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John H. Elliott's Social-Scientific Criticism

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TRINJ 28NS (2007) 251-278

JOHN H. ELLIOTT’S SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM

JAMES D. DVORAK*

I. INTRODUCTION

The past thirty years of biblical studies has seen the substantial
growth and impact of social-scientific criticism of the Bible. Barton
attributes, but does not limit, its rise to the following factors:

The rise to prominence of the social sciences from the late

nineteenth century on, and the impact of the sociology of
knowledge in a wide range of academic disciplines; the influence
on interpretation theory of the hermeneutics of suspicion
represented by such intellectual giants as Nietzsche, Durkheim,
Marx, and Freud; the exhaustion of the historical-critical method as
traditionally understood, and the failure of form criticism to fulfil
its promise of identifying the Sitze im Leben of New Testament texts;
shifts in historiography generally away from the “great man” view
of history typical of Romanticism to one more attentive to history
“from below,” with a much stronger popular and sociological
dimension; the influence of the discovery of texts and
archaeological remains, as at Qumran, which provide important
new comparative data for social history and sociological analysis;
and the surfacing of different kinds of questions to put to the New
Testament in the light of developments in twentieth-century
theology, not least, the failure of liberal theology and the urgent
concerns (often of a social and political kind) raised by liberation
and feminist theologies.1

Because of these factors and others like them, it has become the
norm for students of biblical studies to learn that determining the
cultural background of biblical texts is as integral a part of the
exegetical process as determining the historical background of the
texts.2

*James D. Dvorak is a part-time faculty member at McMaster Divinity College in

Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, as well as an adjunct instructor at Oklahoma Christian
University in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
1Stephen C. Barton, “Social-Scientific Criticism,” in A Handbook to the Exegesis of
the New Testament (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Boston: Brill, 2002), 278.
2A sampling of introductions to biblical interpretation supports this point. See
the following works: W. Klein, C. Blomberg, R. Hubbard Jr., Introduction to Biblical
Interpretation (Dallas: Word, 1993), 172-79; Gordon D. Fee, New Testament Exegesis (rev.
ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 114-23. The introductory book in the
252 TRINITY JOURNAL

Several questions come to mind regarding social-scientific

criticism: (1) What exactly is social-scientific criticism? (2) How does
it relate to the more traditional historical methods of criticism? (3)
What real or potential contributions can social-scientific criticism
make to biblical studies? (4) What are the limitations of social-
scientific criticism? (5) What does social-scientific criticism’s
methodology look like? The purpose of this article is to investigate
the answers to these questions. More specifically, this article will
analyze social-scientific criticism from the perspective of its leading
American proponent, John H. Elliott. As will be shown, there are
different emphases among social-scientific critics, but focus will be
given to social-scientific exegesis, which best describes Elliott’s
method.

II. JOHN H. ELLIOTT

A. Biographical Sketch

John H. Elliott is Professor Emeritus of Theology and Religious

Studies at the University of San Francisco. He received his Bachelor
of Arts as well as his Bachelor and Masters of Divinity degrees from
Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, Missouri. He earned the degree of
Doktor der Theologie from the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in
1963, the same year he was ordained a Lutheran clergyman. He has
taught at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis (1963-67), Webster College,
St. Louis (1963-67), the University of San Francisco (1967-2001), the
Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley (1977-present), Notre Dame
University (1981), and at the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome
(1978) as the first and only Lutheran scholar since the Reformation.3

B. The Context Group4

In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a growing

dissatisfaction with the then-current methods of biblical studies,
especially the type represented by Rudolf Bultmann.5 Form and
other criticisms were not fulfilling the desires of biblical scholars as a
___________________________
Guides to New Testament Exegesis series has individual chapters dedicated to
historical background and sociology of the NT, though the latter chapter, in spite of its
positive thesis statement (“social-scientific method can increase our understanding of
the biblical world and thus enable us to interpret the message of the Scriptures with
greater accuracy and clarity”), has a negative tenor. See Thomas E. Schmidt,
“Sociology and New Testament Exegesis,” in Introducing New Testament Interpretation
(GNTE; ed. Scot McKnight; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), 115-32.
3For this and other information about Elliott, see his personal Web site at
http://www.usfca.edu/fac_staff/elliottj/personalpage.html or his Curriculum Vitae
at http://www.usfca.edu/fac_staff/elliottj/curriculumvitae.html.
4For a history of the Context Group, see Philip F. Esler, “The Context Group
Project: An Autobiographical Account,” in Anthropology and Biblical Studies: Avenues of
Approach (eds. Louise J. Lawrence and Mario I. Aguilar; Leiden: Deo, 2004).
5Ibid., 49.
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 253

means of understanding the phenomena of early Christianity. As a

result, scholars like Gerd Theissen, John Gager, Wayne Meeks,
Abraham Malherbe, and others began engaging the social-sciences
looking for models to describe the social world of the Bible.6 The
success of these works attracted more scholars to the enterprise of
social-scientific criticism. Eventually, a group of scholars including
John Elliott, Bruce Malina, Jerome Neyrey, and John Pilch involved
themselves with organizations like the Bay Area Society for
Theology and Related Disciplines and various task forces in the
Catholic Biblical Association and focused their attention on the
relationship between biblical studies and the social-sciences.7 In
1979, Elliott and Malina began a working relationship, in which was
planted the seed that would later sprout as the Context Group.8 A
mixture of personal friendship, scholarly interaction, and various
task forces, birds-of-a-feather groups, and publications continued to
attract others to the social-scientific approach. In the Spring of 1990,
a core group of these scholars met and formed the “Context Group:
Project on the Bible in Its Cultural Environment,” and Elliott was
appointed Program Chair of the group.9

III. WHAT IS SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM?

A. General Definition

Social-scientific criticism has been broadly defined as

that phase of the exegetical task which analyzes the social and
cultural dimensions of the text and of its environmental context
through the utilization of the perspectives, theory, models, and
research of the social sciences.10

Further, social-scientific criticism is seen as a “component” or “sub-

discipline” of the historical-critical method, which “investigates
biblical texts as meaningful configurations of language intended to
communicate between composers and audiences.”11 It accomplishes
this task by studying in three different (though related) veins: (1)

6Gerd Theissen, “Wanderradikalismus: Literatursoziologische Aspekte der

Überlieferung von Worten Jesu im Urchristentum,” ZTK 70 (1973): 245-71; John G.
Gager, Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975); Wayne Meeks, The First Urban Christians (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1983); Abraham Malherbe, Social Aspects of Early Christianity
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983). See the very full bibliographies in John H. Elliott,
What is Social-Scientific Criticism? (GBS; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 138-74 (hereafter
GBS).
7Esler, “Context Group Project,” 49.
8Ibid., 50.
9Ibid., 52. For more information, see the Context Group’s Web site at
http://www.serv.net/~oakmande/.
10Elliott, GBS, 7.
11Ibid.
254 TRINITY JOURNAL

“the conditioning factors and intended consequences of the

communication process”; (2) “the correlation of the text’s linguistic,
literary, theological (ideological), and social dimensions”; and (3)
“the manner in which this textual communication was both a
reflection of and a response to a specific social and cultural
context.”12

B. Two Chief Focuses

1. Socio-Cultural Anthropology13

As social-scientific criticism of the Bible has taken shape as a

“sub-discipline of exegesis,”14 two major methodological focal points
have become clear.15 The first focuses on the “social and cultural
conditions, features, and contours of early Christianity and its social
environment.”16 Here one finds descriptions of geography, economic
life, religious practices, daily life, the political scene,17 and other
topics usually discussed by cultural/social anthropologists.18 An
example in this line of work is the book edited by John J. Pilch and
Bruce J. Malina entitled Handbook of Biblical Social Values.19 Briefly, the
purpose of this work “is to describe some of the values prominent in
the New Testament and frequently referred to in the Bible in
general.”20 For example, a few of the values described in the book are
(typically pairs in binary opposition): honor/shame,
individualism/dyadism, and being/doing.
Another sample work in this area is the volume edited by
Jerome Neyrey entitled The Social World of Luke-Acts.21 Though this
work moves in the direction of social-scientific exegesis (discussed
below), it is not merely another collection of exegetical essays on
Luke-Acts, another attempt at reconstructing the history behind

12Ibid.
13Sometimes referred to as cultural anthropology or social anthropology.
14Elliott, GBS, 7.
15Schmidt (“Sociology and New Testament Exegesis,” 118-19) describes the major
emphases as three points on a continuum. On one end is social description, where
emphasis is given to describing the “geography, economic life, religious practices,
daily life, and the political scene” behind the text. A middle point includes work like
that just described, but begins to make theological (ideological) explanations of the
texts. On the far end of the continuum is sociological analysis (exegesis), where the
exegete begins with sociological perspectives and methods and explains the text from
this perspective. I will follow Elliott and discuss only two focuses.
16Elliott, GBS, 32.
17Schmidt, “Sociology and New Testament Exegesis,” 118.
18See Elliott, GBS, 32-33 for a pretty full list of examples.
19John J. Pilch and Bruce J. Malina, eds., Handbook of Biblical Social Values
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 1998). This volume is an updated edition of Biblical Social
Values and Their Meaning: A Handbook, published by Hendrickson in 1993.
20Ibid., xv.
21Jerome Neyrey, ed., The Social World of Luke-Acts (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991)
(hereafter Social World).
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 255

Luke-Acts, or a social description of the “world” of Luke-Acts.22

Instead, it attempts to “discover the meanings implicit in Luke-Acts
through attention to the values, social structures and conventions of
Luke’s society which determine and convey those meanings.”23 In
terms of content, then, the essays deal with similar topics as the
handbook edited by Pilch and Malina: social values (e.g.,
honor/shame, individualism/dyadism, labeling and deviance
theory), as well as social institutions (e.g., temple/household,
patron-client relations) and social dynamics (e.g., social location of
the author, status transformation, and ceremonies).24
Many important contributions have been gleaned from this vein
of social-scientific criticism. Perhaps the most important contribution
is the recognition that honor (“publicly acknowledged worth”) and
shame (“publicly denied worth”) are perhaps the foundational
values of the Mediterranean world.25

2. Social-Scientific Exegesis

A second emphasis focuses more specifically on the exegesis of

biblical texts, of which the key North American proponent is John H.
Elliott. I will discuss his methodology more thoroughly below, but a
general description here is profitable. Broadly speaking, social-
scientific exegesis (a.k.a., “sociological exegesis”) is “the analytic and
synthetic interpretation of a text through the combined exercise of
the exegetical and sociological disciplines, their practices, theories
and techniques.”26 The objective of social-scientific exegesis is clearly
stated by Elliott:

The objective of sociological exegesis is the determination of the

social as well as the literary and theological conditions, content and
intended consequences of our text; that is, the determination of the
sum of its features which make it a vehicle of social interaction and
an instrument of social as well as literary and theological
consequence.27

The approach is exegetical in that its focus is still on determining

the meaning of the biblical documents, and it does not neglect other
operations of the exegetical enterprise such as textual, literary,
narrative, historical, tradition, form, redaction, rhetorical, and

22Ibid., x-xi.
23Ibid, xi.
24For more, see works cited above as well as S. C. Barton, “Social Values and
Structures,” in Dictionary of New Testament Background (ed. Craig A. Evans and Stanley
E. Porter; Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000), 1127-34 (hereafter, DNTB).
25See esp. Pilch and Malina, Handbook, 106-15; also Bruce J. Malina and Jerome
Neyrey, “Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts: Pivotal Values of the Mediterranean
World,” in Social World, 25-65.
26John H. Elliott, A Home for the Homeless (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 7-8
(hereafter Home).
27Ibid.
256 TRINITY JOURNAL

theological (ideological) criticisms.28 The approach is also sociological

in that it exercises the presuppositions, theories, analytical methods,
and comparative models of the discipline of sociology.29 I shall
discuss more thoroughly the presuppositions, assumptions, and
models underlying social-scientific exegesis in the next section.

IV. ELLIOTT’S METHOD OF SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC EXEGESIS

A. The Method: Presuppositions

Taking a cue from the social sciences, Elliott is very careful to be

forthright regarding the presuppositions of social-scientific criticism.
He writes:

Such an interdisciplinary approach to a biblical text involves a

plethora of presuppositions. In general it may be said that a
sociological exegesis operates comprehensively and yet critically
with the received presuppositions and methodological principles of
both sociological and exegetical disciplines. This requires an
acquaintance with, and as critical an acceptance of, the
assumptions, procedures and “assured results” of each discipline
as is possible. In addition, however, the fusion of the perspectives
and procedures of both disciplines may well be expected to
generate new methodological insights and cast unidisciplinary
presuppositions and techniques into critical light.30

Elliott is also careful to explain that presuppositions of social-

scientific criticism are not only related to methodology and the
objects being interpreted; they also relate to the interpreter.31 The
following paragraphs describe each of the major presuppositions of
social-scientific criticism in general, which also includes those
pertaining specifically to Elliott’s social-scientific exegesis.32

28Elliott, GBS, 7-8; idem, Home, 8. See also, Barton, “Criticism,” 68.
29Elliott, Home, 8.
30Ibid., 9. See also idem, GBS, 36, where he adds, “Clarity regarding theories,
models, and methods is a characteristic concern of social-scientific criticism. It will
therefore be appropriate to precede a description of its method with an initial
clarification of the major presuppositions informing and guiding its procedures.”
31GBS, 36.
32In Home (9-13), Elliott lists eight presuppositions he considers to be “worthy of
note”; in GBS (36-59) he lists ten, most of which are reiterations (or slightly modified
forms) of the eight in Home. I will follow the list in GBS since it was more recently
compiled than the list in Home.
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 257

1. Knowledge is Socially Conditioned

The first presupposition is that “all knowledge is socially

conditioned and perspectival in nature,” and this includes the
knowledge of the authors and groups under examination, as well as
the interpreter.33 This presupposition has two implications. First,
complete objectivity in interpretation is impossible because, as
sociologists of knowledge have pointed out,34 even “reality” itself—
whether the original author’s or the interpreter’s—is conditioned by
“specific temporal, psychological, social, and cultural locations.”35
About this, Elliott is quick to point out that this conditioning does
not eliminate the “possibility of creative thought and expression on
the part of the ancient authors whose work we study.”36 However, it
does mean that the authors’ expressions are constrained by personal
and social experience, as well as communicative frameworks of the
day—without which no communication could have occurred at all.37
The challenge for the interpreter, then, is to understand as clearly as
possible the social location—all the factors that might influence a
person or group38—of the ancient authors in order to achieve the
clearest interpretation.
A second implication of this presupposition is that the
interpreter must be aware of his or her own personal and social
locations.39 One of the dangers interpreters face as they do their work
is (and always has been) eisegesis, that is, reading meaning back into
the text being interpreted. This can occur when one’s own personal
and social locations influence the interests, methods, and goals of
textual analysis. Thus, it is very important for interpreters to
understand first of all that they approach the interpretive task with
“baggage” that may influence their exegetical decisions. Recognizing
as much of this “baggage” as possible before beginning the
interpretive process may help the interpreter to come to what Elliott
calls “relative objectivity.”40 As was noted above, there is no such
33Elliott, GBS, 36-37; idem, Home, 9.
34See, e.g., Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); Karl
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936).
35Elliott, GBS, 37.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
38Ibid. “Social location” here is an encompassing category involving all the
factors that influence one person or group, their socialization, experiences,
perceptions, frameworks of rationality, and views of reality. This would include, says
Elliott, such things as “gender, age, ethnic roots, class, roles and status, education,
occupation, nationality, group memberships, political and religious affiliations,
language and cultural traditions, and location in place and time” (Ibid., 37-38).
39Ibid.
40Ibid. Elliott seems convinced that in spite of the distance between the
interpreter and the authors and in spite of the interpreter’s presuppositions, one can, if
they will work to identify these presuppositions, still find truth in the Scriptures. He
writes even though that reality is conditioned by one’s personal and social locations,
such conditioning does not “dispute or eliminate the claims to truth made by either
258 TRINITY JOURNAL

thing as total objectivity, but relative objectivity is possible as the

interpreter does their best to recognize their own personal and social
location and to work around any accompanying interests and
presuppositions.
Determining one’s own social location as well as that of the
authors and objects of interpretation is important for several reasons.
First, it raises awareness about how people in different social
locations might be more or less sensitive to the nuances of the text.
For example, someone in a context of poverty and destitution may
pick up more readily on how Luke seems to give prominence to “the
poor” in the programmatic statement regarding Jesus’ ministry
recorded in Luke 4:16ff. Yet even this example highlights another
reason for seeking to know social location, because it prompts the
sociological question, “Who are the poor?” More specifically, in what
way were they poor? That is, were they necessarily economically
poor? Joel Green asks this question and turns to social-scientific
criticism to help answer it:

In [the Mediterranean culture and the social world of Luke-Acts],

one’s status in a community was not so much a function of
economic realities, but depended on a number of elements,
including education, gender, family heritage, religious purity,
vocation, economics, and so on. Thus, lack of subsistence might
account for one’s designation as “poor,” but so might other
disadvantaged conditions, and “poor” would serve as a cipher for
those of low status, for those excluded according to normal canons
of status honor in Mediterranean world. Hence, although “poor” is
hardly devoid of economic significance, for Luke, this wider
meaning of diminished status honor is paramount.41

The point here is that different people in different social locations are
susceptible to reading and interpreting biblical texts a certain way
because of their social location. Such readings are anachronistic and
ethnocentric and can more easily be avoided if the interpreter takes
time to ask sociological questions of the biblical text and world of the
text.

2. Analytical Method Must Provide a Way To Distinguish Social Locations

If it is true, which undoubtedly it is, that the interpreter must

establish the social location of the authors and objects being
interpreted as well as their own, then social-scientific interpretive

___________________________
ancient authors or modern interpreters as totally relativized and compromised in their
persuasive power” (ibid., 37 [italics added]).
41Joel B. Green, The Gospel of Luke (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 211.
Green’s take on “poor” also makes sense in light of the parallelism in the Isaiah text
that is quoted, where “poor,” “captives,” “blind,” and “oppressed” are mutually
definitive. In fact, this becomes clearer when one asks the (sociological) questions,
“Who are the ‘captives,’ ‘blind,’ and ‘oppressed’?”
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 259

methods must provide a means for doing so.42 Elliott suggests that
one possible way to distinguish between ancient biblical and modern
conceptual points of view is to utilize the distinction between “emic”
and “etic” typically employed in anthropological field study.43
Emic information is that which is supplied by the “natives.” In
other words, emic information is the explanation (or interpretation)
of

phenomena as perceived, narrated, and explained according to the

experience, folk knowledge, conceptual categories, ratiocinations,
and rationalizations of the indigenous narrators in their historical,
social, and cultural locations.44

Thus, for example, in John 9 when Jesus and his disciples came upon
a man blind from birth, the disciples, given their social location,
assumed the reason for the man’s blindness was that either he or his
parents had sinned.45 Their interpretation of the situation is an
example of emic information, and may be thought of as looking at
things “from the inside out.”
Etic information is that which comes from the external
investigator or interpreter. It is the explanation (or interpretation) of
phenomena as perceived “by his or her own social, historical, and
cultural location, experience, and available knowledge and the
conceptual categories used for analyzing these same phenomena.”46
If emic information may be characterized as an explanation of
phenomena from the “inside out,” etic information may be
characterized as an explanation of phenomena from the “outside in.”
Interpreters utilizing social-scientific criticism employ models and
theories to transform the data of the ancient texts and artifacts into
etic information, so to speak.
More will be said about the use of models below. Here it is
important to emphasize why the emic/etic distinction is important
to social-scientific criticism. It lies in the fact that in making the
distinction, “interest shifts from decrying the ‘primitive’ (and
‘uninformed’) views of the native to the questions of how and why
the natives found this explanation plausible and cogent.”47 Looking
again to John 9, modern interpreters may treat the disciples’
reasoning regarding the cause of the man’s blindness as mere
superstition or perhaps as ignorance, though an ignorance that was
no fault of their own (i.e., they simply lived in a time before science
and medicine could have answered their question). But social-
scientific criticism does not dismiss such instances so quickly.

42Elliott, GBS, 37.

43Ibid., 38.
44Ibid.
45Note their question, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that [i[na] he
was born blind?” (John 9.2).
46Elliott, GBS, 38-39.
47Ibid., 40.
260 TRINITY JOURNAL

Rather, these critics seek to know why the disciples would have
raised such a question, prompting such probing questions as, "What
social or religious script might have caused the disciples to think sin
was the cause of the ailment?” In this way the sociological attempt
“to keep real flesh and blood human beings at the forefront of the
stage in all the complexity of their social relationships and turmoil of
their social situations”48 becomes clear.

3. Models as a Means to Finding Meaning

Theories and conceptual models play an essential role in social-

scientific criticism, especially in terms of producing etic
information.49 Social-scientists use various methods of observation to
seek typical and recurring patterns and regularities in human
behavior (emic information), whether behavior of individuals or
groups of humans. Based on those observations, social-scientists
then create theories (etic information) to explain the patterns they
have observed. These theories are then articulated through the use of
models.50 A model is “an abstract simplified representation of some
real world object, event, or interaction constructed for the purpose of
understanding, control, or prediction.”51 Models, then, are essentially
“cognitive maps” or conceptual frameworks

that organize selected prominent features of social terrain such as

patterns of typical behavior (for instance, at work, at meals, in law
courts), social groupings (kin and fictive kin groups, faction,
coalitions, patrons and clients, and such), process of social
interaction (for example, buying and selling, oral and written
communication, feuding, making contracts), and the like. Such
models alert the social traveler to typical and recurrent patterns of
everyday social life in given times and places.52

48Derek Tidball, An Introduction to the Sociology of the New Testament (Exeter:

Paternoster, 1983), 12.
49Ibid. See also Elliott, “Social-Scientific Criticism of the New Testament: More on
Methods and Models,” Semeia 35 (1986): 1 (hereafter, Semeia).
50See Elliott, GBS, 42. This process will be discussed further in the next
presupposition.
51Bruce Malina, “The Social Sciences and Biblical Interpretation,” Int 36 (1982):
231 (hereafter, Int). Malina (see ibid., 241; the following list synthesized in and quoted
from Elliott, GBS, 45) also suggests that models have the following six features to be
useful for studying the Bible and its environment: “(a) it should facilitate cross-
cultural comparison of the social situations of the interpreter and the object
interpreted; (b) its level of abstraction should be general enough to display similarities
that allow comparison; (c) it should fit a larger sociolinguistic framework for
interpreting texts; (d) it should be designed from experiences that match as closely as
possible empirical evidence from the biblical world; (e) the meanings it exposes
should be culture-specific and thus possibly irrelevant yet comprehensible to modern
Westerners; and (f) the quality of the model should conform to social-scientific
standards.”
52Elliott, GBS, 42. Further, “A conceptual model is the researcher’s image of the
phenomena in the real world that he [sic] wants to study” (Matilda W. Riley,
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 261

Malina describes three basic types of models from a fairly high

level of abstraction: the structural functionalist, the conflict, and the
symbolic models.53 The structural functionalist model assumes that

a social system is embodied in a group of interacting persons

whose interactions follow certain mutually understood and
expected patterns (structures) that are oriented around mutually
shared purposes or concerns (functions).54

Thus, meaningful behavior is that which functions within the

parameters of the social structures. What holds societies together in
equilibrium are core values held in common consensus by all the
units making up the system.55
The conflict model explains social systems “in terms of various
groups with differing goals and interests and therefore use coercive
tactics on each other to get their own goals realized.”56 In this view
the only constant is change and all units of social organization
(persons and groups in society) are constantly changing unless
someone or something intervenes to stop the change.57 What holds
the system together is not consensus, as in structural functionalist
models, but constraint, a sort of checks-and-balances type of
relationship among the units of society.58
The symbolic model (the most abstract of the three) explains
social systems as systems of symbols “consisting of persons (self,
others), things (nature, time, and space), and events (activities of
persons and things) that have unique reality because of their
perceived symbolic meaning.”59 Each symbolic entity is given
meaning and significance by the others sharing in the system, much
like words get their range of meanings from the shared social speech
system.60 Thus, symbols have a “range of meanings” made up of
various roles, rights, and regulations that unite them with or
separate them from other symbols in the system.61 These social
“meanings” function to maintain a tentative equilibrium in the
system.62
It is important to understand that the models themselves are not
meant to create material evidence; instead they are meant to provide
a way to visualize the patterns and relationships among the emic

___________________________
Sociological Research I: A Case Approach [New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963],
7).
53Int., 233 ff.
54Ibid., 233.
55Ibid., 234.
56Ibid, 234-35.
57Ibid., 235.
58Ibid.
59Ibid., 235-36.
60Ibid., 236.
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
262 TRINITY JOURNAL

information under scrutiny so as to understand them.63 Thus, models

are valuable explanatory tools.
Models, however, not only have explanatory (or descriptive)
value, they also have heuristic value. Models provide a means of
testing64 the theories behind them as well as stimulating further
investigation.65 As new theories are produced (or existing ones are
revised) and new models of those theories are created (or existing
ones revised), others can apply them to see if they work. Not only
are they tested on the same data or information of their genesis, but
they may be taken and applied to data gleaned from similar cases. In
this way, the model is tested to see if it can explain similar
phenomena. Where the model breaks down (technically, where the
theory behind the model breaks down), the researcher will be
prompted to ask new sets of questions regarding the information to
which the model was applied. Theories and the resulting models can
then be revised (or new ones created) and the cycle of testing begins
again.66
Finally, since models are “cognitive maps” (or conceptual
models), social-scientists say there is no choice as to whether or not
researchers use them.67 The choice lies in the deciding whether or not
one will use models consciously or unconsciously.68 From Elliott’s
perspective, it is crucial that practitioners of social-scientific
criticism—especially as applied to biblical studies—are up-front with
their models of interpretation. This encourages interpreters to think
constructively and critically about how they approach the Scriptures
and the task of interpretation. Moreover, it allows other interpreters
to critically examine and test the model to see if it works, which, as
mentioned above, brings out the heuristic value of using models.

4. Employing Abduction/Retroduction

Social-scientific criticism involves a process of logic that is neither

exclusively deductive (from model to material) nor inductive (from

63Elliott, GBS, 42.

64Models are evaluated based on a couple of general criteria: (1) the degree to
which the model articulates the theory and hypotheses of the researcher, and (2) the
degree of their interpretive and explanatory power (Elliott, GBS, 45). “This means that
what counts is their capacity for revealing and explaining the relations among social
phenomena and the regularities and peculiarities of social behavior” (ibid.).
65Ibid., 44.
66See ibid. and especially Semeia, 6.
67Elliott, Semeia, 6. The truth is that everyone uses “models” to make sense of
their world. Anyone who has a “worldview” of any kind is using a model, since a
“worldview” is really a model or framework for understanding reality.
68Ibid., 6 (citing T. F. Carney, The Shape of the Past [Lawrence, Kans.: Colorado
Press, 1975], 5).
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 263

material to hypothesis) but inclusive of both in a procedure called

“abduction.”69

This process (as implemented in the social-sciences) may be thought

of as “inference to the best explanation.”70 It is a way of finding an
explanation that “renders the observed facts necessary or highly
probable.”71 In other words, abduction starts with an observable fact
and reasons backwards to the best explanation of the fact. This kind
of reasoning follows this pattern:72

D is a collection of data (facts, observations, givens)

[H is tested against D and other hypotheses]
H, if true, explains D;
No other hypothesis explains D as well as H.
Therefore H is probably correct.

This process is similar to induction,73 but one thing sets it apart:

abduction involves “a back-and-forth movement of suggestion
checking.”74 In relation to the emic/etic categories put forward
earlier, abduction is a cyclical process of analyzing emic information,
creating etic hypotheses about how that emic information was
formed, and then testing those hypotheses against the emic
information, making necessary adjustments along the way.

5. Basing Models on Circum-Mediterranean and Ancient Near Eastern

Emic Information

It is presumed by social-scientific critics of the Bible that the

most appropriate models for interpreting the Bible and the biblical
world are those constructed to analyze the emic data of the Circum-
Mediterranean and ancient Near Eastern regions, that is, the
geographical, social, and cultural areas inhabited by the biblical
communities.75 Historical criticism attempts to locate the biblical
69Elliott, GBS, 48. This process was named by Charles S. Peirce (pronounced
“purse”).
70John Josephson, “Abductive Inference in Reasoning and Perception,” n.p. [cited
23-March-2006]. Online: http://www.cse.ohio-state.edu/lair/Projects/Abduction/
abduction.html. I added the bracketed line.
71Elliott, GBS, 48. See esp. Bruce J. Malina, “Interpretation: Reading, Abduction,
Metaphor,” in The Bible and the Politics of Exegesis: Essays in Honor of Norman K.
Gottwald on His Sixty-fifth Birthday (ed. David Jobling et. al.; Cleveland: Pilgrim, 1991),
259-60.
72Josephson, “Abductive Inference.”
73For a good, general comparison of deductive, inductive, and abductive logical
processes, see Miri Levin-Rozalis, “Searching for the Unknowable: A Process of
Detection—Abductive Research Generated by Projective Techniques,” IJQM 3 (2004):
6 ff. [cited 23-March-2006]. Online: http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/3_2/
pdf/rozalis.pdf.
74Linda Woodson, A Handbook of Modern Rhetorical Terms (Urbana, Ill.: National
Council of Teachers of English, 1979), 1, quoted in Elliott, GBS, 48.
75Elliott, GBS, 49; though Pilch and Malina (Handbook, xv) compare the values of
biblical times and places with those held by citizens of the United States.
264 TRINITY JOURNAL

documents in their appropriate time frame and setting and interpret

them in light of that information.76 In addition to this, social-scientific
criticism seeks to locate the biblical texts in their appropriate
geographical, social, and cultural contexts and interpret them in light
of that information.77 This places the biblical documents in the
agrarian society of the Circum-Mediterranean and ancient Near
Eastern worlds. Appropriate models, then, will analyze the biblical
texts in light of the cultural values and scripts of these worlds, as
reconstructed by historians, archaeologists, and socio-cultural
anthropologists.78 In general, appropriate models would seek to
identify and to explicate features from the Circum-Mediterranean
and ancient Near Eastern worlds such as:

ƒ worldview
ƒ societal structures
ƒ physical features
ƒ economic structures
ƒ political climate
ƒ behavior patterns, dress, and customs
ƒ religious practices, power centers, convictions, rituals, or
affiliations.79

6. Linguistic Presuppositions Regarding Texts

More specifically related to social-scientific exegesis are various

presumptions about how “text” is defined, as well as what are the
features, functions, situations, and strategies of a text.80
First, social-scientific criticism defines “text” as a “unit [sic] of
meaningful social discourse in either oral or written form.”81

76Cf. Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, Introduction, 179-83.

77Elliott, GBS, 49.
78“The goal of historical-cultural research is to reconstruct, or at least to
comprehend, the historical setting and cultural features of the specific passage as
clearly as possible” (Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, Introduction, 182 [italics theirs]).
79Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard (Introduction, 182) suggest these and provide a
brief description/examples of each of these categories.
80Elliott, GBS, 49.
81Ibid. See also the following who define “text” in a similar manner: M. A. K.
Halliday, Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning
(Baltimore, University Park Press, 1978), 108-9: “a text is a semantic unit”; M. A. K.
Halliday and Christian M. I. M. Matthiessen, An Introduction to Functional Grammar (3d
ed.; London: Arnold, 2004), 3 (hereafter, IFG): “the term ‘text’ refers to any instance of
language, in any medium, that makes sense to someone who knows the language”;
Gillian Brown and George Yule, Discourse Analysis (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983; reprinted, 2004), 6: “verbal record of a communicative act”;
Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity, 1989), 231-32; Bruce J. Malina “Reading Theory Perspective: Reading
Luke-Acts,” in Social World, 10 (hereafter “Reading Theory”): “unit of articulated
meaning in language.”
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 265

“Meaningful discourse”82 assumes a shared system of signification—

a social semiotic83—which determines the “meaning potential” or
range of possible meanings of language in a given social system.84
Language, then, is that which realizes or encodes the meanings
generated by and making up of the social system.85 Thus, Elliott may
assert, “the expression (form and content) and the meaning of a text
are relative to its historical and social location.”86
Given this definition of “text” and view of “meaningful
discourse,” a second assumption in this category arises: to determine
what texts meant in their original contexts (the task of exegesis)
necessarily requires the exegete to know as well as possible the social
and cultural systems from which the communication occurred.87 This
is especially important because the ancient Mediterranean world was
a “high context” society.88 A high context society is one in which
“people have been socialized into shared ways of perceiving and
acting,” thus “much can be assumed” in the transfer of meaning.89
Discourses from high context societies are not as likely to explicitly
communicate contextual details simply because they do not have to
do so. This makes it all the more important for interpreters (esp.
those from low context societies) to learn the social and cultural
systems of the biblical world.
A third presumption about texts is that they not only have
cognitive and affective dimensions, they also have an ideological
dimension.90 In other words, texts not only inform and evoke
emotional responses, they also fulfill a variety of social functions.

They can express cultural perceptions, values, and worldviews and

articulate the relation of persons to the other more abstract
dimensions of human experience: other persons and society, time,
space, nature, the universe, God. They can describe social relations,

82“Meaningful” here has to do with semantic content, and is not meant to be a

value judgment (as if so-called “chit chat,” as a precursor to an important discussion,
has no semantic content, but the important discussion does).
83Halliday (Social Semiotic, 123): “a system of meanings that constitutes the
‘reality’ of the culture”; further, it is “the higher-level system to which language is
related: the semantic system of language is a realization of the social semiotic.”
84M. A. K. Halliday, Explorations in the Functions of Language (ELS; ed. Peter
Doughty and Geoffrey Thornton; London: Edward Arnold, 1973; repr., 1981), 49.
85Malina, “Reading Theory,” 8. On this subject, see also Halliday, Social Semiotic,
122-24.
86Elliott, GBS, 50.
87Ibid.
88Malina, “Reading Theory,” 20. The concepts of high and low context societies
was developed by Edward T. Hall in Beyond Culture (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976)
and The Dance of Life: The Other Dimensions of Time (Garden City: Doubleday, 1983).
Both of these texts are cited in Malina’s essay.
89Malina, “Reading Theory,” 20.
90Elliott, GBS, 51. “Ideological” is not meant in the sense of false consciousness or
as a reference to Mannheim’s “unrealized situationally transcendent ideas.” Rather, it
refers to what Davis calls “an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values,
not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests of a group or class
at a particular time in history” (quoted in Elliott, Home, 12 and GBS, 52).
266 TRINITY JOURNAL

behavior, and institutions and explain how and why they work.
They can serve to motivate and direct social behavior. They can
conceptualize for groups faced with present deprivation a
compensation for current suffering later. They can legitimate social
institutions by tracing them back to ancient sacred or divine
origins. They can situate and integrate social phenomena
cosmologically within the social, cultural, and physical cosmos and
invest this cosmic order with coherence, plausibility, and ultimate
meaning.91

Fourth, alluded to above, the biblical texts are instruments of

communication with the following features: (1) they encode
(sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly) and express comments
about the social experience of the biblical world; (2) they imply or
explain the relationship between author and targeted audience/
readers; and (3) they organize the elements of the preceding features
into coherent discourses related to specific situations with the intent
to produce a specific effect (cognitive, affective, and/or behavioral).92
These features emphasize that the biblical texts have an occasion and
a purpose, or as Elliott prefers, a “situation” and a “strategy.”93
Elliott believes that the conventional terms “occasion” and
“purpose” do not accurately describe why the biblical texts were
written. Generally, occasion and purpose are thought of in terms of
“ideas needing reinforcement or misunderstandings requiring
correction.”94 “Situation,” as Elliott defines it, is meant to take into
consideration those social circumstances and interactions that
prompted the communiqué. Further, “strategy” implies that the
author did not merely have an intention or purpose, but the text he
produced was “specifically designed . . . not simply to communicate
ideas, but to move a specific audience to some form of concerted
action.”95

7. Social-Scientific Criticism Is Distinct From But Complementary to

Historical Approach

Typically, an historical approach focuses on the individual,

distinctive, or exceptional actors, actions, and properties found in a
text, as well as personal relationships and diachronic development.96
These are important and valuable aspects of a text upon which to
focus study. However, social-scientific criticism maintains that the
results of the historical approach can only come as one looks for
91Elliott, GBS, 51.
92Ibid., 53. On (1) see Halliday, Social Semiotic, 141 ff.; on (2) see Michael Hoey,
Textual Interaction: An Introduction to Written Discourse Analysis (London: Routledge,
2001), 11-43; on (3) see, e.g., Michael Stubbs, Discourse Analysis (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1983), 40 ff.
93Elliott, GBS, 54; see also idem, Home, 10-11.
94Elliott, GBS, 54.
95Ibid.
96Ibid., 55.
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 267

these things against the larger backdrop of social life.97 Extraordinary

actors and actions only stand out against regular patterns of
behavior. Distinctive personal relationships only stand out against
institutionalized and structured patterns of relationship. The
“movie” of diachronic change and development is made up of many
synchronic “frames.” The point is that both disciplines are necessary
if satisfactory interpretations of the biblical texts are going to be
produced.98

8. To Study “Religion” in the Bible Requires the Study of Social Structures

and Relations

Socio-cultural anthropology has helped give prominence to the

fact that “religion” in the Bible was not a free-standing institution as
in modern times. Instead, religion was “embedded” in the two
dominant institutions of kinship and politics.99 Malina concludes,

Just as there was domestic economy and political economy in the

first-century Mediterranean, but no economy pure and simple, so
also there was domestic religion and political religion, but no
religion pure and simple.100

So, rather than imposing modern ideas of religion and religious

phenomena upon the first-century Mediterranean context, social-
scientific critics seek to analyze religion as it was intertwined with
kinship and politics.101 This requires research into such topics as
relationships, power, conflict, and the like—all social phenomena
enmeshed in the fabric of life and social location.

9. Social-Scientific Critics Draw on the Full Range of Social-Science Theory

and Practice

Earlier in the discussion of models, three basic types of models

were said to exist at a fairly high level of abstraction (the structural
functionalist, the conflict, and the symbolic models).102 These models
were created by social-scientists from various branches of the social-
sciences such as sociology, psychology, and anthropology. To a
social-scientific critic, any of these theories and models, no matter
the social-scientific discipline from which they were derived, may be
employed in the study of the biblical texts and biblical world. Of key

97Ibid.
98Ibid., 57.
99Ibid. See also Elliott, “Temple Versus Household in Luke-Acts,” in Social World,
230 ff., and idem, Home, 165 ff.
100Quoted in Elliott, GBS, 57.
101See esp. Elliott, Home, 165 ff., where he analyzes the significance of oi-koj in
both religious and political contexts and how that significance should inform one’s
reading of 1 Peter.
102Elliott, GBS, 58, adds ethnomethodology and refers to “others.”
268 TRINITY JOURNAL

importance, then, is that social-scientific critics must always be

aware of the theories, methods, philosophical and developmental
differences among the various branches of social-science that stand
behind the basic models available for use.103 This means more than a
superficial knowledge of the social-sciences is required of
interpreters using this method.

10. Concern for Aggregated Meaning of the Biblical Documents

The final presupposition of social-scientific criticism is that it

holds the history of interpretation in high regard. Social-scientific
criticism “asks how and under what conditions the Bible continues
to be meaningful for modern readers.”104 It seeks to know how and
why the Bible has been interpreted in the ways it has; how and why
it was appropriated into liturgy, hymnody, prayer, creeds, and the
like.105 In seeking these answers social-scientific criticism seeks to
continue the rich legacy of exegetes and theologians that have gone
before.

B. The Method: Procedures and Practice

1. Phases

According to Elliott, there are two main phases in social-

scientific criticism. The first phase is the data collection and
organization phase.106 As is common in the social-sciences, this phase
is characterized by designing research, conducting the research, and
organizing the findings in preparation for the second, interpretive
phase (more below).
Research design is shaped by a hypothesis about particular
social properties of, in this case, the biblical world or the texts of the
biblical world. A hypothesis is a specific statement of prediction that
describes in concrete terms (as opposed to theoretical terms) what
one expects the results of the research to indicate.107 Generally,
hypotheses are formed by asking questions of empirical study that
has been done previously108—by setting out to evaluate109 previous

103Ibid. See also Schmidt, Sociology and New Testament Exegesis, 131-32.
104Elliott, GBS, 58.
105Ibid.
106Ibid., 60.
107William M. K. Trochim, The Research Methods Knowledge Base (2d ed.;
Cincinnati: Atomic Dog, 2001), 9. Technically, the hypothesis that is supported (the
prediction) is called the “alternative hypothesis,” and the remaining possible
outcomes are referred to as “null hypothesis.”
108Elliott, GBS, 60; Trochim, Research Methods, 25-26.
109Debate surrounds the terms “evaluate” and “assess” and whether or not they
can or should be used interchangeably. This paper uses the terms to refer to the same
thing. There are two types of assessment/evaluation: formative and summative.
Formative assessments/evaluations are those that seek to strengthen or improve,
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 269

theories/models or attempting to apply those theories/models in

new and constructive ways.110 The researcher then articulates the
hypothesis in a conceptual model, and in turn uses the model to
identify the source and scope of the items (in this case, social
properties) to be studied (and the criteria used to choose those
items), the relationship between those social properties, and the
specific methodological operations (the “steps”) to be followed when
research commences.111 This phase concludes when the findings of
the research are reported.112
The second phase is the synthetic (interpretive) phase. In this
phase, “the aim shifts from the description of social properties and
relations to the explanation of social properties and relations.”113 Here
one tests to see if the prediction (hypothesis) is supported by the
data. If the findings fit the model, the hypothesis (and the
accompanying model) is confirmed; if not, the hypothesis is
disconfirmed and the model must be modified or rejected. Figure 1
summarizes the basic research process.114

Figure 1: General Research Process

___________________________
while summative assessments/evaluations are those that examine outcomes or effects.
See Trochim, Research Methods, 32, for further discussion.
110Note the discussion above regarding the testing of models, as well as the
discussion about the heuristic value of models.
111Elliott, GBS, 60.
112On the “write up,” see Trochim, Research Methods, 317-25.
113Elliott, GBS, 61 (italics added).
114From ibid., 62.
270 TRINITY JOURNAL

These procedures may be applied to study of the socio-cultural

system from which the biblical documents were produced (e.g.,
institutions such as kinship relations or values and value objects like
honor and shame) or the social features and functions of the biblical
texts themselves. Since Elliott’s application falls more in the latter
realm, the sample application of the method will likewise deal
specifically with social-scientific exegesis.

2. Sample Application – 1 Peter

The purpose here is not to produce a fully-orbed exegesis, which

cannot be done due to space constraints; however, a brief sample
that focuses on the principles brought to the exegetical table by
social-scientific criticism is in order, especially as Elliott employs
them.115 This discussion will proceed as though the conventional
tasks of exegesis have already been completed (text, source, form,
etc.). Further, although there are two areas of social interaction that
might be studied, namely, a narrower field of interaction (author,
addressees, and their respective geographical and social locations)
and a wider field (how 1 Peter has been read and interpreted
throughout the history of its interpretation),116 the sample will of
necessity be confined to the narrower immediate field of interaction
and will focus even further on the situation of the letter based on the
addressees of the letter. If one desires a more thorough treatment,
Elliott has contributed many volumes to Petrine studies over the
years, and those may be consulted for a full treatment of 1 Peter.117

a. Determining situation and strategy

Before dealing specifically with the addressees and their

situation, it is beneficial to list the types of questions that are usually
asked when attempting to determine a document’s situation and
strategy (and their relationship). They are:118

1. Who are the explicitly mentioned or implied readers-hearers

of the document?
2. Who is the explicitly mentioned or implied author-sender of
the document?
3. How is the social situation described in the text?
4. How does the author(s) diagnose and evaluate the situation?
5. How is the strategy of the text evident in its genre, content
(stressed ideas, dominant terms and semantic fields,
115See esp. GBS, 70 ff.
116Ibid., 71-72.
117To name a few: Elliott, Home, 21-100; with R. A. Martin, James, I-II Peter/Jude
(ACNT; Minneapolis, Augsburg, 1982); idem, 1 Peter, 84-103 (esp. 94 ff.), 307-54. See
bibliographies there for Elliott’s other works on 1 Peter.
118Elliott, GBS, 72-75; also idem, Home, xxv-xxvi. In GBS (72), he lists a whole
series of related or sub-questions for each one listed here.
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 271

comparison and contrasts, traditions employed and

modified, semantic relations), and organization (syntax and
arrangement, line of thought and argumentation, integrating
themes, root metaphors, ideological point of view, and, in
narrative, the mode of emplotment of the story [romance,
satire, comedy, tragedy])?
6. What response does the author(s) seek from the targeted
audience (implicit or explicit)?
7. How does the author attempt to motivate and persuade the
audience?
8. What is the nature of the situation and strategy of the text as
seen from social-scientific etic perspective with the aid of
historical and comparative social-scientific research?
9. What are the self-interests and/or group interests that
motivated the author(s) in the production and publication of
this document?

Our sample application will attempt to answer question one.

b. The geographical and social profiles of the addressees of 1 Peter

(1) Geographical profile

The recipients of 1 Peter are explicitly mentioned in 1:1-2. They are

the “chosen strangers” (evklektoi/j parepidh,moij) who are
“dispersed” (diaspora/j) among the Roman provinces119 of Asia
Minor known as Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia
(see Map 1 below120). These provinces covered approximately
129,000 square miles of land, comparable to the size of California
(which covers approximately 159,000 square miles).121 The primary
area addressed was west and north of the Taurus mountains, and
most of the area, except Asia, was rural. Before becoming Roman
provinces, these lands were territories or independent kingdoms of
the Anatolians, but they were progressively taken over by Rome
during their eastward expansion which began around 133 BCE.122
That Pontus and Bithynia are listed separately by Peter is unusual
since the two were combined into a single province at the end of the
Third Mithridatic War (74-63 BCE), when the Roman General
Pompey defeated Mithridates IV.123 Perhaps the unlinking of the two
suggests the route Silvanus (1 Pet 5:12) would take to deliver the
letter.124

119As opposed to “regions.” Elliott, 1 Peter, 84; Home, 60; Karen Jobes, 1 Peter
(BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005), 19 ff.
120The map is from Elliott, 1 Peter, 85.
121Ibid., 84; Jobes, 1 Peter, 19.
122J. A. Harrill, “Asia Minor,” in DNTB, 131; Elliott, 1 Peter, 84; Jobes, 1 Peter, 20.
123Harrill, “Asia Minor,” 135; Elliott, 1 Peter, 87; idem, Home, 59-60; Jobes, 1 Peter,
21.
124Or it could reflect popular usage (cf. Acts 16:7; 18:2). Elliott, 1 Peter, 90-91.
272 TRINITY JOURNAL

Map 1: Asia Minor – Flavian Period (69-96 CE)

Given the fact the land was successively controlled by Persians,

Greeks, and Romans, but without complete political or cultural
unification,125 the nearly nine million people living in these areas126
comprised a sort of cultural melting pot. Further, the general
populace represented a diverse socio-ethnic makeup:

The population of these provinces included natives (local

aristocrats, administrators, and ordinary citizens), freed persons
(former slaves who had been manumitted [liberti]), a massive
number of slaves (douloi, oiketai, servi), as well as a sizeable number
of resident aliens (paroikoi, metoikoi, katoikoi), strangers passing
through (parepidēmoi, xenoi), a small number of Roman officials and
military veterans, and numerous Israelite communities that had
been accorded special rights and privileges (living according to
their own law, grants of land for farming and viticulture,
exemption from tithes on produce, and the protected right to send
an annual temple tax to Jerusalem; cf. Josephus, Ant. Books 14,
16).127

125Ibid., 86. Even while under Greek control, Hellenization only made partial
headway into Galatia (ibid., 86) and Pontus-Bithynia (ibid., 87), and Cappadocia was
the least Hellenized (ibid., 88).
126Elliott admits the difficulty in determining the population of the provinces,
but offers 8.5 million based on previous research (ibid., 84, 89).
127Elliott, 1 Peter, 88-89; cf. also idem, Home, 65-73.
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 273

There are many implications that are drawn from the

geographical location of the addressees alone that have a bearing on
how we read 1 Peter.128 (1) The vast expanse of territory in interior
Asia Minor mentioned in 1 Pet 1:1 indicates that Christianity had
spread rather extensively after the activity of Paul and before the
writing of 1 Peter. (2) The recipients most likely lived in the rural
sections of the region, given the rural feature of the geography and
the lack of mention of major cities (esp. those in Asia). (3) The
situation of the recipients of 1 Peter cannot be assumed to be the
same reflected in the writings of Paul, John, and Acts. These writings
addressed Hellenized urban areas of Asia, whereas 1 Peter appears
to address the inland and highland areas.129 The “social tension
between Christians and natives instead would have been typical of
the animosity regularly directed by natives against displaced and
foreign outsiders.”130 (4) The political, geographical, ethnic, and
cultural diversity suggest the heterogeneity of the addressees.

A movement with members of diverse regions, cultures, and

religious backgrounds presents the practical challenge of
establishing some sense of a singular social identity and promoting
an effective measure of social cohesion.131

Given the emphasis of 1 Peter on a common identity and solidarity,

it appears that Peter takes on this challenge. (5) The addressees of 1
Peter were most likely not from the mission field of Paul. Paul did
not campaign in Bithynia-Pontus or Cappadocia; further, he worked
in and wrote to urban communities; and his mission from the A.D.
50s reached only part of the territory described by 1 Pet 1:1 (Galatia).

(2) Social profile132

First, the recipients are addressed as “strangers” (parepi,dhmoi)

and “resident aliens” (pa,roikoi), which indicates to some extent the
precariousness of their “social status, whose social and legal rights
were curtailed, and who were frequently the object of suspicion,
slander, and abuse from the natives, who were endemically hostile
to strangers and suspicious of their commitments to local standards
of obligation and morality.”133 In Home For the Homeless, Elliott
argues that paroiki,a referred to an institution recognized by the

128The following list is adapted from Elliott, 1 Peter, 90-91; note that the
predominant logical process for determining the implications in the list is abductive
reasoning discussed above.
129Though Elliott (Home, 69), admits that “it is further likely that, while a
predominant number of the addressees are rurally located, the letter is intended for
Christians in the cities also.”
130Elliott, 1 Peter, 90.
131Ibid.
132Much of what follows in this section comes from Elliott, 1 Peter, 94-87; idem,
GBS, 75-76; idem, Home, 67-84.
133Elliott, GBS, 76; see also idem, 1 Peter, 94 and idem, Home, 67-68.
274 TRINITY JOURNAL

state which included underprivileged people and groups.134 Thus,

the term is one which described the legal, economic, and social
conditions of the addressees.135
Second, the letter assumes that all the recipients are constituents
of a worldwide “community” (avdelfo,thta, 1 Pet 2:17) of believers in
Jesus Christ, which they entered through conversion and baptism.
The members of this group or “sect” are called Cristianoi, (cf. 1 Pet
4:16). Further, the worldwide sect of Christians is a suffering group
(1 Pet 5:9).
Third, this local constituency addressed in the letter is itself
made up of diverse members. There are free people and slaves (2:16,
18-20); males and females (wives and husbands are addressed
directly in 3:1-7); older and younger people (5:1-5)136; and a mix of
converts137 (1:14, 17; 4:1-4) of both Gentile and Jewish origin.138
Fourth, 1 Peter presupposes that there was a body of faith, tenets
of worship, as well as Christian norms and values that were shared
not only by the recipients of the letter, but also by the author himself.
This presupposition pool allowed the author to communicate readily
with the believers from such a large area.
Fifth, the letter presumes that the recipients knew the Apostle
Peter139 and that they respected his authority (1:1; 5:1, 12). Moreover,
the recipients must have known Silvanus (5:12) and Mark (5:13), the
colleagues of Peter.
Finally, the situation or predicament of the recipients, as
presumed in the letter, was that they were a dispersed alien minority
within a larger, generally hostile society.140 The hostility toward the
believers was addressed as “suffering” in terms of slander (e.g., 3:16)
and “unjust suffering” (cf. 2:19). In general the social situation of the
addressees was tenuous and precarious.

(3) Concluding remarks

Having ever-so-briefly described the geographical and social

locations of the recipients of 1 Peter (barely skimming the surface, in

134Elliott, Home, 68.

135Ibid., 69.
136The relative ages (“younger” and “older”) may indicate biological ages or
length of time the people had been believers.
137I.e., not eyewitnesses of Jesus, but evangelized by missionaries (cf. 1:25).
138There is some debate about this last point. See Elliott, 1 Peter (95-96) and Jobes,
1 Peter (23-24) for a roundup of the issues. To me, the vast number of references to the
Scriptures and the vast amount of Jewish tradition and people tip the scales toward a
primarily Jewish Christian audience, though, given their location, there were probably
not a few Gentiles in the church, too.
139I will not address issues of authorship here. Either the letter was written by the
Apostle Peter directly, the Apostle Peter with the aid of Silvanus as an amanuensis, a
pseudonymous writer, or, as Elliott (1 Peter, 127-30) claims, by a “Petrine group” from
Rome. See ibid., 118-30 and Jobes, 1 Peter, 5 ff. for arguments for and against Petrine
authorship.
140Elliott, 1 Peter, 97; idem, GBS, 77-78.
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 275

fact) hopefully one can at least get an idea of the kinds of things that
social-scientific exegesis practitioners aim to ask about the text and
the world portrayed by the text. From this point, exegetes employing
social-scientific criticism would determine as best as possible the
strategy of 1 Peter from an etic perspective.141 Once the strategy is
determined, the exegete can seek to apply an appropriate model. For
example, Elliott has discerned that the emic information of 1 Peter
portrays Christianity as a “messianic sect”142 which was once a
faction within Judaism that had split off from its parent body both
socially and theologically (ideologically).143
From an etic perspective, Elliott uses a sect typology model to
identify the strategy of 1 Peter: “to empower and motivate its
addressees to meet the challenge posed by their abuse in society and
their unjust suffering.”144 It fulfills this strategy in three ways. First,
the letter affirms the distinctive collective identity of the believers by
focusing on their union with God through Jesus Christ and their
status as an “elect” and “holy” people of God (cf. 1:2; 1:3–2:10).145
Second, it encourages group solidarity and cohesion by presenting
obedience and subordination to God’s will (cf. 1:14, 17, 21; 2:13, 15,
18-20, 21; 3:17; 4:19; 5:6), loyalty to Christ (1:8; 2:7, 13; 3:15; 4:14, 16),
and constant love and mutual respect for other believers (cf. 1:22; 3:8;
4:8-11; 5:1-5).146 Finally, the letter promotes an enduring commitment
to God, Christ, and community in the following ways:147 (1) by
providing a rationale for innocent suffering (such is Christlike [2:21-
25; 3:13 to 4:6; 4:12-16]) and suffering as a “test” of loyalty (1:6; 4:12);
(2) by stressing hope of vindication and salvation through
relationship with the vindicated Christ (1:3-12, 18-21; 2:2-10, 24-25;
3:18–4.16, 12-19; 5:10-11); and (3) by depicting the Christian
community as a “community” (2:17; 5:9), a “household” of the
Spirit/God (2:5; 4:17), a “family” of God (1:3, 23; 2:2).

Christians, in other words, form a fictive kin group, a community

bound by the loyalties and reciprocal roles of the natural family—a
potent notion of community in a culture where religion is
embedded in kinship!148

141Elliott, GBS, 78-80.

142Or "conversionist sect" (cf. esp. Elliott, Home, chs. 2 and 3).
143Ibid., 80; Elliott, Home, 101-64; idem, 1 Peter, 97-108.
144Elliott, GBS, 81. Cf. esp. idem, Home, 101ff.
145Ibid.
146Ibid.
147Ibid., 82.
148Ibid.
276 TRINITY JOURNAL

V. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

A. Benefits and Contributions

Social-scientific criticism offers many potential benefits and

contributions to biblical studies. First, whereas traditional historical-
critical approaches to exegesis have provided insights into cause and
effect relations of a diachronic sort, social-scientific criticism offers
insights of a synchronic sort.149 In other words, social-scientific
criticism emphasizes how meaning is produced by humans
interacting with one another in a complex socio-cultural system.
Above the difference between historical approaches and social-
scientific approaches was described as being like the difference
between a “movie” and an individual “frame” of the movie strip.
Social-scientific criticism stops the movie’s film from moving and
focuses on individual frames, making it possible to identify and to
describe how that frame fits into the larger framework of the film.
Social-scientific criticism can also benefit biblical interpretation
by providing a way to fill in gaps where traditional historical
approaches may not be able to do so. For example, if a social-
scientific model (e.g., labeling and deviance theory) has been tested
on analogous data and proven valuable as a descriptive and heuristic
tool, that model may be able to help interpreters make better sense of
a text. Of course, as we shall mention below, there is a danger in
placing too much value on a model that has not been tested or that
has been shown to be lacking; thus, I emphasize the conditional
nature of this benefit. Models and the theories they represent are
hypotheses that must be thoroughly tested before they are fully
adopted.
Barton highlights a third benefit:

[Social-scientific criticism] offers a corrective to the strong tendency

to “theological docetism” in many circles, that is, to the assumption
that what is important about the NT are its theological
propositions, abstracted somehow from their literary and historical
setting, and that true understanding has to do with the
interpretation of words and ideas rather than, or to the neglect of,
the embodiment and performance of NT faith in the lives of the
people and communities from whom the text comes or for whom it
was written.150

The method provides a way to further understand the “world

behind the text” as well as the “narrative world within the text” and
ourselves as “culturally-embedded interpreters of the text.”151

149Stephen C. Barton, “Historical Criticism and Social-Scientific Perspectives in

New Testament Study” in Hearing the New Testament: Strategies for Interpretation (ed.
Joel B. Green; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 69 (hereafter, “Perspectives”).
150Ibid., 71.
151Barton, “Criticism,” 279.
DVORAK: SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CRITICISM 277

Finally, social-scientific criticism has provided some fresh air for

biblical studies that is capable of displacing the stagnant air of the
conventional historical-critical approaches to exegesis. It has done so
by “enlarging the agenda of interpretation”152 which allows
interpreters to ask new sets of questions of the biblical world and
texts and to produce models for more fully describing those entities.

B. Cautions and Limitations

1. Over-Interpretation

Any method of interpretation flirts with the danger of over-

interpreting a text, but social-scientific criticism may be more
susceptible to this trap if not closely scrutinized. One has to be very
careful when choosing or producing a model for interpreting the
biblical texts. Models are to be tested carefully against the text itself
as well as other hypotheses, and the interpreter must be willing to
modify the model or abandon it altogether if it is shown to be faulty.
A main reason for this is that interpretive models in social-scientific
criticism are largely devised by abductive (a.k.a., “retroductive”)
logic (see above). This logical process, though widely employed by
all people with capacities for reasoning, is ultimately a way of
“guessing” what factor(s) precipitated data that has been observed.
Abductive logic is not “bad,” but it must always be borne in mind
that one’s “guessing” may be wrong and may need adjustment.

2. Methodological Egoism

Related to the first limitation is the proneness of social-scientific

exegesis to claim too much about its contribution. Social-scientific
criticism, indeed, can offer fresh and illuminating approaches to
interpretation. However, social-scientific criticism is not the only
valid way of interpreting. Believing so ends up in “throwing the
baby out with the bath water,” dismissing many of the other
productive and enlightening methods that have come before social-
scientific criticism.153 On this point, Elliott’s view of social-scientific
criticism as co-existing and functioning in partnership with the more
traditional methods of interpretation is an appropriate attitude.

3. Anachronistic Fallacy

There is a very real danger inherent in using models developed

by a modern discipline like sociology to interpret the ancient world
and text of the Bible. In other words, some models are better at
eisegesis than exegesis. For example, the commentary on John’s

152Ibid.
153See Barton, “Perspectives,” 75.
 278 TRINITY JOURNAL

apocalypse by Malina and Pilch154 may serve as an example of an

interpretive model run amuck. There is not much from the text of
Revelation that supports the idea that John was an astral prophet or
that there was any relationship at all between the genre of the
Apocalypse and astronomy.155 The model they employ from a later
cultural situation seems to end up imposing a certain meaning back
onto the text of Revelation that the author most likely did not intend.
Social-scientific exegetes must always bear in mind that the text
being interpreted is also a primary source of information for learning
about the social and cultural location from which it was born. In this
sense, the text plays a role in the interpretation of itself.

VI. CONCLUSION

Though social-scientific criticism has limitations and is

susceptible to serious pitfalls, overall it is beneficial for the biblical
interpreter to add this method to his or her exegetical toolbox. If
employed, as Elliott prefers, in concert with the other conventional
methods of historical-critical interpretation (which may provide a
check and balance system), it can illuminate the text of Scripture for
the interpreter.

154Bruce J. Malina and John J. Pilch, Social-Science Commentary on the Book of

Revelation (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000).
155See the short review by Paul B. Duff in JR 81 (2001): 631-32 for these and other
criticisms.

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