GALASINAO, ILYNE C.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Student No.: 2020-00618-R-2 Atty. Danilo Barde
PUP-ReCAP R3

I. EFFECT and APPLICATION of LAWS (Art. 1-18)

CASE DIGESTS No. 1:

ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI

G.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014

Facts:
Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer,
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean national.

Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118] were for
sale. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot
were clean.

After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and
commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the
properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez,
Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed
to deliver the documents.

Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties. He learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the
Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name
of Cityland Pioneer. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to
the properties remained in possession of Perez.

Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez, however,
refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as
its reason.

Issue:
Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of
spouses Kang?
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Held:
In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal principle
that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning to the title and disposition of
real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can
alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by
which an interest therein can be gained or lost.

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by
the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a
foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question
of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of
a foreign law. Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be
governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the
property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the
conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification,
does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is
no showing that it was properly authenticated.

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or

processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or,
even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law.

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to
declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of
spousal consent. It is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of the
Dacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the
condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to
take possession of the property even six (6) months after the supposed date of
execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of the
condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon.

NMSMI vs. DND

G.R. NO. 187587, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 359

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Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. Department of National Defense
(DND) Military Shrine Services - Philippine Veterans Affairs Office,

Facts:
Former President Marcos issued a proclamation which excludes a certain area in a
parcel of land previously reserved for military purposes and declared it open for
disposition. The proclamation includes three barangays (Lower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village) in its body and another barangay (Western Bicutan)
contained at the bottom through a handwritten addendum by the President. Said
proclamation was published in the Official Gazette without the hand written
addendum.

Issue:
Whether or not the handwritten addendum is an integral part of the proclamation.

Held:
No, the handwritten addendum has no legal force and effect due to lack of the
required publication in the Official Gazette. Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all for the purpose that it should inform the public of the contents of the
law.

Pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is

indispensable in the effectivity of a law unless otherwise provided by the law itself.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child

RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193707   December 10, 2014

TOPIC: Art. 14 & Art. 15 of R.A. No. 386 – TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE &
NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE, respectively.

DOCTRINE: Territoriality Principle: "Penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations."

Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 1990. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant
petition was sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on
July 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
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However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son, Roderigo. To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Petitioner filed a complaint
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation
of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner.

RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case,
the dispositive part of which states:

The Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly,
orders this case DISMISSED.

Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s

obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code.

The lower court issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling:

xxx

The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced

earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby
reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not
subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and
obligation to givesupport to his child.

Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari was raised.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law.

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Held:

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In terms of Territoriality Principle
ISSUE # 2: The Supreme Court ruled that that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to
petitioner’s son.

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.The crime

of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to

engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist
from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right
to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement
or conduct: xxxx (2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation

to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

The Supreme Court further add that, considering that respondent is currently living in
the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in
criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant
case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations."

On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in

refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all
of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts
have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

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In terms of Nationality Principle
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law.

The Supreme Court agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign
citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In
other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of
the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy,
the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national
law with respect to family rights and duties.

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that
family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the
nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil
Code, Article 15).

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same.

Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in

his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law.

Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

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 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. MA. JOPETTE REBESENCIO et.al
GR No. 198587; January 14, 2015

Facts:

Respondents, who were regular flight attendants were illegally terminated by

petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines due to their pregnancy which was alleged as a
ground for termination under their employment contract. Faced with the dilemma of
resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten
resignation letters. A year later, respondents filed a complaint against Saudia for
illegal dismissal; the case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Suelo. Saudia assailed the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter claiming that the complaint be dismissed on the
ground of forum non conveniens and that the respondents had no cause of action as
they resigned voluntarily. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held:
No. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: forum
non conveniens may not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must
be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be
deemed waived.

Furthermore, forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to

divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.
Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of
the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi
Arabia.

In addition, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more conveniently
tried elsewhere because Saudia is doing business in the Philippines and all four
respondents are Filipino citizens, thus Saudia may be tried under the jurisdiction of
Philippine tribunals.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs REDERICK A. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. 

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They lived as husband and wife in Australia.  However, an Australian family court
issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989. 

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at
Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City.  Since October 22, 1995, the
couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.  As a
matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of

bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

Issue: 
Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as
evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

Held:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued
was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized
Australian. 

However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to

marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree.  The said decree,
being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it
was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a

public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s
legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

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 MILLAROSA vs CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC.
G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013

Facts:
 LOCATION: Pangarap Village, Barrio Makatipo, North Caloocan.
 Carmel Development, Inc. (respondent) was the registered owner of the
TCTs for Pangarap Village at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City (156 hectares, 3
parcels of land).
 September 14, 1973: President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 293,
which invalidated the titles and declared them open for disposition to members of
Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI).

o Fun Fact: Marcos cited Proclamation 1081 and General Order No. 1 (issued Sept.
21 and 22, 1971 respectively) as his authority to do so.

 By virtue of PD 293, a Memorandum was inscribed on the last page of the titles,
certifying that they are “declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered
cancelled xxx.”
 On the basis of PD 923, Pelagio Juan, a member of MHAI, occupied Lot 32 and
built houses there.
 January 29, 1988: SC promulgated Tuason v. Register of Deeds, which declared
PD 923 as unconstitutional and void ab initio.
 February 17: The Register of Deeds cancelled the Memorandum on the titles,
restoring respondent’s ownership.
 Sometime in 1995: Petitioner took over Lot 32 by virtue of an Affidavit executed by
Pelagio M. Juan in his favor. o Respondent made several oral demands to asking
them to vacate, to no avail. o April 2002: they sent a written demand to vacate the
premises, but they were unheeded.
 January 14, 2003: CDI.filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MeTC.
 November 9, 2007: MeTC decided in favor of respondent, ordering their vacation
and payment of attorney’s fees (P10K). o Rationale: respondent was the registered
owner until its title was voided by PD 293. It had no alternative but to allow by mere
tolerance petitioner's occupancy. Petitioner was necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he would vacate the property upon demand.
 April 30, 2008: RTC reversed MTC’s findings, finding that respondent did not make
out a case for unlawful detainer. o Rationale: Since the possession was sanctioned
by P.D. 293, and respondent's tolerance only came after the law was declared
unconstitutional, petitioner thus exercised possession under color of title, which
placed the Complaint outside the category of unlawful detainer.

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 September 24, 2008: CA reversed, reinstating the MTC decision.
o Since the Complaint specifically alleged that the possession of respondent was by
petitioner's tolerance, and that respondent's dispossession had not lasted for more
than one year, MeTC rightly acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint.
o CDI had a better right to the property’s possession and enjoyment, so petitioner
had no right to the continued possession of the property.
o Petitioner is also not a builder in good faith who can claim benefits under Art. 448,
CC because when PD 923 was declared unconstitutional and the property restored
to respondent, no good faith can be claimed.
 Art. 449, CC applies, petitioner losing what he would be building, planting,
or sowing without right of indemnity from that time.

Issues:
1. W/N MTC had jurisdiction over the case. YES.
2. W/N the Tuason ruling applies, even though petitioner is not a party to the case.
YES.
3. W/N petitioner is a builder in good faith. NO.

Held:

1. YES, MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being one of unlawful
detainer.
 Petitioner’s Argument: MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
since respondent filed the Complaint beyond the one-year prescriptive period
for ejectment cases. Respondent lost ownership as early as Sept. 14, 1973,
but they took no action against it. Tolerance had not also been present from
the start of his possession as respondent only extended it after PD 293 was
declared unconstitutional, placing it outside the category of an unlawful
detainer. The case should’ve been accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria.
 An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds
possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or
other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
 Here, possession by a party was originally legal, as it was permitted by the
other party on account of an express or implied contract between them.
o However, the possession became illegal when the other (1) party demanded
that the possessor vacate the subject property because of the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the (2) possessor
refused to heed the demand.

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  The making of the demand is INCREDIBLY IMPORTANT. The one-year
prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful detainer is tacked from the
date of the last demand, the reason being that the other party has the right to
waive the right of action based on previous demands and to let the possessor
remain on the premises for the meantime.
 The once legal possession because of PD 923 became illegal because of
Tuason.
 The tolerance can only be properly tacked after PD 293 was invalidated
because respondent had no option but to allow petitioner and his
predecessorin-interest to enter the property.
o Petitioner’s contention is not “tolerance” envisioned by the law. The decree
"was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice
principles or the exercise of police power. It was a disguised, vile stratagem
deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful
disregard of the rights of others.

o It was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without
compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in
accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law.
 Respondent sent a demand letter in 2002 and filed the Complaint in 2003 well
within the one-year prescriptive period.
 It doesn’t matter whether there was an ownership issue that had to be solved
during the demand because determining that would only be provisional and would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.

2. YES, Tuason may be applied despite petitioner not being a party to that case,
because an unconstitutional law produces no effect and confers no right upon
any person.
 Petitioner’s Argument: respondent has no cause of action against him under
the doctrine of (1) operative fact and (2) res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis
praejudicium faciun1 , so the unconstitutionality of PD 293 should not affect
non-parties.
 On res inter alios xxx: o As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional
produces no effect whatsoever and confers no right on any person. It doesn’t
matter whether a person is a party to the original case, because “all persons
are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one
may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases.” o The res inter alios xxx doctrine does not apply. In fact,
in Dar Adventure Farm Corp. v. CA, they specifically held that this doctrine
does not apply “when the party concerned is a successor in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action.”

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  On operative fact:
o The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be
applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects.
o The doctrine is applicable when an unconstitutionality declaration will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law, but it
cannot be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act.
o Petitioner cannot be said to be unduly burdened by reliance on an
invalid law since he anchored his right to an Affidavit from a member of the
MHIA, authorizing petitioner to occupy the property.
 However, this was issued only in 1995, seven years after the
Tuason case was promulgated.

3. NO, petitioner may not be deemed to be a builder in good faith.

 Petitioner’s Argument: he is a builder in good faith for want of knowledge of

any infirmity in the promulgation of P.D. 293, so he is entitled to the
reimbursement of his useful expenses and has a right to retain possession of
the premises (Art. 545, CC).

 However, a builder in good faith is "one who builds with the belief that the
land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build
thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title."

 Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995

(when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or about
seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of
the binding effect of that ruling.

 All judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, and ignorantia legis non
excusat. He thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to
indemnity, in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M.

ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN,Petitioners, v.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES
B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building
Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis
Occidental, Respondents. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS: 

PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in

the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects
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 within Misamis Occidental.PETAL built some cottages on Capayas Island
which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its
beneficiaries,among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.

Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of

Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to
the construction of its buildings in violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop all
illegal building activities on Capayas Island. On July 8, 2002 the Sangguniang Bayan
of Jaena Lopez adopted a Municipal Ordinance which prohibited, among others : (a)
the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the
sanctuaries;and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on
the premises, except if authorized by the local government.

On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same
was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which
in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at
the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.

A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to

remove the structures it built on Capayas Island.

Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and
damagesagainst respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy
and utilize Capayas Island. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject
ordinance on the following grounds : (a) it was adopted without public consultation;
(b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as
required by the Local Government Code (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the
SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.

Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them

since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was
classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain.

The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.

On appeal, the CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon
failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in
accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance within
its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law,
the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.
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Issue:

Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.

Held:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

POLITICAL LAW presumption of validity

Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides : If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or
resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

It is noteworthy that petitioner's own evidence reveals that a public hearing

was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other
than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no
publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made.

While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting
evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment.
Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they,
however, failed to do.

In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA, 364 Phil. 683(1999) citing United States v.
Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the
ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local
government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of : (a) the
oppositors equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local
governments non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the
local governments non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the
oppositors cause of action. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the
burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of
the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public
hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to
uphold their constitutionality or legality. The PETITION  is denied.

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