UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Law 124 – Crim.

Pro
Omlang Prof. Gonzales
Alimpoos v. CA
G.R. No. L-27331. July 30, 1981
1st division | Melencio-Herrera J.

Parties:
Petitioner: Eliseo Alimpoos, Ciriaca Alimpoos, Sgt. Millardo M. Pates, Pedro Respondent: Court of Appeals
Baclay, Catalino Yamilo, Rafael Capangpangan, Dalmacio Ygot, and
Eufrocina Estores

Doctrine: A writ of Habeas Corpus cannot function as a writ of error. Furthermore, there is a general rule that a writ of
habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to another general
remedy, such as appeal or writ of error. In this case, Reynaldo had other remedies available: petition to quash the warrant of
arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.

FACTS OF THE CASE

• Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by
the Municipal Judge in a Criminal Case for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. The owner of the house
robbed were Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos, who are the petitioners in the present case.
• Reynaldo contended that the Warrant was issued without observing the legal requirements for the issuance thereof. He
and his wife instituted a Habeas Corpus case before the trial court. Named as defendants in the said complaint were the
petitioners in this case, and their witnesses. In the amended complaint, the two arresting policemen, the Chief of Police,
and the Municipal Judge were added as co-defendants. Reynaldo’s complaint was premised on the alleged violation of
Arts. 32(4), (8), (15), (16), (17), and (19) of the Civil Code, and Art. 269 of the RPC.
o Reynaldo prayed that he be released from detention. He also prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to enjoin the petitioners, the witnesses, the Municipal Judge, and/or their representatives, from
proceeding with the Criminal Case. Reynaldo also prayed for damages (actual, moral, exemplary, attorney’s fees).
• The trial judge issued an order granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. This
is despite the contention of the petitioners that they had nothing to do with Reynaldo’s detention and arrest.
• The Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the Order on Mar. 31, 1966. He then moved for extension of time within
which to appeal, but he eventually desisted from doing so.
• Meanwhile, one of herein petitioners, Elicio Alimpoos, received a copy of the Order on Mar. 31, 1966. He then handed
this to their counsel on Apr. 4, 1966. The counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on the same date when it received a copy of
the Order. However, the trial judge dismissed the appeal for having been filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period.
• Counsel of the petitioner claims that they received a copy of the Order only on Apr. 4, 1966, and right after receipt,
filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioners, on the other hand, filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, but the latter
also dismissed the appeal. The CA said that the petitioners’ counsel should have been notified on the same day that the
petitioner received the copy of the Order. Hence, this case.

ISSUE/S & RATIO

1. W/N the CA erred in holding that herein petitioners’ appeal was interposed beyond the reglementary period. –
YES
• While Eliseo Alimpoos received a copy of the Order on Mar. 31, 1966, such date cannot be deemed as notice in law to
his counsel. The date as to when the counsel received a copy of the Order, must be deemed as the date of notice to said
counsel. In this case, the counsel received the copy on Apr. 4, 1966, and lost no time in mailing his Notice of Appeal on
the same day. Procedurally, the appeal was seasonably filed.

2. W/N the Habeas Corpus proceeding was proper. – NO

• A habeas corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties. It is an inquisition by the government, at the suggestion
and instance of an individual, most probably, but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign. Reynaldo should have
limited his complaint against the Chief of Police, the person having him in alleged illegal custody.
• It was not the proper remedy for the accused. A writ of Habeas Corpus cannot function as a writ of error.
Furthermore, there is a general rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could
have been procured by resort to another general remedy, such as appeal or writ of error. In this case, Reynaldo had
other remedies available: petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of the case by the
respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
• It is to be noted that the Order contains a provision enjoining the prosecution of Reynaldo in the Criminal Case
(Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries). If Reynaldo was illegally detained and was arrested without a
preliminary examination, what should have been done was to set aside the warrant of arrest and order the discharge of
the Accused, but without enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Law 124 – Crim. Pro
Omlang Prof. Gonzales
properly issuing a warrant of arrest. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not meant to determine criminal
responsibility.

When a preliminary investigation is not held, or is improperly held, the procedure is not to dismiss the case, or enjoin
its prosecution, but to have the preliminary investigation conducted.

• Reynaldo challenged the personality of the petitioners to interpose appeal. Sec. 19 of Rule 41 states that if the detention
is by reason of civil proceedings, the party in interest or the person who caused the detention shall be entitled to control
the appeal. However, if the detention was by virtue of criminal proceedings, the provincial fiscal or the city fiscal, is
entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the government, subject to the right of the Solicitor General to intervene. In
this case, the habeas corpus proceeding arose by virtue of criminal proceedings in the Criminal Case.

Pursuant to the rule, it was the Provincial Fiscal who was entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the Government. In
this case, although the Provincial Fiscal filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal" on Apr. 1, 1966, he
had nevertheless desisted from it. Neither did he take steps for the reconsideration of respondent Trial Judge's Order of
Apr. 23, 1966, dismissing the appeal. The inaction of the Fiscal may be deemed to have been an admission on his part
of the unmeritoriousness of an appeal.

As in criminal proceedings, his sound discretion on the matter should be deemed controlling, and it has to be held that
the petitioners were bereft of personality to prosecute the appeal, especially an appeal from a judicial Order granting a
Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the release of a person detained.

RULING
Note: the SC did not act on this case as a proper Habeas Corpus proceeding, given the reasons under Issue #2. The Warrant
of Arrest against Reynaldo, the dismissal Order of the RTC, and the decision of the CA are SET ASIDE. The proceedings
in the last two cases are INVALIDATED.