UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NAPHTALY EMMANUEL NGESA

REG NO: R67/38989/2016

SUPERVISOR:
DR.MARTIN OUMA

IMPLICATIONS OF PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND

LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

A research project submitted in partial Fulfilment of a Bachelor‘s Degree in

International studies to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
(IDIS), University of Nairobi

2019

i
 DECLARATION

I Naphtaly Emmanuel Ngesa declare that this research project is my original work and has not

been presented to any other examination body.

Signature……………………….….. Date………..………..…

STUDENT: NAPHTALY EMMANUEL NGESA REG. NO. R67/38989/2016

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University

of Nairobi Supervisor.

Signature……………………….….. Date………..………..…

SUPERVISOR: DR. MARTIN OUMA

ii
 DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to my loving mother for her unending support during the period of

this study. I also dedicate it to my friends for their support and accountability in ensuring I

worked on this study diligently.

I also dedicate this research to all efforts being carried out to fight the threat of illicit arms for

a peaceful and cohesive environment for all.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge The Almighty Father in heaven for enabling me to successfully pursue this

course. Secondly to my beloved mother and family for your support during my studies. To

my dear friends who constantly encouraged me, Kevin Kimutai, Bradley Wandera, Mwanzo

Mutuku, Wellington Mbuvi and the ‗Mans‘ crew, thank you very much. I also acknowledge

the sincere guidance of my work by my supervisor, Doctor Martin Ouma without whose

support this work would be incomplete.

I am also indebted to James Owino, expert on Arms proliferation whose wealth of

information proved extremely valuable. I am also indebted to the support of my colleague

Leah Chelang‘at who encouraged me even when times were very tough. You are truly a gem.

Lastly, I would love to acknowledge everyone else who was a part of this journey with me

and held my hand at different times, your actions will not go unrewarded.

iv
 ABSTRACT

Over the years, the use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has become increasingly

wide spread around the world, owing to their portability and easy use. This has resulted in

their presence at every corner in the world. The wide spread use of SALW has enabled their

illicit use in conflicts around the globe and in various criminal activities. This has resulted in

loss of life and destruction of essential infrastructure. These and other detrimental effects

pushed the international community to formulate instruments against the dangerous trend.

Such instruments such as the UN Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the

illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects (PoA) and the firearms

protocol have enhance the global efforts against SALW proliferation. These have worked in

tandem with regional instruments against proliferation of SALW. The Horn of Africa, has

over the years been plagued by the influx of illicit small arms and light weapons. This has

resulted in violent conflict of untold magnitude and other security issues that have resulted in

a falling economy and degrading of the security fabric in the region. The Nairobi protocol,

the regions instrument against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the regions

instrument has had a varying degree of success. There are still some issues experienced even

after the adoption of the protocol. This study aims to investigate why this is so and ways to

make it more efficient.

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ................................................................................................................. ii
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................. iv
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi

CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................................. 1

INTROUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY…………………................. 1

1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background to the study …………………………………………………………………2

1.2 Problem Statement ........................................................................................................... 4

1.3 Research Questions ……………………………………………………………………...5
1.4 Objectives of the study ..................................................................................................... 6

1.2.1 Main Objective ..................................................................................................... 6

1.2.2 Specific Objectives................................................................................................ 6

1.5 Literature Review .............................................................................................................. 6

1.5.1 Small arms and light weapons…………………….. ............................................ 6

1.5.2 Prolifeartion………………………………………............................................... 8

1.5.3 The small arms and light weapons problem: a brief overview …………………..9

1.5.4 Proliferation of SALW in the Horn of Africa ..………………………………….12

1.5.5 The Nairobi Protocol ..…………………………………………………………...13
1.5.6 Gaps in the literature ……………………………………………………………..13
1.6 Hypotheses ……………………………………………………………………………….13

vi
1.7 Research Justification ……………………………………………………………………14
1.7.1 Policy justification ……………………………………………………………….14
1.7.2 Academic justification …………………………………………………………...14
1.8 Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................................14

1.9 Research Methodology ......................................................................................................16

1.10 Definition of terms …...………………………………………………………………....17

1.10.1 Diversion ………..…………………………………………………………………….17

1.10.2 Brokering ...…………..…...…………………………………………………………..17

1.10.3 Marking ………………………………………………………………………………17

1.10.4 Tracing ……………………….…………………………………………………….…17

1.11 Chapter Outline ................................................................................................................17

CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................................................................20

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE………..........20
2.0 Dynamic of small arms and light weapons in the world …………………………………20
2.1 Proliferation of SALW in the Middle East…………………......................................... ...21

2.1.1 Arms control initiatives in the Middle East …………………………...……………….24

2.2 Proliferation of SALW in Asia ………………. ............................................................... 25

2.2.1 Arms control initiatives in Asia ………………………………………………………..28

2.3 Proliferation of SALW in Europe…………………………...............................................28

2.3.1 Control of proliferation of SALW in Europe ………………………………………….30

2.4 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………….31

vii
CHAPTER THREE ...............................................................................................................32

SMALLARMS AND LIGHT WEAPON PROLIFERATION IN AFRICA…................ 32

3.0: Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 32
3.1 Historical perspectives of SALW proliferation in Africa ………………………………..32

3.2 Contributors to proliferation of SALW in Africa ………………………………………..34

3.2.1 Porous Borders …………………………………………………………………………35

3.2.2 Diversion form State stockpiles ………………………………………………………..35

3.2.3 Arms from external sources …………...……………………………………………….36

3.3 Implications of SALW to security in Africa ……………………………………………..38

3.3.1 Violent extremism and radicalisation ……………………………………………….....38

3.3.2 Increased organised crime ……………………………………………………………..39

3.3.3 Increased conflict tendencies …………………………………………………………..39

3.4 Control of proliferation of SALW in Africa ……………………………………...……...40

3.4.1 Bamako Declaration …………………………………………………………………...40

3.4.2 SADC Protocol ………………………………………………………………………...41

3.4.3 ECOWAS Convention on small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related
materials………………………………………………………………………………….......44

3.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..45

CHAPTER FOUR ..................................................................................................................46

PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE GREAT

HORN OF AFRICA ………………………………………………………………...……...46
4.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 46
4.1 Historical perspectives of SALW proliferation in the Great Horn of Africa..................... 46

4.2 Contributing factors to the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the horn
of Africa………………………………………………………………….............................. 48
4.2.1Weak capacity of states …………………………………………………………………48
4.2.2 Violent extremism and radicalisation …………………………………………...……..49
viii
4.2.3 Conflict between communities ………………………………………………...………49
4.2.4 Diversion from Government stockpile ……...................................................................50
4.3 Security implications resulting from SALW proliferation in the Horn of Africa…..……51

4.4 Control of proliferation of SALW in Africa ……………………………………………..51

4.5 The Nairobi protocol …………………………………...………………………………..52

4.5.1 Legislative measures, Law enforcement and Operational Capacity ……………...……54

4.5.2 Transparency, Information Exchange and Harmonisation of information …………….55

4.5.3 Import, Export, Transfer and Transit of Small Arms and Light Weapons ………….....56

4.5.4 Corruption ……………………………………………………………………………...57

4.5.5 Community education and awareness programmes ………………………………..….57

4.5.6 Institutional Arrangement ……………………………………………………………...58

4.6 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………….59

CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................................. 60

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.............60
5.0 Introductions ......................................................................................................................60
5.1 Summary of findings …………………………………………………………………….60

5.1.1 Security implications from illicit SALW proliferation ………………………………..60

5.1.2: Security implications of Illicit SALW in Africa ………………………………….…..61

5.1.3: Security implications of illicit SALW proliferation in the Horn of Africa region ……62

5.1.4: Control initiatives against illicit proliferation of SALW …………………………...…63

5.2 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………….64

5.3: Recommendations……………………………………………………………………….65

5.3.1 Welfare for soldiers ……………………………………………………………………65

ix
5.3.2 Cross-Border smuggling monitoring and border patrol ………………………….……65

5.3.3 Legally binding instruments …………………………………………………………...65

5.3.4 Adress issues affecting pastoral communities …………………………………………66

5.4 Further research ……………………………………………………………………….…66

LIST OF REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………..67

x
xi
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

In the world of arms, there are various categories of arms. Small arms, referred to also as

firearms, are usually operated mostly by one person. They tend to be easily portable and

operated, due to their size. Small arms include handguns, rifles, and light machine guns.

Light weapons, on the other hand, are operated by a small group of personnel. These may

include heavy machine guns, mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. These arms are in use

around the world by states for self-defence but become a danger when they are misused and

diverted into illicit use1.

The proliferation of these small arms and light weapons are a major problem and pose a great

threat to the overall security in the international system. Owing to the various armed conflicts

and security mishaps, proliferation of SALW‘s continues to be a major security issue. In the

region, this is a major threat to security. Their use has resulted in a massive loss of property

and lives around the region in various circumstances such as armed conflict and organized

crime2. The goal of the study, therefore, is to investigate the link between the proliferation of

SALWs and current security levels in the region as well as find suitable solutions to the

problem.

1
United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs: Small arms; use and misuse
2
The Global Threat of Small Arms and Light Weapons -- A Primer,
https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/primer.html( May 2019)

1
1.1 Background to the study

Conflict is not a new phenomenon in the international system. The earliest records of the

armed conflict date back to the year 2700 BCE which took place in Mesopotamia between

Sumer and Elam. Since then, the armed conflict has become more advanced with the

development of newer weapons within a greater magnitude of damage. Africa‘s interaction

with small arms and weapons dates back to the early days of colonization in which they were

used to quell rebellions and on the other hand, push back European forces. These arms would

be acquired through trade with European merchants or as spoils of war from previous

victories. The Maji area is considered by scholars as one of the first hubs for firearms in the

Horn of Africa region3. This area, located in Southwestern Ethiopia hosted various markets

where ammunition was used as a currency of trade. Some of the arms were essential in

various communities for activities such as hunting and cattle rustling. African interaction

with arms continues subsequently during both world wars where Africans were taken by their

colonial powers to fight alongside them. Examples of such include the Kings African Rifles

who were taken from British colonies in East Africa. Some battles were even fought on

African soil. Such include the East African campaign during the First World War (1914 –

1918). The campaign was fought between the Germans and the British forces around the

Maktau hill in Taita Taveta Another relevant example is the North Africa campaigns from

1940 – 1943 (WW2) fought by the British for control of the Suez Canal and vital oil reserves

in the Middle East. The world wars played vital roles in increased proficiency of arms by

Africans. In addition to this, the number of arms in circulation increased in the region. In the

following years, this increased proficiency proved instrumental in various resistances around

the continent. The Mau Mau in Kenya for instance built and repaired guns aside from

acquiring some from colonialists during their struggle. The Mau Mau is said to be the origin

3
Wepundi M,Nthiga E., Kabuu E., Murray R. and Alvazzi del Frate, Availability of Small Arms and
Perceptions of security in Kenya: An assessment (Geneva,Small Arms Survey, 2012)

2
of SALW proliferation in post-colonial Kenya due to their vast influence and presence during

the independence struggle. This, in addition to the presence of operatives in vast areas, both

rural and urban increased the proliferation. This is a problem still experienced today,

especially in rural areas. Post-colonial Africa (especially during the cold war era) was

characterized by various armed conflicts and political instability in various areas around the

continent.

In the Horn of Africa region, the proliferation of SALWs has been a great concern, with very

devastating results on the region‘s security as well as development. The region was once

viewed as with the most armed conflict in the continent. This is owed to the polarity of

national borders in the region, facilitating easy of transit of weapons across the region. To

curb this, various protocols such as the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and

Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of

Africa4 have been formulated with varying levels of success. This study aims to evaluate the

success of these protocols and investigate the need for more measures against the said threat.

In Kenya, the proliferation of SALWs has been a growing concern, especially with the

increase of terrorist attacks around the country, with the latest attack being the attack on Dusit

d2 hotel in Nairobi. The attack left pondering questions as to how the attackers were able to

cross the Kenya – Somalia border in possession of the arms. This and other acts of terror in

the past have prompted action against extremism by the government as well as military action

in Somalia5. Apart from terrorism, armed conflict, though in small numbers continues to be a

problem. Local conflicts have also played a major role in the increase of illicit arms

proliferation. The 2007-2008 Post election violence in Kenya saw a great increase in the

number of illicit arms, most of which could still be in circulation today. Communities such as

4
Adopted on 21 April 2004 and came into force on 5 May 2005
5
Such as the operation Linda Nchi by the Kenya Defence Forces in 2011 against the Alshabaab

3
the pokot and the Turkana have engaged in armed conflict over the year‘s .This recurrent

conflict has been fuelled by the ready availability of weapons .The Nairobi Protocol, while in

force, has not been able to reduce the threat. Other measures by the national government such

as voluntary disarmament6 methods of arms control have been successful to some extent,

however have not been able to eliminate the problem fully. This study aims to evaluate these

measures and their setbacks as well as seek suitable solutions to ensure a safer country and

region, creating an optimal environment for development.

1.2: Statement of the research problem

The independence and end of cold war brought a new wave of positive diplomatic relations

among states. This was to ensure unending peace and economic prosperity in the region.

Unfortunately, this era also brought with it a wave of intrastate conflicts that ended whose

effects transcended national borders, even leading to outbreak of other conflicts. These

conflicts have led to great loss of life, property and infrastructure. In addition to this, it has

also brought an environment unsuitable for economic growth and foreign investment.

In the Horn of Africa region, these conflicts were responsible for displacement of persons

from their home country and collapse of governments such as Somalia. It is actually

estimated that the horn of Africa region is home to the worst conflicts in the continent7. Most

of these and other conflict situations in the continent have been exacerbated by the

proliferation of Small arms and light weapons. This does not imply that they are the direct

cause of conflict, rather their use increase the magnitude of the conflict. In some instances,

6
Such as Operations Okoa maisha and Chunga mpaka of Kenya in 2008
7
Bereketeab, R. (Ed.). (2013). The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security. London:
Pluto Press. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183p650

4
SALW have acted as a multiplier effect in a conflict8, leading to outbreak in adjacent areas.

Aside from this, their proliferation in attributed to the rise in crime rates around the sub

region. In addition to this, it has led to a state of insecurity through conflict as well as violent

terrorist activity leading to the drop in economic stability and loss of infrastructure as well as

human life. The Nairobi protocol among other regional instruments have been formulated in

order to ensure states close loopholes perceived to encourage arms proliferation. To some

extent it has been successful but has not fully cured the ill. National governments have also

held amnesty surrender of arms severally but has not been able to acquire all illicit arms in

circulation9. Due to this, the problem of illicit arm proliferation is still persistent. With this,

the fundamental query of research is, why is proliferation of SALW still a problem in the

region despite measures against it? This study therefore aims to investigate the reason for this

failure and examine various loopholes in protocols and regimes against SALW proliferation

in the region.

1.3: Research Questions

1.3.1 How has SALW implication affected security in the world?

1.3.2 How has SALW implication affected security in the Horn of Africa?

1.3.3 What instruments have been formulated against the proliferation of SALW?

1.4 Objectives of the study

Broadly, this study aimed to investigate various security implications that have risen from

illicit SALW proliferation.

8
Sofia Tuvestad, Mark Bromley, Emma Bjerténgünther and Johanna Larsson, The Proliferation of small arms
and light weapons in fragile contexts, Stockholm Forum on Security and Development.
9
It is reported that most civilians surrender unoperational arms and retain the serviceable ones, compromising
the efficiency of the voluntary surrender programs.

5
Specific objectives Include:

i. Investigate the implications SALW proliferation has on security in the global arena.

ii. Examine the implications SALW proliferation has on security in the Horn of Africa.

iii. Examine various regional instruments against the proliferation of SALW.

1.5 Literature review

1.5.1 Empirical literature review

The Empirical review focuses on the implications of SALW proliferation in the world,

implication of SALW proliferation in the Horn of Africa and the regional instruments to curb

the proliferation of SALW. It will begin with a detailed definition of Small arms and light

weapons and proliferation. After will be followed by an overview of Small arms and light

weapons proliferation. This will be followed by a review of the various regimes and

protocols around the world around proliferation of small arms as well as other international

efforts to curb the growing threat. This will be followed by a focus on the Horn of Africa

region. This will conclude with a revision of a major framework on small arms and light

weapons, which is the Nairobi Protocol.

1.5.2.1 Small arms and light weapons

The concept of small arms and light weapons fails to have a single agreed definition. There is

even debate on the clear distinction between small arms and light weapons. This is because

with technological development over time and changing weapon dimensions, the definition is

subject to amendment every now and then. The definition of these arms is based on various

6
factors such as size and portability10.The United Nations Panel of Government Experts in

their 1997 report on small arms consider small arms and light weapons as both civil and

military weapons that fire a projectile with condition that it may be carried by a person, small

number of people are required to operate and can be transported by a light vehicle. Examples

of small arms may include pistols, rifles and grenades among others. Light weapons include

portable anti-aircraft guns, Mortars and other weapons of less than 100mm calibre.

Suneel Kumar 11 defines small arms as weapons that can be carried by one or two persons,

mounted on a vehicle or carried by an animal pack from one place to another. This definition

is in contradiction with most other definitions of small arms as it widely seems to equate to

light weapons. Kumar however continues to state that in some cases, the term small weapons

is used in generalisation of arm groups namely: light weapons, small arms and ammunition

and explosives. He further gives examples of small arms such as pistols, revolvers, grenades,

rifles and carbines. He classifies light weapons as heavy machine guns, mounted grenade

launchers, anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns among others.

It is clear in these definitions that there is no clear distinction between small arms and light

weapons. In some cases, light weapons happen to just be advanced versions of small arms.

Small arms are the most widely used in criminal activities and armed conflict, mainly due to

their practicality and accessibility.

10
1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts report on small arms
11
Kumar, S. (2008). SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: A GLOBAL THREAT TO HUMAN
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 69(4), 787-800. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/41856469

7
1.5.2.2: Proliferation

The term proliferation first came to mainstream use during the cold war with the nuclear arms

race. In recent times however, it has been widely used to explain the spread and movement of

weapons, most of which are illicit between national borders. Proliferation of arms is made

possible with the existence of porous borders, securing easy transfer of these arms. The

proliferation of small arms and light weapons according to the United Nations12 poses a great

threat to long term social and economic development, particularly in developing states.

It is evident that, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons act as a catalyst in areas

experiencing tension. Most weapons proliferated are usually acquired from the national

stockpile using illegal means such as diversion13 of government stockpile and or civilian arms

stockpile. In addition to this, proliferation occurs through government sponsored arm

shipments to areas under embargo. This is done in the aim of financial gain14 or to destabilise

a government by arming non state actors. This is referred to as grey market15. Other forms of

proliferation include sales in the black-market and craft production16.

1.5.2.3: Small arms and light weapons proliferation

Small arms and light weapons are easy to transport, use and maintain, hence their extensive

use in conflicts around the world. In addition to this, their easy accessibility has led to their

presence in almost every corner of the world. The problem of arms proliferation is therefore

12
UN chronicle Vol. XLVIII No. 4 2011 December 2011
13
transfer of arms, mostly government owned to illicit armed groups
14
It may also have political motives.
15
Transfer of arms from a state that have (arms) questionable legality. Could be done by states as a political
strategy.
16
Production of homemade firearms. Preferably for personal use and sale in black market.

8
not limited to any country, rather has a global impact. Also, the large number of armed

conflicts that have been and are being experienced, fuel the need for arms by combatants. In

addition to this, current economic hardships have also added to the demand for arms in the

black market. As stated earlier, these arms may have been destined for legal use by state

forces but are diverted from the intended user17. In some cases, the perpetrator of this act is

the state itself. In this case, the state may directly divert arms from the national armoury and

supply to armed groups18. In other cases it may supply the armed groups with the funding and

necessary training to militants. A relevant example of this is the funding and training of

combatants in proxy wars by world powers during the cold war.

Small arms and light weapons are singlehandedly one of the major causes of death in the

world indirectly or directly. According to former UN secretary general, Koffi Anan, small

arms and light weapons are accountable for large casualties, even more than the nuclear

warheads launched at Japan in WW2. He adds that, considering the immense amount of

damage they have caused over the years, they could be well termed as weapons of mass

destruction19. This shows the sheer damage small arms and light weapons have rendered to

the world.

The illicit flow of small arms and light weapons has been associated with various social as

well as economic issues as slow infrastructure development especially in the areas the arms

have been used. Aside from this, these areas have experienced some form of political

17
Kirkham Elizabeth and Greene Owen, Preventing diversion of Small Arms and Light weapons: Issues and
priorities for strengthened controls, Safe World and University of Bradford.
18
Such as diversion of arms by the South Sudan Armed Forces to Jonglei communities
19
United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects New York,
26 June – 7 July 2006

9
instability hindering the much needed development in the area. According to the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the proliferation of SALW is a great

hindrance to development. The negative impact on development is a major issue that cannot

be ignored. The Safe world training manual on SALW control states that SALW use causes

long term ripple effects on development. It adds that without proper security, development is

not possible as secure environment is optimal for development. Various efforts have been

carried out against the Lack of development in turn creates an environment of poverty,

making emergence of more social issues such as increased crime. The cycle seems to go on.

It is therefore in the best interest of the international system to find suitable ways to control

their proliferation.

Production of SALW is vast due to their majority use by government forces such as the

police as well as civilian gun holders (in this case, specific small arms apply). According to

Small arms survey, there are over 1000 companies operating in 100 countries currently,

which is a very large number. Since the opening of the 21st century, Africa saw a double in

the number of arms producing companies, most of which are based in South Africa. In

addition to this, it estimates legal trade in arms to have earned an estimated 8.5 billion US

dollars every year. This shows how lucrative the arms business is. The question that one

would pose is, ―if this amount is for legal trade of arms, what about the money earned

through illicit trade?‖ According to small arms survey, illicit trade of arms in the black

market mostly occurs on a regional and local level. In addition to this, this trade is done

According to the UN office on disarmament affairs, a lot of trade in illicit arms is now

10
occurring in the dark web20. In the dark web, traders and potential customers freely negotiate

on pricing and delivery of these arms. In some instances, there are even reviews on the

various arms by individuals who have used them. Although various efforts by anti-cyber-

crime institutions to nab such users of the dark web, it is very hard due to the sheer number of

loopholes in the web.

Aside from control of illicit arm trade online, there have been various efforts in the

international system to enforce arms control .This has been majorly done by use of

agreements such as the UN firearms protocol, popularly known as the Vienna protocol which

was formulated to back the UN Programme of Action (PoA) .The Un PoA is regarded as the

ultimate manual for states in tackling the SALW issue. It gives detailed information on the

production, stockpiling, international transfers, law enforcement as well as destruction. In

order to make it effective, supporting agreements had to be formulated such as the firearms

protocol mentioned above. Regional frameworks such as the E.U joint Action and Bamako

declaration can be attributed to the PoA due to the information it gave. These regional

frameworks have been instrumental in tackling the problem on the ground.

1.5.2.4 Proliferation of SALW in the Horn of Africa

The Greater horn of Africa region has been plagued with the problem of SALW proliferation.

This, due to the availability of porous borders and low implementation of agreements has

made SALW a catalyst in various conflicts, for the worse. Due to this, the region is seen as

20
Paoli Giacomo Persi, The Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Dark Web: A Study, UN Office on
Disarmament Affairs occasional papers No.32

11
one of the most prone to conflict in the continent 21resulting in great loss of lives and human

rights violations of great magnitudes .This has been exacerbated by the recirculation of arms

and weapons from the struggles of decolonisation and the cold war arms from neighbouring

regions. Aside from this, rampant cattle rustling especially between Western Kenya and

North Eastern Uganda have increased the volatile situation. Due to this, most proliferated

arms are in the hands of pastoralist groups for defence and/or for vengeance in the event

cattle have been stolen. Knighton22 estimates that there are currently 5 million arms in

circulation among pastoral communities alone. All this has slowed overall regional growth of

economy and security. In addition to the constant supply and demand dynamic of arms in the

region, it is used as a major depot / transit point for illicit arms. From here they find their way

to the rest of the continent through porous borders. Citing the need for an instrument to

tackle the issue, the horn of Africa and great lakes region developed the Nairobi protocol as a

control instrument.

1.5.2.5: The Nairobi protocol

Signed into force by IGAD member states and states in the great lakes region, the Nairobi

protocol seeks to find suitable solutions to the SALW by preventing, combating and

eradicating stockpiling and illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Adopting

most of its provisions from the SADC protocol23, the Nairobi protocol has been regarded as

one of the most comprehensive legally binding regional agreements on SALW.

21
Bereketeab R. (Ed.), The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security (pp. 3-25).
London: Pluto Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctt183p650.7
22
B Knighton, The State as Raider among the Karamajong; Where there are no guns, they use the threat of
guns, p.
1, paper presented at the seminar on Historical Ethnography and the Collapse of Karamajong Culture: Premature
Reports of Trends, African Studies Seminar, St. Antony s College, University of Oxford, 13 June 2002.
23
Protocol on the control of Firearms, ammunition, and other related material in the Southern African
Development Community Region. Went into force in 2004

12
1.5.6: Gaps in the literature

The formulation of various agreements is often done with incredible detail with most effort

being put into the formulation and signing of the agreement and the margins of success

prospects of the initiatives seem very promising. The problem however is the implementation

process of the agreements. Due to this, the problem at hand remains persistent, making hopes

for an illicit arms free area bleak. It is therefore the aim of this study to identify why this is so

and find suitable solutions.

1.6: Hypothesis

H0 There is commitment by states to the regional instruments against proliferation of Small

Arms and Light weapons.

H1 There is no commitment by states to the regional instruments against proliferation of

Small Arms and Light weapons.

1.7: Research Justification

This research study will be highly instrumental in the study of international security and

works related to the impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation. The research

will be relevant on a policy and academic perspective.

1.7.1: Policy justification

On a policy perspective, this research study may be used as a reference by the relevant policy

makers in curbing the SALW problem not only in Kenya but also around the world.

13
1.7.2: Academic justification

Academically, this research will contribute to other scholarly works conducted on the

problem as well as act as a reference material for other researchers in the future.

1.8: Theoretical framework

The horn of Africa region has been plagued by a number of security issues, leading to a

universally experienced rise in political, social as well as economic instability. A sheer

number of these issues have an evident attachment to the proliferation of small arms and light

weapons that has occurred in the area for an extensive period of time. This collective problem

has led states in the region to see the necessity of collective action against this issue.

This collective action by the various National governments is a text book example of the

regional security complex theory. The regional security complex theory is formulated by

Barry Buzan. In his study, people, states and fear, Buzan clearly explains the concept behind

regional security24. He begins by defining a region in security terms where he argues that ―a

distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate

is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other‖. By this he means

that a region is an area of closely located states with similar threats. More often, these threats

are of a security and political nature. He continues to examine a security complex as a group

of states whose primary security concerns link together to an extent that their national

securities differ minimally from one another25.

24
Stone M, Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive Security Analysis, Newyork, Columbia University,
School of International and Public Affairs
25
Berouk Mesfin, The Horn of Africa Security Complex :9 Sep 2013, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

14
The great horn of Africa region closely follows Buzan‘s description of a regional security

complex. The region has faced various transnational security issues such as drug trafficking

and terrorism, with terrorism being the most prevalent transnational crime in the region. This

is evident with the widespread activity of Alshabaab in the region. Their activities span the

whole region. The proliferation of SALW remains a great challenge in the region with the

various security challenges such as political instability26 being attributed to it. The region‘s

geographical location makes it an easy transit point for these arms to be spread across the

continent. In addition to this, the close proximity of states in the region makes the spread of

transnational threats easy as they do not have to go long distances.

It is evident that it would be expensive for each individual state to carry out control measures

and initiatives unique to their state in such a situation. This is why it is essential for regional

states to collectively find suitable solutions. It is not only cost-effective, it fosters relations

between the said states. The regional security complex shows that in the current international

system, a nationalistic approach towards security would not make any sense since current

dynamics of national security are relational.

The current international security environment follows the regional security complex theory

to suit. This is due to the fact that no state can be self-contained and self- reliant to fight

various security threats. These threats require collective action. The horn of Africa for

instance has faced a number of issues on a regional scale with proliferation of SALW being

one of the most prevalent. The Nairobi protocol is a regional initiative against the illicit

proliferation of SALW .This is a true reflection of a collective initiative against a common

26
Also spill over of national instability, Such as the spread of refugees.

15
threat. With the initiative, states in the horn of Africa and great lakes region have a common

interest; eradicating illicit proliferation of small arms. It is with this that the regional complex

theory forms a base in the research study.

1.9: Research Methodology

This study is based on desktop research whereby the research collected secondary data from

books, journals, newspapers and media from online resources. The data was analysed from

which findings, conclusions and recommendations to the problem were acquired.

1.10: Definition of terms

This section provides definitions of key terms that will be seen throughout the research.

These will help the reader comfortably understand the study. These terms include:

1.10.1: Diversion

According to Small Arms Survey, This is generally used to refer to the situation in which licit

arms, mostly government owned are transferred in one way or another to illicit armed groups

making them illicit.

1.10.2: Brokering

This is the facilitation of transfer, payment and documentation of any transaction related to

arms and ammunition for a benefit, mostly financial benefit. The person who carries out the

act is known as the broker.

16
1.10.3: Marking

The application of a unique and permanent inscription on weapons. These inscriptions are

unique by region and country. Marking is mostly done by governments to distinguish their

firearms.

1.10.4: Tracing

This is the tracking of weapons from the point of manufacture and/or import to the point of

illicit use. This is made possible by the marking done to the SALW.

1.11: Chapter Outline

This section gives the reader a roadmap of what to expect to find across the whole study.

Chapter one introduces the research study to the reader. It gives a small background to the

problem of Small Arms and Light weapons proliferation. It further gives a small literature

review on the problem and actions that have been done to control it. In addition to this, it

prepares the reader for the study.

Chapter two provides an extensive review of the SALW problem from a global perspective, it

does this by looking at the implications SALW proliferation have had on their security by

continental region. In addition to this, the chapter also looks at the regional initiatives against

the problem as well as global initiatives such as the UN Programme of Action.

Chapter three extensively reviews the dynamics of SALW from an African perspective. It

reviews the history of Africa‘s interaction with Small Arms and reviews the factors behind

17
their proliferation across the continent. The chapter also reviews the various regional control

initiatives that have been implemented and their varying degrees of success.

Chapter four looks at the SALW issue in the Great Horn of Africa as the case study of the

research. It looks at the history of the region‘s interaction with the issue and the security

implication small arms have had on the region‘s security. It goes further and reviews the

regional initiative to control the proliferation of arms in the region, the Nairobi protocol. It

looks at the various clauses in the protocol and the national initiatives that states have

implemented in line with the protocol. In order to do this, the chapter makes use of the

primary and secondary data acquired during data collection.

Chapter five gives a summary of findings of the study. It reviews the issues emerging from

the case study and discusses the obtained data in relation to the study objectives. In addition

to this, the chapter develops various recommendations based on the observations of the study.

The recommendations are not an assured way to completely address the issue, rather should

be used as a reference for future studies on the issue as well as a reference for policy makers.

18
19
 CHAPTER TWO

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

2.0: Dynamic of small arms and light weapons in the world

As stated earlier, the proliferation of illicit SALW is not confined to a region, rather has a

global perspective most security issues affecting the world today have some form of roots in

the proliferation of illicit SALW in one way or another. In most instances, SALW have been

a multiplier factor to the original problem, exacerbating the crisis. It is believed that the

genesis of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as we know it today is in the

Cold War. During this period most weapons were acquired by support from foreign powers.

These arms were supplied for allied forces to fight in various proxy wars such as the war in

Vietnam .Militants of various factions were supported by the USA, Soviet Union and to some

extent China. All factions provided military equipment as well as troops. Such support was

also accorded in other proxy wars around the world.

Such transfer or arms could be termed as legitimate and legal as nation states willingly

provided arms to states as a form of military strategy. Due to this, in as much as the cold war

is seen as the genesis of transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons, it is not the origin of the

illicit transfer of SALW. The trend of illicit proliferation of SALW began after the end of the

cold war, sometime around the close of the 80s. During this time, the dynamics of conflict

changed from being inter-state to being intrastate27. With no more support from foreign

powers, local militants had to find a suitable alternative; buy and sell arms already in

27
Mack, 'Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline', International Peace Academy, New
York

20
circulation. In other areas, supply and demand dynamics gave the need for craft gun

manufacturers. These local gun smiths replicate designs of already existent models, which

are used in local markets or smuggled out where they are sold for considerably lower prices

as compared to authentic firearms. This has acted to exacerbate the already volatile situation

around SALW. In the proceeding sections, the SALW proliferation dynamics are broken into

continental areas.

2.1: Proliferation of SALW in the Middle East

The Middle East and Asia represent one of the most affected regions by the proliferation of

SALW. This is due to the evident sheer damage that armed conflict has rendered to it over

the years some of which is still being experienced to date. According to the Guardian

newspaper, it is estimated that over the past five years, half of all US arms exports have been

to the Middle East with Saudi Arabia being its biggest customer. The Middle East region has

greatly suffered under the great amount of armed conflicts mostly fuelled by the availability

of arms, both licit and illicit. This availability of arms has fuelled armed conflicts as well as

other security issues such as terrorism, threatening the overall security of the region. Some of

these issues have also had a global impact.

In order to understand the dynamics of SALW in the region, it is important to have a grasp of

the history of SALW proliferation in the region. The Middle East has had long interactions

with arms over the years, beginning with their extensive use during the Ottoman Empire. In

addition to that, they were a tool of trade, capturing slaves and trading them for other

essentials. The modern dynamics of SALW in the region originate from the cold war with

21
massive arms transfer from the USA to the region. During the time, both the USA28 and

Soviet Union were in a race to create influence in the region and woo nonaligned states29.

The USA mainly supplied arms to Saudi Arabia and Iran (before the revolution) and the

Soviet Union on the other hand supplied arms to Iraq, Syria and Egypt. These regional

dynamics ensured security as well as economic growth for the states.

The fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the cold war created a great Geopolitical

shock, and a sudden change in the balance of power in the region. States formerly supported

by the Soviet Union had to reconstruct their economic and political structures. This political

shock extends to the political instability still being experienced in the region today. It is

important to note that former Soviet allies have been embroiled in political unrest in recent

times. This political unrest has added to the ease of proliferation of illicit SALW in the

region. These arms used in mostly armed conflict are acquired from diversion of government

stockpiles and external support from other powers. 30Such arms transfer dynamics have

generated significant challenges to security .These arms have mostly found themselves in the

hands of non-state actors such as terrorists or rebels. According to a SIPRI31, conflict is often

a major access point for illicit arms32. The paper goes forward to state that the dynamics of

arms trafficking in the Middle East and North Africa are highly influenced by external forces

such as conflict, for instance. This can be attributed to the large acquisition of arms by states

pre-empting conflict .It is then during the conflict that large mounts if arms are looted from

28
It is important to note that the need for oil also majorly led US-Middle east relations.
29
Members of the non-aligned movement
30
Mostly for political gain.
31
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
32
Mark Bromley, Giovanna Maletta and Kolja Brockmann, Arms transfer and SALW controls in the Middle
East and North Africa: Mapping capacity-building efforts, SIPRI

22
the stockpile, leading to a surge of illicit arms in the state and region. Such is the case in the

Iraq conflict of 2003.It is believed that in the course of the conflict, at least 4.2 million arms

were transferred from the military to illicit armed groups. These arms, mostly acquired from

illegal diversion to armed groups and looting of armouries formed the basis of persistent

instability in Iraq as we know today. In addition to this, these arms have been trafficked and

have found their way in other armed groups in the region. This has contributed greatly to the

rise of armed non state actors such as Al-qaeda. The Al-qaeda has been responsible for

various terrorist attacks in the Middle East and the rest of the world.

The proliferation of arms in the Middle East is a major security issue not only for the region

but also for the rest of the world. The illicit transfer of arms has acted as a catalyst in various

political situations, some of which are still affecting the region. A suitable example of this is

the Arab spring. Beginning in late 2010, the Arab spring was a series of politically motivated

protests and revolutions. Beginning with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in

Tunisia, the protests began and spread like wildfire to the region. This act motivated

revolutions in the region and even spread as far as North Africa. Due to the availability of

arms (from illicit transfers and looting of government stockpile), some protests evolved into

armed rebellions such as in Syria. The Syrian conflict between government forces and rebels

was aided by foreign powers33, with Russia supporting government forces loyal to President

Bashar al-Assad and the United States and some NATO34 states supporting rebel forces.

33
The National newspaper, Syria: Who‘s backing who and why? January 24,2018
34
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

23
The Syrian conflict has taken a global perspective, with creating great rifts in diplomatic

relations between states35. This shows the effects of SALW proliferation not only in terms of

security but in other aspects as well.

The illicit transfer of SALW in the Middle East has incurred the region a large range of

security challenges. The region has experienced great loss of life, and vital infrastructure

resulting in slow economic growth and high poverty levels among issues. It is evident that a

solution has to be sought.

2.1.1 Arms control initiatives in the Middle East

Though global control initiatives such as the UNPoA (Programme of Action) take centre

stage in global arms control efforts, regional instruments are also essential as they are tailored

to handle local problems associated to SALW. As stated earlier, there is an evident need of

arms control in the Middle East region. This has proven difficult to do, considering the

various issues in the region over the years. Despite this, the Middle East states have

formulated various control measures against SALW proliferation. Some actions have

involved restrictions of arm imports and sales. This has been meagrely successful as some

foreign powers with interests in the region have been supplying arms. Regional frameworks

against SALW include the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group36.

This was a great initiative as key states in the region (even Israel) were able to convene and

discuss matters concerning regional security and arms control. There have been other

35
Martini, J., York, E., & Young, W. (2013). Syria as an Arena of Strategic Competition. In Syria as an Arena
of Strategic Competition (pp. 1-10). RAND Corporation. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt2jc9hh.1
36
JONES, P. (1997). Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Reflections on ACRS. Security Dialogue, 28(1),
57-70. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/26296561

24
frameworks as well but their success is debatable. The region however continues to suffer

under the SALW problem.

2.2: Proliferation of SALW in Asia

SALW transfer in Asia The proliferation of SALW in Asia traces its roots to the cold war.

During this time, most arms came in through support from foreign powers. These arms were

aided by these foreign powers in various proxy wars around the region. Examples such as the

Korean War and the war in Vietnam show the sheer support the USA and the Soviet Union

gave to their allies during the period37. The cold war gave Asia an opportunity to understand

the dynamics of SALW and their transfer across various areas. SALW proliferation in Asia

today however is majorly for criminal use. Alongside illicit transfer of arms, there are various

craftsmen producing replicas of weapons. A relevant example is the Darra gun market. It is

considered to be the largest illegal gun market. According to Riaz Ahmad in ―The Way of the

Gun: The legendary gun smiths of Darra , This age old market (approximately 150 years old)

has been a focal point for arms in the region. Here, skilled gunsmiths produce replicas that

work as good as the authentic weapon but at a cheaper price. This market has enabled the

transfer of illicit weapons to the greater Asia due to the ready market across the border. It is

believed that the Darra gun market has been a choice source for arms by armed groups38.

This is due to the fact that the market is not regulated by government hence the arms are

rarely traceable. This market and supplementary arms from outside have a substantial role in

creating internal instability in Pakistan and South Asia. According to Muhammad Munir‘s

37
Mueller, J. (1971). Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam. The American Political
Science Review, 65(2), 358-375. doi:10.2307/1954454
38
Aqab Malik, PhD, Darra Adam Khel: ―Home Grown‖ Weapons ASPJ Africa & Francophonie - 1 st Quarter
2016

25
study 39the proliferation of these arms have been aggravated by neighbouring Afghanistan

and the Kashmir insurgence. According to him, they have not only sustained the supply-

demand factor but have facilitated arms flow from the Northwest and Northeast.

Other than this, SALW proliferation has been influenced by culture whereby arm ownership

is seen as a status symbol hence are used to show one‘s view in politics. Their use has been

further explained as ‗self-defence‘. SALW in Pakistan have also facilitated commitment of

various transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking. It is estimated that due to

the presence of porous borders, trafficking of the two is easy and is catalysed by the use of

these arms. This and other factors such as its geographical position have resulted to a

continuously thriving illegal economy raking in millions of dollars.

It is evident that SALW has brought Pakistan a lot of ―suffering‖. This is especially to those

not involved on the trade or use. Muhammad estimated that 80% of casualties from the

proliferation of SALW are usually non-combatants. This exhibits the great need for some

form of control. Muhammad states that controlling of these arms has been a tough task for

the government. The government has implemented various disarmament tactics over the

years namely house to house searches which were short lived due to the technicalities.

Another strategy that has been used was the halt of fresh arms licenses in the early 2000‘s

.This was used in conjunction with an amnesty period for surrender. It is estimated that

during this period, the government managed to recover approximately 2800 arms, which is a

39
The Role of Light Weapons in creating internal instability: Case study of Pakistan, Muhammad Munir,
Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 18, Issue - 2, 2011: 243-260

26
far fetch to the number of arms in circulation at the time. The Proliferation of SALW remains

to be a prevalent problem in the region.

Firearms production for criminal use is rampant in the South east region of Asia40. Illicit gun

makers in the Philippines and Vietnam create replicas of common firearms and sell at a

fraction of the original price in the black market41. These arms are smuggled across the

region facilitating various crimes. According to Former Malaysian Prime Minister Ahmad

Zahid, criminal activity was on the rise in the region, attributed to the smuggling of illicit

arms.42 The Prime ministers statement is supported by a number of scholars who have carried

out studies in the region. This smuggling is believed to have originated from various factors.

For instance, the region has faced a number of internal conflicts over the years, creating an

environment where arms are constantly ‗needed‘. Also, the region is geographically optimal

as it boasts a large coastline and vast national borders, hard to patrol effectively. Indonesia

for instance boasts of 81,000 km of coastline and 8,000,000 km2 of territorial waters.43 This

has led to a number of porous borders, easing the smuggling of arms and other illegal goods.

In addition to this, this has been a multiplier factor in the prevalence of transnational crimes

in the region. This has brought a relative environment of insecurity threatening the social,

economic as well as political wellbeing of the region. This emphasises the necessity for states

in Asia to develop control initiatives against SALW proliferation.

40
Armed violence and Guns in South East Asia ,retrieved from
https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/south-east-asia ( September 2019)
41
Illegal movement of firearms by an individual or a group of actors, mostly non-state.
42
Harian Metro Newspaper, July 29, 2016
43
According to international law, area of the sea immediately adjacent to the shores of a state, about 12 nautical
miles.

27
2.2.1 Arms control initiatives in Asia

Citing the problem SALW has brought to Asian states it was essential that some form of

control initiatives were formulated .It is important to note that the Continent of Asia as a

whole has no joint control initiative, rather has initiatives based on blocs. The Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for instance, citing the great connection between SALW

proliferation and various transnational crimes established the ASEAN ministerial meeting on

Transnational crime44. Having ten members, this meeting meets annually to address matters

on arms smuggling across the region as well as other arms related issues affecting the region

.The ASEAN receives support from Australia, Canada, UNDP and Japan as well as the EU.

The various meetings have been essential in regional integration and enhancing cross border

cooperation and information exchange across members. This has been largely successful as

there is prompt exchange of intelligence on smuggling and illicit arm manufacturing.

Other states in Asia have established personal initiatives based on the UN Programme of

Action.

2.3 Proliferation of SALW in Europe

Europe‘s interaction with Small Arms and Light weapons dates back to the times of the

industrial revolution. In fact, the very origin of small arms and light weapon use is seen to be

in Europe. As the main theatre of both world wars, there was a vast number of arms in

circulation. The proliferation of SALW as we know it today occurred during and after the

Second World War. Proliferation of these arms to non-combatants was facilitated by spoils of

war after various campaigns. In some other instances, arms were supplied by other powers
44
The Issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the context of trans-national organized crime: Its
implications for ASEAN Security

28
for support. The French resistance and other rebel groups got support from allied powers.

Britain dropped weapons to the rebels from their aircraft .These weapons were essential in

fighting against axis occupation of various territories.

The subsequent cold war increased the number of arms in circulation, especially in the

Southern region of Europe. The end of the cold war saw a large number of arms in circulation

in the area. Proliferation of SALW in Europe today is mostly used for criminal purposes, with

arms being sold in the black market to criminals. Technological developments have also

enabled craft production of Arms, according to a Jenzen Jones45 .This has led to an increase

in the number of arms, mostly unregistered due to the capability of one to produce a firearms

at the comfort of their home. However, there is still some flow of illicit arms from the

Southern region of Europe. This is due to political instability and the war in Ukraine. This

war, also known as the hybrid war 46by some broke when Russia occupied the Crimean

peninsula claiming to protect its port access. However the reason behind the conflict is

Russia‘s interest in Crimea‘s natural gas reserves. The conflict has claimed thousands of lives

of both combatants and civilians.

Another factor to SALW proliferation is the influx of refugees in Europe47. In the course of

the Syrian conflict, Europe has opened its doors and welcomed refugees from the area. While

it is a noble move for the European Union, It has posed a security threat, this is because it has

also enabled ISIS48 operatives to infiltrate the region unnoticed. In addition to this, the open

border had rendered it nearly impossible to track movements of refugees in and out of the

45
Behind the Curve :New Technologies, New Control Challenges
46
Kamusella Tomasz, Hybrid war: The real casualties in Ukraine. Retreived from
https://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/09/08/hybrid-war-the-real-casualties-in-ukraine/.
47
Byman Daniel L. , Do Syrian refugees pose a terrorism threat? October 27, 2015
48
Islamic state of Iraq and Syria

29
national border49. This has resulted in various sleeper cells as well as radicalisation in Europe.

The infiltration of ISIS into Europe is evident by the amount of terrorist attacks that have

been witnessed in recent times such as the 2018 Strasbourg Attack in France that claimed 11

people.

2.3.1 Control of proliferation of SALW in Europe

The European Union (EU) has over the years carried out various efforts to deal with the

proliferation of SALW in Europe. Since the close of the cold war, EU states had experienced

the negative effects and was actually the first regional bodies to identify these as threats to

sustainability. In 2005, the EU adopted the Council of the European Union, Strategy to

combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, simply known as

the 2005 strategy50. This strategy, a culmination of earlier efforts by the EU aimed at curbing

the spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The strategy highlighted various key areas that

the EU would expect problems in the near future, these included: terrorism, regional

conflicts, state failure and organised crime. To ensure efficiency the strategy emphasised on

various aspects such as; multilateralism, prevention and cooperation51. The 2005 strategy was

seen as a major milestone in the fight against the proliferation of SALW in the region.

In November 2018, the council of the EU adopted a new strategy, which was a revision of the

2005 strategy. The strategy is mandated to guide integrated and collective action to prevent

the illicit acquisition of SALW and their ammunition by unauthorized actors and to promote

49
Brady, E. (2017). An analysis of Patterns of Change Arising from the Syrian Conflict: Islamic Terrorism,
Refugee Flows and Political Destabilization in Europe. Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of
International Relations, 8(1), 53–67. DOI: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1298
50
Poitevin Cedric, European Union initiatives to control small arms and light weapons: Towards a more
coordinated approachs EU Non-Proliferation Consortium non-proliferation papers No.23 2013
51
Strub Andreas, the EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their
Ammunition. Retrieved from http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/small_arms_eu-
strategy_a_strub.pdf

30
accountability and responsibility with regards to arms trade52.The strategy aims for a

comprehensive approach and has various measures to support the various aspects of curbing

SALW proliferation. This is through four pillars namely; strengthening the normative

framework, implementation of norms in different life cycle phases of SALW, compliance

through monitoring and enforcement and international cooperation and assistance. The

strategy also commits to work hand in hand with international frameworks regarding the

regulation of arms trade and combating illicit SALW proliferation.

2.4: Conclusion

The proliferation of SALW has had a global impact on various aspects such as security and

the economy. It is however positive that states have formulated ways to collectively address

the issue to mitigate operational costs. This is a step forward in ensuring a safe world for all.

52
Duquet Nils, the 2018 EU SALW Strategy: Towards an Integrated and Comprehensive approach, EU non-
proliferation and disarmament Consortium, non-proliferation papers No.62, April 2019

31
 CHAPTER THREE

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN AFRICA

3.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, it was determined that the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and

Light Weapons is a global problem that needs to be fully addressed. This chapter looks at the

issue from an African perspective. The continent of Africa is the most affected region with

illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons. This illicit flow of arms has greatly

curtailed national security and has led to massive loss of life as well as destruction of

essential infrastructure. In some states such as Somalia, they have catalysed conflicts leading

to total collapse of governments. This has necessitated the formulation of initiatives to tackle

the issue. There have been various measures taken to tackle the issue namely the formulation

of various regional initiatives, beginning with the Bamako declaration which applies to all

African Union member states.

3.1: Historical perspectives of SALW proliferation in Africa.

Africa‘s interaction with small arms and weapons dates back to the early days of colonization

in which they were used to quell rebellions and on the other hand, push back European

forces. These arms would be acquired through trade with European merchants or as spoils of

war from previous victories. The Maji area is considered by scholars as one of the first hubs

for firearms in the Horn of Africa region53. This area, located in Southwestern Ethiopia

hosted various markets where ammunition was used as a currency of trade. Some of the arms

53
Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Ryan Murray, and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Availability of
Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment ,Geneva ,Small Arms Survey 2012

32
were essential in various communities for activities such as hunting and cattle rustling.

African interaction with arms continues subsequently during both world wars where Africans

were taken by their colonial powers to fight alongside them. Examples of such include the

Kings African Rifles who were taken from British colonies in East Africa. Some battles were

even fought on African soil. Such include the East African campaign during the First World

War (1914 – 1918). The campaign was fought between the Germans and the British forces

around the Salaita hill in Maktau54. Another relevant example is the North Africa campaigns

from 1940 – 1943 (WW2) fought by the British for control of the Suez Canal and vital oil

reserves in the Middle East. The world wars played vital roles in increased proficiency of

arms by Africans. In addition to this, the number of arms in circulation increased in the

region. In the following years, this increased proficiency proved instrumental in various

resistances around the continent. Post-colonial Africa (especially during the cold war era)

was characterized by various armed conflicts between communities 55and political instability

in various areas around the continent. Civil wars and coups characterized the better part of

the last half of the 20th century. These as well as other factors led to increased flow of arms in

the continent.

As stated earlier, post-colonial Africa was characterized by civil war. This period, parallel to

the cold war period saw many proxy wars fought on behalf of the USA and USSR. Africa

was one of the theatres of this war. Angola, for instance, faced civil war right after gaining

independence in 1975 between three political groups namely: MPLA, UNITA and FNLA.

54
The East African newspaper , Forgotten battlefields: Tracing First World War fighters in East Africa,
Tuesday, Novermber 20 2018
55
Blanton, R., Mason, T., & Athow, B. (2001). Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in
Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 38(4), 473-491. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/424898

33
 56
The Angolan civil war was a proxy war. This is because the various political factions were

supported by various countries with various ideologies during the cold war. For instance,

MPLA was supported by communist states such as the Soviet Union and Cuba, Zaire while

the UNITA and FNLA were supported by capitalist South Africa as well as South Africa,

supported by the United States. The Angolan war is regarded as the best example of a proxy

war. This is due to a large number of foreign powers involved during the course of the war.

These powers gave support in the form of economic aid, troops, weapons and military advice

as well as intelligence. These arms in most instances found themselves in hands of illicit

persons in the course of the war, leading to the proliferation of these arms in Angola and the

adjacent regions. Great economic by the end of the conflict in 2002, the war had claimed

over 500,000 lives of both combatants and civilians. In addition to this, a refugee crisis and

other issues led to the outbreak of other conflicts around the region57 , the Congo war. In

addition to this, the lack of efficient disposal of arms after the conflict led to transfer of the

arms to other areas.

3.2: Contributors to proliferation of SALW in Africa

As said earlier, Africa is the largest victim of illicit proliferation of SALW. The Council of

Foreign relations estimates that there are at least 100 million small arms in circulation of

which most are illicit. This is a cause for great concern. This great number is facilitated by a

number of factors. These factors act as enablers to the action.

56
Pearce, J. (2012). CONTROL, POLITICS AND IDENTITY IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR. African
Affairs, 111(444), 442-465. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/41494511
57
As per the Regional security complex Theory

34
3.2.1: Porous borders

Some states exhibit large national borders. With lack of sufficient funding, it is near

impossible for security forces to effectively patrol the border. This facilitates for a loophole

for illicit arms to be smuggled into through the border. According to enact Africa, extremist

groups such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab take advantage of these poorly secured borders

to smuggle weapons. In addition to this, weak capacity of states makes it a great challenge to

effectively monitor illicit cross-border transfer of arms58. According to interviews conducted

among experts, it was determined that porous borders contributed heavily to cross-border

proliferation of arms. The sheer amount of porous borders around the region make it difficult

for a state to tackle the illicit smuggling from a single front. This issue necessitates collective

action.

3.2.2: Diversion from state stockpiles

As stated earlier, diversion is a situation where licit arms, mostly government owned are

transferred in one way or another to illicit groups. This is a common occurrence in Africa and

occurs in various ways. In some instances it is facilitated by corrupt officials who sell or

broker the illegal sale to non- state actors. A relevant example is the arrest of Nigerian

soldiers for selling arms to Boko Haram militants in 20165960. It has been debated that poor

welfare of military officers could be a contributing factor to this act. This, coupled with

inefficient armoury record oversight facilitate this illegal trade.

58
Alusala Nelson, Africa and arms control Challenges and successes, Enact issue 03,April 2018
59
https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerian-military-some-officers-selling-arms-boko-haram
60
ADESOJI ADENIYI, Ph.D., The human cost of uncontrolled arms in Africa: Cross-national research on
seven African countries

35
Aside from illegal sale of arms, arms are also diverted from government stockpiles through

theft by other armed groups. This, conducted by looting military armouries is done by non-

state actors. Relevant examples of looting include the looting of military armouries in Mali

and Libya by armed militants61. In Libya it is feared that the looted arms could find their way

to terrorist groups62. In addition to this, it is also believed that the same arms have also been

smuggled to other conflict areas in the region. The looting is also facilitated by weak capacity

of states to protect their stockpiles ‗exposing‘ them. Looting of arms is a typical occurrence

in conflict areas due to this.

3.2.3: Arms from external sources.

Most if not all arms in circulation in Africa originated from outside the continent. While

some of them are legally imported into the region for use by state armed forces, most of them

are illicitly imported either by parties within the region or supplied by states and or

multinationals in support of conflicts. The illicit importation of arms is done in conflict areas

by corrupt politicians and members of the elite who take advantage of powerful connections

to acquire the arms. Illegal arms exports by external powers are usually done in pursuit of

national interest. As said earlier in the chapter, powers supported warring parties with arms

as well as other supplies during the cold war. During the period, the state interests were

assimilation of other states to their ideologies, that is communism and capitalism.

61
Chivers C.J., Looted Libyan Arms in Mali may have shifted conflict‘s path, The New York Times, February 7
2013
62
Chivers C.J. , Experts fear Looted Libyan arms may find their way to terrorists ,the New York Times, March
3,2011

36
Support in conflict however has taken a new dimension. Today, conflict is funded by states

and multinational corporations in Africa, in pursuit of natural resources .It is evident that

countries ‗loaded‘ with natural resources in the region are also those that have experienced

the most fierce of conflicts over the years. This has had scholars term resource-rich countries

as ‗cursed‘63. This is because these countries are almost never able to utilise their natural

resources for their benefit.

In funding of conflicts, rebel groups are funded with the necessary arms and other supplies in

order to cause instability. This allows the interested parties evade regulations and taxes

regarding the resources of interest64. The Democratic Republic of Congo for instance has

fallen victim to this. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has most, if not all attractive

minerals. This has made it undoubtedly attractive to foreign powers as a source for these

resources. Belgium for instance has benefited by illegal logging of the Congo forest. In

addition to this, it has in some instances signed agreements for royalties and mining rights in

exchange of arms and other supplies. These findings were of course aptly denied by the

Belgian government. Multinational corporations have also been found to fund conflict in

various areas in Africa. Dutch company, the Oriental Timber Corporation was in 2017

indicted in the Netherlands on acquiring timber illegally in Liberia from former president

Charles Taylor in exchange of arms. The timber, dubbed ‗blood timber‘ is blamed for the loss

63
Harsch E., Conflict resources:From ‗curse‘ to blessing, transforming an African war risk into a peace asset.
Africa renewal, January 2007
64
Alao, A. (2007). Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment. Boydell and Brewer.
Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt81t74

37
of 250,000 lives through supply of arms65. These and other external factors increase the

spread of SALW in their respective states and to the rest of the region.

3.3: Implications of SALW to security in Africa

With the spread of Small Arms and Light Weapon in the region, their use has had some

security implications in the region. Some of these implications to security are direct and

others are a ripple effect resulting from their use. The implications of SALW to security in

Africa include but are not limited to:

3.3.1: Violent extremism and radicalisation

This has both acted as a factor for the spread and also is a security implication of SALW use.

The availabity of Small Arms and Light Weapons has enabled the activity of extremist

groups such as Boko Haram to widen their scope of influence. Their increased activity has

caused a general environment of great insecurity in the Western Africa region .In addition to

this, the proliferation of SALW has allowed such groups to also gain revenue from the sale of

the arms in the black market facilitated by porous borders. This creates a regional security

issue from both the sale and use of the arms.

65
The Guardian Newspaper: Dutch arms trafficker to Liberia given war crimes conviction: Guus Kouwenhoven
convicted of selling weapons to ex-president Charles Taylor during wars that involved mass atrocities, 22 April
2017. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/apr/22/dutch-arms-trafficker-to-liberia-guus-
kouwenhoven-given-war-crimes-conviction

38
3.3.2: Increased organised crime

Due to the availability of arms from illicit trafficking, it is relatively easy for criminal groups

to conduct their activity and even expand their reach. In addition to this, access to more

powerful weapons has enabled these groups to carry out more serious crimes, which are a

great hazard to the society. According to Oxfam, these arms are also used to protect criminal

infrastructure such as drug dens and trafficking routes and may also be used as a tool of

trade66. This coupled with a weak capacity of states to tackle organised crime is very

dangerous for the society and overall national security.

3.3.3: Increased conflict tendencies

The increased number of arms in circulation encourages the outbreak of conflict. This is

because the ‗tools‘ of conflict are readily available. This is a great risk to security because it

becomes a challenge to monitor progress of conflict using the common conflict ‗indicators‘

such as increase in illicit arms smuggling and cross border transfer. With the ready

availability of the arms, conflict is easier to break out. This greatly compromises the security

as well as brings other social issues such as the influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

and increase in Gender Based Violence (GBV).67 This damages the population and is also

detrimental to the economy as well as infrastructure.

66
ADESOJI ADENIYI, Ph.D., The human cost of uncontrolled arms in Africa: Cross-national research on
seven African countries p14
67
In most conflict situations, GBV practices such as rape is used alongside SALW by combatants .

39
3.4: Control of proliferation of SALW in Africa

As stated earlier, the proliferation of Small arms and Light Weapons has brought a lot of

problems to the region and has caused massive loss of life and various infrastructure. In order

to stop this dangerous circle, various instruments were established and are in use today.

3.4.1: Bamako declaration

This initiative was implemented in December 2000 by African Union member states. This

was in response to a decision made during the 35th ordinary session of the Heads of State in

Algiers which called for an African approach to the problem posed by the Proliferation of

illicit SALW. The declaration integrates some aspects of regional arms control initiatives for

a comprehensive document. For efficient address of the issue, it proposes various aspects

such as:68The actions of member states go beyond the protection of national interests,

Promotion of conflict prevention measures and pursuit of pacific solutions to conflict, The

inclusion of both control and reduction of arms as well as supply and demand aspects in

tackling the illicit proliferation problem, Enhancement of the capacity of states to confiscate

and destroy illicit arms as well as place measures against the circulation of SALW and

Promotion of measures aimed at peace and security.

The Bamako declaration also recommend that states should carry out the following actions at

national levels:69Enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies to deal with aspects of

arms related issues .This includes training on investigative procedures, and upgrading of

equipment, Adoption of legislations to make involvement in any way with illicit Small Arms

and Light Weapons and ammunition, Establishment and implementation of frameworks for
68
Article 2
69
Article 3 Bamako Protocol

40
the management of illicit arms, surrender of illicit weapons and reintegration of de-

radicalised youth in possession of these arms, Carrying out of public awareness on the

problem of SALW and the effects and Adoption of legislations to prevent breaching of

international arms regulations.

At the regional level, the declaration encourages states to carry out the following actions:

Encourage bilateral agreements, to establish a common system of control of SALW,

Strengthening of regional cooperation among law enforcement agencies with regards to

SALW proliferation control. This includes but is not limited to information exchange, and

joint training on Small arms and Establishing of mechanisms to coordinate efforts to address

the illicit proliferation of SALW.

The Bamako also appeals to the international community to greatly discourage the transfer of

illicit arms to Africa as well as act on stringent legislations to ensure control over arms

transfer, and track illicit arms transfers. In addition to that, the international community

should actively fund AU efforts to address the problem of illicit SALW. It also encourages

international cooperation with foreign agencies in order to curb the illicit proliferation of

SALW.

3.4.2: SADC Protocol

The Protocol on the control of Firearms, ammunition and other related material in the

Southern African Development Community Region, also known as SADC Protocol was

adopted in 2001 but began work on November 2004. The protocol was formulated citing the

years of conflict and arm influx in the region. The protocol aims to prevent and combat illicit

manufacturing, as well as regulate the legal export and import of arms to and from the region.

41
Before the protocol, there existed a great lack of capacity of governments due to inefficient

government legislation on arms. The protocol raises various aspects such as information

exchange and the legal ownership and manufacture of SALW. In addition to this, it also

seeks to enhance cooperation and exchange of experience around SADC member states. It

also seeks to enhance collaboration with international entities such as the EU and UN for

effective carrying out of the mandate.

For efficiency of the protocol, the state is required to become signatories to international

instruments regarding the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit manufacturing,

destabilising accumulation and trafficking and use of firearms70.Aside from that, the SADC

protocol recommends that states enhance their legislative measures to combat the

proliferation of illicit SALW. This includes incorporating some aspects as national law such

as71: Prohibition of possession and use of Light weapons by civilians and restriction on

ownership of small arms by civilians, Provision of standardized marking of firearms at the

time of manufacture, import or export, Monitoring and auditing the number of firearms

owned by a person, Co-ordination of export and import as well as transit of arm shipments,

regulation of manufacture of arms and related material, Provisions on the seizure,

confiscation and destruction of all arms and related material manufactured or in transit

contrary to licenses and permits and regulation of brokering in state territories.

Aside from this, the protocol also encourages states to increase the occupational capacity of

officer in various departments such as the police, judiciary and related departments to act on

70
Article 4 (INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES)
71
Article 5 (LEGISLATIVE MEASURES)

42
their mandate in accordance to the protocol. The capacity building is to help them to72:

Establish inter-agency working groups to improve co-ordination, information sharing and

analysis of the information, Undertake joint exercises for officials within the region and

facilitate exchange programs for officers within the region and even from other regions, and

Improve and establish where there isn‘t databases and communication systems for monitoring

of cross-border transfer of arms.

In order to prevent diversion from state stockpiles, the protocol expects states to establish and

maintain inventories of firearms and ensure all firearms are marked at the time of

manufacture and import. In addition to this, surplus arms and related material should be

destroyed and destroy arms considered obsolete. States are also expected to carry out public

awareness on efforts to tackle SALW proliferation and encourage responsible ownership and

management of firearms.

The advantage of the SADC protocol is that it acknowledges the Problem of illicit Small

Arms and Light Weapons and Light Weapons as a regional one. With the encouragement of

joint actions, it has ensured regional unity and a noticeable reduction in illicit SALW

incidences.

3.4.3: ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Ammunition and

other related materials

The ECOWAS convention is a successor to the ECOWAS Moratorium of 1998.This is after

the Moratorium was found to be largely inefficient due to its voluntary nature. The

Convention on SALW is therefore an ‗overhaul‘ of the earlier agreement. In comparison to

72
Article 6 (OCCUPATIONAL CAPACITY)

43
the old agreement the convention is legally binding hence obliges signatories to act upon its

mandate. The ECOWAS Convention was adopted in June 2006 but entered into force in

September 2009 after Benin‘s ratification.

The objectives of the convention include the prevention and combat of accumulation of illicit

SALW, consolidate the gains the Moratorium has on the import, export and manufacture of

SALW and strengthen the efforts of the control of SALW within ECOWAS. Aside from that,

the convention is also aimed at building capacity of the ECOWAS secretariat as well as

member states to curb SALW proliferation.

The convention obliges states to ban transfer of SALW as well as manufacturing material in

or from their national borders. This includes transit through their borders. To strengthen this,

it disregards SALW as good so as not to be given exemption as with Article 45 of the

ECOWAS revised treaty (1993). However, states are allowed exemption to this in the case of

need of arms for policing, peace operations and defence.73

The ECOWAS convention also requires states to facilitate exchange of information and

embrace transparency. To do this, states are required, where applicable to establish national

databases and registries on SALW74. The database should include: The particulars on various

arms such as the model and calibre as well as information on owners, former, current as well

as future prospective owners and information on marking of the firearm as well as transaction

concerning the various arms.

In addition to this, member states are required to create a sub-regional database and register

of SALW under the ECOWAS executive secretary. This is to facilitate transparency on

information and information exchange.

73
Chapter II , Article 3
74
Chapter IV Article 9

44
Other requirements include appropriate measures against corruption associated with the illicit

use and proliferation of SALW and necessary measures for management and protection of

government stockpile. With this, it also requires states to facilitate effective collection and

destruction of seized arms as well as arms not needed by government. In addition to this, the

convention incorporates aspects of marking and tracing as well as brokering.

3.5: Conclusion

Africa‘s interaction with illicit SALW has been a major factor to insecurity and various social

issues. There is hope however as regional initiatives as well as the Bamako declaration are in

force and have a considerable progress in curbing the illicit proliferation of SALW.

45
 CHAPTER FOUR

PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE GREAT

HORN OF AFRICA

4.0: Introduction

The previous chapter explored the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in a

continental perspective. It also looked at the various initiatives against arms proliferation in

the continent. This chapter takes a regional outlook into the problem. It will also examine the

regional initiative in the region and look at the degrees of success in tackling the problem.

In the Greater Horn of Africa region, the proliferation of SALWs has been a great concern,

with very devastating results on the region‘s security as well as development. The region was

once viewed as with the most armed conflict in the continent75. This is owed to the polarity of

national borders in the region, facilitating easy of transit of weapons across the region. To

curb this, various protocols such as the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and

Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of

Africa76 have been formulated with varying levels of success. This chapter aims to evaluate

the success of the protocol and investigate the need for more measures against the security

threat.

4.1: Historical perspectives of SALW proliferation in the Great Horn of Africa.

As stated in the previous chapter, Africa‘s interaction with Small Arms and Light Weapons

began in the Maji gun market .This market helped African communities in the region carry

out resistance against European occupation. It is also believed to be the origin of SALW

75
Obi, C. (2013). Foreword. In Bereketeab R. (Ed.), The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts
and Security (pp. Xiii-Xiv). London: Pluto Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctt183p650.6
76
Adopted on 21 April 2004 and came into force on 5 May 2005

46
proliferation in the region. However, the majorly recognized origin of SALW proliferation in

the region is seen to be the struggle for independence as well as the cold war period. These

periods were characterized by armed internal conflicts that led to a great influx of arms from

neighboring areas such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflicts also increased

the demand for arms and need for increased supply. In addition to this, the presence of porous

borders facilitated the spread of these arms to around the region. These arms facilitated the

outbreak of conflict in areas such as Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. The Idi Amin ouster saw a

massive transfer of arms into the hands of civilians. This is after looting of various armories,

especially in the Northern region77. According to Adan, arms looted from Uganda were

proliferated into Kenya‘s North rift and the North West of Uganda78. This could explain the

persistent conflicts in these areas. The Collapse of Somalia under Said Barre influenced the

diversion of massive government stockpiles to illicit armed groups and were transferred

across the region. The resulting conflict creating a ready market for illicit arms, facilitated an

increase in the number of illicit arms as well as a ready source for illicit arms. These readily

available arms have facilitated other issues such as cattle rustling and inter-communal

conflict. In addition to this, the lack of government in Somalia over an extended period of

time has rendered it as an ideal gateway for arms smuggles into the region and continent. The

influx of the Al shabaab in Somalia brought a new dynamic of SALW use in the region.

Taking advantage of the lack of governance in Somalia, they have taken advantage as arms

dealers and also smugglers to outposts in the region. Due to this, the carrying out of their

operation is easy due to ready availability of arms and related material at their disposal. Such

arms have been used in the northern region of Kenya and adjacent areas by the group and

77
Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Ryan Murray, and Anna Alvazzi del Frate Availability of
Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment, Small Arms Survey and Kenya National
Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Geneva.
78
Pkalya R. and Adan M.,(2006) Conflict Management in Kenya : Towards policy Formulation ,Nairobi

47
also by communities. This and other factors have greatly contributed to insecurity in the Horn

of Africa.

4.2: Contributing factors to the illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in

the Horn of Africa

The proliferation of SALW as said earlier is a great problem in the region. To some extent, it

can be argued as the greatest contributor to insecurity in the region. Their use continue to

threaten the peace and economic development in the region. The Spread of arms is influenced

by various factors and may also act as inhibitors to Arms control.

4.2.1: Weak capacity of states

States in the region lack the adequate capacity to track as well as control flow of arms across

borders. In addition to this, the inadequate resources for border monitoring such as limited

equipment and workforce limits border patrol. The lack of effective border monitoring

facilitates for porous borders and smuggling across national borders. According to Darryl

Whitehead79, the large Presence of refugees and many nomadic groups constantly crossing

national borders is a security risk. He explains that refugees are mostly neglected and may

move to sell arms as a means of income generation and for personal protection. In addition to

this, nomadic groups in the region render it difficult to monitor cross border flows. In some

instances, they may be used by organized cartels to smuggle the arms.

Apart from that, lack of sufficient infrastructure makes it difficult to trace arms at the point of

use and from the point of diversion or entry.

79
SALW Proliferation Pressures, The Horn of Africa and EU Responses, Darryl Whitehead
Life & Peace Institute

48
4.2.2: Violent extremism and radicalisation

The Al shabaab has operations spread across the Horn of Africa. This spread is further linked

to under development in various areas in the region, easing the flow of arms. In addition to

this, high poverty rates has encouraged involvement of people, especially the youth with the

Al shabaab. The ‗promise‘ of good compensation for their service to the extremist group

lures them, leading to widespread terror cells across the region80. Each of the terror cells have

access to weapons through smuggling and illicit trade. In addition to that, the Alshabaab is

also involved with illicit sales of arms, owing to the point of the group‘s origin, Somalia.

4.2.3: Conflict between communities.

As stated earlier, the Horn of Africa was at some point seen as having experienced the most

armed conflict. This is mostly characterized by conflict between communities, mostly of a

pastoralist nature. According to a Small Arms Survey report on Kenya, poor policing in

remote areas has influenced a form of gun culture among communities. This has made the

gun seem to be a sign of power .The AK-47 rifle has become synonymous with conflict and

is the choice firearms in conflict areas81. The gun culture among communities triggers a form

of ‗arms race‘ between the communities, increasing the demand of illicit arms. Aside from

that, these arms are needed by communities to protect their livestock from rustling, which is a

major problem among communities in the region. Conflict between pastoralist communities

is mainly on Kenya‘s North rift and West Uganda as well as some areas of Northern Kenya.

Somalia has been in a state of conflict since 1999 when President Said Barre was ousted.

During this period, massive amounts of arms were looted from government stockpiles and

some were spread across the region while others were used in the following conflict. The

80
Trt world magazine, why is Alshabaab making inroads into Kenya? :15 March 2019.Retreived from
www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-al-shabab-making-inroads-into-kenya-24981
81
Due to its reliability in very harsh conditions and relative ease of service

49
conflict was between various clans in a struggle to claim power. This has left Somalia in a

prolonged state of anarchy, where it is believed according to Whitehead has created major

SALW proliferation pressures. In addition to this, the various attempts to salvage the

situation and create a functional government have been largely futile.

4.2.4: Diversion of Government stockpile

As said earlier, diversion is the transfer of arms, mostly from government stockpile to another

actor, in most cases non-state actor. The Conflict Armament Research based in London

conducted a study82 and discovered that in the course of the South Sudan civil war, Uganda

diverted some of its arms to the South Sudanese military. This, while in violation of

international arms embargoes showed the disregard that Uganda has for the resolution of the

conflict. The report goes further to expose how Uganda created false end-user certificates,

showing the imported arms were for use by the Uganda military when in fact they were

destined for use in South Sudan. The arms were attained from Bulgaria, Romania and

Slovakia. These arms fuelled the civil war leading to the deaths of around 390,000 people and

has created a massive humanitarian crisis. Apart from this, Uganda also diverted arms to

civilians, better known as ‗vigilantes‘ in Moroto, in response to insecurity83. While this action

was successful in restoring security to some extent in the onset, slow payment and other

issues led to corrupt dealings and eventually the vigilantes became an illicit group, a danger

to the community it was once mandated to protect.

Apart from diversion by Uganda, South Sudan in some instances diverted some of its

stockpile to the Lou Nuer ethic group as well as other civilians. This was through the South

82
Sudanese Stockpiles and Regional Weapon Diversion (2017): An analysis of captured equipment in the
possession of the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army-North in the Nuba Mountains, Conflict Armament Research.
83
Bevan James, Crisis in Karamoja: Armed violence and the failure of disarmament in Uganda‘s most deprived
region. Geneva, Small Arms Survey.

50
Sudan Defence forces and the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army. Such actions increased the

SALWs in circulation and the degree of responsible use is debateable.

4.3: Security implications resulting from SALW proliferation in the Horn of Africa.

The proliferation and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa has had

various implications to the security of the region .Some of these issues are ripple effects from

the direct implication.

Direct implications to security include increased terror activity around the region due to

access to arms across the extremist terror cells. Aside from that there is an increase in the

occurrence of conflict due to easy availability of the major enabler of conflict, Arms.

The spread of arms also influenced a spike in crime rates. This is due to the relative ease of

acquiring an illicit firearm. This coupled with increasing rates of poverty has led to the influx

of more crimes requiring arms such as robberies. A ripple effect from these security

implications is the drop in economic growth due to pull out of international investors.

4.4: Control of proliferation of SALW in Africa

Seeing the adverse effects the illicit proliferation of SALW had on Security and causing

destruction as well as human suffering, it was essential that a comprehensive control,

initiative .Although the Bamako declaration was in force it was still essential for a regional

initiative for tailor made solutions to the problems in the region. Such deliberations led to the

formulation and adoption of the draft Nairobi protocol in 2003 during a meeting of national

police chiefs in the region (EAPCCO)84and came into force in 2005. The Nairobi protocol

takes largely from the SADC protocol, and addresses some of the loopholes the SADC

protocol has. As such it is legally binding to the signatories as compared to the Nairobi

84
Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation.

51
declaration that‘s politically binding. The Nairobi protocol is regarded as the second legally

binding instrument on Small Arms after the SADC protocol.

4.5: The Nairobi protocol

The Nairobi protocol affirms the right to self-defence of states whether in an individual or

collective manner as prescribed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The protocol

Concerned with the problem of the illicit proliferation of SALW recognises the serious

consequences it has had on the region‘s peace as well as encouraging serious crimes such as

terrorism .In addition to this, the protocol shows great concern for the supply of arms into the

and see the need for effective control of arms transfers by suppliers and brokers outside the

region, including transfer of surplus arms to the region to curb the problem of illicit SALWs.

It also recognises the urgency85 for prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit

manufacturing, excessive accumulation, trafficking and possession of SALW and related

material due to the danger they pose to the well-being of the population in the region and to

the socio-economic development of the region.

The protocol further recognises the weak capacity of states in the region to effectively

monitor and control their borders, as well as having poor immigration and customs controls

and weak capacity to track movement of armed refugees across borders in some states and

the great contribution to the proliferation of illicit SALWs. As a measure it urges member

states to become parties to international instruments relating to the prevention, combat and

eradication of use and trafficking of illicit SALWs and to implement the instruments within

their jurisdiction86. It further acknowledges the efforts by various international entities such

as the African Union, the European Union and the Organisation of American States and other

efforts in Africa to address the problems relating to illicit Small Arms and Light weapons.

85
Preamble, Nairobi protocol.
86
Preamble, Nairobi Prorocol.

52
The Nairobi protocol urges states to fulfil their obligations and exercise their rights under the

protocol in a manner consistent with principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and

non-intervention in domestic affairs of member states. This is in the aim of reaffirming the

goals of and implementing the Nairobi declaration and the coordinating Agenda for Action.

The Nairobi protocol outlines its objectives as the prevention, combat and eradication of the

illicit manufacturing, trafficking and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the region. In

addition to this, the Protocol aims to promote cooperation and information sharing between

the member governments and with intergovernmental organisation as well as the civil society

in matters relating to the illicit proliferation and trafficking of SALWs. This is also to

promote cooperation within the region and also in the international level, with relevant

partners such as the United Nations87.

In order to carry out its mandate effectively, the Nairobi Protocol outlines key

implementation areas that outlines state obligations in the various thematic areas. These

implementation areas include: Legislative measures, Operational capacity, Control of

Civilian possession of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Control and Accountability of State-

owned Small Arms and Light weapons, Marking and Tracing of Small Arms and Light

Weapons and Record-keeping, Disposal of State-owned and confiscated Small Arms and

Light Weapons, Law enforcement, Public/Community Education and Awareness

Programmes, Transparency, Information Exchange and Harmonisation, Import, export,

transfer and transit of SALW, Marking and Tracing. For analysis, thematic areas with

somewhat similar mandates will be analysed as one large key implementation area.

87
Article 2,Nairobi Protocol

53
4.5.1: Legislative measures, Law enforcement and Operational Capacity

States are required to adopt various legislative measures as may be necessary to establish

criminal offences under national law when various acts are committed intentionally. These

acts include: illicit manufacture, trafficking and possession of Small Arms and Light weapons

as well as falsifying, altering or removing markings on Small Arms and Light Weapons as

required by the protocol.88 In addition to this, they are required to adopt where applicable

legislative and other measures to sanction under their national law the violations of arms

embargoes mandates by the UN Security Council and regional organisations. Also states are

required to incorporate various aspects into national law such as; Regulation of civilian

ownership of firearms and prohibition of unrestricted civilian possession of Small Arms.

Relevant State parties are also required to engage in the creation of a mutual legal assistance

system to facilitate cooperation with each other to afford mutual legal assistance in the effort

to eradicate the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of SALWs and control the use of SALW.

To increase capacity of officers and law enforcement89, states are required to strengthen

regional cooperation among police, intelligence agencies, customs and border control

officials in combating the illicit circulation and trafficking in SALWs as well as supressing

criminal activities relating to their use. In addition to this, states should establish or enhance

inter-agency groups to improve policy coordination, information sharing and analysis at the

national level. Also, states are required to enhance the capacity of national law enforcement

and security agencies, including appropriate training on investigative procedures, border

control and law enforcement techniques. In addition to this, develop or improve national

training programmes to enhance their capacity to fulfil their roles in the implementation of

88
Article 3,Nairobi Protocol
89
Article 4,Nairobi Protocol

54
the agenda for action. This is to be done by upgrading of equipment and relevant resources

for monitoring and controlling SALW movements.

Apart from this, State agencies are required to promote cooperation with international

organisations such as the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and World

Customs Organisation (WCO) as well as utilize existing databases such as the Interpol

Weapons and Explosives Tracing System (IWETS).

4.5.2: Transparency, Information Exchange and Harmonisation of information

To enhance information exchange and transparency among member states, states are

required to establish National Focal Points to facilitate rapid information exchange to combat

cross-border SALW trafficking. An example of this is the Kenya National Focal Point on

Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP). Also, states are required to develop and improve

transparency in information regarding SALW accumulations and policies relating to civilian

owned arms and consider the development of a sub-regional register on civilian possession of

SALW90.

In addition to this, states are required to harmonise relevant import, export and transfer

documents and end user certificates. Also to facilitate the verification of valid documents

issued by licensing authorities in the region. This is to be done by establishing of respective

sub-regional systems.

It is evident that information exchange is important and is emphasised in protocols and

agreements in various fields. In the field of SALW this is highly essential as it is vital in

tracking the problem at hand. Due to this, states are encouraged to exchange information

among law enforcement agencies on criminal groups, types of SALW use, and sources of the

arms, supply routes, methods of transportation and financial support of these groups. In

90
Article 16, Nairobi Protocol

55
addition, a sub-regional system should be established for exchange of intelligence on Small

Arms and Light Weapons violation and trafficking. This information exchange is to facilitate

Knowledge sharing among the various state agencies and officers in the member states for

effective functions against illicit SALW transfers.

The information possessed by member states can be linked to the Interpol Weapons and

Explosives Tracing System (IWTES)91. This enables efficient data analysis and considerable

progress in tackling the SALW problem. It has been noticed however that some member

states have been inefficient in sharing of information, hindering the fulfilment of the agenda.

4.5.3: Import, Export, Transfer and Transit of Small Arms and Light Weapons92

Under this areas, states are required to establish and maintain an effective system of export

and import licensing or authorisation as well as measures on international transit for transfer

of SALW. Before issuing export licences or authorisations for shipments of SALW, states

shall verify that the importing state has issued import licenses or authorisations and without

prejudice to multilaterals agreements, states have at the minimum given a written notice prior

to the shipment that there‘s no objection to the transit. The export and import license and

accompanying documentation shall contain information that at the minimum should include

the date and place of issuance, date of expiration, country of export and import, the final

recipient, a description and quantity of the SALW and in the event of transit, the countries of

transit. This information must be provided in advance to the transit states as well as the

import licence. Upon receipt of the arms shipment, the importing state shall inform the

exporting state.

To ensure validity of the documents, states are required to take measures to ensure that

licensing or authorisation procedures are secure and documents can be verified. While each

91
Article 15 a(iv)
92
Article 10

56
state may develop their own procedures for authorisation and issuance of licence, it is

essential that member states harmonise their procedures for uniformity. A better option would

be a uniform document depicting import or export licence or authorisation93.

4.5.4: Corruption

Corruption is rampant across member states, especially among law enforcement officers. This

has greatly curtailed efforts to fully tackle the SALW problem as they are sometimes used by

cartels to allow the movement of illicit arms across national borders. According to the

Nairobi protocol, states are required to institute appropriate and effective measures for

cooperation between law enforcement agencies to curb corruption associated with the illicit

manufacturing, trafficking, possession of and use of small arms and light weapons.

4.5.5: Community education and awareness programmes

States are urged to develop local, national and regional public/community education and

awareness programmes to enhance the involvement of the public and communities and

support for efforts to tackle the proliferation and illicit trafficking of Small arms and light

weapons as well as encourage responsible ownership and management of small arms and

light weapons. The programmes are aimed at promoting a culture of peace and involve and

cooperate with all sectors of society94.

Community education is essential as it promotes a culture of peace. This is very instrumental

in areas of high conflict between communities. The education on pacific methods of resolving

conflict has been influential in reducing the rate of armed conflict in various areas of the

region. It has even led to the signature of peace agreements such as the Mabanga Peace

Accord in Mount Elgon. With pacific methods of conflict resolution, the state is able to

93
James Owino, expert at the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons
94
Article 13

57
introduce programmes for surrender of arms by communities95. Immunity from prosecution

of illicit ownership of these arms may apply. Various member states such as Uganda and

Kenya have held various amnesty periods for voluntary surrender of illicit Small arms and

light weapons. This has had some level of success.

4.5.6: Institutional Arrangement

State parties are mandated to establish the Nairobi secretariat to oversee the implementation

of the protocol. The secretariat shall be responsible for development and issuance of

guidelines and instructions for the implementation of, the execution of, and the evaluation of

this protocol, in liaison with law enforcement agencies, and ensuring adherence to the

standards set out there in informing Ministers on a regular basis of progress thereof and

attending to difficulties experienced in the application of this protocol.

The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) or simply the Nairobi Secretariat was

established in June 2005 as directed in the protocol. The secretariat is mandated to build the

capacity of Member states, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Nairobi

Protocol within the region. It is currently the only internationally recognized

intergovernmental organization within Africa with the sole mandate to address the

proliferation of illicit SALW to provide a conducive environment for sustainable

development.96 The RECSA has three policy organs namely: Council Of Ministers,

composed of ministers in charge of internal security. This is the supreme organ. This is

followed by the Technical Advisory Committee, composed of the executive secretary,

National Focal Point Coordinators and 2 members of Civil Society Organisations and finally

the Secretariat, which is the administrative body and is headed by the Executive Secretary. 97

95
Article 12
96
RECSA webpage, recsasec.org
97
RECSA 2016-2017 Annual Report,pg 2

58
4.6: Conclusion

Although the region was once termed as the most affected by illicit SALW, it is evident that

there is considerable progress to tackle the problem. The degree of success of the Nairobi

protocol despite various spoilers can be seen as a slow, but sure progress.

59
 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0: Introduction

This chapter examines the various findings established during the course of the research in

summary .This is in line with the broader objective of the study that aimed to investigate the

various security implications that have risen from illicit SALW proliferation. The summary

of the study findings will also be based on the findings from the three specific objectives

namely; view the implications SALW proliferation has had on security in Africa, view the

implications SALW proliferation has had on security in the great Horn of Africa and examine

the various control initiatives against the illicit proliferation of SALW. With this, the chapter

gives a summary of the entire research findings, a conclusion to the study as well as

recommendations in relation to the study.

5.1: Summary of findings

5.1.1: Security implications from illicit SALW proliferation

The study began with a focus on the illicit proliferation of SALW form a global perspective.

The study shows that the proliferation of illicit SALW is not confines to a region, rather takes

a global perspective. In addition to this, the study also reveals that most security issues

affecting the world today have some form of roots in the illicit proliferation of SALW. The

study went on to reveal that the problem of SALW proliferation as experienced today has its

genesis in the cold war. This period was characterised by proxy wars whereby warring parties

were supported by the divides of the cold war. This support was in form of military

equipment and other related supplies.

60
The study also reveals that illicit proliferation of SALW began towards the close of the cold

war, due to reduced support in terms of arms from foreign powers, forcing combatants to

seek suitable alternatives and buy arms already in circulation. In areas where the demand

exceeded supply, the need for craft arms manufacturers arose. These craft arms makers

replicate design of existing guns and produce a cheaper alternative, to satisfy the demand.

This was seen to exacerbate the already volatile situation in the conflict area.

The study examines the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light weapons in various

regions of the world. It reveals that a common security implication from the illicit

proliferation of SALW is an increase in terrorist activity. Terrorism is a major security issue

today. The activity of terror groups is made easy by the illicit proliferation of SALW,

facilitating their activity. The study reveals that various regions, recognising the security

implication from illicit arms have formulated control instruments such as the Arms Control

and Regional Security (ACRS) working group and the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN).

5.1.2: Security implications of SALW in Africa

The study‘s second objective looks at the problem of illicit arms proliferation with an African

perspective. Africa is the most affected region with illicit proliferation of SALW. Its use has

resulted in very many deaths as well as massive loss of property and destruction of vital

infrastructure. The study looks at the historical aspects of illicit SALW proliferation in

Africa. It reveals that post-colonial Africa was characterized by a large number of Intra-state

conflicts. Some of the conflicts were proxy wars to the cold war such as the Angolan Civil

War, between MPLA and UNITA. These factions were supported by various allies98 to the

powers in terms of economic aid, weapons as well as intelligence. The war contributed

98
Allies provided supplies with respect to the ideologies of the factions in Angola.

61
greatly to the influx of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the region in the course of the war

and after, due to inefficient disposal.

The study proceeds to investigate the various contributors to the proliferation of SALW in

Africa. It reveals that corruption plays a large role in the illicit proliferation of arms. It further

reveals that corrupt officials sell or broker the sale of arms diverted from government

stockpiles .This was seen to be tied to poor welfare of military officers as well as inefficient

oversight over military records99. Other contributing factors to illicit proliferation include

porous borders, arms from external sources and diversion from state stockpiles.

The study proceeded to investigate some security implications resulting from the use and

proliferation of illicit SALW. These include increased organised crime, violent extremism

and radicalisation, increased conflict tendencies. These lead to a great loss of life, destruction

of property and other social issues such as Gender Based Violence.

5.1.3: Security implications of SALW proliferation in the Horn of Africa region

As the case study, the study examines the proliferation of illicit SALW in the Horn of Africa

and the implication on security. It is revealed that the region is one of the most affected with

illicit proliferation of SALW .This has caused great concern among states in the region and

the international community. The study then examines the historical perspectives behind the

phenomena and shows that the genesis of illicit SALW in the region is tied to various

conflicts in the region as well as transfer of arms from the Democratic Republic of Congo

during its civil war. Apart from this, the ouster of Idi Amin saw many barracks especially in

Northern Uganda looted, leading to spread of these arms. A major contributor was the

Somalia civil war which saw a massive diversion of government stockpile to illicit groups as

well as facilitating smuggling of illicit arms from other parts of the world into the region.

99
Africa‘s arms dump: Following the trail of bullets in the Sudans, The Guardian, 2 October 2014, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/02/-sp-africa-armsdump-south-sudan, 27 November 2017

62
The study goes further to examine various contributing factors to the illicit proliferation of

SALW. These include weak capacity of states, violent extremism, conflict between

communities, and diversion from government stockpiles to non-state actors. The study

revealed that in some instances, states themselves divert arms to conflict areas. A relevant

example is Uganda who falsified end-user certificates100 showing the arms were meant for

military use by the Uganda defence Forcers when in real sense the arms were headed to South

Sudan. Various security implications arising from proliferation in the Horn of Africa include

increased terror activity, a spike in crime rates and slowed economic growth.

5.1.4: Control initiatives against illicit proliferation of SALW

The fourth objective involves various control initiatives against the illicit proliferation of

SALW .The study examines various initiatives in Africa such as the SADC protocol, Bamako

declaration and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Ammunition

and other related material. The study reveals that a major problem experienced is the weak

capacity of states to tackle the illicit arms problem. In addition to this, it also reveals that

there is no enforcement mechanism for the instruments hence some states do not fully adhere

to the obligations as indicated by the various instruments. The study goes forward to examine

the control initiative in the Horn of Africa region, the Nairobi protocol. The Nairobi Protocol

came into force in 2005. The protocol highly takes after the SADC protocol and is the second

legally binding instrument after the SADC protocol. The protocol exhibits various key

implementation areas to efficiently carry out its mandate. Some of the implementation areas

include: legislative measures and operational capacity, transparency, information exchange

and harmonisation of information, corruption and community education and awareness

programmes. The study reveals that although the protocol is formulated for the benefit of the

100
AP News, Uganda diverted weapons to South Sudan despite arms embargo by Cara Anna, November 29
2018

63
region, various states still flaunt some of the regulations. A relevant example is the

falsification of end-user certificates by Uganda to divert SALW to South Sudan during the

civil war. Such actions greatly curtail the efficiency of the protocol. On the other hand

however, some states have witnessed some level of success in reducing the number of illicit

SALW in the area by following some of the provisions. For instance, Kenya has held

community awareness programmes in high conflict areas on the adverse effects of the use of

illicit SALW and has also educated the community on peaceful conflict resolution methods.

This has been successful as the Mabanga Peace Accord was signed between warring

communities thereby negating the need for arms by the communities. In addition to this,

Kenya has also held successful programmes on the voluntary surrender of illicit SALW by

communities during amnesty periods and has managed to acquire thousands of illicit SALW

through this initiative.

5.2: Conclusion

The study investigated the implications illicit SALW has had on security in the Horn of

Africa. This spread of arms has had great security implications that have greatly

affected the Region. This illicit proliferation of arms was influenced by various

factors, some of which greatly related to the well-being of the various state officers

such as law enforcement and military. In addition to this, the weak capacity of states

in the region to efficiently monitor borders facilitates porous borders, enabling cross-

border proliferation of SALW. The study identified that in various instances corrupt

state officials facilitate the proliferation of the arms. This can be tied to poor welfare,

as discovered during the study.

The formulation of Control initiatives as a major step towards eradicating the illicit

proliferation of SALW is not enough. It requires the commitment of states to follow the

64
regulations and the provisions in these protocols. The lack of adherence by some states drags

the progress of the rest in the eradication of this security concern. It is essential that states

collectively adhere to the various provisions of instruments, with the common goal of a

secure region.

5.3: Recommendations

The research has exhibited the need for some policy as well as other reccomendations.The

Recommendations may be implemented by government, organisations and also individual

Entities for their concerns.

5.3.1: Welfare for soldiers

The government should establish an inquiry into the welfare of its officers, especially those

deployed in areas of high conflict and border patrol. This should help the government in

addressing their grievances, negating the need to involve themselves in corrupt activities such

as diversion of arms.

5.3.2: Cross-Border smuggling monitoring and border patrol

Security agencies should look to invest in precise monitoring equipment as well as drones in

order to carry out border patrol. This will ease the work of security forces. It is also be cost

effective as there is no need for expenses such as fuel for vehicles and other related costs.

5.3.3: Legally binding instruments

Policy makers should make various the instruments to be legally binding. This will ensure

that states that act in contradiction to the provisions of the instruments attract legal

repercussions. This can be enforced by placing embargoes as well as sanctions to the

responsible states.

65
5.3.4: Address issues affecting pastoral communities

Governments should establish a taskforce seeking to find lasting solutions to conflict in high

conflict areas. In addition to this, it should address the various issues that have been

experienced by these communities so as to eradicate the possibility of conflict over the said

issues. In Addition to this, governments should encourage peaceful methods of conflict

resolution by public awareness and community education.

5.4: Further research

This document should not act as a final reference to issue concerning illicit SALW rather

should act as a bench mark for further research into the issue.

66
LIST OF REFERENCES

Abiodun Alao, Natural resources and conflict in Africa: The tragedy of endowment,

University Of Rochester Press.

Adesoji Adeniyi, Ph.D, The human cost of uncontrolled arms in Africa: Cross-national

research on seven African countries

Alusala Nelson,(2018) Africa and arms control, Challenges and successes, , Enact

Issue03/April 2018

Amnesty International: Arms transfer to the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for an

effective arms trade treaty.

Asuni, Judith B.(2009) Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta by, Council on

Foreign Relations

Bereketeab, R. (Ed.). (2013). the Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and

Security. London: Pluto Press. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183p650

Blanton, R., Mason, T., & Athow, B. (2001). Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic

Conflict in Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 38(4), 473-491. Retrieved from

www.jstor.org/stable/424898

Colonel Ng‘ang‘a, F. Effects of proliferation of Small Arms in Sub-Sahara Africa by Kenya

Army, U.S. Army War College.

Conflict in Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 38(4), 473-491. Retrieved from

www.jstor.org/stable/424898

Darryl Whitehead, SALW Proliferation Pressures, the Horn of Africa and EU Responses,

Life & Peace Institute

67
Emilie Oftedal, ―Boko Haram: A Transnational Phenomenon?‖ Master’s Thesis, the

Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, spring 2013

Ernest Harsch, Conflict resources: from ‗curse‘ to blessing: Transforming an African war risk

into a peace asset.

Gerald M. Steinberg, Toward Real Arms Control in the Middle East, Issues in Science and

Technology Vol. 7, No. 4 (SUMMER 1991), pp. 63-69.

Gerald M. Steinberg (2001), starting over: the prospects for regional security and arms

control in the Middle East in the next decade

Herby, P. (1999). Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict —

Summary of an ICRC study for the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red

Crescent. Revue Internationale De La Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red

Cross, 81(835),

Ian Anthony, Reflections on continuity and change in arms control by: SIPRI Yearbook

2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Kumar, S. (2008). SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: A GLOBAL THREAT TO

HUMAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT. The Indian Journal of Political

Science, 69(4), 787-800. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/41856469

Nina von Uexkull & Therese Pettersson (2018) Issues and Actors in African Nonstate

Conflicts: A New Data Set, International Interactions, 44:5, 953-968,

Peter Jones, Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Reflections on ACRS:, Stockholm

international Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Pirseyedi B (2000) , The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: Features and Implications,

Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

68
Sudanese stockpiles and regional weapon diversion: An analysis of captured equipment in the

possession of the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army-North in the Nuba Mountains, Conflict

Armament Research.

Tackling illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition in the great lakes and

horn of Africa, Africa-China-EU Expert Working Group on Conventional Arms, June 2014

Wepundi M, Nthiga E., Kabuu E., Murray R. and Alvazzi del Frate, Availability of Small

Arms and Perceptions of security in Kenya: An assessment (Geneva, Small Arms Survey,

2012)

Yixuan Yang, DISEC I: Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weaponry, Jonathan Edwards

College.

69