LEARNING

Warren T. Wollman, Section Editor

Applying the “Cognitive Conflict”
Strategy for Conceptual
Change-Some Implications,
Difficulties, and Problems
AMOS DREYFUS, EHUD JUNGWIRTH, and RONIT ELIOVITCH
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Introduction
The implications of “constructivist” theories of conceptual change for instruc-
tional design have been vividly summed-up by various authors, (see for instance
Nussbaum & Novick, 1982; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Champagne,
Gunstone, & Klopfer, 1983; West & Pines, 1984; Driver & Bell, 1985). As a result,
science teachers seem to have been provided with explicit and applicable instructions
concerning the teaching of concepts and principles.
The main idea is, that in order to learn a new concept, pupils must be actively
involved in a process of reshaping and restructuring of their knowledge. The starting
point of the process of conceptual change is the students’ “naive knowledge,”
which, although often imprecise, poorly differentiated and different from the in-
tended scientific knowledge, “has served the student successfully” (Champagne et
al., 1983). At the first stage of the process of conceptual change, these precon-
ceptions must be identified. By means of a kind of socratic dialogue the students
analyze their views and are led to a confrontation between different perspectives
until-“flabbergasted students” are ready to “seriously reconsider the validity of
their original assumptions” (Champagne, et al., 1983). According to Posner, Strike,
Hewson, and Gertzog (1982), the phase of conflict, of dissatisfaction with existing
concepts is central to the process of conceptual change: only at this stage will
students realise that they must “replace or reorganise” their “central concepts,”
because they are “inadequate to allow him to grasp some new phenomenon suc-
cessfully;” to be successful, the new conceptions obtained in the last stage of the
process must be, from the point of view of the students, intelligible, plausible, and
fruitful (Posner et al., 1982). West and Pines (1984), have called the three main
stages of conceptual change “awareness, disequilibrium, and reformulating.” The

* This article is an expanded and somewhat altered version of a paper presented to the 1988 NARST
Conference.

Science Education 74(5): 555-569 (1990)

0 1990 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0036-8326/90/050555-15$04.00
556 DREYFUS, JUNGWIRTH, AND ELIOVITCH

teachers’ intervention is crucial at all the stages of the process described above:
they are the ones who are expected to lead the students to be “responsible,” (in
Driver and Bell’s terms, 1985), for the discarding or modifying of existing and (so
far) satisfying conceptions, and for their replacement by meaningful new ones.
This article will deal with some practical implications of the “instructions” pre-
sented above and with some difficulties and problems encountered while trying to
implement them. This study is naturalistic-qualitative and is intended mainly to
uncover and characterize problematic situations, nor to assess their relative fre-
quency.

Method
The opportunity to be involved in situations where we could try to induce con-
ceptual changes was provided within the framework of ongoing research projects
concerning misconceptions in biology. The misconceptions themselves had been
previously identified by means of written tests and interviews administered to a
population of 219 students during the first term of grade 10 (usually 16 years of
age) in secondary schools in Israel. All the students had been taught the relevant
topics in grade 9. (Dreyfus & Jungwirth, 1988,1989). At a later stage of the project,
now in progress, we endeavored to define the scientific level (see below) at which
the topics under study could be taught (if at all) to the experimental population.
For this purpose, a representative and stratified sample of 48 students from six
schools was selected. The sample was stratified according to students’ achievement
in biology, i.e., the marks given by the teachers, into three groups: upper, middle,
and lower achievers. The members of the sample were chosen by the class teachers
themselves as representative of the stratum to which they had been assigned. These
interviews became in fact minilessons given to small homogeneous groups (two to
four students, all belonging to the same stratum). The students were not aware of
having been selected according to their achievement, or at least were never made
explicitly or intentionally aware of this fact. The strategy used was the following:
one of the interviewers asked an open question of the type “a pupils says that;
what do you think about this statement?” The statement under consideration always
included a “misconception” which had been uncovered during the preceding stages
of the study, but no hint was given to the interviewees concerning its existence or
nature. When one of the students responded, a discussion was initiated, during
which the interviewers involved the students-when necessary-in situations of
cognitive conflict. All the interviews were conducted by at least two of the authors
of this article, so that all the stages of the interviews were simultaneously performed
by one interviewer and observed by the other. In this way, when the “active”
interviewer had apparently reached a dead end, the observing one was usually able
to suggest another opening, and they exchanged roles. All the pupils were required
to take part in the discussions by responding to questions they had been asked
personally and/or by reacting to the responses of their peers. In fact we always
requested them to express their opinions about their peers’ statements, suggestions
or tentative explanations. A verbatim protocol of the interviews was written down
but, according to the wishes of the interviewed students, no electronic recording
 APPLYING COGNITIVE CONFLICT STRATEGY 557

devices were used. The objectives of the interviews were (1) to identify and to
exemplify meaningful conflicts, and (2) to try to resolve the conflicts with the
students, at a level which would be both meaningful to the student and scientifically
acceptable.
Firstly, the type of knowledge which the students did, if at all, input into the
process, was considered. This knowledge was roughly classified into Strauss’s (1979)
two main categories: Experience-hound-common sense-knowledge “which is nei-
ther reflective nor self-conscious” and cultural knowledge “which goes beyond the
immediate and includes the postulation of models which have no direct counterpart
in one’s physical experience. It is self conscious knowledge . . . the knowledge one
constructs in laboratories or in one’s reflections about theories.” These categories
resemble closely the useful ones suggested by West and Pines (1984) (1) intuitive,
naive knowledge, (interaction with environment, influenced by language, culture);
(2) formal knowledge (someone else’s interpretation of the world), or even Caroll’s
(1964) types of school and out-of-school knowledge. The categories were not re-
garded as precisely delimited and mutually exclusive, but rather as the opposite
ends of a continuum, to which all the instances of students’ knowledge could be
referred.
After the students’ preconceptions had been uncovered, the interviews were
expected to provide the answers to three questions:
1 . Had the students reached the scientific level necessary to become involved in
a meaningful and relevant cognitive conflict in the specific case under consid-
eration? How could this conflict be formulated? By “students’ scientific level,”
we mean possession of the necessary scientific background, i.e., knowledge of
concepts and principles, and the ability to use them. By “meaningful conflict,”
we mean a conflict which brings about an actual state of dissatisfaction with
existing knowledge.
2 . Had the students reached the scientific level necessary to replace their precon-
ceptions by new, intelligible to them and scientifically acceptable concepts, in
the specific case under consideration? What would these be?
3. What was the impact of the new knowledge on what the students constructed
while using it independently? What happened when the students independently
used the newly acquired concepts?
Three patterns of occurences which were found to repeat themselves consistently
with different groups of students, will now be described below.

“ Experience-Bound Knowledge:” The Concept of Perspiration

One of the “minilessons” given to 10th grade students dealt with the heat reg-
ulation of the human body. The discussion was supposed to fit the students’ quite
rudimental scientific level. The only principle that the students were intended to
know, concerning the process of perspiration, was that the evaporation of sweat
has a cooling effect on the body. The lesson was not intended to spend time and
efforts on the factors which influence the rate of sweating. However, a deep mis-
conception was uncovered, slightly beyond the intended scope of the lesson:
On the sea coast of the central part of Israel, the summer is hot and very humid.
558 DREYFUS, JUNGWIRTH, AND ELlOVlTCH

As a consequence, sweat evaporates very slowly, especially in towns where the

wind is broken by high-rise buildings, and thus one continuously feels the sweat
on one’s body. In the southern desert of the Negev however, the temperature is
generally higher than on the coast, but in the very dry air, sweat evaporates quickly,
and the skin is normally quite dry.
This situation brought about the very common misconception that “you sweat
more in Tel-Aviv than in the Negev,” very often phrased as “you feel much better
in the Negev (true), because you sweat less (false).” The latter statement served
as a starting point for the interviews. All the students confirmed that the statement
was accurate and “common knowledge.” Then the interviewer intervened: (in the
excerpts presented below in detail, the interviewees belonged to the upper third)
Question: “What is “sweating?”
Answer: “The body loses water to cool itself.”
Question: “Where is the danger of dehydration greater, i.e. where does the body
lose more water?” In the Negev or in Tel-Aviv?
Answer: “In the Negev” (answer based on common sense, on everyday knowledge).
Question: “So if you sweat more in Tel-Aviv, why is it that in the desert you are
more in danger of dehydration?
This was a perfect conflict, between the perception of the concept by the students
and the facts they themselves knew, their personal knowledge. (The immediate
reaction, in all the interviews, was always: this is impossible! This was not a case
of semantics concerning the word “sweat;” the conflict was authentic).
Answer: It seems impossible. On one hand you sweat more, on the other hand
you lose less water!
Question: Would you like to suggest a different definition of sweating?
Answer: (thinking . . .) No . . . sweating is LOSING (emphasised) water to cool
the body.
Answer: So?
The new knowledge was easily constructed by the pupils: the humidity of the
skin was not considered any more to be a measure of the total amount of sweating.
It was now well understood that one can loose water even if one does not “feel
it” and that the total loss of water could better be measured by weighing the body.
Student, suddenly questioning: “So, how does one know if one is losing water, I
mean how much water you are losing?
Interviewer: “You certainly can find a method by yourself.”
Student “How much water can one lose . . .”
A discussion followed about the various situations and conditions in which
amounts of water were expressed in kilograms, and the students decided that
weighing could be a good way; this was finally confirmed by providing experimental
results from well known experiments which had been performed in the country.
The replacement of an experience-bound, intuitive concept by a more accurate
and formal one appeared to have been, in this case, relatively easy and not to have
 APPLYING COGNITIVE CONFLICT STRATEGY 559

required “radical restructuring” (Vosnadiou and Brewer, 1987). However, as hap-

pens very often, the concept had a life of its own and “performed” independently
of the expectation and of the intentions of the “teachers.” The active construction
of knowledge did not stop where it had been intended. It appeared immediately
that the students were uncritically forming new (mis)conceptions, based on their
new formal perception of the concept:
Student: “Since you lose less water in Tel-Aviv because the air is much more humid
. . . so at equal temperatures one sweats more in the desert because of the dry air,
. . . you do not lose much water in Tel-Aviv (you only feel as if you did), because
of the humidity of the air . . .”
Question: Did someone tell you that?
Answer: “No, but it is logical . . .”
Question: Did W E say that one loses less water in Tel-Aviv?”
Answer: (slightly disturbed . . .) But isn’t that true? The danger of dehydration is
after all (YOU SAID THAT!) greater in the desert . . .”
Sophisticated students, as the ones whose interview is reported here, went further
and suggested some excellent ideas about feed-back mechanisms of regulation of
the amount of sweating and about the very complex mechanisms of water regulation
in the human body, to which sweating is directly related. The main idea, which
was suggested clearly by several groups, was that a physiological mechanism, based
on “receptors in the skin, can feel if the water is evaporating, and that sweating
continues only when water is evaporating, otherwise it stops and this explains why
you do not lose so much water in Tel-Aviv.” Actually, these students were actively
developing, with an impressive display of logic and imagination, new conceptions
in areas in which they were lacking theoretical or empirical knowledge and which
had been considered by their class teachers to be beyond the scope of the lesson
or beyond the level of the students. Their formulations are not accurate scientific
knowledge. (Unfortunately although the suggested mechanism was properly in-
ferred logically, it is, in fact, not correct empirically.)
The sequence of events can be summed-up as follows: (1) The students were
able to reach a state of relevant and meaningful conflict (It is impossible that you
sweat more in Tel-Aviv. (2) They were also able to resolve it (You only feel as if
you were sweating more in Tel-Aviv, etc. Accurate results can be obtained by
weighing the body. . .). However, (3) new knowledge brought about independently
constructed new conceptions, at a higher level. (4) These new conceptions were not
always scientifically acceptable (Physiological mechanism based on a good idea-
receptors-and a loose use of the concept of feed back mechanism).
It would appear that while making decisions about the teaching of a scientific
topic, teachers cannot content themselves with the questions 1 and 2 asked above,
but must also consider (question 3) the impact of the new knowledge on what the
students construct while using it independently. The role of the teacher would be
to try to cope with such “chain reactions” between newly acquired formal knowl-
edge and newly formed conceptions. When students are actively building their own
knowledge, the direction, nature and scope of their intellectual activity cannot be
entirely predicted or controlled. The teacher should therefore try to plan for the
560 DREYFUS, JUNGWIRTH, AND ELlOVlTCH

unpredicted as well as for the predictable, i.e. be willing and able to invest time
in the uncovering, analysis, and treatment of unforeseen issues which may have
been previously considered to be relatively marginal. (Actually, had we stopped
the interviews at the stage where the students resolved the conflict, we would not
have uncovered the consequent new misconceptions). The role of the teacher may
be even more difficult in the case of treatment of totally cultural, formal knowledge,
as in the following case.

“Cultural Knowledge:” The Cell Membrane

The functioning of the cell membrane cannot be perceived by our senses and,
as far as the pupil is concerned, it is a “model which has no counterpart in one’s
physical experience” (Strauss, 1979). However the concept is central to any un-
derstanding of the living cell, and is therefore taught in ninth and tenth grade.
The interviews began at a point where the pupils said that “small things could
penetrate, but big ones could not,” and were consequently asked if the membrane
was just a sieve.
All the groups but one (of the upper level, who said straightforward that they
had no idea, had not been taught but refused to accept the suggestions of the other
students) suggested the following interesting mechanism of the functioning of the
cell membrane, which implies the idea of some knowledge, on the part of the cell,
of what is “good (important, desirable, useful) to it:” “The membrane IDENTI-
FIES, (others said RECOGNIZES,) the ‘things’ which are important to the cell
and lets them penetrate into the cell, but rejects all the others.” “The cell knows
what is good for it so it lets it penetrate and the membrane rejects the other things.”
The students were to be involved in two successive lines of conflict: the first,
intended only to shake the students’ satisfaction with their own theory, remained
at the common sense” level: Interviewer: “If the membrane functions in such a
way, a cell can never be poisoned, because it certainly does not need the poison.
Right?” The second line of conflict dealt directly with (and depended on) the main
conception of the students: the “identification” of food components by the cell
membrane.
The “poison” argument had always a striking effect on the confidence of the
students. However, their reaction depended on their level. A few lower achievers
seemed to stick to their ideas in spite of apparent surrender:
“Answer: “Well, there must be something else . . . I am sure that a body can be
poisoned” (conflict established).
Question: ‘‘Well, what would you suggest?”
Answer: “Well, you know, the cell does know how to choose because in most cases
it is not poisoned . . . there is no poison . . . and it takes only what it needs. . .”
Question: “So, would you say that the cell can make a decision?”
Answer: “Maybe the membrane, because it is selective”
Question: “Does the membrane make decisions? How?”
Answer: “I do not know, but it does, doesn’t it? We know that it is selective ...
I don’t know . . . somehow it does”
 APPLYING COGNITIVE CONFLICT STRATEGY 561

Question: “But then it may decide to accept a poison”

Answer: “I don’t know . . . maybe the poison kills the membrane first and then
the poison gets in. . .”.
(This, we must recognize, is in itself an impressively good idea.)
Question: “So, as long as the membrane is alive, it can make decisions? Does it
think?
Answer (smiling shyly): “No, maybe not really think, (conflict established) but
something like it, because it is selective and does not let everything go inside.”
A more common reaction (an idea actually suggested by five groups of different
levels) of students is shown in the following excerpts:
Question: “Can a cell think?”
Answer: (embarrassment, apologetical smile) “No, there must be another expla-
nation” (conflict).
Question: “So what do you mean by recognize?”
Answer: “I think something like immunity, like antibodies . . . they can recognize
enemies and destroy them . . . so maybe the cell recognizes what is bad for it and
its selective membrane knows it is an enemy, something not desirable. . . .”
(In another group: “it is like when you are vaccinated . . . your body learns to
recognize enemies”)
Question: “Does the cell have a memory, which remembers things which are good
and bad?”
Answer: “Yes.”
Question: “How?”
Answer: “I don’t know . . . We have not been taught (turning to peers: “Have
we;? all agree that they haven’t).
Question: “So if it had not previously met a certain kind of food, the membrane
would not know what to do with it?”
The pupils were very surprised by this question (they actually stated that they
had never thought about it). They did not like this idea. They reacted in the way
usual in situations of conflict “There must be another explanation. ”

A very “simple” idea emerged frequently during the discussions:

Answer: “It is ‘hereditary.’ It is transmitted with the genes. A cell knows what is
good and bad for it, this is a knowledge which comes by heredity.”
(in another group: “I think it is hereditary. Your body knows what is good for it
. . .”)
Question: “Would you say that if a cell met a type of food for the first time, it
would know by some instinct if it is good o r bad for it, and that the selective
membrane would act accordingly?”
Answer: “Yes, . . . instinct . . .”
Question: “Did someone teach you that in this way?”
Answer: “No, . . . we were only told about the size of the molecules . . . I never
thought about it”
562 DREYFUS, JUNGWIRTH, AND ELlOVlTCH

The discussion had to be quite subtle for the membrane does in fact “recognise”
certain molecules by means of chemical affinities (and the terms “recognition,”
“identification,” or “communication” are actually used in biochemistry).
However, the students never displayed any knowledge of the very complex
mechanisms which are suggested in the modern theories of the cell. As shown
above, they either actually applied every-day language, experience-bound, intuitive
conceptions of recognition to a formal scientific situation, or they used, in an
intuitive way, previously acquired formal situation, or they used, in an intuitive
way, previously acquired formal knowledge: recognition to them meant some
blurred type of psychological process (the cells, it appeared, made decisions about
what to eat and what not to eat), or of immunological processes (the membrane
had some kind of inborn or acquired memory-the nature of which remained
undefined-of useful and useless food components). A “radical restructuring” of
knowledge was required mainly to make some of the students change their phil-
osophical attitude towards physiological processes; the main conflicts were, as
frequently found in biological education, between the anthropomorphic-teleolog-
ical views of these students (Jungwirth, 1979), and the nature of the physiological
processes, as presented by the curriculum. When the students had reached the
stage at which they recognized that all their suggested explanations were unsound,
we found that AT T H E SCIENTIFIC LEVEL OF THE STUDENTS it was very
difficult to find any SATISFACTORY AND COMPREHENSIVE EXPLANA-
TION of the functioning of the membrane. Chemical affinities, electro-chemical
potential, purely chemical and physical laws had little appeal for students who had
just begun their chemical education. (In Israel, formal chemistry studies begin only
in tenth grade). They did accept such explanations as a result of the conflictual
situation in which none of their own explanations had appeared to be satisfactory;
they often shrugged, as if to say “if you say so” (Dreyfus & Jungwirth, 1989). The
only ones who accepted the new view with enthusiasm were the students who from
the beginning, had professed a complete lack of knowledge on the subject, but
hcd rejected all the explanations suggested by their peers (see above). Students:
“It is nice that you came . . . We were never told . . . we never understood . . .
it must be so . . . you see until you asked us we never thought about it.”
It may be of interest that this set of events was later reproduced with intact
classes and it was found that, a few weeks later, most of the students had returned
to the security of their old and (to them) satisfactory and somehow mysterious
explanations, insisting stubbornly that “you know quite well that in most cases the
cells take in only foods they need and this is a fact which shows that somehow the
membrane knows what is good for it . . . and how to do it.” However, they did
nor invest any further efforts in the subject, and thus did not develop any further
misconceived theories.
To summarize (1) Before being taught at school the students had had no knowl-
edge about this highly sophisticate topic. (2) Having been taught about it, the
students used intuitive knowledge to develop “satisfactory” but scientifically wrong
explanations. (e.g., the cell recognises, knows what is good for it, and the selective
membrane lets it penetrate). ( 3 ) These explanations filled the vacuum which had
been left by the teaching (too difficult, beyond level of students). By their own
 APPLYING COGNITIVE CONFLICT STRATEGY 563

testimony, the students felt no need for further elaboration (explanation “satis-
factory”). (4)When put in a situation of conflict, the students became dissatisfied
(question 1: meaningful conflict possible) with their own theories and recognised
the need for better ones; however, ( 5 ) at their scientific level, they were (question
2) unable to construct satisfactory and comprehensive theories, they constructed
explanations such as immunological memory and hereditary knowledge, which were
not very different from their old ones, showing the same philosophical approach
to physiological mechanisms, and ultimately some of them reverted to their pre-
conceptions and refused to be budged. ( 6 ) Finally (question 3) they showed no
tendency to ask further questions on the subject. The “chain reaction” stopped at
a point where the students felt satisfied, i.e., felt no need to ask and answer further
questions.
Having answered all three questions, as regards the “Cell Membrane,” we could
now proceed to make suggestions to curriculum developers concerning the teaching
of this subject at the ninth or tenth grade level in Israel: (1) since the students
lacked the prerequisite scientific level necessary to replace their preconceptions by
new, intelligible and scientifically acceptable ones, (questions 1, ability to reach a
meaningful conflict, and 2, ability to solve it in an acceptable way), (2) and since
these preconceptions were a consequence of having been taught the topic, (3) and
since the students did not actively tend to progress in the subject (no drive toward
further inquiry, question 3), therefore the question must be asked: was it wise to
attempt to teach these ninth or tenth graders diluted versions of the physical and
chemical mechanisms of the functioning of the cell membrane at all? In our own
view the answer may be negative. We further suggest that the tendency of the
students to stick to their “satisfactory” (but scientifically unacceptable) explanations
even after being exposed to a “meaningful conflict,” may be a consequence of
teachers’ tendency to attempt to explain the unexplainable (at the cognitive level
of the students). Concerning the cell membrane, a sound decision strategy MAY
therefore be to try to teach only the results and implications of its functioning, and
not its biophysical and biochemical processes. This is actually the subject of further
investigations and experimentation, in which our team is currently involved.

The Highly Formal Aspects of Experience-Bound Knowledge:

The Transmission of Hereditary Traits
It is common knowledge that hereditary traits are transmitted from parents to
children; daily experience shows likeness between siblings and other relatives. O n
the other hand, daily experience shows nothing about the mechanism of transmis-
sion. Concept-formation about the mechanism of transmission is based on the
formal understanding of abstract concepts such as genes, alleles, and nucleic acids,
the functioning of which cannot be perceived by the senses.
The main misconceptions found during the interviews, reproduced theories which
had been held by distinguished scientists in the 19th century (see Mayr, 1982), such
as “similar” genetic units, “soft” inheritance (genetic material not constant) and
unequal distribution of the genetic material to daughter cells (to explain differ-
entiation).
564 DREYFUS, JUNGWIRTH, AND ELIOVITCH

The “attractive” analogy between “ontogeny and phylogeny” of scientific con-

cepts has often been reported and analysed (Nussbaum, 1983). In McCloskey (1983)
words, students’ misconceptions appear” to be grounded in a systematic intuitive
theory that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles” of science as known
and taught nowadays.
Thus when our interviewees said that “it does not matter how many times the
cell divides, as long as a little bit of hereditary material remains it will be enough;”
or that differentiation comes from unequal division of the cell-nucleus: “Well . . .
when a cell divides . . . and the two cells which come out from the division are
different, it means . . . well it can mean only one thing . . . that one cell got one
part of the code and the other cell another part . . . ;” or suggested that:
“I don’t know exactly but at the beginning all the code is the same so that all the
cells receive the same hereditary information . . . so I think it must change . . .
you know . . . I think there are hormones who can do that . . . yes maybe it . . .
yes maybe it is hormones, maybe they do change the words of the code . . . ;”
these interesting misconceptions could not be put in conflict with the students’
experience or common sense (as in the case of the concept of sweating), but were
“systematically grounded in it.”
The only way to bring the students to a state of dissatisfaction was therefore to
cause a conflict between their theories and their own previously learned formal
knowledge about chromosomes, mitosis, etc., and/or in some cases, with knowl-
edge about plant propagation and tissue cultures:
Question: “According to this theory, the code which transmits the information is
changed when cells become different tissues . . .”
Answer: “It looks like it, doesn’t it? Because the cells of different tissues are
different, so there must be a different code . . . the orders come from the code

Question: “Do you know that plants can be reproduced vegetatively, ‘asexually’
. . . i.e., that you can take a cutting and plant it?”
Answer: “Yes, everyone knows that . . .”
Question: “But you obtain a complete plant from a cutting who comes only from
a stem . . . if the code had changed when the cells became cells of a stem, you
could never have obtained a full plant from a bit of stem, could you?
Answer: (apparently very surprised, frowning, other interviewees silent, watching
the exchange intently) “You are right . . . I never thought about that . . . you see
we did not learn that . . . we never . . . were asked this question . . . but you are
right”
Such conflicts could be and were established. With pupils who knew about tissue
culture the effect was even more striking. However, these conflicts did not always
function as expected. Very often the students failed to reject their previous knowl-
edge, which they tended to use even after having apparently “learned” the intended
one.
After accepting the idea that parts of a common code could be activated and
 APPLYING COGNITIVE CONFLICT STRATEGY 565

other repressed, a theory which satisfied apparently all the demands of the conflict,
some students apparently did not like it.
The reasons for failure to accept the new knowledge, and the expressions of
rejection of the new knowledge were of different types, as will be shown below.

Accepting and not Accepting New Knowledge

As Carol1 (1964) remarked, pure “school-concepts” are difficult to teach because
they are complex notions which are themselves based on complex notions. There-
fore, the success of an “abstract conflict” such as the one mentioned above will
depend, first, on the ‘‘functionality’’ of the existing formal knowledge of the stu-
dents (Dreyfus & Jungwirth, 1987). If the students do not realise that their theory
is in contradiction with their own existing knowledge, then that knowledge does
not function and there can be no conflict. But even when knowledge appears to
function, “although students may successfully construct an intended meaning, they
may be reluctant to accept it or to believe it” (Driver & Bell, 1985).
Learning should not be seen only as an activity, but also as an attitude. In
confrontations between well established, “satisfactory” experience-bound knowl-
edge, and formal knowledge, we found that very often the formal knowledge lacked
the impact and the reality of common-sense knowledge. Many students did neither
“believe” nor “not believe” school knowledge, they were non-committed to it.
They did not really reject new school knowledge, they just preferred to use their
preconceptions, which they found more “comfortable.” They often shrugged with
a charming indifferent smile, indicating that, as far as they were concerned, there
was a real world, in which they were personally involved, and a world of school
learning, which had no reality in true life. Therefore, knowledge obtained at school
could not meaningfully replace knowledge from the “true world.” It is difficult to
describe in writing the reaction of such students, which should be seen rather than
been told about, but their main characteristic was that they were definitely neither
“flabbergasted,” nor quite surprised. They were just indifferent. The most typical
response of this kind was the one of a group of pupils who told us “well . . . if
you say so, it must surely be true, because you know . . . you come from the
university.” For that type of students, preconceptions may be “barriers rather than
springboards” (Harlen, 1983).
Another kind of attitude which we found to be crucial to constructive learning
was the attitude of the student towards school-tusks. Bright successful students
reacted enthusiastically to cognitive conflicts. They liked the “flabbergasting effect”
of the method and the confrontation with new problems. This was indeed the
attitude which could be expected from bright students (Wallace & Adams, 1985).
Unsuccessful students cannot a priori be expected to like conflicts. For reasons
which have been considered to be psychological (Frankenstein, 1970) or sociological
(Ginzburg, 1972), they have been shown to develop negative self-images, negative
attitudes toward school and school tasks and high levels of anxiety. Their behavior
at school is often irrelevant to the tasks and aimed only at obtaining positive
reinforcements from the teacher. Anxious, feeling unsafe and threatened, they
566 DREYFUS, JUNGWIRTH, AND ELlOVlTCH

tried to avoid the conflicts. They were most characteristically apologetical when
confronted with a conflict which, to them, seemed to represent just another failure.
Actually, in spite of the fact that they were often able to understand the subject
matter, they did not take an active part in the process of constructing their knowl-
edge. Again, the whole attitude of the students would be better visually shown
than just represented by their answers:
“Right, you can obtain a whole plant, but we have not been taught . . . you cannot
blame us”
“Blame you for what?”
“For not knowing. . . .”
“No one can blame you and no one is blaming you. We know that you have not
been taught. We ask you only about things you have not been taught, and you are
doing quite well . . .”
“. . . No response . . .”
“So, (first name), what do you think? If you can obtain a whole plant from a bit
of twig? do you think the code is different in the twig from the code in other parts
of the plant?”
“No, it must be the same . . . (agreement from the others)”
“You are absolutely right. It must be the same. Now, how would you explain that
to one of your friends who just ten minutes ago told us that they must be different,
i.e., that they have changed when the twig became a twig?”
“He was wrong was he?”
“Yes. . . .”
“Well, . . . you see, we have not learned it. We cannot know.”
(With this group and at least another one from the lower level, we obtained that
type of reaction on all the topics discussed).
“But why did you say that the code must be the same . . . ?”
“(Sudden decision, speaks with great determination) Because if a whole plant got
out of the twig, it must have had all the code otherwise it would have made only
another twig, right?”

(excellent explanation, so the topic is apparently not beyond the ken of these
pupils).
“Exactly! . . . Now let’s come back to the beginning. When cells divide, d o they
transmit all the information to each of the daughter cells or only part of it?”
“All the information”
“Why d o you say so?”
“We have been taught in genetics . . . that it is so . . .”
“Could you not explain it with what you know?”
“. . . No response. . . .”
 APPLYING COGNITIVE CONFLICT STRATEGY 567

“Is it possible that only a part of the information is transmitted to the daughter
cells in each division?”
“This is not in the syllabus . . . I do not think our class knows such things . . . We
are good in biology and we do not know such things.”
As long as such students are not induced to change their attitudes toward school
learning, and this may be a complex “rehabilitating” enterprise (Eiger, 1975), their
first stage in conceptual change will have to be a convincing conflict, rooted in
experience bound knowledge, and presented in such a way as not to emotionally
disturb the students. This is because first of all, such students must overcome this
obstacle to further learning. Our team is now engaged in a search for contexts in
which such conflicts can be produced.

Conclusion
Decisions about what and at which level to teach scientific topics may be based
on the principles of conceptual change. The parameters of the decision are: (1)
the type of knowledge which the students input into the prices, (2) their ability to
reach a stage of meaningful conflict, ( 3 ) their ability to resolve the conflict in a
scientifically acceptable way, (4) the impact of the new knowledge on what the
students construct while using it independently, and ( 5 ) the attitudes of the students
toward school tasks and school knowledge, attitudes on which may depend their
ability to be involved successfully in an active constructive process of learning.
The basic problem appears to be the ability of the pupils to reach a state of
meaningful conflict. They may not do so for various reasons which, while relevant,
were not investigated in this study: difficulties in formal reasoning with abstract
concepts (Lawson, 1985); poor understanding of conceptual data which they are
expected to have mastered (Stewart 1985); decisions of teachers not to deal with
some prerequisite concepts, or unawareness of teachers concerning students’ lack
of prerequisite knowledge (Dreyfus & Jungwirth, 1989). On the other hand, this
study demonstrates starkly that even meaningful conflicts are not always successful,
in the sense that they do not always ensure the construction of the required knowl-
edge and/or only of the desired knowledge.
Highly meaningful conflicts may easily be designed when the knowledge that the
students input into the process is “experienced bound.” In such cases, however,
the students may become quite involved in the process and go beyond the intention
of the teacher, thus independently constructing new conceptions which very often
are not scientifically acceptable. Teachers must become aware of these creations
of the minds of the students; they must therefore plan their activities so as to have
the opportunity and the time to uncover and analyze them. Basically, it means that
the students, at some stages of the lesson, must have the opportunity to express
themselves more or less freely, otherwise the unpredicted will remain unperceived.
When the input knowledge is “cultural,” or pure “school knowledge,” i.e., has
no counterpart in the experience of the student, meaningful conflicts can still be
established. However, they can be very difficult, if not impossible, to resolve at
568 DREYFUS, JUNGWIRTH, AND ELlOVlTCH

the scientific level of the students. If a solution is proposed at a level which is

beyond that of the students, it will remain meaningless to them a n d the effect of
the conflict will be lost. Teachers a r e thus confronted with the difficult issue of
finding a context in which both the conflict and the solution are meaningful to the
student. They should realize that not everything is explainable t o all the students
in terms of the leading scientific theories, a n d that information may be presented
meaningfully without being entirely based, e.g., o n complex physico-chemical prin-
ciples. If neither conflict nor solution can be made meaningful, the total omission
of a topic, o r at least certain aspects of it, should be considered.
When highly formal knowledge, i.e., cultural knowledge which itself is based o n
cultural, abstract knowledge, has everyday implications which a r e known to stu-
dents, they may tend to use their common sense in a way which leads t o miscon-
ceptions. Because such misconceptions are common sense, they a r e not easily put
in conflict with pupil’s personal conceptions. They must b e put in contradiction
with the formal knowledge of the students. Such conflicts may lack impact with
certain types of students.
Students may be classified according to their attitudes towards school knowledge
and school tasks. When school knowledge is perceived as “not truly real,” as
compared with everyday knowledge, the efficacy of a n otherwise meaningful con-
flict may be impaired. Also, teachers may find it difficult t o use the cognitive
strategy with students who tend to feel unsafe and threatened in situations of
conflict. o r uncertainty. T h e successful application of this strategy may therefore
depend not only on cognitive, but also on affective parameters.

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Accepted for publication 21 September 1989