Arranged by: Jovel C.
Pascua
People vs Alejandro
G.R No. 176350, August 10, 2011
FACTS:
The RTC found the appellant John-John
Alejandro for violating RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of
2002. It was alleged that he sold shabu to
undercover police on September 1, 2002. The
appellant appealed the case in the Court of
Appeals but the appellant court affirmed the
decision of the lower court stating that the
defense already admitted the admissibility of
certain evidences against the appellant and
further stated that, in the absence of any
motive to do otherwise, the police officers are
presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner. Thus, the appellant raised
the matter to the SC claiming that the RTC
erred in convicting him because the
prosecution failed to prove that the integrity
of the seized item, with police having failed
to mark and photograph the seized item,
therefore, his guilt was not proven to be
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
WON, the prosecution was able to prove the
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
NO, the prosecution was not able to prove the
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
If the prosecution fails to meet the required
quantum of evidence, the defense does not
even need to present any evidence in its
behalf; the presumption of innocence
prevails and the accused should be
acquitted.—The burden lies on the
prosecution to overcome such presumption
of innocence by presenting the quantum of
evidence required. In doing so, the
prosecution must rest its case on its own
merits and cannot merely rely on the
weakness of the defense. If the prosecution
fails to meet the required quantum of
evidence, the defense does not even need to
present any evidence in its behalf; the
presumption of innocence prevails and the
accused should be acquitted.
The elements necessary for the prosecution
of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9165 are: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material in the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
1
drugs is proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of the
corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of
the crime that establishes that a crime has
actually been committed, as shown by
presenting the object of the illegal
transaction.
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the
narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and proof of its
existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the seized drug, the
evidence must definitely show that the illegal
drug presented in court is the very same illicit
drug actually recovered from the appellant;
otherwise, the prosecution for drug pushing
under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
The presumption of regularity obtains only
when there is no deviation from the regular
performance of duty. Where the official act in
question is irregular on its face, no
presumption of regularity can arise.—In
convicting the appellant of the crime
charged, both the RTC and the CA relied on
the evidentiary presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed.
However, this presumption is not conclusive
and cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
The presumption of regularity, it must be
emphasized, obtains only when there is no
deviation from the regular performance of
duty. Where the official act in question is
irregular on its face, no presumption of
regularity can arise.
G.R. No. 188694 February 12,
2014
RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO
A. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
⚫ Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are
employees of the CA, particularly
assigned to its Budget Division.
⚫
On March 20, 1995, Atibula, Records
Officer I and Custodian of the CA
Original Decisions in the CA Reporter’s
Division, was invited by Castro to attend
Atienza’s birthday party where he was
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
introduced to a certain Dario and asked
him to assist the latter in searching for
the CA decision in the case entitled
"Mateo Fernando v. Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc.".
⚫ Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office
– followed by Dario – and searched for
the aforementioned decision. As Dario
was scanning through the said volume,
Atibula observed that he was comparing
its pages to the discolored papers he was
holding.
⚫ On March 24, 1995, Dario requested
Atibula to insert a Decision dated
September 26, 1968 in one of the
volumes of the CA Original Decisions.
However, Atibula refused and
immediately left.
⚫ Atienza offered Atibula the amount of
₱50,000.00 in exchange for Volume
260, which the latter turned down.
⚫ Disturbed by the situation, Atibula
reported the incident to Atty.
Macapagal.
⚫ On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that
Volume 266 covering the period from
January 28 to February 12, 1969 was
missing. On May 18, 1995, a certain
Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at
the CA Reporter’s Division, handed to
Atibula a bag containing a gift-wrapped
package which turned out to be the
missing Volume 266. He claimed that it
was Castro who asked him to deliver the
said package to Atibula.
⚫ Atibula compared the contents of
Volume 266 with the index of the
decisions and noticed that there were
two new documents inserted therein.
⚫ Laboratory analysis and comparative
examination conducted by the NBI
showed that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed
been altered; and (b) the signatures of
the CA Justices in the subject resolution
and decision (questioned signatures)
and their standard/sample signatures
"were not written by one and the same
person," leading to the conclusion that
the questioned signatures were
forgeries.
⚫ Consequently, a criminal complaint was
filed by the NBI and the Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman against Atienza,
Castro, and Dario before the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of
the OMB charging them for the
following crimes: (a) Falsification of
Public Document; (b) violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, as amended; and (c) violation of
Section 8 of RA 6713.
2
⚫ After investigation, the charges
involving the pertinent provisions of
RAs 3019 and 6713 were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, but it was
contrarily determined that there existed
probable cause to charge Atienza,
Castro, and Dario for the crimes of
Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the
RPC, as amended, and of Falsification of
Public Document under Article 172(1) in
relation to Article 171(6) of the same
code.
⚫ The RTC found petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the
RPC and Falsification of Public
Document under Article 172(1) in
relation to Article 171(6) of the RPC, and
sentenced them to each suffer: (a) the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, for the first
crime; and (b) the penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day, as minimum, to
six (6) years of prision correccional, as
maximum, and a fine of ₱5,000.00 for
the second crime.
⚫ In convicting petitioners, the RTC found
that "the evidence x x x of the
prosecution is replete with situations
and/or events to prove [petitioners’]
guilt," namely: (a) Atienza requested
Atibula to take out Volumes 260, 265
and 267 of the CA Original Decisions
from the CA Reporter’s Division, which
the latter rejected despite offer of
remuneration; (b) Volume 266 was
subsequently discovered to be missing;
(c) access to the missing volume appears
to have been acquired by entering
through an opening in the premises of
the CA’s Reporter’s Division because the
air conditioning unit occupying the
space thereat was taken out for repair
earlier; (d) Castro returned Volume 266
after its loss; (e) Volume 266 bore
badges of tampering evidenced by the
"non-continuity of the front and the back
cover flaps x x x and the pages of the
book/volume differences in the cutting
marks on the sides of the volume and the
presence of artificial aging on [its]
sides"; and (f) two (2) new documents
which materially amended the original
decision and resolution in the Fernando
case were inserted in the said volume.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed their
conviction to the CA.
⚫ The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment of
conviction in toto. It held that while
there is no direct evidence showing that
the petitioners committed the crimes
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
charged, the testimonies of Atibula and
NBI Agent Atty. Daganzo with respect to
what had transpired before and after
Volume 266 was taken from its shelf,
when viewed together with the other
circumstances in the case, constitute
circumstantial evidence which
sufficiently point to the guilt of
petitioners. In addition, it found that
Atienza’s defenses were self-serving
negative evidence which cannot
outweigh the circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his participation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the falsification case.
RULING:
No. The RTC did not have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the falsification case since
Falsification of Public Document under
Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is
punishable by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (or
imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 6 years91) and a fine of not more than
₱5,000.00, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980," as amended by RA 7691. While
petitioners raised this jurisdictional
defect for the first time in the present
petition, they are not precluded from
questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law and cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-
settled that lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. Hence, questions of
jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised
for the first time on appeal.
Whether or not petitioners’ conviction for the
crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document should be upheld on account of
the circumstantial evidence in this case
proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The petition is meritorious.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from
3
which the main fact in issue may be inferred
based on reason and common experience. It
is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To
uphold a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads
one to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
the others, as the guilty person. Stated
differently, the test to determine whether or
not the circumstantial evidence on record is
sufficient to convict the accused is that the
series of circumstances duly proven must be
consistent with each other and that each and
every circumstance must be consistent with
the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence.
Applying these principles to the facts that
appear on record, the Court finds that no
sufficient circumstantial evidence was
presented in this case to establish the
elements of Robbery under Article
299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of
Public Documents under Article 172(1) in
relation to Article 171(6) of the same code, or
of petitioners’ supposed conspiracy therefor.
The Constitution mandates that an accused
shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence,
failing which, the presumption of innocence
prevails and the accused should be
acquitted. This, despite the fact that his
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal
conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness or even absence of defense. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction, as in this case. Courts
should be guided by the principle that it
would be better to set free ten men who
might be probably guilty of the crime charged
than to convict one innocent man for a crime
he did not commit.
Accordingly, there being no circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support a conviction,
the Court hereby acquits petitioners, without
prejudice, however, to any subsequent
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
finding on their administrative liability in
connection with the incidents in this case.
G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFINO MIRANDILLA
BERMAS, accused-appellant
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL; The right to counsel means
that the accused is amply accorded
legal assistance extended by a counsel
who commits himself to the case for
the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement
by the lawyer in the proceeding
particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic
rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case, and his knowing
the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence.
FACTS:
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas was charged with
the crime of rape committed against his
daughter Manuela Bermas. On the basis of
the evidence of the prosecution, the Regional
Trial Court of Paranaque rendered its
decision finding the accused guilty of rape
and sentenced him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death. Hence, this automatic
review. In this instant appeal, the defense
alleged that the accused was denied of his
constitutional right to effective and vigilant
counsel. It appeared that on the day
scheduled for his arraignment, the accused
was brought before the trial court without
counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty.
Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of the Public
Attorney's Office to be the counsel de officio.
Thereafter, the complainant testified on
direct examination with hardly any
participation by defense counsel, who
inexplicably later waived the cross-
examination and then asked the court that
she be relieved of her duty as counsel de
officio. Consequently, Atty. Roberto Gomez
was appointed the new counsel de officio.
While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to
cross-examine the complainant, it should be
quite evident, however, that he barely had
time to prepare therefor. Moreover, on the
scheduled reception of the defense evidence,
Atty. Gomez failed to appear. Hence, the
court was constrained to appoint another
4
counsel de officio in the name of Atty.
Nicanor Lonzame. However, for one reason
or another, Atty. Lonzame ceased to appear
for and in behalf of the accused-appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant
was properly and effectively accorded his
right to counsel.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the
negative. The right to counsel must be more
than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right
to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the case for
the defense and acts accordingly. The right
assumes an active involvement by the lawyer
in the proceeding particularly at the trial of
the case, his bearing constantly in mind of
the basic rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant has not properly and
effectively been accorded the right to
counsel. The right to counsel proceeds from
the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be
heard before being condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of a person's
basic rights; it is not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. [Peop1e vs. Bermas; G. R.
No. 120420; April21, 1999; EN BANC--
- Vitug, J.]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-
Appellant.
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
FACTS
An Information was filed against Lara with
robbery with homicide. The prosecution
presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz
(SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3
Calix).
Sumulong, the accounting staff of San
Sebastian Allied Services testified that: May
31, 2001, 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew
the amount of ₱ 230,000.00 from the
Metrobank to defray the salaries of the
employees of San Sebastian and was
accompanied by Virgilio Manacob, Jeff Atie,
Joselito Bautista and left the bank after the
transactions. Around 10:30 AM at the
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared
at the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang
pera, iyong bag, nasaan? Bautista shouted,
"Wag mong ibigay”
Sumulong threw the bag in Bautista’s
direction Bautista alighted from the car and
ran. Lara ran after him while firing his gun.
Sumulong called the office of San Sebastian
to relay the incident. But, Bautista was shot
and the bag was taken away from him. On
June 7, 2001, Sumulong saw Lara walking
along in Pasig City. He alerted the police and
Lara was thereafter arrested.
SPO1 Cruz testified that: June 7, 2001,
Sumulong went to the police station and
informed him that he saw Lara walking. Four
(4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr.
Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, they
approached Lara and invited him for
questioning. Lara was positively identified by
Sumulong and his two companions.
PO3 Calix testified that: May 31, 2001, he was
informed of a robbery that took place at the
corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues,
Pasig City. Together with three (3) other
police officers, proceeded to the crime scene,
upon arriving one of the police officers who
were able to respond ahead of them and
handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty
shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm
pistol. As part of his investigation, he
interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the
police station. Before Bautista died, he was
able to interview Bautista at the hospital.
In his defense, Lara testified that: on May 31,
2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer
trench and his brother, was constructing a
comfort room. They were working from 8:00
AM until 3:00 PM. on June 7, 2001, around
7:00 PM, he was at the house of one of his
cousins, police officers arrived and asked
him if he was Arturo Lara. He confirmed that
he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked
him to go with them to the Barangay Hall.
While inside the patrol car, one of the
policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able
to caught you in your house, if in another
place we will kill you". He was brought to the
police station and not the barangay hall as he
was earlier told where he was investigated for
robbery with homicide; when he told the
police that he was at home when the subject
incident took place, the police challenged
him to produce witnesses; Lara witnesses
arrived at the station, one of the police
officers told them to come back the following
day. He was at the police line-up holding a
name plate, a police officer told Sumulong
and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo";
Lara witnesses arrived the following day,
5
they were told that he will be subjected to an
inquest.
The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi and
convicted Lara of robbery with homicide. On
appeal The CA found that Lara’s alibi failed
to convince. The CA affirmed Lara’s
conviction.
ISSUES
a. whether the identification made by
Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police
line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood
therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest
may be raised for the first time on appeal for
the purpose of nullifying his conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to
convict Lara; and
d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence
so as to exonerate him from the crime
charged.
RULING
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired through compulsory
process such as a warrant of arrest or
through his voluntary appearance, such as
when he surrenders to the police or to the
court.19 Any objection to the arrest or
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. An accused submits to the
jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a
plea and participating actively in the trial and
this precludes him invoking any
irregularities that may have attended his
arrest.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused
is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set
aside a conviction that was arrived upon a
complaint duly filed and a trial conducted
without error. As Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege
any ground therefor. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
any objections except those based on the
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not
provided with counsel when he was placed in
a police line-up did not invalidate the
proceedings leading to his conviction. That
he stood at the police line-up without the
assistance of counsel did not render
Sumulong’s identification of Lara
inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed
to have arisen at the precise moment
custodial investigation begins and being
made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
III
It is well-settled is the rule that direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is
not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain,
consistent with each other and to the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the
exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is
not.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial
evidence sufficed to convict upon the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an
accused may be convicted of the crime for
which he is charged. Resort to circumstantial
evidence is essential since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in
setting felons free and denying proper
protection to the community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following
circumstances established by the evidence
for the prosecution strongly indicate Lara’s
guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie,
Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger
side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while
pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the
front passenger seat, Lara demanded that
Sumulong give him the bag containing the
money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara,
Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated
6
at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista
got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran
towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran
after Bautista and while doing so, fired his
gun at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista
sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g)
Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and
empty shells were recovered therefrom.
In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by
Sumulong’s positive narration that it was
Lara who pointed the gun at him and
demanded that the bag containing the money
be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to
violence in order to actualize his intent to
gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony that
he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of
Bautista, who was running away from the
pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.
IV
In view of Sumulong’s positive identification
of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s
alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive
identification prevails over alibi, which is
inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule,
for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and
difficult to disapprove.
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the
offense was committed, but it must likewise
be demonstrated that he was so far away that
it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi
must be supported by clear and convincing
proof.
In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at
the scene of the crime wholly negates his
alibi. Assuming as true Lara’s claim and that
of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer
trench on the day of the incident, it is
possible that his witnesses may not have
noticed him leaving and returning given that
the distance between his house and the place
where the subject incident took place can be
negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter
of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his
witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh
impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.
The Court denied the appeal. The decision of
the CA is affirmed in all respects.
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 227038
July 31, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The Facts
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45
in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay
Bayan operative of Barangay San Antonio
Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo
was doing his rounds when he purportedly
received a report of a man showing off his
private parts at Kaong Street. Bahoyo and
Velasquez then went to the said street and
saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they
later identified as herein petitioner,
urinating and displaying his private parts
while standing in front of a gate enclosing an
empty lot.
Bahoyo and Velasquez approached
petitioner and asked him where he lived, and
the latter answered Kaong Street. Bahoyo
then said that he also lived in the same street
but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he
asked for an identification card, but
petitioner failed to produce one. BB
Velasquez then repeated the request for an
identification card, but instead, petitioner
emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of
cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette
and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing
dried marijuana leaves, among others. This
prompted Bahoyo and Velasquez to seize the
foregoing items, take petitioner to the police
station, and turn him, as well as the seized
items, over to SP03 Rafael Castillo. SP03
Castillo then inventoried, marked, and
photographed the seized items, all in the
presence of Bahoyo and Velasquez, and
thereafter, prepared an inventory report and
a request for qualitative examination of the
seized two (2) pieces of rolled paper and for
petitioner to undergo drug testing. After
examination, it was confirmed that the
aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana
and that petitioner was positive for the
presence of methamphetamine but negative
for THC-metabolites, both dangerous drugs.
An Information was then filed before the
RTC, charging petitioner of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002”.
The RTC Ruling
7
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
found that Bahoyo and Velasquez conducted
a valid warrantless arrest.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA affirmed petitioner's conviction. It
also held that the search made on petitioner
which yielded the seized marijuana was
validly made as it was done incidental to his
arrest for exhibiting his private parts on
public. As such, said seized marijuana is
admissible in evidence and, thus, sufficient
to convict him for the crime charged. The CA
likewise held that the rule on chain of
custody was duly complied with and, thus,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs were not compromised.
Undaunted, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was, however, denied
in a Resolution. Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
WON the arrest and search of Bahoyo and
Velasquez were validly made
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit. Petitioner’s
conviction must be set aside.
It is worth noting that his arresting
officers, i.e., Bahoyo and Velasquez, are
mere Bantay Bayan operatives of Makati
City. Strictly speaking, they are not
government agents like the Philippine
National Police (PNP) or the National
Bureau of Investigation in charge of law
enforcement; but rather, they are civilian
volunteers who act as "force multipliers" to
assist the aforesaid law enforcement
agencies in maintaining peace and security
within their designated areas.
Particularly, jurisprudence described the
nature of Bantay Bayan as "a group of male
residents living in the area organized for the
purpose of keeping peace in their
community, which is an accredited auxiliary
of the x x x PNP."
In the case of Dela Cruz v. People, the Court
thoroughly discussed that while the Bill of
Rights under Article III of the 1987
Constitution generally cannot be invoked
against the acts of private individuals, the
same may nevertheless be applicable if such
individuals act under the color of a state-
related function.
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and
the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law
enforcement officers for purposes of
applying Article III of the Constitution.
In People v. Lauga, the court held that
a "bantav bayan," in relation to the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation
under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, "has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights."
In this light, the Court was convinced that the
acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-
based or other volunteer organizations in the
nature of watch groups - relating to the
preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas have the color of a state-
related function. As such, they should be
deemed as law enforcement authorities for
the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights
under Article III of the 1987 Constitution to
them.
Having established that the Bill of Rights
may be applied to the Bantay
Bayan operatives who arrested and
subsequently searched petitioner, the Court
then determined whether such arrest
and search were validly made.
"Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. Evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated are deemed tainted
and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need
of a warrant before a search may be effected
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In
this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made and the process
cannot be reversed. A lawful arrest may
be effected with or without a warrant. With
respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as
a general rule - be complied with:
8
Section 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a
warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just
been committed and he has
probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal
establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has
escaped while being
transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112.
The aforementioned provision identifies
three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an
arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which
had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of
a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to
Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On
the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113
requires for its application that at the time of
the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it.32
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
In both instances, the officer's personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the
crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he
knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed."
On the basis of the testimonies, the Court
was inclined to believe that at around past 12
o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 2010,
petitioner went out to the street to urinate
when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced
upon him. The latter then approached and
questioned petitioner, and thereafter, went
on to search his person, which purportedly
yielded the marijuana seized from him.
Verily, the prosecution's claim that petitioner
was showing off his private parts was belied
by the aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these
circumstances do not justify the conduct of
an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering
that there was no overt act constituting a
crime committed by petitioner in the
presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. Neither do these circumstances
necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest
as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives do
not have any personal knowledge of facts that
petitioner had just committed an offense.
More importantly, the Court simply finds
highly implausible the prosecution's claim
that a valid warrantless arrest was made on
petitioner on account of the alleged public
display of his private parts because if it was
indeed the case, then the proper charge
should have been filed against him. However,
records are bereft of any showing that such
charge was filed aside from the criminal
charge for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs - thereby strengthening the view that
no prior arrest was made on petitioner which
led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed
earlier, there must first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made and that such
process cannot be reversed.
All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives
conducted an illegal search on the person of
petitioner. Consequently, the marijuana
purportedly seized from him on account of
such search is rendered inadmissible in
evidence. Since the confiscated marijuana is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
petitioner was acquitted and exonerated
from criminal liability.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA
CRISTOBAL, Accused-Appellant.
9
G.R. No. 159450 March 30, 2011
FACTS
Among the six tellers in the Angeles City
main branch of Prudential Bank, accused-
appellant (hereafter "appellant") was the
only teller assigned to handle dollar deposits
and withdrawals.
An internal spot-audit team headed by
Prudential Bank’s senior audit examiner
inventoried the cash accountabilities of the
said branch by manually counting the money
in each of the tellers’ cash boxes. While the
books of the branch showed that appellant
had a cash accountability of $15,040.52, the
money in her cash box was only $5,040.52
The appellant explained that there was a
withdrawal of $10,000.00 Appellant then
presented to senior auditor a withdrawal
memo showing a withdrawal of $10,000.00
from Dollar Savings Account of Adoracion
Tayag and her co-signatory, Apolinario
Tayag.
The appellant showed the aforesaid
withdrawal memo to the branch cashier.
Noticing that the said withdrawal memo did
not contain the required signatures of two
bank officers.
Meanwhile, The Bank’s senior auditor
checked the account ledger and found a "hold
jacket" indicating that no withdrawal from
the said account should be allowed to reduce
its balance below $35,000.00. The supposed
withdrawal of $10,000.00 had reduced the
account balance to $26,077.51.
From the account ledger, the senior auditor
also discovered that a deposit of $10,000.00
found the deposit memo on file. Thereafter,
Frias compared the signature on the
withdrawal memo with the specimen
signatures of the depositors in their
signature card. Finding a "big difference" in
the signatures, he referred the matter to the
branch manager.
The branch manager asked to explain, then
appellant reiterated that the withdrawal was
made after the cut-off time. Doubting her
explanation, the senior auditor conducted
another cash count. At that time, appellant’s
accountability based on the books of the bank
was $21,778.86, but the money in her cash
box was only $11,778.86, thus, short of
US$10,000.00.
The next day, January 4, 1996, appellant told
the branch manager that she gave the
$10,000.00 to a person on December 29,
1995 because her family was being
threatened.
The appellant wrote a letter to the bank
President, The appellant apologized and
explained her shortage of $10,000.00 and
another shortage of P2.2 Million which the
audit team had also discovered.
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
The depositor Apolinario Tayag denied
withdrawing $10,000.00 from the date
recorded, when he was in Baguio City that
time.
The appellant counsel filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense
Evidence,5 praying for the dismissal of the
charge on the ground that the evidence of the
State did not suffice to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence
and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision on
the basis that her filing her demurrer to
evidence without express leave of court as
required by Section 15, Rule 119, of the Rules
of Court had waived her right to present
evidence.
The accused appealed, but the CA affirmed
her conviction modifying the penalty.
ISSUE
(a) Whether the information filed against the
accused was fatally defective;
(b) Whether the RTC correctly found that the
accused had waived her right to present
evidence in her defense; and
(c) Whether the extrajudicial admission of
taking the amount involved contained in the
letter of the accused to the President of
Prudential Bank was admissible under the
rules and jurisprudence.
RULING
I Henceforth, to protect the constitutional
There is no question about the
findings of fact being based on the evidence
adduced by the Prosecution. The decisions of
both lower courts are remarkable for their
thoroughness and completeness. In fact, the
accused did not impugn the findings of fact,
and confined herself only to the validity of
the information and the legality of her letter
due to its being held admissible as evidence
against her. Although she decried her failure
to present her evidence on account of her
having demurred without express leave of
court, that, too, was not an obstacle to the
correctness of the findings of fact against her.
The main purpose of requiring the
various elements of a crime to be set forth in
the information is to enable the accused to
adequately prepare her defense.12 As to the
sufficiency of the allegation of the time or
date of the commission of the offense,
Section 6 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
II
CA and RTC did not err in
deeming petitioner
10
to have waived her right to present
evidence
The CA did not thereby err. The rule
in point is Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised
Rules of Court, viz:
Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. – After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of
the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal,
the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion
to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.
Under the rule, the RTC properly declared
the accused to have waived her right to
present evidence because she did not obtain
the express leave of court for her demurrer to
evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary
and knowing waiver of her right to present
evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire
into the voluntariness and intelligence of the
waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to
evidence without first obtaining express
leave of court effectively waived her right to
present her evidence.
right to due process of every accused in
a capital offense and to avoid any confusion
about the proper steps to be taken when a
trial court comes face to face with an accused
or his counsel who wants to waive his client’s
right to present evidence and be heard, it
shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial
court to observe, as a prerequisite to the
validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a
"searching inquiry" as specified in People v.
Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty,
particularly –
1. The trial court shall hear both the
prosecution and the accused with their
respective counsel on the desire or
manifestation of the accused to waive the
right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance
of the prosecution and especially the accused
with their respective counsel in the hearing
which must be recorded. Their presence
must be duly entered in the minutes of the
proceedings.
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of
the trial court to –
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question
to determine whether he had conferred with
and completely explained to the accused that
he had the right to present evidence and be
heard as well as its meaning and
consequences, together with the significance
and outcome of the waiver of such right. If
the lawyer for the accused has not done so,
the trial court shall give the latter enough
time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with
conformity of the accused whether he wants
to present evidence or submit a
memorandum elucidating on the
contradictions and insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, if any, or in default
theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior
leave of court, if he so believes that the
prosecution evidence is so weak that it need
not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to do
so, the trial court shall give the defense
enough time to this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality
profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a
free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should
be in a language known and understood by
the latter, hence, the record must state the
language used for this purpose as well as
reflect the corresponding translation thereof
in English.
The accused and her counsel should not have
ignored the potentially prejudicial
consequence of the filing of a demurrer to
evidence without the leave of court required
in Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules
of Court. They were well aware of the risk of
a denial of the demurrer being high, for by
demurring the accused impliedly admitted
the facts adduced by the State and the proper
inferences therefrom. We cannot step in now
to alleviate her self-inflicted plight, for which
she had no one to blame but herself;
otherwise, we may unduly diminish the
essence of the rule that gave her the
alternative option to waive presenting her
own evidence.
III
Petitioner’s handwritten letter
is admissible in evidence
11
The letter was not an extrajudicial
confession whose validity depended on its
being executed with the assistance of counsel
and its being under oath, but a voluntary
party admission under Section 26, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court that was admissible
against her. An admission, if voluntary, is
admissible against the admitter for the
reason that it is fair to presume that the
admission corresponds with the truth, and it
is the admitter’s fault if the admission does
not. By virtue of its being made by the party
himself, an admission is competent primary
evidence against the admitter.
Worth pointing out is that the letter was not
a confession due to its not expressly
acknowledging the guilt of the accused for
qualified theft. Under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, a confession is a
declaration of an accused acknowledging
guilt for the offense charged, or for any
offense necessarily included therein.
Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel
to have assisted the accused when she wrote
the letter because she spontaneously made it
while not under custodial investigation. Her
insistence on the assistance of a counsel
might be valid and better appreciated had
she made the letter while under arrest, or
during custodial investigation, or under
coercion by the investigating authorities of
the Government. The distinction of her
situation from that of a person arrested or
detained and under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense derived
from the clear intent of insulating the latter
from police coercion or intimidation
underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
The Supreme Court held that in such a case,
the accused should be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for forty years with the
accessory penalties of death under Article 40
of the Revised Penal Code.
The SC denied the petition for review on
certiorari, and affirm the decision of the CA
JANET LIM NAPOLES v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION)
G.R. No. 224162
February 6, 2018
REYES, JR., J.:
FACTS
1. On December 20, 2017, petitioner
Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the
Court's Decision dated November 7,
2017. (The Issue of the case on
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
November 7, 2017 was whether or
not the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its assailed Resolutions
denying Napoles’ application for
bail. The Court there held no because
the prosecution bears the burden of
proving that evidence of Napoles’
guilt of the crime is strong as she was
charged with plunder. This is in
regards with the PDAF Scam).
2. The Court denied Napoles'
application for bail, there being no
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Sandiganbayan.
3. Napoles now invokes the ruling
in Macapagal-Arroyo v.
People, which was promulgated on
July 19, 2016. The Court in that case
reversed the Sandiganbayan's denial
of the demurrer to evidence in the
plunder case against former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) based on the prosecution's
failure to specify the identity of the
main plunderer, for whose benefit the
ill-gotten wealth was amassed,
accumulated, and acquired.
According to Napoles, the ruling
in Macapagal-Arroyo should have
been applied to her case.
ISSUE
WON the ruling in Macapal-Arroyo should
be applied in this case- to consider the
demurrer to evidence filed by Napoles.
RULING
NO.
The Court finds this argument
unmeritorious.
In a demurrer to evidence, as in the case
of Macapagal-Arroyo, the accused imposes
a challenge on the sufficiency of the
prosecution's entire evidence. This involves
a determination of whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution has established
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Should the trial court find the
prosecution's evidence insufficient in
this regard, the grant of the demurrer
to evidence is equivalent to the
acquittal of the accused.
The stage at which the accused may demur to
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence
is during the trial on the merits itself-
particularly, after the prosecution has rested
its case. This should be distinguished
from the hearing for the petition for
bail, in which the trial court does not sit to
try the merits of the main case. Neither does
12
it speculate on the ultimate outcome of the
criminal charge. The Court has judiciously
explained in Atty. Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan the difference between
the preliminary determination of the
guilt of the accused in a petition for
bail, and the proceedings during the
trial proper, viz.:
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs.
Bernabe, the Court held that in a petition for
bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a
summary hearing, meaning such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. The court does
not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be given to the
evidence against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be offered
therein. It may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness
in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable
minimum the amount of corroboration
particularly on details that are not essential
to the purpose of the hearing.
The Court has previously discussed in the
Decision dated November 7, 2017 that the
trial court is required to conduct a
hearing on the petition for bail
whenever the accused is charged with
a capital offense. While mandatory, the
hearing may be summary and the trial
court may deny the bail application on
the basis of evidence less than that
necessary to establish the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
this hearing, the trial court's inquiry is
limited to whether there is evident proof that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
This standard of proof is clearly
different from that applied in a
demurrer to evidence, which
measures the prosecution's entire
evidence against the required moral
certainty for the conviction of the
accused.
The distinction between the required
standards of proof precludes the application
of Macapagal-Arroyo to the present case.
The Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer
to evidence in Macapagal-Arroyo was
annulled based on the paucity of the evidence
of the prosecution, which failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that former
President GMA was the mastermind of the
conspiracy to commit plunder. In other
words, there was a final determination of
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
former President GMA's innocence of the
crime charged.
This is not the case for Napoles. The
issue that the Court resolved in its Decision
dated November 7, 2017 was whether the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in denying Napoles' application for bail. This
involved a preliminary determination of her
eligibility to provisional liberty.
The resolution of this issue does not involve
an inquiry as to whether there was proof
beyond reasonable doubt that Napoles, or
her co-accused as the case may be, was the
main plunderer for whose benefit the ill-
gotten wealth was amassed or accumulated.
These are matters of defense best left to the
discretion of the Sandiganbayan in the
resolution of the criminal case. It was
sufficient that the denial of her bail
application was based on evidence
establishing a great presumption of guilt on
the part of Napoles.
Lastly, the other issues raised in Napoles'
Motion for Reconsideration merely
reiterated the earlier arguments that this
Court has already resolved. For this reason,
the reconsideration of the Court's earlier
Decision is unwarranted under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves
to DENY the present Motion for
Reconsideration.
______________________________
______________________________
_________________
Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. —
After the prosecution rests its case, the court
may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence
filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the
demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of
court, the accused waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (15a)
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer
to evidence shall specifically state its grounds
and shall be filed within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days after the prosecution
rests its case. The prosecution may oppose
the motion within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from its receipt.
13
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall
file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice. The prosecution may oppose the
demurrer to evidence within a similar period
from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of
court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
Domingo Neypes v CA
G.R. No. 41524 September 14, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC
against the private respondents. Later, in an
order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’
complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly
received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter
or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial
court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the
notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the
CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day
they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for
appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-
day period to appeal should have been
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the “final
order” appealable under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order
triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary
period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998
order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their
notice of appeal on time.
RULING:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration should be
deemed as the final order. In the case of
Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial
court declared petitioner non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon
receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an
omnibus motion to set it aside. When the
omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-
day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He
later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then
filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed
out of time. The court a quo ruled that
petitioner should have appealed within 15
days after the dismissal of his complaint
since this was the final order that was
appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed
the trial court and declared that it was the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what
ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more
recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.
where the SC again considered the order
denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the
SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order
dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order
contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
14
period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also
apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule
45. The new rule aims to regiment or make
the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998
(the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word “or”
signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in
the above provision supposes that the notice
of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the “final order,” which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the
spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to
15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The
original period of appeal (in this case March
3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for
strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only
when a party opts to file a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. In this
manner, the trial court which rendered the
assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the
process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either
file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it within
15 days from receipt of the order (the “final
order”) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the
new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua

becomes final and executory after the lapse ⚫ This case consists of three consolidated
of the original appeal period provided in Rule
cases (Soliven vs. Makasiar, Beltran vs.
41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days Makasiar, and Beltran vs. Executive
from receipt of the order denying their
Secretary)
motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within ⚫ Soliven broadcasted the statement that
the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
President Aquino hid under her bed
discussed.
during a coup d' etat. Luis Beltran is
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as among the petitioners in this case. He,
the “Fresh Period Rule,” states that “a party
litigant may either file his notice of appeal together with others, was charged
within 15 days from receipt of the Regional with libel by the then president Corazon
Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days
from receipt of the order (the "final order") Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-
denying his motion for new trial or motion affidavit against him and others. On
for reconsideration.” (Domingo Neypes
versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
September 14, 2005) denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration as well as the second
PURPOSE OF THE RULE motion for reconsideration filed on April
7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
To standardize the appeal periods provided
in the Rules and to afford litigants fair through the Executive Secretary,
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court affirmed the resolution of the Secretary
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted for reconsideration was denied by the
from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988.
reconsideration. (supra)
⚫ Petitioner Beltran alleged that there was
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule"
is to standardize the appeal period provided a violation of his constitutional right
in the Rules and do away with the confusion
upon the issuance of a warrant of arrest
as to when the 15-day appeal period should
be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to against him without the personal
appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing
determination by the judge of probable
of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not cause. He also contends that to allow this
concern themselves with counting the
libel case to proceed would produce a
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since
the 15-day period is now counted from chilling effect” of press freedom. The
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
petitioner also contends that the
new trial or motion for reconsideration or
any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu president could not file the complaint
versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No.
affidavit herself because this would
170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
defeat her immunity from suit. This case
is a petition for certiorari and
TOPIC: WHEN WARRANT OF
ARREST MAY ISSUE prohibition to review the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Soliven, et. Al., petitioners, vs
Makasiar et. Al. respondents.

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 ISSUES:

(1) whether or not petitioners were
FACTS: denied due process when
informations for libel were filed

15
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was
still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the
President;
Ruling: No Petitioners were not denied due
process when informations for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still
under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President.
As to the first issue, the court ruled that
subsequent events have rendered it moot and
academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary
of Justice denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the
City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case
against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran
was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Executive Secretary on
May 16, 1988. With these developments,
petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available
under the law has lost factual support.
Also, with respect to petitioner Beltran, the
allegation of denial of due process of law in
the preliminary investigation is negated by
the fact that instead of submitting his
counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint by
filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law
does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if
he is so minded.
(2) whether or not the constitutional
rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause;
Ruling: No. The constitutional rights of
Beltran were not violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the
16
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause.
The constitutional provision on the issuance
of warrants of arrest reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
nder oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after
the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other
responsible officers as may be authorized by
law," has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge
is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead
of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court
unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting
down guidelines for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. The procedure therein provided is
reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge
has deviated from the prescribed procedure.
Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
(3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the
filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Ruling: Yes. The President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit.
The rationale for the grant to the President of
the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded
by the privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely
the President's prerogative. It is a decision
that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person
ALSONS vs. HEIRS OF CONFESOR
G.R. No. 215671, September 19, 2018
FACTS:
17
Petitioner and the DENR, through its
Regional Executive Director executed a
leasehold agreement i.e., IFPMA No. 21, with
a term of 25 years over a parcel of land in
Gen. Santos City, South Cotabato, wherein
the coverage area was later on expanded.
Respondent filed a protest against the
petitioner before the DENR, praying for the
cancellation of IPMA No. 21 on the ground
that a large portion of the land was part of the
property covered by the consolidated
original certificate of title. Furthermore, they
argued that the DENR had no jurisdiction to
enter into the said leasehold agreement
because the subject property was no longer
classified as public land.
Prior to the filing of the respondent’s protest,
the subject property was put under
investigation through the Task Force
Titulong Malinis of the LRA with a report
stating that it is a spurious title and that the
Plan is situated in San Pablo City, Laguna.
However, the said report was set aside by the
DOJ, sustaining the validity and the
authenticity of the said title. Furthermore,
the DOJ found that the said title existed in
the DENR files; that it was affirmed that the
said land is located in Buayan, Cotabato; and
that the subject property was classified as
alienable and disposable with no adverse
claim of ownership except that of the
registered owners.
The DENR conducted its own investigation
and found out that the said title was genuine,
and that there were other certificates of title
issued to the heirs of confessor which were all
fake and spurious. Thus, the respondent’s
protest was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal, the OP set aside the DENR’S
decision, upholding the validity and the
existence of the said title under the torrens
system, and the OP ruled that the
respondents have established their
ownership of the subject property.
The petitioner filed a Petition for Review
with a Prayer for Status Quo Order before the
CA, questioning the OP’s decision,
manifesting that a petition for annulment of
title and reversion of the land was filed
before the RTC to nullify the respondent’s
title for being fake and spurious. However,
the CA denied the motion and the civil case
no. 7711 was dismissed by the RTC, without
prejudice, for failure or parties to file judicial
affidavits.
The Republic re-filed the petition for
annulment of titles before the RTC. With
that, the petitioner now argues that the CA
erred in not considering that the issue of
whether or not to cancel IFPMA no. 21 is
dependent solely on the outcome of the civil
case.
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
ISSUE:
whether or not the civil case for annulment of
title and reversion before the RTC constitutes
a at which would operate as a bar to the
action for the cancellation of IFPMA No. 21.
RULING:
The court found the petition meritorious.
Generally, a prejudicial question comes into
play only in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending and
there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because the
resolution of the civil action is determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. This, however,
is not an ironclad rule. It is imperative that
we consider the rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question, i.e., to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
The earlier case of Quiambao v. Hon. Osorio,
is relevant in the case at bar wherein the
Court recognized the fact that the cases
involved were civil and administrative in
character and thus, technically, there was no
prejudicial question to speak of. In ruling,
however, the Court also took into
consideration the apparent intimate relation
between the two cases in that, the right of
private respondents to eject petitioner from
the subject property depends primarily on
the resolution of the issue of whether
respondents, in the first place, have the right
to possess the said property, which was the
issue pending in the administrative case.
Here, the two cases involved are the
cancellation of IFPMA No. 21 in the case at
bar and the cancellation of title and reversion
case before the RTC.
Petitioner cited the pending annulment of
title and reversion case before the RTC,
wherein the Republic claims that
respondents' title is fake and spurious and as
such, the subject property remains in the
public domain Corollarily, the government
claims that it has the right to lease or dispose
of the same. Thus, it is petitioner's position
that said civil case between the Republic and
respondents operates as a bar to the action
for cancellation of IFPMA No. 21.
Undeniably, whether or not IFPMA No. 21
should be cancelled at the instance of the
respondents is solely dependent upon the
determination of whether or not
respondents, in the first place, have the right
over the subject property. Respondents' right
in both cases is anchored upon the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) that they are
invoking. If the RTC cancels respondents'
TCT for being fake and spurious, it proceeds
then that respondents do not have any right
18
whatsoever over the subject property and
thus, do not have the right to demand IFPMA
No. 21's cancellation. If the RTC will rule
otherwise and uphold respondents' TCT,
then respondents would have every right to
demand IFPMA No. 21's cancellation.
Thus, applying the wisdom laid by this Court
in the case of Quiambao, indeed, the
cancellation of the IFPMA No. 21 is the
logical consequence of the determination of
respondents' right over the subject property.
Further, to allow the cancellation thereof at
the instance of the respondents
notwithstanding the possibility of finding
that respondents have no right over the
property subject thereof is a "sheer exercise
in futility."
As the outcome of the civil case is
determinative of the issue in the case at bar,
by the dictates of prudence, logic, and
jurisprudence, the proper recourse is to wait
for the resolution of the said civil case.
Certainly, at this point, delving into the issue
on the propriety of IFPMA No. 21's
cancellation is premature.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-
Appellant.
G.R. No. 199877 August 13,
2012
FACTS
An Information was filed against Lara with
robbery with homicide. The prosecution
presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz
(SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3
Calix).
Sumulong, the accounting staff of San
Sebastian Allied Services testified that: May
31, 2001, 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew
the amount of ₱ 230,000.00 from the
Metrobank to defray the salaries of the
employees of San Sebastian and was
accompanied by Virgilio Manacob, Jeff Atie,
Joselito Bautista and left the bank after the
transactions. Around 10:30 AM at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared
at the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang
pera, iyong bag, nasaan? Bautista shouted,
"Wag mong ibigay”
Sumulong threw the bag in Bautista’s
direction Bautista alighted from the car and
ran. Lara ran after him while firing his gun.
Sumulong called the office of San Sebastian
to relay the incident. But, Bautista was shot
and the bag was taken away from him. On
June 7, 2001, Sumulong saw Lara walking
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
along in Pasig City. He alerted the police and
Lara was thereafter arrested.
SPO1 Cruz testified that: June 7, 2001,
Sumulong went to the police station and
informed him that he saw Lara walking. Four
(4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr.
Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, they
approached Lara and invited him for
questioning. Lara was positively identified by
Sumulong and his two companions.
PO3 Calix testified that: May 31, 2001, he was
informed of a robbery that took place at the
corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues,
Pasig City. Together with three (3) other
police officers, proceeded to the crime scene,
upon arriving one of the police officers who
were able to respond ahead of them and
handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty
shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm
pistol. As part of his investigation, he
interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the
police station. Before Bautista died, he was
able to interview Bautista at the hospital.
In his defense, Lara testified that: on May 31,
2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer
trench and his brother, was constructing a
comfort room. They were working from 8:00
AM until 3:00 PM. on June 7, 2001, around
7:00 PM, he was at the house of one of his
cousins, police officers arrived and asked
him if he was Arturo Lara. He confirmed that
he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked
him to go with them to the Barangay Hall.
While inside the patrol car, one of the
policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able
to caught you in your house, if in another
place we will kill you". He was brought to the
police station and not the barangay hall as he
was earlier told where he was investigated for
robbery with homicide; when he told the
police that he was at home when the subject
incident took place, the police challenged
him to produce witnesses; Lara witnesses
arrived at the station, one of the police
officers told them to come back the following
day. He was at the police line-up holding a
name plate, a police officer told Sumulong
and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo";
Lara witnesses arrived the following day,
they were told that he will be subjected to an
inquest.
The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi and
convicted Lara of robbery with homicide. On
appeal The CA found that Lara’s alibi failed
to convince. The CA affirmed Lara’s
conviction.
ISSUES
a. whether the identification made by
Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police
19
line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood
therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest
may be raised for the first time on appeal for
the purpose of nullifying his conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to
convict Lara; and
d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence
so as to exonerate him from the crime
charged.
RULING
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired through compulsory
process such as a warrant of arrest or
through his voluntary appearance, such as
when he surrenders to the police or to the
court.19 Any objection to the arrest or
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. An accused submits to the
jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a
plea and participating actively in the trial and
this precludes him invoking any
irregularities that may have attended his
arrest.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused
is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set
aside a conviction that was arrived upon a
complaint duly filed and a trial conducted
without error. As Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege
any ground therefor. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not
provided with counsel when he was placed in
a police line-up did not invalidate the
proceedings leading to his conviction. That
he stood at the police line-up without the
assistance of counsel did not render
Sumulong’s identification of Lara
inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed
to have arisen at the precise moment
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
custodial investigation begins and being
made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
III
It is well-settled is the rule that direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is
not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain,
consistent with each other and to the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the
exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is
not.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial
evidence sufficed to convict upon the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an
accused may be convicted of the crime for
which he is charged. Resort to circumstantial
evidence is essential since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in
setting felons free and denying proper
protection to the community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following
circumstances established by the evidence
for the prosecution strongly indicate Lara’s
guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie,
Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger
side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while
pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the
front passenger seat, Lara demanded that
Sumulong give him the bag containing the
money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara,
Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated
at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista
got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran
towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran
after Bautista and while doing so, fired his
gun at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista
sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g)
Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and
empty shells were recovered therefrom.
In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by
Sumulong’s positive narration that it was
Lara who pointed the gun at him and
demanded that the bag containing the money
20
be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to
violence in order to actualize his intent to
gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony that
he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of
Bautista, who was running away from the
pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.
IV
In view of Sumulong’s positive identification
of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s
alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive
identification prevails over alibi, which is
inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule,
for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and
difficult to disapprove.
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the
offense was committed, but it must likewise
be demonstrated that he was so far away that
it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi
must be supported by clear and convincing
proof.
In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at
the scene of the crime wholly negates his
alibi. Assuming as true Lara’s claim and that
of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer
trench on the day of the incident, it is
possible that his witnesses may not have
noticed him leaving and returning given that
the distance between his house and the place
where the subject incident took place can be
negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter
of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his
witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh
impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.
The Court denied the appeal. The decision of
the CA is affirmed in all respects.
G.R. No. 208001 June 19, 2017
P/C SUPT. EDWIN A.
PFLEIDER, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
FACTS:
• An Information for Murder against
petitioner and Ryan Bautista was
filed on April 18, 2011 before the
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City.
• On September 15, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating
and by offering a price, reward or
consideration to Ryan O. Bautista
and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill and with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery,
evident premeditation.
• Ryan 0. Bautista was armed with an
unlicensed firearm, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Manuel Granados with the use
of said unlicensed firearm and
inflicting upon the said victim fatal
wounds on different parts of his
body, which resulted to his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.
• The RTC dismissed the case for lack
of probable cause against petitioner
• The CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit,
there being no legal and factual basis
for the Court to depart from its
earlier ruling.
ISSUE:
WON, a probable cause really exists in the
case against petitioner for murder.
RULING:
NO
It must be emphasized that this Court is not
a trier of facts. The determination of
probable cause is and will always entail
a ·review of the facts of the case. The CA, in
finding probable cause, did not exactly delve
into the facts of the case but raised
questions that would entail a more
exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled
that, "Questions remain as to why, among
all people, Ryan would implicate Pfelider
as the inducer and why the other witnesses
would associate Pfleider to the
crime." 12 From this query, the CA has raised
doubt. Under the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure,
Section 6. When warrant of arrest
may issue. - (a) By the Regional
Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall
21
personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of
information. 13
In this case, the judge of the RTC, not
finding the existence of probable cause,
outrightly dismissed the case. The
contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC
is well noted and from the very provision of
the Rules of Court, 14 the remedy, in case of
doubt, is for the judge to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence.
Therefore, in the interest of justice, this
Court finds it appropriate to remand the
case to the trial court for its proper
disposition, or for a proper determination of
probable cause based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution. This is not the
first time that this Court has remanded a
case to the trial court for it to make a ruling
on whether certain Informations should be
dismissed or not.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated July 23, 2013 of petitioner P/C
Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) is hereby
GRANTED-insofar as his prayer to SET
ASIDE the Decision dated October 23; 2012
and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of
the Court of Appeals. However, considering
the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider,
instead of remanding the case to the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban city for the
determination of probable cause, the
criminal action is DISMISSED, there being
no defendant to stand as accused. 16
SO ORDERED
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua
NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS,
Petitioner, vs. PURIFICACION F.
FELIPE, Respondent
G.R. No. 199067 November 11, 2013
Facts:
Purificacion Felipe was charged with the
violation of BP22. S issued the said check
amounting to P1,020,000 because her son,
Frederick, defaulted with his payment when
he bought a Nissan Terrano 4x4 from herein
petitioner despite several demands. After
trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment
acquitting Purificacion of the charge, but
holding her civilly liable to Nissan. She
appealed to RTC where the court denied the
petition and the MR.
The CA, before whom the case was elevated
via a petition for review, granted the petition
on May 20, 2009. In so deciding, the CA
reasoned out that there was no privity of
contract between Nissan and Purificacion.
No civil liability could be adjudged against
her because of her acquittal from the
criminal charge. It was Frederick who was
civilly liable to Nissan.
The CA ruled that Purificacion could not be
an accommodation party either because she
only came in after Frederick failed to pay the
purchase price, or six (6) months after the
execution of the contract between Nissan and
Frederick. Her liability was limited to her act
of issuing a worthless check, but by her
acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no
more basis for her to be held civilly liable to
Nissan.12 Purificacion’s act of issuing the
subject check did not, by itself, assume the
civil obligation of Frederick to Nissan or
automatically made her a party to the
contract. Nissan filed MR which was denied.
Issue: whether or not Purificacion is civilly
liable for the issuance of a worthless check
despite her acquittal from the criminal
charge
Held:
YES.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action
(unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the
22
civil action prior to the criminal
action).
(b) The criminal action for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with
respect to criminal actions for violation of BP
22, it is explicitly clear that the
corresponding civil action is deemed
included and that a reservation to file such
separately is not allowed.
In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law,
the intent in issuing a check is immaterial.
The law has made the mere act of issuing a
bad check malum prohibitum, an act
prescribed by the legislature for being
deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Considering the rule in mala
prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether
the law has been breached.25 The lower
courts were unanimous in finding that,
indeed. Purificacion issued the bouncing
check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she
remains civilly liable because the act or
omission, the making and issuing of the
subject check, from which her civil liability
arises, evidently exists.
If the judgment is conviction of the accused,
then the necessary penalties and civil
liabilities arising from the offense or crime
shall be imposed. On the contrary, if the
judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition
of the civil liability will depend on whether or
not the act or omission from which it might
arise exists.
A person acquitted of a criminal charge,
however, is not necessarily civilly free
because the quantum of proof required in
criminal prosecution (proof beyond
reasonable doubt) is greater than that
required for civil liability (mere
preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a person’s
acquittal must be based on the fact he did not
commit the offense. If the acquittal is based
merely on reasonable doubt, the accused
may still be held civilly liable since this does
not mean he did not commit the act
complained of. It may only be that the facts
proved did not constitute the offense
charged.
The rule is that every act or omission
punishable by law has its accompanying civil
liability. The civil aspect of every criminal
case is based on the principle that every
person criminally liable is also civilly
liable.16 If the accused, however, is not found
to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily
Arranged by: Jovel C. Pascua

mean that he will not likewise be held civilly

liable because extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. This rule more specifically
applies when (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does
not arise from or is not based upon the crime
of which the accused was acquitted.18 The
civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.

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