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Political Law Recent Jurisprudence 2021
Political Law Recent Jurisprudence 2021
POLITICAL LAW
The BANAT formula mirrors the textual progression of Section 11(b) of the law. The
formula withstood the test of time and the Court is offered no cogent reason to depart therefrom.
FACTS
In these twin Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, and for Intervention,
ANGKLA: Ang Partido Ng Mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc., (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa
Bayan Party (SBP) assail the constitutionality of Section 11(b), Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941) insofar as it provides that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
ISSUE
Is Section 11(b), R.A. No. 7941 allocating additional seats to party-lists in
portion to their total number of votes unconstitutional?
RULING
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 249
NO. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
party-list system shall compose twenty percent (20%) of the total membership in
the House of Representatives. But the matter on how party-lists should qualify for
a seat is left to the wisdom of the legislature.
Round 1:
(b) Each of those receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to and guaranteed one seat each.
Round 2, Part 1:
(c) A party-list shall be awarded no more than two (2) additional seats.
Round 2, Part 2:
The Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy applicable to cases of
illegal confinement or detention where a person is deprived of his or her liberty, or where the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. In this case, there was
never any accusation that the Anakbayan employed violence, force or threat against AJ that
would have influenced her in deciding to stay with the Anakbayan.
FACTS
Relissa Santos Lucena and Francis B. Lucena (Spouses Lucena) are the
parents of Alicia Jasper S. Lucena (AJ) — a 19-year old Grade 11 student at the
Far Eastern University (FEU). AJ was enticed to join the FEU Chapter of
Anakbayan — a youth organization supposedly advocating ideals of national
democracy.
On July 10, 2019, AJ left the family home for the third time and never came
back. She has since dropped out from FEU. Seeking mainly to regain custody of
AJ, Spouses Lucena instituted the present petition for the issuance of the writs of
amparo and habeas corpus.
ISSUES
(1) Was Spouses Lucena’s plea for the issuance of a writ of amparo proper?
(2) Was Spouses Lucena’s plea for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
proper?
RULING
252 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
"Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, the elements
constituting "enforced disappearance," are enumerated as follows:
(d) That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Here, there is not much issue that AJ's situation does not qualify either as
an actual or threatened enforced disappearance or extralegal killing. AJ is not
missing. Her whereabouts are determinable. By all accounts, she is staying with
the Anakbayan and its officers which, at least insofar as AJ's case is concerned, are
not agents or organizations acting on behalf of the State. Indeed, against these
facts, Spouses Lucena's invocation of the remedy of amparo cannot pass.
(2) NO. The Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy
applicable to cases of illegal confinement or detention where a person is deprived
of his or her liberty, or where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
In this case, Spouses Lucena failed to make out a case that AJ is being
detained or is being kept by the Anakbayan against her free will. To start, there was
never any accusation that the Anakbayan employed violence, force or threat against
AJ that would have influenced her in deciding to stay with the Anakbayan.
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 253
It also cannot be said that Spouses Lucena were being excluded from their
rightful custody over the person of AJ. As it was established, AJ has already
reached the age of majority and is, thus, legally emancipated. This meant the
termination of the Spouses Lucena's parental authority — which includes their
custodial rights — over the person and property of AJ.
As she has already attained the age of majority, AJ — at least in the eyes of
the State — has earned the right to make independent choices with respect to the
places where she wants to stay, as well as to the persons whose company she wants
to keep. Such choices, so long as they do not violate any law or any other persons'
rights, have to be respected and let alone, lest the Court trample upon AJ's
personal liberty — the very freedom supposed to be protected by the writs of
amparo and habeas corpus.
254 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
(a) Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular
performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the
family are not civilly liable to return consistent with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(b) Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have
acted in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence are, pursuant to Section 43 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, solidarily liable to return only the net
disallowed amount which, as discussed herein, excludes amounts excused
under the following sections 2c and 2d.
(d) The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on
undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions
as it may determine on a case-to-case basis.
Examined under the rubric of the rules above, the Court holds that those who were the
approving and certifying officers need not refund the disallowed amounts inasmuch as they had
acted in good faith. They disbursed the subject allowances in the honest belief that the amounts
given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they
richly deserve such reward.
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 255
FACTS
In December 2013, the Municipality of Mondragon, Northern Samar (the
Municipality) passed and approved a Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Ordinance and four
SB Resolutions, granting various allowances to its officials and employees. These
allowances are:
On post-audit, the Audit Team Leader (ATL) and the Supervising Auditor
(SA) of the Municipality issued Notices of Disallowance (NDs) on the grounds,
among others, that the grants violated Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 (R.A.
No. 6758) or the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) as regards the consolidation of
allowances and compensation, and that the services rendered thereunder are not
considered as government service.
Mario Madera, et al. (Madera, et al.) filed their appeal with the Commission
on Audit (COA) Regional Director (RD), arguing that the grant of additional
allowances to the employees is allowed by R.A. No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code (LGC). Hence, the LGC actually repealed Section 12 of R.A.
No. 6758 because the former law allows the municipality to grant additional
allowances/financial assistance should its finances allow.
The COA affirmed the ruling of the COA Regional Office, with
modification in that the officials and employees who unwittingly received the
disallowed benefits or allowances are not held liable for their reimbursement since
they are recipient-payees in good faith.
ISSUE
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NDs?
256 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
RULING
NO. The Court upholds the NDs against the subject allowances, finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in affirming the disallowance.
The Court recognizes that the jurisprudence regarding the refund of disallowed
amounts by the COA is evolving, at times conflicting, and is primarily dealt with
on a case-to-case basis. The discussions made in this petition, however, have made
it apparent that there is now a need to harmonize the various rulings of the Court.
For this reason, the Court takes this opportunity to lay down the rules that would
be applied henceforth in determining the liability to return disallowed amounts,
guided by applicable laws and rules as well as the current state of jurisprudence.
(a) The statutory bases for the liability of approving and certifying officers
and payees for illegal expenditures;
(b) The badges of good faith in determining the liability of approving and
certifying officers;
To ensure that public officers who have in their favor the unrebutted
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty, or
those who can show that the circumstances of their case prove that they acted in
good faith and with diligence, the Court adopts Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen's (Justice Leonen) proposed circumstances or badges for the
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 257
Thus, to the extent that these badges of good faith and diligence are
applicable to both approving and certifying officers, these should be considered
before holding these officers, whose participation in the disallowed transaction
was in the performance of their official duties, liable. The presence of any of these
factors in a case may tend to uphold the presumption of good faith in the
performance of official functions accorded to the officers involved, which must
always be examined relative to the circumstances attending therein.
The history of the rule evinces that the original formulation of the "good
faith rule" excusing the return by payees based on good faith was not intended to
be at the expense of approving and/or certifying officers. The application of this
judge made rule of excusing the payees and then placing upon the officers the
responsibility to refund amounts they did not personally receive, commits an
inadvertent injustice.
(d) The nature of the payees' participation and their liability for return
and the acceptable exceptions as regards the liability to return disallowed
amounts on the bases of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti;
Being civil in nature, the liability of officers and payees for unlawful
expenditures provided in the Administrative Code of 1987 will have to be
consistent with civil law principles such as solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment.
To be sure, the application of the principles of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti
258 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
in disallowed benefits cases does not contravene the law on the general liability
for unlawful expenditures. With the liability for unlawful expenditures properly
understood, payees who receive undue payment, regardless of good faith, are
liable for the return of the amounts they received.
Consistent with this, "the amount of damage or loss [suffered by] the
government [in the disallowed transaction]," another determinant of liability, is
also indirectly attributable to payees by their mere receipt of the disallowed funds.
This is because the loss incurred by the government stated in the ND as the
disallowed amount corresponds to the amounts received by the payees. Thus,
cogent with the application of civil law principles on unjust enrichment and solutio
indebiti, the return by payees primarily rests upon this conception of a payee's
undue receipt of amounts as recognized within the government auditing
framework. In this regard, it bears repeating that the extent of liability of a payee
who is a passive recipient is only with respect to the transaction where he
participated or was involved in, i.e., only to the extent of the amount that he unduly
received.
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 259
The Court accepts the arguments raised by Madera, et al. as badges of good
faith.
First, a review of the SB Resolutions and Ordinance used as basis for the
grant of the subject allowances shows that these were primarily intended as
financial assistance to municipal employees in view of the increase of cost on
prime commodities, shortage of agricultural products, and the vulnerability of
their municipality to calamities and disasters. Notably, these subject allowances
were granted after the onslaught of typhoon Yolanda which greatly affected the
Municipality. While noble intention is not enough to declare the allowances as
valid, it nevertheless supports Madera, et al.'s claim of good faith.
Second, that these additional allowances had been customarily granted over
the years and there was no previous disallowance issued by the COA against these
allowances further bolster petitioners' claim of good faith. Indeed, while it is true
that this customary scheme does not ripen into valid allowances, it is equally true
that in all those years that the additional allowances had been granted, the COA
did not issue any ND against these grants, thereby leading Madera, et al. to believe
that these allowances were lawful.
As for the payees, the Court notes that the COA Proper already excused
their return; hence, they no longer appealed. In any case, while they are ordinarily
liable to return for having unduly received the amounts validly disallowed by
COA, the return was properly excused not because of their good faith but because
it will cause undue prejudice to require them to return amounts that were given as
financial assistance and meant to tide them over during a natural disaster.
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 261
Thus, until his liability under the law is so established before the courts of law, retirement
eligibility and benefits have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was removed by
impeachment on May 29, 2012. There being no such determination of liability, his entitlement
thereto subsisted.
FACTS
Renato Coronado Corona (Corona) was the Chief Justice of the Philippines
for eight years after his appointment on May 12, 2010 until being indicted through
an impeachment by the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 2, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. The grounds of his impeachment were betrayal of
public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, and graft and corruption.
Senate declared Corona unfit to hold the position and removed him from
office because of non-declaration of Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth (SALN). Because of the stress from trial, Corona’s health quickly
deteriorated leading to his death in 2016. The pending criminal cases on graft and
corruption were all dismissed.
His widow, Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona (Mrs. Corona), asserted that the
Senate judgment be voided for insufficiency and non-compliance with Section 14,
Art. VIII of the Constitution because the impeachment merely stripped him of
his political capacity as Chief Justice. Hence, she prayed for the retirement benefits
and other gratuities provided for under R.A. No. 9946, and survivorship pension
under Admin. Circ. No. 81-2010.
262 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
ISSUE
Should the retirement benefits, other gratuities, and survivorship pension
be accorded to Mrs. Corona as the spouse of the late Chief Justice Corona despite
the latter's ouster by impeachment?
RULING
YES. The Court grants the plea of Corona’s widow. The effects of a
judgment on an impeachment complaint extend no further than to removal from
office and disqualification from holding any public office. Since the Constitution
expressly limited the nature of impeachment, its effects must consequently and
necessarily be confined within the constitutional limits. Impeachment proceedings
are entirely separate, distinct, and independent from any other actionable wrong
or cause of action a party may have against the impeached officer, even if such
wrong or cause of action may have a colorable connection to the grounds for
which the officer have been impeached.
After the judgment of impeachment was announced on May 29, 2012, tax
evasion charges, criminal cases for perjury, administrative complaints for violation
of the R.A. No. 6713 of the Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, and a civil case for forfeiture were slapped against Chief
Justice Corona in 2014. These charges, however, were terminated upon his
demise. The Court deems Chief Justice Corona to have been involuntarily retired
from public service due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding his removal by
impeachment, without forfeiture of his retirement benefits and other allowances.
Notably, from the time the impeachment court rendered its judgment, there
has been no law that commands the automatic cancellation of post-employment
benefits and other privileges pertaining to the impeached official. Considering the
2021] RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 263
foregoing, the Supreme Court holds that Chief Justice Corona was involuntarily
retired by virtue of his conviction arising from impeachment.
This is where equity comes in. Under the prevailing circumstances, the fairer
and more equitable treatment of the present claim for post-employment privileges
is to first consider Chief Justice Corona as involuntarily retired, rather than to
dismiss it outright without citing any legal basis.
(a) That the retiree be a magistrate, i.e., a Justice of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of Tax Appeals,
or a judge of the trial courts, Shari'a court, or of any other judicial court;
(b) That the retiring magistrate has rendered at least 15 years of service in
the judiciary, in any other branch of the government, or in both;
(c) That the retiring magistrate be at least 60 years of age at the time of
retirement; and
(d) That the last 3 years of public service by the retiring magistrate be
continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Until his liability under the law is so established before the courts of law,
retirement eligibility and benefits have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona
when he was removed by impeachment on May 29, 2012. There being no such
determination of liability, his entitlement thereto subsisted.