PRO

Answers to: Turkey Plays Nice with Russia

First, Their evidence is old. It’s talking about a missile defense system that Turkey bought from
Russia after they were denied a similar system by the US. It’s not an indication of siding with
Russia.

Second, turn – the last card in our case says that Turkey will join in an alliance with Russia if
they leave NATO. This is way worse than buying a missile defense system from Russia

Third, the most recent evidence proves

Turkey supports NATO on the Ukraine and opposes Russia on key issues
Daily Sabah, 2-1, 22, Turkey’s dialogue with Russia, Ukraine continues:
Defense Minister,
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkeys-dialogue-
with-russia-ukraine-continues-defense-minister
Turkey’s dialogue with both Moscow and Kyiv continues amid tensions
between the two countries, Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said Monday, underlining that Ankara also upholds its NATO
responsibilities within this scope. “The status of the straits (regarding the rules on the passage of ships of the Black
Sea and non-Black Sea countries) set by the convention benefits all parties. In the current circumstances, there is no
As for the Black Sea dialogue, Turkey is doing
question of abandoning this convention.
everything it should. We will continue our dialogue with Russia and
Ukraine and we will fulfill our NATO obligations,” Akar was quoted by Turkish
broadcaster TRT as saying. Akar elaborated on the situation in the Black Sea region, saying Turkey’s dialogue with
both Ukraine and Russia continues while it undertakes its responsibilities within NATO as part of the alliance. He
underlined that the Montreux Convention of 1936 regulated the use of the Turkish Straits and the transit of naval
warships to the Black Sea is essential to security and stability in the region. Referring to the latest tensions between
Russia and Ukraine and the West, he warned that this posed the danger of uncontrolled escalation. “As such, we, as
Turkey, urge all parties concerned to remain calm and engage in coordination, cooperation and dialogue,” he added.
The U.S. with its European allies has been warning that Russia is setting the stage for an invasion of Ukraine and has
pre-positioned over 100,000 troops on its border with the former Soviet republic alongside significant artillery and
tank deployments. Moscow has denied preparing for a military offensive, saying its troops are there for regular
exercises. Turkey has been closely following the developments and is in close contact with both Kyiv and Moscow.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had said Turkey could mediate between the neighbors amid increasing tensions in
the region and recently announced a visit to Ukraine on Feb. 3 to help defuse tensions; likewise, Putin said he would
. NATO member
visit Turkey upon Erdoğan’s invitation when the pandemic situation and schedules allow
Turkey has friendly ties with both Kyiv and Moscow but opposes
Russian policies in Syria and Libya, as well as its annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Kyiv has also bought Turkish drones to
possibly use against Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine,
angering Moscow, and agreed with Ankara to manufacture the drones
locally this year.
Turkey supports deterrence against Russia now

Ragip Soylu, 1-27, 2022, Ukraine conflict: Why it really matters to Turkey,
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ukraine-turkey-why-conflict-matters
This week, Nato announced a deterrence package against a possible Russian military assault on Ukraine, which will see warships,
fighter jets and land troops deployed to the Black Sea and neighbouring countries. Notably, Turkey wasn’t among the countries that
promised to contribute. Some, like former EU ambassador to Turkey Marc Pierini, believe it's likely Ankara won't be adding its own
ships and jets to the deterrence force. Doing so would significantly escalate tensions with Moscow. ButTurkish officials
say they have always supported Nato patrols and operations in the Black Sea, as they
did this week by approving them within the alliance. “We might partake in some
operations, depending on our interests. But this is a political decision that will be made by the political leadership when the
time comes,” a second Turkish official said. “But we are already doing our maximum by supplying drones
to Ukraine. It is the deadliest support to Kyiv to this date among all Nato countries.”

Turkey will negotiate an end to the Ukraine crisis

Daily Sabah, 1-21, 22, , Turkey wants peace to prevail in region: Erdoğan on Ukraine crisis,
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-wants-peace-to-prevail-in-region-erdogan-
on-ukraine-crisis
Turkey aims for peace to prevail and hopes no other adverse developments will take
place in the region, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said as Turkey has intensified its diplomatic
efforts for a mediator role to de-escalate tensions between Russia and Ukraine while the
international community is worried about a large-scale war. "A psychology of war in the region upsets us, as a country that has ties
with both sides. Our hope is to bring together Mr. (Russian President Vladimir) Putin and (Ukrainian President Volodymyr)
Zelenskyy as soon as possible and to ensure that they have a face-to-face meeting," Erdoğan said Thursday after a joint news
conference with El Salvador President Nayib Bukele in the Turkish capital Ankara, in which they signed six agreements as both
countries pledged to enhance their ties in several fields. Erdoğan underlined that he places great importance on both his visit to
Ukraine and Putin's visit to Turkey. "I will visit Ukraine at the beginning of next month,” he noted. Also addressing reporters on
Friday, Erdoğan reiterated that Turkey can be the broker to establish peace between Ukraine and Russia. "Any development
towards the occupation or the outbreak of a war constitutes a very serious violation for the peace of the region. As Turkey, we do
not accept the emergence of unrest here," he said. "We want peace to prevail in the region, and for this, we are ready to do
whatever comes our way," he said and added that may talk with Putin on phone or visit him in Moscow in addition to his planned
Ukraine visit. Underlining that Russia invading Ukraine is not a realistic scenario, Erdoğan warned Tuesday that the region could not
endure another war. Turkey is ready to play a role in de-escalating tensions between Russia
and Ukraine, Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalın also said Tuesday, announcing Erdoğan will be traveling to Kyiv to hold
talks with Zelenskyy in a couple of weeks. Russia will only welcome efforts if Turkish partners can encourage Ukraine to implement
the Minsk Protocol, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Wednesday in their initial response. Meanwhile, both Russia and
Ukraine are open to the idea of Turkey playing a role in easing tensions between the two countries, as proposed by Ankara in
November, Turkish diplomatic sources said Thursday. Turkey is discussing the possibility of hosting the next meeting of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group, during which Ukraine's eastern Donbass region will
be discussed, the sources told reporters on condition of anonymity. No date has been set for an Istanbul meeting but
representatives from Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE Minsk Group and Donbass are expected to attend, they said, adding the group
would meet "frequently." According to the Kremlin, however, Peskov told RIA news agency that there have been no preparations for
such a meeting. "There is nothing on this meeting," he was quoted as saying, adding that Ukraine has not abided by the Minsk
accords on the settlement of the conflict with pro-Moscow rebels, while weapons are supplied to Ukraine. Western countries say
they fear Russia is planning a new offensive against Ukraine after it massed tens of thousands of troops near the border in recent
months. Moscow denies planning an attack. One source said that both Russia and Ukraine responded positively to Turkey's offer to
mediate. NATO member Turkey has friendly ties with both Kyiv and Moscow but opposes
Russian policies in Syria and Libya, as well as its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in
2014. U

Turkey successfully challenged Russia in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict

Chauvsky, 1-14, 22, Eugene Chausovsky is a nonresident fellow at the Newlines Institute.
Chausovsky previously served as senior Eurasia analyst at the geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor
for more than 10 years. His work focuses on political, economic, and security issues pertaining
to Russia, Eurasia, and the Middle East, Foreign Policy, Russia Is Worried About Challenges in
the Caucasus, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/14/russia-csto-caucasus-nagorno-karabakh/
Stepping in was meant also to limit the influence of Turkey, whose security
support for Azerbaijan via
weaponry including TB2 drones proved pivotal in helping the country’s forces break
through Armenian defenses. Thus, Russia intervened as a mediator to oversee a cease-fire
and transfer of territory in and around Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia to Azerbaijan,
which was painful to accept for Yerevan but at the same time was much less than what Armenian forces would have otherwise likely
lost on the battlefield. Armenia and Azerbaijan both agreed to the Moscow-brokered armistice, with its implementation consisting of
the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in November 2020. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict highlighted Russia’s regional
power status and Moscow’s continued ability to shape events, but it also revealed that Moscow’s influence has limitations. After all,
Russia’s preferred outcome would have been the prewar status quo, but Azerbaijan,
along with its own ally in Turkey, was able to forcefully challenge this status quo. This
challenge substantially raised the profile of Ankara in the region, with Moscow agreeing to a joint
Russian-Turkish monitoring center to oversee the cease-fire implementation and Russia having no choice but to acknowledge the
important regional power role played by Turkey. The year since has also revealed key constraints to Russia’s influence in the
region. Despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have violated
the cease-fire on a periodic and sometimes deadly basis. And Turkey has been able to leverage its increased influence for its own
political and economic gains, most notably in its support for Azerbaijan’s regional transport and infrastructure initiatives and its
diplomatic outreach to Armenia to resume trade and flights, and to revive the long-dormant process of political normalization. To be
sure, Russia has played an important part in all of these discussions, but Moscow is no longer the only major actor in shaping the
geopolitics of the Caucasus. While Russia’s military presence in the region mitigated the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it
Turkey has
has not been enough to prevent eruptions of violence or to bring about a sustainable peace. In the meantime,
proved its willingness and ability to directly challenge Russia in the region, even as the
two countries cooperate in other spheres such as energy and weapons sales. The world is
becoming more multipolar, which can serve as both a benefit and a challenge to entrenched powers—including Moscow. This brings
us back to the unfolding events in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In the Ukrainian case, Russia is still trying to push back against the
political, economic, and security influence of the West, while seeking guarantees against the prospects of NATO enlargement it has
fought to avoid. In Kazakhstan, Russia is less worried about the West, but it could see its position as the dominant external power
giving way to others, including China and perhaps even Turkey. While Russia has established a pragmatic division of labor of sorts
And Russia can be even
with China in Central Asia, Moscow cannot be sure this working arrangement will last forever.
less sure of Turkey’s intentions, considering that the two have been on opposing sides
of conflicts in such areas as Syria and Libya, and that Turkish TB2 drones are now being
sold to the likes of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, there is a broader connection between what is happening in
the Caucasus and the events that are unfolding in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Kremlin finds its dominant power status in
the former Soviet periphery being challenged from numerous directions, and Russia’s CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan and its
military maneuvers along the Ukrainian border are intended to show that Moscow is both able and willing to use military force to
maintain its position as the dominant regional power in the post-Soviet space. However, such military actions may only take Russia
so far, and they have their own risk of blowback. For example, Russia has to consider that its CSTO deployment to Kazakhstan may
set a dangerous precedent, as other member states like Armenia are no strangers to mass protests and unrest. For example, if
violent demonstrations were to erupt in Armenia in the future, would Russia have to intervene again? And if so, could it be certain
such an intervention will succeed? Such questions could become increasingly relevant as Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to stare
each other down and Turkey and others look to expand their position in the region. The Caucasus may soon prove to be no less
dynamic and consequential than Eastern Europe or Central Asia, both for Russia and the powers with which it contends.
Turkey supporting Baltic state security
Soicescu & Hanso, January 2022, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and
Difficult Ally, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICDS_Policy_Paper_Turkey
%C2%B4s_Future_Role_in_NATO_Stoicescu_Hanso_January_2022-1.pdf, Kalev Stoicescu Kalev Stoicescu is
a Research Fellow at ICDS. A former Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official, he joined the ICDS in August 2014. Among other fields, he specialises
in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
from 1991–2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia
and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002–2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at
the Estonian Embassy in Paris. Hille Hanso Hille Hanso is an independent researcher and analyst, based in Istanbul. Her articles, interviews, essays and commentaries have
appeared in all media outlets in Estonia and abroad. Her expertise and research interests include Turkish culture and language, nationalism, security and defence in the regional
context, Turkish domestic and foreign policy; Estonia-Turkey relations in the 1920s and 30s, minorities and forced migration in the Middle East. Her latest graduate degree is in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. TThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia recognised Hille Hanso for her contribution to
developing Estonian-Turkish relations in 2020

The rise of Polish and Baltic interest in Turkey, and also in the opposite direction, became evident after
Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 37 “Turkey drops objections to NATO defence plan for Poland and the Baltics,”
NATO Watch, 3 July 2020. and Andrzej Duda signed an agreement for the purchase by Poland of
Bayraktar TB2 drones at the presidential complex in Ankara, in May 2021.38 The agreement signed by the
Turkish and Polish ministers of defence and worth USD 270 million, made Poland the
first NATO member state to purchase a batch of 24 Bayraktar UAVs, with the first drones
due to be delivered in 2022.39 For now, it is hard to say whether this is a new trend or an isolated arms deal.
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Qatar and Libya have purchased similar models of the Bayraktar TB2 drones with a range of 150 kilometres
Latvia’s defence minister Artis Pabriks and Lithuania’s
and readiness to be armed with anti-tank missiles.
foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis visited Turkey in June and July 2021,
respectively. Turkey is interested in selling variants of the Bayraktar TB2 to these Allies,
as well. It is possible that Latvia and Lithuania, in addition to Poland and Ukraine, could
purchase and start to operate the combat proven and capable Turkish drones, a
development that would certainly enhance deterrence and defence in the region. In early
July 2021, Turkey deployed four F-16s and an 80-strong detachment from its 6th Main Jet
Base at Bandırma to the Malbork Air Base in Poland, to support the enhanced Baltic Air
Policing (BAP) Mission40. This was the second contribution by Turkey to upholding
NATO’s north-eastern flank, after a single rotation in the BAP from April to July 2006 (in Šiauliai, Lithuania). The
deployment of Turkey’s F-16s to Poland demonstrated the power of political dialogue, and also of defence procurements between
Allies. Interestingly, three Allies from the south – Spain, Italy and Turkey – contributed together to the BAP mission in Lithuania,
Estonia and Poland, an excellent example of Allied solidarity. However, Turkey has not yet contributed troops to NATO’s enhanced
Forward Presence. Last but not least, Poland and the Baltic states have expressed support for continuing accession negotiations
between Turkey and the European Union.

Answers to: Turkey Blocks Israel from Joining NATO

First, according to the NATO Association of Canada, “All in all, it is probably more likely that
Israel would be wary of membership in NATO, not least for the obvious reason that it
would then be called upon to assist other NATO members in their respective conflicts.
Israel is, at root, a nationalistic refuge state focused on its own survival. It would not be irrational if, by conducting
a cost-benefit analysis, Israel determined that NATO membership was simply not worth the cost. In the case of the Mediterranean Dialogue, for example, states like Israel are granted great leeway in determining
how deeply they wish to be involved with NATO. From Israel’s perspective, it can potentially extract whatever it finds useful from an association with NATO, and even participate in joint exercises with it, but
without binding itself to the specific commitments that alliance membership involves. Then again, a somewhat delicate truth about the collective defence mechanism of the North Atlantic Treaty is that stipulates
that parties to the treaty will “consider” an attack against one as an attack upon all members, and that each state will take “such action it deems necessary” to restore security in the North Atlantic region. If it ever
did become a member, this measured language could potentially allow Israel – or any member of the alliance, for that matter – to limit just how involved it became in a foreign conflict.

In the final analysis, the rest of NATO would probably benefit from Israeli membership in
the alliance more than Israel would from such an arrangement. Therefore, it is unlikely
that Israel will seek to join the organization anytime soon, especially while it is occupied by the thorny issue of finding a long-term
solution to the issue of Palestinian dispossession.

Second, it’s more useful for Turkey to be in NATO because it has the second largest army in
NATO and is geographically located closer to Europe. They are more valuable to NATO.

Third, extend our last card in case that says Turkey will flip to being a NATO ally if they are not
in NATO. That is way worse for NATO than for Israel not to be in it.

Fourth, NATO still contributes. According to the NATO Association of Canada, Israel has been
a valuable associate of NATO for years. It is involved in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue,
an initiative designed to foster collaboration between the alliance, Israel, and six other Middle
Eastern and North African states to promote stability around the Mediterranean through
military and political cooperation. Less formally, Israel’s Mossad has been critical to the
intelligence effort that is central to the prosecution of the War on Terror, a conflict in
which NATO is deeply steeped.

Answers to: Turkey Blocks UAE from Joining NATO

First, it’s more useful for Turkey to be in NATO because it has the second largest army in NATO
and is geographically located closer to Europe. They are more valuable to NATO.

Second, extend our last card in case that says Turkey will flip to being a NATO ally if they are
not in NATO. That is way worse for NATO than for the UAEl not to be in it. Turkey also has the
third largest army.

Third, there is no reason for the UAE to have to be in NATO. According to the US Department of
State in 2021, the UAE is a long-standing contributor to United Nations (UN), NATO, and
regional peacekeeping operations, including United Nations Operation in Somalia II, the UN’s
peacekeeping Kosovo Force, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Answers to: Turkey Vetoes NATO Actions

First, NATO countries don’t always agree. Germany won’t send weapons to the UKraine at the
moment and France is taking a softer line toward Russia over Ukraine. A country disagreeing
with NATO on some issues isn’t a reason to remove them.

Second, extend the first card in our case that says that although there have been
disagreements that Turkey’s participation in NATO has been net-desirable because it
cooperates with NATO on the core issues

Third, Turkey is unified with NATO against Russia now. They aren’t vetoing any actions.
Fourth, Their evidence is just talking about the threat of a veto. Turkey did not end up vetoing
the Baltic security plan. Two days ago when the US decided to deploy more troops to Poland,
the US did not veto that.

Answers to: Turkey Undermines NATO Cohesion

First, NATO countries don’t always agree. Germany won’t send weapons to the UKraine at the
moment and France is taking a softer line toward Russia over Ukraine. A country disagreeing
with NATO on some issues isn’t a reason to remove them.

Second, extend the first card in our case that says that although there have been
disagreements that Turkey’s participation in NATO has been net-desirable because it
cooperates with NATO on the core issues

Third, Turkey is unified with NATO against Russia now. They aren’t vetoing any actions.

Fourth, Their evidence is just talking about the threat of a veto. Turkey did not end up vetoing
the Baltic security plan. Two days ago when the US decided to deploy more troops to Poland,
the US did not veto that.

Fourth, Turkey committed to NATO

Soicescu & Hanso, January 2022, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and
Difficult Ally, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICDS_Policy_Paper_Turkey
%C2%B4s_Future_Role_in_NATO_Stoicescu_Hanso_January_2022-1.pdf, Kalev Stoicescu Kalev Stoicescu is
a Research Fellow at ICDS. A former Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official, he joined the ICDS in August 2014. Among other fields, he specialises
in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
from 1991–2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia
and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002–2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at
the Estonian Embassy in Paris. Hille Hanso Hille Hanso is an independent researcher and analyst, based in Istanbul. Her articles, interviews, essays and commentaries have
appeared in all media outlets in Estonia and abroad. Her expertise and research interests include Turkish culture and language, nationalism, security and defence in the regional
context, Turkish domestic and foreign policy; Estonia-Turkey relations in the 1920s and 30s, minorities and forced migration in the Middle East. Her latest graduate degree is in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. TThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia recognised Hille Hanso for her contribution to
developing Estonian-Turkish relations in 2020

Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy debate has been unsettled since the coup in 2016. Nevertheless, its commitment
to NATO, including the development of a new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, remains
strong. Interviewees agreed on this point, referring to the communiqué of the Brussels summit, in June
2021, to which Turkey fully subscribed. On the other hand, Turkey’s so-called Eurasianists, as
well as many Islamists, pose questions as to whether the country should stay in or leave
NATO. These doubts are on the margins of Turkey’s political landscape, but they do affect the
domestic public debate and the results of opinion polls.

Turkey supports NATO enlargement and the NATO’s role in Afghanistan

Soicescu & Hanso, January 2022, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and
Difficult Ally, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICDS_Policy_Paper_Turkey
%C2%B4s_Future_Role_in_NATO_Stoicescu_Hanso_January_2022-1.pdf, Kalev Stoicescu Kalev Stoicescu is
a Research Fellow at ICDS. A former Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official, he joined the ICDS in August 2014. Among other fields, he specialises
in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
from 1991–2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia
and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002–2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at
the Estonian Embassy in Paris. Hille Hanso Hille Hanso is an independent researcher and analyst, based in Istanbul. Her articles, interviews, essays and commentaries have
appeared in all media outlets in Estonia and abroad. Her expertise and research interests include Turkish culture and language, nationalism, security and defence in the regional
context, Turkish domestic and foreign policy; Estonia-Turkey relations in the 1920s and 30s, minorities and forced migration in the Middle East. Her latest graduate degree is in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. TThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia recognised Hille Hanso for her contribution to
developing Estonian-Turkish relations in 2020

Turkey’s views on NATO’s enlargement are officially in contradiction with Russia’s

position. Ankara supports the bids for NATO membership for both Ukraine and Georgia.
Turkey also wants NATO to help more in Libya and display stronger commitment, upholding the country’s
legitimate/ internationally recognised government in Tripoli, although NATO probably will not make any decisions to that end in the
near future. In Afghanistan, Turkey played a major role in NATO’s efforts. It was the only Ally
present and one of the six countries invited (together with Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and Qatar) to the
inauguration of the Taliban-ruled government in Kabul, in a way representing both itself and the recently
departed Alliance. Turkey was prepared to keep the Kabul Airport under control after the
withdrawal of NATO troops, but there is no agreement with the new Taliban regime.

Turkey provides significant support to the European Response Force

Soicescu & Hanso, January 2022, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and
Difficult Ally, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICDS_Policy_Paper_Turkey
%C2%B4s_Future_Role_in_NATO_Stoicescu_Hanso_January_2022-1.pdf, Kalev Stoicescu Kalev Stoicescu is
a Research Fellow at ICDS. A former Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official, he joined the ICDS in August 2014. Among other fields, he specialises
in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
from 1991–2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia
and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002–2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at
the Estonian Embassy in Paris. Hille Hanso Hille Hanso is an independent researcher and analyst, based in Istanbul. Her articles, interviews, essays and commentaries have
appeared in all media outlets in Estonia and abroad. Her expertise and research interests include Turkish culture and language, nationalism, security and defence in the regional
context, Turkish domestic and foreign policy; Estonia-Turkey relations in the 1920s and 30s, minorities and forced migration in the Middle East. Her latest graduate degree is in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. TThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia recognised Hille Hanso for her contribution to
developing Estonian-Turkish relations in 2020

In 2021, Turkey took over from Germany the land component of the NATO Response
Force (NRF), providing a Rapid Deployable Corps.21 In addition, France contributes the French AeroNaval
Rapid Reaction Force (FRAMARFOR) to the NRF’s maritime component. The ACC Ramstein (Article 5 and Collective Defence) and
Italy’s JFAC (crisis response) make up the air component, and Command and Control (C2) and Special Forces from Denmark,
Turkey contributes also routinely
Belgium, and the Netherlands contribute to the special operations components.
to NATO’s maritime groups and operations in the Mediterranean (Standing NATO Maritime Group 1,
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 and Operation Sea Guardian).

7th, Turkey’s role as a NATO ally is on-balance desirable

Soicescu & Hanso, January 2022, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and
Difficult Ally, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICDS_Policy_Paper_Turkey
%C2%B4s_Future_Role_in_NATO_Stoicescu_Hanso_January_2022-1.pdf, Kalev Stoicescu Kalev Stoicescu is
a Research Fellow at ICDS. A former Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official, he joined the ICDS in August 2014. Among other fields, he specialises
in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
from 1991–2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia
and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002–2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at
the Estonian Embassy in Paris. Hille Hanso Hille Hanso is an independent researcher and analyst, based in Istanbul. Her articles, interviews, essays and commentaries have
appeared in all media outlets in Estonia and abroad. Her expertise and research interests include Turkish culture and language, nationalism, security and defence in the regional
context, Turkish domestic and foreign policy; Estonia-Turkey relations in the 1920s and 30s, minorities and forced migration in the Middle East. Her latest graduate degree is in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. TThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia recognised Hille Hanso for her contribution to
developing Estonian-Turkish relations in 2020

Executive Summary
Turkey is one of the key Allies in NATO. Turkey’s relations with and attitude towards the
West will have a significant impact on the future of the Alliance and its capabilities and
influence in the Black Sea region, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Turkey’s regional power ambitions and interventionist policy, departure from democracy,
unsettled disputes with NATO Allies and rapprochement with Russia and China create a very
complex picture. The authors present the following recommendations from the perspective of
reviving Turkey’s Western orientation, as much as possible, and strengthening NATO:
• The West – meaning NATO Allies and the EU institutions and non-NATO member states –
should adopt a double-track approach to Turkey by strengthening relations both personally,
given Turkey’s present governance and President Erdoğan’s role/style, and institutionally,
contemplating a longterm perspective.
• The relations between the West and Turkey do not need more irritants (disputes and conflicts
of interest), but rather a problem-solving agenda, a positive atmosphere, and constructive
contacts and communication.
• The above is easier said than done, but the main interests of, and critical issues that concern
Western countries, NATO and the EU, and Turkey have been on the table for years, and should
be solved one by one. None of these issues, from the refugees and Turkey’s membership in the
EU, to the Patriot versus S-400 systems, are unsolvable, or can be shelved indefinitely. All
sides have made mistakes, but through good will reasonable compromises can be
achieved for the common benefit. Western-Turkish relations need a success story/ a
good news story soon.
• Western criticism of Turkey’s current democracy deficiencies is legitimate, but it should
not block the path to improving mutual relations. Turkey is a NATO ally, not an adversary
of the Alliance. There is no reason to treat Turkey like Russia and differently, for
example, from Poland or Hungary.
• Time cannot be turned back and the Turkish economic and democratisation “miracle” of the
2000s cannot be repeated in the same fashion under the current government, but the West has
a duty and a vested interest in preventing Turkey from unbalancing its policies and
strategic choices in favour of Russia (and China).
• Turkey’s membership of the EU – that is full membership – depends on achieving consensus
between member states. Turkey should be given clear answers regarding the accession
negotiations that should be unfrozen in exchange for Ankara’s pledge and tangible steps made
towards improving its democracy record.
• The customs union agreement between the EU and Turkey could be complemented with
clauses that allow Turkish exports of agricultural products to the EU, as a bonus for making
steps that improve the state of democracy and freedoms before the elections in 2023.
• The EU should negotiate with Turkey a reasonable/acceptable way for visa liberalisation for
Turkish citizens.
• A renewed peace process, aimed at resolving issues related to Kurdish organisations
vis-à-vis fighting terrorism in Syria and elsewhere, could help pave the way to lasting
security in Turkey and the region. The West could provide economic incentives to bring
all counterparts, including relevant actors in the Kurdish political movements, to the
negotiation table. Respect for human rights, territorial integrity and sovereignty of states,
and of security arrangements are crucial ingredients of a peace process.

Answers to: Russian Threat Hypothetical

This is silly.; Russia invaded part of the Ukraine in the past and it invaded Georgia at the start of
the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

And just because something hasn’t happened yet doesn’t mean it will. In 1935, the Nazi
genocide was speculative and so was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Turkey kills ISIS. Merve Adoygan, April 14, 2021, Turkey remains as indispensable member
of NATO for 69 years, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-remains-as-indispensable-
member-of-nato-for-69-years/2273488

ANKARA As NATO allies gathered for a summit in Brussels this week, the key role that Turkey plays in the alliance is again in the
spotlight, amid continuing security concerns in Syria and Turkey's wider region. Since becoming a NATO member in 1952 (just three
years after its formation), Turkey has been one of the alliance's biggest contributing partners,
making its abilities and capabilities an integral part of the command and force structure
of the alliance, with its second-largest army. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded on April
4, 1949, currently has 30 members and is headquartered in Brussels. In 1952, to its 12 founding countries of Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States, NATO added
Turkey. This month NATO is marking its 72nd anniversary in Brussels with the attendance of heads of state and government. The
oft-cited cornerstone of the alliance is Article 5 of the NATO charter, which ensures collective defense -- an attack against one
member is an attack against all. Turkey 'important ally' for NATO Through its military and advancing defense systems, Turkey
remains as an "important is an important NATO ally," as stated by the alliance's secretary-general. Previewing the NATO Summit in
Brussels, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stressed Turkey's importance in an event jointly organized by NATO, the
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the Brookings Institution. "I think it's also important to remember that Turkey is
an important NATO Ally. You can just look at the map and realize the importance of these lands, the landmass of
Turkey. And also the only country, the only NATO Ally that borders Iraq and Syria," he
said. Stoltenberg also hailed the country's infrastructure and airports in fighting against
Daesh while also noting that "...Turkey played an important role in the Global Coalition to Defeat
ISIS and we continue to work closely with the NATO ally, Turkey, in stabilizing our southern neighborhood." He also underscored
Turkey's significance in dealing with the ongoing migrant and refugee crisis. Since 2016, Turkey has launched a trio of
successful anti-terror operations across its border in northern Syria to prevent the
formation of a terror corridor and to enable the peaceful settlement of residents:
Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), and Peace Spring (2019). Turkey's contributions
Turkey has been the international frontrunner in the fight against terrorism, especially
against the terrorist YPG/PKK, Daesh/ISIS and FETO, the group behind the 2016 defeated
cou

ISIS is distinct – ideologically motivated – causes systematic genocide and

widespread structural violence – thousands dead and millions displaced
Guilbert 15 GUILBERT, KIERAN. “Islamic State aims to eradicate Iraq minorities: rights
groups.” Reuters. 27 Feb 2015. Web. 4 March 2015.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/27/us-iraq-violence-
minoritiesidUSKBN0LV0U020150227>.
“Islamic State militants have abducted, injured and killed thousands of civilians across
northern Iraq and uprooted millions from their homes in a bid to eradicate the country's
ethnic and religious minorities, rights groups said on Friday. Several minority communities,
including Christians, Yazidis and Turkmen, have been subjected to killings, rape and
sexual enslavement, and women and children have been targeted in particular, a report by
four human rights organizations said. Islamic State seized the Iraqi city of Mosul in June last
year while sweeping through the north towards Baghdad, meeting virtually no resistance from
the army and declaring a caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria under its control. Around 8,000
civilians were killed and more than 12,000 wounded between June and December 2014,
the United Nations said. Alison Smith, legal counsel of No Peace Without Justice, said Islamic
State had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and possibly even genocide
against minorities in northern Iraq. Iraq's U.N. ambassador told the U.N. Security Council
last week that Islamic State had committed genocide.”
ISIS threatens the Kurds, recently attacking and slaughtering imprisoned Kurds.
Tariq Ogoluz explained in 2021 that, “Turkey's cooperation within NATO has been vital to the
defeat of radical religious terrorism in the wider Middle East.”

Answers to: Turkey WIll Join the EU if they Aren’t in NATO

First, they literally do not have a card that says anything even close to this. Their claim is that
Turkey will try harder, but Turkey has been trying to get into the EU for years but the EU has
rejected them because they don’t have a market economy and because they aren’t that
democratic and have a history of abusing human rights. None of that is going to change if they
leave NATO.

Second, turn – the last piece of evidence in our case says that if they aren’t in NATO they’ll
align with Russia. IF they are aligned with Russia thy EU isn’t going to take them and human
rights abuses will increase. Look at what happened in Belarus when they left the West to align
with NATO.

Third, if they are no longer part of the Western military alliance, how are they going to get a
Western economic alliance to admit them>

Fourth, turn, trade is a disaster

Free trade leads to massive spread of infectious disease

ASU 15 (Arizona State University, cites a new study by Charles Perrings, an ASU professor of
environmental economics, “Infectious disease spread is fueled by international trade” December
22 2015, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/12/151222163415.htm)
International trade and travel has literally opened up new vistas for humans, ranging from travel to exotic places to
enjoying the products and services of those distant lands. But along with international trade and travel comes the risk of
spreading infectious diseases, a growing problem in today's global economy, says an Arizona State
University researcher. "The recent Ebola outbreak made us realize that we are all just a plane ride
away from exposure to emerging infectious diseases," says Charles Perrings, an ASU
professor of environmental economics. Perrings recently published the paper, "Options for Managing the Infectious Animal and
Plant Disease Risks of International Trade," in the early online version of the journal Food Security. The paper reported project results to an
international conference "Global Plant Health Risks and Consequences: Linking Science, Economics and Policy," hosted by the British Food and
Environment Research Agency, and supported by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Cooperative Research Programme
on Biological Resource Management for Sustainable Agricultural Systems. Perrings is the principle investigator of a project funded by the National
Science Foundation-National Institutes of Health-U.S. Department of Agriculture Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases program in collaboration
with the UK's Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council. In the paper, Perrings describes the growth of international trade since the
1950s and the increasingly tight coupling of developed and developing economies. The paper considers how the global community currently deals with
An example of the
trade-related infectious disease risks of animals and plants, and asks how the system could be made more effective.
impact of an infectious disease came in 2001 in the UK when an outbreak of hoof and mouth
disease cost some $10 billion and more than 2 million sheep and cattle had to be destroyed,
Perrings said. More recently, African swine fever--a much more serious disease of pigs--has been
spread in the Caucasus region through trade in pork, pork product or through waste in trade
vehicles. "The more trade grows as a proportion of global production, the more likely it is that
diseases will be spread through trade, and the higher the economic cost of resulting trade bans," Perrings said. "What is at risk is
 many infectious diseases that affect
the food we eat, the fibers we wear and build with, and the fuels we burn." "In addition
animals also affect people," he added. "Zoonoses like SARS, MERS, HIV AIDS, or highly pathogenic avian influenza, all originated in
wild animals and were then spread person to person through trade and travel." Perrings said current instruments to control
infectious diseases are far from adequate, as the recent report of the Harvard-London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, published in the Lancet, makes clear. "There are two problems to address," he said.
"One is that disease spread is an unintended (external) effect of trade. To solve this problem exporters
and importers need to be confronted with the risks they impose on consumers."

Pandemics cause extinction – burnout wrong

Kerscher 14—Professor, unclear where because every website about him is in German
(Karl-Heinz, “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten)

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens,
multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an
upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that
quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its
hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-
compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are
not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However,
this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence
and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of
virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with
different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition
There are numerous historical examples of
between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence.
pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the
possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.

Answers to: Turkey Will Join the BRI if they Aren’t in NATO
There own article says there are other primary barriers

Chaziza ‘21

The issue of the Uyghur, the Muslim-Turkic ethnic minority in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region of China, continues to be the most crucial obstacle to ChinaTurkey
relations. Although some progress has been made towards a mutual understanding that would
address both governments’ concerns, it still has the potential to
negatively affect their relations.88
Another obstacle relates to suspicions of debt-trap diplomacy regarding the BRI. Ankara
cited debt-trap diplomacy and the Uyghur issue as reasons to not attend the second BRI
summit after having attended the first summit.89 Turkey remains dissatisfied with the current
level of economic engagement with China, as it has a significant trade deficit with
China. According to China Customs Statistics (export-import) 2019, while China’s export
value to Turkey is $17.3 billion, Beijing’s import value from Ankara is just $3.4 billion.9

In practice, the BRI does not solve poverty. Their evidence is just
descriptive of what it ought to do/could potentially be achieved, not what
actually happens

Forbes, January 29, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-chinas-

belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-of-trouble/?sh=320f262443d7

China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), a network of enhanced overland and maritime trade routes better linking China with Asia, Europe and Africa began in 2013 with much
fanfare and hope. Upwards of a trillion dollars were being put on the table to boost economic development in globalization’s final frontiers, Asia and Africa’s infrastructure gap
was to be lessened, and the world’s second largest economy was taking more of an active role in international affairs with the prospect of creating a true multi-polar global
power structure. With catchphrases like “a rising tide lifts all ships,” China stepped beyond its borders to an extent that hasn’t been seen for centuries—perhaps ever—and was

nearly seven years since the Belt and Road began, the
welcomed by many emerging markets with open arms. But today,

story is much different, as in some markets Chinese investment has nearly become a
euphemism for wasteful spending, environmental destruction and untenable debt. Many
major projects are currently strewn around the world in half-finished disrepair and the
opportunities that were sold to local populations rarely materialized. All up and down the
Belt and Road, projects have been marred by delays, financial implosions and
(occasionally violent) outpourings of negative public sentiment. In the initial stages of the Belt and Road, it seemed as if China was trying
to rewrite the book on international development. The projects were bigger, more costly, and riskier than what the world was used to seeing, which created a buzz and sense of excitement: could China step up onto the global stage and show us how it’s done? While
the news tickers sparkled with headlines of multi-billion dollar deals, big moves, and action along the Belt and Road, a broader view would have shown that a large portion of these deals were being made with countries that had credit ratings classified as “junk.”
Making big deals with countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Malaysia showed the initial propensity of the Belt and Road to shoot for quantity over quality, expediency over transparency—and the reactions from this strategy was quickly felt across the entire network.

It was in Sri Lanka that the deficiencies of China’s international development activities were first revealed globally. China partnered with Sri Lanka’s former president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who now faces allegations of financial irregularities, to build a series of
infrastructure mega-projects in Hambantota, a vastly undeveloped region on the island nation’s southern coast. To start, the plan called for a new deep sea port, an airport, a stadium, a giant conference center and many miles of new roadways. These projects were
mostly funded with loans from China, which a few years later Sri Lanka struggled to pay back, as the country sunk into a debt trap of its own making. China eventually seized a 70% share of the deep sea port at Hambantota for 99 years for $1.12 billion. While this at
first appeared to be a debt-for-equity swap, news later came out that Sri Lanka actually used the money to beef up its foreign reserves and make some other foreign debt repayments to save itself from economic collapse. However, the optics on the situation were
entirely unhelpful, with headlines like “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port” echoed across media sources around the world as the “Chinese debt trap diplomacy” theory was born.

BRI worsens climate change, and every $1 invested makes it worse

Lili Pike, 9-24, 19, https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2019/09/24/belt-and-road-countries-will-
make-or-break-the-paris-agreement/, Belt and Road countries will make or break the Paris
Agreement
The nature of BRI investments means they will also have an outsize effect on emissions, according to
the report. Roads, power plants and other major power and transportation infrastructure
projects make up the bulk of them, and these projects are carbon-intensive by nature.
Every dollar invested in infrastructure is more significant than other kinds of investment
from a carbon perspective. And because infrastructure lasts decades, these investments will have a strong influence on
countries’ emissions trajectories For power sector investments, the report explicitly states that Chinese
investments – dominated by coal power – are not aligned with a 2C path, but rather are
set to follow a “business as usual” path. This finding, which draws on Belt and Road-wide
projects found in an American Enterprise Institute database, is supported by other research
showing that China’s continued investment in overseas coal projects is not in line with the Paris
Agreement.
Each tenth of a degree matters and saves millions of lives
Aronoff & Denvir 21 [Kate, staff writer at the New Republic, writing fellow at In These Times, Daniel, visiting
fellow in International and Public Affairs at Brown Univ, “Capitalism Can’t Fix the Climate Crisis,” Jacobin, 08/25/21,
https://jacobinmag.com/2021/08/capitalism-climate-crisis-global-green-new-deal-clean-energy-fossil-fuel-industry, accessed
08/26/21, JCR]

The text of the Paris Agreement says that warming should be constrained to well below two
degrees Celsius. 1.5 degrees is an aspiration. It’s good to understand where that demand comes from; it
has been a standing call from the folks in climate-vulnerable countries in the Global South, for whom the
difference between 1.5 and 2 degrees is huge. The folks talking about 1.5 degrees have been marching through
the halls of UN climate talks, chanting “1.5 to survive,” because for low-lying island states, warming of 1.5
degrees represents an existential threat. Currently we are on track for about 1.1 degrees Celsius of
warming. That gives us a punishingly short window in which to meet even two degrees, which is a bit of a fabrication; there’s some
debate about where the two-degree target came from. Some people credit that to the economist William Nordhaus, who is not the
most reliable source on a lot of these things. But there’s something comforting about a target. There’s something comforting about
saying that this thing that is happening is far-off, and that we can potentially avoid it. We have a bit of time, and two degrees gives
us more time than 1.5 degrees. Reaching targets has been the popular goal. That’s what you see in the fossil fuel industry
assessments. But the conversation about targets can sometimes obscure what’s actually happening. It’s not as if somebody who is
The climate crisis is
living through a hurricane or a natural disaster will say, “Oh no, we’ve hit two degrees Celsius.”
playing out all around us. There’s not a point at which we cross the boundary toward a disastrous future. Every tenth
of a degree of warming that we avoid makes an enormous amount of difference, saving on the order
of tens of thousands of lives. If we cross 1.5 or even two degrees of warming, it’s not that we should all
pack up, go home, and wait to die. There are still millions of lives that can be saved by
preventing each additional tenth of a degree of warming.

Turn – Turkey’s participation in the BRI means Turkey turns a blind eye to the Uyghures
and massive human rights abuses

Global Voices, 9-24, 21, https://globalvoices.org/2021/09/24/turkeys-uyghur-dilemma-in-the-

context-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/

Turkey has traditionally been an ally of the Uyghurs due to strong linguistic, cultural, and
religious ties. Yet Ankara's political and economic alliances with Beijing, including the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI), have complicated these historical bonds, divided Turkish public
opinion, and reshaped Turkey’s official policy regarding the Uyghurs in the past years.
Having lost their political independence in the 1940s, the nearly 13 million Uyghur people living
in western China in Xinjiang province have long considered Turkey a cultural and political
haven. Turkey has become a home to Uyghur businessmen and students, as well as dissidents
who have sought refuge to escape persecution and life in internment camps. Today, an
estimated 50,000 Uyghurs live in Turkey to flee the Beijing-orchestrated deprivation of
their most basic human rights, including freedom of religion, of movement and of
communicating in their native language. Until the early 2010s, the Uyghur cause was widely embraced in Turkish political circles. In 2009 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
then prime minister, described the situation in Xinjiang as a “genocide” and sought to shame China internationally. A sudden U-turn
But following a sharp economic decline in the aftermath of a military coup in July 2016, Erdoğan’s tone changed. The national currency depreciated 29 percent, dealing the economy a major blow, as relations with
the US soured and Turkey swapped its parliamentary system for a presidential one in 2018. The economy has hardly recovered since then. Credit rating agencies currently rank Turkey as a high-risk country. In
the last three years, capital outflows have surpassed capital inflows. In other words, foreign investors are leaving the Turkish economy for economic or political reasons. While nearly a quarter of Turkey's
government bonds were held by foreign investors in 2013, today it is around 4 percent. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has also dropped. According to the Ministry of Trade, from 2016–2020, total FDI in Turkey
dropped from 12.18 billion US dollars to 6.67 billion US dollars. In due course, investors from the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Azerbaijan, and Russia all reduced their investment in the country.

China to the rescue: investment and vaccines

As foreign investors abandoned Turkey, China stepped in as an important player . Shortly after the currency crisis in
2018, China provided Turkey with a loan of 3.6 billion US dollars to be used in the energy and transportation sectors. Since then, the country has loaned an additional 6.6 billion US dollars to strengthen the

As economic ties strengthened, Turkey's policies on the treatment

economic, and commercial ventures between the two countries.

of Uyghurs in China weakened. Most notably, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu made a
statement in 2017 assuring Chinese counterparts that Turkey would not tolerate criticism against
China, marking a shift in the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) policies regarding the Uyghurs. We absolutely will not allow in Turkey any activities targeting or opposing China. Additionally, we
will take measures to eliminate any media reports targeting China. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.
The last time Turkish authorities criticized the mistreatment of Uyghurs was in February 2019. In a written statement, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hami Aksoy said, “more than one million Uighur Turks
incurring arbitrary arrests are subjected to torture and political brainwashing in internment camps and prisons. Uyghurs who are not detained in these camps are under heavy pressure.” The response from the
Chinese government was swift. China's Ambassador to Turkey Deng Li “warned” Turkey that such statements disturb Chinese investors and if Turkey continues its criticism, they would inevitably jeopardize

In 2017, Turkey signed an extradition treaty with China during President Erdogan's
bilateral economic relations.

visit to Beijing. The agreement consists of 22 articles and obligates Turkey to extradite any person
wanted on criminal charges to China. Although China ratified the treaty in December 2020, Turkey is yet to do so. The Turkish parliament received the document in 2019.
Many have linked the delay in ratifying the treaty with China failing to deliver the promised 100 million doses of China-made COVID-19 vaccines.

BRI expands China’s military footprint in a way that threatens US

leadership
NADÈGE ROLLAND, September 2019, Roland is Senior Fellow for Political and Security Affairs
at the National Bureau of Asian Research. She is the author of China’s Eurasian Century?
Political , and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (2017),
https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr80_securing_the_belt_and_road_se
p2019.pdf

BRI increases the urgency for the PLA to further develop a flexible expeditionary force
capable of more complex, larger, and lengthier deployments away from China’s shores.
Kristen Gunness examines in detail how the different PLA components are addressing the
capability gap: upgrading, improving, and producing new maritime capabilities while working on
strategic airlift; strengthening special operations forces; and possibly augmenting border
security capabilities to conduct land-based expeditionary missions. The PLA will likely be able to
sustain maritime operations overseas relatively soon (by 2025), assesses Gunness BRI is not
focused on China achieving a “dominant position,” explains Guifang (Julia) Xue in her essay on
the potential dual use of support facilities. Yet she observes that “investing in ports located in
strategic positions no doubt helps China diversify its supply of overseas energy and raw
materials, safeguard its SLOC [sea lines of communication] access and security, and
improve its overall geopolitical position.” The question therefore is not whether China
will need naval bases, but rather how to manage the “concerns and anxiety” about its
military intentions along the Belt and Road routes as it opens more of them. Xue reckons
that China will not need to establish multiple bases for missions that will essentially be
small-scale and low-intensity. A permanent military presence could also be too
economically and politically burdensome. She advocates instead for dual-use logistical
bases, which are essentially commercial ports that could be used to host naval ships
when necessary. Indirect options are also under consideration. Among them is increasing
military diplomacy, international cooperation, and involvement in peacekeeping operations so as
to showcase China’s “harmless use of overseas military force.”18 Raffaello Pantucci examines
in particular how China’s longer-term penetration of Central Asia’s security apparatuses through
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, training and joint exercises, military aid, and military
sales could gradually upend Russia’s security predominance in the region and overturn the two
countries’ traditional division of labor between economics and security. Pantucci illustrates how
BRI could be the precursor of China’s expanded security footprint in third countries using a
multiplicity of security-related tools. China has also developed innovative frameworks in its
immediate neighborhood, principally with an eye on instability in Afghanistan and its possible
spillover into Chinese territory. Dirk van der Kley focuses on how Beijing has beefed up its
security activities in Tajikistan and at the border with Afghanistan through a three-pronged
approach: building capacity, co-opting local forces to protect its own projects and interests, and
conducting joint operations with Tajik and Afghan forces near the shared border. His essay
provides a useful case study about options that could be implemented elsewhere along the Silk
Roads. New security demands along the Belt and Road routes could also give rise to an
increased role for Chinese private security companies, which not long ago were mostly
operating at the municipal level in China. Alessandro Arduino describes the arduous path for
these thousands of young companies to become highly professionalized units in order to
operate in precarious environments overseas. He underlines the opportunity to help shape their
rules of engagement and regulatory procedures as the sector slowly matures. Taken together,
these contributions present a sweeping picture of the set of options that are under
consideration to enhance the security of China’s interests along the Belt and Road
routes. Common to all seven essays is the idea that the expansion of China’s overseas
interests naturally creates the need for military protection. Along with normative
adjustments and military overseas operations and basing, Beijing can also pursue indirect
approaches, such as engaging in extended international cooperation on nontraditional security
and subcontracting protection either to host nations or to private contractors. The U.S.
government has begun to recognize that the implications of China’s expansion of its security
frontier, along the lines described in this report, will be far-reaching.19 This expansion could
complicate, restrict, or even deny the United States’ ability to project power, protect the lines of
communication through the global commons, exert influence, and shape future regional security
developments, as well as the United States’ ability to defend its allies and interests.

BRI increases sex trafficking

Dubow, 2017, Philip Dubow is a graduate of the United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice
Research Institute in Turin, Italy. Previously, he was an educational consultant in Shenzhen,
China,
China and its state partners are not the only actors using the BRI to expand their
mobility, connectivity, production capacity, and market share. Criminals are, too. The more
Eurasia integrates via the BRI, the easier it becomes for criminal entities to recruit
additional members, acquire new clients, diversify their portfolios, and outsource their
operations to less-developed areas with laxer laws, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/is-
chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-increasing-crime-and-terrorism/, Is China’s Belt and Road
Initiative Increasing Crime and Terrorism?
Ironically, many of the BRI’s transportation projects coincide with and elongate existing
trafficking routes. For example, although Myanmar is already at the apex of the “Golden
Triangle” (Southeast Asia’s primary opium-producing region), the renovation of old highways will
make smuggling drugs easier, while the construction of new roads will expose formerly isolated
areas to illicit activity. In other words, BRI infrastructure in rural Myanmar will provide criminals
with access to customers and resources that were previously too remote to reach. As a result,
opioid addiction will proliferate, and forests will be ravaged for timber, wildlife contraband, and
arable land for poppy production. If these thoroughfares were properly secured, then their
inauguration would herald positive growth. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that the government of
Myanmar is willing or able to insulate these roads from crime — especially since drug lords
routinely collaborate with corrupt officials to monopolize the country’s jade racket.

Answers to: Turkey is Not Democratic

Turn – If Turkey leaves NATO they will align with Russia. That’s the last card in case. When
Belarus left the Wdst and aligned with Russia they became authoritarian

Even if Erdogan is more authoritarian, this is transitional and Turkey is a

democracy

Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı Director, Ankara Office, Gkreen Marchall Fund, January 12, 2022,
https://www.gmfus.org/news/it-not-too-early-think-about-political-change-turkey, It Is Not Too
Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey
After almost 20 years of uninterrupted rule by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, first as prime minister and then as
president, Turkey may be on the verge of political change. While this is a possibility rather than a foregone
conclusion, its allies and partners should be prepared for such an outcome. Not too long ago, it was widely believed that Erdoğan
could not be defeated in an election due to several factors, including the devotion of his supporters, his political savvy, and the lack
of a viable opposition. After the failed coup attempt in July 2016 and the repressive state of emergency that followed, a new
narrative emerged: Turkey was now an authoritarian state where election outcomes would be predetermined. Others argued that,
while they are unfair, elections are real and competitive, with the opposition having a genuine chance of winning. The latter
argument was proven correct in the March 2019 local elections. The opposition won in most of the metropolitan cities, including
Ankara and İstanbul. The rerun of the elections in İstanbul, based on flimsy arguments, cast a shadow over Turkey’s electoral
democracy, but ultimately the city’s voters made their will indisputably clear and the opposition won by an even bigger margin in the
rerun. The
next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 2023, but
early ones cannot be ruled out. Erdoğan has been sliding significantly in opinion polls
since the local elections, indicating that his reelection cannot be taken for granted. Several factors have
contributed to this situation. First, the change from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government has not worked well for
Erdoğan. In the new system, his Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been sidelined by presidential bureaucrats and advisors
who do not necessarily have connections to the party grassroots. As a result of this and of losing major municipalities in 2019, the
clientelist network that the AKP and Erdoğan used to enjoy has been largely disrupted. The presidential system came with two other
changes that had negative outcomes for Erdoğan. The 50 percent plus one threshold to be elected president and the legalization of
formal electoral alliances led him to ally the AKP with the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP). His dependence on the MHP has
not only limited his policy choices but also alienated some AKP voters such as conservative Kurds. While the audience for the
opposition’s message is growing by the day, that of Erdoğan is gradually but steadily shrinking. Second, the social democratic
Republican People’s Party (CHP) was able to form an alliance with a diverse set of parties—including one moderate nationalist, one
hardcore Islamist, and one center-right party—gaining the ability to address a wider audience. The CHP then changed its political
discourse. In the past, it engaged in a rigid secular, antireligious, and nationalist rhetoric, and it “othered” religious conservatives and
Kurds. It supported repressive measures such as the infamous headscarf ban of the 1990s. This approach had confined CHP to a
marginal ideological corner. Under its current president, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the party has gradually pivoted away from this
approach, hesitantly at first and more decisively recently. He went so far as to publicly apologize to those his party has wronged in
the past. While the audience for the opposition’s message is growing by the day, that of Erdoğan is gradually but steadily shrinking.
The opposition bloc had another problem: cohesion and coherence. Initially, its common denominator was little more than anti-
Erdoğanism. However, it has recently begun building a proactive and positive shared agenda, such as restoring the parliamentary
system and advancing democratic freedoms. Third, Turkey is experiencing its worst currency crisis since the 2001 economic crisis
that propelled the AKP to power. Due to the increasing political risks, the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, and most notably
unorthodox monetary policies such as keeping the interest rate below inflation, which Erdoğan insists on, the Turkish lira has
devalued by more than 50 percent in a year. The devaluation was partially curbed only through the guarantee by the Treasury to
indemnify holders of lira deposits if devaluation exceeds the interest rate. As a result of the devaluation, inflation has jumped to 36
percent as of the start of the year. Unless there is an unexpected development, Erdoğan, the opposition candidate, and likely the
candidate of the Peoples’ Democratic Party, (HDP) will face off in the presidential election. The HDP was never invited to join the
opposition bloc because it was thought that this would not go down well with the voters of the other opposition parties. The HDP has
not taken issue with this and in the case of a second round, which is more likely than not, its voters are expected to support the
opposition bloc candidate. Under these conditions, one can envision three scenarios for the country. More of the Same Erdoğan
could be reelected despite the disadvantages he is now experiencing. Any combination of unexpected improvements in the
economy, a crisis that looks like a national emergency, making the vote counting less transparent, and finding other ways to make
the election even less fair—or mistakes by the opposition, such as picking the wrong candidate—could result in another victory for
Erdoğan. This scenario would likely see more of the same trajectory in Turkey, but accelerated. Some observers take this scenario
further—to the election not taking place in an orderly fashion or to Erdoğan not conceding if he loses. Given that that the AKP
candidate, under instructions from Erdoğan, did not concede after losing the local elections in İstanbul and that the stakes would be
Turkey has a long tradition
much higher in the presidential election, this perspective must not be dismissed. However,
of democratic elections and a vibrant opposition, and the system monitoring the ballots
and protecting votes has proved resilient so far. Moreover, Turkey is an open market
economy that needs foreign capital inflows to sustain its growth, and for this reason it
cannot afford a Belarus scenario for long. Change of Season This is a scenario in which the opposition wins the
presidential election. This could lead to a bare minimum of democratization steps or political paralysis. The former will represent a
slow transition, the latter a transition crisis that can scuttle the transition. Because
a new president would be
elected with the support of a very diverse group of political parties and would need their
support in the parliament, he or she would have an incentive to adopt an inclusive,
consensual, and pluralistic governing style. This would pave the way to the reversal of
some of the recent democratic backsliding. The rule of law, media freedom, and human
rights would improve and the space for civil society would grow. However, ideological differences
among the parties supporting the new president could prevent them from making constitutional changes to advance and consolidate
democratic reforms. Even if the parliamentary system is restored, Turkey’s democracy would look a lot like the one before the failed
coup attempt in 2016—a nominal democracy in need of comprehensive modernization. This would be a shaky and reversable
democratization. It would still be spring, but winter would likely follow.

Answers to: Turkey-Greece Conflict

US military assets in both Turkey and Greece means there can’t be a

conflict between the two

Soicescu & Hanso, January 2022, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and
Difficult Ally, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICDS_Policy_Paper_Turkey
%C2%B4s_Future_Role_in_NATO_Stoicescu_Hanso_January_2022-1.pdf, Kalev Stoicescu Kalev Stoicescu is
a Research Fellow at ICDS. A former Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official, he joined the ICDS in August 2014. Among other fields, he specialises
in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
from 1991–2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia
and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002–2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at
the Estonian Embassy in Paris. Hille Hanso Hille Hanso is an independent researcher and analyst, based in Istanbul. Her articles, interviews, essays and commentaries have
appeared in all media outlets in Estonia and abroad. Her expertise and research interests include Turkish culture and language, nationalism, security and defence in the regional
context, Turkish domestic and foreign policy; Estonia-Turkey relations in the 1920s and 30s, minorities and forced migration in the Middle East. Her latest graduate degree is in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. TThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia recognised Hille Hanso for her contribution to
developing Estonian-Turkish relations in 2020

The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken called Greece a “pillar of stability the region”, as Athens and Washington agreed to the
US gaining greater access to Greek military bases in October 2021.36 The
agreement is indefinite and allows
US forces to train and operate more broadly in Greece. This means the US has significant
military assets deployed in both Turkey and Greece that surely would play a key role in
preventing conflict between the two Allies and historic rivals. This agreement may signal
to Ankara that it is time to solve disputes with Greece for the sake of strengthening the
Alliance, and that solutions could be found by negotiations and/or international
mechanisms/ bodies (for example, the International Court of Justice, in the case of the maritime EEZ) rather than unilateral
actions.

Lack of democracy needs to be balanced with other needs

Soicescu & Hanso, January 2022, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and
Difficult Ally, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICDS_Policy_Paper_Turkey
%C2%B4s_Future_Role_in_NATO_Stoicescu_Hanso_January_2022-1.pdf, Kalev Stoicescu Kalev Stoicescu is
a Research Fellow at ICDS. A former Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official, he joined the ICDS in August 2014. Among other fields, he specialises
in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
from 1991–2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia
and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002–2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at
the Estonian Embassy in Paris. Hille Hanso Hille Hanso is an independent researcher and analyst, based in Istanbul. Her articles, interviews, essays and commentaries have
appeared in all media outlets in Estonia and abroad. Her expertise and research interests include Turkish culture and language, nationalism, security and defence in the regional
context, Turkish domestic and foreign policy; Estonia-Turkey relations in the 1920s and 30s, minorities and forced migration in the Middle East. Her latest graduate degree is in
International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. TThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia recognised Hille Hanso for her contribution to
developing Estonian-Turkish relations in 2020

The United States should certainly speak up and openly criticise Erdoğan’s deepening
autocracy, but in the meantime, it should also face reality. For all his faults, Erdoğan
nevertheless leads an important country. He is, for now, the only person that the US can
attempt to do business with and work with to solve major problems between the two
countries.28 Yet, the US should keep pushing for constructive relations in Turkey at the institutional level, such as ministries
and parliament, to avoid accelerating the concentration of power to a very narrow group of people in Turkey. 26 Andrew Wilks,
“Turkey’s Erdoğan lifts threat to expel Western ambassadors,” AP News, 25 October 2021. 27 Jeff Mason, “Biden to warn Turkey’s
Erdoğan against ‘precipitous’ actions,” Reuters, 31 October 2021. 28 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ömer Taşpınar, “Repairing the rift
Turkey can be a critical player in helping the US to
with Turkey,” Brooking Institution, 18 November 2020.
handle Russia, Iran and many issues in the Middle East and the Mediterranean