Harley2000 - Accountants Divided

Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2000) 11, 549–582
doi: 10.1006/cpac.1999.0405
Available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on
ACCOUNTANTS DIVIDED: RESEARCH

SELECTIVITY AND ACADEMIC ACCOUNTING
LABOUR IN UK UNIVERSITIES
S ANDRA H ARLEY
De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
This paper presents data from a postal survey designed to explore the impact of
the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) on academic accounting labour in the
UK. The RAE is seen as integral to the growth of managerialism in UK higher
education and to the increasing commodification of academic labour. The data
indicates that academic accountants are divided in their perceptions of and reactions
to the RAE. It is argued that in co-opting peer review for managerial ends, the
RAE appeals to traditional academic identities, re-enforcing existing divisions within
the academic accounting community and dissipating resistance to its perceived
negative effects. The conclusion is that despite a significant degree of hostility to
the RAE, UK accountants are themselves in large part responsible for enacting
this particular managerial control strategy. In the process, there is a danger that
academic accounting knowledge is being distorted, the profession divided and
academics disillusioned by its power to direct what “counts” as high status academic
research.
c 2000 Academic Press
“Well, for a discipline dominated by critical accountants, why are we so uncritical about all
of this?”
Introduction
This paper reports the results of a survey of academic accountants working in

UK universities, the aim of which was to investigate the impact of the Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE) on the academic labour process in the UK.1 The
paper is positioned within the general debate about the growth of managerialism
in higher education and the commodification of academic labour consequent upon
a government-led push for tighter monetary control over public services at a time of
severe resource constraint (Willmott, 1995). In higher education, as elsewhere in the
public sector in the UK, the principal control mechanisms have been the generation
of increased competition amongst institutional providers in quasi-markets and the
introduction of “performance indicators” to judge quality and determine funding
(Farnham & Horton, 1993; Townley, 1993; Clark & Newman, 1997). We argue that
Received 25 November 1998; revised 21 October 1999; accepted 30 November 1999
549
1045–2354/00/100549+34/$35.00/0
c 2000 Academic Press
550 S. Harley
in the case of academic labour, the RAE achieves both these objectives under cover
of peer review.
First we describe the origins of research selectivity in UK universities and the
institutional mechanism of the RAE, contrasting it with the system of informal peer
review that previously characterised the academic labour process as a self-referring
“reputationally based” work organisation (Whitley, 1986). The results of the survey
of academic accountants are then presented in an effort to meet demands made
by writers concerned with the commodification of academic accounting labour for
more empirical investigation into its negative impact on the academic accounting
profession and the production and evaluation of academic accounting knowledge
(Puxty et al., 1994; Humphrey et al., 1995, 1996; Parker et al., 1998). The data
indicates that whilst there is a good deal of hostility to the RAE, academic accountants
are divided in their perceptions of and reactions to it, thereby dissipating active
resistance. It is argued that, in co-opting peer review for managerial ends, the RAE
appeals to traditional academic identities, reinforcing existing divisions within the
academic (accounting) community and creating others, which did not exist before.
As audit, it has been “the ultimate divide and rule technique” (Power, 1997) for UK
universities in the late 20th century. The question is raised as to whether academics,
who of necessity still have some operational control over the substance of their work,
will summon the will to resist its disciplinary power or whether they will allow it to
continue to legitimise the unequal allocation of research funds in UK universities into
the 21st century.
The contention is that, if the RAE is allowed to continue in its present form, there is
the potential not only for further division within the academic accounting community
but also distortion in the production and dissemination of academic accounting
knowledge. The implication is that this can be avoided if there is a return to some
form of the status quo ante, whereby funds for research are built into the unit cost
per student on the assumption that the opportunity to engage in both research and
scholarship should be available to all academics who teach in higher education if
there is not to emerge a self-perpetuating elite of gatekeepers within the profession
employed in equally elitist institutions.
The Commodification of Academic Accounting Research
Until the early eighties, public funding for research in UK universities was based on a
system of “dual funding” (Halsey, 1992) whereby monies were made available from
the government funding councils built into funds per student on the grounds that
all academics were contractually obliged to engage in some sort of research and
scholarly activity, and upon successful application to the Research Councils for a
grant to pursue a particular project. The underlying “equity principle” demanded that
all universities had a more or less equal right to funding council research monies
on the grounds of the historic unity of teaching and research. Massive cuts in
university expenditure, however, raised doubts as to whether it was practicable for
all university departments to engage in research of the highest standard, especially
in the natural sciences where expensive equipment was needed. Consequently, the
Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour 551
principle of “research selectivity” was put forward by the University Grants Committee
(the body responsible for distributing the funds at that time) and accepted, somewhat
reluctantly, by the university authorities as a means of securing adequate funding
for those pursuing the best research in their field. The first Research Selectivity
Exercise (later to become the RAE) was carried out in 1986, a somewhat ad
hoc affair with only a small proportion of funding council research funds (14%)
dependent upon the deliberations of hurriedly appointed assessors. In 1989 a rather
larger proportion of funding (30%) was dependent upon the judgement of formally
constituted “subject panels”, membership of which was meant to reflect a breadth of
knowledge and experience sufficient to place the relevant university departments on
a five-point scale according to their judgement of the quality of research submitted.
In 1992, all of a university department’s money for research coming from the funding
councils came to depend on the subject panel’s assessment and that money had
now to be shared with the ex-polytechnics, which had been recently incorporated
as universities. By the time of the 1996 exercise, the immediate context of the
research reported here, UK universities were competing for a bigger slice of an ever
diminishing cake, with even greater differentiation between departments on a seven
point scale, which now distinguished between a “3A” and “3B” rating as well as a
adding a “5∗ ” category. It was also possible for subject panels to “flag” particular
strengths within a given department as being outstanding in relation to others.
At the time of writing, UK universities are preparing for the next RAE in the year
2001. 2
Academic communities have traditionally been more or less self-referring with a
high degree of professional control over research priorities and goals as well as
the “reputational systems” (Whitley, 1986) created by them. In this sense research
productivity and quality judged by peer review has long been central to academic
work. What has changed is the institutional context in which peer review takes place
and the governmental, hierarchical and bureaucratic controls to which it is now
subject. Informal peer review based on established intellectual authority relations
within a given discipline is very different from that which is externally imposed for
funding purposes. 3 . The collegiate, self-referring quality of peer review has been
harnessed to managerial ends through a research selectivity exercise designed
to distribute research funds unequally between different university departments
in a given subject area according to the panel’s assessment of their degree of
“excellence”. As such, the RAE has come to dominate university research activity
in the UK over the last decade. Halsey (1992, p. 189) describes it as a “dramatic
moment in the decline of donnish dominion” and the educational press has reported
that the funding councils have considered making funds for teaching as well as
research dependent on audit as this has proved such a “powerful mechanism for
steering institutions’ behaviour” (Times Higher Education Supplement, Dec. 8, 1995).
Where academic accounting labour is concerned, Puxty et al. (1994, pp. 142–3)
note considerably increased research output in recent years, especially amongst
“premier” research departments (defined as those then ranked 3, 4 or 5 in the 1992
RAE) and Humphrey et al. (1996, p. 141) tell us that “research selectivity exercises
have played an increasingly influential role in defining the meaning of life in British
university accounting departments”. Parker et al. (1998) note an “obsession” with
552 S. Harley
research on the part of senior academics or “gatekeepers” within the profession,

particularly with its measurable output in terms of publications in high status refereed
journals.
All these writers would agree with Willmott (1995, 1998) that academic research
in the UK has become increasingly commodified and that the RAE has been central
to this commodification process. As the unit of resource continues to be cut and
institutions are forced to compete for a greater proportion of their funding, institutional
managers become increasingly concerned with the exchange value of their “product”
in terms of its ability to attract either research funding or fee-paying “customers”, once
known as students. Pressure is put on individual academics, research groups and
even whole departments to produce more where it is believed to count most for
ranking purposes. 4 Where academic accounting labour is concerned, Puxty et al.
(1994, p. 159) argue that academic accountants themselves “are now commodified
as more or less productive achievers of research rankings”. Writing in 1994, they
leave open the degree to which this drive will be realised, pointing to the possible
unintended consequences of commodification in terms of a dilution of standards, the
intensification of academic labour and more general disaffection and demoralisation
of academic staff. In addition to the above concerns, Humphrey et al. (1996) fear the
breakdown of the collegiate ideal in the face of the individual pursuit of self-interest
on the part of career-minded academics anxious for promotion and willing to sell
themselves to the highest bidders. Parker et al.’s (1998) particular concern is with
the definition of what constitutes high status academic accounting knowledge on the
part of senior academics whose social constructions as to what constitutes “quality”
research impacts not only on individual career prospects but also on the production
and evaluation of academic accounting knowledge. They argue that what counts as
“real” academic accounting knowledge is that which is publishable in a tacit hierarchy
of elite journals. Dominelli & Hoogvelt (1996) go further and argue more generally that
the RAE is destroying academic freedom and the potential of “counter-hegemonic
intellectuals” to challenge the ideological status quo. This it does without recourse
to overt ideological or political manipulation but through financial and economic
incentives. “The government,” they tell us, “has tackled the problem of controlling
its intellectual elite by subjecting universities to quasi-market disciplines” (Dominelli
& Hoogvelt, 1996, p. 192). The strong implication is that the academic community
is both victim and perpetrator of the commodification process. For this reason, all
consider the issues raised by the operation of the RAE important enough to warrant
further empirical investigation in the hope of exposing “its numerous contradictions
and paradoxical consequences” (Puxty et al., 1994). It was in that spirit that the
present survey was carried out. 5
The Sample
The mailing list for the survey was taken from listings in the Universities
Commonwealth Yearbook and the questionnaires were sent out in January, 1997,
which was a month after the results of the 1996 RAE had been made public. A one
in two sample of academics was taken from departments which could be identified
Table 1 Proportions of staff in senior posts in the old and the new universities
Old universities New universities

Post n (%) n (%)
Professor/Head of Dept 29 32.6 10 9.2
Reader 3 3.3 2 1.8
Senior Lecturer (old)/ 25 28.1
Principal Lecturer (new) 28 24.6
Non-senior posts 32 36.0 70 61.4
Total 89 = 100.0 110 = 100.0
Table 2 Staff by length of time working in higher education

Time in HE n (%) n (%)
5 years or less 6 6.2 24 21.1
6–10 years 24 24.7 34 29.8
11–15 years 17 17.5 19 16.7
16–20 years 19 19.6 16 14.0
20 years plus 31 32.0 21 18.4
Total 97 = 100.0 114 = 100.0
as Accounting and Finance Departments and from Business Schools where they
could not. We estimate that about 400 questionnaires reached accountants working
in both the old and the new universities (ex-polytechnics) in the UK. We received 212
replies from respondents who when asked their discipline said that they worked within
accounting and/or finance. Forty-five institutions were represented, of which 27 were
“old” universities and 18 were “new”. Ninety-seven respondents could be identified
as working in the “old” universities and 114 in the “new”. Of the respondents from the
old universities, 64% held promoted posts (senior lecturer and above) and within this
category there were 29 who were professors and/or heads of department. Thirty-six
per cent of respondents from the new universities held promoted posts (principal
lecturer and above) of whom 10 were professors and/or heads of department (see
Table 1).
Table 2 shows that greater seniority of staff in the old universities was reflected
in the longer time they had spent working in higher education compared with their
colleagues in the new universities. Fifty-two per cent of staff in the old universities
had been working in higher education for more than 15 years compared with 32% in
the new universities. This means that at the time or the survey just over half of old
university staff had been working in UK higher education since before the date of the
first RAE (1986). In comparison, about four-fifths of new university staff would have
been in post before the polytechnics were incorporated as universities and the RAE
applied to them (1992).
As was to be expected given their different history and culture, there was an
asymmetry in RAE ratings between the old universities with relatively well estab-
554 S. Harley
Table 3 Staff by 1996 RAE departmental rating

Departmental rating n (%) n (%)
5∗ 17 17.5 0 0.0
5 20 20.6 0 0.0
4 41 42.3 0 0.0
3a 11 11.3 15 13.2
3b 5 5.2 33 28.9
2 0 0.0 17 14.9
1 0 0.0 8 7.0
Did not submit 0 0.0 35 30.7
Don’t know 3 3.1 6 5.3
Total 97 = 100.0 114 = 100.0
lished research cultures and the new universities often struggling to take off from
a zero or near zero research base. Table 3 shows the number of staff in differently
rated departments in both the old and the new universities. Eighty-five per cent of
respondents from the old universities were working in departments ranked “4” and
above whilst no respondents from the new universities found themselves in depart-
ments ranked higher than “3A”. Thirty-one per cent of respondents from the new
universities were in departments that did not make any submission at all to the RAE.6
Despite the wide spread of respondents, we do not wish to claim that our sample
is representative of the total population of academic accountants in the UK in any
strict statistical sense. As with any postal survey, it is possible that the returns over-
represent those with the strongest feelings about the RAE as they would be the
most likely to respond. It is also possible that those who responded were those
who felt the most aggrieved, though it was apparent from the responses that there
were many, especially professors and heads of high ranking departments, but not
exclusively so, who felt similarly moved to defend the exercise.7 The aim of the
research was not to generate generalisable statistical outcomes in any positivistic
sense but to understand the felt impact of research selectivity from the perspectives
of those concerned. The questionnaire was for the most part open ended, designed
to prompt as many academics as possible to say what they believed to be the effect of
the RAE on their discipline, their departments and themselves. This was particularly
important given claims by policy-makers, institutional managements and academic
gatekeepers that the RAE has now become an acceptable part of academic life. It
was thought that there might be a set of stories to be told about the RAE alternative to
those deriving from positions of power and influence. The intention was to examine
the extent to which this might be true by accessing the subjectivity of a broad range
of academics at the sharp end of research selectivity enabling them, through the
survey, to find a “voice” (Power, 1997; Rustin, 1998). From this point of view, as
long as they are not atypical, the significance of statements made by respondents
to questionnaires is never strictly proportional to their number.
Table 4 Perceived changes in recruitment and selection of staff
In discipline In department
Old universities New universities Old universities New universities
Perceived
Change n (%) n (%) n (%) n (0%)
Yes 87 89.7 102 89.5 82 84.5 79 69.3
No 10 10.3 12 10.5 12 12.4 20 17.5
Not sure 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 3.1 15 21.2
Total 97 = 100.0 114 = 100.0 97 = 100.0 114 = 100.0
The Data
A central hypothesis of the research was that the need to secure research funding
through the institutional mechanism of the RAE has meant that research is being
privileged over other aspects of an academic’s role and that there is pressure on
academics not only to publish, but to publish more where it is believed to count
most for ranking purposes. When respondents were asked whether they perceived
any changes in recruitment and selection in their discipline in recent years, 90
per cent of respondents (N = 189) believed that there had been changes and three-
quarters of these (N = 138) believed them to be directly consequent upon the RAE.
A further nine respondents believed that the changes had been partly due to the RAE
and 22 were not sure. Only 14 out of the 189 accountants who perceived change
believed that the RAE was not at all responsible. Furthermore, there was almost no
difference between the old and the new universities in the degree to which change
was perceived. Closer to home, when asked directly whether they thought the RAEs
had had any influence on recruitment and selection in their departments, 85 per
cent of respondents working in the old universities (N = 82) and 70 per cent of those
in the new (N = 79) believed that they had (see Table 4).
When presented with a list of possible types of change in both their disciplines
generally and in their own departments, on both counts the vast majority
who perceived change believed it to constitute a greater concentration on
the sort of criteria assumed to gain high ratings in the periodic assessment
exercises. These were overwhelmingly thought to be a greater emphasis on
research and publication generally, and in some cases on particular types of
research (variously described as abstract/theoretical/academic) and publication (in
refereed/top class/international/US journals). A correspondingly large number of
academic accountants also believed that the RAE had had an effect on the work of
their departments, 88 per cent of respondents (N = 84) in the old universities and
70 per cent in the new (N = 79) attributing change directly to the impact of the RAE.
A large majority of the sample was therefore agreed that the RAE had had an
impact both on their discipline and on their own working lives. Where there was less
agreement was on whether this impact was a good or a bad thing. There were four
open-ended questions on the questionnaire that gave respondents the opportunity
556 S. Harley
Table 5 Feelings about perceived changes in discipline

Feelings about change n (%) n (%)
Good 23 33.8 27 34.2
Good and bad 10 14.7 13 16.5
Bad 35 51.5 39 49.4
Total 68 = 100.0 79 = 100.0
to register their feelings about the exercise. The first asked them directly how they felt
about any changes they perceived in their discipline; the second asked them what
type of influence they thought the RAE had had on the work of their department;
and the third what influence the RAE had had on their own work. The last question
on the questionnaire asked whether they had any further comments they would like
to add. Where a respondent’s feelings about the RAE could not be elicited from
their response to the first open-ended question, which was sometimes the case for
those who were broadly in favour of the RAE, their response to the other open-ended
questions was taken into account.8 Thirty-four per cent of the respondents who gave
a definite opinion (N = 50) felt that they were good or predominantly good; 15 per
cent felt that they were both good and bad (N = 23); and 50 per cent felt they
were unequivocally bad (N = 74). There was very little difference in the spread of
feelings about change between the old and the new universities (see Table 5).
The biggest variations in the survey were found in the influence of rating of depart-
ment and rank of academic on feelings about change. Table 6 shows that in the old
universities those located in the highest 5∗ ranking departments were considerably
less likely to be unhappy about the changes taking place than those located in the
lower ranking departments (though it is interesting to note that 5 ranking departments
were no more likely to be happy than lower rated departments, presumably because
of the additional differentiation introduced between them and the elite 5∗ ratings in
the 1996 exercise). This was a pattern repeated in the larger data-set (comprising
sociologists, psychologists and marketers as well as accountants), where the num-
bers were sufficient to show a statistical significance at both the five per cent and
one per cent levels. There was a similar relationship between departmental ranking
and dissatisfaction in the new universities, with the highest ranked departments (3A)
being the least unhappy although satisfaction in these departments was tempered
by a certain degree of ambivalence, making the numbers of staff unconditionally
happy with the exercise higher in the lower rated 3B category. Again this pattern was
repeated in the larger data-set, where the numbers were sufficient to show a level
of significance at the five per cent level. Table 7 shows that professors and heads of
department were considerably more likely than other members of staff to be happy
with RAE-led changes and that this relationship was even more marked in the old
universities than in the new, a pattern of response that was again repeated in the
larger data-set and also significant at both the five per cent and one per cent levels.9
The length of time accounting academics had been working in higher education
also had an impact on feelings about RAE-led change but the impact was in a different
Table 6 Feelings about change in discipline by department rating
Departmental rating
Old universities
3B/3A/4 5 5∗
Feelings about change n (%) n (%) n (%)
Good 11 29.7 4 26.7 8 34.8
Good and bad 5 13.5 2 13.3 3 21.4
Bad 21 56.8 9 60.0 3 21.4
Total = 37 100.0 15 = 100.0 14 100.0
New universities
didn’t
submit/1/2 3B 3A
n (%) n (%) n (%)
Good 11 30.6 11 45.8 5 35.7
Good and bad 3 8.3 1 4.2 4 28.6
Bad 22 61.1 12 50.0 5 35.7
Total = 36 100.0 24 100.0 14 100.0
Table 7 Feelings about RAE-led change in discipline by job grade

Job grade
Prof/ Other Prof/ Other
HoD post HoD post
Feelings about change n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Good 12 57.1 9 21.4 4 50.0 22 31.4
Good and bad 3 14.3 6 14.3 2 25.0 11 15.7
Bad 6 28.6 13 64.3 2 25.0 37 52.9
Total 21 = 100.0 42 = 100.0 8 = 100.0 70 = 100.0
direction in the two types of institution. In the new universities 40 per cent of those
who had been working in higher education for less than 15 years were happy as
opposed to 24 per cent of those who had been working for more than 15 years. In
the old universities the respective values were 20 per cent for those working in higher
education for less than 15 years and 45 per cent for those with the greater length of
service (see Table 8)
Some of this difference can be explained by the larger numbers of staff in the
sample from the old universities who were in senior positions (see Table 7 above)
but it is also likely that some of the difference in direction of response can be explained
by the different histories and culture of the two types of institution. Business-related
disciplines in the new universities would have had very little experience of academic
research before their incorporation as universities and subsequent access to RAE
funds. The emphasis in the new universities was on teaching and consultancy with
558 S. Harley
Table 8 Feelings about change in discipline by length of service in higher education

Length of service
Feelings about change under 15 years over 15 years under 15 years over 15 years
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Good 6 20.0 17 44.7 20 40.0 7 24.1
Good and bad 3 10.0 7 18.5 8 16.0 5 17.2
Bad 21 70.0 14 36.8 22 44.0 17 58.7
Total 30 = 100.0 38 = 100.0 50 = 100.0 29 = 100.0
Table 9 Changed own work to fit in with RAE demands

n % n %
Yes 60 62.5 58 51.3
No 32 33.3 50 44.2
Not sure 4 4.2 5 4.5
Total 96 = 100.0 113 = 100.0
the majority of staff recruited as practitioners. Members of staff recruited during this
period would be the ones most unhappy with changes that emphasised academic
research and publication as they would lack the necessary skills and knowledge to
meet the new demands placed on them whilst younger members of staff in the new
universities might see the RAE as presenting the first real opportunity to engage
in academic research and might in fact have been recruited specifically to raise
their department’s research profile. On the other hand, younger academics in old
university departments in search of the highest ratings might be under the most
pressure to perform, to produce more, possibly different, research to a tighter time-
scale.
Indeed, it did seem that pressure to comply with the demands of the RAE were
generally greater in the old universities than in the new. When asked whether the
RAE had influenced their own work in any way, rather more respondents in the old
universities said that they had changed the direction of their work to fit in with the
perceived demands of the RAE than in the new (see Table 9) and this was despite
the fact that many in the old universities would have been doing the sort of work
necessary to gain a high ranking in any case.
Three out of the 43 academic accountants in the new universities who gave a
reason for not changing the direction of their work said it was because they were
already doing what was necessary to obtain a high rating as opposed to 27 who said
that it was because they were primarily involved in teaching and/or administration.
Seventeen out of the 26 in the old universities who gave a reason for not changing
the direction of their work said it was because they were already doing what was
Table 10 Perceived positive effects of RAE on discipline

n % n %
Increased research 12 60.0 12 63.2
Better research 4 20.0 0 0.0
Helps focus teaching 1 5.0 4 21.1
Selectivity a good thing 1 5.0 1 5.3
Division of labour a good thing 0 0.0 1 5.3
Accountability a good thing 2 10.0 1 5.3
Total 20 = 100.0 19 = 100.0
necessary to gain a high rating. On the other hand, only six out of 26 respondents
from the old universities said they had not changed the direction of their work because
they were involved primarily in teaching and administration. Finally, as many as three-
quarters of those in the old universities who said they were unhappy about the RAE’s
impact on their discipline had changed the direction of their own work to fit in with
its perceived demands. This applied to 38 per cent of those who disapproved of its
impact in the new universities.
The Benefits
It is clear from the above that whilst senior academics in high ranking departments
were, not surprisingly, more likely to view research selectivity positively, there were
others less obviously privileged who also approved of it. Furthermore, many of those
who were in principle hostile nevertheless in practice complied with its demands.
Analysis of responses to the open-ended questions on the questionnaire would
indicate that the disciplinary power of the assessment exercises has derived not
only from straightforward financial and economic incentives (Dominelli & Hoogvelt,
1996), significant though they might be, but also from the opportunity they present
to secure or reaffirm status within the “reputational system” (Whitley, 1986) of the
discipline they represent. The rewards are both material and symbolic, striking at
the very heart of traditional academic identity and culture. This is well illustrated by
the academic accountants who approved of them. By far the biggest stated reason
(N = 28) given by those who approved of the impact of the RAE’s on their discipline
revolved around the positive impact it was felt to have had on research, an activity
central to academic identity and the one whereby reputations are established in the
wider academic community (see Table 10).
The greater emphasis on research and publication was seen by those who
approved as an indication that their discipline was “maturing”, by which was meant
beginning to look like a “real” academic discipline rather than a low status vocational
subject, a direction some believed would have been taken in any case regardless of
the RAE. Take for example the following responses from accountants in the traditional
pre-1992 universities where research had been longer established than in the new:
560 S. Harley
Table 11 Perceived positive effects of RAE on own department

n % n %
Increased research 14 30.3 26 57.8
Increased publication 11 23.9 11 24.4
Target research/journals 11 23.9 3 6.7
Makes some people work harder 6 13.2 0 0.0
Division of labour a good thing 4 8.7 5 11.1
Total 46 = 100.0 45 = 100.0
They have led to a systematic improvement in UK Accounting research.

(Professor, old university, 5 rating)
They have established research as an essential academic activity. I approve.
I think we should welcome the RAE. Research is an important part of university work and
league tables (in spite of their many defects) are useful indicators of quality.
(Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)
The perceived positive effects of the RAE on the development of accounting as

an academic discipline generally were mirrored in the reasons why accountants
approved of the RAE’s impact on the work of their own department. As might be
expected, given the historic mission of the ex-polytechnics as teaching institutions,
rather more academics in the new universities mentioned increased research per se
as a positive impact on departmental work than in the old where a research culture,
even in business-related disciplines, was more likely to be established.
Accounting researchers within the new universities felt that the RAE enabled them
to secure a recognition for their work that might not otherwise have been forthcoming:
(I feel) very positively. My first HE post was in a polytechnic where research was neglected
and regarded with suspicion. Without the RAE this would still be the case. The methodology
can be criticised in detail, but it has increased the influence and career prospects of research
active staff in ways which would not have otherwise occurred.
Positive shift to provide resources to support research
(Head of Dept, new university, did not submit)
Acknowledgement of the need to free up time to do research
(Senior Lecturer, new university, 3B rating)
The RAE has made research a respectable activity in the new universities.
(Lecturer, new university, 2 rating)
I support the higher profile given to research in an institution which would like to be teaching
only.
(Senior Lecturer, new university, did not submit)
In the old universities, it was the increased pressure to publish research, especially
in high status refereed journals, more than the opportunity to do it per se, which was
seen to be a good thing:
Greater reliance on quantitative research methods and more emphasis on publication in

leading journals a good thing
And others (N = 5) explicitly defended the RAE in terms of the traditional unity of
teaching and research:
Has helped improve the quality of teaching through in-depth coverage.
(Professor, new university, 3B rating)
The quality of research has improved steadily and this has benefited our teaching also.
Finally, some respondents, especially professors and heads in old university

departments, were pleased that the RAE at last gave the opportunity for the obligation
on academics to do research to be enforced, thus enabling them to fulfil their
managerial role more effectively:
It is helping to focus academic work and shake some of the “time-servers” out of the system.
Non-researchers can’t hide.
whilst other believed that it was only right that academics, being public employees,
should be subject to greater public accountability in the fulfilment of their role:
The taxpayer has the right to make academics accountable.
Despite the fact that it was generally agreed that promotion and selection depended
heavily on research performativity and that over half of our respondents (N = 118)
admitted to changing the direction of their own work to fit in with the RAE’s perceived
demands, only one respondent in favour of the research assessment exercise was
prepared to admit that in increasing their research activity they were looking after
their more immediate self-interest:
Relevance is if I want to move job rather than current job. Need to produce more articles.
(Lecturer, new university, 3B rating)
even though the degree to which the RAE was felt to encourage the pursuit of
individual self-interest was a major source of complaint on the part of those against.
The Costs
It is clear that many of the efforts to increase research and publication brought the
desired results in terms of a higher rating. Almost 70 per cent of our respondents
found themselves in departments that had increased their rating in the 1996 exercise,
a further 22 per cent were in departments that had stayed the same and 6 per
562 S. Harley
cent were working in departments that had gone down (the few remaining did not
know).10 What those against the RAE objected to was the degree of emphasis now
placed on these activities together with constraints on the type of research activity
and publication that were valued. They felt their discipline distorted, their profession
divided and themselves disillusioned by it. This discontent was often expressed in
terms of what was thought to be an unacceptable intensification of academic labour
and increased managerial surveillance and control. Take for example the pattern of
response from an accounting department in an old university whose rating had
gone up from a “2” to a “4” between the 1992 and 1996 exercises. Out of eight
responses, four were professors and all of these were in favour of the exercise on
the grounds that the RAE was good for research and research was good for the
discipline. The attitudes of other members of staff in the department were rather
more hostile:
I am no longer motivated to compete on the current culture’s terms, (but) there is greater
interference under the guise of staff appraisal.
(Senior Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)
Given that my discipline is vocational, I think the emphasis on academic publications
almost to the exclusion of professional journals is regrettable. . . research has become more
important relative to teaching. (The RAE) encourages short-termism. Our dept. bought in
two professors at a premium because they had good quality journals in the period. One
has since left already. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)
(I am) disappointed. Quality professionals will not be employable because of lack of
publication no matter how knowledgeable and experienced. . . it has encouraged the pursuit
of self-interest. No concern for the department. Just sort the CV. . . I have 15 years
commercial/professional experience and an FCA. 5 years ago I was encouraged to join
the academic world—this would no longer be the case today.
Greater emphasis on quick publications (often quantitative) and refereed publications.
(Books, especially text-books, don’t count). Desire for young and active or “high flyers”
with a reputation AND 4 RAE papers. Buying in staff just pre-RAE leading to too many
“professors” some of whom are weak. I am no longer allowed to do the research that I want
to and instead have to do much more teaching. Staff are also being victimised/bullied. There
is no longer any “academic freedom”. Managerialism and dictatorship on rule. It should be
discontinued. It is divisive both within and between institutions, and will lead to a long-term
decline in the standard of UK research. . .
Research relies on co-operation and communication of ideas AND on risk-taking innovation.
The current RAE process leads to the breakdown of communications, secrecy and low-risk,
low quality research.
(Lecturer, old university 4 rating)
Out of eight respondents in a new university business school that had gone up from
a “1” to a “3A” not one was in favour.
As an ex-poly we are/were a teaching establishment with some research. We are being
forced into becoming a research establishment with some teaching.
(Principal Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)
More teaching work for those not involved in research. More money spent on research staff
therefore less available for other purposes.
(Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)
Table 12 Perceived negative effects of RAE on discipline

n % n %
Quantity not quality 11 22.4 5 9.8
Too academic 12 24.5 5 9.8
Only what’s publishable 10 20.4 2 3.9
Neglects teaching 6 12.2 25 49.0
Overwork/stress 4 8.2 6 11.8
Managerialism/control 2 4.1 6 4.0
Divisive of staff 2 4.1 6 3.9
total 47 = 100.0 51 = 100.0
Table 13 Perceived negative effects of RAE on department

n % n %
Too much emphasis on research 5 9.3 16 32.7
Too much emphasis on publication 19 35.2 7 14.3
Few risks/no creativity 4 7.4 3 6.1
Teaching suffers 11 20.4 8 16.3
Divisive of colleagues 12 22.2 9 18.4
Pressure/overwork 3 5.5 6 12.2
Total 54 = 100.0 49 = 100.0
More work, having to cover for staff doing research coupled with higher student numbers.
Pressure now intense on “teaching” staff.
In fact, despite its history as a “fledgling academic discipline” (Humphrey et

al., 1995), the research untapped a stream of hostility towards the RAE amongst
academic accountants who were against the RAE not dissimilar to that found
amongst other, more established, social science disciplines (Harley & Lee, 1997;
Harley & Lowe, 1998).11 As with the other disciplines, it was verbalised in terms
of what was perceived to be interference in the academics’ traditional freedom to
set their own research agenda, to produce the knowledge which they considered
important and to disseminate it in the way that they saw fit. There were similar
concerns about the RAE’s effect on the quality of research being produced as well
as its divisive impact upon the collegiate ideal. Last but not least, there was concern
about its negative impact on teaching, especially, but not exclusively, in the new
universities. Tables 12 and 13 summarise the negative responses to the open-ended
question asking accountants how they felt about changes in their discipline in general
and on the work of their departments in particular consequent upon the RAEs. Whilst
the differences of emphasis between the two types of institution were to be expected
given their different histories and culture, the types of concern taken as a whole were
surprisingly similar. As too was the strength of feeling expressed by those against.
564 S. Harley
The Price of Everything
Thompson (1990) argues that central to the analysis of any labour process is the
indeterminacy of labour potential in the production of exchange rather than use value;
in other words, the commodification of labour, where production is not for intrinsic
worth but for profit. In the case of academic labour, the production and dissemination
of academic knowledge is subordinated to the institutional need to secure funding
(Puxty et al., 1994; Willmott, 1995) and/or the individual desire to secure a career
(Lee, 1995). The result, it is argued, is the mass product of research for a rating
which is more important than what is produced:
Simplistic measurement processes now drive HE funding. Currently academia accepts
this—a sad comment on the state of British higher education
(Lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating)
Publication has taken priority over research
(Senior Lecturer, old university, 3B rating)
Good quality publications are essentially taken to be anything that scores points
(Senior Lecturer, new university, 2 rating)
More pressure to publish a certain kind of research (that which pays RAE-wise!)
Research has to be directed at refereed publications and in sufficient volume to count
What those in favour of the RAE saw as the elevation of academic accounting
knowledge through targeting prestige journals and concentration of effort, those who
were against saw as the distortion of accounting knowledge and of the traditional
accounting academic’s role. In the days before the RAE, informal peer review, for all
its weaknesses, left space for the pursuit of independent and critical scholarship,
at least until the point of publication. A centrally organised and bureaucratically
controlled ranking system designed for funding purposes, however, “colonises” that
space and subjects it to “a disciplinary project of classification, categorisation and
assessment” (Hillyard & Sim, 1997, p. 10). This would seem to be particularly true of
paradigm-bound “normal science” (Kuhn, 1970) such as economics and psychology
(Lee & Harley, 1998a; Harley & Lowe, 1998) where a number of high status,
mainstream journals can come to dominate the field. Surprisingly, however, academic
accountancy, with its much less established research tradition and characterisation
as “a low paradigm consensus field” (Lee, 1995, p. 257), did not seem to be exempt
from this process. Reference was made by our respondents to the way in which
the need to target what were variously referred to as “high status”, “quality”, “top”,
“international”, “US” or “prestige” journals was fixing the research agenda, restricting
the range of research being undertaken and misdirecting research efforts:12
It forces you to concentrate on publishable research in the “right” journals rather than on
research that “you” want to do.
Emphasis on journal articles rather than books inappropriate for legal issues in finance, my
area of specialism.

Journals listed as “top” journals for RAE define types of research: statistically based
stock markets. I use qualitative research methods on unusual topics—this has been under
pressure. Ends of the RAE are shaping the research agenda.
Publication in top US journals, concentration on particular types of research—econometric
(capital markets) take away European focus.
Shift to empirical research where publication in top journals is relatively easier
Zeff (1989, p. 169) has argued that “an unmistakable trend in US accounting research
during the past 25 years has been the increasing use of formal empiricism and
mathematical model-building.” From comments made by the UK accountants in our
sample, this would now seem to be increasingly the case in UK accounting research,
too. Of those who mentioned this trend, the majority disapproved, but there were
several professors and heads of high ranking departments who thought the greater
reliance on quantitative research methods and more emphasis on publication in
leading journals was a good thing. From that point of view, said one professor in a high
ranking department, the RAE merely reflected changes in thinking within a discipline
struggling to establish an academic identity. Similarly the “greater distance between
the academic discipline and professional experience” brought about by the emphasis
on publication in leading journals was felt by another to reflect “long-standing attitudes
within the profession as well as changes in academe.” Those who objected to these
trends were not as convinced that the RAE was quite so neutral an instrument. They
feared that the combination of peer review and research selectivity had produced
a mechanism that, because of its control over monies for research coming directly
from the funding councils, had the power to direct the bulk of accounting research
being carried out and to institutionalise the divisions that already existed within the
profession, making them even more difficult to break down. In this sense, the RAE,
like other forms of external audit, stands accused not of reflecting but of distorting
the reality it is meant to monitor, leading to demoralisation and demotivation amongst
those who disagree with or are disadvantaged by the process (Power, 1997):
If you make rules, people will play to win according to the rules so changing/distorting their
behaviour.
Academics versus Practitioners
When asked how they felt about recent trends in their profession, a number of the
accountants in our sample (N = 25) explicitly expressed a concern that the search
for publication in high status academic journals had occasioned a move away from
the publication of professionally relevant and accessible research.(12) This disquiet
was by no means confined to the more vocationally oriented, lower- or non-rated
departments in the new universities, but found expression throughout:
566 S. Harley
I am totally demotivated as far as any sort of writing is concerned. Only activity which
counts in the RAE is valued although I personally feel that other types of writing is valid. In
my discipline I think writing for professional journals should be valued as accountancy is a
profession.
(Senior Lecturer, old university, rating unknown)
Accounting academe is moving further away from the profession of accounting as a result
of the accounting journals becoming more and more academic.
Fifteen years ago in the profession, staff felt that the ABR was of minimal interest–today
it is doubtful if they could even understand it. The danger is that the RAEs give money for
academic research ignoring any value to the profession who need accessible research.
The emphasis on high status publications in prestigious journals was thought to

reinforce an academic–practitioner divide, which was greatly regretted by some. A
symptom of this growing divide was the increased tendency to appoint applicants
with doctorates, especially in the old universities where the pressure to obtain a high
rating was greatest:
Quality professionals will not be employable because of the lack of publication no matter
how knowledgeable and experienced they are. I have 15 commercial/professional years
experience and an FCA. 5 years ago I was encouraged to join the academic world, this
would no longer be the case today.
Move towards recruiting PhD. . . Increasing perceived irrelevance of professional accounting
qualifications, particularly for promoted posts. When I was a student I was told (mid-70s)
that the only way to get a job teaching accountancy in a university was to get a professional
qualification and 3 or 4 years experience working in industry. Neither seems very important
now.
(Professor, old university, 3A rating)
A PhD. not originally a necessary qualification for an academic staff member in my subject.
(Senior Lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating)
Whilst professional bodies might fund research into the “real issues facing the
discipline”, academic accounting departments knew exactly what was expected of
them to achieve a high rating in the RAE, as witnessed by the response from a top
5∗ Finance and Accounting Department:
The department is focused almost totally on “pure”, “academic” research. Contacts with
the profession have diminished. Little applied research is undertaken. I have cut back on
company specific research and consultancy in order to generate more research in academic
journals. The RAE has provided a motivation for many departments to choose between
research and teaching. We took the decision to establish ourselves as a leading research
department. We have had a significant turnover of staff in the last 2 years as less committed
researchers have moved on to be replaced by good, proven and potential researchers. The
cost has been a fall in the quality of our teaching and the loss of some experienced staff
with good professional and industrial contacts. The RAE encouraged the decision and, for
us, it has been the right one, but I am convinced our students have suffered.
(Senior lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating)
and they pursued their goal with a brutality once alien to the academic community:
Research is not an option for staff. They must deliver. Also, individual failure has collective
repercussions so low research performance must be assisted (or dealt with).
(Professor, old university, 5∗ rating)
One particular benefit has been that it has forced staff over 45 to either increase their
commitment to research or take early retirement thereby making way for younger talent.
Thus the unequal power relations inherent in the employment relationship of even
this “key profession” (Perkin, 1969) are articulated in terms of and legitimated by the
demands made by the RAE, and the discourse of peer review, in theory democratic
and consensual, becomes inextricably linked with its original managerialist intent to
intensify academic labour and bring it under greater surveillance and control. The
irony is that the senior academics who defend it the most on academic grounds are
often the line managers whose hierarchical power is thereby increased, a point not
lost on some respondents:
(The RAE) has exacerbated the dictatorial way in which universities are now managed.
(Lecturer, old university, 3A rating)
Research-Active Staff versus Teaching Staff
The divisions perceived to have grown up between academics and practitioners in

academic accounting were sometimes expressed in terms of a felt division between
those who did research and those who taught (N = 36) and/or the lesser value felt to
be accorded to the act of teaching (N = 53). There was a feeling in both the old and
the new universities that teaching accountancy was in danger of being neglected for
two reasons. The first was that the increased emphasis on types of research which
bore little relation to the needs of practitioners was by the same token of little benefit
to the needs of the students either:
It involves a great deal of effort. The benefits of the research done are not evaluated.
Certainly no attempt is made to link research output with teaching input or the general
health of the accounting profession.
(Lecturer, new university, did not submit)
The second was that the increased emphasis on the need to research and publish
under conditions of resource constraint was bound to have a negative impact on the
attention which could be given to teaching and the rewards available for doing it well:
No incentive, recognition or reward for good teaching.
More money spent on research staff therefore less available for other purposes. Now seem
to be suffering severe financial embarrassment due to over-recruitment of researchers who
benefit a very small number of our students (PG) and strain resources available to the
majority of our students (UG) I hope eventually that our current activity will bring more
income to us in due course but I doubt it.
568 S. Harley
Need to economise on teaching input to make space for research. Creation of different
types of staff.
(Principal Lecturer, new university, did not submit)
Higher teaching, admin loads for non-researchers.
Teaching unequally distributed–status given only to research. Students feel neglected,
teaching under-resourced.
A perceived neglect of teaching was felt particularly acutely in some ex-polytechnic

departments where there was a feeling that the institutions were betraying their
original mission as more vocationally-oriented teaching institutions:
We are not recruiting teaching staff. As an ex-Poly we are/were teaching establishments

with some research. We are forced into becoming research establishments with some
teaching.
(Principal Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)
The changes are moving the institution (not just the discipline) away from its tradition as a
teaching institution. Teaching expertise is being undermined.
Generally feel that post-’92 universities were better as teaching polytechnics.
In the new universities especially, the institutional pressure to achieve a respectable

rating had in many cases resulted in a conscious management strategy to divide
academic labour into research active and non-active, with those who were “non-
active” given additional teaching loads. Not surprisingly, this led to some bitterness
on the part of those who either did not wish to do research or who were thereby
rendered unable to do it because their research was not in areas targeted to improve
the rating.
Someone has to do the real work of teaching and administration.

(Senior Lecturer, old university, 3A rating)
My primary job is teaching, not research diverting resources to research leaves fewer people
available for teaching.
More academics have timetable remission to do research, leaving fewer to do teaching (of
more students).
Added pressure on colleagues, especially those with little or no experience/interest in
research. Identification of those willing to pursue research who are given time allowance
and greater teaching loads on those who are not.
(Principal lecturer, new university, 3B rating)
People should be reminded that 70 per cent of current grant is for teaching which
researchers seek to avoid.
and there were many others, themselves researchers, who saw the division between
“academic high flyers” and “teaching drones” as having a negative impact on the
traditional quality of the profession as a community of scholars valued equally for
their teaching expertise and knowledge:
(I feel) saddened. Staff are being divided. The lowly teach.
Lament “teaching of undergrads is for losers” ethos. No “care” for students. Research is
everything.
or who resented the fact that in order to do research they were themselves put in the
position of having to neglect their teaching:
Conformed to pressure to publish—less effort put into teaching.
Even the old universities, where there has long been a contractual obligation on
the part of all members of staff to engage in research, were not immune from
internally divisive pressures. The RAE formula for funding comprises a rating for
quality multiplied by the number of staff whose research was submitted (Whittington,
1997; Cooper & Otley, 1998). This had led to an element of “gaming” on the part
of some institutions who might maximise their funding by submitting only those
members of staff whose work was certain to be deemed of high quality and therefore
boost the departmental rating, a practice both divisive of staff and detrimental to the
authenticity of the exercise overall:
The structure of the RAE causes departments to be manipulative and divisive. What is the
sense in including five members of staff out of thirty in the only major assessment exercise
applied to the department?
The Breakdown of Community and the Pursuit of Self-interest
Knights (1990) argues that capitalist labour processes fragment, atomise, and
individualise workers, setting them in competition with each other rather than
encouraging co-operation and a sense of common interest. The “marketisation”
(Marginson, 1995) of higher education is breaking down the sense of community
once experienced amongst academics replacing high with low trust (Trow, 1996)
and collegiality with relationships characteristic of more typically capitalist relations
of production. Academic accountants in our sample were not insensitive to these
developments:
It should be terminated now. It is divisive and demoralising.
(Professor, new university, 3A rating)
It is highly divisive mechanism which promotes conflict between institutions and within
institutions. It also serves to legitimate research cuts and blame the victims as the hoops
get higher.
570 S. Harley
In the new universities especially, much of this bad feeling came from teachers who
felt their contribution devalued and from practitioners who felt their status threatened,
but it was also directed at colleagues in the old universities who were thought to
have an unfair advantage in the funding stakes. For example, the greatest single
source of ambivalence towards the RAE on the part of new university staff who were
otherwise in favour of it because of increased opportunities for research was the
lack of resources to do the job properly:
Ambivalent because research is more encouraged but there are not the resources to do it
properly. Apart from the continual lack of resources still research in my “spare time”.
(Lecturer, new university, 2 rating)
Unsure. I am being encouraged to research and publish—as we all are—but teaching

loads are increasing too. Balance is needed. Increased pressure on conscientious staff
enormously. Later recruits seem to have less teaching and the load is passed on to the
rest of us. Also some senior staff take advantage of their research profiles to alleviate their
teaching responsibilities. Competitiveness increased. Not a healthy sign.
Strong wish, even pressure, to engage in research but minimum structural support.
We teach 15 hours per week plus have project supervision and personal tutees. We have
no research assistants. If we have more than two papers accepted in one year we are
unable to attend and deliver due to financial constraints. But the rationale of the RAE is that
we are “judged” on equal terms with the pre-1992 universities. . .
I teach twice as many courses as I did 5 years ago. I don’t have time for anything else.
(Principal Lecturer, new university, did not submit)
which led to an inevitable resentment against the old universities on the part of the
new:
My perception is that the exercises are “fixed” to ensure the status of the old universities.

The RAE is an attempt by an elite group of institutions to justify a disproportionate allocation

of research funds. If carried to its logical conclusion it will destroy research in most
universities
Whilst new universities have to make do with what they’ve got, more prestigious depts in
old universities are busy “head-hunting” and poaching researchers—nothing else matters.
(Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)
It is a game the big boys play to ensure they get a bigger and bigger share of the cake and
“kill” as competition up and coming university departments, old or new. It is arbitrary: who
judges, and where do they come from? 13
(Lecturer, independent university, did not submit)
In fact, what has come to be known as a transfer market in “research stars” was
a mixed blessing for many an old university department, serving often to create
divisions within what was once considered to be a community of relative equals and
generating an uneasy feeling that the profession was involved in something just a
little bit dirty:
Lecturers who did their research with us were “head-hunted” by other departments. Those
who left us took their research with them. This is worse than the situation in football. At
least the players can’t take their goals with them.
Our department bought in two professors at a premium because they had good quality
journals in the period leading up to the RAE. One has since left already.
Totally superficial. Leads to the equivalent of football transfer around the key date.
(Head of Department, new university, 2 rating)
It seems to me that the major effect of the RAE on behaviour is the “poaching” of staff—
buying in “stars” who will bring their work/publications with them as “dowry”. My dept.
recruited two people (one a new professor) who started on 1st March 1996, just in time for
the RAE. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)
At very least, argue Hillyard & Sim (1997, p.15) in their discussion of research in the
socio-legal field, “the transfer market reinforces the divisions between established
names and those attempting to break into academic life though securing a permanent
post. These individuals are likely to remain on short-term contracts as resources are
moved towards attractive package deals for those who have been bought and sold
on the market.”
It would seem, therefore, that in a number of different ways the commodification of
academic research could be reconstituting academic labour in terms of the discourse
of “self-interest, marketing and entrepreneurship” (Humphrey et al., 1995) rather than
community, co-operation and the collegiate ideal. Whilst it is tempting to idealise
collegiality, harking back to some mythical age of consensus and co-operation,
it nevertheless remains a value to which many British academics aspire14 . This
would certainly seem to be true for the academic accountants in our sample who
were discomforted by what they perceived to be the competitive individualism of
colleagues who wished to succeed on the RAE’s terms:
572 S. Harley
It has encouraged self-interest. . . the selfish pursuit of individual publications. No concern

for department—just sort the CV.
Individuals in the dept now tend to think of what benefits them as individuals i.e. to get
promotion etc.
There was evidence of this competitive individualism in the response of some

members of the business schools who, whilst generally in favour of the opportunities
presented by the RAE, had had to submit under a general business and management
heading. Their concern was that they might be dragged down by the lack of research
productivity of colleagues not in their field. Take the comments of a lecturer in
Human Resource Management in a new university business school who approved
of the new emphasis on research and its impact “on the tiny band of us who are
research active—little effect on the rest of the school who are moribund.” This lecturer
recognised the “greater pressure to publish and recycle” but withheld his judgement
of the RAE. “My views will be affected by the amount of money we get,” he said.
Similarly, a professor of marketing could not hide his contempt for his relatively
“unproductive” accounting colleagues:
Though inevitably crude, it has had a useful influence. However, marketing (which made
a major contribution here) has to be part of business and is saddled with unproductive
accountants, IT specialists etc. I favour a more tightly defined classification.
(Professor, new university, 3A rating)
who, no doubt, were also the sort of people to blame for the attitude of some within
the old university sector who held the new university sector in similar contempt:
The RAE has become largely predictable. It continues to reveal that the post-1992
“Universities” should in many cases not have been awarded that status.
The Degradation of Academic Work
It has been argued that work in capitalist society is subjective in two senses (Knights,
1990; Willmott, 1990). The first is in the sense that workers are subject to or controlled
by others for purposes which are not their own but those of the market. We have
argued that in the case of the research assessment exercise, a new mechanism
has been put in place through which the market works and to which the academic
worker submits, more or less willingly. The second is in the “existential” sense that
“work has implications for self-identity, in terms of the sense of confirmation or denial
experienced in its accomplishment” (Willmott, 1997, p.1346) The RAE is seductive
precisely because of the opportunities it offers for an affirmation of self on the part
of those who wish to establish what they see as an academic identity, either for
themselves or for their discipline. By the same token, a felt negation of self was a
major source of resentment on the part of academics who felt constrained by the
exercise. The final paradox of the RAEs is that the pursuit of high ratings was felt by
many to produce lower rather than higher quality research. By far the biggest source
of discontent across all the disciplines which the author has surveyed (Harley &
Lee, 1997; Harley & Lowe, 1998) was felt to be the need to maximise publications
within the given RAE “accounting period” independent of necessarily having anything
significant to say. In accounting, as in other disciplines, this was thought to encourage
“quick and dirty” research and “quick-fix”, ‘salami-sliced” publications which lacked
academic rigour, scholarship and weight:15
RAE has led to more mechanical/safe research where publications are assured. A reduced
emphasis on innovative/more risky research projects which pay dividends but take a long
time to come to fruition. RAE has led to mediocrity in research in Business, Finance and
Economics.
They have enforced publication by those who have little to say. They suppress reclusive
scholars who read widely and do not write. Both negative
(Reader, old university, 5∗ rating)
More lecturers doing low-level research on substantially the same thing. Induces
establishments to undertake research which is generally being “duplicated” all over the
place—not unique, re-hash of same old stuff.
A lot of “academics” are publishing obscure, boring articles because of pressure from the
university.
Emphasis on number of publications appears to be diluting the quality of journals. Literature
reviews frequently reveal one piece of research spread over two or three articles.
(Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)
Concern about quality was not confined to new university departments struggling
to develop a research culture nor to lesser-ranked old university departments under
pressure to make the grade, but was also found amongst the elite. Take, for example,
the following responses from 5-rated departments:
Narrowly defined research produced. Schools of Business are particularly prone. Focus on
publications (not research) and teaching relegated to a secondary role. Some change was
necessary but the current form of RAE is not designed to produce scholarship. May well
produce research of the nature being attempted here!
I am not a fan of the RAE–it certainly leads to greater activity but it is narrowly focused and
leads to a vast output of academic papers which basically nobody reads and those which
count most in the RAE probably have least influence in the outside world. We are all playing
a big game which is increasingly divorced from the real issues in my subject.
It is a game which has more politic than substance
(Lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating)
The need to produce papers sufficient to count within the relevant time period could
lock academics into practices which not only reinforced their subordination but also,
through the RAE’s negative impact on their work, their degradation as well. In this
574 S. Harley
way, a growing sense of alienation was found not only amongst those on the wrong
side of the research active–inactive divide, nor in just the low-rated departments.
Many of those who were successfully playing the RAE game felt some doubt as to
the value of what they were doing:
Under pressure to produce quantity rather than quality. Quality publications are sought but
difficult to achieve within the short time-scale of the assessment exercise.
Downgrading of importance of teaching and support activities. I now “dabble” in research.
Encouraged to “write-up” experiences/projects which may not have bothered about before.
(Senior lecturer, new university, 3A rating)
Influenced to seek publication for research at very early stages.
Inappropriate pressure to work in areas where I had no particular expertise; move to more
“publishable” research areas
(Pressure) towards forms of discourse which are currently marketable. My compromise is
to protect my substance and publish in “their” journals.
(Reader, old university, 5∗ rating)
This could explain the strength of feeling against the RAE which we found amongst
our sample. Conscious of the damage being done to traditional academic values, to
the unity of teaching and research, to the need for scholarship as well as publication,
they resented the double bind in which they had been placed. It is important to
recognise that much of the disciplinary power of the RAE emanates from the
knowledge that both individual and collective destinies depend upon achieving a
good rating. The consequences are both material and symbolic. Institutional ratings
confirm high status within the profession and the funding to attract “good’ staff who
will contribute to (even) higher ratings next time round. Low ratings could set in a
vicious circle of decline:
The ultimate consequences of the RAE are a matter for worry and need resolving. RAEs
directly affect the funding of HE institutions. If the latter wish to develop, the RAE reports
can make or break an institution. They therefore raise the stakes in workload and stress
which academics are working under. A healthy research position does not, in reality equate
with a happy and healthy academic staff.
In a very real sense, therefore, resistance to the RAE could be self-defeating:

Inequity i.e. established research departments tend to score well and receive funding. Those
with records of inactivity (for good reason) score low, receive no funding and consequently
will never catch up.
A split between types of department. Some very academic will only recruit guaranteed
publishers, others go for consultancy and pragmatism at the cost of scholarship let alone
research! the division between research departments and practitioner departments is
damaging to academic accounting. It makes it harder for academics to move from “new”
university departments to “traditional” university departments, but encourages “poaching”
in the other direction.
(Principal Lecturer, new university, 1 rating)
which some in high ranking departments and/or elite institutions thought might be
no bad thing:
Overall, I think they are fair and beneficial. They have, however, now established a barrier
to the development of new research departments which may well have been the original
objective. My dept moved progressively from a low rating to a 4. It took time and a lot of
effort. I doubt that such a progression is now possible in the UK.
It is essential for the discipline for some departments to be internationally excellent for
research. It is not essential for all depts to be in this position.
To avoid being relegated to second-class citizenship within the profession in a

predominantly teaching-only department devoid of the resources to pursue the most
basic of scholarly activities, never mind research, it was, therefore, necessary to
comply.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the extent to which managerialist
forms of control in UK universities have supplanted earlier, more collegiate, forms
of control which had their origins in the Oxbridge ideal and became more or less
general as the university sector expanded in the 19th and 20th centuries (Halsey,
1992). There is general agreement amongst academic observers that in recent years
attempts have been made by both government and institutional managements to
impose new forms of control on academic labour, which are centralised, bureaucratic
and hierarchical. They point to the increasing “McDonaldisation” of higher education,
the “commodification” of academic labour and the progressive “proletarianisation” of
the academic worker (Wilson, 1991; Parker & Jary, 1995; Willmott, 1995; Puxty et al.,
1994). As a result traditional values of professional autonomy and academic freedom
are increasingly subordinated to those of the market (Miller, 1995; Marginson, 1995).
The outcome, these writers argue, is both a degradation of academic work and the
alienation of academic workers (Smyth, 1995) who, forced to continuously produce
more and at less cost, lose control of the product of their labour in the need
to bail their institutions out of a government-induced and senior management-led
mess (Campion & Renner, 1995; Shumar, 1995). The data presented here would
indicate that there is some truth in these claims albeit contingent upon institutional
circumstance and personal history. It also contributes to our understanding of the
degree to which academics themselves have been responsible for enacting new
forms of managerial control.
There has been considerable disagreement about the extent of academic
complicity in recent changes. At one end of the spectrum, writers detect a
“compliance culture” amongst UK academics (Henkel & Kogan, 1996) whereby at
least part of the blame for what they consider to be a potentially much debased
system of mass higher education falls on academics themselves who “complicitly
through their inaction have knowingly contributed (without so much as a whimper)
576 S. Harley
to the progressive fragmentation, stratification and alienation of academic work”

(Smyth, 1995, p.8). Parker & Jary (1995) predict that the very identity of the “new”
academic will come to reconstitute itself in terms of what is needed to gain reward,
either personal or institutional, rather than in terms of independence and creativity
of thought. Miller (1995) believes that in submitting to the increased surveillance and
control of government audits and management-imposed performance indicators,
academics displace personal goals of scholarship and independent inquiry, thereby
colluding in the construction of their own fate.
On the other hand, there are those who believe that the extent of this “self-
subordination” has been exaggerated. They doubt the degree to which any external
mechanism of surveillance and control can be imposed on academics, whose
identity has indeed been constituted in terms of the twin discourse of academic
freedom and professional autonomy, values that have been strongly felt and fiercely
defended (Halsey, 1992; Henkel, 1997). Prichard & Willmott (1997) put this side of
the argument in their critique of Parker & Jary’s (1995) analysis of the changing
subjectivity of the academic worker. Studies of the growth of managerialism in
higher education, as elsewhere in the public sector, they argue, have overestimated
the degree to which managerialist values have penetrated professional discourse
and practice. In support of their argument they submit evidence from research
amongst senior postholders in British universities where they found continuing
commitment to traditional academic values and attempts to mediate any hard
managerialist demands made on their staff by university “senior executives”. In
similar vein, Townley (1997) uses the concept of “institutional logic” to explain why
UK universities successfully resisted government attempts to impose judgmental
rather than professional-developmental forms of staff appraisal consequent upon
recommendations by the Jarratt report that university management should take on
more of the characteristics of private industry (CVCP, 1985). She also makes the
important point, as have others, that the intrinsic nature of much academic work
places very real limits on the degree to which management can directly control the
academic labour process without defeating its object (Townley, 1997; Wilson, 1991;
Johnston, 1996; Dearlove, 1997).
The research reported here would indicate a possible explanation for this apparent
paradox, at least where the RAE is concerned. It does seem that “imperialistic
management discourses” (Prichard & Willmott, 1997) have indeed found it hard to
compete with those of existing locales of academic life. Academics still think and talk
like academics. However whilst management discourse may have found it hard to
penetrate the walls of UK academe, management practice has not. The RAE is such
an effective mechanism of managerial control precisely because it does not need
to replace one type of discourse with another but offers individuals the possibility
of securing both material and symbolic rewards without ostensible violence to the
traditional value systems that constitute academic identity and culture. In co-opting
peer review for managerial ends, the managerialist intent behind the RAE is rendered
both less transparent and more difficult to resist. There is no doubt that the RAE has
reinforced and institutionalised divisions that already existed in the profession and it
may be that that in itself has been sufficient to dissipate active resistance, especially
since those who most approved of the RAE and agree with its criteria of excellence
were concentrated in positions of power within both the institutions and the profession
at large (Parker et al., 1998; Humphrey et al., 1996). More importantly, the RAE
legitimates these divisions with reference to traditional academic values, thereby
depriving those who would wish to resist with an alternative discourse through which
academic life can be lived and worked. In this way, the RAE constitutes a much more
subtle threat to academic diversity and freedom than the “hard” managerialist styles
recommended for the public services in the Thatcher era (Clark & Newman, 1997) in
that it deprives academics of the ideological means with which to resist at the same
time as offering powerful incentives, both material and symbolic, to comply.
However the significance of the RAE as a managerial control strategy goes deeper
than the intensification, fragmentation, and degradation of academic labour, all of
which would seem to be a consequence, albeit to greater or lesser degree. It also
has fundamental implications for the structure of intellectual authority relations within
accountancy as an academic field. In an analysis of the role of élite academic journals
in the production and evaluation of accounting knowledge, Lee (1995, p.259) argues
that accounting research in the US “has become a process of commodification to
enhance academic reputations and pedigree, rather than a means of facilitating
criticism and accountability of practitioners.” This is the outcome, he argues, of “an
institutionalised academic strategy of focusing on research rather than teaching”,
which creates “a competitive and hierarchical university field, in which attention is
paid mainly to the production and maintenance of cultural capital—predominantly
of the individual but also of the institution.” Research selectivity would seem to be
encouraging a similar process in the UK. The danger is not only one of increased
fragmentation within the profession, with elite academic accounting departments (in
the old universities) reproducing high status accounting knowledge for consumption
by other elite researchers in equally high status departments, leaving others to get
on with the job of teaching narrowly based principles of accounting practice to the
mass of vocationally oriented undergraduates now pouring into UK universities. It is
also one of potential censorship in the reproduction and dissemination of academic
accounting knowledge. It would seem that despite a proliferation of journals and a
number of competing methodologies and value-systems, it remains relatively clear
what has to be done to attain a high reputation in accountancy as an academic
field. This is evident in the tacit hierarchy of its journals, the élite domination of its
institutions and the now formal ranking of university departments, in what Bourdieu
(1997) would call the “agencies of reproduction” within the discipline. In the case
of research selectivity, institutionalised peer review designed for funding purposes
reconstitutes itself as a powerful agent of reproduction, controlling access to elite
positions and defining what shall and shall not be defined as “real” accounting
research and “high status” academic accounting knowledge. As such it could lend
ever greater weight to any mainstream that might emerge within the discipline in
the production, evaluation and dissemination of academic accounting knowledge
(Arrington, 1990; Niemark, 1993) thereby increasing the possibility of effective
closure against more radical and critical ideas (Lee, 1997). This can only be avoided
if the RAE’s potential to direct research, intended or otherwise, is diffused. An initial
step might be to de-couple research “assessment” from funding so that genuine,
honest and open debate can take place within the profession itself rather than
578 S. Harley
allowing that space to be colonised by both managerial and self-interest.
Notes
1. The data on academic accountants was part of a larger study of four academic disciplines which
included sociology, psychology, marketing and accounting and finance. See Harley & Lowe (1998)
for a full report of the data. The original intent behind taking these four disciplines was to see whether
any significant differences emerged in feelings about the RAE and its impact in two traditionally
“pure” social sciences where an academic research culture had been long established and two more
business-related disciplines where it would be less so. In the event, surprisingly few differences in the
pattern of response emerged. These are reported in the text where relevant.
2. Accountancy submissions were made to either the Accountancy Panel or, as part of a larger Business
and Management Studies grouping, to the Business and Management Studies (BMS) Panel. Twenty-
three submissions were made to the Accountancy Panel and 49 to the BMS Panel. However, the
BMS panel submissions were passed on to the Accountancy Panel, which used the same criteria and
procedures to judge them as to those submitted to its own panel. The Accountancy Panel then passed
back the rankings awarded to accountancy groups to be incorporated into overall BMS rankings.
Definitions of the degree of “quality” that each point on the scale is meant to denote and the processes
recent Accountancy and BMS Panels have used to reach their assessments as well as details of the
funding formulae can be found in Whittington (1997) and Cooper & Otley (1998) respectively. See
Humphrey et al. “Questioning the Value of the Research Selectivity Process in British University
Accounting” (1995) for a critical review of the operation of the accountancy panel and Willmott “On
Measuring and Managing Research Quality: The State Industry and Peer Review” (1998) for a critique
of the operations of the BMS Panel.
3. In this sense it is questionable whether the research assessment exercise constitutes a system of
peer review in the traditional meaning of the term in that peer review is consensual and democratic
with those subject to its authority freely entering into the process and accepting the legitimacy of the
outcome. The RAE, on the other hand, is management led, externally imposed and widely questioned,
with its constituents having little control over the composition of its panels and no right to feedback
as to the basis of its decisions (Lee & Harley, 1998b; Willmott, 1998)
4. Previous research carried out by Harley & Lee (1997) into the impact which the RAE has had
on the organisation of economics as an academic field showed that despite considerable disquiet
on the part of many within the profession, academic economists had submitted to institutional,
departmental and/or peer pressure to publish in journals that were believed to count most in the
ranking exercise. The fact that these journals represented almost exclusively a mainstream neo-
classical economic paradigm and that the economics subject panel was itself made up almost entirely
of high ranking mainstream economists (Lee & Harley, 1998a) had the effect of pushing many non-
mainstream economists in a more mainstream direction in the hope of securing increased funding for
their department, and/or better career prospects for themselves. Where individual members of staff
were either unwilling or unable to play this game, institutional managements resorted to recruitment
policies that emphasised publication within the mainstream as a condition of appointment. In this
way, institutional interests and managerial control combined with peer review to exercise an immense
power of censorship over the reproduction and dissemination of economic knowledge and resistance
to greater management control of research was successfully “outflanked” (Clegg, 1994) by the need
of academics to secure jobs and/or build a career.
5. Parker et al. (1998, p.398), for example, argue that the co-implication of (at least some) senior
academics in the implementation of research selectivity requires urgent debate and further
investigation “if the academic accounting community is to constructively influence and develop its
research agents rather than allowing it to develop virtually by default.”
6. There was a significant difference in performance in the RAEs between the old and the new universities
with the old universities gaining an average weighting across all subjects of 4.3 and the new universities
an average of 2.5 in the 1996 exercise. Both averages are an increase on the 1992 values, which
were 1.9 and 3.8 respectively (Court, 1998). See Whittington (1997) and Cooper & Otley (1998) for a
breakdown of the proportions of different rankings according to university status in the Accountancy
and Business and Management Panels.
7. Some indication that our survey might not unduly over-represent the dissatisfied can be obtained
from a survey of academic staff in 15 institutions carried out in February and March 1996 as part of
a larger study into the impact of the 1992 RAE financed by the Higher Education Funding Council
(McNay, 1997). In response to the question as to whether on balance the effects of the RAE on
higher education had been positive, 36.7 per cent in the old universities and 49.6 per cent in the new
universities thought that they had. Taking into account the differences in the way the questions were
phrased and the possibility of registering ambivalence in our survey, the results are not dissimilar.
8. The first open-ended question asking directly about how respondents felt about changes in their
discipline elicited only 39 unequivocally positive responses, less than the total number of respondents
who could be identified as being in favour (N = 50) or ambivalent (N = 15) when looking at the pattern
of response to the open-ended questions overall. It was therefore decided to take the responses to
the other questions into account when deciding how many felt good about the RAE’s impact on their
discipline so as not to under-represent those who were generally in favour of the RAE. On the other
hand, those respondents who were against (N = 74) or ambivalent (N = 15) produced 100 negative
responses to the first open-ended question, more than the total number who could be identified as
being against from the questionnaire as a whole, so it was not necessary to take their other responses
into account. There was a similar pattern of response to the fourth open-ended question (and last
question on the questionnaire) asking respondents whether they had any further comments they
would like to make. Twenty-five respondents offered clear reasons in favour and 56 clear reasons
against. The 25 respondents in favour of the RAE gave a total of 29 reasons for their opinion in
comparison with the 56 against who gave a total of 87. Taking the questionnaires as a whole into
account, therefore, those who were against the exercise had a lot more they wanted to say in support
of their opinion than those in favour.
9. It is not surprising that those privileged by the process should be the most committed to it nor that
those less privileged should be alienated by it, but recognition of the fact that subjective perception
is structured by objective interest does not mean that we can dismiss the feelings of those who are
unhappy with the RAE as the unreliable response of disgruntled individuals with a personal axe to
grind any more than we can dismiss the responses of those committed to it as mere rhetoric or
ideology. Both types of response to the RAE are in need of explanation. Furthermore, when we find a
significant number of academics, many of whom are in senior positions within the profession and/or
located in high ranking departments for their sector, agreeing with those less privileged by the system,
we feel that we have identified a issue that should be a matter of concern to the profession as a whole,
not just to one sectional interest. Perceptions of and reactions to the increasing commodification of
academic research need to be understood at a level deeper than that of immediate self-interest if
academics are to influence the production, evaluation and dissemination of academic accounting
knowledge in a constructive and reflexive way.
10. This increase in rating is in line with, if not strictly proportional to, the increase in ratings awarded by the
Accountancy Panel where, out of 18 groups who submitted in both 1992 and 1996, nine improved their
rankings, six maintained them and three declined (Whittington, 1997). The overall average ranking
also went up in the BMS panel but it is more difficult to isolate the contribution specifically accountancy
rankings made to the overall BMS ratings, which were on average somewhat lower than those awarded
by the accountancy panel (Cooper & Otley, 1998).
11. Whilst the types of reason both for and against the exercise were similar across all the disciplines
examined, the business-related disciplines were overall somewhat happier with the impact of the
RAE than the more traditional social sciences. The sociologists were the least happy with 23 per
cent believing change to be good, 18 per cent both good and bad and 56 per cent believing it to be
bad closely followed by the psychologists. On the other hand 34 per cent of accountants believed
the changes to be good, 10 per cent both good and bad and 50 per cent bad (see Table 6 above),
closely followed by those in marketing. This difference can be explained primarily by the aspirations of
many within the business-related disciplines to establish themselves as working within an accepted
academic discipline. (See Harley & Lowe, 1998)
12. More (N = 79) noted, but did not necessarily comment on, an increased trend not only towards
research and publication, but towards particular types of research and publication which were felt to
be in high status academic journals. Whittington (1997) and Cooper & Otley (1998) tell us that their
panels considered but then rejected the use of an “official list” of journals publication that might serve
as a proxy for determining research “quality”. This does not negate the fact that individuals on the
panel might work with their own tacit understanding of what would constitute such a list, nor that such
lists have been circulated “unofficially” amongst academic accounting departments keen to maximise
their ratings. See Brinn et al. (1996) for a fuller discussion of UK accountants’ perceptions of research
580 S. Harley
journal quality and Lee & Harley (1998a) for a critical discussion of the role the “Diamond List” of
economics journals played in the production and evaluation of economic research in UK universities.
13. The composition of the panels for Accountancy, Business and Management and Economics was made
up overwhelmingly of academics from old universities in high rated departments. See Whittington
(1997) for the composition of the 1996 Accountancy Panel; Cooper & Otley (1998) for the composition
of 1996 Business and Management Panel and Lee & Harley (1998a) for the composition of the 1992
and 1996 Economics Panel.
14. In an initial summary of findings from a research study on the impact of “new public management”
reforms on higher education in England, Sweden and Norway, Henkel (1997, pp.134–138) argues
that “academics are struggling to hold on to values and conceptions of professional practice
that are traditionally held to depend on pre-modern forms of governance and organisation.” She
describes these values as embodying not only the assumption that academics will combine research,
administration and teaching in their roles but also that all academics, as academics, should have:
“security of tenure, relatively generous allocations of time, relatively low levels of administration,
a common salary structure, the interdependence of at least teaching and research, an emphasis
on equality values in the allocation of work and the idea that academic specialisation is discipline
rather than functionally based”. In combination, she tells us, these assumptions represent deeply held
academic values. It could be argued from our data that whether intentionally (as part of a managerialist
project to gain greater control over academics and their work) or as unintended consequence of the
desire to secure academic status on the part of academics themselves, the RAE has the power to
violate each one of these values in turn.
15. Short-termism was mentioned explicitly 63 times by the academic accountants as a reason for being
against the RAE’s impact on either their discipline, the work of their department or themselves. Too
much emphasis on publication (which might implicitly amount to the same thing) was referred to on
154 separate occasions.
Acknowledgement
The author wishes to acknowledge the help of her colleague at De Montfort University,
Peter Lowe, who has been responsible for the computer analysis of the survey data,
and the comments of two anonymous reviewers.
References
Arrington, E., “Intellectual Tyranny and the Public Interest: The Quest for the Grail and the Quality of Life”,
Advances in Public Interest Accounting, Vol. 3, 1990, pp. 1–16.
Bourdieu, P., Homo Academicus (Cambridge: Polity, 1997).
Brinn, T., Jones, M. J. & Pendlebury, M., “UK Accountants’ Perceptions of Research Journal Quality”,
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1996, pp. 265–278.
Campion, M. & Renner, W., “Goal Setting, Domestication and Academia: The Beginnings of an Analysis”,
in J. Smyth (ed.) Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education pp. 74–83
(Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press, 1995).
Clark, J. & Newman, J., The Managerial State (London: Sage, 1997).
Clegg, S., “Power Relations and the Constitution of the Resistant Subject”, in J. M. Jermier, D. Knights,
W. R. Nord (eds) Resistance and Power in Organisations: Agency Subjectivity and the Labour Process
pp. 274–325 (London: Routledge, 1994).
Cooper, C. & Otley, D., “The 1996 Research Assessment Exercise in Business and Management”, British
Journal of Management, Vol. 9, 1998, pp. 73–88.
Court, S., “The Research Assessment Exercise: The Basis for a New Gold Standard in Higher Education”,
in D. Jary, M. Parker (eds) The New Higher Education: Issues and Directions for the Post-Dearing
University pp. 115–132 (Stoke on Trent: Staffordshire University Press, 1998).
Dearlove, J., “The Academic Labour Process: From Collegiality and Professionalism to Managerialism
and Proletarianisation?” Higher Education Review, Vol. 30, No. 11, 1997, pp. 56–75.
Dominelli, L. & Hoogvelt, A., “Globalisation, the Privatisation of Welfare and the Changing Role of
Professional Academics in Britain”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 191–211.
Farnham, D. & Horton, S., Managing the New Public Services (London: MacMillan, 1993).
Halsey, A., The Decline of Donnish Dominion (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).
Harley, S. & Lee, F. S., “Research Selectivity, Managerialism, and the Academic Labour Process: the
Future of Non-Mainstream Economics in UK Universities”, Human Relations, Vol. 50, No. 11, 1997,
pp. 1425–1460.
Harley, S. & Lowe, P., Academics divided: The Research Assessment Exercise and the Academic Labour
Process, Occasional Paper 48 (Leicester: The Business School, De Montfort University, 1998).
Henkel, M. & Kogan, M., The Impact of Policy Changes on the Academic Profession, Plenary paper
presented to the Society for Research in Higher Education Conference, Cardiff Institute of Higher
Education, Cardiff.
Henkel, M., “Academic Values and the Corporate Enterprise”, Higher Education Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 2,
1997, pp. 134–143.
Hillyard, P. & Sim, J., “The Political Economy of Socio-Legal Research”, in P. Thomas (ed.) Socio-Legal
Studies (Dartmouth: 1997).
Humphrey, C., Moizer, P. & Owen, D., “Questioning the Value of the Research Selectivity Process in
British University Accounting”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1995,
pp. 141–163.
Humphrey, C., Lewis, L. & Owen, D., “Still Too Distant Voices? Conversations and Reflections on the Social
Relevance of Accounting Education”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 77–99.
Johnston, R. J., “Managing How Academics Manage”, in R. Cuthbert (ed.) Working in Higher Education
pp. 101–118 (Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press, 1996).
Knights, D., “Subjectivity, Power and the Labour Process”, in D. Knights, H. Willmott (eds) Labour Process
Theory (London: MacMillan, 1990).
Lee, F. S. & Harley, S., “Peer Review, the Research Assessment Exercise and the Demise of Non-
Mainstream Economics”, Capital & Class, Vol. 66, Autumn, 1998a, pp. 23–53.
Lee, F. S. & Harley, S., “Economics Divided: The Limitations of Peer Review in a Paradigm-Bound Social
Science”, in D. Jary, M. Parker (eds) The New Higher Education: Issues and Directions for the Post-
Dearing University pp. 185–207 (Stoke on Trent: Staffordshire University Press, 1998b).
Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
Lee, T., “Shaping the US Academic Accounting Pofession: The American Accounting Association and
the Social Construction of a Professional Elite”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 6, 1995,
pp. 241–261.
Lee, T., “The Editorial Gatekeepers of the Accounting Academy”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1997, pp. 11–30.
Marginson, S., “Markets in Higher Education: Australia”, in J. Smyth (ed.) Academic Work The Changing
Labour Process in Higher Education pp. 17–39 (Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press, 1995).
McNay, I., The Impact on the 1992 RAE on Institutional and Individual Behaviour in English
Higher Education: The Evidence From a Research Project (Norwich: Centre for Higher Education
Management, Anglia Polytechnic University, 1997).
Miller, H., The Management of Change in Universities (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995).
Niemark, M., “Looking for Copernicus”, In The Public Interest, Vol. 19, June, 1993, pp. 7–17.
Parker, L., Guthrie, J. & Gray, R., “Accounting and Management Research: Passwords from
the Gatekeepers”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1998, pp. 371–402.
Parker, M. & Jary, D., “The McUniversity: Organisations, Management and Academic Subjectivity”,
Organization, Vol. 2, 1995, pp. 319–338.
Prichard, C. & Willmott, H., “Just How Managed is the McUniversity?” Organization Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2,
1997, pp. 287–316.
Perkin, H., Key Profession: The History of the Association of University Teachers (London: 1969).
Power, M., The Audit Society: The Rituals of Verification (Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 1997).
Puxty, A. G., Sikka, P. & Willmott, H. C., “Systems of Surveillance and the Silencing of UK Academic
Accounting Labour”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1994, pp. 137–171.
Rustin, M., “The Perverse Modernisation of British Universities”, in D. Jary, M. Parker (eds) The New
Higher Education: Issues and Directions for the Post-Dearing University pp. 319–331 (Stoke on Trent:
Staffordshire University Press, 1998).
582 S. Harley
Shumar, W., “Higher Education and the State: The Irony of Fordism in American Universities”, in J. Smyth
(ed.) Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education pp. 84–98 (Buckingham:
SRHE/Open University Press, 1995).
Smyth, J. (ed.) Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education (Buckingham:
SRHE/Open University Press, 1995).
Thompson, P., “Crawling from the Wreckage: The Labour Process and the Politics of Production”, in D.
Knights, H. Willmott (eds) Labour Process Theory (London: MacMillan, 1990).
Townley, B., “Performance Appraisal and the Emergence of Management”, Journal of Management
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1993, pp. 222–238.
Townley, B., “The Institutional Logic of Performance Appraisal”, Organization Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1997,
pp. 261–285.
Trow, M., “Trusts, Markets and Accountability in Higher Education: A Comparative Perspective”, The
Thirtieth Anniversary Seminars (London: SRHE/Chameleon, 1996).
Whitley, R., “The Structure and Context of Economics as a Scientific Field”, Research in the History of
Economic Thought and Methodology, Vol. 4, 1986, pp. 179–209.
Whittington, G., “The Research Assessment Exercise”, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 29, 1997,
pp. 181–197.
Willmott, H., “Subjectivity and the Dialectics of Praxis: Opening Up the Core of Labour Process Analysis”,
in D. Knights, H. Willmott (eds) Labour Process Theory (London: MacMillan, 1990).
Willmott, H., “Managing the Academics: Commodification and Control in the Development of University
Education in the UK”, Human Relations, Vol. 48, No. 9, 1995, pp. 993–1025.
Willmott, H., “Rethinking Management and Managerial Work: Capitalism, Control and Subjectivity”,
Human Relations, Vol. 50, No. 11, 1997, pp. 1329–1359.
Willmott, H., “On Measuring and Managing Research Quality: The State Industry and Peer Review”, Paper
Presented to the Higher Education Close-Up Conference, Preston, University of Central Lancashire,
July 6–8, 1998.
Wilson, T., “The Proletarianisation of Academic Labour”, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1991,
pp. 250–262.
Zeff, S. A., “Recent Trends in Accounting Education and Research in the USA: Some Implications for UK
Academics”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 21, 1989, pp. 159–176.

Harley2000 - Accountants Divided

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Harley2000 - Accountants Divided

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2000) 11, 549–582

ACCOUNTANTS DIVIDED: RESEARCH

This paper reports the results of a survey of academic accountants working in

The Commodification of Academic Accounting Research

research on the part of senior academics or “gatekeepers” within the profession,

Old universities New universities

Table 2 Staff by length of time working in higher education

Old universities New universities

Table 3 Staff by 1996 RAE departmental rating

Old universities New universities

Table 4 Perceived changes in recruitment and selection of staff

Table 5 Feelings about perceived changes in discipline

Old universities New universities

Table 6 Feelings about change in discipline by department rating

Table 7 Feelings about RAE-led change in discipline by job grade

Old universities New universities

Table 8 Feelings about change in discipline by length of service in higher education

Old universities New universities

Table 9 Changed own work to fit in with RAE demands

Old universities New universities

Table 10 Perceived positive effects of RAE on discipline

Old universities New universities

Table 11 Perceived positive effects of RAE on own department

Old universities New universities

They have led to a systematic improvement in UK Accounting research.

The perceived positive effects of the RAE on the development of accounting as

Greater reliance on quantitative research methods and more emphasis on publication in

Finally, some respondents, especially professors and heads in old university

Table 12 Perceived negative effects of RAE on discipline

Old universities New universities

Table 13 Perceived negative effects of RAE on department

Old universities New universities

In fact, despite its history as a “fledgling academic discipline” (Humphrey et

The Price of Everything

(Professor, old university, 5 rating)

Academics versus Practitioners

The emphasis on high status publications in prestigious journals was thought to

Research-Active Staff versus Teaching Staff

The divisions perceived to have grown up between academics and practitioners in

A perceived neglect of teaching was felt particularly acutely in some ex-polytechnic

We are not recruiting teaching staff. As an ex-Poly we are/were teaching establishments

In the new universities especially, the institutional pressure to achieve a respectable

Someone has to do the real work of teaching and administration.

The Breakdown of Community and the Pursuit of Self-interest

(Lecturer, new university, 2 rating)

Unsure. I am being encouraged to research and publish—as we all are—but teaching

(Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

(Senior Lecturer, new university, did not submit)

(Lecturer, new university, did not submit)

(Principal Lecturer, new university, did not submit)

(Senior Lecturer, new university, 3B rating)

The RAE is an attempt by an elite group of institutions to justify a disproportionate allocation

It has encouraged self-interest. . . the selfish pursuit of individual publications. No concern

There was evidence of this competitive individualism in the response of some

The Degradation of Academic Work

In a very real sense, therefore, resistance to the RAE could be self-defeating:

To avoid being relegated to second-class citizenship within the profession in a

Summary and Conclusions

to the progressive fragmentation, stratification and alienation of academic work”

allowing that space to be colonised by both managerial and self-interest.

You might also like