A.C. No.

4103 September 7, 1995

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and

TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be
disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of
this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No.
38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of
the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount
to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the
aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the
trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously
neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case
No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had
already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy
he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because
according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August
17, 1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong
case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be
disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately
denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because
it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association
(FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable
judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the
case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the
union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to
harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The
respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer
was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the
affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the
President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the
union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and
directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights
and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction,
since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion
to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case.
Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case,
and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from
notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This
motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred
to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did
not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the
complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence
before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective
damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however,
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for
the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant
disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason
the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence,
which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with
competence and diligence,3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure
to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru honest
mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again
"inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as
stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was
"deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for,
as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and
pressure of legal work."9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given
inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained
his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and
pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect
due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two
distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of
his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed
a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of
Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based
on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to
file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that
the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that
he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in
his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from
the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the
order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence
in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence,
skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03
thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing
cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-
Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere
afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense
therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the
case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble
of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the
adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he
meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not
entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all
the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the
complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth,
more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 152954             March 10, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
PAULINO SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA, a.k.a. "Tamayo Sevilleno", appellant.

PER CURIAM:

On July 25, 1995, appellant Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva alias Tamayo was charged with rape with homicide in
an Information1 which reads:

That on or about 10:00 o’clock a.m., July 22, 1995 at Hacienda San Antonio, Barangay Guadalupe, San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one VIRGINIA BAKIA, a minor, 9 years of age,
against the latter’s will and consent; and after attaining his purpose of ravishing said Virginia Bakia,
accused, did, then and there, with intent to hide his identity and to prevent discovery thereof, with intent
to kill, strangled said Virginia Bakia which directly resulted to her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea. Trial proceeded to determine the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the plea. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, appellant escaped from prison but
he was recaptured several months later.

On March 6, 1997, the appellant was found guilty as charged by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 57, and sentenced to death and to pay the heirs of his victim P50,000.00 plus costs.

On automatic review before this Court, it was found that the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension by the appellant of the consequences of his plea of guilty. It likewise
appeared that the defense lawyers were remiss in their duties to explain to appellant the nature of the crime and
the gravity of the consequences of his plea. Finding that appellant was not properly apprised of his fundamental
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation leveled against him, this Court set aside and annulled the trial
court’s decision of March 6, 1997 and remanded the case to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial
of the appellant until terminated.

Appellant was thus re-arraigned on February 23, 2000, where he entered a plea of "not guilty". Trial on the merits
ensued and the following facts were established:

At around 10:00 in the morning of July 22, 1995, 9-year old Virginia and 8-year old Norma, both surnamed
Bakia, met appellant on their way to a store in Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Appellant
offered them bread and ice candy then invited Virginia to watch a "beta show." 2 Appellant and Virginia thereafter
headed to the direction of the sugarcane fields while Norma followed. However, she changed her mind and went
home instead.

Rogelio Bakia, Virginia’s and Norma’s father, came home at around 11:00 that same morning and looked for
Virginia. They were informed by Norma that Virginia went with appellant to Sitio Guindali-an. Rogelio
immediately set out after her. He met appellant in Sitio Guindali-an but he denied any knowledge of Virginia’s
whereabouts. Rogelio noticed fingernail scratches on appellant’s neck and a wound on his left cheek.

The following day, Rogelio and Eugenio Tiongson again met appellant at the house of former barangay captain
Paeng Lopez. When asked where Virginia was, appellant answered that she was in a sugarcane field known as
Camp 9, also located in Brgy. Guadalupe. Immediately, they proceeded to the designated place where they found
Virginia’s corpse covered with dried sugarcane leaves. She was naked except for her dress which was raised to
her armpits. Her legs were spread apart and her body bore multiple wounds.

Another prosecution witness, Maria Lariosa, testified that on July 22, 1995 at around noontime, she saw appellant
and Virginia pass by her house near Camp 9. The following day, July 23, 1995, she saw appellant emerge alone
from the sugarcane fields in Camp 9 with scratches on his face and neck.

Dr. Arnel Laurence Q. Portuguez, Health Officer of San Carlos City, autopsied Virginia’s body and found the
following: linear abrasion over hematoma, 3.0 x 2.0 cm., right superior anterior neck; linear abrasion over
hematoma, 2.5 x 3.0 cm., left superior anterior neck; hematoma 9.0 x 4.0 cm., right inguinal area; hematoma 9.0 x
5.0 cm., left inguinal area; superficial hymenal laceration 0.5 cm., at 12 o’clock position, with clot formation at
intuitus; abrasion 5.5 x 4.0 cm., left superior gluteal area; abrasion 5.0 x 3.0 cm., right superior gluteal area;
abrasion 6.0 x 2.0 cm., right inferior lateral gluteal area; vaginal smear showing absence of sperm cells except pus
cells and epithelial cells. Cause of death: asphyxia secondary to strangulation. 3 The examining physician
concluded that Virginia must have been raped and strangled to death.

Appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on July 22, 1995, he left his house at 6:30 in
the morning and went to his work place at Uy King Poe warehouse in San Carlos City, arriving there at about
7:00 in the morning. At 5:00 in the afternoon, he left the warehouse and passed by the market to buy fish. He
reached his house at 8:00 in the evening.

No other witness for the defense was presented. On October 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City,
Branch 59, rendered a decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and so holds the accused PAULINO
SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA (detained) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

The accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as an indemnity for
the death of the victim; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The accused is further ordered to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary for service of
sentence.

The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately forward the records of this case to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In his Brief, appellant submits that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION

EXECUTED BY HEREIN APPELLANT IS VALID AND BINDING.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

Appellant argues that the voluntariness and due execution of his extra-judicial confession was not sufficiently
established, considering that only his thumbprint was affixed on said document. He alleges that he customarily
affixes his signature on all his documents. Appellant likewise argues that at the time his extra-judicial confession
was taken, he was assisted by Atty. Vicente J. Agravante who was admonished by this Court for being remiss in
his duties.5

Appellant’s contention is misleading. The March 29, 1999 Resolution referred to Atty. Agravante’s participation
during appellant’s arraignment and not during his custodial investigation. In fact, it was stated therein that "Atty.
Vic Agravante assisted the accused during the arraignment only." 6

Besides, the rule is that once the prosecution has shown compliance with the constitutional requirements on
custodial investigations, a confession is presumed voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of destroying this
presumption. The confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. 7

Appellant failed to show that his confession in this case was given under any of the above circumstances. As
correctly found by the trial court:

Atty. Agravante knows the accused Paulino Sevillano because the latter was his previous client in a case
for qualified theft and was also the previous counsel of the accused in the present case, The accused
happened to be his client way back in July 24, 1995 when he was called up by Patrolman Ramon Bartulin
 through a telephone that the accused wanted his services, so he responded to the police station, and on his
arrival at the police station, he talked and inquired with the accused as to the incident and the latter
answered that he (accused) was charged with the crime of rape then the accused voluntarily confessed his
guilt to him (Atty. Agravante) then when asked the accused what was the latter’s opinion, the accused
replied that he (accused) will accept his guilt on the case charged against him and so the extra-judicial
confession was executed by the accused while he (Atty. Agravante) was present all the time until the end
of the investigation. In fact, he was with the accused and the investigator who went with them to the
Prosecutor’s Office and he (Atty. Agravante) also affixed his signature in the extra-judicial confession.

xxx   xxx   xxx

During cross-examination, witness Atty. Agravante further testified that before the accused was
investigated, the accused was informed of his constitutional rights and the accused requested him to
translate the question in visayan or the local vernacular, and he was certain that the accused understood
his plea for which in fact the accused had already confessed to him twice. That when the accused pleaded
guilty during the arraignment he was also the one who assisted the accused, however, the case was
remanded by the Supreme Court. . . .8

Also, we agree with the Solicitor General’s observation that appellant trusted Atty. Agravante considering that he
had previously hired the said lawyer’s legal services in a theft case and engaged him again in this rape charge. 9

Moreover, appellant failed to present evidence that his constitutional rights was violated when he executed his
extra-judicial confession. His claim that his extra-judicial confession bears only his thumbmark is not an
indication that his confession was irregular considering that it was executed in the presence of his lawyer. Also,
he never denied that Atty. Agravante was not his personally chosen counsel. Neither was there evidence to prove
that his extra-judicial confession was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or made upon a promise of
reward or leniency.

Significantly, appellant’s conviction was not based solely on his extra-judicial confession but on other pieces of
evidence established by the prosecution to the satisfaction of the court.

In the second assigned error, appellant submits that the circumstances relied upon by the trial court as bases for
his conviction did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime.

The trial court convicted appellant based on the following circumstances:

1. Prior to the commission of the crime the victim and her sister were seen in the company of the
appellant. (TSN-Alcantara, Jan. 31, 2001, p. 8)

2. Appellant invited the victim to watch a "beta-show" in Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe. (TSN-
Alcantara, Jan. 31, 2001, p. 8)

3. Norma Bakia saw the victim and the appellant proceed to a sugarcane field in Campo 9, Hacienda San
Antonio, the place where the corpse of the victim was found. (TSN-Alcantara, Jan. 31, 2001, p. 8)

4. Maria Lariosa, saw the appellant together with the victim at noon time of July 22, 1995 pass by the
back of their house en route to Camp 9, Hacienda San Antonio. (TSN-Alcantara, Feb. 28, 2001, p. 16)

5. Maria Lariosa saw the appellant emerge from the sugarcane field alone and without the victim, with
fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms. (TSN-Alcantara, Feb. 28, 2001, p. 8)

6. When the appellant went to the residence of the victim in the morning of July 23, 1995, witness Norma
Bakia observed that the right portion of his face and neck have scratch marks on it. ( TSN-Alcantara, Jan.
31, 2001, pp. 10-11).

7. The body of the victim was found in the same sugarcane field at Camp 9, the same place where the
appellant and the victim were seen by the witnesses go inside. (TSN-Alcantara, Feb. 28, 2001, pp. 8-9)

8. The multiple scratches suffered by the appellant on the right side of his face and ears were all caused
by human fingernails. (TSN-Mondragon, Dec. 13, 2000, p. 3)

9. The appellant was the last person seen in the company of the victim before the commission of the
crime and was positively identified as such by the witnesses; and
 10. The victim suffered hymenal laceration, contusions, abrasions and hematoma on different parts of her
body and was strangled resulting to her death which indicated that there was a struggle and the victim
vigorously put up a fight against her attacker. 10

Appellant argues that the scratches on his face do not prove that they were inflicted by Virginia, much less that he
committed the crime.

Indeed, the scratches on appellant’s face, by itself, may not prove that he committed the crime. Nonetheless, he
explained that the scratches were caused by a galvanized sheet which hit his face. 11 This claim, however, was
contradicted by three prosecution witnesses. SPO4 Romeo S. Leyte testified that appellant admitted to him that
the scratches were inflicted by the victim Virginia. 12 Eugenio Tiongson testified that appellant admitted to him
that they were caused by his girlfriend. 13 Finally, Dr. Diosdado G. Sarabia testified that when he examined
appellant on July 23, 1995, he admitted that the scratches were inflicted by Virginia. 14

Appellant claims that if he was indeed guilty, he would not have gone to the victim’s residence in the early
morning of July 23, 1995.

We are not persuaded. Appellant’s act of going to the house of the victim may not be consistent with ordinary
human behavior, but is nevertheless possible. While an appellant’s post-incident behavior is never proof of guilt,
neither is it of innocence.15

The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence
require the presence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must
be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused. 16 To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the
appellant.17 Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of
the crime.18 These, the prosecution were able to establish.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree
of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 19 While it is established that nothing less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to
circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition  sine qua non to
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and
under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances,
the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
impossible, to prove.20

In People v. Corfin,21 which is similar to this case, we upheld the conviction of the accused based on the following
circumstances: (1) the accused was the last person seen with the victim; (2) said accused and the victim were seen
together near the dry creek; (3) the accused was seen leaving said place alone; and (4) the body of the victim was
found in the dry creek.

Likewise, it did not help that appellant can only raise the defenses of denial and alibi. Denial is inherently a weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, such denial is
purely self-serving and without merit. 22 In the case at bar, appellant’s workplace and the crime scene in Camp 9
are both in San Carlos City.

On the other hand, an alibi, to be believed, must receive credible corroboration from disinterested
witnesses.23 Appellant failed to present his employer or any co-worker to corroborate his alibi or a logbook that
would prove his presence at his workplace at the time of the commission of the crime. Neither was there any
evidence to show that it was impossible for the appellant to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission.

In the end, the rule is settled that where the culpability or innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility of the
witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are given the highest degree of respect.
Hence, their findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. 24 We find no
circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked by the trial court.

Appellant was thus correctly convicted by the trial court of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to R.A. 7659, which provides that when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. 25
The trial court awarded damages in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Current judicial policy authorizes the mandatory award of P50,000.00 in case of death, and P50,000.00 upon the
finding of rape. Thus, if homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape, indemnity in the amount
of P100,000.00 is fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said complex crime. 26 We
therefore award P100,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim.

As to moral damages, jurisprudence allows that the amount of P75,000.00 be awarded in cases of rape with
homicide. Thus, the P50,000.00 award given by the court below as moral damages should likewise be increased to
P75,000.00.27

The P25,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial court is deleted for lack of legal basis. Article 2230 of
the New Civil Code provides that in criminal cases, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. There is none in this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 16, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. RTC-1285 finding Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva a.k.a. "Tamayo
Sevilleno" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, and imposing upon him the
penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Virginia
Bakia the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. The award of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of legal basis.

Upon the finality of this decision, and pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
25 of Republic Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8158               February 24, 2010

ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

In a verified complaint 1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline), Atty. Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon) sought the disbarment of Atty. Ramil E.
Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule 16.01, 2 Rule 18.03,3 and Rule 18.044 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case.

The Facts

Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Regional Office 8, Tacloban City. Although he is in public service, the DENR Secretary has given him
the authority to engage in the practice of law.

While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005, Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon by a
mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty. Macalalad to handle
the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern Samar and owned by Atty. Solidon’s relatives.
For a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad accepted the task to be completed
within a period of eight (8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as initial
payment; the remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) was to be paid when Atty. Solidon
received the certificate of title to the property.

Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the present
time.

In the Complaint, Position Papers5 and documentary evidence submitted, Atty. Solidon claimed that he tried to
contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up on the status of the case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He
did this through phone calls and text messages to their known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through a
letter sent by courier to Atty. Macalalad. However, he did not receive any communication from Atty. Macalalad.

In the Answer,6 Position Paper,7 and affidavits of witnesses, Atty. Macalalad posited that the delay in the filing of
the petition for the titling of the property was caused by his clients’ failure to communicate with him. He also
explained that he had no intention of reneging on his obligation, as he had already prepared the draft of the
petition. He failed to file the petition simply because he still lacked the needed documentary evidence that his
clients should have furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad denied that Atty. Solidon tried to communicate with
him.

The Findings of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong
made the following finding of negligence against Atty. Macalalad:

…complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the mutual acquaintance of
both complainant and respondent. In the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-Borata described how she repeatedly followed-
up the matter with respondent and how respondent turned a deaf ear towards the same. There is nothing on record
which would prompt this Office to view the allegations therein with caution. In fact, considering that the
allegations corroborate the undisputed facts of the instant case...

As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the application despite the
lapse of about a year from the time his services were engaged, it is plain that his negligence in filing the
application remains uncontroverted. And such negligence is contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. In fact, Rule 18.03 even provides that his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

Acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008, holding that:

RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution … and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months and Ordered to Return the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) with 12% interest per annum to
complainant …

The case is now before this Court for our final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
considering that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline imposed the penalty of suspension on Atty. Macalalad.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the IBP’s factual findings and legal conclusions.

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the
complainant has the burden to discharge. 8 We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied
that the complainant’s evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in proving Atty.
Macalalad’s negligence.

Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states:

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the
obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.

Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,9 we held that a lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his client’s
interest after receiving his acceptance fee. In In Re: Atty. Briones, 10 we ruled that the failure of the counsel to
submit the required brief within the reglementary period (to the prejudice of his client who languished in jail for
more than a year) is an offense that warrants disciplinary action. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, we penalized a
lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters.11
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan, 12 we reiterated that the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal
services in handling the complainant’s case and, subsequently, in failing to render the services, is a clear violation
of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We made the same conclusion in Canoy v. Ortiz 13 where
we emphatically stated that the lawyer’s failure to file the position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in
handling a case. In Canoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to his client for failing
to follow up on his case because it was the lawyer’s duty to inform his client of the status of the case. 14 Our
rulings in Macarilay v. Seriña,15 in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,16 and in Villaflores v. Limos17 were of the same
tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the
main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required
information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the latter has more control in handling the case.

All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client once an engagement for legal
services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s
interest with utmost diligence.18 The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and
to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. 19 Accordingly,
competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases
appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. 201avvphi1

The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he failed to file the
required petition. He cannot now shift the blame to his clients since it was his duty as a lawyer to communicate
with them. At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalad’s defense that it was his clients who failed to contact him.
Although no previous communication transpired between Atty. Macalalad and his clients, the records nevertheless
show that Atty. Solidon, who contracted Atty. Macalalad’s services in behalf of his relatives, tried his best to
reach him prior to the filing of the present disbarment case. Atty. Solidon even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-
Borata to follow-up on the status of the registration application with Atty. Macalalad.

As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit, 21 she succeeded several times in getting in touch with Atty.
Macalalad and on those occasions asked him about the progress of the case. To use Ms. Cabo-Borata’s own
words, she received "no clear-cut answers from him"; he just informed her that everything was "on process." We
give credence to these narrations considering Atty. Macalalad’s failure to contradict them or deny their veracity,
in marked contrast with his vigorous denial of Atty. Solidon’s allegations.

We consider, too, that other motivating factors – specifically, the monetary consideration and the fixed period of
performance – should have made it more imperative for Atty. Macalalad to promptly take action and initiate
communication with his clients. He had been given initial payment and should have at least undertaken initial
delivery of his part of the engagement.

We further find that Atty. Macalalad’s conduct refutes his claim of willingness to perform his obligations. If Atty.
Macalalad truly wanted to file the petition, he could have acquired the necessary information from Atty. Solidon
to enable him to file the petition even pending the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline investigation. As matters
now stand, he did not take any action to initiate communication. These omissions unequivocally point to Atty.
Macalalad’s lack of due care that now warrants disciplinary action.

In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also find Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the money received from the client.
In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from
Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the engagement. 22

The Penalty

Based on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommended penalty by
increasing the period of Atty. Macalalad’s suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months, to six (6)
months.23 In this regard, we follow the Court’s lead in Pariñas v. Paguinto 24 where we imposed on the respondent
lawyer suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION Resolution No. XVIII-

2008-336 dated July 17, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. We impose
on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective upon finality of this
Decision. Atty. Macalalad is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Atty. Macalalad is also ORDERED to RETURN to Atty. Elmer C. Solidon the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of this Decision
until the full amount is returned.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Macalalad’s record as
a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7178

VICENTE M. GIMENA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR T. SABIO, Respondent

DECISION

jardeleza, J.:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment 1 filed by Vicente M. Gimena (complainant) against Atty. Salvador T.
Sabio (respondent) for gross negligence in handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99 (case). Complainant laments
that his company, Simon Peter Equipment and Construction Systems, Inc. (company) lost in the case because
respondent filed an unsigned position paper and ignored the order of the labor arbiter directing him to sign the
pleading. Aware of the unfavorable decision, respondent did not even bother to inform complainant of the same.
The adverse decision became final and executory, robbing complainant of a chance to file a timely appeal.

Facts

Complainant is the president and general manager of the company. 2 In his Complaint3 dated March 7, 2006, he
narrated that he engaged the legal services of respondent in relation to a case for illegal dismissa l  4 filed against
him and the company. All the pleadings and orders were directed to respondent because the company no longer
had active presence in Bacolod, save for the stockpile of construction equipment found in Barangay
Mansilingan.5 Sometime in February 2000, complainant signed the verification page of the position paper for the
case and sent it to respondent for his signature. However, respondent filed the position paper without signing
it.6 The labor arbiter noticed the unsigned pleading and directed respondent to sign it within 10 days from
notice.7 Respondent did not comply with the directive.

In a Decision8 dated October 21, 2004, the labor arbiter ruled against the company and noted that: "[the company
J filed an unsigned position paper which cannot be considered as such. Despite the order to Atty. Salvador Sabio
to sign said position paper, the order was deemed to have been taken for granted " 9

Respondent received a copy of the Decision on January 13, 2005 but he did not

notify complainant about it.10 Complainant only learned of the Decision after a writ of execution was served on
the company on June 2005 and by that time, it was already too late to file an appeal. 11

Complainant stressed that respondent was previously suspended from the practice of law on two (2) occasions:
first was in the case of Cordova v. Labayen,12 where respondent was suspended for six (6) months, and the second
was in the case of Credito v. Sabio,13 where he was suspended for one (1) year. The latter case involved facts
analogous to the present Complaint.

In his Comment,14 respondent countered that complainant engaged his services in 2000. Complainant, however,
did not pay the expenses and attorney's fees for the preparation and filing of the position paper in the amount of
₱20,000.00.15 The lack of payment contributed to respondent's oversight in the filing of the unsigned position
paper.16 Respondent also insisted that the unfavorable Decision of the labor rbiter is based on the merits and not
due to default.17 Respondent further explained that he was not able inform complainant of the outcome of the case
because he does not know the address of the company after it allegedly abandoned its place of business in
Barangay Mansilingan, without leaving any forwarding address. 18 Respondent claimed that complainant only
communicated to him when the writ of execution was issued on July 27, 2005. 19 He faulted complainant and the
company for being remiss in their legal obligation to be in constant communication with him as to the status of
the case.20

Moreover, respondent averred that the filing of the administrative case against him is tainted with ill will to
compensate for complainant's failure to post a bond to stay the writ of execution and the sale of the construction
equipment levied upon.21 Respondent submitted that if it were true that he was negligent in the handling of the
case, then why did complainant, the company and the third party claimants still avail ofhis services as attorney-in-
fact in the auction sale?22

In his Reply,23 complainant insisted that the acceptance fee of respondent was ₱50,000.00. Complainant paid
respondent ₱20,000.00 as advance payment, but which was without a receipt because complainant trusted
him.24 The remaining P30,000.00 was also paid to respondent, as evidenced by photocopies of deposit slips to his
Banco De Oro account. 25

We referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation. During the
mandatory conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (the Commission), complainant and
respondent were asked to discuss their complaint and defense, respectively. For the first time, respondent raised
the issue of lack of attorney-client relationship. He pointed out that he and complainant had never met each other
and that there was no formal engagement of his services. 26 The parties did not enter into stipulation of facts and
limited the issues to the following:

a) Whether or not there was attorney-client relationship between respondent and the company in RAB Case No.
06-11-10970-99;

b) If in the affirmative, whether or not respondent was negligent in handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99 and
whether such negligence renders him liable underthe Code of Professional Responsibility. 27

The Commission ordered the parties to file their verified position papers. Respondent, in his Position
Paper,28 reiterated that he cannot be expected to render legal services to the company and the complainant because
no formal contract for legal retainer services was execute. 29

On December 2, 2008, the Commission issued its Report and Recommendation 30 fmding respondent guilty of
gross negligence.

IBP Recommendation

As regards the first issue, the Investigating Commissioner Atty. Randall C. Tabayoyong (the Investigating
Commissioner) ruled that there is indeed an attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent.
Respondent's assertion that he was not a counsel of record in the case is belied by his own admission in the
Comment he filed before the Commission. 31 In paragraph 1 of his Comment, respondent stated that he was
"engaged by complainant in 2000 regarding the labor case of the [company]." 32 Then, in paragraph 2, he averred
that he was not paid for legal expenses and legal charges for the filing of the position paper. 33 More, the Order and
Decision of the labor arbiter referred to respondent as the counsel of the company. 34

With respect to the second issue, the Investigating Commissioner declared that the evidence on record sufficiently
supports the charges of negligence against respondent. 35 Again, it was respondent's own admissions that put the
final nail on his coffin. Respondent neither denied that he filed an unsigned pleading nor refuted the claim that he
did not inform complainant of the outcome of the case and the due date of the appeal before the National Labor
Relations Commission. He only offered excuses, which the Investigating Commissioner found as "reprehensible"
and "downright misleading."36

The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the negligence that he committed in handling the case referred to him. 37 Weight was also given
to the fact that respondent was previously suspended for the same offense in  Credito. 38 Hence, it was
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a warning
that a similar violation in the future will merit a heavier penalty. 39

The recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution 40 dated April
16, 2010. Respondent filed a Motion for reconsideration41 but the same was denied.42

Issue

Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.

Ruling

We concur with the findings of the IBP, with the addition that respondent also violated Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We also find that a longer period of suspension is warranted in view of the number of
times that respondent had been disciplined administratively.
There is attorney-client relationship
between respondent and complainant

The contention of respondent that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and the company is, at
best, flimsy.1âwphi1 It is improper for him to capitalize on the fact that no formal contract for legal retainer was
signed by the parties, for formality is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney. 43 The contract
may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received,
in matters pertinent to his profession. An attorney impliedly accepts the relation when he acts on behalf of his
client in pursuance of the request made by the latter. 44

Respondent acted on behalf of the company and the complainant in relation to the case. Albeit unsigned, he
allowed his name to appear as "counsel for respondent" 45 in the position paper that he filed before the labor
arbiter. He never called the attention of the labor court that he was not the counsel of the company. More
importantly, he admitted in his Comment that the complainant engaged his legal services. Respondent cannot
plead the same before us then later on deny it before the IBP to save him from his omissions. Estoppel works
against him. Basic is the rule that an admissiop. made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making
it for such is conclusive as to him, and all proofs to the contrary shall be ignored, whether

objection is interposed by the said party or not. 46

Respondent is grossly negligent in

handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code") mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. Corollarily, Rule 18.03 directs that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him.47 He must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the case that he is
handling. This is true whether he accepted the case for free or in consideration of a fee.

A lawyer is presumed to be prompt and diligent in the performance of his obligations and in the protection of his
client's interest and in the discharge of his duties as an officer of the court. 48 Here, however, this presumption is
overturned by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was grossly negligent as counsel of the company
and complainant in the case.

Every law student is taught that an unsigned pleading creates no legal effect, such that the party may be deemed
not to have filed a pleading at all. Yet, respondent, a long standing legal practitioner, did not sign a position paper
that he filed in a labor suit allegedly due to oversight. What more, he claimed that his client's failure to pay legal
expenses and attorney's fees contributed to such oversight. These actuations of respondent demean the legal
profession. Lawyering is not primarily concerned with money-making; rather, public service and administration
of justice are the tenets of the profession. 49 Due to respondent's negligence, the labor arbiter did not consider the
position paper of the company and the complainant. This circumstance deprived the company of the chance to
explain its side of the controversy - an unfortunate incident brought about by its own counsel.

Respondent's inattention is further highlighted by his disobedience to the labor arbiter's directive that he sign the
position paper. His conduct evinces a willful disregard to his duty as officer of the court. This alone warrants the
imposition of administrative liability.

Respondent's irresponsibility went beyond the unsigned pleading and refusal to obey court orders; he also
admittedly failed to apprise the company and the complainant of the adverse decision against them. He even had
the audacity to place the blame on his client for not communicating to him as regards the status of the case. He
furthermore justified his omission by saying that he was not aware of the address of the company. The foregoing
excuses should be rejected. As the IBP correctly observed, respondent overlooked the attached affidavit of the
complainant in the unsigned position paper, which clearly indicates that the principal office address of the
company is at Quirino Highway, Sacred Heart Village IV, Novaliches, Caloocan City. 50 Respondent himself had
notarized the affidavit.51 Thus, contrary to his contention, it appears from the records that he was fully aware of
the address of the company. There was no justifiable reason for him not to notify complainant and the company of
the adverse decision against them.

Respondent's conduct is inconsistent with Rule 18.04 of the Code, which requires that "[a] lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information."

In Alcala v. De Vera,52 we ruled that the failure of a lawyer to notify his client of a decision against him manifests
a total lack of dedication or devotion to his client's interest expected under the lawyer's oath and the then Canons
of Professional Ethics. 53
Then in Garcia v. Manuel, 54 we decreed that the failure of a lawyer to inform his client of the status of the case
signifies bad faith, for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary; thus, the ever present
need to inform clients of the developments of the case. 55 It is only in this manner that the trust and faith of the
client in his counsel will remain unimpaired. 56

Respondent is a repeat offender

This is not the first time that respondent was subjected to disciplinary proceedings. In Credito,57 the then members
of the Third Division found respondent guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Similar to the present case, respondent's legal services were engaged in connection with a labor
suit. The labor case went up to us only to be dismissed due to respondent's failure to attach the required
certification on nonforum shopping and to pay the total revised docket and other legal fees. Respondent also kept
his clients in the dark as to the fact that their petition was dismissed.

Prior to Credito, respondent was also held administratively liable in Cordova58 for instigating his clients to file a
complaint against a judge to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders.

All told, respondent seems unfazed by the sanctions we have so far imposed upon him. He did not learn from his
previous suspensions and continued with his negligent ways. In Tejano v. Baterina,59 we imposed a longer period
of suspension on account of the lawyer's previous suspension for negligence in handling a case. We found the
lawyer's pattern of neglecting his duty to his clients and his propensity to disrespect the authority of the courts
unacceptable.60

For this reason, we impose upon the respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice oflaw for three (3)
years.

WHEREFORE, for violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE (3)
YEARS. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts and the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to
include a copy in respondent's personal file.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6591             May 4, 2005

MARISSA L. MACARILAY, complainant,
vs.
FELIX B. SERIÑA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Failure to render the legal services agreed upon, despite the undisputed receipt of an acceptance fee, is a clear
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Negligence in attending to the needs of a client and a
deceitful cover-up of such carelessness likewise constitute major breaches of the lawyer's oath.

The Case

Before us is a verified Complaint 1 for "malpractice and/or gross misconduct" against Atty. Felix B. Seriña, filed
by Marissa L. Macarilay with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on
September 22, 2003.

The IBP-CBD, through Director Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to answer the charges. 2 It thereafter
held a mandatory conference/hearing on January 13, 2004, during which the parties were able to enter into a
stipulation of facts as well as to present and mark their documentary evidence. 3 After they submitted their
respective Position Papers,4 the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

The investigator of the case, Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr., summarized the antecedents thus:

"Complainant's version of the facts pertinent to this case is as follows:

"Sometime in year 2000, Complainant and one Jenelyn Balaoro ('Balaoro') bought a lot from one Albaria
Mohammad ('Mohammad'). Complainant and Balaoro, however, could not register the sale with the
Register of Deeds and cause the transfer of the title in their names because Mohammad failed to surrender
the owner's duplicate certificate of title for said lot. Subsequently, Complainant learned from one Reina
Ong ('Ong') that Mohammad had mortgaged the said lot to a third party. Ong advised Complainant to get
a copy of the mortgage contract and to do this the latter needs to have a contact in the Register of Deeds.
Sometime in January or February 2002, Ong introduced Complainant to one Vic Paule ('Paule'), an
employee of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, who advised Complainant to get a lawyer to handle
the case. Complainant allegedly gave Paule P8,000.00 for the help the latter will give her in securing a
copy of the mortgage contract concerned. On March 18, 2002, Complainant, Balaoro and Ong met with
Paule at the Star Mall in Mandaluyong and proceeded to the office of Respondent, the lawyer
recommended by Paule. During said meeting, Complainant consulted Respondent about the problem
concerning the transfer of the subject lot title in her and Balaoro's names and the latter advised that the
first thing [they have to do], is to file an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. Respondent, however,
required an acceptance fee of P20,000.00 before he could act on the matter. Thus, on the same day,
Complainant issued a check to Respondent for P20,000.00 as payment of the acceptance fee.
Subsequently, Respondent asked Complainant for P3,000.00 as notarization fee and P5,000.00 as filing
fee for the adverse claim. On April 5, 2002, Complainant and Balaoro went to Respondent's office and
paid said amounts. On the same day, Respondent himself typed the affidavit of adverse claim in the
presence of Complainant and Balaoro and the latter subsequently signed the same. On May 16, 2002,
upon Respondent's advice, Complainant gave Respondent another P20,000.00 in check as filing fee for
the suits to be filed against Mohammad.

"Towards the middle part of the year, Complainant inquired from Respondent about the status of the
case(s) against Mohammad but the latter could not give any further developments other than that the
affidavit of adverse claim had already been filed with the Register of Deeds. It appears that Respondent
was having problems about the fact that Mohammad's whereabouts are unknown and Respondent was not
sure what to do about it. Subsequently, Complainant received assurance from Respondent that the case
against Mohammad was already filed in court although Respondent could not identify the particular court
except that it was pending in the sala of one Judge Regala. Upon verification with the courts and the
fiscal's office [at] Quezon City, Complainant learned that no case, whether criminal or civil, was ever
filed by Respondent against Mohammad. Complainant then called Respondent regarding her findings and
even suggested service of summons by publication upon Mohammad, having receiv[ed] advice from one
Atty. Noel Sorreda ('Atty. Sorreda') that such manner of service is appropriate in view of the lack of
information regarding Mohammad's whereabouts. Respondent, however, immediately got angry so
Complainant did not insist on her inquiries and suggestions.

"On March 24, 2003, upon Complainant's request, Atty. Sorreda called Respondent to inquire about the
specific branch where the case against Mohammad was supposedly pending. Respondent got angry and
hung up the phone. Upon learning this, Complainant authorized Atty. Sorreda to terminate the services of
Respondent on her behalf. Atty. Sorreda called Respondent a second time but was able to talk only with
presumably Respondent's lady-receptionist or secretary whom Atty. Sorreda requested to just relay to
Respondent his message regarding the termination of Respondent's services. On March 26, 2003, Atty.
Sorreda, upon Complainant's request, sent a letter to Respondent confirming the verbal termination of
services, and also asking for the turnover of the pertinent documents that were with Respondent.
Subsequently, Complainant herself wrote Respondent a letter affirming the contents of the earlier letter of
Atty. Sorreda. In a letter dated April 4, 2003, Respondent denied the fact of his termination by Atty.
Sorreda and invited Complainant to his office to talk things over. Complainant responded through Atty.
Sorreda in a letter dated May 16, 2003 by reiterating the termination of Respondent's services and the
request for the turnover of documents. In a letter dated May 23, 2003, Respondent enclosed the
documents requested. Since it appears from the documents turned over that Respondent never filed a suit
against Mohammad, Complainant wrote Respondent demanding the return of the money she paid for the
anticipated legal services Respondent was supposed to render but which were not actually rendered.
Respondent's failure to respond to said letter prompted Complainant [to] send a follow-up letter dated
July 16, 2003. Instead of returning the money, Respondent wrote Complainant a letter dated July 14, 2003
denying receipt of any amount from Complainant other than the P20,000.00 acceptance fee and
demanding payment of alleged unpaid attorney's fee of P40,000 and fees for notarial services
of P3,000.00 which Respondent allegedly advanced for Complainant. Thus, Complainant filed the present
administrative case for disciplinary action, likewise praying for the return of the money she paid for the
anticipated legal services Respondent was supposed to render but which were not actually rendered.

"On the other hand, Respondent's version of the facts pertinent to this case is as follows:

"On March 16, 2002, Complainant, Balaoro and Ong went to Respondent's office during which
Complainant related to Respondent her various problems and cases. Respondent advised Complainant
that the solutions to her problem regarding Mohammad consist of two (2) phases. The first phase consists
of: (1) having the notary public of the deed covering the sale of the subject property sign the
 acknowledgment page (since although the said deed contained the notarial seal of said notary, the latter
did not sign the same); (2) preparing a complaint in court to compel Mohammad to surrender the owner's
certificate of title; and (3) executing an affidavit of adverse claim to cause its inscription on the copy of
the said title in the Registry of Deeds to protect their interest. The second [phase] consists of: (1) filing
the complaint in court to compel Mohammad to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, to
cause the cancellation of said title and the issuance of another title in the names of Complainant and
Balaoro, and to cause the removal from said title of the mortgage lien thereon in favor of Hernando and
Nenita Rosario; and (2) filing of a criminal complaint for estafa against Mohammad. On the same day,
Complainant engaged Respondent to provide the legal services to pursue the foregoing remedies. The
parties' verbal agreement with respect to Respondent's fees is as follows: (1) payment of acceptance fee
of P20,000.00; (2) payment of attorney's fees of P15,000 after Respondent has accomplished the first
[phase] of the remedies; (3) payment of attorney's fees of P15,000 after Respondent has accomplished the
second [phase] of the remedies; and (4) for hearings/follow-ups, payment of per appearance fee
of P3,000.00. Complainant paid the acceptance fee by issuing Respondent a check dated March 18, 2002
covering P20,000.00.

"Thereafter, Respondent caused the notary public whose seal appeared on the deed covering the sale of
the subject property to sign the acknowledgment page thereof, advancing the notarial fee of  P3,000.00
which Complainant failed to pay for which reason said notary did not sign said deed. On April 5, 2002,
Complainant and Balaoro went to his office and signed the affidavit of adverse claim, which Respondent
prepared. On the same date, Respondent requested Complainant and Balaoro to sign the civil complaint
and criminal complaint against Mohammad which Respondent prepared but Complainant and Balaoro
refused to sign because according to the latter two the residence of Mohammad in said complaints is
already wrong since Mohammad's whereabouts are already unknown. Complainant and Balaoro promised
to locate Mohammad's whereabouts and asked Respondent to wait for such data. Thereafter, Respondent
even advised Complainant and Balaoro to locate Mohammad because resorting to the remedy of
complaint and summons by publication is very expensive and should be resorted to only as a last
recourse. Respondent adds that even as late as January 8, 2003, the civil and criminal complaints could
not be filed because Complainant herself wanted Respondent to amend the pleadings by including an
additional defendant or respondent and increasing the claim, for damages.

"Respondent further claims that he also extensively gave legal advise to Complainant with respect to the
following matters: (1) Complainant's litigation against spouses Casido to recover her 10% retention in
architect's fee; (2) collection of P800,000.00 indebtedness of one Mrs. Dizon; and (3) recovery of
Complainant's investments in her 2001 and 2002 car transactions.

"Claiming that Complainant did not pay him any amount other than the P20,000.00 acceptance fee,
Respondent argues that Complainant still owes him the following amounts: (1) the P3,000.00 he paid to
the notary public to sign the acknowledgment page of the deed covering the sale of the subject property;
(2) the P200 he spent in the notarization, registration and inscription of the affidavit of adverse claim; (3)
the P15,000.00 attorney's fees agreed upon for accomplishing the first [phase] of Complainant's remedies
relative to her problem with Mohammad; and (4) an additional P40,000.00 for the legal services he
rendered with respect to Complainant's other problems. Respondent further claims that Complainant
should pay him the costs relative to the filing of this administrative case." 5

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In the investigating commissioner's opinion, respondent had been remiss in attending to the cause of his client, in
violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Regarded as a mere afterthought
was his defense that his failure to file the civil and the criminal complaints was the fault of complainant. It was
noted that if she was indeed responsible for the non-filing of the complaints, he should have pointed out this fault
at the earliest opportunity, which was in his April 4, 2003 letter. The commissioner further opined that this
defense had been invoked only in respondent's letter dated July 14, 2003, after complainant demanded the return
of the amounts she had paid.

While likewise rejecting respondent's claim for unpaid legal fees amounting to P15,000, the commissioner upheld
Balaoro's sworn testimony. It corroborated that of complainant, who had said that the only agreement between her
and respondent was the acceptance fee of P20,000. His claim of P40,000 as consultation fee for the advice he had
allegedly given her concerning other legal problems was also rejected for lack of evidence.

Commissioner Villadolid then wrote the following recommendation:

"x x x [T]his Commissioner finds that Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR and
recommends a penalty of reprimand or suspension subject to the discretion of the Commission.

Further, considering that it is established from the records that Respondent received a total of  P48,000.00
from Complainant and that the only legal service rendered by Respondent consists of the notarization of
 the deed of sale covering the subject property and the filing of the adverse claim, this Commissioner
believes that P8,000.00 is sufficient compensation for the services actually rendered and thus
recommends that Respondent be ordered to pay Complainant P40,000.00 by way of restitution to
Complainant."6

Acting on the above recommendation, the IBP board of governors approved on July 30, 2004, the following
Resolution:

"RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-386

CBD Case No. 03-1141
Marissa L. Macarilay vs.
Atty. Felix B. Seriña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A'; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for respondent's violation of Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by his failure to exercise due diligence in protecting
and attending to the interest of complainant after receiving payment for the legal services he was
supposed to render, Atty. Felix B. Seriña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months and Ordered to Pay complainant P40,000.00 by way of Restitution."7

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP board of governors.

Administrative Liability

A lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature; 8 it is delicate, exacting and confidential. 9 It requires a
high standard of conduct and demands utmost fidelity, candor, fairness, and good faith. 10 The legal profession
demands vigilance and attention expected of a "good father of a family." 11 Lawyers should adopt the norm
expected of people of good intentions. In brief, they must always be protective of the interests of their clients as
good parents would be protective of their own families. 12

Indeed, under their sacred oath, lawyers pledge not to delay any person for money or malice. They are bound to
conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to their
clients.13

These duties are further stressed in the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically in the following pertinent
provisions:

"CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.

"CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.

xxxxxxxxx

"Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.

"CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

"CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxxxxxxx

"Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

"Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information."

Admittedly, respondent received the amount of P20,000 as acceptance fee for the cases he had agreed to file on
behalf of complainant. Plainly, he was less than candid in his dealings with his client; he displayed lack of
honesty and fidelity to her cause. Sufficiently established were the following acts: (1) despite his receipt on May
16, 2002, of P20,000 for filing fees, he did not file the cases he had agreed to handle; (2) he deceived complainant
when he lied by saying that a civil complaint had been filed in the sala of one "Judge Regala" of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City; (3) respondent refused to return the money he had received for the filing fees. These
misrepresentations, lies and lapses constituted a breach of his sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards
he was required to honor and observe.

Lawyers owe full devotion to the protection of the interests of their clients, as well as warmth and zeal in the
defense of the latter's rights. 14 Once they agree to handle a case, lawyers are bound to give to it their utmost
attention, skill and competence, regardless of its significance. 15 Public interest requires that they exert their best
efforts and use all their learning and ability in the speedy prosecution or defense of the client's cause. 16 Those who
perform that duty with diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends
of justice.17 They do honor to the bar and help maintain the community's respect for the legal profession. 18

Moreover, the lawyer-client relationship, being one of confidence, requires lawyers to give the client timely,
adequate and truthful updates on the developments of the case. 19 In this manner, the trust and faith of clients in
their counsel would remain unimpaired.

Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file the complaints as he was supposed
to. Unbelievable is his claim that the complaints were ready as early as April 5, 2002, but that these were not filed
anyway because complainant had refused to sign them, absent the correct address of the defendant (Albaria
Mohammad).

First, evidence abound that it was complainant who was insistent that the cases be filed. She repeatedly inquired
about the case, but respondent would not give her any clear answer. Later on, he lied to her by saying that the
complaint was pending in the sala of one Judge Regala. His deception on top of his failure to file the cases were
raised in the letter dated March 26, 2003, 20 written by Atty. Noel Sorreda, her new counsel. In his April 4, 2003
reply,21 respondent did not mention anything about the complaints that had allegedly been prepared as early as
April 5, 2002. Commissioner Villadolid aptly observed in his Report:

"x x x The fact that respondent's 4 April 2003 letter-response to said letter, as well as respondent's
subsequent letter dated 23 May 2003, did not contain either gives further credence to complainant's
version of the facts. Notably, it was only in respondent's letter dated 14 July 2003 that respondent raised
such defenses for the first time. Considering that said 14 July 2003 letter was in response to complainant's
28 June 2003 letter demanding the return of certain amounts for legal services which complainant
believed respondent did not render, this Commissioner is inclined to believe that such defenses are mere
afterthought to defeat complainant's claim for the return of said amounts."

Were it not for the vigilance of complainant in inquiring about the status of her cases, she would not have known
that the complaints had not been filed at all. Respondent deliberately withheld informing her of his inaction,
notwithstanding her repeated follow-ups. Thus, he is deemed to have wronged her and effectively betrayed the
trust she had placed in him.

Second, his alleged lack of knowledge of the correct address of the defendant is not a hindrance to the filing of a
complaint. Indeed, such address is material to the service of summons 22 which, however, presupposes that a
complaint has been properly filed in court. Furthermore, Section 14 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court 23 provides
for remedies when the defendant's address is unknown. Thus, respondent should have nevertheless filed the
complaint, especially because complainant had already given him payment for the filing fees. His attempt to cover
up his negligence by wrongfully shifting the blame to her cannot be countenanced by this Court.

Finally, respondent should have returned the money to complainant following his failure to file the cases. 24 Where
the client gives money to the lawyer for a specific purpose -- such as to file an action or to appeal an adverse
judgment -- the latter should, upon failure to do so, immediately return it to the former. 25 The unjustified
withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer. 26

It was sufficiently proven that, all in all, complainant had paid respondent P48,000:

"Similarly, a review of the records reveals that contrary to Respondent's claim, in addition to
the P20,000.00 covered by the check dated 18 March 2002 which complainant paid during the parties'
initial meeting, complainant made subsequent payments to respondent. Balaoro confirms that when she
and complainant went back to respondent's office on 5 April 2002, complainant paid
respondent P3,000.00 and P5,000.00 in cash. Another P20,000.00 was likewise paid to respondent as
evidenced by the RCBC check dated 16 May 2002 issued by complainant to respondent." 27

Likewise established was the obvious fact that the only legal service rendered by respondent consisted of the
notarization of the Deed of Sale covering the property purchased by complainant and the filing of the adverse
claim. We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that P8,000 was sufficient compensation for the services actually
rendered. Hence, respondent must return to complainant the balance of P40,000 plus legal interest.

The failure of respondent to discharge his duty properly constitutes an infringement of ethical standards and of his
oath. Such failure makes him answerable not just to his client, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to
the general public.28 The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months is in
accordance with jurisprudence.29

WHEREFORE, Atty. Felix B. Seriña is found GUILTY of violating Canons 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is further ORDERED to return to Marissa L. Macarilay, within
thirty (30) days from notice, the amount of P40,000, with interest at 6 percent per annum from May 16, 2002,
until full payment. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's personal file.

SO ORDERED.