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C2 General

C2 General
THE THIRD STATE
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA
Based on the ILM FILM Studios’s GREEN HISTORY PODCAST

CHAPTER ONE ABDUL-AZIZ IBN AL-SAUD


Once upon a time in the Hijaz (1)
Abdul Aziz ibn al-Saud (2) — The Rashidi Clan (2)
The Hashimites of Makkah (3)

CHAPTER TWO IBN ABDUL-WAHHAB


Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab (4)
Family background and formative years (4)
Persecution and migration (5) — The First Saudi State (5)
Death and Legacy (5-6)

CHAPTER THREE THE IKHWAN


Life in the Najd (7) — Desert encampments (8)
The Ikhwan (8) — Pillars of Power (9)

CHAPTER FOUR THE GREAT REBELLION


The birth of Saudi Arabia (10) — King Abdul-Aziz (10)
Brothers no more (11) — The secret council of the Ikhwān (12)
The compromise (13-14) — The Battle of Sabilla, 1929 (15)
A new beginning (16)

CHAPTER FIVE THE SAUDI RENAISSANCE


The forgotten Kingdom (17) — The Americans (17-18)
The Kings of KSA (19) — Desert Metropolis (20-21)

CHAPTER SIX THE ISLAMIC AWAKENING


Free Thinkers (22) — Islamic Reformation (22)
The Arab Renaissance (23)
The Islamic University of Madinah (24)
Jamat Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (25)
Juhayman bin Saif al-Otaybi (25-26)

CHAPTER SEVEN THE MAHDI


A new Islamic Century (27) — New Year ’s Eve preparations (28)
The unholy apparition (29-30) — Pandemonium (31)
The Kingdom is shaken (31) — Tabloid Wars (32)
A state of emergency (33-34) — The Fatwa (35)
The Siege of Makkah (36) — French connections (36-37)
The final act (38) — The end, once more (39)
The Salafi Kingdom (40-41)
BIBLIOGRAPHY & REFERENCES

C2 General
Chapter One
Abdul-Aziz Ibn al-Saud

Once upon a time in the Hijaz


The ancient Arabian region has always been known locally and internationally as the Hijaz – at least that was
what locals called it before the Al-Saud clan conquered and ruled over it. Before that, they were governed by
the Turks for centuries, the Turks were not always model examples of what a true Islamic governing body
should be but they honored the land and did an outstanding service for the religion, some of the local Arab
clans were even favored highly by the Turks, due to their lineage and history on this land.

Alas, all of that had changed in later years, as the Turks were defeated and banished by the British backed Arab
rebels and this region was subsequently claimed and renamed by the Al-Saud clan. The British had an unsavory
appetite for Arab land during the war. They were in fact very focused on destroying the Turks and uprooting
them from their territories once and for all, this of course would result in several secret pacts with sympathetic
Arab rebels here in the Hijaz but also in other key strategic locations such as Egypt, Syria and in Palestine. In
return, the British promised these ambitious Arabs dominion of their own independent Arab states.

The Turks were feared but not always respected by certain Arab tribes, some considered them to be
illegitimate leaders, usurpers and imposters because they were not Arabs nor were they seen to be concerned
with the Arab plight, in fact the Turks had a very strong cultural influence and pride that even permeated
administrative ranks and positions, some Arabs resented them for this – of course there were other reasons
too.

An ordinary scene in the Hejaz

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Abdul Aziz ibn al-Saud
But to rule over a region such as the Hijaz is not given to just anyone – the inhabitants were not easily subdued
or governed and the endless tribal conflicts made it very challenging to maintain any semblance of peace and
security, but King Abdul Aziz had achieved significant feats in a very short time.

He was actually born in Riyadh in 1875 and started off as a desert general, he and his clan originate from Najd.
The al-Saud clan have had a very interesting past, however they had been on a military campaign to seize and
control several key regions in the Hijaz – which they went on to consolidate and unite under the banner of a
single state in what was perceived by many to have been an Arab Islamic State, which would be independent
of Turkish governance.

Their conquests came with a bloody series of tribal raids beginning in 1901 when Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and
some relatives, including a half-brother, Mohammad, and several cousins, set out on a raiding expedition into
the Najd, targeting mainly tribes associated with the Rashidis. The group made camp in the Yabrin oasis during
the month of Ramadan in 1902. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud masterminded a plan to attack Riyadh and retake it from
the Al Rashid. On the night of 15 January 1902, he led 40 men over the walls of the city on tilted palm trees
and took the city. The Rashidi governor of the city, Ajlan, was killed in front of his own fortress. The Saudi
recapture of the city marked the beginning of the Third Saudi State – founded and lead by a young and
formidable Abdul Aziz ibn Saud.

The Rashidi Clan


The al-Saud’s greatest rivals during Abdul Aziz’s childhood years were the Rashidi clan, who had captured key
regions and drove the Al-Saud into exile for a number of years, as a teenager, King Abdul Aziz and his family
initially took refuge with a Bedouin tribe in the southern desert region – they were known as the Al Murrah
tribe. That lasted a short time before the Al-Saud immigrated to Qatar where they were hosted for two
months before moving onto Bahrain, again – they only stayed momentarily before relocating once more. Their
final destination was Kuwait, the Al-Saud stayed in Kuwait for nearly a decade.

Ironically, one of the leading members of the Rashidi clan was also named Abdul Aziz, in 1904 he sought
support from the Turks to fight against the Al-Saud clan. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud resorted to guerilla warfare
against the Ottomans and managed to severely disrupt their supply routes, within two years the Al-Saud clan
had total dominance and were victorious against the Rashidis, ibn Rashid was killed in battle.

Abdul Aziz ibn Saud’s conquest and domination over the Rashidi clan rekindled the morale of his own clan and
settled the long lasting thirst for revenge. Over the next two years, he and his forces recaptured almost half of
the Najd from the Rashidis, rendering them virtually powerless.

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Over the following ten years, King Abdul Aziz’z explosive military conquest and dominance over the entire Najd
region set Arabia alight and made this land a hotbed of uprisings, raids and rebellions – but it was not only the
Al-Saud, people often forget to mention that the Sharif of Makkah and his clan, the Hashimites, were perhaps
the most destructive and menacing force in this region during those days.

Sharif Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashimi

The Hashimites of Makkah


Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashimi, also known as the Sharif of Makkah was no fan of the Saudis, in fact he and his clan
considered the al-Saud to be unworthy and inconsiderable for the leadership of any region let alone the whole
nation. Still, the Sharif also betrayed the Turks despite his family’s long and illustrious history in Makkah, they
were direct descendants of the Prophet’s family through al-Hassan ibn Ali and Fatimah. The Sharif and his
clan were Nobles amongst Muslims – Arab and otherwise, and for this, the British wanted the Sharif and his
clan to take over the Hijaz once the Turks were kicked out, but they betrayed the Sharif and sided with the al-
Saud once the mission was completed.

In the end, the British tried to console the Hashimites for their deceptive act by offering them leadership in
Iraq, Kuwait and other minor Arab territories, however the Saudis got the crown of Arabia, al-Hijaz – which
they renamed after themselves.

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Chapter Two
Ibn Abdul-Wahhab

Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab


Before one can talk about the al-Saud or about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one must first begin with the
name of the ideological founder whose vision has shaped the whole movement. Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul
Wahhab.

He is a very central figure in the history of Saudi-Arabia, everyone knows his name there and he is highly
regarded. His legacy inspires much debate and contention within the Muslim world in general – due to the fact
that his campaigns across Arabia resulted in much conflict and bloodshed, in essence he was a revivalist who
sought to purify the Muslim world of the superstitious and heterodox practices that prevailed in the Hijaz, for
example – he severely opposed the prevalent practice of venerating the tombs of pious people and the act of
supplicating to saints as intermediaries between men and God, or Tawassul to be more precise. During his era,
the ideas he propagated proved very controversial in the Hijaz during his day, but not anymore – as Saudi
Arabia follows his interpretation of Islam to this very day.

Family background and formative years


His exact date of birth is not known however many historians have cited the year 1703 as the most plausible
date. What we are certain of is that he was born in the village of ‘Uyayna situated in the Najd and that he
hailed from a well-respected Arab clan, the Banu Tamim.

During his youth, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab had spent time in Madinah where he met a scholar and
teacher from the Najd, his name was Sheikh AbdallAh ibn Ibrahim al Najdi. The two struck up a friendship and
Sheikh AbdallAh al Najdi introduced Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab to the works of Shaikhul Islam Ahmed Ibn
Taymiyyah. The work of Ibn Taymiyyah left a very profound impression of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and
he soon grew very fond of the teachings of Sheikhul Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, who himself had lived and died in
Syria several centuries prior to that.

While in Madinah, Ibn Abdul Wahhab was introduced to an Indian scholar by the name of Muhammad ibn
Hayya as-Sindhi, he was in actuality a Sufi of the Naqshbandi order, ironically enough - this did not deter
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab from studying under him and they had a close student teacher relationship.
This may be a very little known fact, but Sheikh Muhammad ibn Hayya himself emphasized the need to reject
the veneration of tombs and saints – this of course appealed very much to the thinking of Muhammad Ibn
Abdul Wahhab who had already grown frustrated with the veneration of tombs in ‘Uyayna.

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Persecution and migration
When he had finished his studies in Madinah, Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab travelled to Basra in
where he spent time studying and teaching, he also spent some time preaching in Iran in the year 1736. Upon
his return to ‘Uyayna, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab began writing his famous treatise entitled ‘Kitaab al
Tawhid’, he also worked towards reviving the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah in his locality, he initially found
favour with the Emir of ‘Uyayna – ‘Uthman Ibn Mu’ammar, however this was not a long lasting arrangement
and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab left ‘Uyayna, fearing for his life.

At the time, a very great deal of people used to visit the tombs of righteous people and it was customary for
them to decorate and venerate such sites. Sheikh Muhammad Abdul-Wahhab criticized these practices and
sought to warn the people against visiting such tombs. But his new policies had caused much offence to one of
the local chiefs who came to learn that the tomb of the companion Zaid ibn al-Khattab (who was also the
brother of Umar ibn al Khattab) had been demolished by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and his followers. The
locals were also enraged by the fact that one of the trees that they had venerated for a long time was also cut
down by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and his followers.

The First Saudi State


Subsequently, the Sheikh fled ‘Uyayna and arrived in Dir’iyyah where the people were won over by his call for
Islamic unity and the need to have societal cooperation based solely on religious grounds. This new model of
governance made it possible for the disparate tribes of Najd to consolidate their ranks and follow a more
uniform agenda.

Muhammad ibn Saud, was the emir of Dir’iyah in 1744 and it was he who hosted the Sheikh but the fruits of
this coalition would bear mutual benefits for each party. Ibn Abdul-Wahhab needed Muhammad Ibn Saud as
much as the latter needed him. Together, they had plans to govern the region through the establishment of a
strong central administrative function that would be built upon the Sharia in order to bring much needed
restoration and reconciliation in Arabia, they had also launched a military campaign for the cleansing and
purification of Arabia.

Nevertheless, in Dir’iyyah, the local Emir - Muhammad Ibn Saud would agree to implementing Sheikh
Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab’s religious policies if the latter would endorse and uphold the legitimacy of the
Emir’s raids and conquests in neighboring Arab Muslim regions, because of course – one could not fight and
kill fellow Muslims without legitimate religious grounds. Thus commenced what came to be known as the First
Saudi State, Diriyah was designated as its Capital.

One should not get the impression that Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab agreed with and condoned
everything that the Emir demanded of him, fundamentally – their motives were not completely aligned
however the two had struck the perfect balance and promoted the unification of warring tribes in the Najd
region. Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab had somehow succeeded in leveraging religious teachings to
shift the society away from one of tribal affiliation towards the more universal Islamic principles of
brotherhood through faith, Ukhuwwa in Arabic. This new collective identity enabled the warring tribes of Najd
to set aside their differences and to unite under the banner of Islam. The brotherhood that subsequently
emerged from this effort soon began to expand its influence towards neighboring regions with a fervent drive
to spread the true version of Islam across the rest of Arabia.

Death and Legacy


Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab settled in Dir’iyyah and fathered six sons. They were Hussain, Abdullah,
Hassan, Ali, Ibrahim and Abdul-Aziz – the latter died in his youth however the remaining siblings followed in
their father’s footsteps and established religious schools close to their homes where students could study the
thoughts and books of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, Sheikhul Islam ibn Taymiyyah and similar
scholars. The family of Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab grew very powerful and are to this day a prominent
pillar in the kingdom, many of the most senior clerics belong to this family and they are collectively known as
the Aal-Sheikh.

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In the years following the death of Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, several critics and adversaries began
circulating rumors and theories as to what his actual identity truly was. Some even questioned his faith,
however such claims can be attributed to the enmity that was created towards the Sheikh due to the legacy of
his movement and the military campaigns that he inspired. Many Muslims feel that it is justifiable to advance
exaggerations and specious arguments to justify their hatred of his legacy however the stories are so varied
and fantastical that one would be best cautioned to remain silent altogether, one account even claims that
Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab was working with a British agent whom he had met while in Basra.

On the other hand, advocates and admirers of the Sheikh have also popularized the idea that Muhammad ibn
Abdul-Wahhab was the savior of Islam in an ocean of innovation and disbelief. In the eyes of such people, the
slaughter of a great number of Muslims at the time was necessary in order for the true version of Islam to
emerge and flourish once more.

Whichever side one takes in this ongoing debate, it must be understood that legacy of Muhammad Ibn Abdul-
Wahhab is deeply controversial therefore must be explored from an intellectually sound basis and not from
emotional perspectives. One must be prepared to conduct independent research and study of the issue before
drawing conclusions.

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Chapter Three
The Ikhwan

Life in the Najd


The Najd has long been a region that contained very few resources. This region never did attract the attention
of foreign administrations or governors and the native population was virtually abandoned for a considerable
period of time. Its residents remained deeply traditional and maintained very conservative customs, their way
of life had not been affected or influenced by the Turks or any other external influences for that matter. Life in
the Najd had been uninterrupted for several generations.

In fact, this stagnation dated back to the middle of the eleventh century, when the Bani al-Akhadyr emirate
stopped ruling the area. Since then, the political system in the Najd had been absent of any central authority,
and tribal rule had become the only form of governance. This power vacuum meant that tribal skirmishes and
confrontations were all but common, given the very scarce resources that were available to its inhabitants.

However, everything changed in the Najd when Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab returned from his
studies abroad and began his revivalist movement which resulted in his exile out of ‘Uyayna and his invitation
to Dir’iyyah, which was ruled by Muhammad ibn Saud.

Bedouins watering their camels

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Desert encampments
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia much like the United States of America, was founded by a group of very religious
men who had a specific vision for the nation they were literally fighting to build, interestingly enough –
whereas the founding fathers of American were fighting against the British for their independence, the Arabs
over were fighting the Ottoman Turks for their independence, the historical parallels between the USA and
KSA are striking, unsurprisingly – they are allies after all, such commonalities only strengthen their bond.

In the desert oasis located in the Najd region, King Abdul Aziz ibn al-Saud began recruiting and assembling
nomadic tribes from all over the Najd, he then masterminded a process of socialization and training which the
Bedouins would experience in the desert camps before being deploying across the Hijaz to fight for the
restoration of Ibn Saud’s hereditary quest to rule the Hijaz.

These training camps were known as Hujjar. Many of them, were strategically located near a desert oases, this
was done in order to encourage the Bedouins to engage in agricultural practices thereby transforming them
into a more cultivated people. The typical community could accommodate up to ten thousand residents, they
had access to living quarters, mosques, schools and ammunition reserves.

Although the Bedouins who had been housed in these desert training camps were being instructed and taught
using the books of Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud was still acutely aware that they were in need of
further development. The Bedouin tribes were still not totally integrated, though they may have loosened the
tight knot of tribal allegiances – they still maintain a very distinct social ranking and hierarchy. In fact, in the
larger encampments, the inhabitants were sub-divided into three distinct social ranks. The first rank was
comprised of tribal Nobles, the second social rank was comprised of the religious clerics, preachers and
teachers who were being brought in from other regions to settle there in order to reinforce and continue the
work of the Scholars in Riyadh. Finally, the third social group were the merchants and craftsmen – of course
the general population as well, which included civilians and ordinary people.

I guess it would be utopic to expect a classless society anywhere on the planet, especially in Arabia, and while
the social condition in these encampments may not have been perfect in every sense, it was still better than
the climate of warfare and division that the Bedouins were accustomed to in the past.

The Bedouin Warriors

Warriors

The Ikhwan
Abdul-Aziz’s desert encampments also included military training grounds. It was where ordinary Bedouins
were trained for combat as Abdul-Aziz prepared his military campaigns across the Hijaz. Their program was
somewhat rudimental and to the experienced military observer, they were just a group of uncultured and
simple desert dwellers who would not mount to any serious threat of danger to any adversarial army, however
– Abdul-Aziz believed in their potential and had a deep conviction in this program.

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The Bedouins were a very resilient yet facile people, the open desert was one of the most hostile terrains on
earth, those who knew how to survive in it could be expected to overcome nearly every obstacle nature
presented. Furthermore, their rudimentary and uncompromising disposition made them easy to influence as
opposed to the city dwelling Arabs who were far more capricious and difficult to control in regards to religious
affairs. Eventually, these recruits will would be ready to go out and sweep over the entire region, fighting
under the banner of unity of faith. They thus were known as the Ikhwaan (Brotherhood).

But regardless of what was yet to come, the world was still oblivious as to what was taking place in the desert
outposts. In fact, it is difficult to believe whether Abdul-Aziz himself was fully aware of the impact and legacy
his Bedouin army would engrave in the pages of history. The Ikhwan were the blueprint for religious and
militant fanaticism that would later engulf the region - typecasting the kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself as an
extreme religious-political actor whose influence spread into surrounding Arab nations over the next half a
century.

In any case, once they were unleashed from their training camps, their influence and legacy would permeate
through the very fiber of Saudi history, society and identity. The Ikhwan were destined to become what the
Pilgrims and Founding Fathers were to the United States of America.

Pillars of Power
There is something very interesting about how Saudi society is organized and governed, from the very
beginning it was comprised of three central pillars of power.

King Abdul Aziz was a very shrewd and experienced commander, he and his progenitors understood the
importance of having religious endorsement from the scholars and sheikhs as that is a fundamental and
essential component needed in order to wage wars against local tribes or to challenge Turkish authority, as a
Muslim ruler cannot and must not be disobeyed unless there are sound and reasonable religious grounds, that
is why scholarly verdicts are so important, without the endorsement of their scholars – anyone fighting against
the Turks would have been considered rebels and insubordinates to Islamic ruling authority. So the Scholars
themselves became the first pillar of power – and this has been the case ever since Muhammad ibn Abdul-
Wahhab and Muhammad ibn al-Saud consummated their pact in 1744.

The second pillar of power is the al-Saud clan itself, they represent the ruling class and the political
establishment, without their direction and tacit approval – nothing will be sanctioned at all. You cannot have a
body without a head, but if the al-Saud were the head and the scholars were the heart of this movement, then
who were its arms and feet? That brings us to the third pillar of power.

This is perhaps the single most elusive and secretive reality about the history of Saudi Arabia. Unbeknownst to
them at that time, the desert Bedouins became the military pillar for the kingdom of al-Saud, because without
a military – neither the religious nor the political will can impose itself on any population. It was therefore
those Bedouins who were the true conquering force in the region and we should really be attributing the
establishment of this kingdom to them.

One wonders why we hear so much about the first two pillars and so very little of the third and most active
pillar in the establishment of this kingdom. Not surprisingly, their contribution and legacy is often sidelined and
omitted from official records altogether.

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Chapter Four
The Great Rebellion

The birth of Saudi Arabia


Despite the tremendous challenges ahead of him and the overwhelming odds he faced, Abdul-Aziz ibn al-
Saud’s joint enterprise with his experimental Bedouin army had come to full fruition over the course of the
next couple of decades. To begin with, he may have been an exceptionally young commander however he was
an ambitious and relentless desert warrior with an undeniably powerful and awesome physical presence. No
doubt, it would have taken an exceptional military mastermind to conquer such an unforgiving terrain.

In fact, his campaigns went from strength to strength and several tribes pledge their allegiance to him. By 1922
Abdul Aziz had full control of the Najd region, three years later - in 1925, the al-Saud were champions of the
Hijaz, and in the same year – the army of Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Saud had finally conquered Makkah, in a
momentous and historical feat wherein the incumbent rulers, the Hashimites of Makkah, who had ruled the
city for seven centuries – were finally vanquished, for good. A few weeks later, on January 8th, 1926 Abdul-Aziz
Ibn al-Saud was declared the King of Hijaz. But Abdul-Aziz unveiled the piece de resistance in 1932, by
renaming the Arabia peninsula after his own family, thus Saudi Arabia was born.

King Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Saud

King Abdul-Aziz
He was certainly born to rule. Even though the al-Saud had always harbored ambitions to regain their ancestral
post as rulers in Arabia, it took just one man to surpass all of their expectations, Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Saud was
endowed with physical strength and a fierce warrior mentality that was only matched by his military genius.
He was a visionary whose ambition to rule Arabia was driven by a deep desire to unite its tribes under a single
banner of Faith.

From a purely academic and factual perspective, King Abdul-Aziz was an exceptional figure. A visionary, a
revolutionary and a statesman. He was also a desert diplomat, as part of his ambitious plans to strengthen his
political allegiances with every major tribe of Arabia, King Abdul-Aziz contracted numerous marriages with the
daughters of each tribal chieftain resulting in twenty two marriages, bringing forth forty five sons, not counting
the daughters of course – because the Arabs did not count women and girls, though to be fair, it’s a cultural
thing that predates the al-Saud.

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Also, as his popularity and dominance grew in Arabia, the King’s views and objectives began to take on a more
diplomatic frame of reference in contrast to his earlier perspective, as a revivalist revolutionary. Things look
very different when you are the under-dog fighting the establishment, but when you become the
establishment – priorities and perspectives do tend to change, very rapidly. This made him the object of
admiration and hope for millions however King Abdul-Aziz, as great as he was, was not in himself a monolith,
everything he achieved in the Hijaz, he achieved with the implicit and unrelenting support of the Ikhwan. The
Bedouin army he had trained and commanded in the early days, and they had remained as hungry and
determined to the revivalist spirit of 1902 as they were before, they were in fact even more determined to
enact the teachings and objectives of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab now that their King was able to
finally legislate and implement to the terms of the pact between Muhammad Ibn Saud and Muhammad Ibn
Abdul-Wahhab that had taken place in 1744.

But King Abdul-Aziz did not see things the same way as his army, and why would he? After all, he was from the
al-Saud clan, they had a long history of leadership in Arabia – his battles and mission was only for the
restoration of their past glory and to advance the al-Saud legacy into the future. The Ikhwan on the other-hand
were a bunch of desert Bedouins who had no prior claim to glory, their mission was clear and simple, to rid the
Arabian peninsula of heresy, innovation and disbelief so that they could implement the complete rule of
Shariah. The Ikhwan were always very loyal to the core teachings of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab.

Anyway, King Abdul-Aziz did finally realize his ambitions in the end. But what was the king of Arabia to do with
a bunch of desert Bedouins once his royal ambitions had been satisfied?

Brothers no more
King Abdul-Aziz had finally accomplished his quest to become master of Arabia, the Ottoman Empire had
crumbled into the abyss, the British were on his side and the world was his oyster. Ironically, it had been very
easy to blame the Ottomans and criticize them for their decadence and materialism as the underdog - no
doubt, however anyone can set fire and destroy an ancient monument but it takes several centuries and
countless experts to construct its foundations and maintain its frame. The Ottomans were not perfect, but
they were able to manage their empire for much longer. King Abdul Aziz was soon to realize this lesson, the
hard way.

The establishment of a new Arab Kingdom was the end goal of King Abdul-Aziz, there is no evidence to suggest
that he ever had any ambitions to go beyond such attainments, thus once his goals were achieved – he and his
royal household were at leisure to enjoy the spoils and luxuries of royalty. The al-Saud began to espouse a
newly found taste for foreign commodities and could be seen to indulge in lavish excursions to Europe and
other occidental destinations for the purpose of education, cultural enrichment and political engagements.
Things had changed and like we have seen with many people who go from rags to riches, often times their
habits evolve and their old friends begin to feel neglected, isolated and eventually rejected.

The Ikhwan espoused a very strict Islamic lifestyle, which was specifically imposed upon them by the Scholars
in Riyadh as part of their socialization program across the various desert communities established by King
Abdul-Aziz himself. This was what they were trained for, that was the agreement. It must have been a
devastating experience for these devout and strict warriors to witness the metamorphosis in the person and
message of King Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Saud once his objectives had been fulfilled.

In all honesty, King Abdul-Aziz was no longer in need of the services of the Ikhwan. They had lost their utility
and their mission had become obsolete however their presence could be tolerated, so long as they did not
exceed the boundaries – perhaps they may even be re-purposed for the safeguarding and defense of the Saudi
Kingdom. One thing was certain, at least for the al-Saud, there could be no more Jihad offensives in or around
Arabia. Those days had come to an end with the establishment of the Saudi Kingdom.

But for the Ikhwan, it was time to realize their religious ambitions. King Abdul-Aziz must have been very aware
of this, a man as intelligent and experienced as he - could not have failed to detect their acute frustration,

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mistrust and growing impatience with the situation at hand. Something clearly had to be done, but in the
meantime – the situation would be managed.

A masterful general knows that it is sometimes necessary you to retreat in order to attack and sometimes it is
wise to lose a battle in order to win the war.

Sadly, the rift between king Abdul-Aziz and the Ikhwan was beginning to engender a growing sense of
frustration and suspicion given the fact that king Abdul-Aziz’s model of rule was closer to desert diplomacy
than of the more orthodox and pious sentiments of the Ikhwan who were calling for complete adherence to
the literal interpretation of the Shariah.

The secret council of the Ikhwān


Some of the leading figures within the Ikhwan organized a consultative meeting to discuss the king’s failure to
deliver on his original mission. Among the prominent attendees to this consultative meeting was a man named
Sultan bin Bajad, he belongs to the Otaibi tribe and was one of the main leaders of the Ikhwān. He was also
very stern and devout. Like most of the Ikhwān, he was faithful to the early message of Shaikh Muhammad Ibn
Abdul-Wahhab and his teachings.

Another leading figure within the Ikhwān movement was a man named Faisal bin Sultan al-Duwaish. He was
also present at the secret meeting of the Ikhwān and they regarded him highly as he was actually a Prince from
the tribe of Mutair who had sided with the al-Saud during the early days of the struggle. Faisal was faithful to
the message of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab.

Senior leaders of the Otaybah clan

The meeting was held in the presence of senior Ikhwān leaders and they discussed their frustrations with the
king, however it did not result in an positive outcomes as the members had expressed their view that the King
was no longer trustworthy enough to uphold and maintain the separation between Imaan and Kufr. They
began to question his commitment to implementing the teachings of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab
because he was clearly not taking his policies far enough.

The council is also cited evidence of how the king was sending his two sons, Prince Faisal and Prince Saud to
England and Egypt in pursuit of further education. England and Egypt were both considered to be Darul Kufr,
(the abode of disbelief) which according to the Ikhwān were impermissible destinations for any Muslim to
travel to. Members of the Ikhwān had also raised the point in regards to the fact that King Abdul-Aziz did not
punish Iraqi and Jordanian nomads who were caught grazing their flocks in the border regions of Saudi Arabia,

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because according to the Ikhwān – such nomads were considered Kuffar (infidels) because they do not follow
the teachings of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab.

In addition to these complaints, the Ikhwān also wanted the king to stop wasting time with the Shia
community in Saudi Arabia. They had to be converted to true Islam, according to the council the Shiites were
disbelievers who had to be dealt with immediately. But the accusations mounted even further when they
accused King Abdul-Aziz of being a religious innovator by citing the fact that Saudi Arabia was importing
foreign appliances and commodities such as cars, telephones, microphones, fans and refrigerators. These
grievances were sufficient proof that the King was no longer ruling by Islam and was therefore a legitimate
target for the Ikhwān, but before they could escalate matter any further – it was necessary to hold court with
the scholars.

The compromise
Subsequently, another meeting was organized, this time the king would be present and both parties would get
an opportunity to defend their views. But the meeting between the Ikhwān and King Abdul-Aziz was no light
entertainment, there was a lot of finger pointing and condemnation coming from the Ikhwān towards the king
as they repeated nearly all the allegations and charges that had been discussed in their secret council. This
time however, the King was able to hear it all for himself, so did the scholars.

Towards the end, both parties came to some consensual agreement. The peace would be maintained on the
basis that King Abdul-Aziz would stop being so diplomatic and mild in his policies towards the Shia community
in the Kingdom as well as towards other Muslim communities who had not embraced the teachings of Sheikh
Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and were therefore considered idolaters and innovators. Also, the King’s
promises not to disrupt the old practices of pilgrims in Makkah and Madinah had to be reviewed, he was not
to allow innovative practices to be taking place under his rule.

On the other-hand, the King specified that the Ikhwān obey his leadership and refrain from meddling with
military and political matters. He thus petitioned the scholars to issue a fatwa forbidding any calls to Jihad
without his express and direct command. The Ikhwān had no business waging any further attacks in or out of
the Kingdom, they were to completely abandon any military ambitions with immediate effect.

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In the end, the scholars who presided over the hearing had sanctioned the views and terms from both parties
and the meeting was adjourned. However, according to historical analysis, the terms of agreement were not
upheld by the Ikhwān and they would soon thereafter revert to their staunch opposition of the king and his
policies.

In fact, they had ambitions to continue the military campaign of King Abdul-Aziz on their own. Although he had
conquered virtually all the central Arabian regions and tribes on the Peninsula, there were still a few select
locations which were under British influence and were not to be meddled with. The King understood his
boundaries and had no intention of overrun these regions because they were under British control at the time,
quite obviously – if he did antagonize the Brits there would be a hell of a price to pay for it. The King
purposefully kept clear of those regions however the Ikhwān could not tolerate this policy and demanded that
all and every single region be conquered and governed by the teachings of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-
Wahhab, there were to be no exceptions and certainly no compromise with the infidel British.

In fact, the Ikhwān were so hard headed and extreme in their interpretation of Islam that they literally
considered anyone who held a different view to be a deviant who had to be refuted, exposed and attacked
until they repented. What this Bedouin army had failed so miserably to comprehend was that the military
consequences that would be suffered should they threaten British interests in the region were far beyond their
fighting capabilities. The British had bombs, aircrafts and machine guns, it was not an even playing field.

But, no one could talk sense into them, it seems that their earlier victories on the Arabian Peninsula had
convinced them that they were chosen by God and that the armies of disbelief could never vanquish or defeat
them. However it would not be very long before they realized their misjudgment.

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The Battle of Sabilla, 1929
Between 1927 and 1929, the Ikhwān launched several military campaigns and openly rebelled against the
scholar’s earlier injunction forbidding any further Jihad without the authority of Kind Abdul-Aziz. Foolishly,
they proceeded to launch military operations and guerilla attacks in Arab regions that had signed treaties with
Britain. It was clear now that the Ikhwān were purposefully rebelling against the ruler and the scholars, they
were now clear vigilantes who had just signed their own death warrant in blood. The Ikhwān were now fair
game in the eyes of the al-Saud.

The reckless and zealous actions of the Ikhwān provoked a swift and relentless response from British forces
who retaliated by bombing the Najd region following the destruction of an Iraqi police station by Ikhwān
soldiers, which was in violation of an earlier agreement between Britain and the Saudi Arabia declaring a
neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

As these events spiraled out of control, the King grew alarmed and requested that the British dispatch
warplanes stationed in Iraq to fly into the Kingdom and launch aerial bombing missions over the Ikhwān
strongholds, which were situated near the Saudi-Iraq border.

Needless to say, hundreds of Ikhwān were killed in the bombing, sending them into a mad rage against the
Kingdom. The conflict had reached peak crisis levels and it was time for Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to finish it off
once and for all. King Abdul-Aziz raised an army against the Ikhwān and went to war, what made it even more
peculiar was that the Saudi army units were reinforced by British aircrafts, four to be exact - and with the
support of two hundred British military vehicles. In fact - all the military apparatus was manufactured and
operated by British soldiers, so it was very clear that Abdul Aziz had switched sides and made new allies – the
Ikhwān were no doubt disgusted beyond belief, when seeing this.

The Battle of Sabilla took place on March the 30th 1929. The Ikhwān were obliterated by the joint British and
Saudi military coalition - wherein the Ikhwān lost its leadership along with five hundred soldiers, they were
simply no match against King Abdul-Aziz’s superior British artillery. Following that crushing defeat, some
surviving factions of the Ikhwān continued to fight the king in other areas, however they were easily defeated
and the revolt was quelled.

The leading figures from the Ikhwān were not all killed during the battle of Sabilla, Faisal Al-Duwaish was one
of the main leaders and a prince from the Mutair tribe, he managed to flee following the battle of Sabilla and
found safety in Kuwait, however he had sustaining serious injuries and soon surrendered to the British forces
stationed in Kuwait. They sent him back to King Abdul-Aziz in Saudi Arabia, where he would spend his final
days in prison. He died in Riyadh on the 3rd of October 1931, his death is attributed to some sort of medical
complications.

As for Sultan bin Bajad al-Otaibi, he was also able to flee from the battle field and found somewhere to hide in
one of the desert reformation camps somewhere in Riyadh where the King’s forces tracked him down and
killed him in 1931.

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A new beginning
However, not all of the Ikhwān were destroyed, some of them had relented and were pardoned by the King
who had decided to grant respite to those most loyal to him by allowing them to remain in their settlements.
Perhaps he was still attached to his earlier subjects or maybe he was exercising his cunning diplomacy.

Nevertheless, the less radical and threatening remnants from the Ikhwān were thereafter permitted to
continue receiving government funds and support, their religious zeal was to be channeled towards a more
civil form of social governance. They could perhaps become useful for the king, who was clearly not one for
wasting a good opportunity to recycle Bedouin potential.

As they continued to become a part of the new kingdom, they had gained the trust of the King once more and
he absorbed them into the Saudi military establishment. In the good old fashioned Abdul-Aziz style, they were
renamed and re-purposed to serve his vision, he rebranded them ‘the White Army’ because of their traditional
Bedouin attire. Later the white army evolved into the “Saudi National Guard”. Now an integral part of the
Saudi military establishment.

King Abdul Aziz was remarkable as a leader, one may not agree completely with all of his decisions or
directions however he was able to exercise remarkable restraint and foresight against the Ikhwān. Considering
the fact that they were out to destroy all that he had established in the new kingdom, not many people would
have given the Ikhwān a second chance at all.

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Chapter Five
The Saudi Renaissance

The forgotten Kingdom


Over the past forty years, Saudi Arabia has had a reputation for being a strict and conservative nation.
However much of what the world now perceives to have been the perpetual state of affairs in the kingdom
could not be farther from the truth. Things were very different prior to 1979.

1979 was a turning point not only for Saudi Arabia but also for Iran, it was the year in which the spirit global
Islamic revivalism engulfed the Middle East. It was the year in which the people rose up against the Shah in
Persia and heralding in the era of ultra conservative rule in Iran, it was also the year in which the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia was shaken by an unbelievable societal tremor following the siege of Makkah, after that – several
Muslim majority countries went from being liberal, socialist and nationalist governments to religious
institutions with pan-Islamic ideologies, the greatest examples being Iran and Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan and
Somalia were also good examples as they were completely different during the 1960s and 1970s, compared to
what we see today.

The Americans
Once the Ikhwān were vanquished and their less radical members were incorporated into the Saudi Guard,
King Abdul-Aziz was then able to continue with his social and political policies uninterrupted. A great many
things had changed in the kingdom from that moment onwards, for one – oil was discovered in 1938, the
hidden treasure was serendipitously unearthed by an American geologist. This discovery would change the
entire trajectory of the King’s policies and directives. Saudi Arabia was now an oil exporting nation and became
wealthy beyond measure.

Thereafter, the King collaborated with the Americans – who had been instrumental in unearthing the oil in the
first place, in order to build the infrastructure necessary to be able to exploit and export the kingdom’s rich
natural reserves enabling it to freely trade on the international marketplace. Needless to say, the kingdom’s
new wealth also changed the lifestyle of the old Arab and Bedouin tribes who were persuaded to abandon
their traditional ways and to embrace a new metropolitan lifestyle. Old desert outposts were transformed into
thriving cities and even the barefooted peasants of yesteryear soon began competing in the construction of
lofty towers.

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From the moment oil was discovered in the region, King Abdul-Aziz began fostering a new working relationship
with the Americans much to the frustration and dismay of the British – who after all, had supported him in his
conquest of the Hijaz and in the subjugation of the Ikhwān. However, the king was now in a position to dictate
terms and conditions and it would appear that the Americans were a more lucrative partner in his ventures.

King Abdul-Aziz had not sent any troops to participate in the second world war, in fact the kingdom was
neutral for the most part however towards the very final phase of the war, King Abdul-Aziz began to entertain
meetings with significant political figures, the most historic one being his meeting with the American president
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on Valentines day in the year 1945.

Meeting with US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

At this time, the Americans had not yet settled in Saudi Arabia. In fact, King Abdul-Aziz and president Roosevelt
held their meeting on the USS Quincy, which was on the Suez Canal in Egypt. Their discussions lasted for three
days and were centered around terms for the ongoing alliance between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
United States of America, a friendship that would characterize the policies and directives of both nations for
several decades to come.

A few days later, King Abdul-Aziz was invited to another meeting in Egypt, this time it was with the British –
Winston Churchill was in attendance, they met at the Grand Hotel du Lac, just fifty miles outside of Cairo. The
meeting with the British prime minister was not as pleasant and smooth as that with the American president.

For example, during lunch – Churchill was requested not to smoke or consume alcohol in the presence of the
King as it was against the regulations of Islam, in response – Churchill addressed the King directly with the
claim that in his religion it was an absolute sacred rite to smoke cigars and drink alcohol before, after, and if
need - during all meals, and in between meals too. He then lit his cigar and continued with the rest of his
lunch.

In the end, King Abdul-Aziz did his best for his people but he was nonetheless subjected to assassination plots,
one such attempt took place in Makkah while he was performing his Hajj pilgrimage on March 15 th 1935. He
survived the attempt and went on to live for another five to six months. He died that same year in the month
of October following serious heart conditions, according to Saudi records – the king died in his sleep, he was 78
years old.

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The Kings of KSA

Following the death of King Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Saud, the throne was given to his son Saud whose rule was
marred with controversy and chaos, though he lasted 11 years on the throne. In the end the al-Saud and their
supporters resolved to force King Saud to abdicate in favor of his brother Prince Faisal, who took over from his
elder brother in the year 1964 and completely transformed the policies and direction of the kingdom during
his eleven year rule as king of Saudi Arabia.

King Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Saud with sons (Prince Faisal to the left)

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A great man King Faisal was, a true ruler, sadly he was gunned down in his office in 1975 by his own nephew
who had returned from the US after studying there for some time, the story is also very long and complicated
however the kingdom still mourns the death of King Faisal. When King Faisal died, his brother Khalid became
the next king of Saudi Arabia. Khalid ruled for seven very eventful and transformative years – between 1975 to
1982. The reign of King Khalid not only revolutionaries Saudi Arabia but it also radicalized it in many ways.

It was a cataclysmic decade, full of dramatic events and cultural shifts that would push Saudi society to a new
height of religiosity and conservativeness, none of it was the as a direct result of King Khalid’s designs really,
however it was just how things turned out. The fallout between 1979 to 1980 will always mark a historical
turning point for the kingdom.

Prince Faisal on official


Trip to Britain in 1919
(Aged 13).

Desert Metropolis
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was atypical compared to how modern generations
view the nation today. In fact, it was not unusual to spot young Saudi men sporting afros and flares in public,
while women were free to drive and appear in public without covering their faces. It was a transformative era,
one in which the inhabitants went from riding camels to driving supercars in less than a single generation. The
pace at which Saudi society was adopting Western modes of living was frighteningly rapid for some and
thrilling for others.

During his short reign over the kingdom, Faisal did a truly great job of turning things around for his people. He
established school, universities and hospitals for everyone and he also managed the kingdom’s oil resources
very well, resulting in vast revenues and profits which he ploughed back into the nation’s economy and
infrastructures.

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In fact, Riyadh, boasted of over half a million inhabitants and it was equipped with universities and specialist
institutions such as the King Faisal Specialist Hospital, the College of applied medical sciences, the Imam
Muhammad Ibn Saud University, the Saudi Arabian National Centre for Science and Technology and even a TV
tower not to mention the British International school and industrial sites such as the Ajlan & Brothers clothing
factory that produced the famous Saudi garments and head-gear commonly worn by Saudi men and contrary
to popular belief, during the 60s and 70s the Niqab and Abaya were not compulsory attire for the women of
Saudi Arabia, some even went without Hijab with many television programs also featuring women.

It was truly an amazing case of rapid social development, the Kingdom had achieved something that had not
been seen in almost any other country, including America, France and Britain.

The residents of Saudi Arabia had access to many amenities and resources as well as being able to enjoy
cultural influences from Egyptian and Lebanon with the influx of musical performances from singers such as
Um Kuthum, Muhammad Abdul-Wahhab and Fayruz.

That era was the era in Saudi Arabia’s history that Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) frequently
makes reference to when he talks of returning to the golden era of Saudi culture and society. It is the vision he
is fighting to re-establish in the modern kingdom. The widely publicized and condemned music festivals hosted
in Riyadh in 2019 were a symbolic marker of a golden era that came to an end forty years prior, in 1979. Thus,
the celebrations and new liberal policies legislated in the year 2019 were considered to mark the rebirth of the
old Saudi Arabia.

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Chapter Six
The Islamic Awakening

Free Thinkers
During the 1960s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia was in the midst of a very significant and transformative era in the
Muslim world. It had only been a few decades since the Ottoman Empire was abolished and new nations had
emerged from its ruins. They were somewhat indecisive, even conflicted - about their new identities.

Ever-since the 1950s, things had been exceptionally tumultuous, with so many Arab thinkers and intellectuals
acquiring new and modern means of education, especially those returning from Western Europe from
destinations such as Paris, London, and Rome. Though this trend has been rising ever since Napoleon entered
Egypt which underwent further westernization following Muhammad Ali’s reform policies.

However with the advent of easily accessible printed books, the spread of liberal and secular ideologies was
made much easier, not to mention the new political philosophies that had taken to the social-milieu of the
upper classes like a wild fire, especially in key metropolitan cities such as Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad. The Arab
world witnessed the emergence of a new social class known as the Muthaqqaf. Linguistically this title can refer
to the cultured individual or the lettered man, however it soon became synonymous with the freethinker,
sometimes even comparable the autodidact i.e. the self-taught intellectual whose understanding of
complicated texts is primarily derived from self-guided study of books and not as a result of any formally
recognized training in that field of study.

The Muthaqqaf came to be characterized as one who was increasingly detached from traditionalism and the
formal study of religion, instead they favored private reading and study of ancient religious texts to derive
their own conclusions, often in direct opposition to well established traditional views and scholarly consensus.
This class of individuals had often been compared to the early Lutheran protestants who came about after
Martin Luther rejected the interpretations and intermediary role of catholic priests and clergy in favor of direct
access to the Bible.

Islamic Reformation
Without getting into too much detail, the Protestants championed a principle known as Sola Scriptura – which
is a Latin phrase that translates into English as Scripture alone. It had to do with the principle of religious
authority, in essence it sought to challenge the principle of who should have authority for making
interpretations in regards to the word of God, was it the priesthood or any literate person who had access to
the Bible?

While the concept of Sola Scriptura may sound reasonable in post-modern societies, it was in fact a
revolutionary concept because before that, Catholics were forbidden from reading the Bible for themselves
and were instead taught to rely on the interpretations and readings delivered through the agency of the
priestly establishment alone, but at a time when most Europeans were illiterate, this policy was acceptable -
however following the invention of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg in 15th century Germany, many
ordinary Catholics now had access to cheap copies of the Bible and could for the very first time in history, read
the word of God for themselves, without having to attend church or by relying on the interpretations of fellow
men.

The affordability and abundance of printed material also had the effect of spreading literacy far and wide so
more people were becoming literate, it is therefore no coincidence that another German pioneer – Martin
Luther would go on to lay the ideological foundations for what would come to be known as the Protestant
Reformation.

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Thus, the prevalence of printed books and literature had resulted in the emergence of ordinary people seeking
to not only read the holy scriptures for themselves, but also to question what they had been taught by the
Catholic clergy in the first place. Sola Scriptura, scripture alone – therefore represented this new spirit of self
determinism within the Christian world, one where every man and woman who had enough literacy to read
the Bible was encouraged to deduct lessons and determine what the truth was for themselves, independent of
scholarly interpretations.

While it took a few centuries to arrive in the Muslim world, when the technological wave eventually reached
the it and printed copies of the Quran became freely available, more people began reading it for themselves
and the Mutthaqaf arose as the champions for the free-thinking audiences who for the very first time in
history had access to cheap print and enjoyed a higher rate of literacy, thereafter the Quran was increasingly
read without the guidance and interpretation of scholars – add to that, new philosophical and political theories
from Europe had also swept through places such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq following the occupation of Western
European powers there, it is not surprising that Muslim scholars warned severely against this new
phenomenon, but – technological advancement was too prevalent and new ideas began to emerge and soon
enough, the Muthaqqaf were convinced that they too could rely solely on the scripture to derive the true
meaning and message of the Quran without the guidance of scholars who now represented a form of medieval
stagnation. In essence, the Muthaqqaf had embraced the concept of Sola Scriptura under the banners of
Islamic Revivalism, Textual Revisionism and intellectual progression.

When this new intellectual ideology first began to appear in the Muslim world during the 1950s, there was
great concern from traditional scholars, some even criticized and forbade the printing of religious books
altogether – including copies of the Hadith and even the Quran itself. They had serious fear of people
becoming misguided by the erroneous misinterpretations of untrained and inexperienced laymen. However,
many intellectuals of the day had already embarked on the course of self-determinism and religious
revisionism that would give birth to many of the modern Islamic movements.

The Arab Renaissance


During this very complicated transitionary period, there was also a new movement to redefine the Arab world
and establish a new identity based on culture and language rather than that of faith. Once the Ottomans were
vanquished, the Arabs were struggling to make sense of their condition, some called for a return to early
Islamic identity while others called to Pan-Arab Nationalism. Thus ideological battle between Islamic identity
and Pan-Arab Nationalism eventually gave birth to the Islamic Awakening (As-Sahwa al-Islamiyya).

In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Faisal did his best to reach out to fellow Muslim leaders, from Palestine to
Pakistan. He tried to instill and reinforce the spirit of Islamic brotherhood and unity at a time when the Middle
East was experiencing what many historians have called the Arab Cold War. On his part, the king invested
heavily in religious education and institutions such as the Islamic University of Madinah and other Islamic think
tanks in Macca.

During the Awakening or the Sahwa, the climate was very unpredictable and also confusing – there were so
many political and religious movements springing up all over the Arab world, from Egypt to Syria to Palestine
to Saudi Arabia. But as the socialist and Pan-Arab governments were becoming less tolerant of the Islamic
movements in their midst, many activists were soon imprisoned or expelled from their lands, several thinkers
then came emigrated to Saudi Arabia during 1950s and 1960s. Those that remained in their countries were
jailed and often tortured to death.

The new arrivals to the kingdom were mostly intellectuals and professionals who quickly assimilated into the
society finding jobs as lecturers, journalists and administrators. No doubt, these influential posts would have a
major impact on the educational system in the kingdom and in institutions such as the Islamic University of
Madinah, for example - one of the most influential arrivals from Syria was Sheikh Nassiruddin al-Albani who
was invited by the vice president of the university, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz in 1961.

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Sheikh Nassiruddin al-Albani became an instructor at the faculty of Hadith and gained many students and
followers during his two year stay as part of his first appointment. He was later expelled from the kingdom in
1963 but would return for a second time some years later before being expelled once more – even though
Sheikh al-Albaani’s views were not always well received in the Kingdom during his lifetime - his impact was to
have long-lasting effects.

It is important to point out that the Sahwa was divided into two main sub-categories, on the one hand you had
the politicised, pragmatic and modern revisionist approach which was being championed by groups such as
Ikhwānul Muslimeen, Hizb-ul-Tahrir and other groups emerging from Arab nations such as Egypt, Palestine and
Syria – but on the other hand there was the apolitical, isolationist and literalist Islamic revivalism which
focused more on strict adherence to classical texts and the revival of early practices from the first three
generations. This movement also rejected all that was new and foreign in this region, perhaps the most active
proponents were those belonging to the Salafi Dawah which flourished in Saudi Arabia but had roots in via
Egypt and Syria.

The Islamic University of Madinah


The newly established Islamic University of Madinah was the epicentre of a lot of Islamic activities and ideas
during the Islamic Awakening era. Beginning from the early 1960s, almost as soon as the Islamic University of
Madinah had opened its doors to the public for the first time, there was an influx of foreigners arriving there
from neighbouring Arab countries.

In 1965, a group of students and callers to Islam began to participate in the open destruction of images and
mannequins in public spaces, the act itself came to be known as ‘Taksir al-Suwar’ (the breaking of images) in
which they would break pictures and any images they could get hold of, this would eventually drive them to
damaging public displays, breaking shop windows and basically being a nuisance in Madinah resulting in
skirmishes between them and the local residents here in Madinah. The authorities were duly informed and
police apprehended the perpetrators, sending them to jail for a week - following arrests.

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This turn of events did not dissuade the group of Islamic activists from continuing their campaign of
destruction, instead – they sought to organise and formalise their group’s mission by approaching the vice
president of the Islamic University here Madinah, Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz. He welcomed their proposal to
establish a new group called ‘al-Jamat Salafiyya’. In fact - the sheikh even suggested that they complete the
group’s name by adding the word ‘Muhtasiba’ (the Accountable group) at the end, implying that they would
also engage in the act of promoting virtue and forbidding vice.

Jamat Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba


From its very inception, the Jamat Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba were endorsed and supported by senior scholars in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which even included such authorities such as Sheikh Abubakr al-Jazairy, Sheikh
Muqbil al-Wadi and Shaikh Badi-al Deen al-Sindhi to name just a few, but they considered Sheikh Abdul-Aziz
Bin Baz as their patron and spiritual guide. Sheikh Bin Baz thereafter appointed Sheikh Abu-bakr al-Jazairy as
his deputy. They were no doubt also influenced by the ideas of Sheikh Nasirudeen al-Albaani, which is not
surprising if we consider the fact that many of them were attending the Islamic University of Madinah.

At first, the Jamat Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba focused on refuting and warning against other Islamic groups that
had been present and involved in the Dawah scene in Madinah. They targeted groups such as the Tabligh
Jamaat, Ikhwānul Muslimeen, Sufi fraternities and other active groups. Their membership base began to grow
rapidly in the 1970s and they had a designated a two story building as their headquarters called the “Bayt al
Ikhwān”.

The Jamat Salafiyya began organising weekly study circles and regular conferences from their headquarters.
The movement flourished and the administrative functions grew, by the mid 1970s they had expanded their
reach and influence across the kingdom with chapters in every major city including Makkah, Riyadh, Jeddah,
Taif, Hail, Abha, Dammam and al-Buraydah. Each branch had a local leader assigned to it and a coordinator,
some of the larger cities even had their own buildings.

As time went by, they continued their Dawah in Madinah, however the Jamat Salafiyya al-Muhtasibah soon
caught the attention of Madinah’s senior scholars, but for all the wrong reasons. One of their senior members,
Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi, also an advanced student Madinah - was summoned and interrogated by two senior
scholars ‘Atiyya Salim and ‘Umar Falatta who questioned him in regards to twelve points of concern that had
been brought up against the activities and teachings of the Jamat Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba.

When the council and advice of the senior scholars did not appear to have any impact on the behaviour of the
Jamat, a secret meeting was thereafter organised between some senior clerics and the group in 1977. The
location was the on the rooftop of the Jamat’s own headquarters in Madinah, the Bayt al Ikhwān. The leading
members of the consultative council were also in attendance.

Juhayman bin Saif al-Otaybi


Of all the things that can be said of the Jamat Salafiyya, none was as remarkable as the emergence of one man
from among them, his name was Juhayman, the son of Muhammad from the tribe of ‘Otaybah.

He was in fact from the same tribe that Sultan Ibn Bajad al-Otaybi, the fierce leader of the original Ikhwān who
was executed by the soldiers of King Abdul Aziz in 1931.

Juhayman was not infamous in Madinah nor was he associated with any criminal activities, to the contrary - he
was a very pious man. His family belonged to the Suqur branch of the ‘Otaybah tribe. They resided in the
Ikhwān settlements in heart of the Najd. Some historians claim that his grandfather was none other than
Sultan bin Bajad Al-Otaibi, however that has been proven to be incorrect although it is known that Juhayman’s
father - Muhammad bin Sayf, was one of the Ikhwān soldiers who fought alongside Sultan bin Bajad during the
infamous Ikhwān revolts that took place in this Kingdom. Juhayman’s father survived the battle of Sabilla in
1929 and went on to live for another 42 years, he died in 1972. Juhayman was known for reminiscing over his
father exploits as a soldier of the Ikhwān.

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Juhayman had been somewhat of an ordinary character. There were no extraordinary signs in his story, in fact
he had only spent four years in school before dropping out and later enrolling into the Saudi National Guard,
like many of the descendants of the Ikhwān. He was in the service of the kingdom between 1955 and 1973, but
left for some unknown reason, that was when he decided to relocate to Medinah. When he first arrived there,
Juhayman maintained a simple and ascetic lifestyle, living in a makeshift compound about a half hour's walk to
the Prophet's Mosque and spending most of his days studying and memorizing the Quran and Hadith with his
friends. Juhayman earned money by buying and repairing old cars from city auctions, he sold them on at a
modest profit. Anyone would have been comfortable purchasing a car from him, he was far too observant and
pious to ever cheat his customers and most of them knew that very well, which is why his business did
relatively good.

Juhayman also attended lectures and study circles – though he was not enrolled at the Islamic University of
Madinah, contrary to false claims. However he was well known amongst students at the Islamic University of
Madinah and many teachers also took a liking to him. It was not long after that when he officially joined and
became part of the Jamat al-Salafiyya Al-Muhtasiba.

Following the rooftop incident in Madinah in 1977, the Jamat was split up and a more radical sub-faction
emerged. It was headed by Juhayman al-Otaybi. He renamed the group ‘al Ikhwān’ and went on to condemn
senior scholars who were at the service of the Saudi government. It was not long before Juhayman attracted
the attention of the authorities and a raid was planned at his headquarters in Madinah, fortunately for him
some of his fellow tribesmen who were serving in the police force had managed to notify Juhayman of planned
raids, enabling him to escape out of Madinah accompanied by two of his closest associates. They headed out
of the city and into the desert where they could gain cover with the Bedouin tribes. Since that day, no one
knew where they were hiding or what they were engaged in. Juhayman became a phantom.

PAGE 26
C2 General
Chapter Seven
The Mahdi

A new Islamic Century


Tuesday November 20th 1979, it was a very special day, indeed.

The very last day of Dhul Hijjah in the year 1399, of the Islamic lunar calendar. The golden dawn of a new
Islamic century, commemorating 1400 years since the Prophet Muhammad departed from Makkah and
traversed the Arabian Desert seeking his destiny in the ancient city of Yathrib.

On this day, November 20th 1979, the world was to celebrate a historical threshold marking 1400 years of
Islamic history, culture and legacy, all of which would be commemorated with a single prayer - performed
before the break of dawn in the epicenter of the Muslim world, the Grand Mosque in Makkah.

All throughout the preceding month, in October of 1979, the residents of Makkah had witnessed the influx of
approximately a million foreigners arriving in the sacred city for the purpose of performing their Hajj
pilgrimage, however following the ceremonies, many of the pilgrims prolonged their stay in Makkah for a few
additional weeks - in order to witness the turning of a golden century.

The suspense and anticipation was electric, millions of Muslims worldwide had dreamt of a new beginning and
a fresh start, with some eagerly anticipating the arrival of a spiritual redeemer, one who was prophesized to be
sent at the turn of each Islamic century for the purpose of renewing and restoring the faith, al-Mujaddid (the
Renewer).

But this spirit of renewal and restoration was also being cemented by the impending completion of the Grand
Mosque’s latest expansion project, which was being undertaken by the Saudi Binladin Group. For several years
prior to this, the holy sanctuary had undergone many successive expansion and development projects
beginning in the 1950s - during the reign of King Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud. This development drive continued
through to the reign of King Khalid and was reaching its final stage, which due for completion in time for the
turn of the new Islamic century.

PAGE 27
C2 General
The entire scenery was a living testament to the rejuvenation of the Muslim world. Everyone was excited for
the future.

But on the eve of the new year, on November 20th 1979 – building contractors and construction companies
were still present at the Grand Mosque in Makkah, rushing to complete the remainder of their task. The
cladding and padding surrounding the Grand Mosque was still visible to pilgrims and residents alike, so one
can only imagine how the presence of such machinery and personnel would have obscured and masked what
would otherwise have been a picturesque image of the Grand Mosque. But as chance would have it, this visual
obstruction was to provide the perfect cover for the unforeseen events that would unfold in Makkah that day.

New Year ’s Eve preparations


Within the precincts of the Makkah’s Holy Mosque, a few inconspicuous pickup trucks drove into the sanctuary
unnoticed and uninspected; they infiltrated the building by driving through the Fatah Gate, which was situated
in the Northern side of the Grand Mosque. This gate was actually being used by construction workers who
were hired to carry out building work on the premises, but surprisingly – the men inside the unidentified
pickup trucks were not construction workers at all, however they were well informed and adequately prepared
to exploit the cover provided by the unsuspecting contractors that day.

Meanwhile, back in vast expanse of the mysterious desert. Juhayman bin-Saif al Otaiby, the enigmatic leader
of the new Ikhwān - had been on the run from the authorities for the best part of two years, however his
underground movement was thriving in his absence and he was able to continue his recruitment drive by
getting his close associates to arrange the publication and distribution of his articles and recorded lectures.
This was possible through the private connections they had established with a printing company in Kuwait, in
fact Juhayman and his Ikhwān had a growing number of sympathizers and supporters in Kuwait too. However,
within Saudi Arabia, the Ikhwān were growing more infuriated over the ever growing Westernization program,
Juhayman’s scathing and unapologetic criticism of Saudi policy and leadership proved very popular with the
religious and conservative classes - attracting many admirers and supporters from all segments of Saudi
society, ranging from students to wealthy patrons who contributed to Juhayman’s campaign by means of
monetary donations.

Juhayman’s articles and letters were not just popular with students and wealthy businessmen, he had also
gained some respect and admiration from factions within the military ranks and with leading members of the
religious establishment who were concerned with the direction of the country’s development but could not be
seen to be too critical of its government. Thus Juhayman became the voice of Saudi Arabia’s silent majority.

C2 General PAGE 28
The Ikhwān soon enlisted military officials from the Saudi National Guard, who had incorporated the original
Ikhwān into their ranks during the reign of king Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Saud, so this was really a return to their
original purpose. These military infiltrators became instrumental in the covert acquisition of automatic
weapons, ammunition and gas masks. All of which was smuggled from National Guard armories and
transported into the Grand Mosque in preparation for the events of November 20 th 1979.

Juhayman may have been out of sight for two years, but he was not out of the picture altogether. In fact, he
had been masterminding a nefarious plan to hijack the Grand Mosque up to a year in advance, in as early as
1978. He and his associates began trained recruits in guerilla tactics from various desert outposts using
weapons smuggled from the National Guard armories.

All of this came to a critical stage on the morning of November 20th 1979, when Juhayman’s men set their final
plans into motion by transporting the weapons and food supplies into the Grand Mosque using inconspicuous
trucks as well as fake coffins in order to infiltrate the Mosque. Their operation was planned to last only a day
or so, however the group had provisioned sufficient supplies to last them several weeks in the events of a
stand off with authorities.

Juhayman meant business - and his return to center stage, was going to be spectacular indeed.

The unholy apparition


In the early morning hours of 20 November 1979, the imam of the Grand Mosque in Makkah, Sheikh
Mohammed al-Subayil, was preparing to lead morning prayers for approximately 50,000 worshippers who had
gathered at the Grand Mosque to celebrate the turn of the new century.

The call to prayer was announced shortly before 5:00 am, after which the imam stood up to lead the faithful in
prayers when the unexpected happened. The Imam was abruptly interrupted by insurgents who brandished
weapons, almost immediately – all the gates of the Mosque were locked and two un-armed guards were shot
dead by the armed insurgents.

Chaos broke loose in the moments that followed and worshipers scattered in all directions seeking a way out
of the mosque. In the midst of this horrific ordeal, three armed men walked directly towards the imam. But
thankfully, they did not intend to harm him, instead - one of the men seized his microphone and began
delivering a chilling message over the mosque’s loudspeakers.

No one knew what to expect next. After those two guards were shot dead for no apparent reason, everyone
feared for the worse. Add to that, most of those present were not Arabic speakers, so the confusion must have
been even more frightening to them.

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However, everyone who understood Arabic and could decipher the speaker’s chilling message was left in utter
shock and astonishment, it was as if they were in a parallel universe, was this all part of a movie script that
they had been unwittingly enlisted into or had the world finally come to an end, on this very special day? It
was all too surreal to comprehend.

But what was perhaps more fascinating was that the man who stood before them did not appear to have been
known to anyone present, he was a complete stranger – yet there was something about his presence that
mesmerized the crowd. He was tall and relatively thin man, approximately six foot, so it was not hard to see
him and although his physical frame was not particularly overwhelming, the impact and measure of his words
could be felt throughout the Mosque. He wore a simple white robe which was enshrouded by a thick black
over-gown, giving him the appearance of a traditional Arab cleric – although he did not wear a turban over his
head.

As he delivered his carefully scripted message, the audience could almost count words coming out of his
mouth as the tip of his full grown beard bobbed up and down with each pronouncement. The speaker was
fully engrossed in his speech and the intensity of his gaze pierced through the crowds like that of a mighty
eagle preparing to pounce on its prey. He was stern and resolute in his delivery but his appearance was that of
an ordinary Bedouin man, whose head carried the weight of a full crown of lank curly dark hair that framed his
youthful face. His eyebrows grew more intense with the weight of words that seemed to be channeled straight
from his soul. He spoke with stern conviction and unwavering authority in what resembled a scene from one of
Hollywood’s classic biblical films, the man stood there and spoke as if delivering a final warning to the world.

Beside him, stood another young Arab man who carried a weapon with him but remained as silent as a wolf,
his eyes were wide and alert. He appeared to be very calm, yet his presence felt ubiquitous – he somehow
commanded the attention of onlookers without ever having to utter a single word. Unlike the speaker – this
second figure appeared to be a little less intense but something about his aura left the observer uncertain and
uneasy.

Finally, the first speaker concluded his sermon and several armed men began to force the people to line up
besides the Kaaba, where the speaker and his silent colleague stood surrounded by armed guards.

Juhayman was back.

The phantom had re-emerged in spectacular form and he brought with him the promised Mahdi, Muhammad
bin abdullAh al-Qahtani. The two of them could be seen standing besides the Kaaba near the Ruqn Aswad,
surrounded by armed men dressed in black vests and balaclavas. It was an awful sight to behold but the
message being delivered to the world would be even more dreadful.

Juhayman had delivered his speech to the world, in which he condemned the al-Saud and their government
approved scholars. He was also calling upon the people to pledge their allegiance directly to the man standing
besides him, the so called Mahdi, Mohammed bin Abdullah al-Qahtani who was apparently from the Prophet
Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraish. Furthermore, his father and mother were both descendants of the
Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Hussein ibn Ali, unlike the al-Saud who were considered illegitimate
imposters to the throne.

It was at this point that the so-called Mahdi stepped forward and took center stage. He stood near the Kaaba
awaiting the steady flow of people coming to pledge their allegiance to him, at first - it was his fellow
insurgents who initiated this process by pledging their allegiance to him – but once they were done, they
prompted others to follow suite. Many of those present could not speak or understand Arabic so a number of
them followed the instructions provided and began pledging their allegiance.

By now confusion and fear permeated the entire Mosque, no one could tell you just what it was like to be
plunged in such an insane situation, but the atmosphere was completely unpredictable and those present
could not figure out what to expect next. Gunshots began to ring out and the captives grew more terrified for
their lives and safety.

C2 General PAGE 30
But in the midst of such confusion, the imam of the Grand Mosque had managed to slip away from where
Juhayman and the false-Mahdi were standing. He blended into the crowds and then made his way back to his
office – where he called Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Rashid, the leader of the General Presidency for the
Affairs of the Two Holy Mosques. The imam informed him of the events that were unfolding in the Mosque –
as he spoke on the phone, shots could be heard ringing in the background.
At this point, one may ask the question – where were the security guards who are supposed to protect the
Mosque at all times and how did Juhayman manage to hijack such a vast complex with just a few hundred
men?

Well, prior to that event – no one ever thought it necessary to inspect those entering the Grand Mosque
because it was a sanctuary and the Muslims simply did not imaging it possible for such horrific crimes to be
committed in the Haram itself. Furthermore, those who were employed to guard the facilities were not armed
with weapons, all they were allowed to carry were wooden sticks with which to control the crowds.

The Haram is a sacred sanctuary, and the carrying of weapons inside it was completely prohibited. However all
of that would change following the events of 1979.

Pandemonium
Back inside the Mosque. The initial panic settled a little and the hostages were now beginning to accept the
situation, however Juhayman ordered for his men to liberate some hostages from the Mosque, these were
mostly foreigners who had very little clue as to who the Ikhwān were and what they were demanding from the
authorities, however - Saudi nationals were detained and prohibited from escaping the Mosque, they were
then forced to swear allegiance to the so-called Mahdi.

Though interestingly enough, a number of captives were converted to the message delivered by Juhayman,
and they genuinely believed that the Mahdi had arrived. Though this should not be a surprise given the hype
and anticipation that was already very prevalent in the Muslim world leading up to the dawn of a new Islamic
century.

Upon seeing this gradual release of non-Saudi worshippers out of the Grand Mosque, its Imam, Sheikh Al-
Subayil came out of his hiding spot and travelled down to the mosque’s basement where he removed his
distinctive cloak and mingled amongst some Indonesian pilgrims who had been allowed to escape, he joined
the crowd and evaded detection by keeping his head low the entire time.

By now, many of the hostages had been liberated however there were still several hostages inside the
Mosque. Juhayman and his coconspirators then settled in the upper levels of the mosque, with snipers still
positioned in the minarets. While Saudi intelligence was still unable to identify who was inside the Mosque, in
what conditions the hostages were kept in and what the kidnapper’s plans were. Unfortunately for those who
did not make it out of the Mosque, they were then forced to evacuate the courtyard and to move into the
corridors where they remained confined while gun shots rang out as snipers fired down at the Saudi security
forces that had gathered outside the Mosque.

Communications from within the Grand Mosque were then abruptly disconnected when Juhayman’s men cut
the telephone lines off, leaving those inside of the compound completely detached from the external world.
The Saudi authorities were left in shock and utter disbelief as this situation intensified through to the late
hours of the day, something clearly had to be done- and in a hurry.

The Kingdom is shaken


Saudi Arabia’s leadership was taken by surprise and completely unprepared for such an event, no doubt – their
contingency plans did not factor in an attack of such magnitude, however their initial reaction to the situation
was to send military troops into Mecca, but they had clearly underestimated the planning and preparation of
Juhayman and his men, because when the Saudi forces arrived at the Grand Mosque they were greeted with
bullets from the Mosque’s lofty minarets.

C2 General PAGE 31
The Saudi military then responded to this with their own arsenal however the attackers began using some of
their hostages as human shields, they also started to shoot into crowds of curious spectators who gathered on
the hills overlooking the mosque. Innocents were caught up in this cross fire and a young boy was killed in the
exchange. The Ikhwān shot at anyone who tried to recover the dead bodies of victims outside the mosque.

Approximately one hundred officers were initially dispatched to respond to events at the Mosque by the
Ministry of the interior, however they suffered heavy casualties and had to seek reinforcement from units of
the Saudi Arabian Army and the National Guard. By the evening of November 20th 1979, the entire city of
Mecca was evacuated and residents were relocated elsewhere while the military moved in.

Tabloid Wars
In the coming 24 hours, Saudi Arabia would be engulfed by a complete media blackout – no news of what had
happened at the Grand Mosque was to be leaked into the outside world, such revelations would deal a very
heavy blow to the Kingdom’s reputation.

But it was a little too late for the Saudis because news of the siege in Makkah had been broken by a
Washington based agency. It had only been a day following the seizure of the mosque – and The New York
Times was already stirring up more trouble for the Kingdom with its front page headlines revealing details of
what they called a terrorist plot in the heart of Makkah that was being orchestrated by Iranian Islamic
revolutionaries.

C2 General PAGE 32
It was fake news of course, however - the inflammatory nature of this so called news sparked off a propaganda
war between Iran and America. Iran’s revolutionary leader – Ayatollah Khomenei, who had only just come into
power following the revolutionary events in Iran during 1979, immediately retorted with his own explanation
for the events in Makkah – he blaming the entire siege on a secret conspiracy masterminded and controlled by
American Zionists.

The Americans could not come counter such a devastating blow.

In fact, Khomenei’s explanation was by far more convincing and plausible in the minds of Muslims worldwide
who were now awakening to the horrible news of what had taken place in Makkah, surely it had to be
perpetrated by infidels, the true enemies of Islam. But as news of the events in Makkah began to spread
throughout the rest of the Muslim world, American diplomats and expats began to experience violent backlash
and faced imminent danger in places such as Pakistan, Iran and Libya.

More notably, in Islamabad - a mob of furious protesters stormed the US embassy and set the building on fire,
burning it to the ground. Two US servicemen and two Pakistani embassy staff died in the attack. Similar unrest
flared up in Tripoli, where the US embassy was also set alight and burned to the ground, all American
personnel were thereafter withdrawn from Libya and barred from returning for the next 25 years. But violent
protests were not the only form of reprisal felt globally, in fact – lone wolf operations were also reported, one
such example was that of Pope John Paul II’s targeted assassination plot which was thwarted in 1981 when a
Turkish assassin made an attempt to kill the pope after having sworn to avenge the Muslim world for what had
happened Makkah in 1979.

A state of emergency
The siege of Makkah had more sinister consequences within the kingdom of Saudi Arabia because news of
Juhayman’s actions had somehow sent signals to his sympathizers and supporters to carryout similar attacks
across the kingdom.

AbdullAh al-Harbi, one of Juhayman’s former associates and supporters had reacted to news of the attack in
Makkah by planning his own attack in the Prophet’s Mosque in Madinah. He had it in mind to create a
decoy for Juhayman and his men by forcing the Saudi authorities to divide and re-direct their resources and
attention from Makkah to Madinah. Fortunately, Abdullah al-Harbi was shot dead by security forces as he

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attempted to drive past a checkpoint on his mission to recruit volunteers for his planned siege and attack in
Madinah.

But if matters within the Kingdom were not already complicated enough, the confusion created by the
American media had also engendered another destructive wave of upheaval, this time it was from the Shia
community that resided in the kingdom’s Eastern Province.

1979 was a cataclysmic year in modern history, especially for the Muslims. The Iranian revolution took place, a
new century was about to unfold, there were claims of people seeing dreams about the eminent arrival of the
Mahdi and groups such as that of the Ikhwān were becoming more and more prominent in the Arab world.

In the case of the Shia community in Saudi Arabia, the revolutionary wave created by the Iranian revolution
combined with news of a Mahdi appearing in Makkah immediately sparked something in them, though they
had clearly not been aware of who Juhayman was and what his group stood for, they reacted to the prospect
of pledging their allegiance to the Mahdi, who is a highly anticipated and central figure in Shia tradition. It all
became even more encouraging considering the timing of his so-called appearance, which happened to be at
the turn of the new Islamic century, which coincided with the new Shia regime in Iran.

Furthermore, Shia rebellion in Saudi Arabia had been previously subdued by the al-Saud administration only a
few months prior to the events in Makkah however the situation intensified once more when Juhayman’s
open criticism of the government began to reach those communities – it was almost too good to be true, but
when America falsely pointed the finger at Iran for the events in Makkah, the Saudi based Shia community
believed the false news and took it as a green light to rise up in arms in support of the greater movement.

Thus the Saudi Authorities found themselves under heavy internal and external pressure with the weight of
the world on their shoulders and a deadly hostage situation at the very heart of the Muslim world. It was a
complete catastrophe and prominent voices from the Muslim world started calling for Makkah and Madinah to
be put under the control of world organizations. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was increasingly being seen as
grossly incompetent for the role, a perception that completely shattered the kingdom’s illustrious reputation
for being the Guardians of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (Makkah and Madinah).

It was clearly a complete and utter public catastrophe.

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The Fatwa
Saudi Arabia was determined to pull all of its resources together in order to find a resolution for this immense
crisis, two of the kingdom’s pillars of power had already been exhausted within the first 48 hours, those pillars
were the leadership and the military arm. However there was still the question of a religious verdict from its
third pillar of power, the Ulamah (Scholars).

In the hour of need, the Kingdom’s religious authority had to rise to the challenge and give guidance in what
came to be the single most complicated and conflicted religious judgement that they had ever been required
to make on behalf of the nation. But matters were not made any easier by the fact that Saudi Arabia’s religious
establishment itself was under the leadership and direction of Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, a scholar who had
previously endorsed, mentored and corresponded with Juhayman and his group in the years and months
leading up to the terrible events in Makkah.

The Sheikh was now required to tow the line between his former disciples and his current patrons without
betraying either party. What made matters even more challenging were the strict prohibitions of violence
within the precincts of the Grand Mosque and its surrounding vicinity, in fact – Islam forbids the carrying of
weapons, the uprooting of plants and the hunting of prey within the sanctuary, so legitimating the use of
violence to disarm and defeat the hijackers was not going to be an easy decision to make but there were no
viable alternatives considering the fact that Juhayman and his men were committed to fighting the authorities
to the bitter end.

It was very challenging, however - the kingdom of Saudi Arabia finally got a response from its scholarly council
on Friday November 23rd 1979 – when for the first time in centuries, the Friday sermon was cancelled and
prayers were not performed in congregation. It was in the late afternoon on that Friday that the Ulama
published their much anticipated Fatwa.

The edict pronounced by the council of Ulama permitted the Saudi authorities to fight the hijackers only after
the hijackers had been granted the opportunity to surrender and lay down their arms, only if they declined this
offer – would fighting be permitted. This edict was derived from a verse in the second chapter of the Glorious
Quran, wherein permission to fight within the holy sanctuary was granted only when hostilities were initiated
by the disbelievers of Makkah.

“And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have
expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al- Haram
(the Grand Mosque in Makkah) until they (initiate hostilities and) fight you there. But if
they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers”

The Glorious Quran • Surah al-Baqarah • Chapter 2 Verse 191

This was further strengthened by another Quranic verse that permitted one group of Muslims to fight another
in such cases where there was a civil war and a group amongst the Muslims had been unjust towards the
other, but the Quran also commands the intervening party to accept the terms of peace and surrender offered
by the transgressing Muslim party.

“And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the
two. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses
until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between
them in justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly”

The Glorious Quran • Surah al-Hujuraat • Chapter 49 Verse 9

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However, the Fatwa was unusually lenient towards the transgressors. One could hardly imagine a worse crime
to commit in the heart of the Muslim world. Yet the committee of scholars who presided over this emergency
council did not condemn Juhayman and his aides outright, the language used in their edict was very measured
and the fact that they did not consider Juhayman and his co-conspirators to be miscreants or infidels but
simply referred to them as “the Armed Group” (al-Jamat al-Musallahah). This drew criticism from many
Muslims. Understandably, this was perceived as being far too tolerant of the grotesque crimes that had been
committed by the group, inside Islam’s holiest sanctuary. Furthermore, the Ikhwān also proclaimed to have
the Mahdi with them, which was a false claim that one could expect would have nullified their faith outright,
but it seems as if the scholars were giving Juhayman and his men the time and opportunity to repent.

Some are of the opinion that the scholars relented in their condemnation of Juhayman’s act due to his close
relationship with Sheikh bin Baz and the association they had during the days of Jamat al-Salafiyya al-
Muhtasiba. It is difficult to believe that any another group of Muslims would have been afforded such
tolerance or patience had they committed the same crimes.

Ultimately, the Fatwa was granted and the Saudi authorities were finally able to take military actions based on
the endorsement of the religious elites. Consequently, the Saudi military then launched a full frontal assaults
from three of the Mosque’s main gates, but Juhayman’s men retaliated and maintained their grounds as
snipers continued to fire down on the Saudi soldiers from the minarets.

The Siege of Makkah


All throughout the streets of Makkah, announcements could be heard coming from the mosque’s loud
speakers, the assailants were making demands for the immediate discontinuation of oil exports to the United
States and the expulsion of all foreign civilian and military experts from the Arabian Peninsula. Juhayman and
his co-conspirators were very clear with what they wanted and the fight was far from over.

In response, the Saudi government decided to change their strategy by waiting for the militants to run out of
food supplies, the battle had lasted seventy-two hours but things had now escalated to a full-blown siege that
would last two entire weeks. It became clear to the Saudi authorities that their adversary was committed to a
long and drawn out conflict.

On Saturday November the 24th 1979, Juhayman and the surviving insurgents, along with some hostages and
prisoners, began to retreat into the interconnected chambers located under the mosque itself, in the
basement. Here, equipped with food, water and plenty of ammunition, they would hold out for more than a
week, fighting off the security forces with everything from bullets to Molotov cocktails. Saudi forces retaliated
by using tear gas to force the militants out of their underground chambers but this tactic had failed miserably
when Juhayman’s men began blocking the narrow passageways with mattresses to block the gas from
reaching the chambers, they also wrapped water-soaked headdresses around their faces to avoid inhaling the
toxic fumes, but in a rare twist of fate, the gas unexpectedly rose back up to the surface, causing problems
for the security forces.

Juhayman’s men also had a tactical advantage. Many of them had studied at the Grand Mosque and knew
every centimetre of the maze. After further attempts to penetrate the underground chambers, it became clear
that this strategy was too risky - so the Saudi authorities decided to cut their losses short by seeking the
expertise of an external foreign agency.

French connections
The Americans were not to be involved at all with events in Makkah, in fact - the head of Saudi Arabia’s
Intelligence Services - Prince Turkey al-Faisal, did not trust the CIA with the management and assistance of any
part of their struggle against Juhayman and his men, especially considering the fact that the CIA had been
weakened by the congressional hearings of 1970s. Instead, the Saudi intelligence office decided to enlist the
French, and by Sunday December 2nd 1979, Saudi Arabia was engaging directly with advisers from France’s
elite Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), which were arguably the most specialised
services in the world.

C2 General PAGE 36
A team of three French commandos arrived and underwent a brief conversion ceremony in order to be
allowed to enter the holy city of Makkah, they brought with them supplies of a chemical called
dichlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CB), which was a gas designed to seriously restrict breathing resulting in
fatal consequences if breathed in for too long.

The following day, on Monday December 3rd 1979, an operation was mounted to drill holes into the floor of
the Grand Mosque in order to facilitate the passage of explosives and canisters filled with CB directly into the
chambers below. Shortly after the holes were drilled, grenades were dropped into the rooms below,
indiscriminately killing many hostages but driving the remaining rebels out into the open where they could be
targeted by snipers from the Saudi military. It was a long and bloody process, lasting more than 18 hours –
however the strategy had been effective and the assailants began to show signs of severe fatigue and
weakness.

It was the sign they had been awaiting, Saudi forces began to enter the underground maze in a drive to break
the resistance once and for all. The military officers eventually located one of the underground chambers in
which 20 militants were huddled tightly like sardines. They were exhausted, emaciated, hungry and covered in
dirt. Amongst this bunch of die-hard survivors was their leader, Juhayman bin-Saif al Otaybi. The Mahdi was no
more, he had died a number of days prior to that and his body remained with the group, apparently many of
the fighters had been demotivated and were devastated by the realization that the Mahdi had died but they
continued to fight alongside Juhayman out of desperation.

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When some Saudi soldiers discovered the body of Mohammed Al-Qahtani, they took a photograph which was
then published and broadcast widely throughout the kingdom, it was to be an open declaration that the
leading figure of this movement had been eliminated – signaling an end of the entire affair. What would later
transpire was that the so-called Mahdi had died on the third day after the siege started, but it remains unclear
as to the conditions surrounding his mysterious death. Some believe that he died as a result of the military
operations while others believe that he was shot by Juhayman in a desperate attempt to ensure that the
Mahdi was not captured alive.

The final act


With the Mahdi dead and the surviving rebels now demoralized and suffering from hunger and fatigue, the
Saudi forces began to get the upper hand and the resistance weakened with each day that went by. Finally, the
struggle ended at approximately 1:30am in the morning of Wednesday December 5th 1979, almost 15 days had
elapsed since the beginning of this tremendous ordeal, but it was now over.

Among the casualties reported from the Grand Mosque were approximately 127 members of the Saudi
military with an additional 451 reportedly wounded during the conflict. As for the fatality count in regards to
civilians and pilgrims, no one is exactly sure how people perished during the siege as there have been many
conflicting reports.

What was far more specific however, were accounts detailing the number of captives taken from Juhayman’s
faction. According to official Saudi reports, they had effectively eliminated 117 rebels inside the mosque and
later executed an additional 63 following official trials.

When the dust settled and the burden of conflict had been set to rest, the courtyard resembled something out
of a Hollywood cowboy film set, with bullet ridden walls visible from almost every angle of the vicinity and
debris covering the grounds of the holy sanctuary. On Thursday December the 6th 1979 – the Grand mosque
was restored to full use in time for King Khaled’s entrance and his ceremonial tour around the Kaaba which he
concluded by drinking from the well of Zam-Zam and by kissing the black stone - in the same spot where
Juhayman and the false Mahdi had stood before crowds of unsuspecting worshippers only a few weeks earlier.

The following day, on Friday December the 7th 1979, a congregation of around 150,000 thousands worshippers
flooded the Grand Mosque in Makkah to participate in the first ever Friday prayers performed in the sanctuary
since the siege began in late November, it was also set to become the very first Friday prayer performed there
in the new Islamic century. Given the symbolic and emotional significance of such an event, many worshippers
arrived the night before and camped outside its gates in order to participate in this historic ceremony which
was broadcast via satellite across the Muslim world.

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C2 General
The end, once more
There were still pressing issues to be resolved. Something had to be done about those militants who had
survived the ordeal and were now under official custody. Juhayman was initially transported to a hospital
where he received treatment for his wounds. Prince Turki al-Faisal paid him a personal visit during his stay
there and the two men had a conversation which concluded with Juhayman apologising for his actions and
expressing regret for his decisions. He then pleaded with the Prince to intercede with King Khaled on his
behalf, Juhayman had hoped that Prince Turki would petition the king to pardon him but he could not have
been more mistaken in his judgement, unlike the council of Ulamah – Prince Turki had absolutely no sympathy
for Juhayman and his supporters. After all, wasn’t the al-Saud regime Juhayman’s primary target? Would he
have granted them the same leniency had his group successfully seized control of the nation? These are
questions to ponder over but Prince Turki al-Faisal completely refused to help Juhayman.

Saudi Arabia had suffered immeasurably as a result of Juhayman’s actions and hundreds if not thousands had
perished during the ordeal, nevertheless - there was to be absolutely no compassion towards the leading and
active proponents of this movement, they had to be eliminated just like the original Ikhwān were eliminated
by King Abdul Aziz fifty years earlier.

On the 9th of January 1980, Juhayman and sixty-two of his fellow rebels were publicly beheaded, their
executions sent a direct warning to any surviving advocates of the Ikhwān and to their sympathisers that the
Saudi establishment would not tolerate any such movements. Amongst those executed were Saudi citizens,
Egyptians, Yemenis, Kuwaitis, Sudanese and Iraqis. Fifteen executions took place in Makkah – which is where
Juhayman himself was killed, ten more were executed in Riyadh, seven each in Madinah, Dammam, Buraidah
and Abha, and five in Hail and Tabuk.

However, the Saudi authorities exercised considerable restraint because not all those convicted were
sentenced to death. The death sentences of nineteen militants were reduced to lengthy prison terms and in
the cases of 23 others (all women and children), two-year sentences were handed out, which had to be served
special correctional facilities. Those under the legal age of consent were enrolled into child protection services.

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The Salafi Kingdom
It was truly a nightmare and things in Saudi Arabia were never the same following this horrendous episode.

King Khaled’s reaction to the entire saga caught many people by surprise. He responded to the events by
introducing stricter religious legislation and policies throughout the kingdom, effectively reversing much
kingdom’s progress leading up to the events in 1979. Religious institutions were financed more heavily, the
Ulamah were granted more power and Saudi society was subjected to a stricter code of Islamic conduct.

Almost immediately following the events in 1979, Saudi Arabia was transformed into a pious and ultra-
conservative society and for the very first time in the modern history of the kingdom, there were wide bans
and restrictions placed specifically on its female population. Their presence in the public realm was almost
considered a moral offense. Women were prohibited from driving or being seen in public without the presence
of a male relative. The public segregation of genders came into full effect and religious police were employed
to monitor and regulate social interactions in public, resulting in more and more women being confined to the
home.

Furthermore, the kingdom’s institutions were to be thoroughly Islamacized, with Saudi’s school curriculum
providing more and more focus on religious texts while simultaneously removing subjects such as foreign
languages and history from its core subjects.

Juhayman may have lost the battle but he won the war.

The Saudi Arabia he left behind reflected much of what he had envisioned in his writings and speeches, for
example –the music shops that he and his supporters targeted in Madinah were now illegal nationwide, so
were cinemas and bars. Music was banned altogether, with performances from famous Lebanese singers such
as Fairouz and Samira Tewfik no longer being broadcast on television. The sale of alcohol too, carried severe
penalties for those caught trading either privately or publicly.

But Saudi’s transformation did not stop there, as this new stage of development marked the beginning of
Saudi’s missionary phase. For the first time in its history, the al-Saud began to focus on the deliberate and wide
propagation of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab’s books and teachings beyond the realms of Arabia. The
Saudi religious movement took on international dimensions. They used more of the funds generated from the
sale of petrol, to print and distribute vast amounts of literature worldwide.

Translations of the Glorious Quran became more prevalent in the English and French speaking world as did
abridged and summarized versions of Hadith literature and manuscripts on basic Islamic rituals, with this tidal
wave of Saudi propagation flooding the Muslim world, but in particular the Western nations – a new
generation of Muslims was beginning to emerge.

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PAGE 40
The Saudis also created funds and offered grants for the establishment of numerous Mosques worldwide, they
also assigned monthly stipends and salaries for Saudi trained clerics and teachers to administer these
international Mosques and centers of propagation. For the upcoming generation of Muslims – particularly
those born after the events of 1979, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was perceived as the beacon and champion
of true Islamic teachings, they had in fact re-invented their image and restored their position as the supreme
reference and authority when it comes to the correct interpretation, teachings and practice of Islam.

Over the coming decades, the teachings of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab also became far more
popular globally and Saudi clerics gained a wider audience beyond the confines of their immediate students
and local congregants.

Lectures were being taped, translated and transmitted to millions of immigrant Muslim communities and
newly converted Muslims in places as far off as the United Kingdom, France, America, Trinidad, Nigeria,
Pakistan and even Russia.

The momentum built up by Juhayman and his group would soon spill over into the battlefields of Afghanistan
during the late 1980s following the soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It would not be incorrect to say that Afghanistan was indeed the next chapter, in this very interesting saga.

C2 General PAGE 41
Bibliography & References
BOOKS
 The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of al Qaeda.
Yaroslav Trofimov, New York: Doubleday, 2007. ISBN 0-3855-1925-7
 Prophets and princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the present. Mark Weston, Hoboken, 2008,
ISBN0470182571
 Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, Steve Coll, Penguin, 2005,
ISBN 9780141020808
 The Desert King: The Life of Ibn Saud, David Howarth, Collins, 1956
 Muhammad ibn Abdil Wahhab: his life-story and mission. Jalal Abualrub, January 2003. Madinah
Publishers and Distributors. ISBN 978-0-9703766-5-7
 Kingdom without borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers. Madawi al-Rasheed,
2009, Capstone. ISBN 978-0-231-70068-9.
 The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud (audio book), Robert Lacey, Blackstone Audio, Inc, 1997

ARTICLES
 Juhayman 40 years on, Published by ArabNews.com. Retrieved February 2020
https://www.arabnews.com/juhayman-40-years-on
 Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman Al-ʿutaybi Revisited, Thomas
Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 39, No. 1 (Feb.,
2007), pp. 103-122

AUDIO ARCHIVES & LECTURES


 Aux origines du Wahhabisme, Radio Meridien Zero (Radiomz.org), Broadcast on Friday December
23rd 2016
 Unity upon what? Dr. Bilal Philips. Delivered in 1993, United Kingdom
 1979: When the Ka'bah was hijacked by the Fake Mahdi. Dr. Yasir Qadhi. Delivered on April 12th
2014, Norway
 The Siege of Mecca, Yaroslav Trofimov. Delivered October 1st 2007 at the Eugene Lang College of The
New School for Liberal Arts.

DOCUMENTARIES & TELEVISION INTERVIEWS


 Abdul Aziz, Unity. King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 2012
 Mohammed Bin Salman: On Saudi Arabia before 1979, broadcast by al-Arabiya English on March 19th
2018

WEBSITES AND ONLINE RESOURCES


 https://www.jstor.org/
 https://www.britannica.com/
 https://www.wikipedia.org/
 https://www.abdulhaqqbaker.com/category/salafism/

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