Prosecution of Criminal Actions

Worldwide Web Corp. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 161106 & 161266, 13 January 2013

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office
(RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants [3] before the RTC of Quezon
City to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) .The applications
alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 401, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT).

The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. During the hearing, the
trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor
plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be taken. The RTC granted
the application for search warrants.

Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, [21] and Planet Internet[22] filed their respective motions to quash the
search warrants, citing basically the following grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without
probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act
complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects
seized pursuant thereto were “fruits of the poisonous tree.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of
general warrants.

PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get the
conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26190. The CA reversed and
set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective.
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. The appellate court denied the
Motions for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether PLDT, despite absence of conformity of the public prosecutor, had personality to
question the quashal of the search warrants

Ruling: Yes, An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the
public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an
order quashing search warrants.

SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.—All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the
prosecution of “(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.” However, a search
warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an
application therefor. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are
completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as
a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.  

A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court.   A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
necessary because of a public necessity.

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have
consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants.
[37]
 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to
quash search warrants.

2.  Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 196842, 09 October 2013

Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334
of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office
of the Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo, with designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional
Hospital, Apokon, Tagum City. Allegedly, Alfredo had ilict relationships with a Emy Sia and Julie de
Leon.

As expected, Alfredo, in his counter-affidavit, denied all accusations against him. In their subsequent
exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained Alfredo’s culpability, and naturally, Alfredo
claimed innocence.

In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa’s failure to implead Sia and de Leon as
respondents cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosa’s complaint ought to be dismissed for failure to
implead his alleged concubines as respondents.

Rosa was apprised of the need to implead the two alleged mistresses in the complaint for
Concubinage pursuant to Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. On 24 June 2008, the Ombudsman
issued a Joint Order4 impleading Sia and de Leon as party-respondents in the complaint for
Concubinage and directing them to submit their respective counter-affidavits within a period of time.
Copies of the Joint Order were mailed to Sia’s and de Leon’s last known addresses, as provided by
Rosa to the Ombudsman.

Apparently still opposed to the Ombudsman’s ruling to simply amend the complaint and implead
therein Alfredo’s alleged mistresses, Alfredo filed his Comment to the 24 June 2008 Order with Motion
to Dismiss and/or Refer the charges to the Appropriate Provincial/City Prosecutor 6 praying for
dismissal of the complaint for: (1) failure to implead the two mistresses in violation of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code; and in the alternative, (2) referral of the complaint to the Office of the City
Prosecutor as provided in OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001.

The Ombudsman, ultimately, found probable cause to indict only Alfredo and Sia of Concubinage and
directed the filing of an Information against them in the appropriate court.

Alfredo filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration excepting to the Ombudsman’s ruling on the
automatic inclusion of Sia as respondent in the complaint and their indictment for the crime of
Concubinage. Alfredo is adamant that Rosa’s complaint should have, at the outset, impleaded his
alleged concubines. Failing such, the Ombudsman cannot resort to automatic inclusion of party-
respondents, erroneously finding him and Sia prima facie culpable for Concubinage.

Nonetheless, the Ombudsman stood pat on its ruling, declared that the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration was filed out of time.

In this appeal, Alfredo insists that the Ombudsman’s automatic inclusion, over his vehement
objections of Sia and de Leon as party-respondents, violates Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which respectively provide:
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. – xxx.

The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including the guilty
parties, if both are alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to the offense or
pardoned the offenders.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman erred in not referring the complaint to the Department of Justice,
considering that the offense of Concubinage is not committed in relation to his office as Chief of
Hospital; and if the Ombudsman railroaded the inclusion of Sia and de Leon as party-respondents in
the complaint.

Ruling: NO

The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation.10 This is the reason why judicial review of the resolution of the Ombudsman
in the exercise of its power and duty to investigate and prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public
officers is limited to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment
for that of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its Rules of Procedure. Thus:

Rule II
PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES

xxxx

Section 2. Evaluation – Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be:

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;

c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the
case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;

e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

xxxx
Section 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:

a) x x x

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an
order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents,
directing the respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the
complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after
service of the counter-affidavits.

c) If the respondents does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may
consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any
event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction.

Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained.

If respondent desires any matter in the complainant’s affidavit to be clarified, the

particularization thereof may be done at the time of the clarificatory questioning in
the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.

e) If the respondents cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6

hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be
deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.

f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there
are facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified
on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded
the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the
witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is
impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the
questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced
into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer
the same in writing and under oath.

g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall
forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated
authorities for their appropriate action thereon.

No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbyan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.

Notably, Rosa’s complaint contained not just the Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the Ombudsman’s perusal, the complaint was
supported by affidavits corroborating Rosa’s accusations. Thus, at that stage, the Ombudsman
properly referred the complaint to Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while the Ombudsman found no
reason for outright dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory hearing to discuss the applicability
of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the issue having been insisted upon by Alfredo.
Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the complaint to respondent for comment and thereafter
the holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in paragraph b, Section 2 and paragraphs d and f,
Section 4 of Rule II, which we have at the outset underscored.

The Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment of the complaint to cure the defect pointed out by
Alfredo. We agree with the Ombudsman that it would be superfluous to dismiss the complaint when
amendment thereof is allowed by its Rules of Procedure 15 and the Rules of Court.

Second, Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office,
had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, 17 and
affirmed in subsequent cases:

The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan
Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies
such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction take over at any stage.

A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an
internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.

Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on Preliminary Investigation,
effective December 1, 2000, to wit:

SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations –

The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused
was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the
complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the
resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of
such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the

prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file
the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to
do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or
motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or
move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall
apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.

confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal
complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable by the proper court within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, including those offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit the records and their
resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor cannot
dismiss the complaint without the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy, nor can
the prosecutor file an Information with the Sandiganbayan without being deputized by, and without
prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy.

To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or
city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the
OMB-DOJ circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ’s
authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of
crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had
been held in the Natividad case citation omitted as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there
is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has
the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary
jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

3.  La. Jimenez vs. Sorongon, G.R. No. 178607, 05 December 2012

The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning
agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis
(respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another
local manning agency.

On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit 4 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The
petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of
incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA).

Respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavit’s
allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.

In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor
reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the
information.9 The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition 10 and
comment to the opposition, respectively.

In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the
existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. 12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the respondents.

On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration
and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC
denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal
case should be dismissed or not.

On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.

On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that
respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC,
in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.

In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being moot and
academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1,
2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.

On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge
Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with
a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.

In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It
treated respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of
probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false
information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings
seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants
of arrest.

On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause
to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the
RTC.22
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading
since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity. 23

In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding that
the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered
the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s
conformity.

On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the
public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case. On
October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA.

CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition
on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
has the legal personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to
institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere
competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that
followed.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he
is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced
by the respondents’ illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the
RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public
prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the
prosecution and appeal of the case.

Issue: Whether petitioner lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines?

Ruling: yes. The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case

Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is
the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. The People is the real party in interest in a criminal
case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the
CA or in this Court.

In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the
case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his
alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the
reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to
prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. 40
4.  Chua vs. Padillo, 522 SCRA 60

Marissa Padillo-Chua, Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, manager of Padillo Lending
Investor owned by the latter. It was found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some of the
borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for approval were fictitious and their signatures
on the checks were spurious.

Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several others with the NBI in Lucena City. In
turn, the NBI forwarded their complaints to the Office of the City Prosecutor, same city, for
preliminary investigation.

In a Resolution, Lucena City Prosecutor Romeo A. Datu found a prima facie case of Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for
estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City.

Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners, respondents
interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution which directed to file the
Information of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents defined and
penalized under Article 315 par. 1(b) in relation to Articles 171 and 172 (58 counts) against
respondent Marissa Padillo-Chua and to cause the withdrawal of the Information of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents against respondents Wilson Chua and Renita Chua.

Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari. TheCA found that it overlooked certain facts
and circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and Renita.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of Justice to
include in the Information Wilson and Renita.

RULING: No.

Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly provides that "All
criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor." The rationale for this rule is that since a criminal offense
is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a representative of the State
shall direct and control the prosecution thereof.

Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of criminal cases, the public
prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the power and discretion to: (a) determine whether a
prima facie case exists; (b) decide which of the conflicting testimonies should be believed free from
the interference or control of the offended party;and (c) subject only to the right against self-
incrimination, determine which witnesses to present in court. Given his discretionary powers, a public
prosecutor cannot be compelled to file an Information where he is not convinced that the evidence
before him would warrant the filing of an action in court. For while he is bound by his oath of office to
prosecute persons who, according to complainant’s evidence, are shown to be guilty of a crime, he is
likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.

We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s exercise of his discretionary powers is not
absolute.

First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice
who, under the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control and supervision over the
investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the public prosecutor’s decision may even be reversed or
modified by the Office of the President.Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, on the ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

We have carefully examined the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated January 3, 2000 wherein
he ruled that there was no probable cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice
either overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa’s practice of depositing
checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the
fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of
the transactions entered into by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November
26, 1998 confirming that Wilson had knowledge of Marissa’s illegal activities.

5.  Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653

Private respondent ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 

Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. Under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after
the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar
petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of
Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review. 

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987.

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted
on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 

Issue: Does the respondent possess the legal standing to file the present complaint for adultery?
Whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of
the action by the former against the latter.

Ruling: Yes

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse.

Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for
the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the
State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or
guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words,
only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of
legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing
of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for,
adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time
of the filing of the criminal case. 

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons.

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

6.  Oporto, Jr. vs. Monserate, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1109, 16 April 2001, 356 SCRA443

On October 31, 1995, Ms. Lourdes A. Senar, the wife of the mayor of the town where the sala of
Judge Monserate was located, filed a complaint against Sonny Rada and complainant, Jovenal
Oporto, Jr. (hereafter, "Rada" and "Oporto") for "violation of Article 172 [2] in relation to Article
173[3] of the Revised Penal Code."  The complaint[4] was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2811. [5] The complaint,
however, was not under oath.

On January 26, 1996, on the mistaken notion that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, Judge Monserate conducted a preliminary investigation, declared that there was probable
cause and ordered that the records of the case be forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor Office,
Camarines Sur, for appropriate action.[8] On February 28, 1996, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur [9] found that the crime committed was not estafa but falsification, the penalty for
which was prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), and thus fell within the expanded jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. 

The Provincial Prosecutor, remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. On July
9, 1996, complainant Oporto filed with the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Naga City, an
administrative complaint charging Judge Monserate with "ignorance of the law, harassment and/or
grave abuse of discretion."

Complainant Oporto charged Judge Monserate with "gross ignorance of the law" for issuing a warrant
of arrest against him despite the fact that, First, the criminal complaint against him was not under
oath, and Second, the affidavits and sworn statements of the prosecution witnesses were likewise
not under oath and certified.

On September 10, 1996, in compliance with the request, Clerk of Court Rosario B. Torrecampo
forwarded the entire record of the case against Judge Monserate to the Office of the Court
Administrator, Supreme Court. Judge Eddie Monserate was SEVERELY REPRIMANDED.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint was in fue form?

Ruling: NO.

Rule 110, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines a complaint as, "a sworn
written statement charging a person with an offense subscribed by the offended party, any peace
officer or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated." Rule 112, Section 3
(a) likewise requires that for purposes of preliminary investigation, the complaint and its
accompanying affidavits and supporting documents be "sworn to before any fiscal, state  prosecutor
or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary
public, who must certify that he personally examined  the affiants  and that  he  is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits (emphasis ours)." The requirement is
mandatory.  Judge Monserate's oversight is deplorable.

There was no deceit employed by them to induce Lourdes Senar to part with her check. Clearly, the
crime committed was not estafa.

7.  Salazar   vs.   People, G.R.   No. 149472,   15   October   2002

It appears that Skiva International, Inc. ("Skiva") is a New York-based corporation which imports
clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier (Philippines) Inc. ("Olivier"). Aurora
Manufacturing & Development Corporation ("Aurora") and Uni-Group Inc. ("Uni-Group") are domestic
corporations which supply finished clothes to Skiva. Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both
Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner, Jorge Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-
Group and a consultant of Aurora.

In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge Salazar was charged with estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty"
to the charge. After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. On March 13, 1997, the lower court denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. 23 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Aggrieved by the aforementioned
rulings, petitioner files the instant petition for review.

Petitioner claims that the third element of estafa is not present as the party prejudiced, in accordance
with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is Skiva, when petitioner had no
obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn. Petitioner argues that
consistent with the ruling of the lower court that Aurora is the owner of the sum remitted as advance
payment, petitioner had the obligation to account for the proceeds thereof to Aurora and not to
Skiva. 42 Thus, petitioner maintains that a conviction for estafa will not hold as no damage to Aurora
was alleged in the information nor did the prosecution present any proof of damage to Aurora.

Additionally, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure,48 the complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva as it is not the "offended party"
contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the
amount withdrawn from the joint account.

Issue: Was the complaint instituted by the appropriate party?

Ruling: Yes

The "complaint" referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a
criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of
an information which is generally filed by a fiscal. 50 It is not necessary that the proper "offended
party" file a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless
the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent
person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation.

Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which
are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party
and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a "complaint" filed with
the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. 52 Thus, in the case at bar, the
complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no
obligation to account to Skiva.

8.  People vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth), G.R. No. 160619, 09 September 2015

Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May 1998
elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,3 in relation to the alleged illegal operation of
the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.

An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed against Castillo also in
relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of
the administrative charge and imposed the penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against Castillo.

After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion
to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings.7 He argued that the case against him had been decriminalized
by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 90038 and invoked the decision of the Court of Appeals absolving
him of administrative liability. His motion was initially denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated September 6, 2001.9

On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the same does not charge an offense.10He claimed that a public officer may only be held liable
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the government or any
private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the undue injury must not only be mentioned in the
Information, its extent must be specified.

The Sandiganbayan Special Division, in its challenged Resolution dated January 9, 2002, granted
Castillo's Supplemental Motion.

The Special Division15 also resolved, on November 3, 2003, to deny the motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed by the People.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: what ultimate facts are required to be stated in an Information charging an accused with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Specifically, we are called to resolve whether an Information
alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must state the precise
amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury
to the point of moral certainty.
Ruling:

The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally informed of the facts
and the acts constituting the offense charged.16 Where insufficient, an accused in a criminal case can
file a motion to have the Information against him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his
plea.17 A motion to quash challenges the efficacy of an Information 18 and compels the court to
determine whether the Information suffices to require an accused to endure the rigors of a trial.
Where the Information is insufficient and thus cannot be the basis of any valid conviction, the court
must drop the case immediately and save an accused from the anxiety and convenience of a useless
trial.

A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the Information whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted.20 The question that must be answered is whether such allegations are
sufficient to establish the elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde. 21 In
proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1) what must be alleged in a
valid Information; (2) what the elements of the crime charged are; and (3) whether these elements
are sufficiently stated in the Information.

Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state-

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states

the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

xxx

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan,22 explained the two important purposes underlying the rule.
First, it enables the accused to suitably prepare his defense. 23 Second, it allows the accused, if found
guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 24 Thus, this Court
held that the true test in ascertaining the validity and sufficiency of an Information is "whether the
crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged.

The subject Information filed against Castillo, on the other hand, reads to wit:

That in or about 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Bacoor,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jessie B.
Castillo, a public officer, being the incumbent Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, while in the performance of his
official and administrative function, acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and
confederating with accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, caretakers of Villa
Esperanza, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to his co-
accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dump site
located at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite, notwithstanding the fact that no Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) or any permit has been issued by the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources to any person or entity for such
purpose., and despite cease and desist orders issued by the DENR, thereby causing undue injury to
the residents and students in the area who had to endure the stench, flies, rats and mosquitoes
emanating from the dumpsite.27

We find that the foregoing Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of a violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. The Information specifically alleged that Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor,
Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and conspiring
with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, by
allowing the illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury ·of the residents
and students in the area who had to endure the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation.

For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an Information charging
a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 need not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount
of unwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the
undue injury caused. We have consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an
Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of
why and how the crime was committed .29

The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount actually received by the
Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of
damage caused to the residents and students) are matters of evidence best raised during the trial;
they need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing the accused of the crime
charged, the allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and undue injury under the
Information suffices.

Sufficiency

1. Zapata vs. People, G.R. No. 170863, 20 March 2013, 

An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with Concordia O.
Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft. Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered
a plea of "not guilty."6 Loyao remains at-large.