FOREWORD hhas provided learners in approach in studying and pressure him to pursue his next home-grown academic endeavors. Sedfrey M. Candelaria Dean, Ateneo Law School (2012-2018)FOREWORD id of study in law is an essential Statutory Construetio -making and legal advocacy. cross-cutting tool in judicial deci Professor Ricardo M. Pilares If has provided learners in law with a clearly defined method and approach in studying and applying Statutory Construction through the prism of established case law. His flair for writing is highlighted by critical analysis of decisions of the Supreme Court. ‘The structure of the text of each chapter of the book outlines the general rules and exceptions in Statutory Construction in a reader friendly format. Professor Pilares has made it convenient for students to be properly initiated into these rules. Professors of law will equally find the book as an excellent guide in developing their syllabi for a class in Statutory Construction. Finally, legal researchers will definitely find comfort in the neatly woven development of jurisprudence discussed by the author for every rule land concept on the subject I commend Professor Pilares for having taken up my challenge for him to see this academic project to its logical conclusion. He has made the Ateneo Law School proud of this work. I continue to pressure him to pursue his next home-grown academic endeavors. Sedfrey M. Candelaria Dean, Ateneo Law Schoo! (2012-2018)PREFACE T have been teaching Statutory Construction in Ateneo Law School since 2008. This gave me an opportunity to study the subject matter more deeply and develop an outline that can help law students understand the subject, and also and members of the law academe in their practi unpredictability in how cases are decided by time, Statutory Construction is a very powerful tool, in landmark cases more often than not, are deci the laws. The interpretation or rules of construction can sometimes, contradictory, meanings. As law practitioners, we should embrace this unpredictability and power, because we are, after all, advocates. It took me several years to finish writing this book, as work, teaching and family commitments have taken over my time. Fortunately, I have a very inspiring wife, Atty. Richi Pilares, who convinced me to find time to complete this proj also very fortunate to be supported by former Ateneo Law School ‘Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, who dedicated resources from the Ateneo Law School for this undertaking, and who kept on asking me how I am doing with this book, For the greater glory of God. Ricardo M. Pilares IIIvill PNR Sey He eE CONTENTS CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ‘Theories of Interpretation. Related Legal Principl 1. Separation of Powers... 2. Hierarchy of Laws... 3. Stare Decisis CHAPTER I: SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION Subject of Construction; Types of Laws Constitution... Statutes Presidential Issuar Implementing Rules and Regulations. Ordinances. 7 & 2 5 Enacting Clause. Body ron Headnotes and Epigrap! Repealing Clause Separability Effectivity Cl CHAPTER III: VERBA LEGIS AND RATIO LEGIS; ‘MEANING AND INTENT Introduetion. Verba LeyRatio Legis: Sp ‘Naturalization Laws... Election Laws. Prescriptive Periods Constitutional Construction -.. a. Framework, b, Self-Executing vs. Provisions. C. Administrative Constructo CHAPTER V: CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES IN A STATUTE Punctuation Marks... Use of Specific Words... d. Affirmative and Prohibi x 124 148 148 150 152 156 159 162 162 169 175 176 BP pp eRe fe. Exceptions £ Periods. Plural Words and Singular Words “Association and Relationship of Words, Each to Each. . Qualifying Terms; Last Antecedent Context and Related Clauses ... CHAPTER VI: EXTRINSIC AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION Extrinsic Aids of Construction in General ‘Contemporaneous Circumstan: Legislative Practice; Reference to Other Statutes... 5. Statutes Borrowed from Foreign Jurisdictions. Preference. CHAPTER VII: CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICTING PROVISIONS Statutes In Pari Mater on Resolving Statut in Pari Mate 1, Special Law versus General Law. 2. Substantive Law versus Procedural Law. 3. Earlier Law versus Later Law; Amendment and Repeal ... CHAPTER VIII: PROSPECTIVITY AND RETROACTIVITY. and Retroactive Laws in General Retroactivity of Statutesope CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION Contracts in General. Interpretation of Contracts Legal Provisions on tho Interpretation o A. Background 1. Definition I, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution vests judicial Supreme Court and such other courts established by ion.” ‘The exercise by the courts of judicial power in resolving actual controversies often times requires the construction of statutes as applied in the case before them. In Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar,? the Supreme Court defined construction as “the art or process of discovering or and intention of the authors of the law tion to a given case, where that intention classifies as non-mailable written or printed matter ig information concerning, among others, “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.” Caltex promoted a contest where ion of the Republic of the Philippines: A 2009 Ea), citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 846 1911). 119660, 29 September 1986 (iting Black, Interpretation of Laws,2 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES Participants were to submit an estimate of the number of liters that a hooded gas pump will dis contestant submitting the The entries are to be sub through mail, which according to the Postmaster General, is not allowed on the ground that the scheme falls within the purview of Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Postmaster General argued Supreme Court that there is no need to co Provision (Section 1954) of the Revised Admini it simply applied the same to Caltex. The Supt this argument and ruled that the issue c Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative Cod resolution of the question of whether the scheme prohibitive provisions of the law “inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.”* Construction is also defined as “the act or result of construing, interpreting or exp ing oF effect fof a statute or contract” The subject is also called Legal Hermeneutics, which is defined as “the systematic body of rules which are recognized as applicable to the construction and interpretation of legal writings.” 2. Characteristics of Construction Based on the definition provided by the Court in Caltex, statutory construction may be broken down into the following characteristics: a. It Is.an Artor Process: Construction of statutes is not an exact science, It does not depend on a set of formulas that can be readily applied in every ‘in fact, a statute may be interpreted differently if different of statutory ‘un counter (CHAPTER, INTRODUCTION 3 lends itself to subjectivity determine the intention of the legislature, and uncertainty, For example, one rule of construction is called the doctrine of last antecedent. Under this doctrine, qualifying words or phrases 2 of the Civil Code,” where the Court held that the phrase “ otherwise provided” does not qualify its immediate antecedent, which is the requirement of publication, but rather the period of publication which is stated at the beginning of the provision. premium on the dollar charged by the bank of the petitioner- importer for the purchase of foreign exchange should be included in the computation of the advance sales tax for landed cost of the goods imported by the petitioner. The legal provision involved is Section 183(B) of the then Tax Code, which provides in part that ‘the import invoice value thereof x x x including freight, insurance, commission, customs duty and all similar charges petitioner argued that the bank charge for the purchase of foreign exchange should not be considered as a “similar charge” 8 contemplated under Section 183(B) of the Tax Code invoking «jusdem generis, because the bank chargeis not similar to the charges specifically enumerated in the provision. The Court disagreed with petitioner and held that the intention in Section 183(B) is to include all charges or all items of expense in determining the advance sales tax. The Court further held that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is but @ rule of construction adopted as an aid to ascertain and give cffect to legislative intent but that the same “should not be given "GR No, L-69816, 24 April 1985, Po4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES such wide application that would operate to defeat the purpose of the law.” These cases show that the mere fact that the words of the statute are organized in a manner contemplated by a rule of ‘anstruction does not automatically mean that such rule shoud be applie ‘The canons of construction should be considered as auxiliary rules of construction which are neither universal nor conclusive in application. Thus, “ only as a means of the legislature.” ‘Theoretically, the question before a requires the interpretation correctly expresses the I simple process. On a prac means that a judge must , whether he or she should rely on the as written or whether to rely on canons of construction and go beyond the written text. The rule is that construction is not necessary when the law is clear. However, determining whether a law is clear or not by itself could be a complicated process. There are several tests in determining whether a provision of a law is clear or ambiguous, all of which requires a certain degree of judgment and subjectivity. Once ambiguity is established, it will then be up to the judge to ascertain which canon of construction should be used in order to determine legislative intent, As shown in the Philippine American ‘canon of construction is not conclusive simply ed in the statute, or the syntax of the provision, tthe conclusion is the correct evidence of legislative intent. It is a mistake to assume that the judiciary has a single, unify. ng and consistent theory of construction. However, there is a consis- ‘tent objective and purpose of construction, which is the determina- intent. The means by which one ean achii id an advocate should be mindful of this real ragimero. Courtot Appeals (.R, Nos, L-48468to 48469, 22 November 1989. lum, Mastering Statutory Interpretation 2nd Ba), 2013, CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 5 b. It Involves the Determination of Legislative Intent ‘The primary objective of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.” The determination of legislative intent is the primary consideration."* In Senarillos v. Hermosisima,"* the Court held that the judicial interpretation of statutes constitutes part of the law as of the date the law was passed, since said construction merely establishes the legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. Thus, when the courts construe a law, they are merely affirming what was originally intended by the legislature in enacting the same. In Torres v. Limjap," the Court, quoting Sutherland, described legislative intent as the vital part and essence of the law, fo wit: In the interpretation and construction of a statute the intent of the law-maker should always be ascertained and given effect, and courts will not follow the letter of f statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the Legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the spirit of the Act. On this subject, Sutherland, the foremost authority on statutory construction, says: ‘The Intent of Statute is the Law. — If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. ‘The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ough it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute, Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative ‘enactment. In construing statutes the proper "People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 19190, 29 November 1922. ‘pasa v, Yul, GR. No. 48676, 31 May 1996. QR. No, 172409, 4 February 2008, MG.R. No, $4385, 21 September6 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES course is to start out and follow the true intent lature and to adopt that sense which. harmonizes best with the content and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. (Vol. II Sutherland, In Araneta v. Dinglasan,'* the Court held that a rule must be tested according to its results, that is, the intention of the law in question must be sought for in its natu object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution. The question before the court in this case is whether the executive orders issued by the Ps Commonwealth Act No. 671, or the Emergency Powers ceased to have any effect, notwithstanding the fact that the text of C.A. 671 does not have an expiration date as to its effect thus, necessitating a new repealing law). The court held that since Article VI of the Constitution already provides that the law that may be passed by Congress authorizing the President to carry ot declared national policy in times of war or national emergency s be “for a limited period,” there is no need for a separate repealing law, since by its nature, a law intended to address an emergency, such as C.A. 671 must be temporary in nature and that it was approved with this limitation in view. It Is Necessary When the Legislative Intent Cannot Be Readily Asceriained from the Words Used in the Law as Applied under a Set of Facts. Acursory readingof the rulingin Caltex may lead to.a conclusion that courts need to construe the provisions of the law at all times for as long as a party to a ease raises an issue on the ap) ty of @ Jaw in a given case. This reading is contrary to a long line of cases wherein the Supreme Court consistently held that where the law is ind unambiguous, there is no room for construction but only ication.” In fact, this is considered as the cardinal rule, In one the court held: GR. No, 1.61426, 28 March 1983; Republic of tal, G.R, Nos, 103882 and 106276, 26 Nev Court, et al, G.R. No. nracale Mining Company, Ine. et av, dela Rose, a Company, Inc, eta. v. dela Rose, CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 rule in statutory construction is that when is clear and free from a no room for construction is only room for app! and free from ambiguity, it must be give meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. ‘This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. Its expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or ‘speech is the index of intention.’ Furthermore, there is the maxim verba Legis non est recedendum, or ‘from the words of a statute there should be no departure.” from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction.” Furthermore, in People v. Mapa, the Supreme Court held that its first and fundamental duty is to apply the law. The court further held that “{clonstruction. and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that ay ion is impossible or inadequate without them.” From these rul is clear that the courts can construe a law only if shown that a literal application of the law is either impossible or inadequate. The burden then is on the party arguing for the need to go beyond the literal meaning of the words used in a statute and construe the same in order todetermine its applicability under agiven ‘set of circumstances. In Caltex, therefore, the court was convinced by Petitioner's arguments why it is necessary to determine whether the promotional scheme falls within the prokibitory provision of Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code in view of the uncertainty of its applicability under the circumstances therein. Construction is necessary only if the law is ambiguous. Thus, “the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.” A statute Boles v. Bolo, G.R, No, 186400, 20 October 2010,8 [STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES capable of being understood by is said to be ambiguous when ‘it reasonably well-informed persons in either two or more senses," Im one case where the accused claims that as a lessee of a fishpond, he is not covered by a municipal ordinance which requires “any owner or manager of fishponds” to pay a municipal tax, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance is not perfectly vague as to Prevent application and held that the accused is covered by the ordinan« a lessee can be considered as a manager. The court further held the test to determine whether a statute is vague is when it lacks comprehensible standards that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Tt cannot be presumed that laws intend an absurdity, and the courts should construe laws as to avoid it. The courts must ascertain the true meaning of a statute “where the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, or where adherence tothe strict letter would lead toinjustice, absurdity or contradictory provisions, since an am calling for construction may arise when the consequence of a literal {nterpretation of the language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable jevous result, oF one at variance with the policy of the ing of the statute is to be ‘ined and declared, even though it seems to conflict with the Tn In re Allen," the Supreme Court held that val interpretation of any part of law will operate unjustly or Ign abr eas of ch Heal inerrtaton contrat evident meaning ofthe law as a whole, such literal in should be rejected. lieralinnarewiatin Based on the foregoing, the Court developed several tests in determining whether # statute is ambiguous, which calls for ite construction: 1. When the statute is capable of two or more reasonable en of common intelligence meaning and differ as to its le Interpretations); must necessarily guess al application (Test of Mult 136298, 29 November 2000, ‘August 1988, Sor ase Romualdes No, 106077, 29 July 199 uly 1909 (cing 82. No, 1466, 29 October 1903 CIS 589. Ne CHAPTER [INTRODUCTION i ible or inadequate 2, When literal application i impossible or inaded (fest of Impossibility); literal interpretation o! eurd, unreasonable 0} race with the policy ff Absurdity or Unrea: f the statute leads to an 'r mischievous result, OF of the legislation 28 & sonableness)- 3, When a ‘one at variat whole (Test of d. It [sa Judicial Function. In In re: R. MeCulloch Dick,” the court jlippine system of government, the dk ncia v. David™ is’ ustrative, Thisease inva .e constitutionalit; ‘of Section 13 of R.A. ‘No. 590 which subject econo SF por w Bn Supreme Court held in Perfecto v. Meer that pursuant to Section 9, eet constitutes a decrease ae Because of the court's ruling in Perfecto, Congress enacted R.A. No. 590, Section 13 of which provides that “[nJo sala received by any public officer of the Republic of the Phil ippines shall fo considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is fe per a a! SO ee Eanenon Sed Oy the Constitution or by law.” In Endencia, the Supreme Court struck | department, ‘Thecase of Ender prohibited under Section ‘As already stated construing and applying the above ‘tutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, GIR, No, 19862A, 16 April 1918. OG .R, Nos, 1-6366.56, 31 August 1958.0 e the col the salaries of judi 8 of judicial officers, We e section 13 Republic Act Noma je quote section 13 of SEC. 18. No salary wherever received Y public officer of the compensation fixed by the Constitution oF by So we have this situation, The Supreme Court in & decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly Section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in Section 13, Republic Act No. 1590, says that ‘no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the ineome proceeds to declare that payment of said income not @ diminution of his compensation, Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of & public official, specially a judicial officer, not a desrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found amd decided otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regandin separation of powers. * Under ot yet of constitutional government, ty Lexi ere is assigned ae een the ve te The Eason dopant, 0a aa ae omer carping ot tthe pre e areed Fee ee epretaton ad (Song entawl to be Zl a and erly eae, Andi Constitution. Before the courts can determing hea fe NO (CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret an¢ een cman, if said law, but also of the ascertain the meaning not only of said Is dl pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide a conflict between the two, because if Jaw will have to give way and has to be ed invalid and unconstitutional. Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial wn and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution, Whenit isclear thatastatute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; ‘and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course wouldlead to thedestruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of is a judicial matter, the courts will the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. Under the American system of constitu- among the most important to the judiciary are the in- terpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. By legislative fiat as enunciated in Section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary officer is not a decrease of compensation. ThisgTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES lear example of interpretation or ascertainment of ‘of the phrase ‘which shall not be shed ir continuance in office,’ found in [Section 9, ‘of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of icors. This act of interpreting the Constitution grany part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. ‘The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legisl a word as used in a statute is not function in defining a term. ‘The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be 80 construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. We have already said that Legislature under our sk and the power to to interpret them. This is interpretation of the basie (CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers." Note however, that the principle that statutory construction is inherently a judicial function does not preclude Congress from enacting curative legislations. In fact, R.A. No. 690 in the Endencia case, can be considered as a curative legislation. The court, however, ruled that R.A. No, 590 conflicts with a provision of the Constitution providing for the non-diminution of the salaries of judicial officers. Under the principle of hierarchy of laws, R.A. No. 590 is void as it with the provision of the Constitution, which is supreme laws. Furthermore, the contemporaneous construction of laws by agencies tasked with the implementation of the same is highly per- suasive." Thus, the Supreme Court held that “the principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control and construction of statutes by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.”® In Laxamana v. Baltazar,» the question before the Coun to the reconciliation of Sec- i wve Code and Section 21(a) of ‘was suspended. The vice mayor, pursuant to the tive Code, assumed office. However, the provin- the consent of the provincial board, and invok- .ction Code, appointed Jose Laxamana as mayor. Section 2198 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC. 2195. — Temporary disability of mayor. — Upon the occasion of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice- Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes.2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES isa dear example of interpretation or ascertainment of poaingf the pase whi aterrey office,’ founs or any part the well-defined and established p of the Judiciary. The rul legislature recogni . pass any declara or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, s0 as to give it yy binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of of its meaning as used elsewhe wure would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, inhibition We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is ‘more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Logi department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have ial processes and court decisions, Under such a gystem, a final court determination of cae based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of Constitution may be undermined oF even annulled is and different interpretation of the law oot ibe Constitution by the Legislative department. Rat would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being ¥y violative of the fundamental principles of our (CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION constitutional aystem of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.” Note however is inherently a ju enacting curative le ‘ease, can be considered as a ruled that R.A. No, 590 conflicts with a provision of the providing for the non-diminution of the salaries of judici Under the principle of hierarchy of laws, R.A. No. 590 with the provision of the Constitution, which is supreme Furthermore, the contemporaneous construction of laws by agencies tasked with the implementation of the same is highly per- suasive.* Thus, the Supreme Court held that “the principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control and construction of statutes by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.” In Laxamana v. Baltazar,* the question before the Court pertains to the reconciliation of Sec: tion 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code. The issue arose after the mayor of Sex- moan, Pampanga, was suspended. The vice mayor, pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code, assumed office. However, the provin- cial governor, with the consent of the provincial board, and invok- ing the Revised Election Code, appointed Jose Laxamana as mayor. Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC, 2195. — Temporary disability of mayor. — of the absence, suspension, or other discharged by the Vi Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes. "Bndenciav. David G.R, Nos. -6365-56, 31 August 1953. citations omitted) "Lim Hoa Ting v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 1-10606, 24 Soptember 1958. "Philippine Duplicator, Ine. v, National Labor Relations Commission, et al, GAR, No, 110068, 11 November 1995 (citing Jn Re Allen, 2 Phil 690, 640 (1908) ™G.R. No, L-6965, 19 September 1962.us STATUTORY C0 » other hand, Seetion 21(a) of the Revised Election Code 21(a). — Vacancy in elective provincial, cit nunicipal office. — Whenever a temporary vacancy in ipal office. ae lany elective local office occurs, the same sl appointment by the governot office, and by the provi i in is a municipal office. the provincial board, ‘The Court noted that the Secretary Department of Who is charged with the supervision of provincial rnis, have consistently held that in ease "y of the mayor, the viee mayor shall, by jee of the mayor, andif the vice mayor be discharged by the first councilor. 1 “w[hlere @ statute has received a contemporaneous and retation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as erpretation of the law.” Furthermore, theory that the legislature is orancous interpretation of a statute, n administrative body or executive officers istering or enforeing the law, interpretation upon re-enactment of suspension or disabi of law, assume is unavailable, the office ‘The Court further ad acquainted with the cont especially when made by charged erpreting statutes do not enjoy the sof the Supreme Court, which je 8 of the Ci e not operate st judicial action because a trative agency does not pretation cannot place the e the same wrong construction of the create vested rights to determine legislat ly ascertained from the plain Revenue, (CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION is rules oF maxims a8 to discover the statute must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute." The purpose of construction is to discover the intention of the law, and not to create doubt. In City of Baguio v. Noga,” the Court held ‘Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. Itis thus not difficult to stray away from the true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind hey ‘are only valuable when they subserve this purpose,’ In fact, ‘the spirit or intention of a statute as far as necessary, th not ‘correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to’ its true intent.’ 4, Theories of Interpretation ‘There are varying theories in statutory interpretation. Some of these theories are discussed below. First, under the textualist theory, or originalism, the words “Laporv, Court of Appenis, G.R, No, 104188, 6 November 1992, GR. No, L-26100, 28 Pebrunry 1969.Treaning of interpretation, The strength of the plain meaning rule lice on its simplicity. Its strength, however, also gives rise to ite ‘Neuknoss, that is, words often do not mean the same to everyone. Furthermore, there is a false belief that language has intrinsic meaning, Language evolves, and the meaning of words evolves." Second, intentionalism or intent “in the belief that the body choose (sic) should g¢ of the court to discern the int to further lism does focuses on legislative 1m society.” As such, ‘of that representative body and intent.”* Furthermore, unlike t require the establishment of resort to extrinsic sources of construction, is the original intent of the framers of the law that should have primacy in the determination ofits meaning. Greater emphasis is placed on the original intent of the drafters of the law and this, requires a review of legislative history and legislative deliberations. ‘The main strength of this approach lies on its consistency with the as it requires the court to inquire into the le source of interpretation mn of but a few members of between general legislative intent and ve intent. The former refers tothe general intention wfting a Jaw as a whole, while the latter refers to the ature in writing a specific section oF sm, which at its extreme focuses tering Statutory Intrp mn (2nd Bal), 2018, LN (CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION con specific legislative intent, could be misleading in the sense that ft fails to view the statute in light of the general intention that the legislature intended in the statute as a whole. ‘The third theory, purposivism or the legal process theory, focuses on determining the problem that the legislature is seeking to address." Thus, interpretation is made with a view to the public policy that the statute seeks to advance." jine Supreme Court decisions shows that initary theory of construction. It may be argued that while our Courts are moderate textualists in theory, in focusing on the plain meaning theory of construction, they are, on the other hand, intentionalists and purposivists in approach. This is evidenced by the fact that while the Court prioritizes the plain meaning rule as the objective manifestation of legislative intent, the /ed to state that if the language of the statute its spirit or ratio legis, then the latter should prevail. While this could lead to some degree of inconsistency in jurisprudence, the fact that our legal system does not adopt a single theory of construction gives the Courts flexibility in advancing its interpretation of a statute. we do not B. Related Legal Principles |A study of the subject of statutory construction requires an understanding of some basic legal principles discussed below. 1, Separation of Powers ‘The government consists of three great branches, the executive, legislative, and the judiciary. The relationship among these three t branches is governed by certain constitutional principles, including the principles of separ: balances. The court described this Commission," thus: ‘of powers and checks and jonshipin Angara v. Electoral js a fundamental principle )btainsnot through express in our Constitution. Each ‘The separation of power inoursystemof government. provision but by actual “SJelim, Mastering Statutory Interpretation (2nd), 2013, id, ‘SJollum, Mastering Statutory Interpretation (nd Bl), 2013. “GL. No, 46081, 15 July 1996.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES department of the government has exclusive cos matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x xx But in the main, the Constitu with deft strokes and in bold line the executive, the legislative and t of the government. The overlapping an‘ functions and duties between the several depart however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social Aisquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks or mares not entirely obliterated. In cases of confi department is the only constitutional organ whic called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. ‘As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much ‘as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate Gnd function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to speci tations find restrictions provided in the said instrument. The forth in no uncertain language the tations upon governmental powers restrictions and limitations are ianism by which to direct the I channels, for e mere verbiage, ent, and the rothegms. yo™ (CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION imitations and restrictions embodied in ‘are real as they should be in any living 1d States where no express tional grant is found in their constitution, the mn of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, hhas been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this ing power is granted, if not expressly, by clear ion from [SJection 2 of [AJrticle VIII of our moders ‘The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope ‘and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the j tate constitutional boundari ity over the other departments; it does not in nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed ‘judicial supremacy’ which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial imited to actual cases and controversies to ‘after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question. raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialecties and barren legal ‘questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice ‘or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed toabide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive ‘and legislative departments of the government. LEy ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James ‘Madison, the system itself is not ‘the chief palladium of constitutional . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eye. must be ever ready to mark, their voice t ling years to come be tested in the is and hearts than in consultation chambers.” crucible of rooms and Under the principle of separation of powers, the Constitution vests in the legislative branch of government the power to enact laws, in the executive branch, the power to execute laws, and in the judicial branch, the power to interpret laws. As held in Endencia v, David, the interpretation and application of laws is vested in the judicial department of government." le of separation of powers likewise imposes « icial power. Considering that the legislature i erpretation of the laws enacted by the legislature and not to legislate, which is vested exclusively in the legislative branch of government. In Taffada v. Yulo,” petitioner Juan Tafiada was appointed as justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas. Upon reaching the age of 65 on 5 October 1934, petitioner was directed by the Judge of First Instance of Tayabas (acting upon instructions from the Department of Justice) tocease toact as ju eace pursuant ‘to the provisions of Section 203 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899 (which took effect on 16 November 1931) which provides in part that “the present justices and a. justices of the peace who shall, a the time this Act takes eff ‘completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-three.” Petitioner argued that he is not covered by the mandatory retirement age unde Act Ne 3899 because he reached the age of 65 on 5 October 1934, or after Tid. Endencin v. Dav GR. No, 43675, 8 INTRODUCTION cHAPTE: iheral the effectivity of Act No. 3899. The eeponone see eae aoe tn of act No, 980 called for conde i const the language of the law used when a literal interpretation thereof would lead to a conclusion that only those justice cvity peace who turned 65 years old before (and not after) the activ 27% Nea arene yt mandatary aren rove A air the petioner the Supreme Court on Oreo yeas of age on 3 Gb 1004 ter the eet es diet na la whi equred justine eS os are hold office on 1 January 1933. the peace 65 years of age to cease to ‘The court held: In substantiation of what has just been said, it is of course fundamental that the dete tion of the ley Hovehen itis equally fundamental that that legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. This principle must be adhered to even though the court be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the Legislature intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be sought out. To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial construction. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret. Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this instance, as in the past, we aim to do, But counsel in his memorandum ‘concedes ‘that the language of the proviso in question somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the sgislative intent’, and at the hearing in response to questions was finally forced to admit that what the Government desired was for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES: matter, and the purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.* In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, et al, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered on 14 November 1955 a judg- ment in a case against the defendant. A copy of the decision was served on the defendant on 21 November 1955 and the judgment became final and executory on 21 December 1955. On 21 December 1965, NAMARCO, the successor in interest of the winning party, filed an action for revival of judgment. The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that the action has already prescribed because Code provides that an action for enforce- ment of judgment shall prescribe in 10 years. It ruled that more than 10 years had passed from the time the judgment became final and executory in 21 December 1955, because under Article 18 of the Civil Code a year is a period of 365 days, and since the years 1960 and 1964 are leap years, the action for revival of judgment was filed two days late. NAMARCO argued that Article 1144 of the Civil Code should be interpreted to mean 10 calendar years. The Supreme Court rejected NAMARCO’s argument and held: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the eaplrat oon of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippin connotation of each ‘year’ — as the term — to 365 days. Tie of oy provision wa: | Code of Spain, subsequently (CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, ‘whenever months .. are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months, are of 30 days’, not the ‘natural’, ‘solar’ or ‘calendar’ months, unless they are ‘designated by name, in which case ‘they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have.’ This concept was, later, ‘modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised ‘Administrative Code, pursuant to which, ‘month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month.’ In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, ‘with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month,’ with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned ‘months, days or nights,” ours has added thereto the term ‘years’ and explicitly ordains that ‘it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days.” Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein ‘cannot be upheld without ignoring, ifnot nullifying, sion to the policy embodi ‘ative Code, through legislative process, not by judicial decree.” In Director of Prisons v. Ang Chio Kio." it was held that “{clourts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws but in the interpretation and application of law.” Furthermore, considering that the intent of the legislature is to be ascertained and enforces is intent expressed in the words of the statute, if said SG.R No. 29181, 27 August 1969 (emphasis supplied). G.R. No. L-30001, 28 June 1970.4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES tive intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the wt, under the guise of interpretation, “speculate as 15 an intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology or the ind “the courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish this s expressed a construe the statute to accomplish this supposed the Court stated in Corpuz v. People: legislative powers the course of such interpretation, modify, revise, amend, , or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the 1 that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent juceinetly put, the Court should shy away upon the primary function of only by subsequent ones, vance shalll not be excused e to the contrary. mer shall be void and the ecutive acts, orders and regulations to the ki Under th Constitution is #u rehy of laws, the Philippi and as such, acts of Congress, 1, 16 Fobruary 1996, (CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION executive agencies exercising quasi-logislative functions and local legislative bodies must be consistent with the Constitution. 3. Stare Deci ‘The maxim stare decisis et non quieta non movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) is embodied in '8 of the Civil Code which provides that “[Judicial decisions interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the item of the Philippines.” It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should led and closed to further argument."” The principle is ‘one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in judicial decisions.® Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet or the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law." The Supreme Court is described as hav- ing the last word on what the law is, as it is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. As such, lower courts are enjoined to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.* In Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., the Supreme Court described the significance of the principle Ineach volume of Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Chief Justice Castro's preface cites the governing le of precedents and stare decisis ‘which has given consistency and stability to the law’ by which lawyers and litigants may know the law in concrete controverted cases, thus: In his famous essay, the Path of the Law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes defined law as a prediction of what the court will do. ‘The prediction is based on precedents. The governing principle, which has given consis- De Mesa, et al. v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils, Ine, G.R, Nos. 159063-70, 18 August 2006. “Department of Transportation and Communications v. Cruz, GR. No. 17286, 23 July 2008, 7 “People v,dabinal, G.R. No, L-20061, 27 February 1974, ‘Albert v, Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VD, etal, G.R. No. L-26964, 29 May 1968. . GR. No. 1.25885, 16 November 1978,26 STATUTO (STRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES ty to the law, is stare decisis et ‘overe (follow past precedents ‘not disturb what has been settled). tency and stabili {ory law and The officials enforcing statut ints seeking judges in adversary ‘be well posted on precedents. Such precedents and jurisprudence of this Court form part of our legal system by force of the provision of iArticle 8 of the new Civil Code that ‘Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution SEE form a part of the legal system of the Philippines’ ‘and may not be lightly treated. In Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc et al,,* a compl crowns” under peti sometime in 1992, Petitioners announes the winning number in announcement, petitioners | were trying to red codes. Petitioners as an act of goodwill, for Php500.00. Responder Trial Court, which however, reversed appeal with the Supreme Cou the argument that the sam the Supreme Court in four pres jued a statement 1s cases and that the joners under the princi 10 fault the appellate Court's pronouncements in four ,, Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and srowns and/or resealable -3560-FQ, like in and Lumahan, "GH No, 17H, 12 October 2006, v, Pagdanganan, { was filed by certain individuals holding “349 ¢ promotional “Number Fever” campaign red the number “349" as 192. On the same night of the sports that numerous people '349" bearing crowns with incorrect security explaining the mistake and ‘offered to redeem the non-winning crowns nis filed a complaint with the Regional ‘missed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, jecision of the Regional Trial Court. On petitioners raised, among others, jue has already been decided by (CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION ber are non-winning crowns under the terms of the ‘Ni Fever’ promo. They reckon that, by virtue of the pri of stare decisis, the aforementioned cases have al Stated the issue of whether or not petitioners PCPPI Std PEPSICO are liable to holders of non-winning ‘349° bearing crowns andior resealable caps. Simply put, the principle of stare decisis should have been determinative Prthe outcome of the case at bar. Rodrigo, Mendoza, Patan and De Mesa cases having ruled on the very same raised in the case at bar, they constitute binding judicial precedents on how Pepsi ‘349' litigations must be disposed of. On the other hand, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan justify the non-application of the principle of required that the legal Jiations of the parties, and the facts, and laws, the issue and evidence are exactly tas those decided in the cases of Rodrigo, Mendoza and later the de Mesa x x x. They contend, however, that ‘a comparison of the subject cases show that they are not the same nor identical x x x as evident in the different questions of law, the findings of facts and evidence and issues involved in said cases x x x.’ In fact, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan particularly ‘argue(d] that the basis of their action is Breach of Contract while that of the Rodrigo and Mendoza cases involved complaints for Specific Performance. ‘The petition is meritorious. ‘There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa, including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning the ‘Number Fever’ promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and Lumahan are among those holding supposedly winning ‘349 Pepsi/7-Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable caps. Said crowns and/or resealable caps ‘were not honored or allowed to be cashed in by petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing to contain the correct security code assigned to such winning combination. As ‘a result, the rejected crown and/or resealable cap holdersh J 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES filed separate complaints for specific performance/sum ‘of money/breach of contract, with damages, all against petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. xxx In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same 1s those in the decided cases of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to be a1 issue has been settled and this Court's final decision in the said ‘cases must be respected. This Court's hands are now tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant petition. ued. 1 ‘The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere precedents and not to unsettle things which ed) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Jal decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution || form a part of the legal system of the ippines. With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial pronouncements, it is quite evident that the appellate court committed reversible error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory decisions = those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the Pepsi ‘349! cases are concerned. For itis the better practice that when a court hhas laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the ‘same. In the ase at bar, therefore, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling thatthe corret security code is ‘an essential, nay, critical, requirement in order to become entitled to the amount printed on a ‘49' bearing crown and/or resealable cap. xxx 1 FN (CHAPTER L. INTRODUCTION ‘The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of on i Il be followed in other controlling jw mn cases involving a simil the necessity for securing certainty and stability the law and does not require identity of or privity ‘This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is even said that such decisions ‘assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, become, to the extent that they are the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.” Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished. To reiterate, there is naught that is left to be brought to court. Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace.“ However, for the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to apply to another case, the factual circumstances of the precedent and the case to which it is applied must be substantially the same. A different factual milieu in a subsequent case can be used as justification for the non-application of stare decisis. Furthermore, for the doctrine of stare decisis to apply, the ciple of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the precedent ‘must pertain to the main issue of the case and not merely obiter ‘um. A dictum is an opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, not the proffered deliberate opinion. DBid,, Citations o “Chin Hui v. Rodri4 Ly a 30 “STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS ANP CASES of the judge himself. As such, mere dicta is not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. to consider that notwithstanding Court is not precluded 's also important, ‘stare decisis, the Supreme from changing its mind and reversing a P) down. Article VIII, Section 4(@) of the Phi {in part that “no dectrine or principle of la in a decision rent reversed except by the Court sitting ¢” of a previous doctrine by the Supreme be asked is how would other si light of the doctrinal change vis: se ting v. Ting." the Court explained that "the interpretation or ra rind ion ofa law by courts constitutes & Part the law as of the coats statute is enacted” and that Lilt is only whe® © Dal ruling date js Gourt is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the cease urine may have tobe applied prospectively favor of parties who have relied on the ol ‘acted in good faith, in ‘accordance therewith under prospicit, non respicit.”" the pri Roalty and Development Corporatio eens ity and Development. Corpo! "GR. No, 166662, 31 March 2009, CHAPTER II. SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION A. Subject of Construction; Types of Law uction is used to interpret various legal the Constitution, statutes, administrative Statutory ct instruments inclu regulations and ordinances, ‘al law is defined as “that branch of public law of state which treats of the organization and frame of government, the sttane and powers of sovereignty, the distribution of political ‘and governmental authorities and functions, the fundamental principles sesh are to rogulate the relations of goverament and subject, and wich preseribes generally the plan and method according to which the public affairs of the state are to be administered.” It forms part Ot political law, which is defined as the “branch of law which deals ork the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of the territory.”* ‘The Philippine Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and the Supreme Court described it as “the basic and paramount Taw to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials ofthe land, must defer.”* Consequently, any act of the government or of a public official or employee contrary gal, null, and voi ionary, 2nd Bd. n. AM, No, 138, 91 May 1982. No, 202242, 17 July 2012.