CivRev1 - Delson Case Doctrines (Syllabus - Leonen) (4SCDE1920)

Part One – Persons and Family Relations
I. Effect and Application of Laws

A. Effectivity of Laws (Art. 2)
1. Publication Requirement; What to Publish; Importance of Publication
• Doctrines:
PUBLICATION IS A CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF ALL STATUTES
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. (Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 [Resolution], December 29, 1986)
PUBLICATION IS INDISPENSABLE IN EVERY CASE, BUT THE LEGISLATURE MAY IN ITS DISCRETION
PROVIDE THAT THE USUAL FIFTEEN-DAY PERIOD SHALL BE SHORTENED OR EXTENDED
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication. (Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 [Resolution], December 29, 1986)
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED TO BE BINDING AND EFFECTIVE
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. (De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718
[Resolution], January 29, 1988)
CIRCULARS WHICH PRESCRIBE A PENALTY MUST BE PUBLISHED BEFORE BECOMING EFFECTIVE
As a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published, and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. (People v. Que Po Lay, G.R.
No. L-6791, March 29, 1954)
INTERNAL RULES OR REGULATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED
Tañada qualified that: “Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.” (National Power Corp. v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010)
THE REQUIREMENT THAT LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH “DULY
PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE” MANDATES THE SENATE TO EITHER PUBLISH THE RULES
FOR ITS LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN EACH CONGRESS OR OTHERWISE MAKE THE PUBLISHED
RULES CLEARLY STATE THAT THE SAME SHALL BE EFFECTIVE IN SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSES OR
UNTIL THEY ARE AMENDED OR REPEALED LEST THE ORDERS OR PROCEEDINGS THAT RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WITNESSES SHALL BE CONSIDERED NULL AND VOID
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses
should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders
and proceedings are considered valid and effective. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643 [Resolution], September 4, 2008)
SINCE RULES OF THE HOUSE OR THE SENATE THAT AFFECT ONLY THEIR MEMBERS ARE
INTERNAL TO THE HOUSE OR SENATE, SUCH RULES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED, UNLESS SUCH
RULES EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR THEIR PUBLICATION BEFORE THE RULES CAN TAKE EFFECT
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the
Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under
the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the
Rules expressly mandate their publication. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011)
4SCDE1920 Page 1 of 102

SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION MUST BE
PUBLISHED DESPITE ABSENCE OF ANY AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules
have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. (Garcillano v. House of Representatives
Committees, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008)
PUBLICATION OF SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
THROUGH THE INTERNET IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FORM OF PUBLICATION
R.A. No. 8792 merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations. (Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees, G.R. Nos. 170338 & 179275,
December 23, 2008)
AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE IN A LAW WHOSE EXACT TERMS
WERE NEITHER REPRODUCED IN NOR ATTACHED AS AN ANNEX TO, SAID LAW, CANNOT BE
ACCORDED THE STATUS OF A LAW
The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of
publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the
presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the
publication requirement. In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,
Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither
was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said
agreement the status of a law. Consequently, the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an
ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
(Conjuangco, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012)
B. Ignorance of Law Excuses No One (Art. 3)
1. Mistake of Law vs. Mistake of Fact
a. Art. 526 –mistake on doubtful or difficult provision of law is basis for good faith - mitigates
but does not extinguish liability;
b. Art. 1334 – mutual error on legal effect of agreement- may vitiate consent;
c. Art. 2155 – mistake in payment gives rise to right to return of erroneous payment
C. Prospective Application of Laws (Art. 4)
1. Exceptions
a. If provided in the law itself
b. Procedural law
c. Penal law if favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent
d. Curative and repealing statutes
e. Creating new rights
f. Tax statutes
g. Interpretative statutes
2. Exceptions to the Exceptions
a. Ex post facto laws
b. Penal laws not favorable to the accused
c. Substantive laws impairing vested rights
• Doctrines:
PENAL LAWS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex
post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. Although
an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused,
considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. (Valeroso v. People, G.R. No.
164815, February 22, 2008)
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, LAWS MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate
mortgages, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent must be given effect if the laudable purpose of
protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved. (Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, G.R.
No. 104528, January 18, 1996)
RULINGS, CIRCULARS, RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE HAVE NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IF TO APPLY THEM WOULD PREJUDICE
THE TAXPAYER
Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations, or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification
or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health
Care Providers, Inc., G.R. No. 168129 April 24, 2007)
BIR CIRCULARS OR RULINGS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT WHERE THEIR APPLICATION WOULD
BE PREJUDICIAL TO TAXPAYERS
Any revocation, modification, or reversal of and of the rules and regulations or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive application if the
relocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers. (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-52306, October 12, 1981)
D. Acts Contrary to Mandatory or Prohibitory Provisions Are Void (Art. 5)
1. Exceptions
a. The law makes the act valid but punishes the violator
b. The law itself authorizes its validity
c. The law makes the act only voidable
d. The law declares the nullity of an act but recognizes its effects as legally existing
E. Waiver of Rights (Art. 6)
1. Requisites
• Doctrines:
WHERE ONE LACKS KNOWLEDGE OF A RIGHT, THERE IS NO BASIS UPON WHICH WAIVER OF IT
CAN REST
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes
that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by
the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time actual
or constructive knowledge of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they
depended. Where one lack knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. (DM.
Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001)
2. Exceptions
a. Waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs
b. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law
c. Alleged rights which really do not yet exist, as in the case of future inheritance
d. If the right is a natural right, such as right to be supported
• Doctrines:
STIPULATION WHEREBY STUDENT CANNOT TRANSFER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL WITHOUT
REFUNDING SCHOLARSHIP CASH IS NULL AND VOID

The stipulation in a contract, between a student and the school, that the student's scholarship is good
only if he continues in the same school, and that he waives his right to transfer to another school without
refunding the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void,
because scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit and to help gifted students in whom society
has an established interest or a first lien, and not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its
prestige and increase its business potential. (Cui v. Arellano University, G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961)
FOR BEING IMBUED WITH PUBLIC POLICY, POSTING AND PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS
MANDATED BY ACT NO. 3135 MAY NOT BE WAIVED
While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that such
waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The notice of sale in a
foreclosure of mortgage, intended to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be
sold, is imbued with public policy and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and
letter of Act No. 3135. (Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc., G.R. No. 139479,
December 27, 2002)
F. Repeal of Laws (Art. 7)
1. Kinds of Repeal
a. Express
b. Implied (not favored)
2. Effects
3. Sec. 444 of the Local Government Code
• Doctrines:
THE SAME SECTION IN THE OLD LAW NOT BEING RESTATED NOR RE-ENACTED IN THE NEW LAW
WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO IMPLIED REPEAL
Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or
abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later
act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
peradventure renewed. (Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992)
G. Judicial Decisions Form Part of the Law of the Land (Art. 8)
1. Doctrine of Stare Decisis
• Doctrines:
THE RULE THAT A NEW DOCTRINE ABROGATING AN OLD RULE SHOULD OPERATE PROSPECTIVELY
ONLY HOLDS MORE TRUE IN THE APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS
Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should
not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith
thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal
law, for, in this area, more than in any other it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society. (People v. Licera, G.R. No. L-39990, July 22, 1975)
H. Duty of Judges (Art. 9)
• Doctrines:
THE IGNORANCE OF THE COURT OR HIS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
A CASE SUBMITTED TO HIM FOR DECISION ARE NOT REASONS FOR THE COURT TO DISMISS THE CASE
WITHOUT DECIDING ON THE ISSUES THEREIN
The fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal
which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons
that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the
issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would
be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the
place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. (Chu Jan v. Bernas, G.R. No.
10010, August 1, 1916)

I. Doubtful Statues (Art. 10)
• Doctrines:
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE - A PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE IN THESE CASES - THE PRIMARY RULE IS TO SEARCH FOR AND DETERMINE THE INTENT AND
SPIRIT OF THE LAW
Legislative intent is the controlling factor, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
(People v. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66, L-46229-32, L-46313-16, & L-46997, November 20, 1978)
J. Customs (Arts. 11-12)
1. Requisites to make a custom an obligatory rule
a. Plurality or repetition of acts;
b. Practiced by the great mass of the social group;
c. Continued practice for a long period of time;
d. The community accepts it as a proper way of acting, such that it is considered as obligatory
upon all
• Doctrines:
ACTS, NOT DESTRUCTIVE AND WHICH RIPENED INTO CUSTOM, CANNOT BE HELD TO BE THEMSELVES
UNREASONABLE OR IMPRUDENT
Acts, the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been
acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. The very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are
beneficial rather than prejudicial. (Martinez v. Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910)
A CUSTOM MUST BE PROVED AS A FACT, ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil
Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact". The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. (Yao
Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988)
K. Computation of Period and Time (Art. 13)
1. Rule on Computation of Period: First day excluded, last day included
a. Years: 365 days, unless year identified
b. Months: 30 days, unless month identified
c. Days: 24 hours
d. Nights: Sunset to sundown
2. Exception: Computation of age (each year based on birth anniversary)
3. Policy if last day is a Sunday or legal holiday
• Doctrines:
A YEAR IS COMPOSED OF 12 CALENDAR MONTHS, THE NUMBER OF DAYS IS IRRELEVANT.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal
with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent
to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a
year is composed of 12 calendar months. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility between the two,
the Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the
more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. (Commission on Internal Revenue v. Primetown,
G.R. No. 162155. August 28, 2007)
L. Penal Laws (Art. 14)
1. Applicability in the Philippines if committed here
2. Territoriality

3. Exceptions
a. Public international law (diplomatic immunity, etc.)
b. Treaty stipulations
M. Civil Laws (Arts. 15-17)
1. General Rule: Nationality principle
a. Family rights and duties
b. Status
c. Condition
d. Legal capacity
• Doctrines:
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985)
AFTER A DIVORCE HAS BEEN DECREED, THE INNOCENT SPOUSE NO LONGER HAS THE RIGHT TO
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE OFFENDERS
The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons. (Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989)
IF THE FOREIGNER OBTAINS A VALID FOREIGN DIVORCE, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL HAVE THE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive
of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. (San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007)
THE DOCTRINE IN VAN DORN BECOMES APPLICABLE UPON PROOF THAT ONE OF THE FILIPINO
SPOUSES WAS NO LONGER A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE; HENCE, THE
DIVORCE BEING RECOGNIZED, SAID SPOUSE CAN NO LONGER INHERIT FROM THE OTHER
The Court deduces that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as
the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. (Quita v. Dandan, G.R. No. 124862, December 22,
1998)
2. Exceptions
a. Property transactions (real or personal): Lex situs
i. Exception to Exception: Succession: National law of the decedent
c. Order of successional rights: National law of the decedent
d. Amount of successional rights: National law of the decedent
e. Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions: National law of the decedent
f. Capacity to succeed: National law of the decedent
g. Art. 26, par. 2 of the Family Code

h. Lex Loci Celebrationis
i. Exceptions to the Exception:
.
I Intrinsic validity of ordinary contracts
II . Art. 26, par. 1 of the Family Code
3. Renvoi Doctrine
• Doctrines:
MATTERS BEARING UPON THE EXECUTION, INTERPRETATION AND VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT
ARE DETERMINED BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE CONTRACT IS MADE
Matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the
law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought. (Government v. Frank. G.R. No. L-2935, March 23, 1909)
THE RECOGNITION OF RENVOI THEORY IMPLIES THAT THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS INCORPORATING THE ORDINARY/INTERNAL LAW OF THE FOREIGN
STATE AND ITS RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it,
must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. (Aznar v.
Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963)
N. Suppletory Application of the Civil Code in Matters Governed by Special Laws (Art. 18)
II. Human Relations

A. Arts. 19-21
1. Doctrine of Abuse of Right
a. Requisites
• Doctrines:
A PERSON SHOULD NOT USE HIS RIGHT UNJUSTLY OR CONTRARY TO HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH,
OTHERWISE HE OPENS HIMSELF TO LIABILITY
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was
not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged
vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. (Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322,
December 6, 2006)
WHEN A RIGHT IS EXERCISED IN A MANNER NOT CONFORMING WITH THE NORMS IN ARTICLE 19
AND RESULTS IN DAMAGE, A LEGAL WRONG IS COMMITTED AND WRONGDOER MUST BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 – (1) to act with justice; (2) to give everyone his due; and (3) to observe
honesty and good faith - and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20, which
pertains to damage arising from a violation of law or Article 21, which pertains to damages arising from
a violation of morals, good customs or public policy would be proper. The right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to
the employee. (Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989)

WANT OF CARE TO THE CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS COUPLED WITH A
CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSE NATURALLY CALCULATED TO PRODUCE THEM WOULD
MAKE THE ERRING PARTY LIABLE
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of
the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want
of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. (University of the East v. Jader,
G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000)
BAD FAITH IS PRESUMED IF THERE IS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS
OF THE LAW THAT PREJUDICES/INJURES ANOTHER
R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to be authorized to disconnect its customer's
electric service on the basis of alleged electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an authorized
ERB representative must be present during the inspection of the electric facilities; and second, even if
there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto
committing the acts under Section 4 (a), the customer must still be given due notice prior to the
disconnection. In view of MERALCO's failure to comply with the strict requirements under Sections 4
and 6 of R.A. No. 7832, MERALCO had no authority to immediately disconnect the respondents' electric
service. As a result, the immediate disconnection of the respondents' electric service is presumed to be
in bad faith. (Manila Electric Co. v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 195145, February 10, 2016)
GOOD FAITH IS PRESUMED, AND HE WHO ALLEGES BAD FAITH HAS THE DUTY TO PROVE THE
SAME
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Bad faith, on the
other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Sending demand letters does not by itself would
constitute bad faith on the part of the sender. (Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008)
2. Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria
3. Damnum Absque Injuria
• Doctrines:
THE EXERCISE OF A LEGAL RIGHT OR DUTY IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH NO INTENTION TO
PREJUDICE OR INJURE ANOTHER WILL NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone. (Nikko Hotel v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005)
IN EVERY SITUATION OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, THEREFORE, THE INJURED PERSON ALONE
BEARS THE CONSEQUENCES
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the consequences
because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong. (Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 178467, April 26, 2017)
4. Acts Contra Bonus Mores
a. Requisites
b. Breach of Promise to Marry
• Doctrines:
MERE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG. BUT TO FORMALLY SET
A WEDDING AND GO THROUGH ALL THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED PREPARATION AND PUBLICITY,
ONLY TO WALK OUT OF IT WHEN THE MATRIMONY IS ABOUT TO BE SOLEMNIZED, IS QUITE
DIFFERENT
As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid. (Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964)
FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY ENTITLES THE PLAINTIFF TO
RECOVER DAMAGES

Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. (Gashem Shookat
Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 97336, February 19, 1993)
DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED BY THE FAMILY IF THE INJURY IS CAUSED IN A MANNER
CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of
the new Civil Code. (Pe v. Pe, G.R. No L-17396, May 30, 1962)
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT IN ITSELF AN ACTIONABLE WRONG
That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of
the American States. (Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960)
B. Unjust Enrichment (Art. 22)
1. Accion in rem verso
• Doctrines:
THERE IS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN RESPONDENT OBTAINED INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
THE MORTGAGED VEHICLE AS THE PETITIONER SPOUSES HAD ALREADY OBTAINED THE
REQUIRED INSURANCE COVERAGE
Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the
patrimony of a person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. (Spouses Villalva v. RCBC
Savings Bank, G.R. No. 165661, August 28, 2006)
MONEY RECEIVED WITHOUT A VALID GROUND OR JUSTIFICATION MUST BE RETURNED UNDER
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been
benefited without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another
person’s expense or damage. (Loria v. Muñoz, Jr., G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014)
AN ACCION IN REM VERSO DOES NOT APPLY IF THE ACTION IS PROSCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION OR BY THE APPLICATION OF THE IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem
verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by
the application of the pari delicto doctrine (Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003)
C. Respect for Other’s Privacy, Personality, Etc. (Art. 26)
• Doctrines:
IN THE ABSENCE OF MALICIOUS MOTIVES, A PARENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR ALIENATION OF
AFFECTIONS, AS WHERE HE ENTICES HIS SON OR DAUGHTER TO LEAVE HIS OR HER SPOUSE
He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations
in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and
advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment.
(Tenchavez v. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965)

AN ADVERTISMENT MISREPRESENTING A HOUSE BELONGING TO ANOTHER MISTAKENLY AND
UNNECESSARILY EXPOSES THE PRIVATE LIFE OF A PERSON; THUS, PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 26
St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the
questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil
who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps. Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were
confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that
Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He
suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. (St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
46061, November 14, 1984)
ARTICLE 26 OF THE CIVIL CODE GRANTS A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES, PREVENTION, AND
OTHER RELIEF IN CASES OF BREACH, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY CONSTITUTING A CRIMINAL
OFFENSE, OF THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: (1) RIGHT TO PERSONAL DIGNITY; (2) RIGHT TO PERSONAL
SECURITY; (3) RIGHT TO FAMILY RELATIONS; (4) RIGHT TO SOCIAL INTERCOURSE; (5) RIGHT TO
PRIVACY; AND (6) RIGHT TO PEACE OF MIND
It appears that Gregorio's rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity
of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the
opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to
refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
he suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time,
effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several
honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, September
11, 2009)
D. Unfair Competition (Art. 28)
• Doctrines:
WHAT THE LAW PROHIBITS IS NOT COMPETITION PER SE BUT THE USE OF UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE OR
HIGH-HANDED METHODS WHICH MAY DEPRIVE OTHERS OF A FAIR CHANCE TO ENGAGE IN BUSINESS
OR TO EARN A LIVING
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated
by unconscionable means. (Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp., G.R. No. 195549,
September 3, 2014)
E. Independent Civil Actions
1. Breach of Constitutional and Other Rights (Art. 32)
• Doctrines:
ALTHOUGH PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE AND PERFORM THEIR
DUTIES AS WHAT RULES AND LAWS PROVIDE, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM TRAMPLING THE
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable
in damages for violating Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said
article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation to the Penal Code or other penal
statute. (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988)
2. Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (Art. 33)
• Doctrines:
AS RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE OR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS NOT ONE OF THE THREE CRIMES
MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES THAT MAY BE INSTITUTED IN CONNECTION WITH SAID OFFENSE
Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that
the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same

criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action.
(Corpus v. Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969)
IN CASES OF DEFAMATION, FRAUD OR PHYSICAL INJURIES, A CIVIL ACTION MAY BE FILED
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION, EVEN IF THERE HAS BEEN NO RESERVATION MADE
BY THE INJURED PARTY
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party reserves his right to institute it separately. The present article creates an exception to this rule
when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party;
the law itself in this article makes such reservation. (Madeja v. Caro, G.R. No. L-51183, December 21,
1983)
ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE ASSUMES A DEFAMATION, FRAUD, OR PHYSICAL INJURIES
INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED
Criminal negligence under Article 365 of the RPC consists in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the negligent or
reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no
independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be
instituted under said article. (Bonite v. Zosa, G.R. No. L-33772, June 20, 1988)
3. Refusal or Failure of City or Municipal Police to Render Protection (Art. 34)
4. Quasi Delict or Culpa Aquiliana (Arts. 2176 and 2177)
F. Prejudicial Question (Art. 36)
1. General Rule: Criminal Case takes precedence
2. Exception: Rule 111, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court
3. Application to civil, criminal, administrative cases
• Doctrines:
THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHERE ONE CASE IS ADMINISTRATIVE AND THE OTHER IS
CIVIL
The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. It was previously ruled that there is
no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for
the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. (Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29,
2000)
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF VITIATED CONSENT IS
DEEMED A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE
Should the question for annulment of the second marriage prosper on the ground that petitioner's consent
thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary
and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. Thus, the issue involved in the action for
the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. (Zapanta v. Montesa, G.R. No. L-14534, February 28, 1962)
NO JUDICIAL DECREE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY OF NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES;
HENCE CONTRACTING A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH DECREE DOES NOT
RENDER THE OFFENDER LIABLE FOR BIGAMY
Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an
express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound
by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to. (People v. Aragon, G.R. No. L-10016, February 28,
1957) [NOTE: This was decided prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, which now, under Art. 40, categorically
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior void marriage for the purposes of contracting a subsequent
marriage.]
ABSENCE OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY AND MERE PRIVATE ACT OF SIGNING A MARRIAGE CONTRACT
BEAR NO LEGAL EFFECT, THUS, THE CONTRACT OF MARRIAGE IS NULL
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of

signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage. (Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004)
THE FINALITY OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF PETITIONER’S SECOND MARRIAGE
DOES NOT IMPEDE THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CHARGE FOR BIGAMY AGAINST HIM
it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that
the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with
private respondent. (Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013)
A DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY DOES NOT ABSOLVE THE OFFENDER OF CRIMINAL BIGAMY
A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
150758, February 18, 2004)
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, EVEN IF PENDING IN THE HLURB, AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY, RAISES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties' submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where
the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a
prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. (San Miguel Properties, Inc., v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836,
September 4, 2013)
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A CASE FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI-SQUATTING
LAW
The contention misses the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if for some
reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case
at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to
possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question
in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended. (Apa v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 112381, March 20, 1995)
III. Persons (Art. 37-51)

A. Juridical Capacity vs. Capacity to Act
1. Restrictions/Limitations and Modifications on Capacity to Act
B. Natural Persons
1. Beginning and End of Personality
a. When child considered born
2. Theory of General Capacities
• Doctrines:
AN UNBORN CHILD IS GIVEN BY LAW A PROVISIONAL PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN FOR ALL PURPOSES
FAVORABLE TO IT
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa

mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code. (Quimiguing v. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970)
NO ACTION FOR DAMAGES COULD BE INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF THE UNBORN CHILD
No action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received
and no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is generally held that recovery can not be had for the death of an unborn
child. (Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961)
C. R.A. No. 6809
D. Juridical Persons
1. How Created and How Terminated
2. Theory of Special Capacities
• Doctrines:
THE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT IS IN LAW REGARDED AS A PERSON AND MAY PROSECUTE AN
UNFINISHED ACTION OF THE DECEDENT TO ITS FINAL CONCLUSION
Within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be considered an artificial
or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include
the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations
of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application
before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to
its final conclusion. The right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute the application for a certificate of public
convenience to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it
constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property despite the possibility that in the
end the commission might have denied the application. (Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Fragante, G.R. No. L-
770, April 27, 1948)
E. Rules on Survivorship
F. Citizenship
• Doctrines:
AN ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING A FILIPNO BECOMES IPSO FACTO A FILIPINA PROVIDED SHE IS NOT
DISQUALIFIED TO BE A CITIZEN UNDER SECTION 4, CA 473
An alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalize here or a natural Filipino follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does
not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. (Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971)
DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION NOT A BAR FOR APPLICATION FOR
JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not
prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. Even if the denial was based on other
grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in
fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
(Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013)
IT IS NOT ONLY THE LAW ITSELF (P.D. 725) WHICH IS TO BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT, BUT EVEN
THE REPATRIATION GRANTED UNDER SAID LAW.
It is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted
under said law. The reason for this is simply that if, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being --
in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the
fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. (Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996)
G. Domicile vs. Residence

• Doctrines:
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE; FOR
PURPOSES OF POLITICAL LAW, RESIDENCE IS USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH DOMICILE
There is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
Domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent;
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place, i.e.,
the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. However, in our election law, what
has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile. (Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)
IV. Marriage
A. Definition (Art. 1)
1. Special Contract vs. Ordinary Contract
B. Requirements (Arts. 2-6)
1. Essential
a. Legal Capacity
i. Sex
ii. Age
.
I 18-21 requires parental consent: Voidable if none
II . 21-25 requires parental advice: Valid if none but issuance of marriage license is
suspended for 3 months
.
A Effect if license issued before 3 months: Mere irregularity
iii. Absence of Impediments (Arts. 35[4], 36-38, 52-53)
b. Consent
2. Formal
3. Effects
a. Absence of Essential or Formal: Void
i. Exception: Art. 35(2)
b. Defective Essential: Voidable
c. Irregular Formal: Valid but persons liable punished civilly, criminally or administratively
i. Exception: Voidable if no consent from parents, either or both of contracting parties at 18
or above but below 21
C. Authority of solemnizing officer (Art 7)
1. Persons authorized
• Doctrines:
WHILE SOLEMNIZING A MARRIAGE OUTSIDE HIS COURT'S JURISDICTION MAY SUBJECT THE
OFFICIATING JUDGE TO ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY, THE SAME IS A MERE IRREGULARITY AND
MAY NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. (Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088,

July 19, 1996) [NOTE: This may be considered as a mere obiter dictum since the issue involves the liability
of a judge and not the validity of a marriage.]
2. Exception: Either or both parties in good faith, person unauthorized to solemnize marriage Art.
35(2)
D. Valid Marriage License
1. Art. 9, Art. 10, Art. 20
2. Marriages Exempt from Marriage License (Arts. 27-34)
a. No good faith exception
• Doctrines:
THE FIVE-YEAR COHABITATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT
SHOULD BE A COHABITATION WHEREIN BOTH PARTIES ARE CAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH
OTHER DURING THE ENTIRE FIVE-YEAR CONTINUOUS PERIOD
That five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000) [NOTE: This was decided on the basis of the Art. 76
of the NCC, and not of Art. 34 of the FC.]
A JUDGE MAY BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR SOLEMNIZING A MARRIAGE UNDER
ARTICLE 34 WHERE LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS EXISTED DURING COHABITATION
The judges' gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34
of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such
as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are,
doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been
capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage. (Office
of the Court Administrator v. Necesario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 [Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC], April 2,
2013) [NOTE: This may be considered as a mere obiter dictum since the issue involves the liability of a judge
and not the validity of a marriage.]
THE FALSITY OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF MARITAL COHABITATION, WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE IN
TRUTH FALLEN SHORT OF THE MINIMUM FIVE-YEAR REQUIREMENT, EFFECTIVELY RENDERS
THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
(Republic v. Dayot, G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008)
RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION OF A CIVIL MARRIAGE UNDER ARTICLE 77 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE,
WHEREIN PROCUREMENT OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE MAY BE DISPENSED WITH, DOES NOT APPLY
WHERE THERE WAS NO PRIOR CIVIL MARRIAGE TO RATIFY
Article 77 of the Civil Code pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a
marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are
exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent
religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the
parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil
marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature. Being that the ceremony held

was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any
ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does
not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. (Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, July
27, 2016)
3. When either or both parties are foreign citizens, stateless persons or refugees (Art. 21)
E. Marriage Ceremony
1. No particular form prescribed
2. Minimum requirements:
a. Appear before Solemnizing officer
i. Proxy Marriage
b. Declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
c. Presence of at least 2 witnesses of legal age
i. Absence merely an irregularity
F. Non-Essential/Non-Formal Requirements
1. Marriage Contract or Marriage Certificate: Best evidence
• Doctrines:
SINCE THE DUE EXECUTION AND THE LOSS OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT WERE CLEARLY
SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, SECONDARY EVIDENCE — TESTIMONIAL AND
DOCUMENTARY — MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROVE THE FACT OF MARRIAGE
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. (Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999)
2. Venue of Marriage (Art. 8)
a. Directory, not affect validity of marriage
G. Foreign Marriage
1. General Rule: Where one or both parties to the marriage are citizens of the Philippines, the foreign
marriage is valid in this country if solemnized in accordance with the laws of the country of
celebration
2. Exceptions:
a. Contracted by a national who is below 18 years of age
b. Bigamous or polygamous (except as provided in Art. 41, FC)
c. Contracted through mistake of one party as to the identity of the other
d. Contracted following the annulment or declaration of nullity of a previous marriage but before
partition
e. Void due to psychological incapacity
f. Incestuous
g. Void for reasons of public policy
3. Divorce (Art. 26(2))
a. Requisites
i. Valid marriage between Filipino citizen and foreigner
ii. Valid divorce obtained
• Doctrines:
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985)
OUR COURTS DO NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS AND JUDGMENTS; HENCE, LIKE
ANY OTHER FACTS, BOTH THE DIVORCE DECREE AND THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE ALIEN MUST
BE ALLEGED AND PROVEN ACCORDING TO OUR LAW ON EVIDENCE
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient. (Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001)
A FILIPINO CITIZEN HAS THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW AFTER
INITIATING A DIVORCE PROCEEDING ABROAD AND OBTAINING A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT
AGAINST HIS OR HER ALIEN SPOUSE WHO IS CAPACITATED TO REMARRY
Based on a clear and plain reading of [Paragraph 2 of Article 26], it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether
the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. Assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. (Republic v.
Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018)
PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE INCLUDES CASES INVOLVING PARTIES WHO,
AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE WERE FILIPINO CITIZENS, BUT LATER
ON, ONE OF THEM BECOMES NATURALIZED AS A FOREIGN CITIZEN AND OBTAINS A DIVORCE
DECREE
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005)
IN A MARRIAGE BETWEEN FILIPINOS, A DIVORCE DECREE OBTAINED BY ONE OF THEM PRIOR TO
HER NATURALIZATION AS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple
is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. And pursuant to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. (Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577,
September 21, 2005)
ONLY THE FILIPINO SPOUSE CAN INVOKE THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE; THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAN CLAIM NO RIGHT UNDER THIS PROVISION
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law. (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE TO
ALIENS DOES NOT NECESSARILY STRIP AN ALIEN OF LEGAL INTEREST TO PETITION THE RTC FOR
THE RECOGNITION OF HIS FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest
to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts
for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law. (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
THE SPOUSE OF A PRIOR MARRIAGE CAN FILE A PETITION TO RECOGNIZE A FOREIGN JUDGMENT
NULLIFYING THE SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS OR HER SPOUSE AND A FOREIGN
CITIZEN ON THE GROUND OF BIGAMY
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. (Fujiki v. Marinay,
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC DOES NOT APPLY IN A PETITION TO RECOGNIZE FOREIGN JUDGMENT
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF A MARRIAGE WHERE ONE OF THE PARTIES IS AN ALIEN
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC applies would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the
form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the
setting of pre-trial, the trial, and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive
litigations on claims and issues. (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
V. Void Marriage
A. Grounds
1. Where any party is below 18, even with consent of parents/guardians (Art. 35[1])
2. Absence of authority of person who solemnized the marriage (Art. 35[2])
a. Exception: Any or both of parties in good faith
3. Absence of Marriage License
a. Exceptions: Arts. 27-34
• Doctrines:
FOR A MARRIAGE TO BE CONSIDERED VOID ON THE GROUND OF ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE
LICENSE, THE LAW REQUIRES THAT THE ABSENCE OF SUCH MARRIAGE LICENSE MUST BE
APPARENT ON THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT, OR AT THE VERY LEAST, SUPPORTED BY A
CERTIFICATION FROM THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR THAT NO SUCH MARRIAGE LICENSE WAS
ISSUED TO THE PARTIES
The license is the essence of the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. (Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016)
4. Bigamous or Polygamous (Art. 35[4])
• Doctrines:
TO BE CONVICTED OF BIGAMY, THE SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE MUST HAVE ALL THE
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the
marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper
of the criminal case. (Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015)
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR BIGAMY
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. The subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. (Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 13, 2013)
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT A GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL
CASE FOR BIGAMY
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. (Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)
BIGAMY IS CONSUMNATED AT THE MOMENT OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE NULLITY OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had
not yet been legally dissolved. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. (Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No.
181089, October 22, 2012)
a. Presumptive Death (Art. 41)
i. Effect of Reappearance of Absent Spouse
• Doctrines:
THE PRESENT SPOUSE MUST HAVE WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE PRIOR SPOUSE WAS
ALREADY DEAD
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. (Republic v. Tampus, G.R.
No. 214243, March 16, 2016)
THE "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" REQUISITE UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE
REQUIRES EXERTION OF ACTIVE EFFORT, NOT A MERE PASSIVE ONE
For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required by
law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse
allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse's relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when
there is failure to report the missing spouse's purported disappearance or death to the police or
mass media, and (3) when the present spouse's evidence might or would only show that the absent
spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead. (Republic v.
Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016)
5. Mistake in (Physical) Identity (Art. 35[5])
6. Void Subsequent Marriage
a. Without judicial declaration of nullity of previous void marriage (Art. 40)
• Doctrines:
A FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING THE PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID NEED NOT BE OBTAINED
ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE
The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other
incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. When a marriage is declared
void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common

children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings.” (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17,
1993)
THE REQUIREMENT OF A JUDICIAL DECREE FOR THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE DOES NOT
APPLY TO MARRIAGES CELEBRATED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in
effect at the time of its celebration. As this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were
born while the Civil Code was in force. (Castillo v. De Leon-Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016)
THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
PRIOR TO A SECOND MARRIAGE APPLIES TO MARRIAGES CELEBRATED UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. (Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012)
A SECOND MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUDICIAL DECLARATION IS BIGAMOUS REGARDLESS OF THE
EVIDENCE OF NULLITY OF FIRST MARRIAGE
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they
are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage. (Vitangcol v. People,
G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
THE DECLARATION IN THE INSTANT CASE OF NULLITY OF THE PREVIOUS MARRIAGE OF THE
DECEASED AND PETITIONER DOES NOT VALIDATE THE SECOND MARRIAGE OF THE
DECEASED WITH RESPONDENT
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. (Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529,
February 2, 2001)
ARTICLE 40, WHICH IS A RULE OF PROCEDURE, SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the
Family Code itself provides that said “Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.” The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. (Jarillo v. People, G.R.
No. 164435, June 29, 2010)
ARTICLE 40 IS APPLICABLE TO REMARRIAGES ENTERED INTO AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF
THE FAMILY CODE REGARDLESS OF THE DATE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case. (Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995)
b. Without judicial declaration of presumptive death of absent spouse (Art. 41)
c. Where the absent spouse was presumed dead, and both the present spouse and would–be
spouse were in bad faith in contracting marriage (Art. 44)
d. Failure to record in the civil registry and registry of property the judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, partition and distribution of the property of the spouses and
the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes (Arts. 52–53)
e. Effect of Termination of Subsequent Marriage (Art. 43)
i. Children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be
considered legitimate

ii. Dissolution & liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership. If either
spouse acted in bad faith, his share in the net profits shall be forfeited:
.
I In favor of the common children;
II . If none, in favor of the children of the guilty spouse by previous marriage; or
III. In default of children, in favor of the innocent spouse;
iii. Donations by reason of marriage remain valid except if the donee contracted the marriage
in bad faith
iv. The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the spouse in bad faith as the
beneficiary in any insurance policy
v. The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate succession
7. Psychological Incapacity
a. Elements
b. Molina Doctrine
• Doctrines:
"PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY" SHOULD REFER TO NO LESS THAN A MENTAL (NOT
PHYSICAL) INCAPACITY THAT CAUSES A PARTY TO BE TRULY INCOGNITIVE OF THE BASIC
MARITAL COVENANTS THAT CONCOMITANTLY MUST BE ASSUMED AND DISCHARGED BY
THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved. (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995)
MOLINA DOCTRINE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS A GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE; GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code for the guidance of the
bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children; (7) Interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997)
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, AS A GROUND FOR DECLARING THE NULLITY OF A MARRIAGE,
MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED. THERE IS NO
REQUIREMENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN
OR A PSYCHOLOGIST AS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR SUCH DECLARATION
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. (Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000)
THE PRESENTATION OF ANY FORM OF MEDICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HOWEVER, DID NOT MEAN THAT THE SAME WOULD

HAVE AUTOMATICALLY ENSURED THE GRANTING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings. (Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017)
SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL TO HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURS IS EQUIVALENT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. (Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997)
NO AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ON NULLIY ON THE GROUND OF
The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful.
(Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005)
SEXUAL INFIDELITY PER SE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE FAMILY CODE; MERE SHOWING OF "IRRECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES" AND "CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES" IN NO WISE CONSTITUTES
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. (Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004)
A PERSON WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER, CANNOT
ASSUME THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. ALTHOUGH ON A DIFFERENT PLANE, THE
SAME MAY ALSO BE SAID OF THE RESPONDENT, WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH ANTISOCIAL
PERSONALITY DISORDER
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The seriousness of the
diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the
parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. (Ngo-Te v. Yu-Te, G.R.
No. 161793, February 13, 2009)
THE INTENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO CONFINE THE MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS
Petitioner's theory that the respondent's psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or
unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits
such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the
level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
"difficulty", if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders — existing at the time of the marriage
— clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and

responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. (Agraviador v. Amparo-
Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010)
OBSSESSIVE COMPULSIVE PERSONALITY DISORDER DOES NOT EQUATE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY ABSENT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CONDITIONS PRESRIBED BY
JURISPRUDENCE
To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
(Republic v. Romero, G.R. No. 209180, February 24, 2016)
BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF THE MOLINA GUIDELINES, NEITHER THE FAMILY CODE
NOR JURISPRUDENCE MANDATED THAT THE INCURABILITY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY BE ESTABLISHED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
The final point in the Molina guidelines is that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It is to be noted that the testimony of the expert
witnesses and the decision of the trial court transpired well before Molina was promulgated and
made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Santos v. CA did refer to that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." However, in
formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. (Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No.
155800, March 10, 2006)
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO AMOUNT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT IT PREVENTED THE
OFFENDING SPOUSE FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
(Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016)
FINAL JUDGMENT DENYING A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY ON THE GROUND
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY BARS A SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY ON THE GROUND OF MARRIAGE LICENSE
In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
(Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528; October 31,2006)
8. Incestuous (Art. 37)
a. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree
b. Between brothers and sisters whether of the full or half blood
9. Void for Reasons of Public Policy
a. Collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate up to the 4th civil degree
b. Step–parents & step children
c. Parents–in–law & children–in–law
d. The adopting parent & the adopted child
e. The surviving spouse of the adopting parent & the adopted child
f. The surviving spouse of the adopted child & the adopter

g. Adopted child & a legitimate child of the adopter
h. Adopted children of the same adopter
i. Parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed the latter’s spouse, or his/her
spouse.
.
I There is no need for conviction in a criminal case of the guilty party. The fact of killing
committed by one of the parties to the marriage can be proved in a civil case
B. Action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
1. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
2. A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
• Doctrines:
IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NO MARRIAGE THAT TOOK PLACE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION
UNDER RULE 108 MAY BE UNDERTAKEN TO CHANGE ONE’S CIVIL STATUS
A petition for cancellation of Entries under Rule 108 may be undertaken specifically in the wife portion in
cases where there is no marriage that took place, such as when the only evidence of the marriage is the
marriage certificate. This is not a case of nullification of marriage because there was no marriage to speak of.
(Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014)
VOID MARRIAGES CELEBRATED DURING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE MAY BE QUESTIONED
EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. (Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)
VI. Voidable Marriage

A. Grounds: Must exist at time of Marriage (Art. 45)
1. 18 or over but below 21 without consent of parents or guardian
2. Either party unsound mind
3. Consent obtained by fraud
a. Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude
b. Wife concealed pregnancy by another at time of marriage
c. Concealment of STD existing at time of marriage
d. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism at time of
marriage
• Doctrines:
THAT THE PREGNANCY IS READILY APPARENT CANNOT BE SUSTAINED AS A DEFENSE IN AN
ANNULMENT CASE BASED ON FRAUD (CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY) AS THERE WAS EVIDENCE
THAT THE WOMAN IS NATURALLY PLUMP
At the time of marriage, the wife was alleged to be only four months pregnant. At that stage, there is no
assurance that her pregnancy is readily apparent to the husband since according to him, Conchita was
“naturally plump”. According to medical authorities, only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of
the abdomen more general and apparent. Therefore, it was possible that at the time of the marriage, the
husband did not suspect that his wife was already pregnant. The fact of pregnancy could have been
successfully concealed from him by his wife if she were only five months pregnant but not if she were
already in her 7th month pregnancy. (Aquino v. Delizo, G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960)
NON-DISCLOSURE OF A HUSBAND’S PRE-MARITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER WOMAN IS
NOT ONE OF THE ENUMERATED CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A GROUND FOR
ANNULMENT BASED ON FRAUD
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment under Article 86 of the Civil

Code (now Article 46 of the Family Code). It is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article,
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having
been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her
grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which
society, and not herself alone, is interested. (Anaya v. Fernando Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, November
26, 1970)
4. Consent obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence
5. Either physically incapable of consummating marriage, incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable
a. Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation
• Doctrines:
IMPOTENCY IS NOT STERILITY, BUT THE PHYSICAL INABILITY TO HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility. Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual
intercourse; it is different from sterility. Impotence is the inability on the part of the male organ of
copulation to perform its proper function. Impotence applies only to disorders affecting the functions of
the organ of copulation, while sterility applies only to lack of fertility in the reproductive elements of
either sex. (Menciano v. San Jose, G.R. No. L-1967, May 28, 1951)
6. Either party afflicted with serious STD which appears to be incurable
B. Action for Annulment of Marriage
1. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
2. A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
3. Persons who may file action for annulment; Period for filing
a. Parents/Guardian who did not give consent before party reaches 21
b. Party within 5 years from majority unless freely cohabited
c. During the lifetime, either party or any relative or person having legal charge
d. Within 5 years from discovery by injured party unless thereafter freely cohabited
e. Within 5 years after force, intimidation or undue influence ceased by the injured party unless
thereafter freely cohabited
f. Injured party within 5 years from marriage for STD and or incapacity to consummate marriage
4. Role of Prosecuting Attorney/ Public Prosecutor
• Doctrines:
A STRICT APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 48 AND 60 WILL NOT APPLY IF IT IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT
EVERY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A NO-HOLDS BARRED CONTEST AND
NOT BY COLLUSION
In all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. (Tuason v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996)
C. Effect of Termination of Marriage
1. Children
a. Status
b. Custody
2. Support (Spouse, child)
3. Presumptive Legitime

4. Property Relation
a. Liquidation of Community of Property
5. Testate or Intestate Succession
6. Insurance Policy
7. Donation Propter Nuptias
• Doctrines:
THE PRESUMPTION OF CUSTODY IN FAVOR OF THE MOTHER UNDER ARTICLE 213 OF THE FAMILY
CODE NO LONGER APPLIES IF THE CHILD IS OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE
The welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that
either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age and are
thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice. (Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115640,
March 15, 1995)
BECAUSE OF ITS PROVISIONAL NATURE, THE COURT NEED NOT DELVE FULLY ON THE MERITS OF THE
PETITION FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BEFORE THE PARTIES CAN BE AFFORDED OF SUPPORT
PENDETE LITE PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or
upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a
court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
(Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013)
IN CASE OF INCAPACITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT BY THE FORMER SPOUSES AFTER A DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE SAME SHALL BE PROVIDED BY PERSONS OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT
UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the
more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who
are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. (Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125041, June 30, 2006)
THE SEPARATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES IS ONE OF THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES
OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
Petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose, is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993)
VII. Legal Separation

A. Grounds (Art. 55)
• Doctrines:
PRIOR CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF CONCUBINAGE IS NOT INDISPENSIBLE FOR A PETITION FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION TO PROSPER
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. The guilt of the
spouse by final judgment is not a requirement. (Gandionco v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987)
A PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION MAY BE FILED ON THE GROUND OF REPEATED PHYSICAL
VIOLENCE OR GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT DIRECTED AGAINST THE PETITIONER, A COMMON CHILD,
OR A CHILD OF PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 55, PAR. 1 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art.
55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were
adequately proven. (Ong v. Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006)
B. Action for Legal Separation
1. A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, March 15, 2003

2. A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
3. Effects of Filing Petition
4. Cooling-off Period (Art. 58); Sec. 19, RA 9262
• Doctrines:
ARTICLE 103 THE CIVIL CODE (NOW ARTICLE 58 OF THE FAMILY CODE) IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE
BAR TO THE HEARING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF
THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD
Article 103 of the Civil Code (now Article 58 of The Family Code) prohibiting the hearing of an action for
legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would not likewise preclude
the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary
remedy to such a suit. Thus, the question of management of their respective property need not be left
unresolved even during such six-month period. (Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr., G.R. No. L-34132, July
29, 1972)
5. Grounds for Denial of Petition (Art. 56)
• Doctrines:
THE ACT OF THE WIFE IN LEAVING THE HUSBAND DUE TO THE LATTER’S ABUSIVE CONDUCT
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT UNDER ARTICLE 55, WHICH REQUIRES THAT IT BE DONE
WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE AND FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR
Having established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision. The abandonment referred to but the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. (Ong v. Ong, G.R. No 153206, October 23,
2006)
CONDONATION IN CASES OF LEGAL SEPARATION
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated
in I Bouver's Law Dictionary, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". A single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband. (Bugayong v. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28,
1956)
CONDONATION LIES IN THE WIFE’S ASSUMPTION THAT SHE REALLY BELIEVED HER HUSBAND IS
GUIILTY OF CONCUBINAGE
The question of whether the wife condoned the concubinage lies in the wife’s "line of conduct under the
assumption that she really believed [her husband] guilty of concubinage.” (Busuego v. Office of
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 196842, October 9, 2013)
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION IS PURELY PERSONAL. DEATH OF ONE PARTY CAUSES THE
DEATH OF THE ACTION ITSELF
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio
personalis moritur cum persona. (Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972)
4. Period for Filing (Art. 57)
C. Effects of Decree of Legal Separation
• Doctrines:
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER TO ENJOIN A SPOUSE FROM INTERFERING WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES PENDING A SUIT FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting
these matters during the pendency of the suit. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator
has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any
share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary
injunction. (Sabalones v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106169, February 14, 1994)
IN LEGAL SEPARATION, IT IS THE ONLY THE NET PROFITS AND NOT THE SHARE OF THE OFFENDING
SPOUSE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP THAT IS FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF THE COMMON CHILDREN

Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated
and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership. what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property
but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. (Siochi v. Gozon, G.R. Nos. 169900 &
169977, March 18, 2010)
A PARTIAL VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY MADE BY THE SPOUSES PENDING THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE MAY BE ALLOWED
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the
proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that
this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of
gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code. (Maquilan v.
Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007)
D. Effects of Reconciliation
VIII. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Arts. 68-73)
• Doctrines:
MARRIAGE CREATES AN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE HUSBAND TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE
An obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him
to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. (Goitia v.
Campos-Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 12, 1916)
COURTS CANNOT COMPEL ONE OF THE SPOUSES TO COHABIT WITH, AND RENDER CONJUGAL RIGHTS, TO
THE OTHER
At best a preliminary mandatory injunction order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses
to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo
v. De Arroyo, G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921)
ESSENTIAL OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS TO INQUIRE IN ALL MANNER OF
INVOLUNTARY RESTRAINT, AND TO RELIEVE A PERSON THEREFROM IF SUCH RESTRAINT IS ILLEGAL
The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. (Ilusorio v. Bildner, G.R
Nos. 139789 & 139808, May 12, 2000)
FAILURE TO PERFORM MARITAL OBLIGATIONS IS ACTIONABLE BY WAY OF DAMAGES
Refusal to perform wifely duties, and denial of consortium and desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong
caused through fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity. (Tenchavez v. Escaño,
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965)
IX. Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

A. Marriage Settlement
1. Requisites
2. Modifications: Must be made before marriage
a. Exception: Judicial Separation of Property During Marriage (Art. 76)
• Doctrines:
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS CANNOT BE MODIFIED AFTER MARRIAGE
Marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. Post-marriage modification of such
settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved
and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and
agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground
that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d)
there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the
voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. (Pana v. Heirs of Juanite,
Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012)

B. Absence of Marriage Settlement, Joint Administration (Arts. 96, 124[1])
1. General Rule: Property relations governed by Philippine laws (Art. 80)
2. Exceptions:
a. Both spouses are aliens
b. As to extrinsic validity of contracts
i. Not situated and executed in the Philippines
ii. Situated in the foreign country but not executed in the Philippines
c. Contrary stipulation
3. In case of disagreement, husband’s decision prevails
a. Wife: Relief from courts within 5 years from transaction
4. Incapacity of spouse or cannot provide for joint administration: Assumption of sole administration
(Arts. 96, 124[2])
5. Transfer of administration (Art. 142)
6. Administration vs. Acts of Ownership
7. Management of household
8. Failure to comply with obligation (Arts. 101, 128)
C. Donations by Reason of Marriage
1. Requisites
2. Distinguished from ordinary donation
• Doctrines:
EXPRESS ACCEPTANCE IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE VALIDITY OF DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS
Article 129 of the New Civil Code provides that express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these
donations”, thus, implied acceptance is sufficient. Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code provides that "acceptance
is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". Therefore, the celebration of the marriage between the
beneficiary couple, with compliance with the prescribed form, is enough to effectuate a donation propter
nuptias. (Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003)
D. Donation between Spouses During the Marriage
• Doctrines:
BAN ON DONATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE APPLIES TO COMMON-LAW
RELATIONSHIP
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. (Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, March
31, 1971)
A DONATION MADE BETWEEN SPOUSES WITHOUT A VALID MARRIAGE IS VOID UNDER ARTICLE 87
OF THE FAMILY CODE
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco
in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. (Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683,
November 22, 2001)
TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN SPOUSES CANNOT BE ATTACKED BY PARTIES WHO DO NOT
BEAR ANY RELATION WITH THE SPOUSES
Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred
to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making
the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a
relationship appears, the transfer cannot be attacked. (Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., G.R. No.
L-12707, August 10, 1918)
E. Grounds for Revocation

F. Property Relations Governed By
1. Marriage settlement
2. By provisions of the Family Code
3. By local customs
G. Absolute Community of Property
1. General Rule: Consists of all property owned by the spouses at the time of the marriage or acquired
thereafter (Art. 91)
2. Exceptions
a. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage
b. Property for personal and exclusive use except jewelry
c. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, except when the donor, testator or
grantor expressly provides otherwise (Art. 92)
• Doctrines:
PROPERTY BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE FORM PART OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THE SPOUSES FOR THE PURCHASE OF SUCH
PROPERTY PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property
for the law itself defines what constitutes community property. Whatever property each spouse brings
into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of
the FC) form the common mass of the couple's properties. (Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11,
2015)
3. Administration and Disposition
• Doctrines:
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY EXECUTED BY A SPOUSE CONSTITUTES AS ACCEPTANCE
PERFECTING THE CONTINUING OFFER CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLES 96 AND 124 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
A special power of attorney executed by the other spouse subsequent to a transaction disposing or
encumbering common property without prior consent or authority of the court constitutes as an
acceptance by such spouse which perfects the continuing offer, as provided for under Article 96 and 124
of the Family Code. (Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr., G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011)
4. Rule on Game of Chance
5. Remedies of Present Spouse in Case of Abandonment
• Doctrines:
ABSOLUTE CESSATION OF MARITAL RELATIONS, DUTIES AND RIGHTS, WITH THE INTENTION OF
PERPETUAL SEPARATION IS NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE ABANDONMENT
The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
desertion. As in Article 178, to constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be
absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
(De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968)
6. Charges upon and Obligations
7. Liquidation (Art. 102)
8. Grounds for Termination (Art. 99)
H. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
1. Properties under Conjugal Partnership of Gains
• Doctrines:

PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION BY BOTH PARTIES IS REQUIRED, OTHERWISE THERE IS NO
CO-OWNERSHIP AND NO PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL SHARING
A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the
live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution.
Proof of actual contribution by both parties is required; otherwise there is no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal sharing. (Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004)
PROCEEDS OF AN INSURANCE POLICY; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
The proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid
by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the
other half to the wife, exclusively; that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly
conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part;
and that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if
delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under
probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they
belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or
outside. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Posadas, Jr., G.R. No. L-34583, October 22, 1931)
THAT ALL PROPERTIES OF THE MARRIAGE BELONG TO CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS A
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. (Jocson v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989)
PROPERTIES BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE MARRIAGE WHERE, DURING ITS
SUBSISTENCE, FULL OWNERSHIP WAS ACQUIRED
It is only upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale that full ownership was vested in Daniel
Jovellanos. Since, as early as 1967 he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property
necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife. (Jovellanos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992)
PROPERTY PURCHASED PARTLY WITH PARAPHERNAL FUNDS AND PARTLY WITH CONJUGAL
FUNDS BELONGS TO BOTH PATRIMONIES IN COMMON, IN PROPORTION TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF EACH
As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the
conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in
common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price. (Castillo, Jr. v. Pasco,
G.R. No. L-16857, May 29, 1964)
2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse (Art. 109)
• Doctrines:
TRUSTEE OBLIGED TO CONVEY PROPERTY TO RIGHTFUL OWNER
As the trustee of a constructive trust, petitioner has an obligation to convey to the private respondents
that part of the land in question to which she now claims an ostensible title, said portion rightfully
pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin
Lacerna. (Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. 73733, December 16, 1986)
MERE CONSTRUCTION OF A BUILDING FROM COMMON FUNDS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE WIFE’S LAND TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of a building from common funds does
not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a mode of
using the land, namely, by erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct
pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife's land. (Vda. de Padilla v. Vda. de Padilla, G.R. No.
L-48137, October 4, 1943)
HE WHO SEEKS INDEMINITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM DEPRIVATION OF A WIFE’S
DOMESTIC SERVICES, MUST PROVE SUCH SERVICES
Inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary
acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to do, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity
for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was
injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so
doing. (Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. L-39587, March 24, 1934)

WIFE’S DECISION TO DISMISS A CASE IS BINDING UPON THE HUSBAND ONLY IF HE OR SHE IS THE
REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
Under Article 113 of the Civil Code, the husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except,
if they have in fact been separated for at least one year. The suit contemplated under the said article is
one in which the wife is the real party-in-interest. Said provision cannot apply to the husband if he is the
main party-in-interest, both as to the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal
partnership. (Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972)
3. Rule in Case of Improvement of Exclusive Property
a. Accession
b. Reverse Accession
• Doctrines:
PRESUMPTION THAT IMPROVEMENT BELONGS TO THE SPOUSE WHO OWNS THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY
Proof is needful of the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the
funds used therefor, in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. Where property is registered in the name of one
spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is
that it belongs exclusively to said spouse. (Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74577,
December 4, 1990)
INCOME DUE TO WIDOW DURING PERIOD OF ADMINISTRATION
As sole owner of those properties that never became a conjugal because the conjugal improvements
thereon were destroyed before they could be paid for the widow, as well as those properties that never
ceased to be paraphernal because there were paraphernal buildings thereon at the time of the
termination of the conjugal partnership, the widow is also the owner of all their income that accrued
during their administration by the executrix-appellant until they were finally delivered to the estate of
the said widow, who later died, minus the administration expenses incurred by said executrix-appellant
with respect to those paraphernal properties. (Vda. De Padilla v. Paterno, G.R. No. L-8748, December 26,
1961)
4. Charges upon and Obligations
• Doctrines:
OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTED BY ONE OF THE SPOUSES WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER
SPOUSE MUST REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN ORDER TO BE
CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
A conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. (BA Finance Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-61464, May 28, 1998)
IN ACTING AS A GUARANTOR OR SURETY FOR A THIRD PARTY, A SPOUSE DOES NOT ACT FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
In acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. If the husband himself is the principal
obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership for it is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. (Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Mar Tierra Corp., G.R. No. 143382, November 29,
2006)
ONE SPOUSE MAY SEPARATELY BRING AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF CREDIT WITHOUT THE
NECESSITY OF JOINING THE OTHER SPOUSE
Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "a partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific
partnership property." Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance
the four checks used to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the
credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes the spouses de Guzman co-owners of
the alleged credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, the spouses may separately bring an action for
the recovery thereof. In a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned

property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. (Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, G.R.
No. 160347, November 29, 2006)
PROPERTY PURCHASED BY SPOUSES DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THEIR MARRIAGE IS PRESUMED
TO BE CONJUGAL IN NATURE
This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property is
paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one
spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. (Spouses
Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006)
ALL PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE ARE PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. (Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004)
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS BENEFITED WHEN A SPOUSE
ENTERS INTO A CONTRACT OF SURETY
The private respondent carries the burden of proof to establish that such benefit redounded to the
conjugal partnership. (Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, G.R. Nos. 217617 & 218540 [Resolution], April 5, 2017)
DEBTS, FINES, AND PECUNIARY INDEMNITIES CONTRACTED BY THE HUSBAND OR THE WIFE
BEFORE THE MARRIAGE ARE NOT CHARGEABLE TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as well as fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such
obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
of the New Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the
same is insufficient. (Lacson v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-19346, May 31, 1965)
WHEN THE CIVIL CODE STILL WAS STILL THE OPERATIVE LAW ON MARRIAGES, THE
PRESUMPTION, ABSENT ANY EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, WAS THAT THEY WERE MARRIED
UNDER THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
Were [the spouses] married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on marriages. The
presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of the
conjugal partnership of gains. (Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012)
INDEBTEDNESS OF THE SPOUSE INCURRED WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE IS NOT
CHARGEABLE TO THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of
the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support
of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs
may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them. (Spouses Wong v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991)
HOSPITALIZATION EXPENSES FOR ONE SPOUSE IS CHARGEABLE TO THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY
The consent of the wife is not required when a disposition of 1/2 of the undivided conjugal properties
was made in order to finance the husband’s hospitalization and medication which are chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. (Costuna v. Domondon, G.R. No. 82753, December 19, 1989)
5. Administration of Conjugal Partnership Property
• Doctrines:
THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE IN A DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY MAYBE
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
The act of the wife signing the 3rd page of the deed of sale, even if the 1st and 2nd page were not signed,
amounts to an implied consent to such disposition of property. (Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, June 8,
2005)
THE RULES ON PARTNERSHIP UNDER THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES SUPPLETORILY TO THE RULES
ON CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by

the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed,
foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the
rules on partnership under the Civil Code. (Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802,
March 11, 2005)
THE RULES ON SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS GOVERNING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY
CODE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE SPOUSE IS INCOMPETENT TO GIVE CONSENT
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse
is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. (Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000)
CONSENT OF BOTH SPOUSES REQUIRED TO DISPOSE CONJUGAL PROPERTY
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. (Jader-Manalo v. Spouses Camaisa, G.R.
No. 147978, January 23, 2002)
CONSENT OF BOTH SPOUSES REQUIRED TO DISPOSE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, OTHERWISE
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IS VOID AND CANNOT BE RATIFIED
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. (Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125172, June 26, 1998)
6. Dissolution and Liquidation
• Doctrines:
SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE FROM THE NET PROFITS IS FORFEITED
Since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to article 63(2) of the Family Code.
There’s no separate property which may be accounted for the guilty party’s favor. (Quiao v. Quiao, G.R.
No. 176556, July 4, 2012)
CO-OWNER SPOUSE CAN SELL HIS INTEREST IN CPG
Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without
prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the
Family code shall be “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.” (Domingo v. Spouses Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016)
IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, THE SPOUSES ARE
NOT SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DEBTS THEREOF UNLESS EXPRESSLY SPECIFIED
The legal provisions about conjugal partnership, contained in Chapter 5, Title 3, Book 4, of the Civil Code,
do not give an adequate answer as to the liability of the spouses with respect to the debts of the
partnership. In order to be solved, it requires a resort to the rule on the contract of partnership,
prescribed in Article 1698, which provides that the partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the
debt of the partnership, and none can bind the others by a personal act, if they have not given him any
power therefor. (Philippine National Bank v. Quintos, G.R. No. L-22383, October 6, 1924)
I. Separation of Property
1. Marriage Settlement (Art. 134)
2. Judicial Order
a. Causes
b. Effects
J. Union without Marriage (Arts. 147 and 148)
1. Applicability
2. Salaries and Wages
3. Property Acquired Exclusively by Other Party
4. Property Acquired by Both

5. Presumption
• Doctrines:
THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE PERIOD OF COHABITATION EVEN IN A
VOID MARRIAGE REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE IS GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 147 OR
ARTICLE 148
The property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household. (Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, G.R No. 122749, July 31, 1996)
LIQUIDATION, PARTITION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIES’ PROPERTIES IS NOT REQUIRED
BEFORE A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE MAY ISSUE FOR MARRIAGES DECLARED
VOID UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Article 50 of the Family Code which requires liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
before a decree of absolute nullity of marriage may issue does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. The property relations of parties in such a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership
apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
co-ownership. (Diño v. Diño, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011)
FAILURE TO PROVE ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE PARTY UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY
CODE DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO CO-OWNERSHIP AND PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL SHARES
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares. (Agapay v. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997)
RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP APPLY TO PROPERTIES ACQUIRED IN VOID MARRIAGES OR BY COMMON
LAW MARRIAGE IF ACQUIRED BY EITHER OR BOTH THROUGH THEIR WORK OR INDUSTRY OR THEIR
WAGES AND SALARIES
Article 144 of the Civil Code provides that “when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.” (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-20530, June 29, 1967)
THE PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY CODE MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO VESTED RIGHTS
Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita,
under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Article 105 of the Family
Code of the Philippines provides that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership established before the code
took effect, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws. In
this case, petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to rebut the presumption. (Francisco v.
Master Iron Works & Construction Corp., G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005)
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be
up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. (Atienza v. De Castro,
G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006)
X. The Family
A. Family Relation
B. Mandatory Prior Recourse to Compromise (Art. 151, NCC)

1. Exceptions
• Doctrines:
A SISTER-IN-LAW OR BROTHER-IN-LAW IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PHRASE “MEMBERS OF THE
FAMILY” UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. The phrase
"members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code. Hence, a sister-in-
law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. (Martinez v. Martinez, G.R. No. 162084, June 28,
2005)
A SISTER-IN-LAW OR BROTHER-IN-LAW IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PHRASE “MEMBERS OF THE
FAMILY” UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. The phrase
"members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code. Hence, a sister-in-
law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. (Gayon v. Gayon, G.R. No. L-28394, November 26,
1970)
C. Family Home
1. General Rule: Exempt from executions
2. Exceptions
• Doctrines:
ARTICLE 153 OF THE FAMILY CODE DOES NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT
All existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home. (Manacop v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 97898, August 11, 1997)
FAMILY HOME NOT YET CONSTITUTED AT THE TIME THE DEBT WAS INCURRED IS NOT EXEMPT
FROM EXECUTION
However, the retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on the family home has
been clearly laid down by the court. The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code
where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain
instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. At that time
when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly,
petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of
Article 243(2). (Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999)
A RESIDENTIAL HOUSE NOT CONSTITUTED AS A FAMILY HOME UNDER THE CIVIL CODE IS DEEMED
CONSTITUTED AS A FAMILY HOME BY OPERATION OF LAW ONLY UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
FAMILY CODE
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential
house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under
the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4,
one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). Article 162
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
(Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990)
THREE REQUISITES MUST CONCUR BEFORE A MINOR BENEFICIARY IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS
OF ARTICLE 159: (1) THE RELATIONSHIP ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE; (2)
THEY LIVE IN THE FAMILY HOME, AND (3) THEY ARE DEPENDENT FOR LEGAL SUPPORT UPON THE
HEAD OF THE FAMILY
The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family
home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of
the spouses who constitute a family home. (Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006)
THE FAMILY HOME IS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 153 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners,
or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following

conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to
fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its
value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. (Eulogio v. Bell,
Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015)
XI. Paternity and Filiation

A. Legitimate Children
1. General Rule: Conceived or born during a valid marriage
• Doctrines:
THE LAW ITSELF ESTABLISHES THE LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN CONCEIVED OR BORN DURING
THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARENTS
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in
exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected. The paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. (De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001)
CHILDREN BORN IN WEDLOCK ARE LEGITIMATE
Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor,
i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during
the subsistence of that marriage. (Social Security System v. Aguas, G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006)
2. Exceptions
a. Artificial Insemination
b. Born of voidable marriage before decree of annulment
c. Conceived or born before judgment of nullity under Art. 36 has become final and executory
d. Conceived or born of Subsequent marriage under Art. 53
e. Conceived or born of mothers who might have declared against legitimacy or sentenced as
adulteress
f. Legally adopted
g. Legitimated
3. Rules on Impugning Legitimacy
a. Generally instituted only by husband
b. Prescriptive period
c. Exception: Heirs may file
i. Husband dies before period expires (remainder)
ii. Posthumous birth (full period)
iii. Continue case instituted by husband
d. Grounds
• Doctrines:
A CHILD WHO IS CONCEIVED OR BORN DURING THE MARRIAGE OF HIS PARENTS IS LEGITIMATE
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. Since the marriage of Concepcion and Almonte was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. (Concepcion v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005)

DEATH OF THE PETITIONER DOES NOT IPSO FACTO NEGATE THE APPLICATION OF DNA TESTING
FOR AS LONG AS THERE EXIST APPROPRIATE BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES OF HIS DNA
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. (Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713,
December 17, 2007)
ARTICLES 164, 166, 170 AND 171 OF THE FAMILY CODE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE A SITUATION
WHERE A CHILD IS ALLEGED NOT TO BE THE CHILD OF NATURE OR BIOLOGICAL CHILD OF A
CERTAIN COUPLE
they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. (Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625,
January 24, 1994)
THE PROCEDURAL RULE THAT PROOF OF LEGITIMACY UNDER ARTICLE 172, OR ILLEGITIMACY
UNDER ARTICLE 175, SHOULD ONLY BE RAISED IN A DIRECT AND SEPARATE ACTION
INSTITUTED TO PROVE THE FILIATION OF A CHILD DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE ALLEGATION
IS THAT THE CHILD IS NOT THE CHILD OF THE SPOUSES
Proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct
and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. What petitioner failed to recognize,
however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy — or illegitimacy
— of a child is at issue. In the instant case, the filiation of a child — herein respondent — is not at issue.
Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and
his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad at all. (Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015)
LEGITIMATE CHILD IS A PROPER PARTY IN THE PROCEEDINGS FOR CANCELLATION OF BIRTH
CERTIFICATE
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. The legitimate child
of the mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate if her
inheritance rights are adversely affected. (Babiera v. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000)
FILIATION OR PATERNITY MAY BE PROVED THROUGH DNA TESTING
The right against self-incrimination is only against testimonial compulsion, and the right to privacy is
not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good. As such, DNA testing may be ordered in case proof of filiation or paternity is unlikely to
be satisfactorily established or difficult to be obtained, without violating the right against self-
incrimination and privacy. (Agustin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005)
A LEGITIMATE CHILD IS A PRODUCT OF, AND, THEREFORE, IMPLIES A VALID AND LAWFUL
MARRIAGE
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and
child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Angeles v. Angeles, G.R. No. 153798, September
2, 2005)
B. Illegitimate Children
C. Actions to Claim Legitimate/Illegitimate Status
1. Who can claim
2. Proof of filiation
• Doctrines:
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS NOW ALSO ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMED FILIATION BY "ANY
OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS”
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. (Salas v. Matusalem, G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013)

ARTICLE 283 CONTAINS A BLANKET PROVISION "ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OR PROOF" PERMITS
HEARSAY AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE TO PROVE ILLEGIIMATE FILIATION
"Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not
sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to
illegitimate filiation. (Ilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994)
DNA TESTING IS A VALID PROBATIVE TOOL IN DETERMINING FILIATION
Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence. The DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof
of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.
(Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005)
IN A CRIME OF RAPE, THE PRESUMPTION AS TO THE FILIATION OF THE CHILD BEGOTTEN AS A
RESULT THEREOF MAY BE IMPUGNED ONLY DUE TO PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO HAVE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE DUE TO IMPOTENCE OR SERIOUS ILLNESS
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-appellant is
alleged to have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the offense in September
1991. 15 Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can overcome the presumption that
Amalia's child was begotten as a result of her having been raped in September 1991 only if he can show either
that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse because of impotence or serious illness
which absolutely prevents him from having sexual intercourse or that Amalia had sexual intercourse with
another man. However, accused-appellant has not shown either of these. (People v. Malapo, G.R. No. 123115,
August 25, 1998)
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMED FILIATION BY ANY OTHER MEANS
ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS
Such evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to Article 283 of the Civil Code.
Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the ROC. (Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991)
GROUNDS FOR IMPUGNING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD MAY ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE
HUSBAND OR BY HEIRS IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of
the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases,
his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the
child is a strictly personal right of the husband. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. (Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002)
FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILD CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY AN ADMISSION IN A PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT BY THE PARENT CONCERNED AND DULY SUPPORTED BY AN ARRAY OF
EVIDENCE
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is
in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. (Verceles v.
Posada, G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007)
XII. Adoption
A. Domestic Adoption Act
B. Inter-Country Adoption
• Doctrines:
ADOPTED ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MAY USE AS MIDDLE NAME THE SURNAME OF BIOLOGICAL MOTHER
Adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,

to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. (In the
Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005)
PETITION FOR ADOPTION SHOULD BE FILED BY HUSAND AND WIFE JOINTLY
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: “…Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases…”
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21,
2009)
XIII. Support
A. Basis: Financial Capacity of Giver, Needs of Recipient

1. Not based on parental authority, hence hoes not terminate with emancipation
B. Coverage
1. Substance
2. Dwelling
3. Clothing
4. Medical Attendance
5. Education
6. Transportation
C. Kinds
1. Legal
2. Judicial
3. Conventional
D. Characteristics
1. Personal
2. Intransmissible
3. Not subject to waiver or compensation
4. Exempt from attachment or execution
5. Reciprocal
6. Provisional character of support judgment
7. Mandatory
E. Persons Obliged to Support Each Other (Art. 195)
F. Order of Liability If Several Persons Obliged to Give Support (Art. 199)
• Doctrines:
SUPPORT MUST BE GIVEN BY MORE REMOTE RELATIVES IF THOSE PRIMARILY LIABLE ARE UNABLE TO
DO SO
The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more
remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called
upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. (Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June
30, 2006)
A SPOUSE IS NOT OBLIGED TO LIVE WITH THE OTHER SPOUSE GUILTY OF INFIDELITY THUS ENTITLED TO
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable
propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. A husband cannot, by his own
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful,
illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her

departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder. (Davidas
de Villanueva v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-29951, December 3, 1929)
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF ADULTERY NECESSARILY FORFEITS THE RIGHT OF THE SPOUSE FOR
SUPPORT
The special defense of adultery set up by the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended
complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action for support. (Quintana v.
Lerma, G.R. No. L-7426, February 5, 1913)
CIVIL STATUS OR JURIDICAL RELATION IS THE BASIS FOR THE ACTION OF SUPPORT IN ALL CASES
ENUMERATED UNDER ARTICLE 143 OF THE FAMILY CODE
It is necessary for the respondent to prove his civil status as the son of the petitioner to claim for support. His
alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue for
there is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same
manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. Thus, no effect can be given to a claim
for support until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. (Francisco v.
Zandueta, G.R. No. L-43794, August 9, 1935)
GENERALLY, ADVANCES MADE BY A STRANGER FOR THE SUPPORT OF ANOTHER ARE RECOVERABLE
FROM THE PERSON BOUND TO GIVE THE SAME
Article 1894 provides: “When without the knowledge of the person who is bound to give support to a dependent,
a stranger supplies it, the latter shall be entitled to recover the same from the former, unless it appears that he
gave it out of charity, and without the expectation of recovering it." For one to recover under said article, it must
be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished to a dependent of one bound to give support but who
fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty.
The negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it. (Ramirez v.
Redfern, G.R. No. L-26062, December 31, 1926)
XIV. Parental Authority

A. General Rule: Exercised Jointly
B. Exceptions:
1. Judicial Order to the Contrary
2. Illegitimate Child
3. Parental Preference Rule
4. Rule in Case of Legal Separation
C. Persons exercising Substitute Parental Authority (Art. 216)
D. Persons exercising Special Parental Authority (Art. 218)
E. Kinds of Properties of a Minor
1. Adventitious
2. Profectitious
F. Grounds for Termination and/or Suspension of Parental Authority
1. Emancipation
2. Death
3. Adoption
4. Appointment of Another as General Guardian
5. Judicial Declaration of Abandonment
6. Final Judgment Divesting Parental Authority
a. Excessive harshness
b. Corrupting orders
c. Compelling child to beg

d. Rape
e. Acts of lasciviousness
f. Judicial declaration of incapacity
7. Permanent/Temporary
• Doctrines:
ONLY IN CASE OF DEATH, ABSENCE, OR UNSUITABILITY OF PARENTS MAY SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY BE EXERCISED BY GRANDPARENTS
The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only
in cases of adoption, guardianship, and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. The law vests on
the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
(Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995)
RIGHT TO THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD IS INHERENT IN PARENTHOOD
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. (Sagala-Eslao v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997)
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED IN CASE OF PARENTS’ DEATH, ABSENCE OR
UNSUITABILITY
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in
case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. (Vancil v. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001)
ASCERTAINING THE WELFARE AND BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is
strong but it is not conclusive as it may be overcome by “compelling reasons.” If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but again, the court is not bound by the choice as the court, in its discretion, may find the chosen parent
unfit and award the custody to the other parent or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
(Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995)
BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CAN OVERRIDE PROCEDURAL RULES
Best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of the
children. Since in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she
can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance
to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral, and intellectual
development. (Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-68374, June 18, 1985)
SEXUAL PREFERENCE OR MORAL LAXITY ALONE DOES NOT PROVE PARENTAL NEGLECT OR
INCOMPETENCE
Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the
child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. (Pablo-Gualberto v.
Gualberto, G.R. Nos. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005)
LAW EXPLICITLY CONFERS TO THE MOTHER SOLE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if
she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Even when the parents are estranged
and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well
being of the child. (Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004)
THE ACT OR OMISSION CONSIDERED AS NEGLIGENT MUST BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY FOR
LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 219 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the

negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. (St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363,
February 6, 2002)
XV. Emancipation and Age of Majority

A. Reaching 18 Years of Age
B. R.A. No. 6809
XVI. Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code

• Doctrines:
DECISION DECLARING PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect
an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code,
supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course
to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
(Republic v. Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005)
XVII.Funerals
A. Duty and right to make arrangement about funerals is in accordance with right and duty to
support under Art. 199 of the Family Code
B. The funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased
C. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased
1. In the absence of the expressed wishes, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine
2. In case of doubt, the persons in Art. 199 of the Family Code shall decide
D. Any person who disrespects the dead or allows the same shall be liable for damages
E. If the deceased is married, the tombstone or mausoleum is deemed a part of the funeral expense
and chargeable against the community or conjugal partnership property
• Doctrines:
THE LAW CONFINES THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO MAKE FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS TO THE MEMBERS OF
THE FAMILY TO THE EXCLUSION OF ONE'S COMMON LAW PARTNER
The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of
Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died
has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. (Valino
v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014)
XVIII.Cancellation or Correction of Entries
A. R.A. No. 9048

B. Rule 108
C. Grounds
• Doctrines:
CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA MAY BE A GROUND FOR A CHANGE IN “SEX” IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE ENTRY
Respondent undisputedly has [Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)]. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. Sexual

development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September
12, 2008)
NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. (Silverio
v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 2, 2007)
XIX. Surname
A. Reason for Interest of State
1. Prevent confusion of identity
2. Prevent use of name for illegal purposes
B. Legal Name: What Appears in Birth Certificate
C. Change: Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
1. Court Approval
2. Grounds
a. Ridiculous, Dishonorable
b. Extreme Difficulty to Pronounce
c. Adoption of Filipino name to remove traces of alienage
d. Legal cause – adoption, et al.
• Doctrines:
A CHANGE OF NAME IS A PRIVILEGE AND NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT
A proper and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. In granting
or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but
a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts. (Gan v. Republic, G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016)
ACKNOWLEDGED ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO USE THE SURNAME OF
THEIR ILLEGITIMATE FATHER
Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children. (Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No.
206248, February 18, 2014)
CHANGE OF THE SURNAME OF THE ADOPTEE AS A RESULT OF THE ADOPTION DOES NOT EXTEND TO
CHANGE OF THE FIRST NAME ABSENT LEGAL GROUNDS THEREFOR
The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's
registered Christian or first name. The right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or
as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in
law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of
a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. (Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No.
117209, February 9, 1996)
CONVENIENCE IS NOT A GROUND TO SUPPORT A PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME
Convenience, as a ground to support a petition for change of name is not within the purview of the law as
‘proper and reasonable cause’ to grant the prayer of change of name. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name

and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966,
March 30, 2005)
A CHANGE OF NAME IS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT BUT OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION, TO BE EXERCISED IN
THE LIGHT OF THE REASONS ADDUCED AND THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WILL FOLLOW; CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA (CAH) IS A PROPER GROUND FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male. (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No.
166676, September 12, 2008)
A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment; rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October
22, 2007)
THE OBLIGATION OF AN ADOPTED CHILD TO USE THE SURNAME OF THE ADOPTER DOES NOT
PROHIBIT A PETITION TO CHANGE SURNAMES ON VALID GROUNDS; REMOVAL OF IMPRESSION OF
ALIENAGE IS A VALID GROUND TO CHANGE NAME
Although Article 365 of the Civil Code obligates the adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, the law
makes no distinction between natural and adopted children with respect to their right to petition the State
to allow them to use a different surname when there are compelling grounds therefor. Thus, an adopted child
can petition to use a Filipino surname to sincerely erase the impression of alienage caused by the alien
surname of the adopter, when made in good faith and if the change will not cause prejudice to anybody.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals and Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21,1992)
D. Rules on what to use
1. Legitimate or Legitimated Children
2. Illegitimate Children
• Doctrines:
A PETITION TO CHANGE THE NAME OF AN INFANT SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY WHERE TO DO SO
IS CLEARLY FOR THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
“While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall
principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law,
from taking another surname with the latter’s consent and for justifiable reasons." If under the law a
legitimate child may secure a change of his name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a
"proper and reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why a natural child cannot do the same.
(Calderon v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18127, April 5, 1967)
CHANGE OF NAME SHOULD BE DISALLOWED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROPOSED
CHANGE OF NAME WOULD IN GREAT PROBABILITY CAUSE PREJUDICE OR FUTURE MISCHIEF TO
THE FAMILY WHOSE SURNAME IT IS THAT IS INVOLVED OR TO THE COMMUNITY IN GENERAL
The principle relied on by the lower court remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change
of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general. Here, adequate publication of the proceeding has not
elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from
various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by
the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm
for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination,
of Teresita and her witnesses. (Llaneta v. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054, May 15, 1974)
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, UPON ADOPTION BY HER NATURAL FATHER, MAY USE THE SURNAME
OF HER NATURAL MOTHER AS HER MIDDLE NAME
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that the illegitimate child adopted is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. (In the Matter of the
Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005)
3. Adopted Child

4. Married Women
a. May retain maiden name
i. May not do so if has been using husband’s surname for a long time
• Doctrines:
ONCE A MARRIED WOMAN OPTED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME IN HER PASSPORT, SHE
MAY NOT REVERT TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME, EXCEPT IN THE CASES ENUMERATED IN
SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239
These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since
petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based
only on the severance of the marriage. (Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5,
2010)
5. Marriage Annulled
a. Wife guilty
b. Wife Innocent
6. Legal Separation
7. Death of Husband
8. Persons with Same Names
a. Usurpation of another’s name
• Doctrines:
USURPATION OF NAME UNDER ARTICLE 377 OF THE CIVIL CODE IMPLIES SOME INJURY TO
THE INTERESTS OF THE OWNER OF THE NAME
It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists
when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an
actual use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of
another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person. (Dapar v. Biscan, G.R. No. 141880,
September 27, 2004)
XX. Absence
A. Provisional Absence
B. Declaration of Absence
C. Presumption of Death
• Doctrines:
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE MUST BE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE
A reading of Article 41 of the Family Code shows that the presumption of death established therein is only
applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. (Tadeo-Matias v.
Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018)
A PETITION WHOSE SOLE OBJECTIVE IS TO DECLARE A PERSON PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE IS NOT A VIABLE SUIT IN OUR JURISDICTION
Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to
presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare presumptively dead under
either of said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such actions, there
would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor status to be established. (Tadeo-
Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018)
D. Reappearance of Absentee
1. Effect on the subsequent marriage of spouse present

2. Effect on the properties
Part Two – Property
I. Classification of Property
A. Concept of Property (Art. 414)
1. Requisites
2. Things vs. Property
3. Kinds of Property
B. Immovable and Movable Property
1. Immovable Property (Art. 415)
2. Movable Property (Arts. 416-417)
• Doctrines:
A HOUSE IS AN IMMOVABLE EVEN IF THE OWNER OF THE LOT IS DIFFERENT
The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following: lands,
buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction
whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. (Ladera v. Hodges, CA-G.R. No. 8027-R, September
23, 1952)
BUILDING IS A SEPARATE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY FROM THE LAND IT IS ADHERED TO
While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious
that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what constitute
real properties. could mean only one thing, that a building is by itself an immovable property. A building is
an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner. (Lopez v. Orosa, G.R. Nos. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958)
PROPERTY THAT CAN BE REMOVED WITHOUT BREAKING THE MATERIAL OR DETERIORATION IS
PERSONAL PROPERTY
The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object." (Yap v. Tañada, G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988)
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT ATTACHED TO THE CONCRETE FOUNDATION OF A BUILDING, IN SUCH
A WAY THAT IN ORDER TO REMOVE THEM, IT BECAME NECESSARY TO UNBOLT THEM AND TO CUT
SOME OF ITS WOODEN SUPPORT, ARE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 5 OF
ARTICLE 415
The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete
foundation of a building, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the
latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it
became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but to also cut some of its wooden supports. Said machinery
and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry" carried on said immovable and
tended "directly to meet the needs of said industry." For these reasons, they were already immovable
pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines. (Machinery & Engineering
Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954)
FOR MOVABLE EQUIPMENTS TO BE IMMOBILIZED, THE ESSENTIAL AND PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF AN
INDUSTRY OR WORKS WITHOUT WHICH SUCH INDUSTRY OR WORKS WOULD BE UNABLE TO
FUNCTION OR CARRY ON THE INDUSTRIAL PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED MUST BE
PRESENT
The tools and equipment are not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner’s business of
transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables
and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. (Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor
and Treasurer, G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962)
MACHINERIES INTENDED FOR AN INDUSTRY WHICH MAY BE CARRIED ON IN A BUILDING WHEN
PLACED BY A TENANT REMAIN MOVABLE PROPERTY SUSCEPTIBLE TO SEIZURE

In Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which
is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but
not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the
land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
(Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984)
TRANSFORMERS, ELECTRIC POSTS, TRANSMISSION LINES, INSULATORS, AND ELECTRIC METERS
QUALIFY AS “MACHINERIES” UNDER THE LGC, WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAX
While the Local Government Code still does not provide for a specific definition of "real property," Sections
199 (o) and 232 of the said Code, respectively, gives an extensive definition of what constitutes "machinery"
and unequivocally subjects such machinery to real property tax. The Court reiterates that the machinery
subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code "may or may not be attached, permanently or
temporarily to the real property;" and the physical facilities for production, installations, and appurtenant
service facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or are not permanently attached
must (a) be actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular industry, business, or
activity; and (2) by their very nature and purpose, be designed for, or necessary for manufacturing, mining,
logging, commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes. (Manila Electric Co. v. City Assessor, G.R. No.
166102, August 5, 2015)
SUBMARINE OR UNDERSEA COMMUNICATION CABLES ARE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO REAL
PROPERTY TAX
Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines which this Court has
recently declared, in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no longer
exempted from real property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local
Government Code. (Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 180110, May 30,
2016)
POWER BARGES INSTALLED BY ITS OWNER IN POWER FACILITIES ARE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO
REAL PROPERTY TAX
Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "docks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable
property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of
machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in
a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work. (FELS
Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. Nos. 168557 & 170628, February 16, 2007)
A HOUSE IS AN IMMOVABLE PROEPRTY FOR PURPOSES OF ATTACHMENT
It is our considered opinion that said house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other
personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs.
Hodges (48 Off. Gaz., 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable -or real
'property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. It is true that the
parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said
contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, 48 Off. Gaz., 2664; Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De
Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72 Phil., 464). However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable
to strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point where there has been no contract whatsoever, with
respect to the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar. (Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958)
ESTOPPEL WILL APPLY WHEN PARTIES AGREE THAT AN IMMOVABLE PROPERTY WILL BE
CONSIDERED AS MOVABLE IN THEIR CONTRACT
Where a chattel mortgage is constituted on machinery permanently attached to the ground the machinery is
to be considered as personal property and the chattel mortgage constituted thereon is not null and void,
regardless of who owns the land. (Makati Leasing & Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., G.R. No.
L-58469, May 16,1983)
MACHINERIES BOLTED OR CEMENTED ON REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT MAKE THEM IPSO FACTO
IMMOVABLE UNDER ARTICLE 415 (3) AND (5) OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
The intention of the parties in a contract are necessary. Mere nuts and bolts do not foreclose the controversy.
We have to look at the parties’ intent. While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile,
a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a contrary
indication. (Tsai v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120098 & 120109 October 2, 2001)

CONTRACTING PARTIES MAY VALIDLY STIPULATE THAT REAL PROPERTY BE CONSIDERED AS
PERSONAL
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. While
the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation
characterizing the subject machinery as personal. (Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc., G.R.
No. 137705, August 22, 2000)
D. Property in Relation to Whom It Belongs (Arts. 419-425)
1. Property of Public Dominion
2. Property of Private Ownership
• Doctrines:
A PROPERTY CONTINUES TO BE PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN "UNTIL THERE IS A FORMAL
DECLARATION ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW IT FROM BEING SUCH
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership
"until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence. (Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990)
A PRIVATE PROPERTY WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME A FORESHORE LAND SHOULD BE RETURNED
TO PUBLIC DOMINION
Foreshore lands have been defined as the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternatively wet and dry according to the low of the tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and
the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals and Morato, G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997)
AS A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION AKIN TO A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE, A ROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY
(RROW) CANNOT BE REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE PERSONS UNDER THE LAND
REGISTRATION LAW AND BE THE SUBJECT OF A TORRENS TITLE; AND IF ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED
IN A TORRENS TITLE, THE LAND INVOLVED REMAINS AS SUCH A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that properties of public
dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private
sale. "Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale." (Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
210669, August 4, 2017)
RIVERS AND THEIR NATURAL BEDS ARE OF PUBLIC DOMINION
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely:
(a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of
public dominion. (Republic v. Santos III, G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012)
LANDS RECLAIMED FROM FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED AREAS ALSO FORM PART OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN AND ARE ALSO INALIENABLE, UNLESS CONVERTED PURSUANT TO LAW INTO INALIENABLE
OR DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted
pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the
government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. (Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002)
THERE MUST BE A LAW OR PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION OFFICIALLY CLASSIFYING THE
RECLAIMED LANDS AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE AND OPEN TO DISPOSITION OR CONCESSION
When the Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, the inalienable lands covered by said proclamations
were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and

465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy
the requirement in Public Estates Authority that "[t]here must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.” (Chavez
v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007)
PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION, EVEN IF TITLED IN THE NAME OF AN INSTRUMENTALITY,
REMAIN OWNED BY THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Properties of public dominion, even if titled in the name of an instrumentality as in this case, remain owned
by the Republic of the Philippines. The PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. Furthermore,
the lands owned by the PEZA are real properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines, thus, cannot be
subjected to real property tax. (City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203
& 187583, November 26, 2014)
A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION CANNOT BE BURDENED BY A VOLUNTARY EASEMENT OF RIGHT
OF WAY IN FAVOR OF A PERSON, AND THE LATTER CANNOT CLAIM ANY RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER
IT IF ITS USE BY THE PUBLIC IS BY MERE TOLERANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased
or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3)
is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement. If the use
of a voluntary easement by the public is by mere tolerance of the government, one cannot appropriate it for
himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession over it. (Villarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438,
November 11, 2004)
LAND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IPSO JURE CONVERTED TO PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN UPON THE
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF IT AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession — possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier — the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. (Heirs
of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013)
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START TO RUN AGAINST PROPERTY WHICH IS STILL
CLASSIFIED AS PART OF PUBLIC DOMINION
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the
State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able
to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted
by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public
dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. (Republic v. Aboitiz, G.R. No.
174626, October 23, 2013)
UNLESS THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS EXPRESSLY CONVERTED
INTO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY, THERE IS NO WAY FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION TO SET IN
UNDER ARTICLE 1113 OF THE CIVIL CODE
Land of the public domain is converted into patrimonial property when there is an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth. Without such declaration, acquisitive prescription does not start to run, even if such land is
alienable and disposable and the applicant is in possession and occupation thereof. (Dumo v. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018)
ALL LANDS NOT APPEARING TO BE CLEARLY OF PRIVATE DOMINION OR OWNERSHIP
PRESUMPTIVELY BELONG TO THE STATE
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been classified, reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable lands of public domain.
Therefore, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. (Republic v. Spouses
Alejandre, G.R. No. 217336, October 17, 2018)
LANDS WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE OR PUBLIC SERVICE SUCH AS RESERVATIONS FOR
PUBLIC OR QUASI-PUBLIC USES ARE PROPERTY OF THE PUBLIC DOMINION AND REMAIN TO BE SO AS
LONG AS THEY REMAIN RESERVED
As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-public uses are outside the
commerce of man. They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or encumbrance; any sale, disposition or
encumbrance of such property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy.
(Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 177168, August 3, 2015)

REGARDLESS OF THE SOURCE OR CLASSIFICATION OF LAND IN THE POSSESSION OF A MUNICIPALITY,
EXCEPTING THOSE ACQUIRED WITH ITS OWN FUNDS IN ITS PRIVATE OR CORPORATE CAPACITY,
SUCH PROPERTY IS HELD IN TRUST FOR THE STATE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS INHABITANTS,
WHETHER IT BE FOR GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY PURPOSES
It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it
owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but
a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. (Rabuco v. Villegas, G.R. Nos.
L-24661, L-24915, & L-24916, February 28, 1974)
PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE AND MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC
IN GENERAL ARE OUTSIDE THE COMMERCE OF MAN AND CANNOT BE DISPOSED OF OR LEASED BY
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT TO PRIVATE PERSONS
Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the
sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show
that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already
withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned. (Macasiano v. Diokno, G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992)
THE CLASSIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL PROPERTY DEVOTED FOR DISTINCTLY GOVERNMENTAL
PURPOSES AS PUBLIC SHOULD PREVAIL OVER THE CIVIL CODE CLASSIFICATION
The classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art.
424 of the Civil Code — is without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the
principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence,
the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should
prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case. (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968)
TO CONVERT A BARRIO ROAD INTO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY, SECTION 21 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE REQUIRES THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE,
APPROVED BY AT LEAST TWO-THIRDS (2/3) OF THE SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The difference
between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution is
only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body. (Alolino, v. Flores, G.R. No. 198774, April 4,
2016)
II. Ownership
A. Concept of Ownership (Art. 427)
1. Characteristics of Ownership
2. Rights Included in Ownership (Art. 428)
• Doctrines:
A PRIOR COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT CANNOT BAR A SUBSEQUENT ACTION FOR RECOVERY OR
PETITION TO QUIET TITLE
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares
only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of
who has the right or title of ownership. (Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994)
THE OCCUPANTS AGAINST WHOM AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE WAS DECIDED, BUT TO WHOM
OWNERSHIP WAS LATER ADJUDICATED IN AN ACCION REIVINDICATORIA CANNOT BE EJECTED ON
THE BASIS OF THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER DECISION
In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful detainer
case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the
decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion
reivindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence,
the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land. The stay of execution is warranted by the
fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute
the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave
injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to

the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. Placing petitioners in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners
of the property. One of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. It follows that as owners of
the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. (Spouses Bustos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120784-85, January 24, 2001)
A JUDGMENT IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY USED TO OUST THE
POSSESSOR OF THE LAND, WHOSE SECURITY OF TENURE RIGHTS ARE STILL PENDING
DETERMINATION BEFORE THE DARAB
The prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is
being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's
occupancy was unlawful. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The
possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A judgment for ownership,
therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident. It is important to note that
although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subject land, the exercise of their
rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. The Tenancy Act provides
one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work
on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. The exercise of the right
of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. (Heirs of Soriano v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 128177, August 15, 2001)
MERE TOLERANCE OF THE OWNER DOES NOT ALLOW THE POSSESSION TO BE IN THE CONCEPT
OF AN OWNER
An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy his property, rent-free does not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor. Possession in the concept of a holder, is where one
who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133140, August 10,
1999)
THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY ENJOYS THE PREROGATIVE TO ENTER INTO A LEASE CONTRACT
WITH ANOTHER IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS JUS DISPONENDI
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership,
and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the
prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor,
the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required
for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present. (Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 129609 & 135537, November 29, 2001)
COROLLARY TO THE RIGHT TO ENJOY HIS PROPERTY, THE OWNER ALSO HAS THE RIGHT TO
EXCLUDE FROM THE POSSESSION OF HIS PROPERTY ANY OTHER PERSON TO WHOM HE HAS NOT
TRANSMITTED SUCH PROPERTY
As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without any other limitations than
those established by law. It is true that, in some instances, the actual possessor has some valid rights
over the property enforceable even against the owner thereof, such as in the case of a tenant or lessee.
In Alvano v. Batoon, this Court held that "[a] simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the
possession of the property unless the mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect."
Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements,
to prove that the real intention of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged
property until full payment of the loan. (Isaguirre v. De Lara, G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000)
RES JUDICATA WILL NOT APPLY BECAUSE AN EJECTMENT CASE INVOLVES A DIFFERENT CAUSE
OF ACTION FROM AN ACCION PUBLICIANA OR ACCION REIVINDICATORIA
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes
only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of
who has the right or title of ownership. (Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004)
AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF A PROPERTY IS THE SOLE REMEDY OF A LANDOWNER
WHOSE PROPERTY HAS BEEN WRONGFULLY OR ERRONEOUSLY REGISTERED IN ANOTHER'S
NAME AFTER ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE DECREE SO LONG AS THE PROPERTY HAS NOT
PASSED TO AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE
The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration
but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the property in controversy
is not the real owner thereof. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based

on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. (Abejaron v. Nabasa, G.R. No. 84831, June 20,
2001)
AS LONG AS THE ALLEGATIONS DEMONSTRATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY, THE
FIRST LEVEL COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; the plaintiff had been in prior physical possession of
the property. This requirement is jurisdictional. (Javier v. Lumontad, G.R. No. 203760, December 3, 2014)
THERE IS NO FORUM-SHOPPING FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IN THE CERTIFICATION ON NON-
FORUM SHOPPING OF THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE, A COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE
STATUS OF THE PENDING ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
There is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer and the land
ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or similar in the two cases. The
issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is entitled to, or should be awarded, the material or
physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact); whereas the issue in
the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be recognized as lawful owner of the
disputed parcels of land. (Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Ando, G.R. No. 195669, May 30, 2016)
3. Principles of Self-Help (Art. 429) and State of Necessity (Art. 432)
• Doctrines:
THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED AT THE TIME OF ACTUAL OR
THREATENED DISPOSSESSION
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action
of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help
enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of
self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code. (German Management & Services,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76216 & 76217, September 14, 1989)
THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP DOES NOT APPLY DURING THE GRACE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO
VACATE THE PREMISES
Art. 429 of our Civil Code upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for,
having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on
June 17, 1959 — or within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in
possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did
not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened…physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria
from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible
entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized
them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust
them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor. (Caisip v. People, G.R. No. L-28716,
November 18, 1970)
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP AUTHORIZES THE LAWFUL POSSESSOR TO USE FORCE, NOT ONLY
TO PREVENT A THREATHENED UNLAWFUL INVASION OR USURPATION THEREOF; IT IS SORT OF
SELF-DEFENSE
The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a justifying
circumstance under our penal laws. (People v. Pletcha, Jr., No. 19029-CR, June 27, 1977)
BEING LEGITIMATE POSSESSORS OF THE LAND AND HAVING EXERCISED LAWFUL MEANS TO
PROTECT THEIR POSSESSION, RESPONDENTS WERE NOT GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION
Article 429 of the Civil Code provides that the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as
may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property. (Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, G.R. No. 19299, July 18, 2012)
THE LAWFUL OWNER OF A PROPERTY HAVE THE RIGHT, UNDER ARTICLE 429 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, TO EXCLUDE ANY PERSON FROM ITS ENJOYMENT AND DISPOSAL
That sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and
Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,
namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to

exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal (Spouses Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21,
2010)
THE IMPOSITION BY AN OWNER OF SECURITY MEASURES ON HIS PROPERTY EMANATES FROM
THE ATTRIBUTES OF OWNERSHIP UNDER ARTICLE 429 OF THE CIVIL CODE
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners
have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private
premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security
measures and filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an
owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the
Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety.
Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises
that are accessible to the public. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018)
4. Right to Enclose (Art. 430)
• Doctrines:
THE OWNER’S ACT OF CONSTRUCTING A FENCE WITHIN HIS LOT, WHICH WAS NOT SUBJECT TO
ANY SERVITUDES AT THE TIME OF CONSTRUCTION, IS A VALID EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHT AS
OWNER; HENCE, WHATEVER INJURY OR DAMAGE SAID ACT MAY HAVE CAUSED IS DAMNUM
ABSQUE INJURIA
The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. Petitioners
had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act
which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever
injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the
said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. (Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116100, February 9, 1996)
5. Use Injuring Rights of Third Persons (Art. 431)
• Doctrines:
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS HAVE MUTUAL AND RECIPROCAL DUTIES WHICH REQUIRE THAT
EACH MUST USE HIS OWN LAND IN A REASONABLE MANNER SO AS NOT TO INFRINGE UPON THE
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF OTHERS
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Although we recognize the right of an owner
to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual
and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a
third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. (Spouses Andamo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990)
6. Legal Remedies to Recover One’s Possession
a. Accion interdictal
i. Forcible entry
ii. Unlawful detainer
b. Accion publiciana
c. Accion reivindicatoria
• Doctrines:
SOLE ISSUE IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES IS MATERIAL POSSESSION
When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession, or more particularly, to determine who between the
parties has the better right to possess the property. (Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 199743,
March 12, 2018)

REQUISITE FOR A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER THAT POSSESSION WAS
INITIALLY LAWFUL AND TURNED UNLAWFUL UPON EXPIRATION OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally
lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.
It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must
be established. (Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona, G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018)
THE FACT OF TOLERANCE IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE IN AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Without proof that the possession was legal at the outset, the logical conclusion would be that the
defendant's possession of the subject property will be deemed illegal from the very beginning, for which,
the action for unlawful detainer shall be dismissed. Tolerance cannot be presumed from the owner's
failure to eject the occupants from the land. (Javelosa v. Tapus, G.R. No. 204361, July 4, 2018)
7. Surface Rights (Art. 437)
• Doctrines:
STRUCTURES BUILT BY THE OWNER ON HIS LAND MUST BE SO CONSTRUCTED AND MAINTAINED
USING ALL REASONABLE CARE SO THAT THEY CANNOT BE DANGEROUS TO ADJOINING
LANDOWNERS AND CAN WITHSTAND THE USUAL AND EXPECTED FORCES OF NATURE
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury
or damage suffered. (Spouses Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, November 6,
1990)
IN THE CONTEXT OF EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, THE SOIL HAS NO VALUE SEPARATE FROM
THAT OF THE EXPROPRIATED LAND; THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND EXTENDS TO THE SURFACE AS
WELL AS TO THE SUBSOIL UNDER IT
In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated
land. As stated in ART. 437, “The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything
under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may
deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.” Thus, the ownership of land extends to
the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. (Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., G.R. No. 185124,
January 25, 2012)
A LAND CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED SIMULTANEOUSLY AS AN AGRICULTURAL LAND IN REGARDS TO
THE SURFACE LAND AND MINERAL LAND IN REGARDS TO ITS SUB-SURFACE
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the
mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface. (Republic
v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. L-43938, L-44081, & L-44092, April 15, 1988)
8. Hidden Treasure (Arts. 438-439)
B. Right of Accession
1. Accession with Respect to Immovable Property
a. Accession Discreta
• Doctrines:
A BONUS THAT BEARS NO IMMEDIATE, BUT ONLY A REMOTE ACCIDENTAL RELATION TO A
LAND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A CIVIL FRUIT OF THE SAID LAND
The said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to the land mentioned,
having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of
the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of
anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's
generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but certainly it is not civil fruits or

income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this case is concerned, has nothing to do with
it. (Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. 35223, September 17, 1931)
RENT IS A CIVIL FRUIT THAT BELONGS TO THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY PRODUCING IT
BY RIGHT OF ACCESSION. OWNERSHIP OF THE THING SOLD IS ACQUIRED BY THE BUYER
ONLY UPON DELIVERY THEREOF, THAT IS, WHEN IT IS PLACED IN THE CONTROL AND
POSSESSION OF THE BUYER
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession.
Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to
petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during
that period. Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery
of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner
signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee." This
right is transferred, not merely by contract, but also by tradition or delivery. Non nudis pactis sed
traditione dominia rerum transferantur. And there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold
"is placed in the control and possession of the vendee." Thus, it has been held that while the
execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the
thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by
the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. (Equatorial Realty Development
Bank, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 133879, November 21, 2001)
NO RECOVERY OF BUILDINGS FOR GOVERNMENT PROJECTS UNDER ARTICLE 445 OF CIVIL
CODE
The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction materials to a construction
site of two government projects, as well as unspecified construction sites, repudiates the idea that
LBP intended to be the owner of those construction materials. As a government financial institution,
LBP should have been aware that the materials were to be used for the construction of an
immovable property, as well as a property of the public domain. As an immovable property, the
ownership of whatever was constructed with those materials would presumably belong to the
owner of the land, under Article 445 of the Civil Code. (Landbank of the Philippines v. Perez, G.R.
No. 166884, June 13, 2012)
b. Accession Continua
i. Accession Industrial
• Doctrines:
UNDER ARTICLE 445 OF THE CIVIL CODE, IMPROVEMENT MUST BE MADE WITHIN
PROPERTY AND NOT OUTSIDE IT
It must be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as "on the
thing that has been mentioned. In other words, the supposed improvement must be made,
constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to qualify as an
improvement contemplated 'by law. Otherwise, it would just be very convenient for land
owners to expand or widen their properties in the guise of improvements. (Daclison v.
Baytion, G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016)
THE MERE FACT THAT A PERSON BUILDS ON A PARCEL OF LAND DOES NOT GRANT SAID
BUILDER CO-OWNERSHIP RIGHTS OVER THE LAND ON WHICH HE BUILDS
There is co-ownership when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belong to different
persons. A parcel of land and a building thereon are separately identifiable properties and can
pertain to different owners. Thus, even if a person is clearly shown to own a building, such fact
alone does not grant the builder ownership of the land on which the construction is made.
(Victoria v. Pidlaoan, G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016)
.
I Art. 448
• Doctrines:
ARTICLE 448 CONFERS THE RIGHT OF CHOICE UPON THE LANDOWNER AND NOT
UPON THE BUILDER NOR THE COURTS
Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that "(t)he
owner of the land…shall have the right to appropriate…or to oblige the one who built…to
pay the price of the land…" The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of
choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. Thus, in Quemuel v.
Olaes, the Court categorically ruled that the right to appropriate the works or

improvements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the
landowner. (Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72876, January 18, 1991)
WHEN THE CO-OWNERSHIP IS TERMINATED BY A PARTITION AND IT APPEARS
THAT THE HOUSE OF AN ERSTWHILE CO-OWNER HAS ENCROACHED UPON A
PORTION PERTAINING TO ANOTHER CO-OWNER WHICH WAS HOWEVER MADE IN
GOOD FAITH, THEN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 448 SHOULD APPLY TO
DETERMINE THE RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES
Whether or not the provisions of Article 448 should apply to a builder in good faith on a
property held in common has been resolved in the affirmative in the case of Spouses del
Campo vs. Abesia. wherein the Court ruled that: "The court a quo correctly held that Article
448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land
owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under
the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. However,
when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the
home of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land
pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the
provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi
agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there is a co-
ownership if good faith has been established." (Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 72876, January 18, 1991)
THE LANDOWNER CANNOT RESUFE BOTH TO PAY FOR THE BUILDING AND TO SELL
THE LAND AND COMPEL THE BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH TO REMOVE THE SAME,
WHICH RIGHT TO REMOVAL IS AVAILABLE ONLY WHEN AFTER HAVING CHOSEN TO
SELL HIS LAND, THE BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH FAILS TO PAY THE SAME
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to
retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453
of the Civil Code. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article
361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he
cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land
and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is
entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same. (Ignacio v. Hilario, G.R. No. L-175, April 30, 1946)
THE LANDOWNER DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY BECOME THE OWNER OF THE
IMPROVEMENTS UPON FAILURE OF THE BUILDER TO PAY THE VALUE OF THE LAND
UPON THE FORMER’S DEMAND THEREOF
There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify
the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the
land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the
owner of the improvement under Article 445. The case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan cited by
appellants is no authority for this conclusion. Although it is true it was declared therein
that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land, after the owner thereof has
chosen this alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost,
nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses
entirely all rights over his own building. (Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Timbang, G.R. No. L-
12812 & L-12813, September 29, 1959)
WHERE THE BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH FAILS TO PAY THE VALUE OF THE LAND
WHEN SUCH IS DEMANDED BY THE LANDOWNER, THE PARTIES MAY RESORT TO
THE FOLLOWING REMEDIES: (1) THE PARTIES MAY DECIDE TO LEAVE THINGS AS
THEY ARE AND ASSUME THE RETENTION OF LESSOR AND LESSEE, AND SHOULD
THEY DISAGREE AS TO THE AMOUNT OF RENTAL, THEN THEY CAN GO TO THE
COURT TO FIX THAT AMOUNT; (2) SHOULD THE PARTIES NOT AGREE TO ASSUME
THE RELATION OF LESSOR AND LESSEE, THE OWNER OF THE LAND IS ENTITLED TO
HAVE THE IMPROVEMENT REMOVED; AND (3) THE LAND AND THE IMPROVEMENT
MAY BE SOLD AT PUBLIC AUCTION, APPLYING THE PROCEEDS THEREOF FIRST TO
THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE LAND AND THE EXCESS, IF ANY TO BE
DELIVERED TO THE OWNER OF THE IMPROVEMENT IN PAYMENT THEREOF
The question is: what is the recourse or remedy left to the parties in such eventuality
where the builder fails to pay the value of the land? While the Code is silent on this point,

guidance may be derived from the decisions of this Court in the cases of Miranda vs.
Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801; 51 Off. Gaz., [12] 6226; Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil., 605 and the
cited case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra. In the first case, this Court has said: "A builder
in good faith may not be required to pay rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which
he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. Possibly he
might be made to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not to appropriate
the improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land but that the
builder is unwilling or unable to pay the land, and then they decide to leave things as they
are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree as to the amount
of rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount.” Should the parties not agree to
leave things as they are and to assume the relation of lessor and lessee, another remedy is
suggested in the case of Ignacio vs. Hilario, supra, wherein the court has ruled that the
owner of the land is entitled to have the improvement removed when after having chosen
to sell his land to the other party, i.e., the builder in good faith fails to pay for the same. A
further remedy is indicated in the case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra, where this Court
approved the sale of the land and the improvement in a public auction applying the
proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and the excess, if any, to be
delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof. (Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v.
Timbang, G.R. No. L-12812 & L-12813, September 29, 1959)
THE OPTION GIVEN BY LAW EITHER TO RETAIN THE PREMISES AND PAY FOR THE
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON OR TO SELL THE SAID PREMISES TO THE BUILDER IN
GOOD FAITH BELONGS TO THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land' belongs to the owner of the land. The
only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the
improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the
former. (Manotok Realty, Inc. v. Tecson, G.R. No. L-47475, August 19, 1988)
THE OWNER OF THE LAND SHOULD CHOOSE BETWEEN INDEMNIFYING THE OWNER
OF THE IMPROVEMENTS OR REQUIRING THE LATTER TO PAY FOR THE LAND
In view of the impracticability of creating a state of “forced coownership”, the law has
provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. (Bernardo v. Bataclan,
G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938)
A BUILDER WHO KNOWS THE DEFECT IN HIS TITLE IS A BUILDER IN BAD FAITH
Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by the
Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith. The owner of the land has three alternative
rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity
therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the
builder to pay the value of the land. 32 In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages
under Article 451. (Heirs of Durano, Sr. v. Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 136456, October 24, 2000)
THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE BETWEEN APPROPRIATING THE IMPROVEMENT OR
SELLING THE LAND ON WHICH THE IMPROVEMENT STANDS TO THE BUILDER,
PLANTER OR SOWER, IS GIVEN TO THE OWNER OF THE LAND
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting or sowing, after
payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the
proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of the land may also
oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner
chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise
the owner may remove the improvements thereon. (Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125683, March 2, 1999)
POSSESSORS IN GOOD FAITH ARE ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY FOR THE
IMPROVEMENTS THEY INTRODUCED INTO THE PROPERTY WITH A RIGHT OF
RETENTION UNTIL THE REIMBURSEMENT IS MADE; HOWEVER, SUBJECT TO THE
OPTION OF THE LANDOWNER UNDER ARTICLE 448
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or

planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall
fix the terms thereof. (Spouses Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010)
THE RULE THAT ARTICLE 448 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS INAPPLICABLE WHERE
THERE IS A CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES ADMITS OF
EXCEPTIONS
As a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a
contractual relation between the parties. It has already been ruled that this provision
covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be
owners of the land, or at least, to have a claim or title thereto. It does not apply when the
interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. From these
pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that – by
some title – one has a right to build, plant, or sow thereon. However, in special cases, the
Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition.
(Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Spouses Nanol, G.R. No. 176791, November 14, 2012)
THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE FINDING OF GOOD FAITH
ON THE PART OF THE BUILDER AND THE RELIEFS GRANTED TO THE OWNER UNDER
ARTICLE 448 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
Article 448 contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land
owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned
by different persons. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title. The provision, which
spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as the builder, is
unquestionably applicable upon a finding that the builder of the house is in good faith.
(Angeles v. Pascual, G.R. No. 157150, September 21, 2011)
INTRODUCTION OF VALUABLE IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LEASED PREMISES DOES
NOT GIVE A LESSEE THE RIGHT OF RETENTION AND REIMBURSEMENT WHICH
RIGHTFULLY BELONG TO A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH
A lessee is neither a builder in good faith or bad faith that would call for the application of
Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code. His rights are governed by Article 1678. The
introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give the lessee
the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good
faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily “improve” out the lessor
out of its property. (Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino Foundation, G.R. No. 170923,
January 20, 2009)
ARTICLE 448 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS INAPPLICABLE IN CASES INVOLVING
CONTRACTS OF SALE WITH RIGHT OF REPURCHASE
In Pecson vs Court of Appeals, the Court held that Article 448 does not apply to a case where
the owner of the land is the builder, sower or planter who then later loses ownership of
the land by sale or donation. In the old case of Coleongco vs Regalado, the Court also ruled
that the provision applies only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land
of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a
person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to the
good or bad faith on the part of the builder. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself
is the builder of the works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely
irrelevant. (Spouses Narvaez v. Spouses Alciso, G.R. No. 165907, July 27, 2009)
IMMEDIATE REMOVAL OF THE STRUCTURES CANNOT BE GRANTED HENCE THE
OWNER MUST EXERCISE EITHER OF THE TWO OPTIONS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 448
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
In view of Article 448 of the New Civil Code, immediate removal of the structures cannot
be allowed. The owner must exercise his option under the said provision. (Department of
Education v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 205664, June 9, 2014)
TO BE DEEMED A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT A PERSON
ASSERTS TITLE TO THE LAND ON WHICH HE BUILDS, I.E., THAT HE BE A POSSESSOR

IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER, AND THAT HE BE UNAWARE THAT THERE EXISTS IN
HIS TITLE OR MODE OF ACQUISITION ANY FLAW WHICH INVALIDATES IT
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land
on which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of owner, and that he be
unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good
faith, since Cepeda permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct
classes on his property. (Department of Education v. Casibang, G.R. No. 192268, January
27, 2016)
THE BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH CAN COMPEL THE LANDOWNER TO MAKE A CHOICE
BETWEEN APPROPRIATING THE BUILDING BY PAYING THE PROPER INDEMNITY OR
OBLIGING THE BUILDER TO PAY THE PRICE OF THE LAND
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building
to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the
owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its
value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the
improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. (Briones v.
Macabagdal, G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010)
ARTICLE 448 COVERS ONLY CASES IN WHICH THE BUILDERS, SOWERS OR PLANTERS
BELIEVE THEMSELVES TO BE THE OWNERS OF THE LAND OR, AT LEAST, TO HAVE A
CLAIM OF TITLE THERETO
Article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves
to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not apply when
the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent, or usufructuary. From
these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned or that,
by some title, one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon. (Spouses Macasaet v.
Spouses Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, September 30, 2004)
ONE IS CONSIDERED IN GOOD FAITH IF HE IS NOT AWARE THAT THERE EXISTS IN
The term "builder in good faith" as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers
to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its
owner and unaware of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner and
unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in
an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. (Spouses Aquino v. Spouses Aguilar, G.R. No. 182754, June
29, 2015)
PERSONS WHOSE OCCUPATION OF A REALTY IS BY SHEER TOLERANCE OF ITS
OWNERS ARE NOT POSSESSORS IN GOOD FAITH
It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a
realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. (Spouses
Esmaquel v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010)
By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The essence of good faith lies in an
honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. (Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 197743, March
12, 2018)
.
II Arts. 448 and 447 applied by analogy
• Doctrines:

ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE MAY APPLY EVEN WHEN THERE WAS CO-
OWNERSHIP IF GOOD FAITH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
As when the co-ownership is terminated by partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil
Code should apply. (Spouses del Campo v. Abesia, G.R. No. L-49219, April 15, 1988)
THE APPLICATION BY ANALOGY OF THE RULES OF ACCESSION UNDER ARTICLE 447
Art. 447 of the New Civil Code contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being
considered the principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The
owner of the land who in good faith - whether personally or through another - makes
constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the
owner of the said materials with the obligation however of paying for their value. The
owner of the materials, on the other hand, is entitled to remove them, provided no
substantial injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right only to
reimbursement for the value of his materials. (Pacific Farms, Inc. v. Esguerra, G.R. No. L-
21783, November 29, 1969)
THE PROVISION ON ARTICLES 448 AND 546 ON INDEMNITY MAY BE APPLIED BY
ANALOGY
Article 448 does not apply where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter
who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation because where the true
owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith
is entirely irrelevant. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity
may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a
state of forced co-ownership. (Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995)
.
III Good faith
• Doctrines:
POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH CONTINUES TO BE ENJOYED BY THE SUCCESSOR, UNTIL
THE CONTRARY IS PROVED
It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it
was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose
this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. (Tecnogas
Philippines Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997)
GOOD FAITH OF THE BUILDER IS DETERMINED BY HIS STATE OF MIND AT THE TIME
HE BUILT THE IMPROVEMENTS
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has
the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. (Pleasantville Development Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996)
LESSEES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS POSSESSORS OR BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH.
BEING MERE LESSEES, THEY KNEW THAT THEIR POSSESSION WOULD CONTINUE
ONLY FOR THE LIFE OF THE LEASE
The private respondents, as lessees who had undisturbed possession for the entire term
under the lease, are then estopped to deny their landlord’s title, or to assert a better title
not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of
the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel
applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was
created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed
to his title. (Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120303, July 24, 1996)
By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The essence of good faith lies in an
honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. (Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 197743, March
12, 2018)

AS A GENERAL RULE, ARTICLE 448 ON BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH DOES NOT APPLY
WHERE THERE IS A CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable
in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are
already bound by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and
by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation). This
Court has ruled that upon acquisition of a condominium unit, the purchaser not only
affixes his conformity to the sale; he also binds himself to a contract with other unit
owners. (Leviste Management Systems, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc., G.R. Nos.
199353 & 199389, April 4, 2018)
ii. Accession Natural
.
I Alluvium or alluvion (Arts. 457-458)
• Doctrines:
ACCRETIONS BELONG TO THE RIPARIAN OWNERS UPON WHOSE LANDS THE
ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS WERE MADE
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of
the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a
river. (Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990)
ACCRETION DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY BECOME REGISTERED LAND JUST
BECAUSE THE LOT WHICH RECEIVES SUCH ACCRETION IS COVERED BY TORRENS
TITLE
The increase in the area of petitioners’ land, being an accretion left by the change of course
or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens
title. As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System. (Cureg v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73465, September 7, 1989)
REGISTRATION DOES NOT PROTECT THE RIPARIAN OWNER FROM ACCRETION
Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretion, which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current, becomes the property
of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such
accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions
of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration Act. (Viajar v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 77294, December 12, 1988)
ALLUVION MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE WORK OF NATURE
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
(Vda. de Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996)
ACCRETION IS NOT APPLICABLE ON SEA BANK
The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers
as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river
bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. (Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997)
RIVER BEDS THAT DRY UP CONTINUE TO BELONG TO THE STATE AS ITS PROPERTY
OF PUBLIC DOMINION, UNLESS THERE IS AN EXPRESS LAW THAT PROVIDES THAT
THE DRIED-UP RIVER BEDS SHOULD BELONG TO SOME OTHER PERSON
By law, accretion, the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the
current of the water, belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where
it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up riverbed belongs
to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests
the ownership in some other person. (Republic v. Santos III, G.R. No. 160453, November
12, 2012)
THERE IS NO ACCRETION WITH ARTIFICIAL AND MAN-MADE DEPOSITS

In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin
with, the land came about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The
deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from the
creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable
requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the river or creek.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
(Daclison v. Baytion, G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016)
ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS ALONG THE BANKS OF A CREEK OR A RIVER AUTOMATICALLY
BELONGS TO THE OWNER OF THE ESTATE TO WHICH IT MAY HAVE BEEN ADDED
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons. (Heirs of Narvasa, Sr. v. Imbornal, G.R. No. 182908, August 6, 2014)
.
II Avulsion (Art. 459)
III . Change of course of rivers (Arts. 461-462)
IV . Formation of islands (Arts. 463-465)
2. Accession with Respect to Movable Property
a. Adjunction or conjunction (Arts. 466-471)
b. Mixture (Arts. 472-473)
c. Specification (Arts. 474-475)
C. Quieting of Title
1. Requisites
2. Classes
• Doctrines:
A FREE PATENT ISSUED OVER A PRIVATE LAND IS NULL AND VOID AND PRODUCES NO LEGAL EFFECTS
WHATSOEVER
Private ownership of land as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory
information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or
previous occupants is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public
Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free
patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership. (Heirs of
Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud, G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016)
AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF FREE PATENTS AND CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE IS NOT THE SAME AS AN ACTION FOR REVERSION
The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title
is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit
State ownership of the disputed land. On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free
patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior
to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake; as the
case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In
such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is
consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-
existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.
(Spouses Galang v. Spouses Reyes, G.R. No. 184746, August 15, 2012)
A CLOUD ON TITLE CONSIST OF ANY INSTRUMENT, RECORD, CLAIM, ENCUMBRANCE OR PROCEEDING;
WHICH IS APPARENTLY VALID OR EFFECTIVE BUT IS IN TRUTH AND IN FACT INVALID, INEFFECTIVE,
VOIDABLE OR UNENFORCEABLE AND MAY BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE TITLE SOUGHT TO BE QUIETED
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact

invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. (Green Acres Holdings,
Inc. v. Cabral, G.R. Nos. 175542 & 183205, June 5 2013)
LANDS WITHIN THE BAGUIO TOWNSITE RESERVATION BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ARE
NO LONGER REGISTRABLE UNDER THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT
Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are:
(1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity. (Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila, G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014)
D. Ruinous Buildings and Trees in Danger of Falling (Arts. 482-483)
III. Co-Ownership
A. Concept
1. Requisites
2. Characteristics of Co-Ownership
• Doctrines:
AN ACTION FOR PARTITION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE; UNTIL NO PHYSICAL DIVISION IS EFFECTED,
SHARES OF CO-OWNERS REMAIN IDEAL
Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a
provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.
(Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-72694, December 1, 1987)
A CO-OWNER HAS THE RIGHT TO ALIENATE HIS PRO INDIVISO SHARE IN THE CO-OWNED PROPERTY
EVEN WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF HIS CO-OWNERS
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership (Article 493). (Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Batongbacal, G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014)
A CO-OWNER EVEN THROUGH THE COURT CANNOT COMPEL OTHER CO-OWNERS TO SELL THEIR
RESPECTIVE SHARES
Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co-owners with full ownership of their parts can
sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the
respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may
be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of
the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners' sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co-
owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with the respondents.
(Arambulo v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014)
BETWEEN DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 17, SECTION 3 AND THE RIGHT GRANTED TO
CO-OWNERS UNDER ARTICLE 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THE LATTER MUST PREVAIL
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of
the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-
owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle,
which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
(Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014)
DEPOSITORS IN A JOINT ACCOUNT ARE CO-OWNERS AS FAR AS THE BANK IN CONCERNED, AS
BETWEEN THE ACCOUNT HOLDERS, THEIR RIGHT AGAINST EACH OTHER MAY DEPEND ON WHAT
THEY HAVE AGREED UPON
While Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as far as the bank is concerned — and may, thus, validly
deposit and/or withdraw funds without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between him and
Evangeline, his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the
purpose for which the subject account was opened. (Apique v. Fahnestich, G.R. No. 205705, August 5, 2015)
ANY ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS MAY BRING AN ACTION IN EJECTMENT
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer
(accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de

reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: A co-owner may bring
such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he
claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. In the more recent
case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to
an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence. (Catedrilla v. Lauron, G.R.
No. 179011, April 15, 2013)
B. Rights and Obligations of Each Co-Owner
• Doctrines:
EACH CO-OWNER OR TENANT IN COMMON OF UNDIVIDED REALTY HAS THE SAME RIGHTS THEREIN
AS THE OTHERS; HE MAY USE AND ENJOY THE SAME WITHOUT OTHER LIMITATION EXCEPT THAT HE
MUST NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF HIS CO-OWNERS
Until a division is effected, the respective parts belonging to each can not be determined; each co-owner
exercises joint dominion and is entitled to joint use. For the use and enjoyment of a particular portion of the
lower part of a house, not used as living quarters, a co-owner must, in strict justice, pay rent, in like manner
as other people pay for similar space in the house; he has no right to the free use and enjoyment of such space
which, if rented to a third party, would produce income. Any one of the co-owners of undivided property
about to be divided or to be sold in consequence of a mutual petition, has the right to ask that the property
be valued by experts, a valuation which would not be prejudicial but rather beneficial to all. (Pardell v.
Bartolome, G.R. No. 4656, November 18, 1912)
C. Extinguishment of Co-Ownership
• Doctrines:
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION MAY BE EXERCISED BY A CO-OWNER OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST ONLY
BEFORE PARTITION, OR BEFORE THE COMMUNITY IS TERMINATED
Right of redemption under the Civil Code may be exercised by a co-owner or his successor in-interest only
before partition. Once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community is
terminated and there is no longer reason to sustain any right of legal redemption. (Caro v. Court of Appeals,
GR. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982)
THE PROPER REMEDY AGAINST A BUYER WHO SUBSTITUTED A CO-OWNER BY VIRTUE OF A SALE OF
THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, IS NOT AN ACTION FOR NULLIFICATION OF SUCH SALE BUT AN ACTION
FOR DIVISION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The proper action in case of sale or of the thing owned in common by one or some of the co-owners to a third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners, is not an action for nullification of the sale but an action
for division of the common property. As a buyer substitutes the seller or sellers as a co-owner of the latter’s
proportionate share, he is a legitimate proprietor and possessor in joint ownership of the common property
claimed. Hence, an action for division of the common property, thereby terminating co-ownership thereof, is
the proper remedy. (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988)
IF DEFENDANT IN AN ACTION FOR PARTITION ASSERTS ADVERSE AND EXCLUSIVE TITLE, THE COURT
SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE ACTION BUT SHOULD INSTEAD DETERMINE IF THE PLAINTIFF IS A CO-
OWNER OR NOT
In case defendants in an action for partition assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the
court should not dismiss the action, but resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not.
Accordingly, the court may then proceed to either grant or dismiss the action. (Roque v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75886, August 30, 1988)
RIGHT TO PARTITION MAY BE BARRED WHEN A CO-OWNER SUCCESSFULLY ACQUIRES EXCLUSIVE
TITLE OVER THE PROPERTY BY PRESCRIPTION
The moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and
denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In
such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of
the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest
ownership by prescription. (Delima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46296, September 24, 1991)
WHEN AN ACTION TO COMPEL SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER ARTICLE 498 IS FILED AND THEREAFTER
GRANTED, THE CO-OWNERSHIP IS DEEMED TERMINATED
When an action to compel the sale of the property is filed pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code, and the trial
court grants the same, thereby ordering the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership is deemed terminated

and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceases. (Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76351, October
29, 1993)
FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLE UNDER ARTICLE 494, AN ACTION FOR PARTITION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE
Defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the
Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. It cannot be barred by
prescription, for Art. 494 provides, no prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999)
ENTERING INTO A MORTGAGE CONTRACT OR PAYING LAND TAXES IN ONE’S OWN NAME WITHOUT
OUSTING OTHER CO-OWNERS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO REPUDIATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
The act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-
ownership. Neither should payment of land taxes in own’s one name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be
construed as such repudiation. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-
owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. (Robles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123509,
March 14, 2000)
AN AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION IS NOT AN ACT OF REPUDIATION BY VIRTUE OF WHICH A CO-
OWNER MAY ACQUIRE EXCLUSIVE TITLE OVER COMMUNITY PROPERTY BY PRESCRIPTION
The execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication does not constitute such sufficient act of repudiation as
contemplated under the law as to effectively exclude other co-owners from the property. Where a co-heir
was excluded from his legal share by the other co-heir who represented himself as the only heir, such act of
exclusion does not constitute repudiation. For title to prescribe in favor of a co-owner there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and the latter has been categorically
advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question. (Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
157954, March 24, 2006)
REDEMPTION BY ONE CO-OWNER OF THE CO-OWNED PROPERTY DOES NOT TERMINATE CO-
OWNERSHIP; FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION BY ONE CO-OWNER SOLE UNDER HIS NAME CONSTITUTES
AN IMPLIED TRUST IN FAVOR OF THE OTHERS; REPUDIATION MUST BE MADE KNOWN TO THE OTHER
CO-OWNERS BEFORE PRESCRIPTION MAY SET IN
Redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it.
The law does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property nor does it state that such
redemption is a mode of terminating a co-ownership; In taking over the property, for his exclusive benefit,
he is guilty of fraud and must act as trustee for the other co-owners; By keeping the other co-owners in the
dark about the repudiation made by a co-owner, it cannot be said that the repudiation was made known in
order to give rise to prescription. (Adille v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44546, January 29, 1988)
EJECTMENT SUIT BY A CO-OWNER, DEEMED INSTITUTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL; EJECTMENT SUIT
BY A CO-OWNER UNDER CLAIM OF EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP WILL NOT PROSPER
A suit for ejectment filed by one co-owner, is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
action will not prosper. (Adlawan v. Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006)
E. Condominium Act
• Doctrines:
OWNERSHIP OF UNIT INCLUDES ONLY THE FOUR WALLS, CEILINGS, WINDOWS AND DOORS THEREOF,
NOT ROOF OR “AIR SPACE” ABOVE IT; RULES ON BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH DO NOT APPLY TO
PROPERTIES RECORDED UNDER AND GOVERNED BY THE CONDOMINIUM ACT
Under the Condominium Act, a unit includes only the four walls, ceilings, windows and doors thereof. It does
not include the roof or the areas above it, such as “air space”; Rules in the Civil Code pertaining to builders in
good faith do not apply to properties governed by the Condominium Act. Special laws cover distinct
situations, such as the necessary co-ownership between unit owners in condominiums and the need to
preserve the structural integrity of condominium buildings; likewise, these special situations deserve, for
practicality, a separate set of rules. (Leviste Management Systems, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc., G.R. Nos.
199353 & 199389, April 4, 2018)
OWNER-DEVELOPER MAY BE A MEMBER OF A CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION; OWNERSHIP OF UNIT
NEED NOT BE THROUGH SALE OR PURCHASE, IN ORDER TO BE ENTITLED TO SUCH MEMBERSHIP IN
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION

An owner-developer of a condominium project can be a member of a condominium corporation. It is
erroneous to argue that the ownership must result from a sale transaction between the owner-developer and
the purchaser. Such interpretation would mean that persons who inherited a unit, or have been donated one,
and properly transferred title in their names cannot become members of a condominium corporation. (Lim
v. Moldex Land, Inc., G.R. No. 206038, January 25, 2017)
COMMON SPACES DO NOT FORM PART OF A CONDOMINIUM UNIT
Unit means a part of the condominium project intended for any type of independent use or ownership,
including one or more rooms or spaces located .in one or more floors (or part or parts of floors) in a building
or buildings and such accessories as may be appended thereto. Section 6(a) of the Condominium Act specifies
the reckoning of a condominium unit's bounds. It also specifies that areas of common use "are not part of the
unit" (bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations and other common structural elements of the
building; lobbies, stairways, hallways, and other areas of common use, elevator equipment and shafts, central
heating, central refrigeration and central air-conditioning equipment, reservoirs, tanks, pumps and other
central services and facilities, pipes, ducts, flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations,
wherever located, except the outlets thereof when located within the unit. (Poole-Blunden v. Union Bank of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 205838, November 29, 2017)
IV. Some Special Properties

A. Waters
1. Arts. 502-518 of the Civil Code
2. P.D. No. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines)
• Doctrines:
DAMAGE OCCASIONED BY ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED WATER IN MAN-MADE LAGOONS BY A HIGHER
ESTATE ENTITLES THE SERVIENT ESTATE TO COMPENSATION
The owner of the higher estate cannot make works which will increase the natural flow of water which the
lower estate is obliged to receive. Thus, when the waters which flow from a higher state are those which are
artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or
servient estate to compensation. (Spouses Ermino v. Golden Village Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No.
180808, August 15, 2018)
A LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT CANNOT ISSUE AN ORDINANCE ARROGATING UNTO ITSELF THE POWER
TO CONTROL AND REGULATE USE OF WATER WHICH PERTAINS TO THE STATE, THROUGH THE
NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES BOARD
Under Art. 3 of the Water Code, water resources are placed under the control and regulation of the
government through the NWRB (then, the NWRC). LGUs, through enactment of an ordinance may not
contravene the provisions of the Water Code arrogating unto itself the power to control and regulate the use
of ground water which, by the aforementioned law, pertains solely to the NWRB. (City of Batangas v.
Philippine Shell Petroleum Corp., G.R. No. 195003, June 7, 2017)
RIGHT TO APPROPRIATE WATER OR TO TAKE OR DIVERT WATERS FROM A NATURAL SOURCE MAY
ONLY BE AFTER A WATER PERMIT THEREFOR IS ISSUED BY THE NWRB
Where extraction of ground water is sought, a permit to drill must first be secured from the NWRB. Only after
it has determined that the application meets the requirements and is not prejudicial to any public or private
interests shall it issue the permit to drill which shall be regarded as a temporary permit, until the rate of
water withdrawal/yield of the well has been determined and assessed, and the application is finally either
approved and a water permit is issued subject to such conditions as the NWRB may impose, or disapproved
and returned to the applicant, stating the reasons therefor. (First Mega Holdings Corp. v. Guiguinto Water
District, G.R. No. 208383, June 8, 2016)
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION MAY TRANSFER OPERATION AND POSSESSION OF MULTI-
PURPOSE HYDROPOWER FACILITIES BUT SHOULD RETAIN THE WATER PERMIT THEREFOR
EPIRA does not authorize NPC to assign or transfer its water rights in case of transfer of operation and
possession of multi-purpose hydropower facilities. Since only the power plant is to be sold and privatized,
the operation of the non-power components such as the dam and reservoir, including the maintenance of the
surrounding watershed, should remain under the jurisdiction and control of NPC which continue to be a
government corporation. There is therefore no necessity for NPC to transfer its permit over the water rights
to K-Water. Pursuant to its purchase and operation/management contracts with K-Water, NPC may authorize
the latter to have beneficial use of the water in the dam to generate electricity but NPC should retain its water

permit. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp., G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
EASEMENTS ESTABLISHED FOR PUBLIC OR COMMUNAL USE ARE CONSIDERED PUBLIC LAND UNDER
SPECIAL LAWS AND SHALL NOT BE RETAINED BY THE OWNER IN THE SAME CONCEPT AS IN THE CIVIL
CODE
Art. 51 of the Water Code of the Philippines provides, “The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the
seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas . . . are
subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage”.
Moreover, according to a series of DENR issuances, when titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-
subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or industrial purposes the segregation of the three (3) meter
wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams shall be observed and be made part of the required easement
pursuant to the above cited provision. (Pilar Development Corp. v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 194336, March 11,
2013)
B. Minerals (Art. 519)
C. Trademark and Trade Names (Arts. 520-523)
V. Possession
A. Concept of Possession
1. Requisites
2. Classifications of Possession
• Doctrines:
POSSESSTION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER MAY BE PROVED BY MATERIAL OCCUPATION; NEITHER
TAX RECEIPTS NOR DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP FOR TAXATION PURPOSES ALONE CONSTITUTE
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP NOR THE RIGHT TO POSSESS REALTY FLOWING THEREFROM
Possession in the concept of owner, is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right
or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right; Evidence consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not conclusive
and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in question. Assessment alone is of little value as
proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. Settled is the
rule that neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-30272,
February 28, 1985)
POSSESSION AS A FACT CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED IN TWO DIFFERENT PERSONALITIES; ONE LONGER
IN POSSESSION, PREFERRED; POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH CEASES WHEN DEFECT IN TITLE IS KNOWN
TO POSSESSOR
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases
of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, if there are two possessions, the
one longer in possession is preferred; Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title
are made known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true
owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge
of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. (Wong v.
Carpio, G.R. No. L-50264, October 21, 1991)
THERE IS POSSESSION IF A PERSON WAS ABLE TO SUBJECT THE PROPERTY TO THE ACTION OF HIS
WILL
Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is
subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that one was able to subject the property
to the action of his will. (Somodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82680, August 15, 1994)
PAYMENT OF RENTALS IS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT ANOTHER HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT OF
POSSESSION
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of
respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses
as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his

belief be right or wrong. Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners,
it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from
1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. (Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, G.R. No. 132518, March
28, 2000)
PAYMENT OF RENTALS BY THE PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION OF CONTRACT OF SALE (ON
THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL) OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
PENDING LITIGATION SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN RECOGNITION OF TITLE
The fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be interpreted to mean either
actual delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorial's title. However, to be able to maintain physical
possession of the premises while awaiting the outcome of the mother case, it had no choice but to pay the
rentals. The rental payments made by Mayfair should not be construed as a recognition of Equatorial as the
new owner. They were made merely to avoid imminent eviction. (Equatorial Realty Development Bank, Inc.
v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 133879, November 21, 2001)
POSSESSION CANNOT BE ACQUIRED THROUGH FORCE OR VIOLENCE
The petitioners did not lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or
violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor.
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by the
former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. (Cequeña v. Bolante, G.R.
No. 137944, April 6, 2000)
AN EJECTMENT CASE WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE DECIDED IN FAVOR OF ONE WHO HAS PRESENTED
PROOF OF OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner
cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. (Carbonilla v. Abiera, G.R. No. 177637,
July 26, 2010)
UNLAWFUL DETAINER INVOLVES THE PERSON’S WITHHOLDING FROM ANOTHER OF THE
POSSESSION OF THE REAL PROPERTY TO WHICH THE LATTER IS ENTITLED, AFTER THE EXPIRATION
OR TERMINATION OF THE FORMER’S RIGHT TO HOLD POSSESSION UNDER THE CONTRACT, EITHER
EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful,
and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be
shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established.
If the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
(Carbonilla v. Abiera, G.R. No. 177637, July 26, 2010)
B. Loss of Possession (Art. 555)
• Doctrines:
THE POSSESSOR MAY LOSE HIS POSSESSION: (1) BY THE ABANDONMENT OF THE THING; (2) BY
TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FOR A GOOD OR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION; (3) BY THE DESTRUCTION OR
TOTAL LOSS OF THE THING OR BY THE THING BECOMING UNMARKETABLE; (4) BY THE POSSESSION
OF ANOTHER, EVEN AGAINST THE WILL OF THE FORMER POSSESSOR, IF THE NEW POSSESSION HAS
LASTED MORE THAN ONE YEAR
If the Government is justified in disturbing the possession of the applicants, it can only be on the ground that
they have abandoned their property, or that it has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the
public domain by the erosive action of the sea. It is quite clear that applicants have never abandoned their
possession under a claim of ownership of this land. If the owners of the land have never in fact nor have the
intent of abandoning it, and the property have not been totally destroyed for the purposes for which it was
held by them, the property does not become a part of the shore of the Bay of Manila. (Aragon v. Insular
Government, G.R. No. L-6019, March 25, 1911)
THE REAL RIGHT OF POSSESSION IS NOT LOST UNTIL AFTER THE LAPSE OF TEN YEARS
The real right of possession of private respondents over the property was lost or no longer exists after the
lapse of 10 years that petitioner had been in adverse possession thereof. (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the
Mountain Province v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 80294-95, March 23, 1990)
LANDS COVERED BY A TITLE CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR ADVERSE POSSESSION
Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. A claim of acquisitive
prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land. In addition to the imprescriptibility, the
person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. The right to possess

and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right
of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible. (Supapo v. Spouses de Jesus, G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015)
C. Theory of Irrevindicability (Art. 559)
1. Requisites
2. Exceptions
• Doctrines:
THE TERM “UNLAWFULLY DEPRIVED” IN ARTICLE 559 DOES NOT INCLUDE A SITUATION WHERE THE
OWNER PARTED WITH THE MOVABLE BY SALE BUT THE CHECK ISSUED IN PAYMENT THEREFOR WAS
DISHONORED
Ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold
even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired
ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired
by the private respondents to the books. (EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, G.R. No. 80298,
April 26, 1990)
UNDER ARTICLE 599 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE TITLE OF THE POSSESSOR OF A MOVABLE PROPERTY
IS NOT THAT OF OWNERSHIP, BUT IS MERELY A PRESUMPTIVE TITLE SUFFICIENT TO SERVE AS BASIS
FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor
has come to acquire indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of
loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to
recover it under any condition. (De Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20264, January 30, 1971)
THE ONLY EXCEPTION THE LAW ALLOWS IS WHEN THERE IS ACQUISITION IN GOOD FAITH OF THE
POSSESSOR AT A PUBLIC SALE, IN WHICH CASE THE OWNER CANNOT OBTAIN ITS RETURN WITHOUT
REIMBURSING THE PRICE
As authoritatively interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that
there was good faith in the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v.
Yapdiangco. Thus: 'Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property
acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law
principle that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed,
cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article
559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction."
(Dizon v. Suntay, G.R. No. L-30817, September 29, 1972)
AS A GENERAL RULE, OWNERSHIP SHALL PASS FROM THE VENDOR TO THE VENDEE UPON THE
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY OF THE THING SOLD EVEN IF THE PURCHASE PRICE HAS NOT
YET BEEN PAID
Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there
is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been
paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold
will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another." (Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86051, September 1, 1992)
THE BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS ON PETITIONER TO SHOW THAT THE PROPERTY WAS UNLAWFULLY
TAKEN
Given this premise - that casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding
representative value - it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly
and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so, any
Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative
value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption
that the chips were exchanged for value remains. (Subic Bay Legend Resorts & Casinos, Inc. v. Bernard, G.R.
No. 193426, September 29, 2014)
D. Fruits
• Doctrines:

A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN ORDERED TO LEAVE CERTAIN PREMISES IS ORDINARILY NOT PROHIBITED
FROM TAKING WITH HIM HIS OWN EFFECTS AND POSSESSION, UNLESS THERE IS AN EXPRESS
PROHIBITION TO THIS EFFECT
Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products
thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545
of the Civil Code, which provides that: “If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or
industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the
net harvest, both in proportion to the time of the possession.” (Azarcon v. Eusebio, G.R. No. L-11977, April 29,
1959)
POSSESSORS SHALL BE DEEMED IN BAD FAITH FROM THE SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS
As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and
those which the legitimate possessor could have received, ... (Art. 549, Civil Code). (Cordero v. Cabral, G.R.
No. L-36789, July 25, 1983)
E. Expenses
• Doctrines:
NECESSARY EXPENSES ARE THOSE MADE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE THING
Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the
preservation of the thing; as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost; as those that
augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded. Among the necessary expenditures are
those incurred for cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. (Mendoza v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-28721, October 5,
1928)
THE BURDEN OF PROVING BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF POSSESSOR RESTS UPON THE PERSON
ALLEGING IT
Good faith is always presumed and the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon
the person alleging it. (Robles v. Hermanos, G.R. Nos. 16736 & 16661, December 22, 1921)
THE RIGHT OF A POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH TO REMOVE IMPROVEMENTS APPLIES ONLY TO
IMPROVEMENTS FOR PURE LUXURY
The right of a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury
or mere pleasure, provided the thing does not suffer any injury and the lawful possessor does not prefer to
retain them by paying their value at the time of his possession. (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-54526, August 25, 1986)
F. Possession of Animals
VI. Usufruct
A. Concept of Usufruct
1. Kinds of Usufruct
2. Special Usufructs
• Doctrines:
SHARE OF STOCK ARE PART OF THE PROPERTY IN USFRUCT
When the cash in the possession of the administratrix corresponding to the 1/2 of the estate adjudicated to
the heirs is sufficient for the monthly allowance being paid to the latter, there is no necessity for the sale of
the 1/2 of the estate corresponding to them, and the lower court may not order said sale especially when the
heirs are opposed to it. (Bachrach v. Seifert, G.R. No. L-2659, October 12, 1950)
ANNOTATION OF USUFRUCTUARY RIGHT OVER AN OCT DOES NOT IMPOSE AN OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE THE VALIDITY OF MORTGAGOR’S TITLE
The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin upon Maxima Hemedes' OCT dose not impose
upon R & B Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor's title. Usufruct gives a right
to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance. The usufructuary
is entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property and may personally enjoy the thing in
usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title, but all the contracts
he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct. (Hemedes v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999)
B. Rights of the Usufructuary

• Doctrines:
USUFRACTUARY HAS THE RIGHT TO THE RENT, TO CHOOSE THE TENANT, TO FIX THE AMOUNT OF
RENT AND RIGHT TO CHOOSE HERSELF AS TENANT THEREOF
All the acts of administration — to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all
necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums thereon — were by
said judgment vested in the usufructuary. Moreover, corollary to her right to all the rent, to choose the tenant,
and to fix the amount of the rent, she necessarily has the right to choose herself as the tenant thereof. (Fabia
v. David, G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945)
C. Obligations of the Usufructuary
• Doctrines:
THE USUFRUCTUARY’S DESIGNATION AS ADMINISTRATOR OF PROPERTIES IS LIMITED BY HIS
REFUSAL AND/OR DEATH AND THEREFORE IT DOES NOT RUN COUNTER TO ARTICLE 870
A proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the
instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be properly disposed of, subject
to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution. (In re:
Aranas v. Aranas, G.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987)
D. Rights of the Naked Owner
E. Obligations of the Naked Owner
• Doctrines:
USUFRUCT IS CONSTITUTED NOT ONLY ON THE BUILDING BUT ON THE LAND AS WELL, THEN THE
USUFRUCT IS NOT DEEMED EXTINGUISHED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BUILDING
A life usufruct constituted on the rentals of the "fincas situadas" located at a certain place includes the rentals
both on the building and the land on which it is rejected, because the building cannot exist without the land.
Hence, the usufruct is not extinguished by the destruction of the building, for under the law usufruct is
extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance. (Vda. de Albar v. Fabie, G.R. No.
L-13361, December 29, 1959)
F. Extinguishment of Usufruct (Arts. 603-612)
• Doctrines:
RTC HAS JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET AND APPLY STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS RELATING
TO LAND REFORM AND GENERAL CIVIL LAW INCLUDING LAW ON USUFRUCT
The Regional Trial Courts have full authority and jurisdiction to interpret and apply both the mass of statutes
and rules and regulations relating to land reform and the general civil law, including the law on usufruct.
(Locsin v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-51333, May 18, 1989)
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 72 EXTINGUISHED EXISTING USUFRUCTS OVER COVERED LANDS UPON
ITS EFFECTIVITY
We believe that the usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favor of Helen Schon was
effectively extinguished by Presidential Decree No. 27. To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon apparently
urges, that her usufruct was not extinguished but rather remained impressed upon the land passing on to the
new owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform statute. Presidential Decree No. 27
was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by giving to tenants-farmers
ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the assumption that they would work harder to
improve their lot in life if they became landowners rather than mere tillers of somebody else's land. (Locsin
v. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 51333 & 52289, February 19, 1991)
VII. Easements
A. Easements in General (Arts. 613-633)
1. Characteristics of Easements
2. Classifications of Easements
3. Dominant Owner vs. Servient Owner
4. Extinguishment of Easements

B. Legal Easements (Arts. 634-687)
1. Easements Relating to Waters
2. Easement of Right of Way
3. Easement of Party Wall
4. Easement of Light and View
5. Drainage of Buildings
6. Intermediate Distances and Works for Certain Constructions and Plantings
7. Easement Against Nuisance
8. Lateral and Subjacent Support
C. Voluntary Easements (Ars. 668-693)
• Doctrines:
WATER RIGHTS APPURTENANT TO A PARCEL OF LAND PASS WITH THE CONVEYANCE OF THE LAND,
ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE CONVEYANCE
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel
of land, pass with the conveyance of the and, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The
purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor’s land cannot be defeated even if
the water is supplied by a third person. (Valisno v. Adriano, G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988)
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY MAY NOT BE ACQUIRED THROUGH PRESCRIPTION
Under the provisions of Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Code, respectively, the
easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription. (Ronquillo v. Roco, G.R. No. L-10619, February
28, 1958)
ALIENATION OF THE DOMINANT AND SERVIENT ESTATES TO DIFFERENT PERSONS IS NOT ONE OF THE
GROUNS FOR EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE EASEMENT
As can be seen from the provisions of law, the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons
is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued
by operation of law. (Tañedo v. Bernad, G.R. No. L-66520, August 30, 1988)
CONVENIENCE OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE IS NOT A GAUGE FOR THE GRANT OF COMPULSORY RIGHT OF
WAY
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites
mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to
a public highway. (Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991)
IT IS THE NEEDS OF THE DOMINANT PROPERTY WHICH ULTIMATELY DETERMINE THE WIDTH OF THE
PASSAGE, AND THESE NEEDS MAY VARY FROM TIME TO TIME
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that “(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. This is taken
to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the
passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. (Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77628, March
11, 1991)
PRESUMPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PARTY WALLS
The legal presumption of the existence of an easement of a party wall is limited to the three cases contained in
article 572 of the Civil Code, and is that of juris tantum; this must be accepted unless the contrary should appear
from the title deeds of the adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in question belongs to one of the
property owners, or, while there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and to support a presumption
against the party wall. (Case v. Heirs of Tuason, G.R. No. 5044, December 1, 1909)
WINDOWS WITH DIRECT VIEWS, OR BALCONIES OR ANY SIMILAR OPENINGS PROJECTING OVER THE
ESTATE OF A NEIGHBOR, CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE DISTANCE PROVIDED BY
LAW
Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting over the estate of a neighbor, cannot
be made if there is not a distance of at least 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and the said estate.
(Choco v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911)

SERVITUDES ARE MERELY ACCESSORIES TO THE TENEMENTS OF WHICH THEY FORM PART, AND EVEN IF
THEY ARE POSSESSED OF A SEPARATE JURIDICAL EXISTENCE, THEY CANNOT BE ALIENATED FROM THE
TENEMENT OR MORTGAGED SEPARATELY
Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. Servitudes are merely
accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are possessed of a separate juridical
existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.
(Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hang Trading Co. Inc., G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991)
MERE CONVENIENCE FOR THE DOMINANT ESTATE IS NOT WHAT IS REQUIRED BY LAW AS THE BASIS FOR
SETTING UP A COMPULSORY EASEMENT
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting
up a compulsory easement. (Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995)
THE CRITERION OF LEAST PREJUDICE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE MUST PREVAIL OVER THE CRITERION
OF SHORTEST DISTANCE
Article 650 of the New Civil Coe explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate is a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. (Quimen v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996)
DUTY OF AN ADJACENT OWNER NOT TO DEPRIVE ANY ADJACENT LAND OR BUILDING OF SUFFICIENT
LATERAL OR SUBJACENT SUPPORT IS AN ABSOLUTE ONE
A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and precaution
made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land. (De Jesus v. Howmart, CA No. 44191-R,
August 28, 1974)
A LEGAL OR COMPULSORY EASEMENT IS THAT WHICH IS CONSTITUTED BY LAW FOR PUBLIC USE OR FOR
PRIVATE INTEREST, WHEREAS A VOLUNTARY EASEMENT IS CONSTITUTED SIMPLY BY WILL OR
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the
necessity. (La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95252, September 5, 1997)
WHERE A PERSON IS ALLOWED TO CONSTRUCT HIS HOUSE ON THE LAND OF ANOTHER TO FACILITATE
HIS GATHERING OF FRUITS, THIS WOULD BE IN THE NATURE OF A PERSONAL EASEMENT
Under Article 614 of the Civil Code, petitioner was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would
facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement. (Alcantara v. Reta, Jr., G.R.
No. 136996, December 14, 2001)
THE WORD PASSAGE DOES NOT CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKABLY CONVEY A MEANING THAT INCLUDES A
RIGHT TO INSTALL WATER PIPES ON THE ACCESS ROAD SINCE THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE WORD
IS THAT IT IS THE ACT OR ACTION OF PASSING: MOVEMENT OR TRANSFERENCE FROM ONE PLACE OR
POINT TO ANOTHER
The ordinary word of passage means the act or action of passing: movement or transference from one place or
point to another. (Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114170, January 25, 1999)
THE NEEDS OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE DETERMINE THE WIDTH OF THE EASEMENT
The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents’
cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled
that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. (Villanueva v. Velasco, G.R. No.
130845, November 27, 2000)
WHERE THE LAND WAS ORIGINALLY PUBLIC LAND, AND AWARDED BY FREE PATENT WITH A
RESERVATION FOR A LEGAL EASEMENT OF A RIGHT OF WAY IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT, JUST
COMPENSATION NEED NOT BE PAID FOR THE TAKING OF A PART THEREOF FOR PUBLIC USE AS AN
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, UNLIKE IF THE LAND WERE ORIGINALLY PRIVATE PROPERTY
Legal easement of right of way exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded
to Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which
case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of right of way.
(National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114348, September 20, 2000)

AN EASEMENT OF A RIGHT OF WAY IS DISCONTINUOUS AND CANNOT BE ACQUIRED THROUGH
PRESCRIPTION
An easement of a right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through prescription. On the other hand,
an easement o light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time when the owner of the
dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the
dominant estate. (Alolino v. Flores, G.R. No. 198774, April 4, 2016)
AN OWNER, BY VIRTUE OF HIS SURFACE RIGHT, MAY MAKE EXCAVATIONS ON HIS LAND, BUT HIS RIGHT
IS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION THAT HE SHALL NOT DEPRIVE ANY ADJACENT LAND OR BUILDING OF
SUFFICIENT LATERAL OR SUBJACENT SUPPORT
Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the
soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premise, he so disturbs the lateral support of his
neighbor’s land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure o the own weight, to fall away or slide from
its position, the one so excavating is liable. (Castro v. Monsod, G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011)
LEAST PREJUDICE IS ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE. ITS VALUE IS NOT DETERMINED
SOLELY BY THE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY, BUT ALSO BY THE VALUE OF THE OWNER’S FOREGONE
OPPORTUNITY FOR USE, RESULTING FROM THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE EASEMENT
By imposing easement on a property, its owner will have to forego using it for whatever purpose he or she deems
most beneficial. Least prejudice therefore, is about the suffering of the servient estate. Its value is not determined
solely by the price of the property, but also by the value of the owner’s foregone opportunity for use, resulting
from the limitations imposed by the easement. (Reyes v. Valentin, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015)
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AT THE POINT LEAST PREJUDICIAL TO THE
SERVIENT ESTATE, AND, INSOFAR AS CONSISTENT WITH THIS RULE, WHERE THE DISTANCE FROM THE
DOMINANT ESTATE TO A PUBLIC HIGHWAY MAY BE SHORTEST
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not
concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the
shortest distance criterion. (Calimoso v. Roullo, G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016)
AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY MAY BE DEMANDED BY THE OWNER OF AN IMMOVABLE OR BY ANY
PERSON WHO BY VIRTUE OF A REAL RIGHT MAY CULTIVATE OR USE THE SAME
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right of way may be demanded by the owner of an immovable
or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate the same. Here, petitioners argue that they are entitled
to demand an easement of right of way from respondent because they are the owners of the subject property
intended to be the dominant estate. (Andres v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc., G.R. No. 201405, August 24,
2015)
DRIED UP RIVER IS NOT PART OF LEGAL EASEMENT AND BELONG TO THE STATE
The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public
dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. (Republic v. Santos
III, G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012)
A ROAD OF RIGHT OF WAY (RROW) CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION, WHICH
IS OUTSIDE THE COMMERCE OF MAN
A road of right of way can be considered as a property of public dominion, which is outside the commerce of man,
and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a contract, except insofar as they may be the object of
repairs or improvements and other incidental matters. (Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 210669, August 1, 2017)
IT IS WELL SETTLED THAT THE CRITERION OF LEAST PREJUDICE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE MUST
PREVAIL OVER THE CRITERION OF SHORTEST DISTANCE ALTHOUGH THIS IS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL
APPRECIATION
Even assuming that the right of way being claimed by the respondent is not the shortest distance from the
dominant estate to the public highway, it is well settled that the criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. (Williams v.
Zerda, G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017)
VIII. Nuisance (Arts. 694-707)
• Doctrines:

A PROPERTY OWNER WHO MERELY RECREATES NATURE SUCH AS AN ARTIFICIAL POOL OF WATER
WITHOUT ADDING ADDITIONAL DANGERS CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR CREATING AN ATTRACTIVE
NUISANCE
The attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to swimming pools, ponds, or reservoirs of water in the absence
of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. (Hidalgo Enterprises,
Inc. v. Balandan, G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952)
UNLESS A NUISANCE IS A NUISANCE PER SE, IT MAY NOT BE SUMMARILY ABATED
Nuisances per se affect the immediate safety of persons and property and thus may be summarily abated under
the undefined law of necessity. Elevating a portion of an adjacent road by cementing it so that it would become
level with a property owner’s gate, is, by its nature not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was
built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of property owner from their house which was admittedly
located on a higher elevation than the subject road. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se, its summary
demolition was unwarranted. (Rana v. Wong, G.R. Nos. 192861-62, June 30, 2014).
AN OWNER WHO MAKES IMPROVEMENTS ON HIS OWN PROPERTY WHICH ENDANGERS NEIGHBORS IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTIONS TO NULLIFY SAID DANGER
Improvements on one’s own property must not be made in such a way as to endanger the life, limb, and property
of neighboring properties and their occupants. Backfilling of soil adjacent to a neighbor’s wall not designed to
carry the load of such backfilling risks causing the collapse of the perimeter wall. Thus, the property owner who
made the improvement must build the necessary retaining wall to nullify the danger created by his own
improvements. (Rana v. Wong, G.R. Nos. 192861-62, June 30, 2014)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MUST STILL FOLLOW THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR ABATING PUBLIC
NUISANCES; THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE DOES NOT GRANT THE
POWER TO MAKE SUMMARY ABATEMENTS ABSENT THE APPROPRIATE ORDINANCE
This Court has ruled time and again that no public official is above the law. Public officials may be held
administratively liable for summarily abating a public nuisance without following the proper procedure therefor.
Moreover, though it has been held that while a nuisance may be abated via an ordinance, the local government
officials must cite a barangay or city ordinance that would have justified their summary abatement through the
exercise of police powers found in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. (Cruz v. Pandacan
Hiker’s Club, G.R. No. 1888213, January 11, 2016)
FOR AN OBJECT TO BE LEGALLY CONSIDERED AS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS, THE PARTY SEEKING ITS
ABATEMENT MUST PROVE THAT IT IS A NUISANCE BY EVIDENCE
A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being
a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such
a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. As such, a finding that something is a nuisance per accidens requires a
proper appreciation of evidence. The person seeking the abatement must prove that it is a nuisance with sufficient
evidence. (North Greenhills Association, Inc. v. Morales, G.R. No. 222821, August 9, 2017)
THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE WILL NOT APPLY WHEN THE CHILD INVOLVED IS OF SUFFICIENT
MATURITY OR CAPACITY, DETERMINED ON A CASE TO CASE BASIS, SUCH THAT THE CHILD CAN BE
DEEMED TO BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY
The doctrine of attractive nuisance is not absolute as to always hold the owner of the premises at fault for any
injury caused to children who wander into his property. As with adults, a child may be of sufficient maturity and
intelligence as to be capable of understanding the nature and consequences of his own acts as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts. The law fixes
does not fix this age and must be determined on a case to case basis. Thus, if the evidence show that the child is of
sufficient age and maturity, such that the proximate cause of the injury is his own negligence, the doctrine does
not apply. (Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., G.R. No. 4977, March 22, 1910)
IX. Registry of Property (Arts. 708-711)
X. Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership

A. Theory of Mode and Title
• Doctrines:
OWNERSHIP MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED THROUGH ONE OF THE RECOGNIZED
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

Ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. Title refers to the juridical
justification of a claim to ownership. Mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over
a thing in question. The law only recognizes seven modes of acquiring ownership: occupation, intellectual
creation, by operation of law, donation, succession, tradition as a consequence of contracts, and prescription.
A declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is not a mode of acquiring ownership by a stranger to the
succession when it does not recite the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode
of acquiring ownership. (Acap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118114, December 7, 1995)
B. Occupation (Arts. 713-720)
1. Requisites
C. Intellectual Creation (Arts. 721-724)
D. Donation
1. Concept of Donation
2. Classifications of Donation
3. Forms of Donation
a. Immovable Property
b. Movable Property
4. Persons Who May Give or Receive Donations (Arts. 735-749)
5. Effects and Limitations of Donation (Arts. 750-759)
6. Revocation and Reduction of Donations (Arts. 760-773)
• Doctrines:
A DONATION MADE TO A CORPORATION BY ESTOPPEL IS VALID AND CURED BY ITS SUBSEQUENT
INCORPORATION
Where a donation is made to a corporation by estoppel without any evidence of fraud, the subsequent
incorporation of the donee corporation cures the defective acceptance of a donation made on behalf of the
donee corporation. (The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima [Peach Sisters of Laguna] v. Alzona, G.R.
No. 224307, August 6, 2018)
ACTIONS FOR REVERSION OF PROPERTY DONATED BY ONEROUS DONATION WHICH PROVIDE FOR
AN AUTOMATIC REVERSION CLAUSE ARE NOT GOVERNED ARTICLE 764 AND THUS DOES NOT
PRESCRIBE IN 4 YEARS BUT IN 10 YEARS
While Article 764 provides that actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the provision does not apply to onerous contracts
that provide for an automatic reversion clause because onerous contracts are governed by the law on
contracts which allow extrajudicial rescissions via resolutory conditions. In such cases, judicial action is not
necessary for the rescission and reversion but only to determine if it had been properly invoked. Hence, the
action to enforce the automatic reversion clause of an onerous donation prescribes in 10 years. (De Luna v.
Abrigo, G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990)
THE NATURE OF A DONATION IS DETERMINED BY THE TERMS OF THE DONATION AND NOT BY ITS
DENOMINATION OR CAPTION
Although the donation was entitled as donations mortis causa, it has been held that dispositions in a deed of
donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of the document which
should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. (Reyes v. Mosqueda, G.R. No. L-45262, July
23, 1990)
ONLY THE PARTY WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE CAUSE OF A DONATION IS BARRED
FROM RAISING THE ILLEGALITY AS A CAUSE OR DEFENSE
Where a donation is based on an illegal cause such as in consideration of an extramarital relations, the parties
who are guilty and had knowledge of the illegality of the act are barred from raising illegality as the cause of
action to enforce or revoke the act. In this case, only the donor was guilty and barred from raising illegality.
Thus, the heirs of the donor are also barred from raising illegality as their cause for the revocation of the
donation. The donee, on the other hand, being in good faith, may enforce the deed which is valid on its face.
(Liguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-11240, December 18, 1957)
DONATIONS OF A PARCEL OF LAND WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY
LAW ARE INVALID

The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation inter vivos because it was not executed in a public
instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code); nor was there as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will
were not complied with. Nor may the conveyance be upheld as a contractual transmission of the heir’s
hereditary share as contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. (Tan Queto v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35648 [Resolution], February 27, 1987)
THE PURPOSE OF THE FORMAL REQUIREMENT IS TO INSURE THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE
DONATION IS DULY COMMUNICATED TO THE DONOR AND IT MAY BE DISPENSED BY OTHER FORMS
OF COMMUNICATION TO THE DONOR
Where the separate acceptance of the donee is not noted in the instrument of donation, a strict interpretation
of Article 633 (Now Article 749) can lead to no other conclusion that it should be annulled for being defective
in form. The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. However, where there is evidence that the acceptance was already
communicated to the donors, the formal requirement may be dispensed with. (Pajarillo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1989)
THE PERSON SEEKING THE REVOCATION HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE LEGITIME OF A
CHILD ADOPTED SUBSEQUENT TO A DONATION HAS BEEN IMPAIRED BY SUCH DONATION IN ORDER
FOR IT TO BE REVOKED
In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his
properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years
from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole
estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-58671,
November 22, 1985)
A JUDICIAL ACTION IS PROPER ONLY WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF A SPECIAL PROVISION
AUTHORIZING EXTRAJUDICIAL CANCELLATION
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not
applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion
of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the
same is not necessary. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77425, June 19,
1991)
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY, HONOR, PROPERTY, LIBERTY, AND SECURITY OF THE DONOR WHICH
ALSO OFFEND THE PERSON OF THE DONOR ARE INCLUDED IN THOSE WHICH SHOW INGRATITUDE
AND CONSTITUTE CAUSES FOR REVOCATION
All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the donor, gives cause for revocation by
reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and
physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against
chastity; and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc.
(Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996)
THE LACK OF AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY THE DONEE BEFORE THE NOTARY PUBLIC DOES NOT
RENDER THE DONATION NULL AND VOID
The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a
public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed
of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public
in the acknowledgment is of no moment. the donee’s acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page
of the notarized deed of donation, was therefore also made in a public instrument. (Quilala v. Alcantara, G.R.
No. 132681, December 3, 2001)
A DONATION INTER VIVOS, ONCE ACCEPTED, TRANSFERS THE OWNERSHIP OF THE OBJECT OF THE
DONATION TO THE DONEE AND CANNOT BE REVOKED BY MERE DENIAL OF THE DEED OF DONATION
BY THE DONOR
Once a donation is made and accepted, it cannot be revoked by the mere denial of its execution by the donor.
The person assailing it must produce clear, strong, and convincing evidence to overcome the positive value
of the public instrument on which the donation appears. Thus, an attempt by the donor to re-convey the same
property to another will have no effect as he is no longer the owner of the property. (Hemedes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999)
FOR THE PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD TO APPLY, IT MUST BE ESTABLISHED THAT THE DONOR DID NOT
LEAVE ADEQUATE PROPERTIES WHICH CREDITORS MIGHT HAVE RECOURSE FOR THE COLLECTION
OF THEIR CREDITS EXISTING BEFORE THE EXECUTION OF THE DONATION

Article 759 of the Civil Code states that the donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors when at
the time thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the donation. For this
presumption of fraud to apply, it must be established that the donor did not leave adequate properties which
creditors might have recourse for the collection of their credits existing before the execution of the donation.
(Siguan v. Lim, G.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999)
THE USURPATION OF THE DONOR’S PROPERTY IS AN ACT OF INGRATITUDE AND DOES NOT NEED TO
BE PROVEN BY CRIMINAL CONVICTION
The donee’s act of occupying the property of the donor without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act
of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of
a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be
proved in the action for revocation. (Noceda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999)
THE DONEE BECOMES THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY DONATED ONCE A DONATION IS
ACCEPTED
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by
the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
Donations can only be revoked by the causes expressly provided for in the Civil Code and the Family Code, as
the case may be. (Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126996, February 15, 2000)
NON-REGISTRATION OF A DEED OF DONATION SHALL NOT AFFECT ITS VALIDITY; THE NECESSITY OF
REGISTRATION COMES INTO PLAY WHEN THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS ARE AFFECTED
As between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be
contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective.
However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now
Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its
validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected. (Gonzales
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001)
ACTION FOR REDUCTION OF DONATION ON THE GROUND OF IMPAIRMENT OF LEGITIME PRESCRIBES
IN 10 YEARS
Donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by
a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to
reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs. (Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999)
WHERE A DONATION IS SUBJECT TO A CONDITION, THE CONDITION IS NOT VIOLATED WHEN THE
PROPERTY IS USED IN A MANNER THAT IS CONSISTENT OR IS FOR THE FURTHERANCE OF THE
OBJECTIVE OF THE DONATION
The subject lot was donated under the condition that it shall be used exclusively for “school purposes”. Thus,
although the land was used to barter for a larger piece of property which could accommodate more school
buildings, the condition is not violated because the exchange of the lot was for a much bigger one was in
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The purpose for the donation remains the same,
which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected.
(Republic v. Silim, G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001)
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE FULFILLS THE FORMAL REQUIREMENT OF COMMUNICATING ACCEPTANCE TO
DONOR
The requirement that the acceptance made in a separate instrument be noted on the original deed is not
indispensable when it is proven that the donor was made aware of such acceptance in another manner.
Where a member of the community donates his property for a specific purpose, such as to support a
community school, the fact that the purpose was actually accomplished, such as the building of a school
building on the donated property, gives rise to the presumption that the donor had knowledge of the
acceptance. (Republic v. Silim, G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001)
A VALID DONATION, ONCE ACCEPTED, BECOMES IRREVOCABLE EXCEPT UPON LAWFUL CAUSE AND
IN PROPER JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
In order for a donation to be validly revoked, the deed of revocation must clearly state that such was based
on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or
ingratitude. Moreover, it cannot be revoked by mere execution of an instrument of revocation but must be
made through the proper action for revocation. (Spouses Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111904,
October 5, 2000)

WHEN THE SUBJECT OF DONATION IS PURCHASE MONEY, ARTICLE 748 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
APPLIES SUCH THAT A DONATION OF MONEY EXCEEDING FIVE THOUSAND PESOS MUST APPEAR IN A
WRITTEN INSTRUMENT TO BE VALID
A donation of money that exceeds P5,000.00, as well as its acceptance, should be in writing. Otherwise, the
donation is void for non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law. Without such a deed, the
existence of a donation of money exceeding such an amount cannot be given credence. (Carinan v. Spouses
Cueto, G.R. No. 198636, October 8, 2014)
ARTICLE 765 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON THE GROUNDS OF REVOKING A DONATION BY REASON OF
INGRATITUDE APPLIES TO THE GRATUITOUS PORTION OF A DONATION THAT IS PARTLY ONEROUS
AND PARTLY GRATUITOUS
Where the burden imposed on the donee is less than the value of the donated property, it is only partly
onerous and partly gratuitous. In such cases, Article 765 of the Civil Code on the grounds to revoke a donation
by reason of ingratitude still applies as to the gratuitous portion. (Calanasan v. Spouses Dolorito, G.R. No.
171937, November 25, 2013)
AN ABSOLUTE SALE DISGUISED AS A DONATION IS A RELATIVELY SIMULATED CONTRACT
In relative simulation of a contract, there is contractual intent except that the parties merely concealed their
true intent. Where the parties intended to enter into a sale that would transfer the ownership of the subject
matter of their contract, but disguised it as a donation for the purpose of evading taxes, there is a relative
simulation of a contract of sale. (Victoria v. Pidlaoan, G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016)
A RIGHT GRATUITOUSLY DISPOSED MUST BE PROPRIETARY
It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. It is true
that gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or a right but the term right must be understood
in a “proprietary” sense over which the possessor has jus disponendi. This is because in true donations there
results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets. (Heirs of Gozo v. Philippine
Union Mission Corp. of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, G.R. No. 195990, August 5, 2015)
TITLE TO DONATED IMMOVABLE PROPERTY PASSES ONLY UPON ACCEPTANCE IN A PUBLIC
INSTRUMENT AND NOTIFICATION OF THE DONOR OF THE SAME
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until
and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not
noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. (Sumipat v.
Banga, G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004)
DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY VOID WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE FORMALITIES IN ARTICLE 749
OF THE CIVIL CODE
Where the law requires that a contract be in some form to be valid, such requirement is absolute and
indispensable; its non-observance renders the contract void and of no effect. One such law is Article 749 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus, donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without
observance of the formalities specified in Article 749. (Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 197743,
March 12, 2018)
E. Prescription
1. Acquisitive Prescription
2. Extinctive Prescription
3. Laches
4. Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights (Arts. 1117-1138)
5. Prescription of Actions (Arts. 1139-1155)
• Doctrines:
TRIAL COURTS MAY DISMISS AN ACTION ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION ONLY WHEN PLEADINGS
SHOW IT IS TIME-BARRED
The affirmative defense of prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint. While
trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription, it may only do
so when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred. (James v. Eurem
Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 190650, October 14, 2013)

ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ARE NOT PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ARE
THUS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. For public land to be susceptible to prescription, there
must be an express declaration by the State that the property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial property.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
(Republic v. Tan, G.R. No. 199537, February 10, 2016)
Part Three – Succession
I. Succession in General
• Doctrines:
THE RIGHTS TO THE SUCCESSION ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF THE DECEDENT
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and
terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided
under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that “[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.” Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied
ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.
(Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 182839, June 2, 2014)
RIGHTS TO THE SUCCESSION ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in
equal shares. In turn, Romana's and Gregoria's heirs — the parties herein — became entitled to the property upon
the sisters' passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death. (Ining v. Vega, G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013)
THE LEGITIME OF THE HEIRS IS TO BE COMPUTED AS OF THE TIME THE DECEDENT DIED
The capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed
as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly,
the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator
(Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948). (Calalang-
Parulan v. Calalang, G.R. No. 184148, June 9, 2014)
THE HEIRS’ LIABILITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF THE ESTATE IS ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE
VALUE OF THEIR INHERITANCE
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property
involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass
of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality
for the payment of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the
extent of the value of their inheritance. (Alvarez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68053, May 7, 1990)
SUCCESIONAL RIGHTS ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF THE DECEDENT AND
COMPULSORY HEIRS ARE CALLED TO SUCCEED BY OPERATION OF LAW
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to
them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. (Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113725, June 29, 2000)
WHAT IS VALID AND BINDING AGAINST THE DECEDENT IS ALSO VALID AND BINDING AS AGAINST THE
HEIRS
Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article
1311 of the NCC states that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted
to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. (Spouses Santos v. Spouses Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28,
2007)

INHERITANCE INCLUDES ALL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY PARENTS’
DEATH
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their deceased
parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not
extinguished by their parents' death. (Pamplona v. Moreto, G.R. No. L-33187, March 31, 1980)
DECEASED’S PROPERTY INTEREST SHOULD GO TO HER ESTATE UPON HER DEMISE SO AS TO BE ABLE TO
PROPERLY DISTRIBUTE THEM LATER TO HER HEIRS BY WILL OR BY OPERATION OF LAW
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his
will or by operation of law. (National Housing Authority v. Almeida, G.R. No. 162784, June 22, 2007)
RIGHT OF ACTION FOR THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF A NATURAL CHILD IS EXTINGUISHED UPON CHILD’S
DEATH
The right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished
by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child. (Conde v. Abaya, G.R.
No. 4275, March 23, 1909)
NO LEGAL BAR TO A SUCCESSOR DISPOSING OF HIS HEREDITARY SHARE IMMEDIATELY AFTER
DECEDENT’S DEATH
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
the 'causante' or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after the decedent’s
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
(Gevero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 77029, August 30, 1990)
LACK OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE CONTRACT TO SELL INVOLVING HEIR’S
HEREDITARY SHARE IN THE ESTATE OF HER LATE FATHER
Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death. Petitioner, therefore,
became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not
invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her
share in the estate of her late father. (Opulencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125835, July 30, 1998)
SUCCESSORS STEP INTO THE SHOES OF THE DECEDENT UPON HIS DEATH AND MAY COMMENCE ANY
ACTION ORIGINALLY PERTAINING TO THE DECEDENT
From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.
(Emnace v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126334, November 23, 2001)
NO CONTRACT MAY BE ENTERED INTO UPON A FUTURE INHERITANCE EXCEPT IN CASES EXPRESSLY
AUTHORIZED BY LAW
“It may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null and void.” But to remove
all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, “(n)o contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.” (Tañedo v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 104482, January 22, 1996)
THE RIGHTS TO A PERSON’S SUCCESSION ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF HIS DEATH AND DO
NOT VEST IN HIS HEIRS UNTIL SUCH TIME
The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until
such time. Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no
longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. (Locsin v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 89783, February 19, 1992)
NO PREVIOUS JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP IS NECESSARY FOR AN HEIR TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT
TO THE PROPERTY OF A DECEASED
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and
Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was
presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the
property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. (Bordalba v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112443, January 25, 2002)
A PRIOR SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE IS NOT ESSENTIAL BEFORE THE HEIRS CAN COMMENCE ANY
ACTION ORIGINALLY PERTAINING TO THE DECEASED

From the death of Lourdes Sampayo (decedent) her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding
partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-
in-interest. (Heirs of Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998)
II. Testamentary Succession

A. Wills
1. Wills in General
2. Testamentary Capacity
• Doctrines:
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY OF THE TESTATOR IS DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF THE
EXECUTION OF HIS WILL
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator
is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally
be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument
will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. The mental capacity of the testator is
determined as of the date of the execution of his will. (Torres v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-24569, February 26,
1926)
NEITHER OLD AGE, PHYSICAL INFIRMITIES, FEEBLENESS OF MIND, AMONG OTHERS, ARE
SUFFICIENT SINGLY OR JOINTLY TO SHW TESTAMENTARY INCAPACITY
Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only later to be rejected as
incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind,
weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly
to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
(Torres v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-24569, February 26, 1926)
3. Forms of Wills and Witnesses
• Doctrines:
A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA MUST COMPLY WITH THE FORMALITIES OF A WILL
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were
not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
The witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of which clause is a requirement
separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the
pages of the will. (Aluad v. Aluad, G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008)
FORMALITIES OF A DONATION DEPENDS UPON ITS NATURE
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation
of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted
with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in
which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a
will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
(Ganuelas v. Cawed, G.R. No. 123968, April 24, 2003)
a. Notarial Will
• Doctrines:
A THUMBARK SUFFICIENTLY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE WILL MUST BE
SIGNED
The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only by the customary
written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark. Expert testimony as to the
identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The method of identification of
fingerprints is a science requiring close study. (Dolar v. Diancin, G.R. No. 33365, December 20, 1930)
WRITING A PORTION OF OR ALL OF THE TESTATOR’S NAME IS ACCEPTED AS A CLEAR
INDICATION TO EXECUTE A WILL
One who makes a will may sign the same by the use of a mark, the name having been written by
others. If the writing of a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the
person to make and execute it, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of the name ought to be

accepted as a clear indication of intention to execute it. The man who cannot write and who is
obliged to make his mark simply therefore upon the will, is held to "sign" as effectually as if he had
written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a
signature by the person making a will to make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his
name thereon. (Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan, G.R. No. 6845, September 1, 1914)
SIGNATURES MADE WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR EACH OF THE NECESSARY PARTIES, IF SO
DESIRE, TO SEE THE SIGNATURE PLACED UPON THE WILL IS SUFFICIENT
While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the
witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence
of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signature made is not
necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary
parties, if they so desire, to see the signatures placed upon the will. (Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan, G.R.
No. 6845, September 1, 1914)
WHEN A NOTARIAL WILL IS CONTESTED, ALL THREE WITNESSES MUST BE EXAMINED
When a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within
reach of the process of the court. (Avera v. Garcia, G.R. No. 15566, September 14, 1921)
SIGNATURES OF ALL MAY BE PROVEN BY EXAMINATION OF THE WILL
The fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will is proven by the
mere examination of the signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact
does not invalidate the will nor prevent its probate. (In Re: Nayve v. Mojal, G.R. No. 21755, December
29, 1924)
AN UNSUBSTANTIAL DEPATURE FROM THE USUAL FORMS SHOULD BE IGNORED
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested
not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause. (In Re: Taboada v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982)
ANY NOTARIAL ACT OUTSIDE THE LIMITS OF HIS JURISDICTION HAS NO FORCE AND EFFECT
A notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments,
within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power
to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. (Guerrero v. Bihis, G.R. No. 174144, April 17,
2007)
ARTICLE 808 ALSO APPLIES TO THOSE “INCAPABLE OF READING THEIR WILL”
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
"incapable of reading their will" such as individuals with "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision. (In
Re: Alvarado v. Gaviola, Jr., G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993)
IT IS ESSENTIAL IN PROBATE THAT A PROVISION IN A WILL STATING THAT “THE WILL SHALL
NOT BE PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURTS” IS A VOID PROVISION, FOR A PERSON CANNOT BY
HIS ACTUATIONS DEPRIVE A COMPETENT COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION
The disposition of the testator that his “Last Will Testament and not be heard by the Court” cannot
strip the courts of their authority to determine if the referral is legalizable or not. They are not
stakeholders in one way or another on an issue, which may confer or remove jurisdiction and
authority to Tribunals to resolve and decide what it wants to resolve and decide. (Mendoza v.
Pilapil, G.R No. L-47931, June 27, 1941)
THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT ALLOW EVIDENCE ALIUNDE TO FILL
A VOID IN ANY PART OF THE DOCUMENT OR SUPPLY MISSING DETAILS THAT SHOULD
APPEAR IN THE WILL ITSELF AND IS INSTEAD LIMITED TO AN EXPLORATION WITHIN THE
CONFINES OF THE WILL
Liberal construction only permits a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law.
This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results. If the
surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to
have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination
should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to
probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-
essential defect. (Testate Estate of Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005)
THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE MUST BE LIMITED TO DISREGARDING THOSE DEFECTS
THAT CAN BE SUPPLIED BY AN EXAMINATION OF THE WILL ITSELF

The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in
each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All
these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation
clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Caneda v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993)
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION, ERROR IN THE NUMBER OF PAGES
OF THE WILL AS STATED IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE IS NOT MATERIAL TO INVALIDATE
THE SUBJECT WILL
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the Court, after examining the
totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated
in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. The position of the court is in
consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code
which reads: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall
not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805." (Samaniego-Celada v. Abena, G.R. No. 145545,
June 30, 2008)
THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE TESTATOR SUBSCRIBES AT THE END OF THE WILL REFERS
TO THE LOGICAL END THEREOF
When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it
necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends.
As the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any
testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment. (Mitra v. Sablan-
Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018)
FAILURE TO STATE THE NUMBER OF PAGES COMPRISING THE WILL ON THE ATTESTATION
CLAUSE DOES NOT RENDER SUCH WILL DEFECTIVE IF SUCH OMISSION CAN BE SUPPLIED BY
AN EXAMINATION OF THE WILL ITSELF, WITHOUT RESORTING TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which provides
that: in the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render
the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance
with all the requirements of Article 805. What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the
existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself,
without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be
supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself." (Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018)
i. Instrumental witnesses
• Doctrines:
ARTICLE 821 OF THE CIVIL CODE FINDS APPLICATION ONLY IN CASE OF WITNESSES TO
A WILL AND REQUIRES A CONVICTION BEFORE ONE CAN BE DISQUALIFIED
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article
821 of the Civil Code which states that persons convicted of falsification of a document, perjury
or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the witness Francisco
Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness
and this case does not involve the probate of a will, the court ruled that the fact that said witness
is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a
witness. (People v. Umali, G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991)
b. Holographic Will
• Doctrines:
A HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT CONTAINING ONLY AN ACT OF DISINHERITANCE CAN BE
CONSIDERED A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the

terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words,
the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. (Dy Yieng Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 140371-72,
November 27, 2006)
ARTICLE 810 DOES NOT SPECIFY A PARTICULAR LOCATION WHERE THE DATE SHOULD BE
PLACED IN A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will. (In Re: Labrador v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 83843-
44, April 5, 1990)
ONLY THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 810 ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE PROBATE OF A
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will
that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator in compliance with Article 810. A reading of
Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of
the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,
does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to
probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. (Spouses Ajero v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994)
4. Codicils and Incorporation by Reference
5. Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions
• Doctrines:
DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE REVOCATION; THE FAILURE OF THE NEW TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION, UPON WHOSE VALIDITY THE REVOCATION DEPENDS, IS EQUIVALENT TO THE
NON-FULFILLMENT OF A SUSPENSIVE CONDITION; HENCE, IT PREVENTS THE REVOCATION OF
THE WILL
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason
that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void. (Vda. de Molo v. Molo, G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951)
THE PHYSICAL ACT OF DESTRUCTION OF A WILL MUST BE COUPLED WITH ANIMUS REVOCANDI
TO BE EFFECTIVE
The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another
person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without
saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. (Testate Estate of Maloto v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988)
6. Republication and Revival of Wills
7. Probate of Wills
• Doctrines:
A MERE STRANGER HAS NO PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE WILLS AND HIS OPPOSITION DID
NOT HAVE THE LEGAL EFFECT OF REQUIRING THE THREE WITNESSES
Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a
mere stranger, he has no personality to contest the will and his opposition thereto did not have the legal
effect of requiring the three witnesses provided under Article 811. (Rivera v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. Nos. 75005-06, February 15, 1990)
ANNEXING THE ORIGINAL WILL IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT
It has been the practice in some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application,
without prejudice to producing the original thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This
precaution has been adopted by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken place in
certain cases." That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is
clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate

by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is
lost or destroyed. (Heirs of Fran v. Salas, G.R. No. 53546, June 25, 1992)
A WILL HAS NO EFFECT WHATEVER AND NO RIGHT CAN BE CLAIMED THEREUNDER UNTIL IT IS
ADMITTED TO PROBATE
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked;
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court.” An owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. (Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110427, February 24,
1997)
PERSONS WHO DO NOT PARTICIPATE OR HAD NO NOTICE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT NOT
BOUND THEREBY
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however,
that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound
thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon, and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened
in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. (Cua v.
Vargas, G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006)
BEFORE ANY WILL CAN HAVE FORCE OR VALIDITY IT MUST BE PROBATED
Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the
Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have
force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.
Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." As the will was not probated, the
Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given effect. Thus, the fact that
petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of
possession. (Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 175720, September 11, 2007)
IN EXCEPTIONAL INSTANCES, COURTS MAY PASS UPON CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE WILL
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. (Spouses Ajero v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994)
UNAUTHENTICATED ALTERCATIONS, CANCELLATIONS MADE ON THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OR
ON TESTATOR’S SIGNATURE DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE WILL ITSELF
Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. (Spouses Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 106720, September 15, 1994)
COURT’S INQUIRY IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS IS LIMITED TO THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE WILL UNLESS THERE EXIST EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. In exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In this
case, the SC invalidated the legacy because the same is to be given to a person with whom the testator
had been living in concubinage. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985)
NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT APPLY GOVERNS THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE WILL
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. (Cayetano v.
Leonidas, G.R. No. 54919, May 30, 1984)
PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN SHOULD BE VENTILATED IN THE PROPER
PROBATE COURT OR IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING INSTITUTED FOR THE PURPOSE
As questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto, it should be ventilated in the proper probate
court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant
ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession. (Agapay v. Palang, G.R. No.
116668, July 28, 1997)

THE DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP MUST BE MADE IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SUCH
PURPOSE AND NOT IN AN ORDINARY SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. (Heirs of
Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013)
DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP MUST BE MADE IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, NOT IN AN
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION BUT WHEN PARTIES IN THE CIVIL CASE PRESENTED THAT ISSUE,
COURTS MAY DECIDE ON IT TO PREVENT UNNECCESARRY SUPERFLUITY
Declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action.
However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who
heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court
had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil
case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. (Rebusquillo v. Spouses Gualvez, G.R.
No. 204029, June 4, 2014)
WHEN ONE’S HEIRSHIP IS AN ISSUE IN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION IT NEED NOT BE RE-DECLARED
IN A SEPARATE SPECIAL PROCEEDING OF PROBATE WHEN TO DO WOULD PROLONG THE CASE
INTERMINABLY
As a rule declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as it involves the
establishment of a status or right. Matters which involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of
a deceased person as well as filiation and heirship partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. However, when one’s
heirship is uncontroverted, there is no need to re-declare such in a separate proceeding so as to prolong
the case interminably. (Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014)
THE PROBATE COURT CAN ALSO PASS UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL WHEN
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS DEMANDED
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was
first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may
become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon
because "practical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary
provisions are doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined,
the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute.
Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains
it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. (Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124099, October
30, 1997)
IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS, THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP IS AN EXTRANEOUS MATTER
As a probate court, the trial court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings but with limited
jurisdiction. It could resolve questions of title only provisionally. In a special proceeding for the probate
of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. This doctrine applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar. All a
probate court could do is to determine whether properties should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. (Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997)
THERE IS NO LEGAL OBSTACLE TO AN HEIR’S WAIVER OF HIS SHARE EVEN IF SUCH IS NOT YET
DETERMINED
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that "rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent." Hence, there is no legal obstacle to an heir’s waiver of his/her hereditary share
"even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate."
(Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997)
a. Notarial Will
b. Holographic Will
• Doctrines:

A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL WHICH WAS LOST OR CANNOT BE FOUND CAN BE PROVED BY MEANS
OF A PHOTOSTATIC COPY
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. However, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. (In Re: Bonilla
v. Aranza, G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982)
ARTICLE 811 IS MERELY DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY IN UNCONTESTED
HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS, EXPERT EVIDENCE MAY BE RESORTED TO
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, Francisco was not required to produce more
than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 of
our present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as mandatory. It is merely directory since there may
be no available witness acquainted with the testator’s hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses
may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness
may be found or may be willing, and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
(Azaola v. Singson, G.R. No. L-14003, August 5, 1960)
ARTICLE 811 IS MANDATORY IN CASE OF CONTESTED HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
The laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. We
cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which
is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will
was in the handwriting of the deceased. (Codoy v. Calugay, G.R. No. 123486, August 12, 1999)
B. Institution of Heir
• Doctrines:
THERE IS NO PRETERITION WHERE A WILL MERELY DISINHERITED AN HEIR WITHOUT INSTITUTING
AN HEIR TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER COMPULSORY HEIRS
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were
not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to
all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the
exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in
the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. (Dy Yieng Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. Nos.
140371-72, November 27, 2006)
C. Substitution of Heirs
• Doctrines:
WHERE THE CODICIL PROVIDES THAT SHOULD THE DEVISEE OR HIS HEIRS NOT FULFILL THE
CONDITIONS IMPOSED IN THE CODICIL, THE PROPERTY REFERRED TO SHALL BE SEIZED AND
TURNED OVER TO THE TESTATRIX'S NEAR DESCENDANTS, THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTION
Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to
whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance
or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with
the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two. (Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113725, June 29, 2000)
D. Conditional Testamentary Dispositions and Dispositions with a Term
• Doctrines:
WHERE THE CODICIL PROVIDES THAT SHOULD THE DEVISEE OR HIS HEIRS NOT FULFILL THE
CONDITIONS IMPOSED IN THE CODICIL, THE PROPERTY REFERRED TO SHALL BE SEIZED AND
TURNED OVER TO THE TESTATRIX'S NEAR DESCENDANTS, THERE IS A MODAL INSTITUTION
BECAUSE IT IMPOSES A CHARGE UPON THE INSTITUTED HEIR WITHOUT, HOWEVER, AFFECTING THE
EFFICACY OF SUCH INSTITUTION
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that
the subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix
imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs

of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a
devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation
be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. (Rabadilla v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000)
PERPETUAL PROHIBITION IN ALIENATION OF PROPERTY IN TRUST IS VALID ONLY FOR 20 YEARS
The trust, insofar as the first 20-year period is concerned, should be upheld and the wishes of the testatrix
ought to be respected. However, upon the lapse of the 20-year period, the trust created over the properties
of the decedent should be dissolved. (Hilarion, Jr. v. Trusteeship of the Estate of Rodriguez, G.R. No. 168660,
June 30, 2009)
E. Legitime
• Doctrines:
OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES SHOULD BE RECKONED ONLY FROM THE ASCENDANT WHERE FIRST
TRANSMISSION OCCURRED
The ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from the ascendant from where the first
transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. Moreover, Article 891
grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the 3rd degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The first cousins, being from the 4th degree are excluded. (Mendoza v. Delos Santos, G.R.
No. 176422, March 20, 2013)
THE DEATH OF THE ADOPTER REVERTS BACK THE PARENTAL AUTHORITY TO THE BIOLOGICAL
PARENTS
The term “dependent parents” should be used in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate
parents". Moreover, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
provided under Section 20 of RA 8552, which is applicable by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. The restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents ensures that the adoptee,
who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age. (Bartolome v. Social Security System,
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014)
COMPLETION OF LEGITIME MUST BE RAISED IN PROCEEDINGS FOR SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
The exercise of the heirs’ actio ad supplendam legitimam, or their right of completion of legitime should be
raised in the distribution and partition stage of a case for the settlement of the estate. (Gala v. Ellice Agro-
Industrial Corp., G.R. No. 156819, December 11, 2003)
COURT ADJUDICATION IS NOT NECESSARY IF THE TESTATOR ALREADY IDENTIFIED THE PROPERTIES
FORMING PART OF THE INHERITANCE
Heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed specific properties do not require Court adjudication to identify
which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already identified these. From the very moment
of the testator's death, title over these particular properties vests on the heir, legatee, or devisee. (Hacbang
v. Alo, G.R. No. 191031, October 5, 2015)
A PARENT ACTING AS LEGAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PROPERTY OF HIS/HER MINOR CHILDREN
CANNOT DISPOSE OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT JUDICIAL APPROVAL
A parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her
minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without
judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property
are only powers of possession and management. (Lindain v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95305, August 20,
1992)
HEIRS CANNOT ALIENATE SHARES THAT DO NOT BELONG TO THEM
An heir had no right to sell the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective heirs. Any
sale by one heir of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the other heirs who did not consent to
the sale. Such sale is void with respect to the shares of the other heirs. (Heirs of Lopez v. Development Bank
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193551, November 19, 2014)
F. Disinheritance
• Doctrines:

A DISINHERITANCE INSTRUMENT, WHILE IT DOES NOT MAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE DISPOSITION OF THE
TESTATOR’S PROPERTY, DISPOSES THE PROPERTY OF THE TESTATOR IN FAVOR OF THOSE WHO
WOULD SUCCEED IN THE ABSENCE OF HEIR DISINHERITED
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to
the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while
it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless,
is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of
the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. (Dy Yieng Seangio v.
Reyes, G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006)
G. Legacies and Devises
III. Intestate or Legal Succession

A. In General
B. Relationship
C. Right of Representation
D. Order of Succession
1. Principle of Absolute Separation between the Legitimate Family and the Illegitimate Family
• Doctrines:
RULE OF PROXIMITY IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION FINDS APPLICATION AMONG COLLATERAL RELATIVES
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the
more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. (Bagunu v. Piedad,
G.R. No. 140975, December 8, 2000)
PRINCIPLE OF ABSOLUTE SEPARATION OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY DOES NOT APPLY
WHEN ALL THE CHILDREN ARE ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF THE SAME PARENT
Succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. There is
no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood
relation, and thus, the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them.
(Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006)
NATURAL CHILDREN ARE COVERED BY THE IRON BAR RULE UNDER ARTICLE 992
The rules laid down in Article 982 (that grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation) and in Article 902 (that the rights of illegitimate children are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate) are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end
that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother. (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992)
IN INTESTACY, LEGITIMATE BROTHERS AND SISTERS CANNOT INHERIT FROM THEIR ILLEGITIMATE
SIBLING
The "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family” rejects succession
ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other
hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. (Manuel v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 117246,
August 21, 1995)
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION IS NOT AVAILABLE TO ILLEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS OF LEGITIMATE
CHILDREN IN THE INHERITANCE OF A LEGITIMATE GRANDPARENT
Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from
the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the right of representation is not available
to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. (Arado v.
Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015)
IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION, NIECES AND NEPHEWS SURVIVING WITH THE WIDOWER/ WIDOW SHALL BE
ENTITLED TO HALF OF THE ESTATE
Article 1001 provides that should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
(Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997)

NEPHEW IS CONSIDERED A COLLATERAL RELATIVE WHO MAY INHERIT IF NO DESCENDANT, ASCENDANT,
OR SPOUSE SURVIVE THE DECEDENT
That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being
his aunt's heir. As the CA correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or
half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors." (Heirs of Uriarte v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116775, January 22, 1998)
PRESENCE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN EXCLUDES SIBLINGS OF THE DECEASED FROM THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATTER
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded
from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are: Art. 988. “In the absence of legitimate
descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.” (Gonzales
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998)
PRESENCE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IN THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DOES NOT EXCLUDE
THE WIFE OF HER SHARE IN THE ESTATE AND HER SUBSEQUENT DEATH DOES NOT CONFER TO THE SAID
CHILD THE ENTIRE ESTATE
Dominador (deceased) was survived not only by petitioner (illegitimate child) but also by his legal wife, Graciana.
By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. The death of Graciana did not
make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by
consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. (Adlawan v. Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916,
January 20, 2006)
IV. Provisions in Common

A. Right of Accretion
B. Capacity to Succeed
• Doctrines:
MERE ESTRANGEMENT IS NOT A LEGAL GROUND FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A SURVIVING
SPOUSES AS AN HEIR OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir. Rosalinda, on the other
hand, is the surviving spouse of Cristobal Olar's son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to
be injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Cristobal Olar's name.
(Spouses Capitle v. Elbambuena, G.R. No. 169193, November 30, 2006)
C. Acceptance and Repudiation
• Doctrines:
REPUDIATION OF THE INHERITANCE OF A WARD BY A GUARDIAN REQUIRES JUDICIAL APPROVAL
To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as
to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Parents and guardians
may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. (Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
163707, September 15, 2006)
D. Executors and Administrators
E. Collation
• Doctrines:
PROPERTIES HELD IN AN IMPLIED TRUST BY A COMPULSORY HEIR ARE SUBJECT TO COLLATION
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate
any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, October 18,
2000)
THE GENERAL RULE THAT THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE OR INTESTATE COURT DOES NOT
EXTEND TO THE DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN
EXCEPTIONS
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall
only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of

collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired. (Aranas v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-156407, January 15, 2014)
PROPERTIES ONEROUSLY TRANSFERRED TO AN HEIR ARE NOT COLLATIONABLE; IT ONLY COVERS
GRATUITOUS TRANFERS
We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these were
contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime. Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are
not collationable because, essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates
properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.
(Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997)
THE DETERMINATION OF A PROBATE COURT REGARDING TITLE OR OWNERSHIP IS PROVISIONAL IN
CHARACTER AND IS SUBJECT TO FINAL DECISION IN A SEPARATE ACTION TO RESOLVE TITLE
As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or
may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject
to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the
contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate
court’s jurisdiction. A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima
facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice
to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit. (Vizconde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998)
F. Partition
• Doctrines:
A PRIOR SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE IS NOT ESSENTIAL BEFORE THE HEIRS CAN COMMENCE AN
ACTION FOR PARTITION ORIGINALLY PERTAINING TO THE DECEASED
From the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, where transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so
demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent,
their predecessor-in-interest. (Heirs of Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998)
PARTITION MAY BE EVIDENCED BY THE OVERT ACT OF A CO-OWNER OF RENOUNCING HIS RIGHT
OVER THE PROPERTY REGARDLESS OF THE FORM IT TAKES
Art. 1082 states that “Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or
any other transaction.” By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-
ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-
owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property
regardless of the form it takes. (Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114151, September 17, 1998)
NON-CO-OWNERS NOT ENTITLED TO THE REMEDY OF PARTITION
Prescinding from the lack of co-ownership, petitioners' argument that they are entitled to have the land
partition must be rejected. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It
seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific
property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.
(Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127827, March 5, 2003)
CO-OWNER MAY DEMAND AT ANY TIME PARTITION OF A COMMON PROPERTY
Any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has
repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches. (Bravo-
Guerrero v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152658, July 29, 2005)
PARTITION INAPPROPRIATE WHERE THERE REMAINS AN ISSUE AS TO EXPENSES CHARGEABLE TO
ESTATE
While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals
and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for
which property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance
taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. In a situation where
there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. (Figuracion-
Gerilla v. Vda. de Figuracion, G.R. No. 154322, August 22, 2006)

SECTION 1 OF RULE 74 CONTEMPLATES A NOTICE THAT HAS BEEN SENT OUT OR ISSUED BEFORE ANY
DEED OF SETTLEMENT AND/OR PARTITION IS AGREED UPON (I.E., A NOTICE CALLING ALL
INTERESTED PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SAID DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND
PARTITION), AND NOT AFTER SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN EXECUTED
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however,
that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.
It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in
the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. The publication
of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take
part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. In this connection, the records of the present
case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned. (Cua v. Vargas, G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006)
AN ACTION TO ANNUL DOES NOT PRESCRIBE IN CASE OF AN INVALID PARTITION
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not
prescribe. Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo's co-heirs.
Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her husband
Pedro, as well as the transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights
upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. (Bautista v. Bautista, G.R. No. 160556,
August 3, 2007)
THE COURT WILL NOT RULE ON RIGHTS OF EXCLUDED HEIRS ABSENT ANY CASE FILED BY THEM
ASSAILING VALIDITY OF THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof. Thus, the resolution of the present case concerns only the issues between the parties
before us and will not in any way affect the rights of the other heirs who have not participated in the partition.
(Daclag v. Macahilig, G.R. No. 159578, February 18, 2009)
PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE PENDING TERMINATION OF SETTLEMENT
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED
The law does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court, in administration proceedings, have allowed
partition for special instances. But the Court should caution that this power should be exercised sparingly.
This is because a partial partition and distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the
division of the entire estate. (Heirs of Morales v. Agustin, G.R. No. 224849, June 6, 2018)
Part Four – Leonen Cases
I. PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS

• Doctrines:
THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE RETIREMENT BENEFITS MAY BE WAIVED AS IT DOES NOT INFRINGE ON RIGHTS
OF THIRD PERSONS
When Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that his retirement
benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias and his
decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even
protects the right of his family to receive support. (Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516, June 8, 2016)
THE OATH AND THE SWORN AND PERSONAL RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP ARE SEPARATE
REQUIREMENTS, THE LATTER BEING AN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR
PUBLIC OFFICE
Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance. The
oath and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being
an additional requirement for qualification to run for public office. When petitioner took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, thus reacquiring her Filipino citizenship. From September 21, 2011 up to the
present, however, petitioner failed to execute a sworn and personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship

particularly required of those seeking elective public office. (Chua v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216607,
April 5, 2016)
RELIGIOUS MARRIAGES THAT LACK REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LAW ARE INVALID
Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not include marriages recognized in certain
religions. Religious marriages that lack some or all of the requirements under the law are invalid. They are
considered not entered into. The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized the judge’s marriage in 1990
renders such marriage as invalid. Hence, no second marriage can be imputed against Judge. (Perfecto v. Esidera,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 [Resolution], July 22, 2015)
DIVORCE BETWEEN A FOREIGNER AND A FILIPINO MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES AS LONG AS
IT WAS VALIDLY OBTAINED ACCORDING TO THE FOREIGN SPOUSE'S NATIONAL LAW
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree
be pleaded and proved as a fact before the RTC. The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once
our courts find that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his or her national
law, and that the foreign spouse's national law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.
(Racho v. Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018)
PHILIPPINE COURTS DO NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
They must be proven as fact under our rules on evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign
judgment, hence the indispensable need to have it pleaded and proved before its legal effects may be extended to
the Filipino spouse. (Arreza v. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019)
FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF REAPPEARANCE WILL ONLY TERMINATE BUT NOT NULLIFY THE EFFECTS OF
SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
For the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would
not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie. (Santos v. Santos, G.R.
No. 187061, October 8, 2014)
A PERSON CANNOT UNILATERALLY DECLARE HIS MARRIAGE VOID
The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage. (De Guzman
y Jumaquio v. People, G.R. No. 224742, August 7, 2019)
A SECOND MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUDICIAL DECLARATION IS BIGAMOUS REGARDLESS OF THE EVIDENCE
OF NULLITY OF FIRST MARRIAGE
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license,
petitioner remains liable for bigamy as his marriage was not judicially declared void nor his wife Gina was
judicially declared presumptively dead. Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. (Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS A MENTAL ILLNESS THAT LEADS TO AN INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH OR
COMPREHEND ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS
Respondent’s repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. (Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., G.R. No. 188400,
March 8, 2017)
SALE OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY BY A SPOUSE WITHOUT THE OTHER’S CONSENT IS VOID
This Court, applying Articles 165 and 166 of the Civil Code, ruled in a number of cases that the sale of conjugal
property by a spouse without the other's consent is void. All subsequent transferees of the conjugal property
acquire no rights whatsoever from the conjugal property's unauthorized sale. A contract conveying conjugal
properties entered into by the husband without the wife's consent may be annulled entirely. (Malabanan v.
Malabanan, Jr., G.R. No. 187225, March 6, 2019)
A SPOUSE’S CONSENT IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE OF CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES
The Family Code is clear: the written consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary before
any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can be valid. It is not disputed that the Reyes Spouses were
married in 1973, before the Family Code took effect. Under the Family Code, their property regime is Conjugal
Partnership of Gains; thus, Article 124 is the applicable provision regarding the administration of their conjugal
property. (Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 15, 2016)
IF THE LOAN WAS TAKEN OUT TO BE USED FOR THE FAMILY BUSINESS, THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVE
ACTUAL BENEFIT
There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case, the wife, contracts a loan to be used
for the family business and the other is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or guarantor,

evidence that the family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership can be held
liable. On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the family business, there is no need to prove
actual benefit. The law presumes the family benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is held liable.
(Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016)
MORTGAGES ON THE PREMISES BEFORE OR AFTER THE CONSTITUTION OF FAMILY HOME DOES NOT
EXEMPT SAID FAMILY HOME FROM EXECUTION, FORCED SALE, OR ATTACHMENT
The contention of the defendant that the subject mortgaged property is their family home is irrelevant as the debt
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after the constitution of the family home does not exempt the
same from execution. (Vitug v. Abuda, G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016)
FOR A CLAIM OF FILIATION TO SUCCEED, IT MUST BE MADE WITHIN THE PERIOD ALLOWED, AND
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
A person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a putative parent must do so via a record
of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation. Article 172
provides the manner by which the filiation of legitimate children is established. (Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273,
February 15, 2017)
FILIATION MUST BE ESTABLISHED FOR A CHILD TO CLAIM SUPPORT FROM A PUTATIVE FATHER
An illegitimate child is entitled to support. To claim it, however, a child should have first been acknowledged by
the putative parent or must have otherwise previously established his or her filiation with the putative parent
When filiation is beyond question, support shall then follow as a matter of obligation. The judicial remedy to
enable this is an action for compulsory recognition. (Abella v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 205128, August 9, 2017)
THE ADOPTION BY THE FATHER OF A CHILD BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK REQUIRES CONSENT OF HIS WIFE
AND LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive
rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights. (Castro v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 188801, October
15, 2014)
CHANGE IN SPELLING OF THE NAME, MERE CLERICAL NOT SUBSTANTIVE. HENCE, CAN BE CORRECTED OR
CHANGED ONLY BY REFERENCE TO OTHER EXISTING RECORD OR RECORDS
A clerical or typographical error pertains to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record
or records. Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. (Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January
17, 2018)
II. CONFLICT OF LAWS

• Doctrines:
ALL FILIPINOS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION
While our law on contract recognizes the validity of contractual choice of law provisions, such respect must not
be so permissive as to lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy that
underlie the contract central to the controversy. In the case at bar, the present dispute relates to illegal termination
of employment. Under our Civil Code, relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. (Saudi Arabian Airlines v.
Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015)
COURTS OF FORUM WILL NOT ENFORCE ANY FOREIGN CLAIM OBNOXIOUS TO THE FORUM’S PUBLIC
POLICY
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum's public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers. Indeed, because
petitioners' employment contracts were executed in the Philippines, Philippine laws govern them. Respondents,
then, must answer and be held liable under our laws. (Aldovino v. Gold and Green Manpower Management and
Development Services, Inc., G.R. No. 200811, June 19, 2019)
RTC MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION SINCE PETITIONER IS A DOMESTIC CORPORATION WITH ITS MAIN
OFFICE IN THE PHILIPPINES
Under the principle of forum non conveniens, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following
requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the

Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. The RTC correctly assumed jurisdiction of
the case since petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that
all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of petitioner's
officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found
in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before
Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce the judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in
this case against petitioner. In addition, forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for
dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
(Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers [M] Berhad, G.R. No. 172301, August 19,
2015)
III. PROPERTY
• Doctrines:
THE CHARACTERIZATION OF MACHINERY AS REAL PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF TAXATION IS
GOVERNED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
As between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations, and the Local Government
Code, a special law granting local government units the power to impose real property tax, then the latter shall
prevail. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real
property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property. Therefore,
for determining whether machinery is real property subject to real property tax, the definition and requirements
under the Local Government Code are controlling. (Provincial Assessor of Agusan Del Sur v. Filipinas Palm Oil
Plantation, Inc., G.R. No. 183416, October 5, 2016)
REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES ARE EXEMPT FROM REAL PROPERTY TAXES,
BEING PART OF THE PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION
In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned economic zones. These economic
zones are property of public dominion. The City seeks to tax properties located within the Mactan Economic Zone.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through
public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is
void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are
subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. (City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority,
G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583, November 26, 2014)
A HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATON MAY REGULATE PASSAGE INTO SUBDIVISION FOR THE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF ITS RESIDENTS EVEN IF THE ROADS HAVE BEEN DONATED TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The donation of the roads to the local government should not be interpreted in a way contrary to the legislative
intent of benefiting the residents. Conversely, residents should not be disempowered from taking measures for
the proper maintenance of their residential area. Under Sec 30 of PD No, 957 they may protect their mutual
interest. Here, the Policy was not inconsistent with this purpose. To rule against it would be contrary to the
intention of the law to protect their rights. (William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners &
Residents Association, G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019)
IN CLASSIFYING LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE, THERE MUST BE A POSITIVE
ACT FROM THE GOVERNMENT DECLARING THEM AS OPEN FOR ALIENATION AND DISPOSITION
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.” (Republic v. Heirs of Daquer, G.R. No. 193657, September 4, 2018)
THERE MUST BE LAW ENACTED BY CONGREE OR PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION FOR LAND OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN TO BE CONVERTED INTO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be an express declaration in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Possession for thirty (30) years
does not convert public land into patrimonial property. (Heirs of Delfin v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
193618, November 28, 2016)
TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS ARE MERELY INDICIA OF A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land, in the
absence of any other strong evidence to support them. Testimonies of witnesses and a tax declaration issued

without tax receipts are not sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity of patents and titles as well as the
presumption of regularity of the performance of official duties of the government offices responsible for the
issuance. (Heirs of Loyola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017)
EJECMENT MERELY SETTLES RIGHT OF ACTUAL POSSESSION, NOT ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
An ejectment case merely settles the issue of the right of actual possession. Hence, regardless of issues on
ownership, as raised in the complaint, possession may still be appreciated in favor of the petitioner. (Eversley
Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona, G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018)
A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH IS A BUILDER WHO WAS NOT AWARE OF A DEFECT OR FLAW IN HIS OR HER
TITLE WHEN HE OR SHE INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS ON A LOT THAT TURNS OUT TO BE OWNED BY
ANOTHER
A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in his or her title when he or she
introduced improvements on a lot that turns out to be owned by another. The essence of good faith is an honest
belief of the strength and validity of one's right while being ignorant of another's superior claim at the same time.
(Padilla, Jr. v. Malicsi, G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016)
COMMON SPACES DO NOT FORM PART OF A CONDOMINIUM UNIT
Unit means a part of the condominium project intended for any type of independent use or ownership, including
one or more rooms or spaces located .in one or more floors (or part or parts of floors) in a building or buildings
and such accessories as may be appended thereto. Section 6(a) of the Condominium Act specifies the reckoning of
a condominium unit's bounds. It also specifies that areas of common use "are not part of the unit" (bearing walls,
columns, floors, roofs, foundations and other common structural elements of the building; lobbies, stairways,
hallways, and other areas of common use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central refrigeration
and central air-conditioning equipment, reservoirs, tanks, pumps and other central services and facilities, pipes,
ducts, flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations, wherever located, except the outlets thereof
when located within the unit. (Poole-Blunden v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205838, November 29,
2017)
A CONDOMINUM OWNER SHALL BE BOUND BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF
RESTRICTIONS ATTACHED TO THE MASTER DEED
When petitioners bought the condominium units from Imperial Bayfront, they were bound by the terms and
conditions of the declaration of restrictions attached to the Master Deed. As the Court of Appeals found, the Master
Deed expressly allows its condominium association to subject its owners, purchasers, tenants, and lessees to rules
and regulations for "the efficient and mutually beneficial management and operation of the project." These were
the House Rules and Regulations, which vested in the Association the power to interrupt utility services in case of
nonpayment of association dues. (BNL Management Corp. v. Uy, G.R. No. 210297, April 3, 2019)
MASTER DEED AND DEED OF TRANSTER MAY BE REFORMED IF SUBSEQUENT AND CONTEMPORANEOUS
ACTS OF THE PARTIES SHOW THAT THEIR TRUE INTENTION WAS NOT ACCURATELY REFLECTED IN THE
WRITTEN INSTRUMENT
A Master Deed and Deed of Transfer may be reformed to reflect the parties’ true intention is not expressed in the
instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.
(Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. v. Multi-Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 185530, April 18, 2018)
MINERAL RESOURCES ARE OWNED BY THE STATE AND THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, UTILIZATION
AND PROCESSING THEREOF SHALL BE UNDER ITS FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
Mineral resources are owned by the State and the exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof
shall be under its full control and supervision. The state may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into
mineral agreements with contractors. (Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association, Inc. v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., G.R. Nos. 149638 & 144916, December 10, 2014)
LAHAR DEPOSITS FOUND ON PRIVATE LANDS ARE MINERALS AND THUS BELONG TO THE STATE
Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution, Sections 3 and 4 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and E.O. No. 224,
series of 2003 treat lahar deposits as minerals, which are owned by the State and are covered by various laws on
mining. (Batac v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 216949, July 3, 2019)
PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES IS A GOOD INDICIA OF POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER
AND WHEN COUPLED WITH CONTINOUS POSSESSION IT CONSTITUTE STRONG EVIDENCE OF TITLE
While recognizing that tax declarations do not absolutely attest to ownership, this Court has also recognized that
the voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes ... strengthens one's bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership. It has stated that payment of real property taxes tis good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner, and when coupled with continuous possession, it constitutes strong evidence of title.
(Kawayan Hills Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 203090, September 5, 2018)

ALTHOUGH NOT ADEQUATE TO ESTABLISH OWNERSHIP, TAX DECLARATION MAY BE A BASIS TO INFER
POSESSION; HOWEVER, SPECIFIC DATE MUST BE ASCERTAINED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
RECKONING POINT (JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER) OF POSSESSION IN JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE
Filipino citizens applying for judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title must prove several
requisites. One of which is that they, by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and actual possession of the property. Additionally, it must be settled that the
applicant’s occupation is under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately before the application is filed. In view of this, although not adequate to establish ownership, tax
declaration may be presented as basis to infer possession of property. However, the specific date thereof must be
ascertained to ensure compliance with the aforementioned reckoning point. (Republic v. Spouses Go, G.R. No.
197297, August 2, 2017)
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF CONDITIONS IS IMPOSED ON THE PERSON WHO
SEEKS THE EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted to another person, the
rights of the property's owner are limited. An owner may not exercise some of his or her property rights for the
benefit of the person who was granted the easement of right of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show the
existence of the conditions is imposed on the person who seeks the easement of right of way. (Reyes v. Valentin,
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015)
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROEDURE LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 699 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS NECESSARY
BEFORE A PUBLIC NUISANCE MAY BE ABATED
Before abatement may be availed of as a remedy against public nuisance, it is necessary that: : (1) that demand be
first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance; (2) that such demand has been
rejected; (3) that the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the
local police; and (4) that the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos. (Department of
Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp., G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016)
WHEN AN APPLICANT IN THE REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY PROVES ACTUAL OCCUPATION AND
POSSESSION OF A LAND FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW, MERE LACK OF SOME DOCUMENTS DOES
NOT ENTITLESTATE TO TAKE SUCH PROPERTY AND REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE LAWFUL POSSESSION BY
APPLICANT
When an applicant is shown to have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of a land for
the period required by law, he or she has acquired an imperfect title that may be confirmed by the State. The State
may not, for the simple reason that an applicant failed to show documents which the State is in the best position
to acquire, indiscriminately take an occupied property and unjustly and self-servingly refuse to acknowledge
legally recognized rights evidenced by possession, without violating due process. (Republic v. Spouses Noval, G.R.
No. 170316, September 18, 2017)
PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION PRIOR TO DECLARATION THAT LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS
INCLUDED IN COMPUTATION OF POSSESSION FOR ACQUIRING REGISTRATION RIGHTS
The period of possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and disposable agricultural land is included
in the computation of possession for purposes of acquiring registration rights over a property if the land has
already been declared as such at the time of the application for registration. (AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System v. Republic, G.R. No. 180086, July 2, 2014)
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD NEITHER RUNS FROM THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION OF A CONTRACT NOR DOES
IT NECESSARILY RUN ON THE DATE WHEN THE LOAN BECOMES DUE AND DEMANDABLE
The prescriptive period neither runs from the date of the execution of a contract nor does the prescriptive period
necessarily run on the date when the loan becomes due and demandable. Prescriptive period runs from the date
of demand, subject to certain exceptions. In other words, ten (10) years may lapse from the date of the execution
of contract, without barring a cause of action on the mortgage when there is a gap between the period of execution
of the contract and the due date or between the due date and the demand date in cases when demand is necessary.
(University of Mindanao, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. Nos. 19464-65, January 11, 2016)
IV. LAND TITLES and DEEDS

• Doctrines:
THE CHARACTER OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
AGRICULTURAL LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN DETERMINES ITS ELIGIBILITY FOR LAND REGISTRATION,
NOT THE OWNERSHIP OR TITLE OVER IT

Classifying a land of the public domain as agricultural is essential only to establish the applicant's "eligibility for
land registration, not the ownership or title over it." The applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. (Republic v. Spouses Go, G.R. No. 197297, August
2, 2017)
PUBLIC LAND REMAINS INALIENABLE UNLESS IT IS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AND
ALIENATED TO A PRIVATE PERSON
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute.
(Republic v. Spouses Go, G.R. No. 197297, August 2, 2017)
OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE DENR SECRETARY’S ISSUANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND AS ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE MUST BE PRESENTED IN EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
OF TITLE TO THE LAND
To satisfy the claim, the CENRO, which only verifies the declaration of DENR, is not sufficient to establish that the
land is alienable and disposable. It should be accompanied by a positive act of the government in reclassifying the
property into an agricultural land and released as alienable, such as an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s
issuance declaring it alienable and disposable. (Republic v. Malijan-Javier, G.R. No. 214367, April 4, 2018)
EXPRESS DECLARATION BY THE STATE REQUIRED IN ACQUISITVE PRESCRITION
For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14 (2) of PD No. 1529, two (2) requirements must be
satisfied: first, the property is established to be private in character; and second the applicable prescriptive period
under existing laws had passed. The period to acquire public land by acquisitive prescription under Presidential
Decree No. 1529 begins to run only after the promulgation of a law or a proclamation by the President stating that
the land is no longer intended for public use or the development of national wealth. (Heirs of Delfin v. National
Housing Authority, G.R. No. 193618, November 28, 2016)
A CLAIM BASED ON A FUTURE RIGHT DOES NOT RIPEN INTO AN ADVERSE CLAIM AS DEFINED IN SECTION
70 OF PD 1529
A claim based on a future right does not ripen into an adverse claim as defined in Section 70 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529. A right still subject to negotiations cannot be enforced against a title holder or against one that has a
legitimate title to the property based on possession, ownership, lien, or any valid deed of transfer. (Cathay Metal
Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 177204, July 2, 2014)
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF INCOMPLETE OR IMPERFECT TITLE UNDER SECTION 14(1) OF PD 1529
MUST PROVE: (1) THAT THE SUBJECT LAND FORMS PART OF THE DISPOSABLE AND ALIENABLE LANDS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND (2) OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND
OCCUPATION UNDER A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945, OR EARLIER
An applicant for land registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 must prove the following requisites: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. (Canlas v. Republic, G.R. No. 200894, November 10, 2014)
APPLICANT FOR LAND REGISTRATION MUST PROVE POSSESSION OF LAND ON OR BEFORE JUNE 12, 1945
Petitioner did not present proof to establish its claim that the property was already alienable and disposable from
the time it acquired the same in 1948, let alone, its allegation that it acquired the property by purchase. Even
Petitioner's exact date of acquisition as purported buyer was not shown with clarity. Neither did it show how its
predecessor-in-interest himself got hold of the property, the character of his possession or occupation, and how
long a time did he exercise the same on the land, if at all. (La Tondeña, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 194617, August 5,
2015)
LAND NEED ONLY BE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AT TIME OF APPLICATION
The agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. (Republic v. Sogod Development Corp., G.R. No. 175760, February 17, 2016)

PROOF OF OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE, AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF A LAND FOR THE PERIOD
REQUIRED BY LAW, AMOUNTS TO ACQUISITION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE THAT MAY BE CONFIRMED BY
THE STATE
When an applicant in the registration of property proves his or her open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of a land for the period required by law, he or she has acquired an imperfect title that may be confirmed
by the State. The State may not, in the absence of controverting evidence and in a pro forma opposition,
indiscriminately take a property without violating due process. (Republic v. Spouses Noval, G.R. No. 170316,
September 18, 2017)
ENTITLEMENT TO AGRICULTURAL LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF CA 141, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC LAND ACT
A judgment approving the subdivision of a parcel of land does not preclude other parties with a better right from
instituting free patent applications over it. Entitlement to agricultural lands of the public domain requires a clear
showing of compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act. (Taar v. Lawan, G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017)
THE IN PARI DELICTO RULE IS INAPPLICABLE WHEN PUBLIC POLICY IS VIOLATED
The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its
application contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that
principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious
to the public or against the public good." (Maltos v. Heirs of Borromeo, G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015)
FRAUD MUST BE ACTUAL AND EXTRINSIC IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE A GROUND FOR REVIEW OF LAND
REGISTRATION DECREE
Different kinds of fraud exist, but the law allowing fraud as a ground for a review or reopening of a land
registration decree contemplates actual and extrinsic fraud. Actual fraud "proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact." Extrinsic fraud "is employed to
deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered
in the name of the applicant." (Mendoza v. Valte, G.R. No. 172961, September 7, 2015)
TORRENS TITLE CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED
An attack is considered collateral when it incidentally questions the validity of the transfer certificate of title in an
action seeking a different relief. This is opposed to a direct attack through an action that seeks to annul or set aside
the transfer certificate of title itself. (Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman, G.R. Nos. 187291 &
187334, December 5, 2016)
AN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT CONSTITUTES A DIRECT ATTACK ON A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action
is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof. An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it challenges
the judgment decree of title. (De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014)
AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE PRESCRIBES IN 10 YEARS FROM THE TIME
OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE TORRENS TITLE OVER THE PROPERTY
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title of property, a constructive trust is created
in favor of the defrauded party. When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust
is created by law in favor of the true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner
prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the title. (Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po, G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497,
June 5, 2017)
DEFECTIVE TITLE MAY STILL BE THE SOURCE OF A COMPLETELY LEGAL AND VALID TITLE IN THE HANDS
OF AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE
The Torrens system was adopted to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon
the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. Even assuming
the procurement of title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, such defective title may still be the source
of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. (Leong v. See, G.R. No. 194077,
December 3, 2014)
A BANK THAT ACCEPTS A MORTGAGE BASED UPON A TITLE WHICH APPEARS VALID ON ITS FACE AND
AFTER EXERCISING THE REQUISITE DILIGENCE CAN BE DEEMED A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH
When a mortgagee relies upon what appears on the face of a Torrens title and loans money in all good faith on the
basis of the title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that the latter’s title was defective, his right
or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained her title thereto
through fraud. A bank that accepts a mortgage based upon a title which appears valid on its face and after

exercising the requisite care, prudence, and diligence appropriate to the public interest character of its business
can be deemed a mortgagee in good faith. The subsequent consolidation of title in its name after a valid foreclosure
shall be respected notwithstanding later proof showing that the title was based upon a void transaction. (Andres
v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 173548, October 15, 2014)
THE PRESUMPTION OF A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH MAY BE DEFEATED BY CONTRARY EVIDENCE
The presumption that a holder of a Torrens title is an innocent purchaser for value is disputable and may be
overcome by contrary evidence. Once a prima facie case disputing this presumption is established, the adverse
party cannot simply rely on the presumption of good faith and must put forward evidence that the property was
acquired without notice of any defect in its title. (Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018)
CLAIMS FROM THE ASSURANCE FUND WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WHEN THE CLAIMANT IS NEGLIGENT
The Assurance Fund is part of our property registration system covered by Presidential Decree No. 1529. Its
purpose is to protect individuals who rely on a property's certificate of title as evidence of ownership. A claim
from the fund must meet the strict requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Claims will not be allowed when
the claimant is negligent. (Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental v. Anglo, Sr., G.R. No. 171804, August 5, 2015)
LACHES APPLY ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY LAW
Doctrines of equity such as laches apply only in the absence of statutory law. The Civil Code clearly provides that
"the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The positive mandate
of Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of the inexistence of a
contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot
be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and the party aggrieved can validly vindicate
their right despite the lapse of time. (Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla, G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014)
V. SUCCESSION
• Doctrines:
DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP IS NOT NECESSARY FOR A PERSON TO ASSERT A CAUSE OF ACTION AS AN
HEIR WHEN THE FACT THEREOF IS DULY PROVEN BY EVIDENCE
In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be superfluous
considering that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto,
which respondents never disputed. (Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas, G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017)
MERE MENTION OF THE NAMES IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE, INSUFFICIENT
[T]he subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the
testator and attested to by the witnesses. Hence, an authentic attestation clause must not only contain the names
of the instrumental witnesses. Mere mention of their names in the attestation clause will not accurately represent
the fact of their attestation and subscription. Instead, the instrumental witnesses must also sign the instrument
before it is notarized by the notary public. (Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019)

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Part One – Persons and Family Relations

I. Effect and Application of Laws

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II. Human Relations

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III. Persons (Art. 37-51)

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VI. Voidable Marriage

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VII. Legal Separation

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IX. Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

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XI. Paternity and Filiation

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A. Basis: Financial Capacity of Giver, Needs of Recipient

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XIV. Parental Authority

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XV. Emancipation and Age of Majority

XVI. Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code

XVIII.Cancellation or Correction of Entries

A. R.A. No. 9048

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