defensive operations. There are two possible alternatives for the defensive C2 organization.
2.3.2.1 MAGTF Providing Primary Defensive C2 Responsibility
The more likely of the two alternatives is that MAGTF personnel from the LFSP retain control of
defensive operations. The Marine Shore Party Group of the LFSP (see Figure 2-3) continues to
maintain primary security responsibilities of the beach landing area and stands up a FSO, LSO,
and SSO structure (if the LFSP has not already done so). With the arrival of NSE forces to
continue offload from shore, SSO duties are turned over to the LCC Watch Officer who, in this
dual role, reports to the FSO on all matters of seaward security, as appropriate. Figure 2-6
shows the C2 structure for this scenario.

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Figure 2-6. MPF Operation C2 - Augment of an Amphibious Assault without MARSECRON

Support (MAGTF Primary Defensive Responsibility)

2.3.2.2 NSE Providing Primary Defensive C2 Responsibility

In this alternative, shown in Figure 2-7, the LFSP does not retain control of security C2, but
instead turns it over to NSE forces when the NSE establishes its base camp ashore. The FSO,
LSO, and SSO would all come from the NSE organization and would therefore work for the
CNSE. In this case, the LCC Watch Officer assumes the duties of the SSO. The LSO
coordinates landward security matters with the MAGTF.

Figure 2-7. MPF Operation C2 – Augment of an Amphibious Assault without MARSECRON

Support (NSE Providing Primary Defensive Responsibility)

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2.4 ASSAULT FOLLOW-ON ECHELON

An AFOE normally is required in the objective area no later than 5 days after commencement of
the assault landing (D+5). If loading and unloading of ships is conducted without the benefit of
deep draft-capable, fixed port facilities; then a LOTS operation is required. Since a pier-side
offload using port facilities would not require the use of NSE assets, the AFOE operations
discussed in this section are, by definition, LOTS operations.
Note
The ships of an AFOE have to be in the AO no later than D+5, but
they do not necessarily have to begin offload at D+5. The ships
carrying the AE carry 15 days of supplies.
There are several ways to transition into an AFOE operation, depending on the forces involved
and the tempo of the operation.
1. AFOE offload operations commence following an MPF augment operation (Figure 2-1,
scenario 2).
2. AFOE offload operations commence immediately following the amphibious assault with
no MPF augment operation (Figure 2-1, scenario 3).
3. AFOE offload operations commence during an ongoing MPF augment operation (Figure
2-1, scenario 4).
During AFOE offload operations, the NSE’s primary mission will be moving cargo and personnel
ashore. If required, they will also contribute to the defense of the landing area and integrate
their security forces into the defense of the base camp.
2.4.1 AFOE Operations Following or During an MPF Augment Operation
Figure 2-8 shows the C2 structure of AFOE scenarios 2 and 4. If the AFOE offload begins
following the MPF offload, the CMPF assumes responsibility for the offload operation. If the
AFOE begins during the MPF, the operation remains under the control of the CMPF. When the
MPF is completed, the CMPF assumes duties as the Commander, LOTS (CLOTS). During
these operations, the FSO works directly for the CMPF or CLOTS in charge of the offload
operation. Protection of all AFOE shipping in the AO is also the duty of the FSO and SSO.

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Figure 2-8. AFOE C2 Following or During MPF Offload Operations

2.4.2 AFOE Immediately Following an Assault Echelon (no MPF augment)

Figure 2-9 shows the situation where AFOE operations commence immediately following the
landing of the assault echelon. In this scenario, the CATF assumes responsibility for the LOTS
operation. NSE forces move ashore and take over offload operations from the beach party
group (BPG); and the MARSECRON assumes its defensive role.

Figure 2-9. AFOE C2 Immediately Following an Amphibious Assault

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This is very similar to the C2 structure described in paragraph 2.3.1 and Figure 2-4 (MPF
augment operation with MARSECRON providing primary defensive responsibility). The FSO
again works directly for the CATF in charge of the AFOE. The SSO coordinates seaward
security operations through the LCC, while landward security is coordinated between the LSO
on the beach and the MAGTF forces moving inland after the initial amphibious assault.
Protection of all AFOE shipping in the AO is also the duty of the FSO and SSO.
2.4.3 AFOE with JSA Established
The US Army or USMC forces will most likely stand up a Joint Security Area (JSA) and Joint
Security Coordinator (JSC). The C2 structure shown in Figure 2-10 is very similar to that shown
in Figure 2-6 (MPF augment operation with MAGTF providing primary defensive responsibility).
The JSC replaces the MAGTF in the C2 structure and the FSO works directly for the JSC;
especially when the FSO as well as most of the troops providing security for the base camp is
assigned from the US Army or USMC. Alternatively, the FSO could continue to work for the
CLOTS or CNSE (as shown in Figure 2-4). The SSO coordinates closely with the LCC for
seaward security.
An important difference when a JSA and JSC have been established is that the LSO
coordinates security with the JSC instead of the MAGTF. This is of critical importance for the
prevention of fratricide among perimeter and rear area patrols, as well as convoy escorts to the
marshalling area, and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Figure 2-10. AFOE C2 With JSA Established

2.5 JLOTS
JLOTS are operations in which Navy and Army forces, under a JFC, conduct the loading and
unloading of ships with or without the benefit of fixed port facilities. Figure 2-11 shows the C2
structure for a typical JLOTS operation.
The JLOTS Commander (CJLOTS) is subordinate to the JFMCC. The CJLOTS exercises
TACON over the NSE and MARSECRON, as well as Army Strategic Flotilla (ASF) and MSC
ships that arrive in the AO. During AFOE/MPF offload operations, the CATF/CMPF is initially

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the CJLOTS. CJLOTS transitions to the Army only when all MPF/AFOE shipping has been
discharged. The CNSE executes offload operations working for the CJLOTS.
Under the MARSECRON FSO, the SSO (from the MARSECRON C2 division) provides surface
and subsurface surveillance and threat interdiction, while LSO provides landward security
forces. The CJLOTS exercises TACON of Army and Navy lighterage crews. The joint
lighterage control center (JLCC) directs movement of lighterage conducting ship-to-shore cargo
operations.

Figure 2-11. JLOTS C2 Structure

2.6 DEFENSIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.6.1 Security Control Centers
NSE and MARSECRON bring several valuable assets to improve the SA for defensive
operations in the AO. These assets may be divided among various command centers. To
facilitate easy coordination between the key security personnel, these command centers should
be collocated to the greatest extent feasible. Figure 2-12 shows an amphibious AO with the
various control centers identified.

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Figure 2-12. Security Control Centers

2.6.1.1 Lighterage Control Center

The LCC, manned by the NSE, is established to provide overall management and guidance
throughout the offload operation. This includes assignment of lighters to SLCPs, monitoring
ship-to-shore movement of lighters, ensuring safe lighterage operations, resolving disputes,
managing available craft, establishing lighter anchorage sites outside of the active operations
area, coordinating lighterage waterborne medical evacuations, and controlling lighterage entry
and exit from the operational area. When the operation commences, the LCC will be the key
coordinating body for the lighter usage plan. The LCC must be physically located ashore or
afloat in a position that affords the best visibility of the lighterage operating area and does not
interfere with shoreline transfer points or lighterage transit lanes. It usually is located on or
within the immediate area of the beach landing area. During a JLOTS operation, the LCC
becomes a JLCC, manned by NSE and Army offload personnel, providing the same functions to
both Army and Navy lighterage.
2.6.1.2 Mobile Operations Center
The mobile operations center (MOC) directs the movements of MARSECRON security boats
and landward security forces. Ideally, there should only be one MOC, and it should be located
in a position overlooking the harbor and lighterage lanes in order to best allow direction of the

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MARSECRON security boats and the landward security forces. However, depending on the
size of an operation and geographic constraints, there may be multiple MOCs. Each MOC
takes reports from its designated area and forwards them to the LSO or SSO in the tactical
operation center (TOC). The SSO may also operate from a remote MOC dedicated to seaward
security.
Note
The FSO, LSO, and SSO should be collocated in the TOC to
provide optimum coordination.
The Mobile Ashore Support Terminal System (MAST) is collocated with and is an integral piece
of equipment in MOC operations. The MAST is a mobile unit that is transportable by land,
surface ship, or air, which provides versatile sensor and Command, Control, Communications,
Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities. The MAST's C4I systems display the tactical
situation as it develops ashore and at sea and allows forces ashore to fully integrate and
interact with afloat commanders and platforms. The MAST should be located in a prominent
geographic position where its radar and sonobuoy processing capability can be best utilized.
Detailed capabilities of the MAST are found in NTTP 3-10.1, Naval Coastal Warfare Operations.
2.6.1.3 Beach Support Center
The beach support center (BSC) is the primary C2 node for NSE forces, coordinating all
lighterage maintenance, ground transportation, and camp operations. The BSC watch officer
receives reports from the LCC and tracks the tactical situation from the BSC. The best location
for the BSC is adjacent to the MOC.
C2 of watercraft operations, maintenance, transportation, and life support, are exercised
primarily through the BSC. BSC watchstanders supervise and direct operations, obtain and
track tactical and mission area-related information, and make recommendations to the CNSE in
order to support timely decision making. The nature of the mission will determine the operation
of the BSC. In general, the BSC Watch Officer and staff will direct and track NSE operations
and maintain real-time status of the tactical situation
In an operation where the NSE is required to be fully self-sustaining (including C2 of force
protection and movement), the BSC will have broad cognizance over all operational and tactical
NSE functions. In a large JLOTS operation, however, where the NSE is one component of a
much larger force ashore, the BSC may report to a joint headquarters and have little to no
tactical control of lighterage, force protection, or movement.
In a benign operating environment, the BSC will track throughput, lighterage, transportation, and
camp operations, but may have few security responsibilities. In combat or other high threat
environments, the BSC will continue to track throughput, lighterage, transportation, and camp
operations, but may have full responsibility for tactical control of security.
2.6.1.4 Tactical Operations Center
The TOC is the C2 node for the CNSE and the FSO. The TOC receives communications from
the LSO and SSO (when not collocated), as well as the BSC. The TOC coordinates all activities
to successfully execute both ship-to-shore movement and security missions. The TOC watch
develops a fused common picture of throughput, movement, and force defensive actions which
improves watchstander efficiency, improves communications flow, and provides better SA on
lighterage and security. This common picture, most importantly, is used to deconflict craft
inbound to the HVAs and mitigate the possibility of fratricide. The TOC is best located in a

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central location within the base camp that is both defensible and provides easy access to all
surrounding security forces and command centers.
2.6.2 Assignment of SSO and Boat Control
The SSO reports directly to the FSO on seaward security matters. This individual must be
specifically trained for waterborne surveillance and force defense. The SSO is responsible for
the security around the offload area and has responsibility for the coordination of all available
waterborne security assets.
The SSO is normally an officer from the MARSECRON boat detachment with extensive training
in security operations. The SSO operates from the TOC or MOCC. If the MARSECRON arrival
is delayed, CNSE will designate the LCC Watch Officer or other officer as SSO. The LCC
Watch Officer operates out of the LCC or JLCC. Upon arrival, the MARSECRON SSO is
integrated into the defensive force structure only after SA is satisfactory.
2.6.3 Assignment of LSO
The LSO is responsible for the coordination of all landward security forces. This includes all
base reaction forces, ECP, perimeter defense, patrols, and convoy defense detachments.The
LSO will usually come from the MARSECRON forces. If MARSECRON AFP arrival is delayed,
USMC or US Army forces could supply the LSO if they still have a security element in the base
camp or JSA. Alternatively, the CNSE may assign the BSC as the LSO.
2.6.4 Exercise of Landward Control
Figure 2-13 shows a landward security C2 structure. Forces participating in landward security
of a base camp are under the FSO. The LSO directs all units participating in perimeter defense,
reaction force, or ECP operations. This might include elements of the MARSECRON, NSE line
companies, and any USMC and US Army security elements that may remain in the JSA.

Figure 2-13. Landward Security C2 Structure

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 TM 3-02.1-08

In a line defense, before a stable perimeter is established utilizing barriers and fence line,
individuals in fighting positions adjacent to one another may be from different units. In order to
prevent fratricide, it is imperative that fighting positions maintain good communication. The LSO
should have communication to fighting positions, but additional communication should be
provided between positions if possible.

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CHAPTER 3
Operational Procedures
3.1 OVERVIEW
Though NSE operations are primarily executed in a Level I or II threat environment as
discussed in paragraph 1.6, the possibility of attacks against personnel and facilities dictates
that planning must provide for operational security. Assets to augment NSE forces are highly
desirable to improve the efficiency of NSE operations and will come from Navy, Marine, Army
Military Police (MP), United States Coast Guard (USCG) port security units (PSU), or the HN.
These assets may be pre-staged and ready to deploy at the onset of an operation or may build-
up in-theater to support ongoing operations.
This chapter discusses two concepts that apply across the spectrum of NSE operations:
seaward and landward defense. Seaward defense is further broken down into small boat
operations and harbor defensive tactics. Landward defense discusses optimal base set up and
the coordination of security patrols and convoy escort in the rear area.
3.2 SEAWARD SECURITY
The primary intent of this section is to provide procedures to mitigate the potential hazards
between small combatant craft and lighterage operating in the same waters. With armed craft
from multiple units trying to defend and operate within a beach, harbor, or port area, the risk of
fratricide is high. This danger is compounded during nighttime operations.
Seaward security is comprised of two elements: Harbor Defense and Boat Patrols in the vicinity
of the beach and base camp.
MARSECRON patrol boats provide the primary defense against waterborne threats, but may be
replaced or augmented by NSE or other forces. They actively patrol the waters near the beach
area and around HVAs in the harbor area. Additionally, patrol boats may be in a position to
engage hostile forces on land.

Prior to any patrol boats engaging enemy forces ashore, such

action must be coordinated with the LSO (via the FSO net from
Figure A-1) to prevent blue-on-blue engagements and to ensure
that the landward threat is being engaged with the most effective
defensive assets.
The USCG is also organized, trained, and equipped to provide port security functions. If
requested, the USCG may provide PSUs, Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), Law
Enforcement Detachments (LEDET), boarding teams, and patrol boats. The USCG may also
interact with HN port security boats that are conducting waterborne security. If a USCG PSU is
assigned, the PSU CO will assume SSO responsibilities.

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 TM 3-02.1-08

3.2.1 Harbor Defense

Harbor Defense involves the protection and management of harbors, ports, anchorages, shore
facilities, strategic shipping, and naval vessels against waterborne threats. Adequate harbor or
beach defense requires a combination of crew-served weapon (CSW) emplacements and boat
patrols.
Static land-based CSW emplacements for seaward defense are deployed as needed on piers,
on anchored or moored vessels, or on the protected assets themselves, to support waterborne
operations. These emplacements are especially necessary when a limited number of boats are
available. Since the primary function of these emplacements is for seaward defense, they
report to the SSO, not the LSO. To ensure continuous coordination and avoid “blue-on-blue”
situations, all shore CSW positions and patrol boats must be on the same tactical radio net.
The Boat Control net from appendix A, Figure A-1, controlled by the SSO, is the primary net,
regardless of what forces are providing the security.

CSW emplacements must not open fire on waterborne targets

without first getting batteries release from the SSO on the Security
Boat Control net.
Additional procedures for harbor defense can be found in NTTP 3-20.6.29, Tactical Boat
Operations, and NTTP 3-07.2.1, Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism/
Force Protection.
3.2.2 Patrol Boat Operations
Boat detachments from the MARSECRON will be the primary units conducting seaward
security. However, it is important that all units involved in seaward defense understand the
basics of boat patrols. In the event that MARSECRON is delayed arriving in theater or is tasked
in another area of operation, NSE utility boats may be required to conduct security patrols.
Full information on small boat tactics and security patrolling procedures can be found in NTTP
3-20.6.29, Tactical Boat Operations. The basic tactics used is a sector or screen defense.

Patrol boats are lightly armed small craft designed for close-in
waterborne defense, and are not equipped to engage hostile
forces beyond a Level II Threat.
The optimum minimum defensive posture is a three-boat patrol, with two boats operating
forward, around or just beyond the offloading area and one boat maintaining position in the rear,
near the beach approach to react to threats. A fourth boat should be kept in standby at a
nearby safe haven, ready to augment as necessary if the threat escalates. These security

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boats will set up a security zone around the offload area. Threat, warning and assessment
areas are all parts of the security zone. For further information on security zones see NTTP 3-
20.6.29, Tactical Boat Operations.
Figure 3-1 shows an example of a three-boat patrol. If threat conditions warrant, one or two
additional boats may be deployed outside the immediate harbor or beach approach to:
1. Extend the range of interception and detection of contacts of interest (COI)
2. Escort vessels through approaches entering and leaving the operating area.
These additional boats should patrol out to 5 nm from the harbor or beach and if escort is
required, be prepared to escort craft out to the patrol boat operational limit of 15 nm.
If only two boats are available, they will both be deployed near the outer edge of the sector they
are protecting, out beyond the offloading ships if possible. A two-boat patrol can adequately
cover approximately a 25 nm2 harbor, beach approach, or security zone around an HVA.

Figure 3-1. Three-Boat Patrol

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 TM 3-02.1-08

For both safety and security reasons, a single boat patrol should only be deployed as a last
resort, taking into consideration several factors:

1. Threat no greater than Level 1

2. Never for use on the open ocean
3. Must always be supported by floating barriers, static weapons emplacements, and/or
augmenting boats (see paragraph 3.2.3).
The single boat will take a position near the center of the area it is required to cover. The boat
will move to the right or left as needed to intercept contacts. Upon disengagement from the
COI, it should return to a central position immediately to be prepared for follow-on tasking.

3.2.2.1 Boat Patrol Sector Defense

Lighterage lanes and HVA anchorages are surrounded by security zones. To conserve assets,
the size and configuration of the security zone should be kept to the minimum necessary to
ensure the safety of the protected assets. These designated security zones are divided into
patrol sectors. The size and configuration of the sectors depends on:
1. Threat capabilities
2. Threat axis
3. Offload traffic
4. Possible civilian harbor traffic
5. Environmental conditions
6. Number of patrol boats available.
3.2.2.2 Boat Patrol Screen Defense
Small boats may provide a security screen to protect the flanks of the operating area to and
from the beach. The number of boats required depends largely on the distance from the
offloading ships to the beach. At least two boats are needed on each flank. When the lanes are
being actively used to move high-value cargo and personnel to and from the beach, a security
zone should be established on each flank.
3.2.3 Augmenting Boats
When a limited number of MARSECRON security boats are available, they may be augmented
by craft of opportunity, such as NSE MPF utility boats or utility landing craft (LCU) with weapons
emplacements. These craft may be anchored or stationed in a position to augment the security
boats or employed dynamically to cover patrol areas. Ideally, such assignments would be made
during a pre-underway brief. In a more short-duration or dynamic situation, the tasking may be
assigned to the NSE augment boat via radio as the threat events unfold, e.g., a COI is entering
a warning zone and the assigned security boat(s) is/are prosecuting other COIs.

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 TM 3-02.1-08

The recommended procedure is as follows (all communications on the Lighterage Control net):
1. The SSO requests control of the augment boat.
2. The LCC Watch Officer responds and acknowledges that the SSO has control of the
augment boat.
3. The augment boat acknowledges the change of operational control (CHOP) to the SSO.
4. The SSO coordinates prosecution of the COI. Other lighterage communication traffic
should be kept to an absolute minimum while the contact prosecution is taking place.
5. Once the situation has been resolved, the SSO relinquishes control of the augment craft
back to the LCC.
6. Again, the augment boat acknowledges the shift.
7. The SSO relinquishes the net and returns to guard.
While utility boats have less performance capability than an MARSECRON craft conducting the
same escort or security mission, the procedures in the following paragraphs apply to augment
boats. If the time is available the augment boat crews should be trained to be able to work
directly with the MARSECRON.
3.2.4 Lighterage Defense
As discussed in paragraph 3.2.2, NSE defense provided by small boats may use either screen
or sector tactics.
3.2.4.1 Lighterage in a Screen Defense
In a flanking screen the lighterage passes through a defended lighterage lane. The basic
procedure is as follows:
1. The LCC coordinates lighterage movements.
2. The SSO coordinates small boat patrols to defend the lighterage lanes.
3. The SSO maintains guard on the Lighterage Control net to maintain SA.
Figure 3-2 shows lighterage traveling from the offload area to the beach with two-boats
patrolling each flank of the screen.

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 TM 3-02.1-08

Figure 3-2. Lighterage Moving Through a Screen Defense (Notional)

3.2.4.2 Lighterage in a Sector Defense

In a sector defense the lighterage passes from sector to sector. The small boat patrols may
either:
1. Randomly patrol assigned sectors while lighterage passes through the sectors without
escort, or
2. Provide close escort and conduct direct hand-off to small boats in adjacent sectors in the
case where the threat is significant.
Figure 3-3 shows a lighterage escort within a sector defense. MARSECRON boats are tasked
to escort lighterage from the anchorage/offload area into the harbor or beach. In this relatively
extreme example the offload area is 15 nm from the beach.

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 TM 3-02.1-08

Note
If the JFMCC is unable to task frigate or destroyer picket ships to
cover lighterage beyond 15 nm, or the MARSECRON does not
have the assets to provide security out to 15 nm, the lighterage
may be outside of a protective umbrella for part of its transit. If it
comes under attack outside of the harbor and there are only
enough MARSECRON boat assets to protect the harbor proper,
the JFMCC will have to provide assistance.

Figure 3-3. Lighterage Escort Through a Sector Defense (Notional)

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 TM 3-02.1-08

Three 5 nm X 5 nm sectors are employed in this example. Each sector is assigned 2 boats with
an additional 2 boats patrolling the immediate harbor/beach area.
Note
Utilizing all boats in this manner may leave no maintenance or
stand down time for boats, requiring additional boats, either
assigned from additional MARSECRON forces or augmenting
boats from the NSE.
The number of MARSECRON security boats available determines the size of the MARSECRON
AFP available for the mission. Planners should balance the requirements and recognize the
need for any additional assets when submitting a Request for Forces/Request for Capabilities
message via the chain of command as appropriate. The format for this message is found in the
CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Employment System, Planning Policies and
Procedures, (JOPES, Volume 1).
The procedure for this sector escort operation is as follows:
1. The LCC Watch Officer controls the Lighterage Control net and guards on the Boat
Common net.
2. The SSO guards on the Boat Common and Lighterage Control nets and controls the
Security Boat Control net.
3. Security boats coordinate with lighterage on the Boat Common net and with the SSO on
the Security Boat Control net.
4. As lighterage enters Sector 1, it checks in with the security boats on the Boat Common
net.
5. The security boat(s) escort(s) the lighterage to the next sector (Sector 2) and hands-off
defensive responsibilities to the next boat patrol on the Security Boat Control net. Escort
and escort transfer procedures can be found in NTTP 3-10.1, Naval Coastal Warfare
Operations.
6. If lighterage sees a threat that its escort boat may not be aware of, it should pass the
information over the Lighterage Control net that the SSO is monitoring. The SSO, in
control of the escort boat, will vector the escort boat as required. If the lighterage sees
no response within 15 seconds, the lighterage should pass the information directly to its
escort over the Boat Common net.
7. If the lighterage comes under threat of attack, several things must be considered:
a. The coxswain will take action as required to defend the lighterage.
b. If the lighterage has the means for self defense, it must use extreme care before
engaging the enemy and in accordance with approved rules of engagement.
c. Lighterage should hold fire on all weapons on the side that escort craft are engaging
to avoid friendly fire with its escort craft.
d. In emergencies, lighterage coordinates fire with its escort on the Boat Common net.

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If lighterage is not under close escort and is passing through a security zone while it comes
under threat,
1. It should immediately transmit a request for assistance over the Lighterage Control net.
2. The SSO monitors this net and will vector escort boats to assist.
3. If the lighterage does not see boats moving to assist within 30 seconds, they should
repeat the call on the Boat Common net.
3.3 LANDWARD DEFENSIVE PROCEDURES
The objective of landward security is to provide defense for all forces operating within the JSA
so that those functions which support combat operations are not interrupted. Modern weaponry
has made rear areas, including established NSE base camps and associated assets, extremely
vulnerable. Security in the JSA must counteract such threats. NSE forces assigned must be
prepared to defend themselves and must be familiar with its defensive organization. Planning
must support NSE base defense and force defense activities during all phases of an operation.
The C2 organization for the rear area is provided in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.3. The JSC has
overall responsibility for rear area security. During amphibious or MPF operations, USMC
forces continue to provide security for the marshalling area and typically assume responsibilities
of security area patrolling. The LSO is responsible to the FSO for defense inside the base camp
perimeter and any designated satellite locations, e.g., airfields.
3.3.1 Base Camp Defensive Force Structure
The MARSECRON AFP has landward garrison forces with small arms and CSW assets. They
typically are responsible for the primary defense of the NSE which includes its base camp.
However, dependant on the AO and the force protection posture, additional personnel may be
required from other units to supplement various areas within the defensive organization. This
may include MAGTF security elements guarding and patrolling the rear area, all NSE forces, US
Army engineers and MPs, and HN forces. If the MARSECRON AFP is properly sized, the NSE
can concentrate on its primary mission without having to contribute to base camp security.
Personnel assigned to supporting defensive operations should not be arbitrarily drafted from the
populace as a whole, but rather be a previously identified and trained security detachment in
camp security, defense, and convoy TTPs. Each base camp has a designated commander.
For NSE operations this will usually be the CNSE.
NOTE

All forces arriving in an NSE base camp should be prepared to

assign ten percent of their personnel to the LSO’s defensive force.
Accordingly, these personnel should be previously identified and
trained prior to deployment. In situations where augmentation is
required and arriving units lack trained personnel, the FSO may
conduct on-the-job training to ensure these forces contribute to
the overall effort.
The PHIBCBs form the preponderance of the NSE’s capability to provide personnel and
equipment for camp defense, entry control point security, convoy security, camp react forces for
quick response to threats, and CSW emplacements for perimeter defense. The NBG, ACU,
BMU, and NCHB can also contribute as described in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.7. NSE forces

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 TM 3-02.1-08

trained in security operations may be integrated into the landward security structure as required
or maintained as a ready response backup.
NOTE
The preferable situation is to attach the NSE to another force’s
base camp, with NSE personnel having limited security
responsibilities. This will enable the NSE to focus on its core
responsibilities. Such an arrangement where the NSE is deployed
without support of other units would require a significant drain on
NSE manpower and would likely prevent or seriously degrade the
NSE’s ability to conduct ship-to-shore movement. This is
especially true if manning a 360-degree perimeter.
The Marine and Army role usually is limited to providing personnel for the NSE base defense.
These personnel most likely will come from combat service support organizations. The majority
of Marine and Army assets likely will be conducting operations further inland. However, if the
Marine element of the LFSP has not been reabsorbed into parent units, it may still be available
to provide beach security.
HN security personnel may provide assets at key defensive areas, usually ECP, to act as a local
law enforcement presence and/or translators. The NSE and the HN security force should
exchange liaison personnel.
3.3.2 Defensive Procedures
Rear area doctrine integrates NSE forces with rear area security forces to provide for
deconfliction, mutual support, and a coordinated defense. The NSE security force shall not
normally be deployed outside of the base camp perimeter unless conducting convoy security
operations. For further information on defensive procedures refer to JP 3-10; Joint Security
Operations in Theater; NWP 3-10, Naval Coastal Warfare; NTTP 3-10.1, Naval Coastal Warfare
Operations; and MCRP 3-31.1, Rear Area Operations.
3.3.2.1 Base Camp Physical Security
The physical security arrangements for the base camp shall consist of the following minimal
components:
1. Secure outer fence perimeter.
2. Two ECPs (entrance gates with gate guards in hardened positions). Access to the base
camp should be through only one ECP with the second ECP reserved for emergency use
only. Security forces should provide overwatch of the ECP.
3. Rapid reaction force of at least 10-man squad strength with at least two HMMWVs and
mounted weapons (i.e., M2, M240B, MK19).
4. Fixed firing/fighting positions providing, in total, 360-degree visibility and fields of fire.
For further information on rear area doctrine, see JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.
3.3.2.2 Defensive Patrolling
Defensive patrolling is the primary means of ensuring rear area security and protecting the
LOCs and may be required to support mission tasking. Normally USMC forces provide security
patrols in the rear area. Upon receipt of a warning order (WO) from the LSO, units will ensure
the designated patrol leader develops and issues the patrol order, conducts a rehearsal, and
coordinates with the communications officer to ensure communications assets are met. In order

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to establish effective patrols, the following considerations in line with JP 3-10 should be
followed:
1. The LSO and FPO will direct patrols and maintain continuous communications.
2. Patrols shall remain within covering range of the CSWs unless otherwise directed.
3. Security patrolling is a continuous action. Therefore, perimeter units shall ensure its
security area is constantly monitored without compromising fighting position readiness.
4. Direct, face-to-face liaison shall be conducted by both units (the patrol and the personnel
manning the line) at the initial passage point, when the tactical situation allows.
5. A guide will be provided by the stationary unit to guide the lead elements of the mobile
patrol unit to the release points.
6. Recognition signals between the patrol and the personnel manning the security
perimeter must be absolutely clear.

In a situation where forward USMC or US Army forces are

conducting rear area security patrols, NSE and accompanying
forces shall not conduct defensive patrols outside the base camp.
Careful coordination must exist between the LSO and JSC to
ensure that perimeter defenders from the NSE camp do not fire on
friendly patrols. The JSC ensures that rear area patrols stay clear
of defended base camps; however, perimeter defenders must be
warned of potentially friendly forces operating in the rear area.
This communication is coordinated between the FSO and the JSC
on the Security Command net.
3.3.2.3 Convoy Defense
During NSE operations, supplies and/or personnel must be moved to various locations in the
AO. Depending on the threat level, the danger of enemy activity may require convoys to be
used. Convoys are a safe and coordinated way of moving large amounts of equipment to its
destination in the AO. There are various reasons that NSE forces may be required to operate
convoys:
1. Depending on the distance from the beach to the base camp, offloaded vehicles and
equipment to the base camp.
2. Vehicles and equipment from either the beach or the base camp to the forward
marshalling area for use in further operations inland by USMC or US Army forces.
3. Supplies needed at another forward base or another rear area base.
4. Personnel transiting from the rear area to a forward position.

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NTTP 4-01.3, Convoy Operations Handbook, contains detailed TTP for conducting convoy
defense. The following considerations are also relevant:
1. As discussed in the MARSECRON CONOPS, MARSECRON will provide convoy
security elements.
2. NSE personnel will be responsible for the defense of their own convoys only in the
absence of MARSECRON.
3. MARSECRON, USMC forces, or HN agents will man checkpoints en route to the
marshalling area.
4. The LSO communicates and coordinates with the checkpoints and convoy commander
on the Camp Tactical/LSO net.
5. When augmenting personnel are executing an escort mission, they operate under the
control of the convoy commander.
6. The convoy commander will utilize the convoy internal net to control the vehicles in the
convoy.

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CHAPTER 4
Transition to Doctrine
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The TAC D&E process requires fleet feedback in order to make an assessment as to the
applicability and effectiveness of the TTP presented in TACMEMOs. Ideally,
TACMEMOs should normally be evaluated within two years of promulgation and either
cancelled or incorporated into appropriate Navy Warfare Publications (NWPs).
However, due to increasing requirements and decreasing resources, it has become
increasingly difficult for fleet units to conduct effective TACMEMO evaluations and
validations within the prescribed two-year period. Therefore, in some cases,
TACMEMOs may be extended beyond original cancellation dates to allow further
evaluation. Portions of the TACMEMO may be identified for inclusion into an NWP,
while other portions may be deemed to require additional evaluation or recommended
for cancellation. The material in this TACMEMO, once validated, is intended for
inclusion in NWP 3-02.1, Ship-to-Shore Movement.
4.2 OBJECTIVE
This chapter provides a methodology for evaluating this TACMEMO as well as a process
and format for reporting the results of the evaluation to the originator. Evaluations
should be conducted on an on-going, not-to-interfere basis during normal training and
scheduled exercises. Any feedback will be valuable in assisting the originator and
Project Sponsor in making final recommendations for accepting or rejecting the TTP
contained in this TACMEMO.
4.3 EVALUATION REPORT
4.3.1 Report Address
When reporting the results of TACMEMO evaluation, Figure 4-1 should be helpful in
describing the thought process for reaching a final evaluation recommendation.
Evaluation feedback may be via Naval message, email (NIPRNET or SIPRNET), or
letter. The following address information is provided:
PHIBCB ONE

Naval message: PHIBCB ONE

Letter: Commanding Officer, Amphibious Construction
Battalion ONE
2524 Eniwetok Road
San Diego, CA 92155
Phone: Com’l: (619) 437-3383/DSN 577-3383 (PHIBCB
ONE Operations, call to request email contact
information)
E-Mail: Call for address

4-1
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4.3.2 Evaluation Report Format/Content

Guidance on evaluation feedback format and content is provided below:
From: (Evaluating Command/Unit)
To: PHIBCB ONE (Use applicable address from paragraph 4.4.1)
Subj: TACMEMO 3-02.1-08; EVALUATION OF
1. Evaluation recommendations/comments of subject TACMEMO are provided
below:
a. TACMEMO Number: 3-02.1-08
b. TACMEMO Title: Coordinating the Defense of the Navy Support Element
c. Recommendation: (Provide one of the following specific
recommendations for disposition of subject TACMEMO)
(1) Cancel TACMEMO (Provide rationale in paragraph 1.d Amplifying
Comments);
(2) Continue TACMEMO evaluation (Provide reasons for
recommendation to continue evaluation in paragraph 1.d Amplifying
Comments);
(3) Incorporate following changes in TACMEMO and retain for further
evaluation (Provide specific change recommendations in paragraph
1.d Amplifying Comments.);
(4) Incorporate following changes in TACMEMO and incorporate into
NWP (Provide specific change recommendations in paragraph and
identify specific publication in 1.d Amplifying Comments.); or
(5) Incorporate into doctrine (Identify specific publication in paragraph
1.d Amplifying Comments).
d. Amplifying Comments.
(1) If recommendation (1) above (Cancel TACMEMO), explain rationale
for cancellation recommendation; i.e., tactics ineffective; threat has
changed/no longer exists; systems/software affected by TACMEMO
are no longer in use.
(2) If recommendation (2) above (Continue evaluation), explain why;
i.e., results of evaluation were inconclusive but TACMEMO is
believed to have merit; unable to conduct evaluation; insufficient
data to offer recommendation.
(3) If recommendation (3) or (4) above (make changes to TACMEMO
and either re-evaluate or incorporate into doctrine), delineate
specific change recommendations by individual paragraph number
within TACMEMO.
(4) If recommendation (5) above (incorporate TACMEMO into doctrine),
identify applicable publication by title and number, and when
possible identify specific chapters/sections of applicable publication
in which TACMEMO should be incorporated.
2. Provide command/unit point of contact information:
Point of Contact:
SIPRNET Address:
NIPRNET Address:
Mailing Address:
Com’l Phone Number:
DSN Phone Number:

4-2
 TM 3-02.1-08

This Recommend
TACMEMO is TACMEMO
ineffective. continue to be
Recommend evaluated since
Fleet Validation
cancellation of evaluation results
TACMEMO. were inconclusive.

This TACMEMO This TACMEMO is

has some effective as it is and
importance in the should be
fleet but needs incorporated into
changes. doctrine.

Recommend the Recommend

following changes. incorporation into
following
publication(s).

Recommend re-
evaluation or
incorporation into
following
publication(s).

Figure 4-1. TACMEMO Evaluation Decision Tree

4-3
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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APPENDIX A
Communications
A.1 COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
Figure A-1 (following page) shows a consolidated guard chart of the communication nets
used by both NSE and MARSECRON security forces. It is imperative that all defensive
units have the capability of communicating on their assigned nets. A communications
plan should be promulgated before any preplanned operation or one should be acquired
by MARSECRON forces arriving in theater.
A.1.1 NSE Defensive Communication Nets
The recommended arrangement of NSE related nets to achieve a high level of response
among defensive forces is as follows:
Note
There are other nets used by NSE forces, but the following
nets are the ones used in conjunction with/for defensive
purposes.
1. NSE Command Net: CNSE controls this net. Subordinate NBG commands
receive and communicate external reports to CNSE as required. It is a UHF
secure net using PRC or SINGARS radios.
2. LIGHTERAGE CONTROL NET: Joint Lighterage Control Center (JLCC) (or LCC
Watch Officer in the absence of a JLCC) maintains overall control of this net.
The LCC Watch Officer exercises control of craft as required. It is a UHF Secure
net using SINGARS radios.
Note
SSO will monitor this net to maintain awareness of
lighterage coming in and out of the seaward operating area
and to pass information to assigned picket boats.
3. CONVOY INTERNAL NET: Convoy Commander controls this net. Convoys
communicate internally as required. This is a UHF secure net using handheld
radios.

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COMMAND NET **

CAMP TACTICAL /

SECURITY BOAT

BOAT COMMON
NSE COMMAND

FSO COMMAND

SECURITY NET

LIGHTERAGE
Legend

INTERNAL
SECURITY

CONTROL

CONTROL
CONVOY
LSO NET
NET

NET

SSO
A – As required
C – Net Control
X – Guard

U – Unsecure
S S S S S S S S S U
S – Secure

U – UHF
U U U U U U U U U V
V – VHF

NSE COMMAND
CNSE C X
Other NSE Subordinate Cmds X
BSC (NBG) X C*
JLCC / LCC X C A
BSWO X X A
Lighterage X A
Utility Boats X X* A
SECURITY COMMAND
CMARSECRON (or other FSO) A A C
MARSECRON Subordinate Cmds
Commander MEF A
JSC C
MARSECRON Sensor Det X X X
SEAWARD SECURITY
SSO X A C C C
MARSECRON Security Boats X X A
LANDWARD SECURITY
LSO X C C
Reaction squads / Security Dets X A
Patrols X A
Line Companies X
Security CPs X A
ECP X A
Convoy Commander A C
Convoy components A
Marine Arrival / Assembly Group A A
OTHER
BAS X
CBR Officer X

* If assigned to particular duties. (BSC as LSO and Utility boats as security)

** Will be designated by higher authority.

Figure A-1. NSE Defensive Communication Nets Guard Chart

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A.1.2 Security Force Nets

The recommended arrangement for defensive security force related nets are as follows:
1. SECURITY COMMAND NET: This net is a secure voice net controlled by the
JSC. It is used to communicate with the FSO and rear area commanders. It is
designated for force protection issues related to subordinate commands. It is a
UHF secure net using SATCOM radios.
Note
This net is used to coordinate with Marine or Army rear
area guards possibly manning checkpoints in the JSA of
NSE convoys that are en route.
2. FSO COMMAND NET: This is a secure voice radio net operating at all times and
continuously guarded by the Harbor Defense Commander (HDC) and controlled
by the CMARSECRON (or other FSO). It is designated for force protection
issues related subordinate commands including the SSO, MARSECRON Sensor
Detachments and the LSO. It is a UHF Secure net using PRC / SINGARS
radios.
3. CAMP TACTICAL NET (LSO NET): The LSO controls this net. This will be the
BSC if NSE is assigned to fill the LSO role. The LSO communicates tactical
direction to and receives tactical reports from line companies and security
command posts, convoys, and security patrols, as well as additional tactical
information. It is a UHF secure net using SINGARS radios.
4. SECURITY NET: LSO controls this net. Security reaction force personnel
communicate updates from roving patrols, coordinate reaction squads, and
report security issues to security command posts (CP) as required. This is a
UHF secure net using handheld radios.
Note
If MARSECRON units are present in theater, NSE
personnel under a MARSECRON LSO in charge of
landward base defense will use this net. It is also used as
a coordinating net for ECP reports to the LSO and for the
coordination of ECP security guards and convoys en route.
5. SSO NET: Secure voice radio nets used and controlled by the SSO to
coordinate seaward security operations and responses. This includes security
boat patrol leaders and CSW teams covering seaward approaches to the AO. It
is a UHF Secure net using handheld radios.
6. SECURITY BOAT CONTROL NET: Secure voice radio net controlled by the
SSO and used by security boat patrol leaders for security boat command, control
and coordination. It is a UHF Secure net using PRC / SINGARS radios.
Note
NSE security boats may have difficulty complying with a UHF
requirement. SINGARS radios in NSE utility boats being used as security
boats may have to operate in the VHF secure range depending on the
type of SINGARS radios available.

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7. BOAT COMMON: This is an unsecure voice radio net used by afloat units for
safety and navigation coordination. Particular attention to disclosures of
potentially damaging information must be given. This is a free net controlled by
the SSO. This net uses a pre-designated VHF bridge-to-bridge channel
Note
Boat crews will ensure that positive radio communications
are established prior to getting underway and are
maintained at all times with the OTC while underway,
unless otherwise directed by appropriate EMCON imposed
by the OTC. Boat crews must maintain communications
(COMMS) network integrity and be aware of each COMMS
net during debarkation and patrol, especially during flight
operations and assault craft operations. The security
boats will need to monitor multiple communications nets.

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APPENDIX B
NSE Weapons
B.1 NSE WEAPONS ASSIGNED
Figures B-1 through B-6 show the various medium caliber CSWs that NSE forces have
at their disposal as per their appropriate unit’s Table of Allowances.
Note
This appendix is a snapshot of CSW TOA at the time of publication. It
enhances but does not replace TOA documents. Detailed planning must
take place to ensure the appropriate number of weapons accompany
deploying units.
B.1.1 Amphibious Construction Battalion

Weapons Number Per Unit

7.62MM M240B or 7.62MM

M60E3 Lightweight 18
Machineguns

.50 cal M2HB Machineguns 16

40MM MK 19-3 Heavy

4
Machineguns

Figure B-1. Weapon Capabilities of an ACB

B.1.2 Navy Beach Group

Weapons Number Per Unit

7.62MM M240B or 7.62MM

M60E3 Lightweight 0
Machineguns

.50 cal M2HB Machineguns 0

40MM MK 19-3 Heavy

0
Machineguns

Figure B-2. Weapon Capabilities of a NBG

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B.1.3 Beach Master Unit

Weapons Number Per Unit

7.62MM M240B or 7.62MM

M60E3 Lightweight 32
Machineguns

.50 cal M2HB Machineguns 0

40MM MK 19-3 Heavy

0
Machineguns

Figure B-3. Weapon Capabilities of a BMU

B.1.4 Assault Craft Unit (Displacement / LCU)

Weapons Number Per Unit

7.62 MM M240B or 7.62 MM

M60E3 Lightweight 0
Machineguns

.50 cal M2HB Machineguns 40

40 MM MK 19-3 Heavy
0
Machineguns

Figure B-4. Weapon Capabilities of an ACU (Displacement / LCU)

B.1.5 Assault Craft Unit (Non-Displacement / LCAC)

Weapons Number Per Unit

7.62 MM M60 (Basic)

34
Lightweight Machineguns

7.62 MM M60D Lightweight

22
Machineguns

Figure B-5. Weapon Capabilities of an ACU (Non-Displacement / LCAC)

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B.1.6 Navy Cargo Handling Battalion

Weapons Number Per Unit

7.62 MM M60 Lightweight

8
Machineguns

.50 cal M2HB Machineguns 4

40 MM MK 19-3 Heavy
4
Machineguns

Figure B-6. Weapon Capabilities of a NCHB

Note
NCHB personnel usually only deploy with sidearms for personal
defense. The above weapons are available in an NCHB, but must
be specifically requested.

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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