No federation without separation

27 No federation without

separation
István Bibó about the
prerequisites of regional and
European integration
Bretter Zoltán

István Bibó (1911–1979) is one of the greatest Hungarian political thinkers. This
is not only a meaningless opening sentence. When we say that he was a political
philosopher, we should bear in mind, that in crucial moments – right after
World War II, during the Hungarian revolution in 1956 – for a short period of
time, he acted even as a politician. A political detainee from 1957 to 1963 then
reduced to public silence during the 70s, being in vogue at the end of 80s, his
work was able to capture the imagination of the intellectual generation that took
the lead in the regime change at the beginning of 90s. Nowadays he is again
largely forgotten.1 The evolution of his memory reflects directly the relation of
today’s politics to his ideas, more precisely to his main idea, that democratic
politics and behavior are the prerequisites for Central European countries to be
able to solve their problems of national identity and territorial disagreements.
However, when we say that he was a political thinker, we have to recall that
he was very much against any philosophy, let alone political philosophy.2 If we
understand philosophers as people concerned with a non-real world, the world
of concepts,3 then indeed, Bibó cannot be counted among them. Bibó’s intention
was to grasp the realities on the ground, to describe them, rather theorize, and his
raw material was the history. Of course, he could not escape theorizing altogether,
because “reality” is in itself a concept.4
Was he then an ideologue, or a partisan theorist, who would offer guidance for
political activity, based on alleged universal principles addressing the immediate
demands of political reality? Of course, this is a very much Burkean and Enlight-
enment sense of the term ideologue. However, there is no need to dwell
deeply here, just to quote the title of Leszek Kolakowski's short, but
identity-building essay, “How to be a conservative-liberal-socialist”; Bibó fits
very well into that mold.5 His strive to encompass mutually exclusive
alternatives left him alone on the nowhere’s land, or alone with his beloved
“reality” and quest for morality.
His standpoint was not due to his lack of opinion, or because he was undecided;
on the contrary, it was a well-developed theory from the outset in his doctoral
the-sis: “Kényszer, jog, szabadság” [Cogency, Law, Liberty] (Bibó 1935). His
meth-odology was that of “synopsis”. Synopsis is a Greek word, the equivalent to
which in German would be Gesamtschau or Zusammenschau, or in English
something

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 231 01-09-2017 08:18:59

 232  Zoltán Bretter
like “Together-watching” or “All-in-one point of view”. This is far from being
dialectical thinking, because it misses the resolution and dilution of contradictions
in a higher synthesis. Paradoxes and unsolvable contradictions remain as they
were before: insoluble and impossible to destroy. Meanwhile, their cogency effi-
ciently and urgently asks for a solution. The synoptical view gives us the oppor-
tunity to look at contradicting, mutually exclusive standpoints concurrently. We
encompass, in the same opinion, the world of what exists on the ground, of facts,
of real constraints and duties, in one word reality on one side, and the world of
desires, hopes, “ought to”, and moral commands, in one word (and indeed, in the
same world) the normative aspects of history and society. The performance seems
to be an impossible task for synoptical outlook: this will reject any reduction of
conflicts as an unprincipled compromise and will refute wars on principles as the
destruction of the fine, compromise-laden fabric of reality alike. But there is a
slight possibility to strike a kind of balance, find equilibrium between reality and
norms, such an arrangement that will mediate and mitigate between them a modus
vivendi, thus allowing us to live together with this contradiction. In philosophical
terms, we would say that instead of finding mutually exclusive rational answers
for any possible theoretical problem, we look for reasonable agreements among
acting individuals.
Anyone who is trapped in an ideology will be unable to find that modus vivendi,
or, the other way round, only in established democracies, that is, in an already
existing modus vivendi, ideological controversies, expressed contradictions, do
not threaten the community’s health (and the community is not torn apart by these
controversies); on the contrary, they make it stronger, contributing to political
stability. Of course, this is again paradoxical, because if we eliminated heated,
ideological debates over public issues, how can we expect that will give rise to
a democratic public opinion, on which a healthy community rests? The answer
could be that realistic analysis, respect for the facts, political correctness, low-key
social planning, decision making rooted in tradition and tolerance, and a contract
that enables the actors to maintain their identities may overcome the difficulties of
paradox. But is not all this a mere utopian community, wishful thinking? A dead
end road that has not got any starting point?
Let us note that we are speaking about a typical Central European phenom-
enon, (East Central Europe is so many times characterized as full of paradoxes;
this being its underlying culture or political culture) within which ideological
debates tend to destroy democratic thinking, rather than contributing to the
enrichment of it. In this respect, István Bibó is a pre-democratic thinker, and
I mean by this, that he tried to advise Central European countries before they
entered in a democratic era about how they have to perform to become demo-
cratic. This is exactly what nowadays the European Union, a would-be almost
federation – the simple notion of federation being rejected by most – takes very
seriously: in that federation, those who intend to be part of it, should meet cer-
tain “democratic standards” (whatever it would mean) if the federation aspires
for political stability.6

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 232 01-09-2017 08:18:59

 No federation without separation 233
Federation as marriage
István Bibó proposed no single integration project and had good reasons why he
did not.

Federation is like marriage: just naïve politicians, who use to deceive them-
selves and movie-goers, imagine that Federation and marriage will solve the
involved actors’ all existing problems, therefore, is not worth dealing with
them. But who knows something about life and human soul, is aware, that
entering a federation or a marriage is permitted only if all problems are dealt
with and ordered, because sooner or later these come to surface and will
shake the stability of the federation; otherwise, Federation and marriage will
bring about their grave new questions, and poor of us, if we do not possess
the collective power for the solutions of them.7
(Bibó 1986a: 614)

Thus, regarding the possibility of the federation, Bibó was skeptical for another
reason as well. Despite sharing a similar culture, East and Central Europeans do
not have to determine joint (I would be tempted to say: synoptical) historical
experiences. Therefore, the federation could come into the discussion only when
all possible partners possess something very precious they do not want to lose,
and that is the moment when they look for safeguarding, that is, the federation
itself. Paradoxically, since Bibó wrote his studies, East-Central European states
gained a common historical experience, communism, and they gained something
very precious they do not want to lose, liberty. This is exactly why they were able
to enter a kind of federation, the European Union.
Let us remark that in 1943 and 1946, this is the closest point where one could
get to conceive a possible federation. Or if we take into account that the starting
point is On European balance and peace, in 1943–1944, in the very midst of
a war, we could even wonder, how realistic was anything about any federation
at all? To be sure, Bibó István was not a visionary thinker, but nonetheless, he
was a thinker, who by this time had already contemplated the end of the war.
He could not foresee, and how could he, that right after the World War II the
moment would arrive when Western Germany will succeed in finding a path back
to democracy, and in the meantime will not unleash, but on the contrary will
be taming her own nationalism to such an extent, that will enable a marriage
with France. This has been another successful “Münchhausen-project”, that
is, reality cannot be contended (see below).
Now, regarding East and Central Europe and following Bibó’s line of reason-
ing, we may observe that the time is ripe even for this region. Territorial disputes
are no more acute, imperial nightmares do not hunt nations any more, there are no
threats for these states to be incorporated into a larger, artificial construction, like
the Ottomans’, Habsburgs’ and Soviets’ empires, so nationalisms cannot disturb
the minds of communities. The only question remains is whether these nations

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 233 01-09-2017 08:18:59

 234 Zoltán Bretter
stick to their democratic commitment or they submerge in a kind of populism and
authoritarianism.

The story of history

In reconstructing Bibó’s argument, we should take into account his description of
the evolution of democracy and nationalism.
Bibó tells his story about history.8 In his rendering, the very moment when
democracy and nationalism become the twins whose relationship shapes the
course of events in modern history is when the tiers état overtakes the national
framework, dispossessing the dynasties that allegedly represented peoples for cen-
turies. “Revolutionary democracy, but indeed every democracy, even if declares
the liberty of men, this liberty is fulfilled within a community” (Bibó 1986b: 191),
and that community, from the French Revolution onwards, is the nation. When
in a healthy relationship, as in Western Europe (except Germany and Italy) and
Northern Europe, democracy and nationalism do not contradict each other, but
when a state, for whatever reason gives way to nationalistic pretensions, democ-
racy has to suffer. When a country that pretends it represents community sets forth
expanding borders because it feels for historical, territorial, ethnic or linguistic
reasons a right to do so, the community members collapse into a “captive mind”
ecstasy. The “Captive Mind” (borrowed here with its full meaning from Czesław
Miłosz) is by far the most insightful and enduring account of the appeal of
author-ity and authoritarianism to the intelligentsia and more broadly to the
community. Hysteria is Bibó’s term for “captive mind”.9
After a careful reading, we could identify three categories of democracies,
according to political culture, notwithstanding the degree of hysteria that charac-
terizes them. These three are the organic (1), the catch-up (2), and the
uncertain (3). These categories cover three distinct regions of Europe: Western
and North-ern (1), Central and East (2), and Balkans (3). But individual
countries are not fixed within a category, not at all times and not permanently,
as they are part and parcel of these regions. Their temporary status depends on
how they cope with the fundamental relationship of nationalism and
democracy; they can upgrade or downgrade, according to this criterion.
What is characteristic of East and Central European nations is that they were
under foreign rule for a long time in their history; so emerges the state of cogency
they were in. For these nations, the course of history is the continuity of inter-
mittency rather than continuity with periodic interruptions. Under such circum-
stances, the cogency tends to perpetuate itself, although it is a bizarre situation. At
the beginning one tends to revolt against cogency, feeling that restraint abridges
liberty, but with time passing, the one becomes even in love with the situation of
being a victim. In this way one perpetuates by his or her will, what was initially
rejected out of hand, not only because of very pragmatic reasons but because
the situation cannot be changed anyway. In this process of assimilating, what
cannot be equated is that one feels permanent that a trauma is guiding his or her
existence.

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 234 01-09-2017 08:18:59

 No federation without separation 235
And here lies how Bibó’s thinking is one of the most important analyses of
social psychology and the proposal of a concept of political culture. Bibó defines
nationalism and hysteria when a reality is conceived as cogency, devoid of any
alternative, a reality that inherently commends, dictates to action and does not
subject itself to a scrutiny of reasonable people who would find those alternatives
for action.
The situation of cogency has a cognitive effect in that it locks the mind in just a
tiny parcel of reality, a partial truth about reality. One part of the truth covers the
whole of it. From this point on the victim (and is a victim, without further ado)
has only vindications against the rest of the world in the name of that partial truth
that dominates his or her entire existence. My truth is the whole truth, and there
is no need any more for any quest for truth. A new trauma is then born: the fear of
losing the truth, which is mine and absolute. This fear then is the essence of life,
and from now on the problem is that I am right. The problem lies precisely in that
I possess the Truth. This is the truth of a community that has lost its senses for
reality. Obviously, from this situation, there is no escape. The only way out is the
“Münchausen-project”, in which the criticism from within the community reveals
the partiality of the commonwealth’s truth, the reality itself, that would enable
then to find alternatives for action. This could be the remedy for community-
hysteria, but it presupposes that a political community is willing to lose the ground
on which the whole of its political establishment rests, to forget the Truth itself.
(István Bibó names just only one example of a successful Münchhausen-
project, that of Denmark and we may assume that he would have added
Germany after the 70's).

István Bibó’s short dictionary of central European miseries

The central notion on which Bibó István builds almost every analysis of his is
hysteria.
Of course, this is a psychological term, but he does not use it for describing the
behavior of individuals, this notion being rather a characteristic of public opinion
and political decision-making, more precisely of political culture.
Hysteria, at the community (read: national) level, means that there is no bal-
ance between what is real, what is feasible and what is desirable. Hysteria distorts
the political character. Typical for these nations is the rampant historical
consciousness, merged with inherent uncertainty, amour propre, conceit merged
with quail, much talk about outstanding achievements and poor records, moral
claims and moral irresponsibility.
“Much of these nations chew their past as of a glorious great power, or aspira-
tions of becoming a great power again, in the meantime they can apply to them-
selves the attribute of being a small nation, so distressed, that a Dane or Dutch
wouldn’t ever understand.” [“The Misery of Small East European States”: 224.]
The hysteria drove, as it were, a distorted community, giving birth to two types
of people be they intellectuals, politicians or civil servants: the false realist and
the ecstatic essentialist. Then even the society becomes divided along the policies

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 235 01-09-2017 08:18:59

 236 Zoltán Bretter
advocated by these two, of course in perfect contradiction with each other. Real-
ity and realistic plans for the future are regarded as nonsense. (As the word of the
philosopher in Plato’s cave, when he wants to share his experiences about the real
world with those who are enchained and constrained to watch for a lifetime the
shadows of the reality.) Reality itself becomes a double reality where the struc-
ture of the society and the whole construction of the state are shaped according
to some lies about reality. For a society to progress, two things are needed: a
realism that enables the community to solve practical problems, and the capac-
ity to distinguish between what is essential and what is not, that is: the capacity
for rational answers. When a society’s perception of reality is disturbed, when it
creates for itself another – of course tangible and very much existing – reality, a
mechanism of selection starts to function. The reversed selection will bring to the
surface those who are in the service of this new reality and contribute to its day-
to-day construction, and on the other pole, those who find themselves at the edges
of society, kind of outlaws, who see the lies on which the new building is built,
but they become more and more angry prophets, without being taken seriously.
[“Distorted Hungarian Temper, Dead-end Hungarian History” – 1948: 604)
The clash of false realists and ecstatic essentialists shapes the future of the com-
munity, just by strengthening the primary lies upon which that society is built.10
There is a direct link between this disturbed political culture and its consequence,
the interrelationships between the small East and Central European states – this
is exactly what we mean by misery. Symbolic and not so metaphorical wars on
language supremacy, for minority rights, are fought endlessly; territorial disputes
any time can erupt, democracy is continuously under threat. The nightmare for
these countries is to slip back into what Bibó calls “antidemocratic nationalism,”
the set up in which nationalism and democracy contradict each other: vindication
of self-determination for us and inner oppression and coercion by us.
István Bibó, one of the greatest Hungarian political thinkers, who witnessed
as a child World War I and as civil servant World War II, saw no possibility of a
Central European federation, unless the states cannot act and solve their intrinsic
problems democratically (democracy is conceived here as empowerment of the
people)11 and until they can come to peace with their nationalisms. But because
democracy and nationalism have the same roots, finding the equilibrium is none-
theless a demanding task, that has not been fully accomplished – yet.

Notes
1 Of course this is an overstatement, as Bibó’s thoughts exercise a constant influence
mainly upon researchers coming from different areas of academia. For an overview see
the website of The István Bibó Center for Advanced Studies (www.bibomuhely.hu). I am
indebted to many Hungarian writings on Bibó I cannot list in the bibliography of this
short chapter. Iván Balog, Gábor Kovács and Balázs Trencsényi to name just a few. In
the text – when otherwise not stated – all translations are mine.
2 There will be many who would consider István Bibó – against his will – as a political
philosopher. Most notably the frequently quoted Robert Berki (Berki 1992: 513–435).
Although in some respects I agree with Berki (at the end of the day, even Machiavelli

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 236 01-09-2017 08:18:59

 No federation without separation 237
can be interpreted as a philosopher, rejecting Aristotle and Aquinas alike), for the pur-
poses of this paper it is more rewarding to follow what Raymond Aron suggests as
being the viewpoint of a political realist: “A problem which derives from experience
and admits of no universally valid solution cannot be settled philosophically” (Aron
1962: 166).
3 More precisely we can make here the proper use of Gilbert Ryle’s “definition” of philos-
ophy: “some characteristically philosophical arguments are not of the premiss-theorem
pattern. For they are operations not with premises and conclusions, but operations
upon operations with premises and conclusions.”(Ryle 2009: 337).
4 There is no importance whatsoever in classifying István Bibó. I present his approach
to politics, history, society and philosophy only because this instructs us in how should
we interpret his standpoint regarding any federative utopia. Further, I will try to sug-
gest in my chapter that his work can be enshrined in something that could be regarded
as an individual school of “political realism.”
5 “Leszek Kołakowski shared with his Oxford colleague and fellow Central European
Isaiah Berlin a disabused suspicion of all dogmatic certainties and a rueful insistence
upon acknowledging the price of any significant political or ethical choice” (Judt
2009), writes Tony Judt on Kołakowski. We may well add István Bibó to this short list
of prominent skeptics of Central Europe.
6 See for example the concerted EU criticism of Hungary’s authoritarian tendencies,
and first and foremost the discussions aroused by the Tavares report (concerning the
curtailment of the rule of law in this country). Though the case of Hungary is a par-
ticular one, we witnessed a similar polemic in the case of Mečiar’s Slovakia, some
anti-European and anti-federative political maneuvers by the brothers Kaczyński, the
EU-skeptic position of Waclav Klaus, the Romanian referendum of overturning the
president Traian Băsescu, etc.
7 The quote is from a magnificent little piece of analysis made by Bibó during the years
1943–1944 (my translation; original: Bibó 1986a: 614). On European balance and
peace has been published posthumously in Hungarian and just recently in English.
(Ersoy, Górny and Kechriotis 2010. This is the essay that deals directly with a possible
Federation of East Central European states, overtaking the pre-World War I nation build-
ing problems on one hand, and taking the Wilsonian proposal for self-determination
seriously as well. The analysis to be found here foreshadows István Bibó’s largest
enterprise, the book advising great powers’ politicians on the settlement of interna-
tional disputes by a series of regional referendums. (Bibó 1976) The arguments of On
European balance and peace will occur in many studies written later, see for instance:
(Bibó 1986b: 427). This latter study is available in English in the only collection of
essays translated so far: Bibó 1991).
8 See also the historical account of the rise of nationalism and its analysis by Lord Acton
(Acton 1862: 1). Bibó’s rendering presents are sometimes striking similarities with
that of Acton’s, though there are no signs in his oeuvre that he had been influenced by
the latter. About Lord Acton’s idea of “nationality” (i.e., nationalism) see for example
Lang (2002), Massey (1969) and Himmelfarb (1952).
9 “Captive Mind” should be re-read (Miłosz 1953). Not primarily as a series of essays in
deciphering the psychology of intellectuals in totalitarianism, but also as the appeal of
communitarianism on individuals and their subjection to a “national” authority. Tony
Judt did something like this. Writing about Milosz, he says: “Above all, the thrall in
which an ideology holds a people is best measured by their collective inability to imag-
ine alternatives.” (Judt 2010).
10 These two categories closely resemble Raymond Aron’s similar category that of “advi-
sor of the Prince” and “lover of Providence”, but Aron does not expand his predicament
on a whole political culture. Raymond Aron was in quest of finding a “third way” out
of the dilemma of choosing between Machiavelli and Marx. His notion of “spéctateur

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 237 01-09-2017 08:18:59

 238  Zoltán Bretter
engagé” is the same position what Bibó envisaged for himself and successfully pur-
sued. Pierre Rosanvallon says about Raymond Aron: “Raymond Aron distant qu’il y a
deux types d’intellectuels: les counsellors du Prince et les confidence de la Providence.
Le conseiller du prince, c’est intellectual expert. Le confidence de la Providence, he
peut être le prophète ou le maître en idéologie. Il nous faut trouver une troisième voie,
celle de l’intellectuel impliqué, chercheur associé de la société civile : celui qui produit
à la fois la critique et l’outil” (Rosanvallon 2006). See also Aron (1982) and Anderson
(1997).
11 Just to note: I have not discussed in the above chapter the demeaning of democracy and
its essential distinction from rule of law; I have not analyzed the notion of democracy
employed by Bibó.

Bibliography
Acton, L. (1862) “Nationality”, Home and Foreign Review, no. 1.
Anderson, B. C. (1997) Raymond Aron: The Recovery of the Political. Lanham, MD: Row-
man and Littlefield.
Aron, R. (1962) The Opium of the Intellectuals. New York: W.W. Norton.
Aron, R. (1982) Le Spectateur engagé : entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique
Wolton /Raymond Aron. Paris: France loisirs.
Berki, R. N. (1992) “The Realism of Moralism: The Political Philosophy of István Bibó”,
History of Political Thought, vol. 13, pp. 513–534.
Bibó, I. (1935) “Kényszer, jog szabadság”, in Válogatott tanulmányok, vol. 1, Budapest:
Magvető Kiadó. pp. 5–149.
Bibó, I. (1976) The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies: A Study of
Self-Determination, Concord Among the Major Powers, and Political Arbitration. New
York: Wiley.
Bibó, I. (1986a) “Az európai egyensúlyról és békéről”, in Bibó, I. (ed.) Válogatott tanul-
mányok. Budapest: Magvető Kiadó.
Bibó, I. (1986b) “A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága”, in Bibó, I. (ed.) Válogatott
tanulmányok. Budapest: Magvető Kiadó.
Bibó, I. (1991) Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination: Selected Writings. Boulder,
CO, Highland Lakes, NY: Social Science Monographs and Atlantic Research Publica-
tions; Distributed by Columbia University Press.
Ersoy, A., Górny, M. and Kechriotis, V. (eds.) (2010) Discourses of Collective Identity in Cen-
tral and Southeast Europe (1775–1945): Texts and Commentaries. Budapest: CEU Press.
Himmelfarb, G. (1952) Lord Acton – A Study in Conscience and Politics. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Judt, T. (2009) “Leszek Kołakowski (1927–2009)”, The New York Review of Books, 24
September 2009.
Judt, T. (2010) Captive Minds, Then and Now, [Online] www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyr
blog/2010/jul/13/captive-minds-then-and-now/, Available 24 July 2014.
Lang, T. (2002) “Lord Acton and ‘The Insanity of Nationalism’ ”, Journal of the History of
Ideas, vol. 63, pp. 129–149.
Massey, H. J. (1969) “Lord Acton’s Theory of Nationality”, The Review of Politics, vol.
31, pp. 495–508.
Miłosz, C. (1953) The Captive Mind. New York: Knopf.
Rosanvallon, P. (2006) La contre-démocratie: La politique à l’âge de la dé iance. Paris:
Le Seuil.
Ryle, G. (2009) “Proofs in Philosophy”, in Ryle, G. (ed.) Collected Papers: Collected
Essays 1929–1968. London: Routledge.

15031-1209d-1pass-r02.indd 238 01-09-2017 08:18:59