Drittwirkung

Germany [de]

Martin Borowski

Content type: Encyclopedia entries

Product: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative
Constitutional Law [MPECCoL]
Article last updated: February 2018

Subject(s):
Constitutional interpretation — Freedom of religion — Judicial review of legislation — Powers and
jurisdiction of constitutional courts/supreme courts — Judicial review — Judicial decisions — Islamic
states — Censorship — Freedom of belief — Freedom of expression — Individual rights — Limitations on
rights
Published under the direction of the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law.
General Editors: Rainer Grote, Frauke Lachenmann, Rüdiger Wolfrum.

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 A.  Definition
1.  The German expression Drittwirkung (in literal translation ‘third-party effect’) refers to
effects of constitutional rights of one private party for another private party. This is to say
that if one private party (individual, private corporation, or other non-state-actor) is the
holder of a certain constitutional right against the state, this constitutional right has
Drittwirkung if and when it gives rise to legal effects for other private parties. Since this
phenomenon refers to legal effects between and among private parties on the horizontal
level (as opposed to the vertical level between the state and a private party), it can also be
called ‘horizontal effect’ or ‘horizontal application’ (→ horizontal application).

B.  Origins
2.  The issue of Drittwirkung was a fiercely debated issue in German constitutional law in
the 1950s and 1960s. Constitutional rights are addressed primarily to public authority. Are
there, however, also legal effects of constitutional rights at the horizontal level? Basically
two main models were proposed: indirect and direct Drittwirkung. Hans Carl Nipperdey,
president of the German Federal Labour Court from 1954 to 1963, defended the idea of
direct Drittwirkung (Currie (1994) 182–183; Cherednychenko 5; Papier 1336–1338). Günter
Dürig argued on behalf of a form of indirect Drittwirkung (Cherednychenko 5; Papier 1341–
1342). It was basically Dürig’s version of indirect Drittwirkung that the → Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (‘FCC’) supported in the
seminal Lüth decision in 1958 (→ Lüth Case (Ger)). Erich Lüth, a politician from Hamburg,
called for a boycott of the then latest film of director Veit Harlan, who produced the
notorious anti-Semitic film Jud Süß at the behest of Joseph Goebbels in 1940. Harlan was
awarded damages because of ‘intentional damage contra bonos mores’ according to Section
826 of the German civil code, by the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg. Lüth’s
constitutional complaint brought the case before the FCC, which ruled that Lüth’s call to
boycott was justified by → freedom of expression as a constitutional right, so that the
expression ‘intentional damage contra bonos mores’ needs to be interpreted in conformity
with the constitution to the effect that Lüth’s case does not count as an instance. The court
ruled that constitutional rights also establish an objective order of values (objektive
Wertordnung). A judge who is called to decide a lawsuit between and among private parties
is not limited to apply private law as such; he or she is also empowered and required to
interpret private law against the backdrop of the objective order of constitutional values
(Lüth (1958) 205 (Ger); see Currie (1994) 181–185; Kommers 361–368).

3.  The saga continued eleven years later with Blinkfüer (Blinkfüer (1969) (Ger)). The local
magazine, Blinkfüer, in the north of West Germany, continued to print the television
programmes of the German Democratic Republic even after the East German Regime
erected the Berlin wall in 1961. The conservative publishing house Springer threatened
newsagents that they would not continue to supply their papers to those who also sell
Blinkfüer. This was a serious economic threat, because newsagents generally depended on
the turnover and profit generated by Springer’s popular high-circulation papers. Most gave
in to the pressure. Blinkfüer sued Springer for damages and finally lost before the German
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), because the court regarded Springer’s course
of action as protected by freedom of expression. The FCC disagreed, because a merely
economic threat does not count as a permissible means in a deliberative democracy such as
Germany (Blinkfüer (1969) 264–265 (Ger)).

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 4.  Although criticism in the literature never fell silent (see, for example, Hager), the FCC
confirmed this case law in a great many subsequent decisions (see, among others, Soraya
(1973) (Ger); Arzthaftung (1979) (Ger); Handelsvertreter (1990) (Ger); Bürgschaft (1993)
(Ger); Parabolantenne (1994) (Ger); Caroline von Monaco I (1998) (Ger) (→ Caroline von
Monaco Case (Ger)); Caroline von Monaco II (1999) (Ger); Benetton I (2000) (Ger);
Benetton II (2003) (Ger); Stasi-Streit (2005) (Ger); Abstammungsfeststellung (2007) (Ger);
Caroline von Monaco III (2008) (Ger); Le Corbusier (2011) (Ger); VBL (2014) (Ger);
Auskunftsanspruch des Scheinvaters (2015) (Ger); Abstammungserklärung (2016) (Ger);
Sampling (2016) (Ger)). The idea of indirect Drittwirkung as the rule with only exceptional
rights to which direct Drittwirkung is attributed proved to be a model that was adopted by
many constitutional systems.

C.  Key Questions

5.  Three key questions need to be distinguished. To begin with, do constitutional rights
exhibit legal effects between and among private parties at all? The second key question,
which has been the subject of a protracted debate, is how to reconstruct Drittwirkung
properly—is direct horizontal effect a more convincing reconstruction than indirect
horizontal effect? Finally, if there is Drittwirkung, the question of its strength arises—do
constitutional rights play a key role in shaping the relation between and among private
parties, or a rather ancillary role? Often the second and the third question are confounded
on the basis of the assumption that direct Drittwirkung is necessarily strong or tends to
result in strong horizontal effect, while indirect Drittwirkung is necessarily weak or tends to
be weak. This is not, however, true—there can be weak direct Drittwirkung as well as
strong indirect Drittwirkung (Alexy (2002) 355–358). The strength of horizontal effect is a
matter of normative argumentation that can be distinguished from the analytical issue of
the construction of Drittwirkung.

1.  The Existence of Drittwirkung

6.  Constitutional rights are rights of an individual or another private party against the
state. This characterization is suggested by many provisions in bills of rights in
constitutions, which emphasize that the state (or other manifestations of public authority) is
the addressee of constitutional rights rather than fellow private parties, eg Article 1, para.
3, German Basic Law: ‘[t]he following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary as directly applicable law’ (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany:
23 May 1949 (as Amended to 11 July 2012) (Ger)). The same goes for international
→ fundamental rights, such as the convention rights of the → European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (‘ECHR’). Article 1 of the
Convention reads: ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’. Private parties
are holders of the right rather than its addressees, so that a private party cannot base a
claim against another private party on constitutional rights.

7.  To be sure, an act or omission of the state vis-à-vis one private party often has necessary
effects vis-à-vis another private party. For example, if and when the state enacts a criminal
statute that prohibits this or that fraudulent behaviour in commercial activities, this counts
as an interference with an individual’s liberty to pursue one’s profession as one wishes.
From the point of view of negative rights the question is whether this interference can be
justified. The addressees of this criminal prohibition can base a claim on a constitutional
right against the state to have the constitutionality of the relevant act reviewed. If the
criminal prohibition is upheld, there is an effect for third parties. Certain fraudulent
activities are banned, so that third parties are protected from falling victim to these
fraudulent activities. The question is, however, whether such an effect is a merely factual

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 phenomenon or actually a legally relevant effect. It is a legally relevant effect if and when
there are rights to protection against the state as instances of positive constitutional rights.

8.  The moral foundation of constitutional rights and international fundamental rights
counts as an argument to perceive such horizontal effect as legally relevant. These rights
objectively claim to transform human rights as moral rights into the law (Borowski (2007)
40–41; Alexy (2014) 19–20). Moral rights as such, which do not presuppose the law, the
state, or any other institutional framework, are rights erga omnes (Alexy (1998) 247–248;
Borowski (2001) 46). If an individual has a → right to life, this is a right erga omnes that no
other individual, or no corporation, private or public, deprives the former individual of its
life. With the institutionalization of the state and the law, these moral rights with their erga
omnes structure are transformed into legal rights in the form of constitutional rights and
international fundamental rights, which are technically addressed to the state as the
omnicompetent power that governs society. This is not to say that any relevant effect for
third parties is necessarily lost in this transformation; there are still good moral arguments
for Drittwirkung of the legal instruments. The hypothetical example of a state that does not
criminalize murder and homicide and does not replace a criminal prohibition of these acts
with other effective means of the protection of its citizens’ lives is telling: would we say that
the indirect protection of life to which a criminal prohibition of murder and homicide gives
rise is a merely factual effect rather than a legally relevant effect? Would we say that an
individual does not have any right to protection against the state to the effect that no other
individual deprives the former individual of its life, if and when the state has effective
means at its disposal, that the former individual has not? These rhetorical questions suggest
that the question of the existence of Drittwirkung or horizontal effect needs to be answered
positively. In particular, large private → corporations in their roles as employers, landlords,
or bankers can be so powerful vis-à-vis individuals that the situation calls for some form of
constitutional protection.

2.  The Reconstruction of Drittwirkung

9.  The classic juxtaposition is between direct and indirect Drittwirkung. For a
comprehensive solution, the latter form needs to be expanded to Drittwirkung mediated by
rights against the state.

(a)  Direct Drittwirkung

10.  According to direct Drittwirkung, constitutional rights exhibit legal effect in the
horizontal relation between and among private parties, so that private parties become both
holders and addressees of constitutional rights. In Lüth, direct Drittwirkung meant that
Harlan would be the addressee of Lüth’s freedom of expression and that Harlan would be
constitutionally required by that provision to tolerate Lüth’s opinion and the form in which
he expressed it—the call to boycott of Harlan’s most recent movie.

11.  Two forms of such direct horizontal effect can be distinguished. According to the first
form, another private party simply takes the place of the state in the vertical relationship
between private parties and the state. It is easy to see that this cannot work, for the
provisions on constitutional rights are tailored to the state and its specific powers—for
example, the state is empowered to limit constitutional rights, while private parties are not.
What is more, the neutral state is under a stronger obligation to consider an individual’s
need for protection than another autonomous individual. It is hardly surprising that this
simplified form of direct horizontal effect has received little if any support in the literature;
it was and is rather used as an artefact by supporters of indirect Drittwirkung as an attempt
to reduce the idea of direct horizontal effect on the whole ad absurdum. According to the
second, more reasonable form of direct Drittwirkung, an individual’s obligation stemming
from constitutional rights is modified with an eye to scope and strength compared to the

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 obligation of the state. The debate on this more reasonable form of direct horizontal effect
largely turns on the wording of the relevant provisions, most of which assume that only the
state is the addressee of constitutional rights. By exception, there are some very few
provisions on constitutional rights whose wording suggests direct Drittwirkung.

(b) Indirect Drittwirkung

12.  The prevailing opinion in Germany has been for quite some time indirect Drittwirkung,
brought about by interpretation of acts of parliament and lower levels of law in conformity
with the constitution. As already mentioned, the provisions on constitutional rights also
establish an objective order of values (objektive Wertordnung), which give rise to a
radiation effect (Ausstrahlungswirkung) on law below the constitution that influences every
legal relation in the legal system (Currie (1994) 184; Kommers 368; Alexy (2002) 352–354).
According to this reconstruction of indirect horizontal effect, any legal effect between and
among private parties is established by means of private law. Constitutional rights indirectly
give rise to rights and obligations that take on the form of private law. There is hardly any
legal effect imaginable that could not be brought about by both direct and indirect
horizontal effect, and the strength of horizontal effect does not, as already mentioned,
necessarily depend on its construction as direct or indirect. Any indirect horizontal effect in
the classic sense depends, however, on the existence of an act of parliament that can be
interpreted in conformity with constitutional rights.

(c) Drittwirkung Mediated by Rights against the State

13.  To arrive at a comprehensive reconstruction of Drittwirkung, traditional indirect
Drittwirkung needs to be developed further into what one could call ‘Drittwirkung mediated
by rights against the state’. The idea is that Drittwirkung is always mediated by rights of
one of the private parties against the state (negative or positive rights). Indirect horizontal
effect is established by the content of the rights in the vertical relationship. There can be
vertical rights to judicial protection that give rise to indirect horizontal effect, and even
vertical rights to legislation. It is crucial to distinguish two sides of such indirect horizontal
effect, the negative side and the positive side.

(i)  The Negative Side of Drittwirkung

14.  Lüth illustrates the negative side of Drittwirkung. Lüth was required by a court to pay
damages to Harlan because of the allegedly unlawful call to boycott. This is an interference
with Lüth’s negative rights (hence: negative side of Drittwirkung) by the state. For the court
is a state organ, whose actions are legally attributed to the state—independent of whether
the state interferes for the sake of the protection of the other individual alone or not. This
interference is only justified if and when this interference (i) has a basis in a parliamentary
act (in the Lüth case section 826 of the German civil code) and (ii) represents an
interpretation of this act that is in itself constitutional.

(ii)  The Positive Side of Drittwirkung

15.  Drittwirkung also has a positive side. For example, in the Blinkfüer case there was no
interference with Blinkfüer’s liberty by state action. The economic pressure exerted by
Springer on the newsagents was the act of a private party. This act cannot be simply
attributed to the state. Rather, the problem was that the court refused to grant protection
to the small magazine against the economically powerful media corporation, Springer,
which tried to ruthlessly enforce its political opinion by means of sheer economic power.
This is to say that the problem was not unconstitutional positive action, it was
unconstitutional omission—for the positive side of Drittwirkung, rights to protection as an
instance of positive rights are key. In the recent debate on Drittwirkung the role of positive

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 rights is often emphasized (see, for example, Alexy (2002) 360–365; Cherednychenko 6;
Gardbaum (2011) 397; O’Cinneide and Stelzer 177).

(iii) The Necessity of Both Sides

16.  A proper reconstruction of Drittwirkung presupposes both sides, the negative and the
positive side. Attempts to reduce both sides to a reconstruction based on negative rights
alone resort to the thesis that in cases such as Blinkfüer the interference by the party can
be attributed to the state, which is hardly convincing (Alexy (2002) 360–361). There are also
attempts to base both sides of Drittwirkung on rights to protection, but cases such as Lüth
are cases in which an interference with liberty rather than an omission of protection is at
stake.

(iv) Rights to Legislation

17.  Thus far little difference between traditional indirect Drittwirkung supported by the
FCC and Drittwirkung mediated by rights against the state may have become apparent.
Indeed, the traditional reconstruction can be understood as a part of the more
comprehensive reading. In both Lüth and Blinkfüer the interpretation of statutes in private
law in conformity with the constitution can be seen as part and parcel of an assessment of
claims stemming from negative rights (Lüth) and positive rights (Blinkfüer). Traditional
indirect Drittwirkung (or, as Barak, calls it, the ‘judiciary model’; at 25–28) runs into
problems, however, either if there is no act of parliament to be interpreted in conformity
with the constitution or if there is one, but legal methodology does not permit what would
be a constitutionally required interpretation of this act. Then rights to legislation come into
play, which is to say that the legislature is also the addressee of Drittwirkung brought about
by constitutional rights, not only the judiciary and the executive. This can be illustrated by a
case decided by the Hessian Higher Administrative Court (‘HHAC’) in 1990
(Gentechnikanlagen (1989) (Ger)). In this case, a licence to operate an industrial plant for
the production of insulin, which made use of genetic engineering, was at stake. At that time
there was no act of parliament in Germany for the regulation of industrial use of genetic
engineering. Thus, there was no statute that could be interpreted with (what was in the
view of the court) the constitutional requirement of protection for life and health against
the dangers from genetic engineering. The HHAC regarded genetic engineering as
particularly dangerous and held that in such a situation the limitation of liberty is the rule
and liberty the exception rather than the other way round, so that industrial use of genetic
engineering would be permitted only after express permission in a parliamentary statute.
This reversal of the fundamental rule that liberty is the rule and its limitation the exception
met with fierce criticism in scholarly writing. If one actually regards genetic engineering as
so dangerous, and if interference with liberty of the pharmaceutical company requires that
there be an act of parliament, only a right to legislation offers a sound solution.

(d) Conclusion
18.  Where the provisions of a → bill of rights suggest that the state rather than a private
party is the addressee of constitutional or human rights, indirect Drittwirkung in the form
of Drittwirkung mediated by rights against the state offers the most convincing
reconstruction.

D.  Drittwirkung in the Comparative Perspective

19.  The debate on Drittwirkung or horizontal effect focuses largely on the German model
of indirect Drittwirkung and, to some extent, the → state action doctrine in United States
(‘US’) constitutional law, which is found on the other end of the spectrum.

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 1.  US Constitutional Law and the State Action Doctrine
20.  According to the state action doctrine in US constitutional law, constitutional rights are
protections against state action. The → Supreme Court of the United States held at the end
of the nineteenth century that the Fourteenth Amendment is not addressed to private
individuals (Virginia v Rives (1880) 318 (US); recently confirmed in United States v
Morrison (2000) (US)). This doctrine, which applies generally to all constitutional
protections (on exceptions see Chemerinsky 495–517), is based on (i) textual arguments, (ii)
the idea that common law covered the horizontal relationship between and among private
parties sufficiently, and (iii) for the sake of preservation of autonomy of the individual
(Chemerinsky 489–492). The last argument was also used in the German debate as a key
argument against direct Drittwirkung; it does not necessarily rule out indirect Drittwirkung
in its classic form. Just as in the case of German classic indirect Drittwirkung, judicial
enforcement of private interests can be regarded as state action that is committed to the
constitution (see Shelley v Kraemer (1948) 18 (US); New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 265
(US) (→ New York Times v Sullivan Case (US)); Cohen v Cowles Media Co (1991) 668 (US);
see, however, also Evans v Abney (1970) 454 (US); on this case law see Giegerich 284–450;
Saunders). This covers only, however, the negative side of Drittwirkung (and even that not
fully, owing to areas in which ‘state action’ is denied). With an eye to the positive side of
Drittwirkung, an additional problem is posed by the fact that in US constitutional law there
is much hesitation to regard constitutional rights as positive rights (Currie (1986);
Gardbaum (2011) 401–402). This is to say that indirect Drittwirkung is rather limited in the
US (Ferreres Comella and Kumm; O’Cinneide and Stelzer 179–180).

21.  Insofar as constitutional rights exhibit no horizontal effect, the standards they set to
public authority can, however, be made applicable to private parties by means of an Act of
Congress (Chemerinsky 489–490).

2.  The National Level and the Regional Level

22.  At the national level, beyond Germany and the US, many countries followed and follow
generally the German idea of indirect horizontal effect, for example Italy, Spain, Japan
(Barak 22–25), and the Netherlands (Cherednychenko 9–14). At the regional level in
Europe, Drittwirkung of the rights of the ECHR has been accepted by the → European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR). The reference to positive obligations is characteristic of indirect
Drittwirkung (see, for example, X and Y v the Netherlands (ECtHR) (1985); Öneryildiz v
Turkey (ECtHR) (2004); Opuz v Turkey (ECtHR) (2009); see furthermore Harris et al 23;
Schabas 90–91; Röben 280–281; Grabenwarter and Pabel 140–142).

23.  There has also been a protracted debate in Latin America, in which the erga omnes
nature of human and fundamental rights has been emphasized in the context of
Drittwirkung, so that → amparo proceedings can also be instituted against private parties
(Brewer-Carias 18–19; Mijangos González). The → Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) has found a violation of a Convention right not only in cases of state action, but
also where the state allowed an act to take place ‘without taking measures to prevent it or
to punish those responsible’ (Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (IACtHR) (1988); Godínez
Cruz v Honduras (IACtHR) (1989)). In more recent judgments, the Court emphasized
positive obligations of the state that reflect Drittwirkung (Masacre de Mapiripán v Colombia
(IACtHR) (2005); Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil (IACtHR) (2006)). In its Advisory Opinion OC
18/03 of 17 September 2003, the IACtHR developed another strand in its case law,
according to which Convention rights give rise to ius cogens (see Mijangos González 15–
23).

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 24.  In the Commonwealth, debates on horizontal effect of fundamental rights were
sparked, in particular, by seminal cases in Canada (RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1986)
(Can); see generally Weinrib and Weinrib; O’Cinneide and Stelzer 183–184; Barak 19–20)
and South Africa (Du Plessis v De Klerk (1996) (S Afr); see generally Cheadle). Owing to the
characteristics of the constitution and the legal system of the United Kingdom there is a
particular debate on the domestic horizontal effect of the rights of the ECHR, which have
been given ‘further effect’ by the Human Rights Act 1998 (Phillipson; Hunt;
Cherednychenko 14–21).

3.  Drittwirkung in International Instruments on Human Rights

25.  The issue of horizontal effect is not explicitly discussed for each and every instrument
for the protection of human rights in international law. Where the issue is actually taken up,
there is a clear tendency towards indirect horizontal effect as mediated by rights against
the state. This applies, in particular, to the rights of the → International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966) (Castan and Castan 41–44, 101–103).

4.  Drittwirkung in European Union Law

26.  The rights of the → Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000),
which are addressed to the organs and agencies of the European Union (‘EU’) itself and the
Member States under certain conditions, exhibit Drittwirkung along the lines developed
under the ECHR (see Jarass 451–453; Röben 286). The same applies to fundamental rights
as general principles of EU law according to Article 6, para. 3 of the Treaty on European
Union (‘TEU’) (Craig and de Búrca 193–196).

27.  There has also been a protracted debate on horizontal effect of treaty provisions or
primary law in general. The Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) ruled on
several occasions that treaty provisions may give rise to legal effects between and among
private parties (see, for example, Defrenne v SABENA (CJEU) 39 (1976); The International
Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union (CJEU) 56–66 (2007)). The
literature on this issue is divided (see Ehlers 198–199; Lohse; Papier 1353–1360; Schepel;
Caro de Souza).

28.  Horizontal effect of primary EU law needs to be clearly distinguished from the issue of
horizontal effect of secondary EU law, most notably from the classical problem of direct
horizontal effect of directives (see Craig and de Búrca 204–220 with further references).

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Lohse, EJ, ‘Fundamental Freedoms and Private Actors—towards an ‘Indirect

Horizontal Effect’’ (2007) 13 EPL 159.

Mijangos González, J, ‘The Doctrine of the Drittwirkung der Grundrechte in the Case
Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) InDret 1.

O’Cinneide, C, and Stelzer, M, ‘Horizontal Effect/State Action’ in Tushnet, M, Fleiner,

T, and Saunders, C, (eds), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge
2013) 177.

Papier, H-J, ‘Drittwirkung der Grundrechte’ in Merten, D, and Papier, H-J, (eds),
Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa vol. II (Müller 2006) 1331.

Phillipson, G, ‘The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal Effect’ and the Common Law: A
Bang or a Whimper?’ (1999) 62 ModLRev 824.

Röben, V, ‘Grundrechtsverpflichtete und Grundrechtsgeltung’ in Dörr, O, Grote, R,

and Marauhn, T, (eds), EMRK/GG Konkordanz-Kommentar vol. 1 (2nd edn Mohr
Siebeck 2013) 253.

Saunders, C, ‘Constitutional Rights and the Common Law’ in Sajó, A, and Uitz, R,
(eds), The Constitution in Private Relations (Eleven 2005) 183.

Schabas, WA, The European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2015).

Schepel, H, ‘Constitutionalising the Market, Marketising the Constitution, and to Tell

the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU
Law’ (2012) 18 ELR 177.

Tushnet, M, ‘The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative

Constitutional Law’ (2003) 1 ICON 79.

Weinrib, LE, and Weinrib, EJ, ‘Constitutional Values and Private Law in Canada’ in
Friedman, D, and Barak-Erez, D, (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart 2001) 43.

Select Cases
Abstammungserklärung 1 BvR 3309/13 (19 April 2016) BVerfGE 141, 186 (Ger).

Abstammungsfeststellung 1 BvR 421/05 (13 February 2007) BVerfGE 117, 202 (Ger).

Arzthaftung 2 BvR 878/74 (25 July 1979) BVerfGE 52, 131 (Ger).

Auskunftsanspruch des Scheinvaters 1 BvR 472/14 (24 February 2015) BVerfGE 138,
377 (Ger).

Benetton I 1 BvR 1762/95, 1 BvR 1787/95 (12 December 2000) BVerfGE 102, 347
(Ger).

Benetton II 1 BvR 426/02 (11 March 2003) BVerfGE 107, 275 (Ger).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
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 Blinkfüer 1 BvR 619/63 (26 February 1969) BVerfGE 25, 256 (Ger).

Bürgschaft 1 BvR 567/89, 1 BvR 1044/89 (19 October 1993) BVerfGE 89, 214 (Ger).

Caroline von Monaco I 1 BvR 1861/93, 1 BvR 1864/96, 1 BvR 2073/97 (14 January
1998) BVerfGE 97, 125 (Ger).

Caroline von Monaco II 1 BvR 653/96 (15 December 1999) BVerfGE 101, 361 (Ger).

Caroline von Monaco III 1 BvR 1602/07, 1 BvR 1606/07, 1 BvR 1626/07 (26 February
2008) BVerfGE 120, 180 (Ger).

Cohen v Cowles Media Co (1991) 501 US 663 (US).

Defrenne v SABENA Case C-43/75 (CJEU) (8 April 1976) ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.

Du Plessis v De Klerk (CCT8/95) [1996] ZACC 10 (S Afr).

Evans v Abney (1970) 396 US 435 (US).

Gentechnikanlagen 8 TH 685/89 VGH Kassel (6 November 1989) NJW 1990, 336

(Ger).

Godínez Cruz v Honduras (Judgment) (IACtHR) (20 January 1989) Series C No. 5.

Handelsvertreter 1 BvR 26/84 (7 February 1990) BVerfGE 81, 242 (Ger).

Le Corbusier 1 BvR 1916/09 (19 July 2011) BVerfGE 129, 78 (Ger).

Lüth 1 BvR 400/51 (15 January 1958) BVerfGE 7, 198 (Ger).

Masacre de Mapiripán v Colombia (Judgment) (IACtHR) (15 September 2005) Series

C No. 134.

New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 (US).

Öneryildiz v Turkey (ECtHR) (30 November 2004) App 48939/99.

Opuz v Turkey (ECtHR) (9 June 2009) App 33401/02.

Parabolantenne 1 BvR 1687/92 (9 February 1994) BVerfGE 90, 27 (Ger).

RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 573 (Can).

Sampling 1 BvR 1585/13 (31 May 2016) BVerfGE 142, 74 (Ger).

Shelley v Kraemer (1948) 334 US 1 (US).

Soraya 1 BvR 112/65 (14 February 1973) BVerfGE 34, 269 (Ger).

Stasi-Streit 1 BvR 1696/98 (25 October 2005) BVerfGE 114, 339 (Ger).

The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union
Case C-438/05 (CJEU) (11 December 2007) ECLI:EU:C:2007:772.

United States v Morrison (2000) 529 US 598 (US).

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 VBL 1 BvL 9/12, 1 BvR 1145/13 (6 May 2014) BVerfGE 136, 152 (Ger).

Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment) (IACtHR) (29 July 1988) Series C No. 4.

Virginia v Rives (1880) 100 US 313 (US).

X and Y v the Netherlands (ECtHR) (26 March 1985) App 8978/80.

Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil (Judgment) (IACtHR) (4 July 2006) Series C No. 149.

Select Documents
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (done 7 December 2000,
entered into force 1 December 2009) (2001) 40 ILM 266.

COE ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms’ (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213
UNTS 221 (European Convention on Human Rights).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966,

entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.

Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants (Advisory Opinion

OC-18/03) (IACtHR) (17 September 2003) Series A No. 18.

Treaty on European Union (signed 7 February 1992, entered into force 1 November
1993) [1992] OJ C191/1 (Maastricht Treaty).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law; date: 19 August 2019