1

CASE DOCTRINES ON RULES

38, 47 and 39
REMEDIES AGAINST EXECUTORY JUDGMENT
A. Relief from judgment (R38)
MESINA vs. MEER
G. R. No. 146845 Jul 2, 2002

1) Under Rule 38, an appellant whose appeal in the

CA has been denied may not file a petition for relief from
judgment alleging the he was prevented from presenting his
case in the MTC, the court of origin, by extrinsic fraud,
mistake and excusable negligence. Rule 38 applies only to
judgments rendered by the RTC or MTC, not the CA in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is

allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present.
Where the defendant has other available or adequate
remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the
adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.

THE PROV’L GOVT. OF AURORA vs. MARCO

G. R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015

1) The remedy of a petition for relief from judgment is

not among those provided under the Uniform Rules on
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Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. This means that

the remedy is not allowed under civil service rules.

2) The rule that no appeal may taken from an order of

execution applies to the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission directing the execution of its final order. Thus,
the CA, pursuant to Section 1(i) of Rule 50, should have
dismissed the petition for relief filed by the aggrieved party
seeking the reversal of the resolution of the CSC directing
the execution of its final order. The proper remedy for the
aggrieved party would have been a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.

The rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution

is based on the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
Under this doctrine, a final and executory judgment "is
removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke
it." The judgment remains immutable even if it is later on
discovered to be erroneous. The doctrine "is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments
of the courts must become final at some definite date fixed
by law. To allow courts to amend final [and executory]
judgments will result in endless litigation."

3) The doctrine of immutability of final judgments

applies to decisions rendered by the Civil Service
Commission. A decision of the Civil Service Commission
becomes final and executory if no motion for
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reconsideration is filed within the 15-day reglementary

period under Rule VI, Section 80 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

THOMASITES (TCIS) vs. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 203642 January 18, 2016

1) Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law

to any person against whom a decision or order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
It is a remedy, equitable in character, that is allowed only in
exceptional cases when there is no other available or
adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available to him, which may either be a motion for new
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court,
and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail of the remedy of petition for
relief.

2) As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of

Court, a party filing a petition for relief from judgment
must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary
periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60)
days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other
proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed
period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order
or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is
required because a petition for relief from judgment is a
final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy
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cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental

principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at
some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to
litigation.

B. Annulment of judgment of the RTC (R47)

DIONA vs. BALANGUE
G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013

1) A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule

47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on
his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not
available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to
the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same.
"The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that
annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality
of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime
and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become
final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to
rest."
2) While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based
only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process
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as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v.

Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and
executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere
inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for
having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law.
2) It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not
prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being
sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without
first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof.
Due process considerations require that judgments must
conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence
presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Teston,36 this Court expounded that:
The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that
may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the
defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be
declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be
accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that
sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind
Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard
defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and
arbitrarily issued judgment.
3) Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of
competence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the
rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of
his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the
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lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain

their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of
their client’s property without due process of law. In which
case, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client
who suffered thereby.
YUK LING ONG vs. CO
G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015

1) Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for Annulment of

Judgment RTC under Rule 47 pertains to either the RTC’s
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or its
failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The former is a matter of substantive law
because it is only by law that courts are conferred
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The latter is
a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of
summons or other processes on the defendant by which the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
In the instant case, the SC declared the judgment of
the RTC in a case for nullity of marriage null and void for
failure of the process sever to effect proper substituted
service of summons on the defendant in accordance with
Manotoc vs. CA.
2) Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there
is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2 of Rule
47 provides for two grounds for annulment of judgment,
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that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment

of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a
party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that
has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to
be discharged from the burden of being bound to a
judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.

LASALA vs. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY

GR No. 171582 Aug 19, 2015

1) Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for Annulment of

Judgment under Rule 47 pertains only to the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It does not
include a situation where the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, a petition for annulment may not be filed on the
ground that, in rendering the subject judgment, the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion.

In a petition for annulment based on lack of

jurisdiction, the petitioner cannot rely on jurisdictional
defect due to grave abuse of discretion, but on absolute
lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction
as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the SC affirmed the decision of the

CA granting the petition for annulment of the decision of
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the RTC granting the defendant’s counterclaim on the

ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
counterclaim. The records showed that the counterclaim
was permissive and the defendant failed to pay the requisite
docket fees.

2) Extrinsic fraud in a petition for annulment refers to

"any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, where the
defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such
as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false
promise of a compromise, or where his own lawyer
fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat.”

The rule is that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence

does not amount to extrinsic fraud that would be a ground
for a petition for annulment. Where the lawyer’s
negligence, however, is so gross that it amounts to
collusion with the prevailing party then it becomes extrinsic
fraud.

In Bayog v. Natino, for instance, it was held that the

unconscionable failure of a lawyer to inform his client of
his receipt of the trial court's order and the motion for
execution, and to take the appropriate action against either
or both to protect his client's rights amounted to
connivance with the prevailing party, which constituted
extrinsic fraud.
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3) To determine if a counterclaim is compulsory, the

following tests apply: (a) Are the issues of fact and law
raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same?; (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule?; (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's
counterclaim?; and (d) Is there any logical relation between
the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all
four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.[51] Otherwise, it is permissive.

MANGUBAT vs. MORGA-SEVA

GR No. 202611, Nov 23, 2015
1) In a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an
abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no
jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it
with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

2) A distinction must be made between lack of

jurisdiction and error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
If the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors
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which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction

are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject
of an appeal. It is lack of jurisdiction not error in the
exercise of jurisdiction that is a ground for annulment of
judgment.

3) Even if the claim of lack of jurisdiction is well-

grounded, the petition for annulment may still be properly
denied if it is shown that petitioner is already barred by
laches from raising it as a ground. In instant case, the
petitioner was deemed barred by laches because he waited
four years from the finality of the assailed order before he
petitioned for its annulment. Records show that petitioner
did not lack opportunities to file the petition much earlier.

4) Only judgments or final orders, not interlocutory

orders, may be the subject of a petition for annulment under
Rule 47.
SIBAL vs. BUQUEL
G.R. No. 197825 January 11, 2016

1) Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of

annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. Fraud is
extrinsic when the aggrieved party has been prevented from
fully presenting his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently
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or without authority connives with the adverse party at his

defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case
are reasons for which a petition may be filed to set aside
and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new
and fair hearing.
As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic
fraud must arise from an act of the adverse party, and the
fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the
petitioner of its d ay in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if
the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.

EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION

OF JUDGMENT (R39)

A. Kinds of execution

BAÑEZ vs. BAÑEZ

G.R. No. 132592/133628 January 23, 2002

1) As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution

pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances
demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result
from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being
an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well
become a tool of oppression and inequity.
In other words, when superior and urgent reasons exist
warranting execution pending appeal and such superior and
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urgent reasons outweighs the possible damages that the

appellant may suffer by reason of such execution pending
appeal, then the motion for execution pending appeal
should be granted.
2) In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court
of Appeals, it was held that “xxx Multiple appeals are
allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of
property with accounting, in actions for partition of
property with accounting, in the special civil actions of
eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale
behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is
to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a
separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and
held to be final.
In an action for legal separation, multiple apples are
not allowed. The issues involved in an action for legal
separation necessarily relates to the same marital
relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately,
dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children,
follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not
separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the
court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of
legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal
separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple
appeals.
SANTOS vs. COMELEC
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G. R. No. 235058 September 4, 2018

1) It is a general rule that the writ of execution should

conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be
executed, and that the execution is void if it is in excess of
and beyond the original judgment or award, for it is a
settled general principle that a writ of execution must
conform strictly to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated.[37] Nonetheless, the Court had held
that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face
of the decision, but extends as well to those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.

2) The better approach would be to allow the crediting

of the votes of the nuisance candidate to the legitimate
candidate, who have similar names, regardless whether
the decision or resolution of the COMELEC became
final and executory before or after the elections. In that
way, the will of the electorate shall be respected as
observed in Bautista and Martinez III.

FEBTC vs. TOH

G.R. No. 144018 June 23, 2003

1) Execution pending appeal or discretionary

execution is permissible only when "good reasons" exist for
immediately executing the judgment before finality or
pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to
appeal. "Good reasons" are compelling circumstances
justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes
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illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time,

become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the
adverse party who may apparently have no case except to
delay.
The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give
examples of "good reasons" to justify execution. The
determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In other
words, the issuance of the writ of execution must
necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge in
accordance with his own conscience and by a sense of
justice and equity, free from the control of another’s
judgment or conscience. It must be so for discretion implies
the absence of a hard and fast rule.16
In this case, the trial court granted private
respondent’s motion for discretionary execution due to his
advanced age of 79. In the case of De Leon v. Soriano, it
was held that old age is a "good reason" to allow execution
pending appeal as any delay in the final disposition of the
present case may deny private respondent of his right to
enjoy fully the money he has with defendant bank.
2) The special civil action for certiorari may be given
due course, notwithstanding that no motion for
reconsideration has been filed before the lower court under
certain exceptional circumstances. These exceptions include
instances where: (1) the issue raised is purely one of law;
(2) public interest is involved; (3) the matter is one of
urgency; (4) the question of jurisdiction was squarely raised,
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submitted to, met and decided by the lower court; and (5)
where the order is a patent nullity.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE vs. FELIX
G.R. No. 148090 November 28, 2006

1) Execution pending appeal is an exception to the

general rule. It is an extraordinary remedy. This rule is
strictly construed against the movant because courts look
with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment
which has not acquired finality. Such execution affects the
rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on
appeal.
The requisites for the grant of an execution of a
judgment pending appeal are the following:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be good reasons for execution
pending appeal;
(c) the good reasons must be stated in the special
order.
As a discretionary execution, execution pending
appeal is permissible only when good reasons exist for
immediately executing the judgment before finality or
pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period
to appeal. Good reasons, special, important, pressing
reasons must exist to justify execution pending appeal;
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otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and

justice, it may well become a tool of oppression and
inequality. Good reasons consist of exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or
damage that the losing party may suffer should the
appealed judgment be reversed later.
In the instant case, the serious illness of the movant’s
wife and the movant’s urgent need for funds to defray the
medical expenses for his wife’s illness were not considered
by the SC as “good reasons” to grant execution pending
appeal. For illness to be considered a “good reason” to
warrant execution pending appeal, it should be that of the
movant himself.
The SC also deemed untenable as a ground for
discretionary execution the trial court’s opinion that the
appeal taken would be dilatory. The SC said it is not for the
trial court to determine the merit of a decision it rendered
as this is the role of the appellate Court. Hence, it is not
within the competence of the trial court, in resolving the
motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal
is patently dilatory and to rely on the same as the basis for
finding good reason to grant the motion.
2) The movant’s offer to post a bond, standing alone
and absent the good reasons required under Section 2 of
Rule 39, is not enough to allow execution pending
appeal. The bond is only an additional factor for the
protection of the party against whom the judgment will be
executed.
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ABENION vs. SHELL PETROLEUM

G.R. No. 200749/208725 February 6, 2017

1) As a rule, judgment may be executed only in any of

the following instances: (a) when the judgment has become
final and executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has
renounced or waived his right of appeal; (c) when the
period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been
filed; or (d) when, having been filed, the appeal has been
resolved and the records of the case have been returned to
the court of origin.
However, Section 2(a) of Rule 39 allows execution
pending appeal but only upon concurrence of the following
requisites: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a
good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good
reason must be stated in a special order.
What would justify execution pending appeal is the
presence of good reasons consisting of exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or
damage that the losing party may suffer, should the
appealed judgment be reversed later. Since the execution of
a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general
rule, the existence of good reasons is essential.
In the instant case, the SC nullified the trial court’s
grant of execution pending appeal because the “good
reasons” cited to justify the discretionary execution were
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true only of a few but not all the parties who were benefited
by the execution.
2) Under Section 2 of Rule 39, the court to may act
upon a motion for execution pending appeal while it retains
jurisdiction over the action or, even after it has lost
jurisdiction, for as long as the record of the case is still with
it. In the latter case, the court would be exercising its
residual jurisdiction.
3) When there is a pending Motion for
Reconsideration of the court’s decision, it would be
improper and premature for the court to grant the motion
for execution pending appeal. The pendency of the MR
legally precludes execution of the court’s decision because
the motion serves as the movant's vehicle to point out the
findings and conclusions of the decision which, in his view,
are not supported by law or the evidence and, therefore,
gives the trial judge the occasion to reverse himself. In the
event that the trial judge finds the MR meritorious, he can
of course reverse the decision.
B. Mode of execution
1) By motion (S6)
VILLAREAL vs. MWSS
G.R. No. 232202 February 28, 2018

1) Execution may be either through motion or an

independent action. The two modes of execution under the
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Rules are available, depending on the timing when the

prevailing party invoked his right to enforce the court's
judgment. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules, states thus:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by
independent action. - A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Execution by motion is only available if the
enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5)
years from the date of its entry. This is a matter of
right. "On the other hand, execution by independent action
is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for
execution by motion had already elapsed. The said
judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court.
The action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of
limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10) years
from the finality of the judgment. The date of entry, in turn,
is the same as the date of finality of judgment.
For execution by motion to be valid, the judgment
creditor must ensure the accomplishment of two acts within
the five-year prescriptive period, as follows: (a) the filing
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of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and

(b) the court's actual issuance of the writ.
The jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of execution
by motion is only effective within the five-year period from
the entry of judgment. Outside this five-year period, any
writ of execution issued pursuant to a motion filed by the
judgment creditor, is null and void. If no writ of execution
was issued by the court within the five-year period, even a
motion filed within such prescriptive period would not
suffice. A writ issued by the court after the lapse of the
five-year period is already null and void. The judgment
creditor's only recourse then is to file an independent
action, which must also be within the prescriptive period
set by law for the enforcement of judgments.
The limitation that a judgment be enforced by
execution within five years, otherwise it loses efficacy,
goes to the very jurisdiction of the Court. A writ issued
after such period is void, and the failure to object thereto
does not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts
is solely conferred by law and not by express or implied
will of the parties.
2) There are instances, however, when execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years may be allowed
but only upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have
one common denominator, i.e., the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.
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In computing the time limit for enforcing a final

judgment, the general rule is that there should not be
included the time when execution is stayed, either by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction,
by the taking of an appeal or writ of error, by the death of a
party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by
the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may
be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during which
execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time
will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.
3) The remedies provided under Rules 45 and 65 of
the Rules of Court are differentiated, as follows:
A review on certiorari under a Rule 45 petition is
generally limited to the review of legal issues; the Court
only resolves questions of law which have been properly
raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition.
Under this mode, the Court determines whether a proper
application of the law was made in a given set of facts. A
Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to
the determination of the propriety of the trial court's
jurisdiction – whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if
so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not
been attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.25
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RCBC vs. SERRA

G. R. No. 203241 July 10, 2013

1) The Rules of Court provide that a final and

executory judgment may be executed by motion within five
years from the date of its entry or by an action after the
lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This rule,
however, admits of several exceptions. Execution by
motion may still be allowed even after the lapse of five
years when the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of
the judgment obligor or the delay is incurred for his benefit
or advantage.
In the instant case, the SC allowed the execution by
motion even after the lapse of the five-year period because
it was respondent Serra who committed various acts, like
effecting a simulated donation of the subject property,
purposely to prevent the execution of the judgment.
2. By independent action (S6)
DAVIS vs. DAVIS
G.R. No. 233489 March 7, 2018

1) Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a

"judgment may be executed within five (5) years from the
date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action."
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There are, however, instances when the SC, upon

meritorious grounds, has allowed execution by motion even
after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one
common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor or is incurred
for his benefit or advantage.
In the instant case, the motion for execution was filed
and the writ of execution was issued well within the five-
year period. The writ could not be enforced, however,
because the judgment obligor sold the subject property to
third parties who were able to have the title thereto
transferred to their names. It was only after twelve years
from entry of judgment, after the judgment obligees were
able to have the title annulled and transferred back to their
names, that they filed another motion for execution.
The SC allowed the execution stating that the delay
was not due to the fault of the judgment obligees but of the
judgment obligors, who deliberately sold the subject
property to another to avoid the outcome of the case filed
against them, and which delay incurred to their
benefit/advantage. The SC added that it is only logical, just,
and equitable that the period during which an action for
annulment of title and document was being litigated upon
shall be deemed to have interrupted or tolled the running of
the five-year period for enforcement of a judgment by mere
motion.
2) A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari, the purpose of
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which is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any

actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
Moreover, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be
deemed to be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that, under Rule 65, would preclude
the filing of a petition for certiorari.
The foregoing, however, is not an ironclad rule as it
admits well-defined exceptions. One of these exceptions
is where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon
in the lower court.
PANOTES vs. CITY TOWNHOUSE DEV. CORP.
G.R. No. 154739 January 23, 2007

1) An action for revival of judgment is no more than a

procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage of
five years without it being executed upon motion of the
prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue
affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. Moreover,
the action for revival of judgment may be filed only against
the original judgment obligor.

In the instant case, the SC sustained the dismissal of

the action for revival of judgment because it was filed not
 25

against the original judgment obligor but against a party

who was not privy to the original action but was claimed to
be the successor-in-interest of the original judgment
obligor. It was shown, however, that the third party against
whom the action for revival of judgment did not succeed
the original judgment obligor in respect to the latter’s
judgment obligation.

D. Properties exempt from execution (S13)

D' ARMOURED SEC. AGENCY vs. ORPIA

G.R. No. 151325 June 27, 2005

1) Under Section 13 of Rule 39 as well as under

Article 1708 of the New Civil Code, the properties exempt
from execution pertain to natural persons, not juridical
persons. More specifically, the exemptions are meant to
favor laboring men or women whose works are manual.
Exemptions under Section 13 of Rule 39 rule are confined
only to natural persons and not to juridical entities. The
rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning from the
‘personal services’ rendered by the judgment obligor. The
rule further requires that such earnings be intended for the
support of the judgment debtor’s family.
In the instant case, the SC declared that the
collectibles belonging to petitioner, a security agency that
were garnished under a writ of execution were not exempt
from execution under Section 13 of Rule 39. In another
case where a security agency claimed that the guns it gives
 26

to its guards are tools and implements exempt from

execution, the SC ruled that the exemption pertains only to
natural and not to juridical persons.
E. Third party claim (S16)
PSALM vs. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 215933 February 8, 2017

1) A third person whose property was seized by a

sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor
may avail himself of the remedy known as "terceria, "
provided in Section 17, Rule 39, by serving on the officer
making the levy an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof
upon the judgment creditor. Consequently, the sheriff shall
not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment
creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnifies
the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not
greater than the value of the property levied on.
2) A third-party claimant whose claim was denied by
the court cannot appeal from the order denying his third-
party claim since he is not a party in the action where the
writ of execution was issued. Neither may he seek the
annulment of the order denying his claim by filing a
petition for certiorari for the simple reason that he has an a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
The remedy of the aggrieved third-party claimant is to
file a separate and independent reinvidicatory action to
 27

recover ownership and possession of his property against

the judgment creditor or the purchaser of the property at the
public auction sale. It is in this separate and independent
action that the issue of the third-party claimant's title to the
levied properties can be resolved with finality.
Under Section 17 of Rule 39, the aggrieved third-party
claimant may also file an action for damages against the
sheriff within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date
of the filing of the bond. The bond filed by the judgment
creditor will answer for whatever damages the third-party
claimant may have suffered by reason of the sheriff taking
or keeping of the property subject of the "terceria."
3) In the instant case, the SC sustained the resolution
of the CA denying the petition for certiorari filed by
PSALM, the third-party claimant, on the ground that it was
not the proper remedy for the denial by the trial court of its
third-party claim. PSALM should have filed a separate
reinvidicatory action to vindicate his title on the attached
properties.
J. Effect of judgment (S47)
CITY OF CEBU vs. DEDAMO
G.R. No. 172852 January 30, 2013

1) Under the principle of res judicata or

conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
 28

jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been

given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those
in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of
judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or
question already settled in a previous case. Neither party,
therefore, may bring another action against the other party
to relitigate a fact or issue already adjudicated between
them in the previous action.
K. Effect of foreign judgment (S48)
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

1) In recognizing foreign judgments, Philippine courts

cannot substitute their judgment on how the case was
decided by the foreign court and under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the rights, duties or legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
Thus, Philippine courts may only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public
policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether an opposing
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither conflict with Philippine public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
 29

courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as

part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
2) A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void (e.g. on the ground of bigamy)
does not require relitigation by Philippine court of the case
as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage that would require compliance with the Rule on
Annulment or Nullity of Marriage or A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."

3) Since the recognition of a foreign judgment,

including a foreign divorce decree, only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded
 30

by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.

3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording.
4) The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code
applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse
may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on
the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the
foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.
BPI vs. GUEVARA
G.R. No. 167052 March 11, 2015

1) In an action for recognition and enforcement of a

foreign judgment, the plaintiff needs only to prove the fact
of the foreign judgment. There is, however, an important
distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem
and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign
judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing,
while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is
 31

presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the

parties.
In both cases, however, the foreign judgment may be
impeached on the grounds of (1) want of jurisdiction, (2)
want of notice to the party, (3) collusion, (4) fraud, or (5)
clear mistake of law or fact. The party assailing the foreign
judgment has the burden of proving the foregoing grounds.