Texas Winter Storm Blackout Litigation

1/28/2022 10:15 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County

Envelope No. 61277418
By: cassie combs
TRANSFERRED TO Filed: 1/28/2022 10:15 PM
MASTER CAUSE NO. 2021-41903
IN RE: § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

§
§
WINTER STORM URI § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
§
LITIGATION § 281ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
TRANSFERRED FROM
CAUSE NO. DC-21-03737
ROBERT ALAN BROCKELMAN, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS THE §
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF §
THE HEIRS AND ESTATE OF §
KIMBERLY SMITH, DECEASED, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL §
OF TEXAS, INC, et al. §
§
Defendants. § 191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION [MDL Case No. 5.00026]
To the Honorable Judge of this Court:
COMES NOW, Robert Alan Brockelman, Individually, as Personal Representative of the
Heirs and Estate of Kimberly Smith, Deceased, and files this Second Amended Petition against
named Defendants, hereinafter referred to as the Power Generation Company (“PGC”)
Defendants, the Transmission/Distribution Utilities (“TDU”) Defendants, the “Natural Gas
Companies” (including the “Natural Gas Producers” and the “Natural Gas Pipeline
Owners/Operators”), the “Retail Electric Providers,” and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(“ERCOT”), and respectfully show the Court the following:

1
I. NATURE OF ACTION
1. Plaintiff Robert Alan Brockelman brings this suit Individually and as the Personal
Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Kimberly Smith, Deceased. Decedent suffered personal
injuries and loss of life resulting in medical bills, property damage, and funeral expenses and
Plaintiff has suffered loss of society and companionship, pecuniary loss, and mental anguish due
to Defendants’ failure to properly prepare for freezing weather and/or otherwise properly conduct
their operations before and during the February 2021 Winter Storm Uri.
2. The Power Generators own and operate power generation facilities where their
electricity is generated through various means, and that electricity is supplied to the ERCOT power
grid and ultimately distributed into a “service area.” Power Generators typically sell their
electricity on a wholesale basis through their agents known as “Qualified Scheduling Entities”
(“QSEs”). QSEs enter into bilateral contracts on behalf of Power Generators to supply electricity
through the ERCOT power grid to purchasers of wholesale energy, including to Retail Electric
Providers (“REPs”). QSE’s also submit offers to sell the Power Generators’ electricity in the
ERCOT “day-ahead ancillary service market” and the ERCOT “real-time market”. When the need
for reserve energy is needed, in exchange for a fee, a QSE on behalf of a Power Generator may
also commit to provide the use of reserve or standby energy services to ERCOT, including non-
spinning reserve services (commonly referred to as NSRS services). REPs purchase electricity on
a wholesale basis supplied by the Power Generators. Generated power is transmitted through
transmission and distribution lines operated by Transmission/Distribution Utilities (“TDUs”) that
ultimately results in electricity delivered to the customer pursuant to retail contracts entered into
between the customer and the REPs:
2
1
3. ERCOT manages the delivery of that electricity. ERCOT’s function is “power
dispatch,” or the scheduling and managing of how electricity will flow through the network.
ERCOT does not itself generate any electrical power. It instead utilizes the 7 day schedules in the
“Current Operating Plan” (“ 7 day COP schedules”) and “day-ahead schedules” submitted by
QSE’s on behalf of the Power Generators for their bilateral contracts which accounts for 95-97%
of the end-user electricity requirements in ERCOT.2 ERCOT utilizes the 7 day COP schedules
and the “day-ahead schedules” in order to conduct its short-term capacity analysis which forms
the basis for the procurement of replacement capacity in the “Day-Ahead” market which operates
from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm on the day prior to the operating day.
Below is a typical “day-ahead schedule” utilized by a Power Generator in communicating
its energy availability for the next day to ERCOT through its QSE:
1
U.S.-CANADA POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 Fig. 2.1 (Apr. 2004),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf.
2
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, A PRIMER ON WHOLESALE MARKET DESIGN, MARKET OVERSIGHT
DIVISION WHITE PAPER, (NOV. 2002),
https://www.hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/txpuc_wholesale.market.primer_11-1-02.pdf; see generally
ERCOT NODAL PROTOCOLS, https://www.ercot.com/mktrules/nprotocols/current.
3
4. After the close of the Day-Ahead period, the Adjustment Period begins. QSEs on
behalf of the Power Generators may adjust their schedules throughout the Adjustment Period
subject to approval of ERCOT. The Adjustment Period ends when the Operating Period begins.
The Operating Period is comprised of the Operating Hour and the hour preceding the Operating
Hour. ERCOT may procure additional ancillary services during the Adjustment Period by
announcing the need to procure additional resources and opening subsequent markets. ERCOT
may also procure additional resources in the “Real Time Market” to address capacity issues. Power
Generators whose QSEs have not adjusted their 7 day COP schedules and/or their “day-ahead
4
schedules” with ERCOT approval and/or who have committed to provide ancillary services are
obligated to provide committed resources to the ERCOT grid. Insofar as ERCOT retains only a
few direct current (DC) interconnections with neighboring markets and reliability councils, the
safe operation of the ERCOT grid is wholly dependent on the Power Generators’ reliably
supplying electricity that they have committed to supply to the ERCOT grid pursuant to their
contractual obligations and ERCOT’s protocols.
5. This lawsuit was mandated because of the Defendants’ individual and collective
failures to implement or enforce long-known and recommended measures to cause power
generating facilities/stations and equipment to be weatherized in order to protect against
foreseeable cold weather and to avoid a catastrophe just like Texans suffered in February 2021 and
because of the Defendants’ individual and collective operational failures both before and during
the February 2021 Winter Storm Uri.
II. DISCOVERY PLAN
6. Pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4, Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery in this case
under a Level 3 Discovery Plan.
III. PARTIES
A. Plaintiff
7. Plaintiff Robert Alan Brockelman is a resident of Dallas County and a citizen of
the State of Texas. Robert Alan Brockelman is the adult son of Kimberly Smith, Deceased.
Plaintiff brings a survival action on behalf of the estate of Kimberly Smith, Deceased.
Plaintiff also brings a wrongful death action on behalf of Kimberly Smith’s wrongful death
beneficiaries.
5
B. Defendants
8. The named Power Generator Defendants, listed on the spreadsheet attached
hereto as Exhibit A, are “resource entities,” and/or “qualified scheduling entities”3 (“QSEs”) in
the ERCOT power region in the State of Texas and use wind, solar, methane gas, biomass,
hydroelectricity, or other processes to generate electricity, which is supplied to the ERCOT Power
Grid.
9. The named Natural Gas Company Defendants, listed on the spreadsheet attached
hereto as Exhibit B, are natural gas producers and/or owners and/or operators of natural gas
pipelines that supply natural gas to power generation plants and/or facilities that are powered by
natural gas.
10. The named Transmission and Distribution Utilities Defendants (“TDUs”), is
Oncor Energy and is a Domestic Corporation in the State of Texas and may be served with process
through its Registered Agent, CT Corporation System, 1999 Bryan St., Ste 900, Dallas, TX 75201.
Oncor is responsible for the delivery of electricity from Power Generators to customers. The TDUs
are tasked with constructing, owning, operating, and maintaining their delivery systems within
their given service territory. They own and are responsible for the lines and meters in their
respective service areas.
11. Defendant Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) is an independent
system operator that manages approximately 90 percent of the State of Texas’s electric load and
the flow of electric power to 23 million Texas consumers.
12. Wherever it is alleged that a Defendant did or failed to do a particular act and/or
omission, it is meant that Defendant, acting individually, or by and through agents, officers,
3
Some “resource entities” also act as their own QSEs. See, List of ERCOT QSEs,
https://sa.ercot.com/misapp/GetReports.do?reportTypeId=14746&reportTitle=Qualified%20Scheduling%20Entity%
20List&showHTMLView=&mimicKey
6
directors, servants, and employees, either did or failed to do that particular act and/or omission, in
the course and scope of his employment, agency contract with the Defendant, and in furtherance
of the Defendant’s business. Therefore, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, each Defendant
is vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions of its agents, officers, directors, subsidiaries,
servants, and employees in the course and scope of their employment, further outlined elsewhere
in this Petition and incorporated by reference here fully. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
28, any entity doing business under an assumed name may be sued in its assumed name for the
purpose of enforcing against it a substantive right, and Plaintiff demands that the Defendants
answer in their correct name, if different than that outlined above.
IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. Jurisdiction is proper because the amount in controversy exceeds the minimum
jurisdictional limit of this Court.
14. Personal jurisdiction over each Defendant is proper in the State of Texas.
15. The incidents complained of herein occurred in the State of Texas.
16. The Defendants all conduct business in the state of Texas.
17. The Defendants are residents and citizens of the State of Texas and/or are subject
to general jurisdiction in the State of Texas by doing continuing and systematic business in the
State of Texas.
18. Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants arise out of and relate to their contacts
with the State of Texas.
19. There are sufficient minimum contacts between each Defendant and the State of
Texas.
a. Each Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privileges and benefits of
conducting business in the State of Texas.
7
b. The claims against each Defendant are linked to their conduct, key elements
of Plaintiff’s cause of action occurred in Texas, and Defendants participated in
producing electricity and introducing electricity into the stream of commerce and
selling the electricity in the State of Texas, and their contacts with the State of
Texas relate to the electricity that is the subject of these suits, and the
conduct associated with that electricity is related to those contacts.
c. Each Defendant has filed affirmative claims in the courts of the State of Texas.
d. Each Defendant has filed affirmative claims seeking damages to property owned
in the State of Texas.
e. Each Defendant has employees in the State of Texas.
20. Given the foregoing contacts, the Defendants can reasonably anticipate being sued
in the State of Texas.
21. This Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, this Court has specific
personal jurisdiction over all of the Defendants named herein.
V. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS
22. On February 13, 2021, a winter storm developed off the coast of the Pacific
Northwest that the Weather Channel unofficially named “Winter Storm Uri” because of its
expected impact on the country. Long before this date, the Defendants knew that a winter storm
of this size and magnitude could not be weathered, and that in the worst-case scenario, electricity
would not be able to be provided to Texas consumers.
23. The Defendants were aware of the impending Winter Storm Uri before it struck in
February of 2021. The following timeline and chart are illustrative:
• February 3, 2021: ERCOT meteorologists warn Market Participants and the public
of the coldest weather of the year.
• February 8, 2021: ERCOT issues an Operating Conditions Notice (“OCN”) for

an extreme cold weather system approaching Thursday, February 11, through
Monday, February 15, with temperatures anticipated to remain 32° F or below.
8
• February 10, 2021: ERCOT issues an Advisory for the predicted extreme
weather for the ERCOT Region.
• February 11, 2021: ERCOT issued a watch for cold weather event for extreme
weather expected.
• February 12, 2021: Governor Greg Abbott declares a state of emergency in all
Texas counties ahead of the expected severe winter weather.
• February 13, 2021: ERCOT issued a Conservation Alert and Emergency notice
for extreme cold.
Temperatures in Texas Cities
24. Furthermore, by February 14, 2021, according to the National Weather Service,
“every square inch of Texas was in a Winter Storm Warning.”
25. The cold weather event predictably caused increased energy demands across the
state as Texans tried to keep their homes and businesses warm, with a total ERCOT actual energy
demand peaking at 69,692 megawatts by 8:00 p.m. on February 14, 2021.
26. A peak demand load of 69,692 megawatts was by no means unforeseeable within
the ERCOT system because the ERCOT system had already experienced similar load levels during
periods of peak demand. The previous winter demand peak of 65,915 had been set three years
earlier in January of 2018 and, since that time, ERCOT forecasted peak load demand growth to
increase by approximately 1,000 to 3,000 megawatts each year.

9
27. According to ERCOT’s internal procedures, if operating reserves for the ERCOT
system were to drop below 2,300 megawatts, ERCOT would declare a “Level 1” Energy
Emergency, and ERCOT would call on “all available power supplies, including from other grids.”
If the ERCOT system operating reserves were to drop below 1,750 megawatts, it would be
considered a “Level 2” Energy Emergency, allowing ERCOT to terminate power to certain large
industrial customers. In the event operating reserves fell below 1,375 megawatts, it was considered
a “Level 3” Energy Emergency, ERCOT’s highest state of emergency, authorizing system-wide
blackouts throughout the State of Texas. Thus, it was well-known to the Defendants that a loss
of energy supply during a winter storm could have catastrophic consequences.
28. On February 10, 2021 as cold weather entered the ERCOT region, the total amount
of offline power plant capacity reportedly increased from 14,400 MW to 25,850 MW, or about
12% to 21% of the total 123,050 MW of nameplate capacity. On February 13, large generators
began to go offline. Additional outages and derates continued to occur during the day on February
14. At 11:32 p.m. on February 14, the frequency of the ERCOT power grid was 59.963 Hz, still
within the normal range. Going into the early morning of February 15, generation outages had
reached roughly 30,000 MW. By 12:11 a.m., after 4 additional generating units had failed,
frequency began to become unstable and declined to 59.940 Hz. Between 12:17 a.m. and 1:20
a.m. on February 15, ERCOT had escalated the event from a Level 1 Energy Emergency to a Level
3 Energy Emergency, culminating in the issuance of a “Load Shed” order at 1:00 a.m. in an attempt
to “maintain frequency” across the ERCOT system.
29. The following chart prepared by ERCOT identify the actions ERCOT claims to
have taken to mitigate the power outages in the early morning hours of February 15:
10
30. By 9:00 a.m. on February 15, generation outages and derates had increased to over
50,000 MW, or roughly 40% of the total installed nameplate capacity in ERCOT. The following
is a list of outages and derates identified by ERCOT beginning at midnight on February 15 to 9:00
am February 20 identified by power source, times of outage and resource entity:4
2/15/21 12:00 PAPALOTE CREEK I LLC CPS (RE)

WIND 2/16/21 4:46 PM
AM PAPALOTE CREEK I LLC (RE)
2/15/21 12:01
WIND 2/15/21 1:00 AM BRUENNINGS BREEZE WIND FARM LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:01
WIND 2/15/21 1:00 AM BRUENNINGS BREEZE WIND FARM LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:01
NG 2/15/21 4:53 AM LAREDO LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:12
NG 2/15/21 1:43 AM WOLF HOLLOW II POWER LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:15 2/28/21 12:00
NG SOUTH TEXAS ELECTRIC CO OP INC (RE)
AM PM
2/15/21 12:16 2/15/21 11:59
NG BRAZOS ELECTRIC POWER CO OP INC (RE)
AM PM
2/15/21 12:23 2/15/21 12:27
NG KIOWA POWER PARTNERS LLC (RE)
AM AM
2/15/21 12:23 2/15/21 12:27
AM AM
4
See Speadsheet of Generation Resource and Energy Storage Outages and Derates (February 10-19, 2021)
https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/03/12/Unit_Outage_Data_20210312.pdf.
11
2/15/21 12:23 2/15/21 12:27
AM AM
2/15/21 12:23 2/15/21 12:27
AM AM
2/15/21 12:23 2/15/21 12:27
AM AM
2/15/21 12:23 2/15/21 12:27
AM AM
2/15/21 12:27 2/16/21 12:25
AM AM
2/15/21 12:27 2/16/21 12:25
AM AM
2/15/21 12:27 2/16/21 12:25
AM AM
2/15/21 12:27 2/16/21 12:25
AM AM
2/15/21 12:27 2/16/21 12:25
AM AM
2/15/21 12:27 2/16/21 12:25
AM AM
2/15/21 12:30
WIND 2/16/21 3:00 PM MAGIC VALLEY WIND FARM I LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:30
WIND 2/16/21 4:00 PM MAGIC VALLEY WIND FARM I LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:33
NG 2/17/21 1:33 PM FORMOSA UTILITY VENTURE LTD (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:34
WIND 2/15/21 1:47 AM MESTENO WINDPOWER LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:36
NG 2/15/21 6:11 AM FORMOSA UTILITY VENTURE LTD (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:41
NG 2/15/21 8:53 AM SOUTH TEXAS ELECTRIC CO OP INC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:44
NG 2/15/21 1:44 AM COLORADO BEND II POWER LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:49
WIND 2/16/21 5:28 AM KARANKAWA WIND LLC B (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:49
WIND 2/16/21 5:30 AM KARANKAWA WIND LLC B (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:53
WIND 2/15/21 1:04 AM KARANKAWA WIND LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:58 2/15/21 12:48
NG CPS ENERGY (RE)
AM PM
2/15/21 12:58
WIND 2/15/21 2:10 AM LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER IA LLC (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:59
NG 2/15/21 1:00 AM CPS ENERGY (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:59 2/15/21 12:33
NG CPS ENERGY (RE)
AM PM
WIND 2/15/21 1:00 AM 2/16/21 8:59 PM BRUENNINGS BREEZE WIND FARM LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 1:00 AM 2/16/21 8:59 PM BRUENNINGS BREEZE WIND FARM LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:00 AM 2/17/21 3:00 PM CALPINE CORP (RE)
12
NG 2/15/21 1:00 AM 2/15/21 2:17 PM CPS ENERGY (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 1:00 AM 2/16/21 7:27 PM STELLA WIND FARM LLC (RE)
ESR 2/15/21 1:05 AM 2/15/21 3:09 PM VIRIDITY ENERGY SOLUTIONS INC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 1:06 AM 2/15/21 1:25 PM KARANKAWA WIND LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:15 AM 2/15/21 1:35 AM NUECES BAY LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:18 AM 2/15/21 4:50 AM NRG TEXAS POWER LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:23 AM 2/15/21 1:28 AM LAREDO LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:25 AM 2/15/21 1:47 AM CITY OF AUSTIN DBA AUSTIN ENERGY (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:33 AM 2/15/21 4:40 PM PORT COMFORT POWER LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:33 AM 2/16/21 1:28 AM PORT COMFORT POWER LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 1:35 AM 2/19/21 8:46 PM BLUE SUMMIT II WIND LLC (RE)
2/15/21 11:33
COAL 2/15/21 1:35 AM NRG TEXAS POWER LLC (RE)
AM
WIND 2/15/21 1:40 AM 2/16/21 8:44 AM AVANGRID TEXAS RENEWABLES LLC (RE)
2/15/21 11:59
PM
NG 2/15/21 1:44 AM 2/16/21 2:30 AM COLORADO BEND II POWER LLC (RE)
2/15/21 11:29
PM
2/15/21 11:59
PM
NG 2/15/21 1:48 AM 2/15/21 2:53 AM EIF CHANNELVIEW COGENERATION LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:49 AM 2/15/21 2:36 AM BARNEY DAVIS LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 1:51 AM 2/15/21 7:07 AM CITY OF AUSTIN DBA AUSTIN ENERGY (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 1:51 AM 2/15/21 2:39 AM MESTENO WINDPOWER LLC (RE)
LOWER COLORADO RIVER AUTHORITY (RE)
2/15/21 12:00 SANDY CREEK ENERGY ASSOCIATES LP (RE)
COAL 2/15/21 1:58 AM
PM BRAZOS SANDY CREEK ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC (RE)
SANDY CREEK ENERGY ASSOCIATES LP TWO (RE)
2/17/21 12:17
NG 2/15/21 2:15 AM BRAZOS ELECTRIC POWER CO OP INC (RE)
PM
WIND 2/15/21 2:15 AM 2/15/21 3:35 AM LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER IA LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 2:18 AM 2/18/21 2:24 AM CALPINE CORP (RE)
2/18/21 11:16
NG 2/15/21 2:18 AM CALPINE CORP (RE)
AM
2/15/21 12:06
COAL 2/15/21 2:20 AM NRG TEXAS POWER LLC (RE)
PM
NG 2/15/21 2:22 AM 2/15/21 8:10 PM BRAZOS ELECTRIC POWER CO OP INC (RE)
2/21/21 10:00
NG 2/15/21 2:27 AM THE DOW CHEMICAL CO (RE)
AM
13
WIND 2/15/21 2:30 AM 2/16/21 4:00 PM RAYMOND WIND FARM LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 2:30 AM 2/16/21 4:00 PM RAYMOND WIND FARM LLC (RE)
2/26/21 11:59
NG 2/15/21 2:30 AM SHELL OIL COMPANY (RE)
PM
NG 2/15/21 2:36 AM 2/15/21 4:29 AM SOUTH HOUSTON GREEN POWER LLC (RE)
2/16/21 12:00
NG 2/15/21 2:36 AM SOUTH HOUSTON GREEN POWER LLC (RE)
PM
2/16/21 11:59
PM
2/16/21 11:59
PM
2/17/21 12:30
AM
2/21/21 10:00
HYDRO 2/15/21 2:41 AM THE DOW CHEMICAL CO (RE)
AM
WIND 2/15/21 2:50 AM 2/16/21 3:16 PM LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER IB LLC (RE)
2/15/21 10:20
WIND 2/15/21 2:56 AM AVANGRID TEXAS RENEWABLES LLC C (RE)
AM
2/17/21 12:00
NG 2/15/21 2:56 AM TPC GROUP LLC (RE)
PM
2/22/21 11:59
NG 2/15/21 3:00 AM CPS ENERGY (RE)
PM
LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER III LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 3:00 AM 2/16/21 4:00 AM LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER IV LLC (RE)
LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER V LLC (RE)
LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER IV LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 3:00 AM 2/16/21 4:00 AM
LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER V LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 3:00 AM 2/15/21 5:00 AM MOUNTAIN CREEK POWER LLC (RE)
2/18/21 12:20
NG 2/15/21 3:00 AM MOUNTAIN CREEK POWER LLC (RE)
PM
6/30/21 11:59
NG 2/15/21 3:06 AM CPS ENERGY 1 (RE)
PM
NG 2/15/21 3:33 AM 2/15/21 2:33 PM BASTROP ENERGY PARTNERS LP (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 3:35 AM 2/16/21 2:57 AM CEDRO HILL WIND LLC (RE)
2/17/21 10:41
WIND 2/15/21 3:35 AM CEDRO HILL WIND LLC (RE)
AM
WIND 2/15/21 3:35 AM 2/15/21 2:14 PM LOS VIENTOS WINDPOWER IA LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 3:37 AM 2/18/21 3:58 PM NRG TEXAS POWER LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 3:45 AM 2/15/21 5:40 AM SAN ROMAN WIND I LLC (RE)
2/15/21 10:44
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:00 AM ALAMO 6 LLC (RE)
AM
WIND 2/15/21 4:00 AM 2/16/21 4:37 AM BUCKTHORN WIND PROJECT LLC (RE)
14
WIND 2/15/21 4:00 AM 2/16/21 4:37 AM BUCKTHORN WIND PROJECT LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:00 AM 2/15/21 8:35 AM CED ALAMO 5 LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:00 AM 2/15/21 8:35 AM CED ALAMO 7 LLC (RE)
2/15/21 10:44 ERCOT_RESOURCES
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:00 AM
AM BHE PEARL SOLAR LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:00 AM 2/15/21 8:35 AM LAMESA SOLAR II LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:00 AM 2/15/21 8:35 AM OCI ALAMO 1 LLC (RE)
OCI ALAMO 4 LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:00 AM 2/15/21 8:35 AM
RAYMOND WIND FARM LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 4:01 AM 2/16/21 7:00 PM PAPALOTE CREEK II LLC (RE)
AVANGRID TEXAS RENEWABLES LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 4:03 AM 2/16/21 8:44 AM
AVANGRID TEXAS RENEWABLES LLC B (RE)
NG 2/15/21 4:07 AM 2/15/21 4:41 AM BRYAN TEXAS UTILITIES (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 4:07 AM 2/15/21 8:59 PM NOTREES WINDPOWER LP (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 4:11 AM 2/15/21 8:59 PM NOTREES WINDPOWER LP (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 4:20 AM 2/16/21 1:26 PM LAPETUS ENERGY PROJECT LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 4:25 AM 2/15/21 2:00 PM LOWER COLORADO RIVER AUTHORITY (RE)
NG 2/15/21 4:28 AM 2/16/21 1:25 PM BARNEY DAVIS LLC (RE)
2/16/21 11:59
PM
2/16/21 11:59
PM
NG 2/15/21 4:41 AM 2/15/21 4:50 AM BRYAN TEXAS UTILITIES (RE)
2/20/21 11:59
PM
NG 2/15/21 5:05 AM 2/16/21 4:30 AM GOLDEN SPREAD ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC (RE)
COAL 2/15/21 5:10 AM 2/16/21 8:41 AM NRG TEXAS POWER LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 5:20 AM 2/17/21 9:20 PM SWEENY COGENERATION LLC (RE)
CPS ENERGY (RE)
NUCLEAR 2/15/21 5:27 AM 2/17/21 9:07 PM NRG SOUTH TEXAS LP (RE)
CITY OF AUSTIN DBA AUSTIN ENERGY (RE)
2/18/21 11:40
NG 2/15/21 5:27 AM OXY VINYLS LP (RE)
AM
NG 2/15/21 5:28 AM 2/15/21 6:27 AM TENASKA FRONTIER PARTNERS LTD (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 5:40 AM 2/15/21 1:42 PM SAN ROMAN WIND I LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 5:41 AM 2/15/21 8:00 PM MIDWAY WIND LLC (RE)
2/15/21 11:22
WIND 2/15/21 6:09 AM FLAT TOP WIND I LLC (RE)
PM
15
2/17/21 11:14
AM
NG 2/15/21 6:11 AM 2/18/21 5:45 PM FORMOSA UTILITY VENTURE LTD (RE)
NG 2/15/21 6:11 AM 2/25/21 6:11 AM FORMOSA UTILITY VENTURE LTD (RE)
NG 2/15/21 6:30 AM 2/15/21 6:57 PM WOLF HOLLOW I POWER LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 6:30 AM 2/15/21 6:57 PM WOLF HOLLOW I POWER LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 6:34 AM 2/19/21 5:00 PM CHILDRESS SOLAR PARK LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 6:34 AM 2/19/21 5:00 PM CHILDRESS SOLAR PARK LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 6:43 AM 2/15/21 6:51 AM OXY VINYLS LP (RE)
NG 2/15/21 6:43 AM 2/15/21 6:51 AM OXY VINYLS LP (RE)
NG 2/15/21 7:00 AM 2/23/21 6:00 PM GEN TEX POWER CORP (RE)
NG 2/15/21 7:00 AM 2/16/21 9:00 AM QUAIL RUN ENERGY PARTNERS LP (RE)
2/21/21 11:59
ESR 2/15/21 7:07 AM NRG TEXAS POWER LLC (RE)
PM
2/15/21 12:59
WIND 2/15/21 7:11 AM SALT FORK WIND LLC (RE)
PM
2/15/21 12:59
WIND 2/15/21 7:11 AM SALT FORK WIND LLC (RE)
PM
2/15/21 10:00
NG 2/15/21 7:29 AM TENASKA FRONTIER PARTNERS LTD (RE)
AM
2/15/21 10:00
AM
2/15/21 10:00
AM
2/15/21 10:00
AM
2/26/21 11:59
NG 2/15/21 7:30 AM SHELL OIL COMPANY (RE)
PM
WIND 2/15/21 7:30 AM 2/15/21 6:00 PM SOUTH PLAINS WIND ENERGY II LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 7:30 AM 2/15/21 6:00 PM SOUTH PLAINS WIND ENERGY II LLC (RE)
2/15/21 12:30
PM
2/15/21 10:34
AM
NG 2/15/21 7:44 AM 2/25/21 1:00 PM ECTOR COUNTY ENERGY CENTER LLC (RE)
NG 2/15/21 7:52 AM 2/15/21 3:02 PM VICTORIA WLE LP (RE)
NG 2/15/21 7:52 AM 2/15/21 3:02 PM VICTORIA WLE LP (RE)
2/15/21 12:24
PM
2/15/21 12:24
PM
2/15/21 12:00
WIND 2/15/21 8:30 AM AMADEUS WIND LLC (RE)
PM
16
2/15/21 12:00
WIND 2/15/21 8:30 AM AMADEUS WIND LLC (RE)
PM
WIND 2/15/21 8:30 AM 2/15/21 5:00 PM AMADEUS WIND LLC (RE)
2/18/21 11:10
AM
WIND 2/15/21 8:32 AM 2/16/21 7:44 PM TYLER BLUFF WIND PROJECT LLC (RE)
SOLAR 2/15/21 8:35 AM 2/20/21 9:30 AM CED CRANE SOLAR LLC (RE)
WIND 2/15/21 8:52 AM 2/16/21 5:44 PM KEECHI WIND LLC (RE)
31. From February 15 through February 16, 2021 the ERCOT system failed to achieve
any net gain in generation—as some Power Generators were restored, others went offline, in whole
or in part, perpetuating the crisis.
32. The ERCOT system remained under Level 3 emergency operations from 1:20 a.m.
on February 15th until 9:00 a.m. in the morning of February 19, 2021. According to ERCOT, its
load shed order resulted in approximately 20,000 megawatts of load shed across the State of Texas.
33. The following chart prepared by ERCOT shows the ongoing issues with outages
and derates from February 11 to February 19:
17
34. Generator outage data, as reported to and summarized by ERCOT, suggests that the
largest share of outage was weather-related. 15,000 MW was reportedly offline because of
weatherization issues by noon on February 14. That number had doubled to 30,000 MW by noon
on February 15. In total, 167 units listed their outages as weather-related during the event. A
recent investigative report issued by the University of Texas at Austin observed: “Beyond wind
turbine icing, outages between February 14 and 15 were mainly the result of frozen water intakes
and sensing lines and the freezing of other general equipment. As freezing persisted further, other
problems arose—for example there were issues around control and condensate systems that caused
more capacity to go offline.”5
35. According to ERCOT, “equipment issues” accounted for the third highest power
plant outages and derates. Equipment issues were reportedly the cause of 1900 MW of outages at
noon on February 14, rising to 5600 MW by noon on February 15. Equipment issues were listed
5
See UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ENERGY INSTITUTE, THE TIMELINE AND EVENTS OF THE FEBRUARY
2021 TEXAS ELECTRIC GRID BLACKOUTS 31 (July 13, 2021) (“UT Report”).
18
as the reason for outages at 146 units. According to the UT Report, a survey of unit-specific data
indicates that these equipment failures were not directly weather related, e.g. related to clogged
sensing lines or stuck valves. Nonetheless, this data suggests that these failures were the result of
inadequate maintenance and/or inspection prior to this foreseeable weather event.
36. The ERCOT chart below provides a breakdown of total megawatts outages by
alleged cause:6
37. The 239 firms that notified ERCOT of outages during the lost load period owned
or operated 1344 units. Most of the units are small. Wind compromises the largest block of smaller
units. Any one of these outages could —if avoided—have reduced losses of electricity to the
Texans affected by the power outages.
6
Further discovery will be necessary to determine whether ERCOT’s relative breakdown of alleged causes is
accurate.
19
38. The 239 firms that notified ERCOT of outages during the lost load period owned
or operated 1344 units generate power using the following sources:
39. The twenty largest entities were:
40. These twenty generators comprise 44% of the outage MWh.
41. The twenty largest generating unit outages were:
42. These twenty units that were out of service comprise 33% of the outage MWh.
43. All of the Power Generators had committed to supply electricity to the ERCOT grid
pursuant to their contractual obligations and ERCOT’s protocols and/or were actively providing
20
electricity to ERCOT grid at the time their facilities and/or equipment failed or otherwise become
inoperable as a result of their wrongful conduct.
A. The Power Generator Defendants’ failure to weatherize their facilities and

equipment were well-known long before Winter Storm Uri arrived in Texas with
catastrophic consequences.
44. In December 1989, a cold weather event descended on Texas for three days,
increasing electricity demands beyond seasonal averages, but below peak levels and total system
capacity. Although total generating capacity exceeded demand during the 1989 cold weather event,
the ERCOT power grid lost 16,805 megawatts of generating capacity to equipment failures and
gas curtailments. Significant blackouts ensued as a result.
45. After investigating the ERCOT power grid in the wake of the cold weather event
of 1989, the Public Utilities Commission of Texas made the following recommendations:
a. All utilities should ensure that they incorporate the lessons learned during
December of 1989 into the design of new facilities in order to ensure their
reliability in extreme weather conditions.
b. All utilities should implement procedures requiring a timely annual (each Fall)
review of unit equipment and procedures to ensure readiness for cold weather
operations.
c. All utilities should ensure that procedures are implemented to correct defective
cold weather protection equipment prior to the onset of cold weather.
d. All utilities should maintain insulation integrity and heat tracing systems in proper
working order. Generating unit control systems and equipment essential to cold
weather operations should be included in a correctly managed preventive
maintenance program.
e. Additional training programs for plant personnel on the emergency cold weather
procedures, including periodic drills, should be implemented by each responsible
utility.7
46. During the February 2011 winter storm event, the ERCOT power grid lost 29,729
megawatts of generating capacity, which resulted in blackouts to over 3.2 million Texans. The
7
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESPONSE TO THE WINTER FREEZE OF
DECEMBER 21 TO DECEMBER 23, 1989, at 7 (Nov. 1990).
21
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and the North American Electrical Regulatory
Corporation (“NERC”) issued a report (“the FERC 2011 Report”) following the weather event of
February 2011 and implored the Defendants to prepare for the winter season with the “same sense
of urgency” and priority as they prepare for the summer peak season.8 The FERC 2011 Report
issued numerous recommendations, which if followed could have avoided entirely or substantially
minimized the dire consequences of another and foreseeable winter event. 9 Tellingly, the FERC
Report referred to the 1989 Report by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (“PUCT”) and noted
that “the majority of the problems generators experienced in 2011 resulted from failures of the
very same type of equipment that failed in the earlier event” and “in many cases, these failures
were experienced by the same generators.”10
47. In September 2014, NERC issued another report following the January 2014 polar
vortex that affected Texas and again resulted in power outages that affected Texas consumers.
Once again, recommendations were issued and observations were made, including many of the
same recommendations that had been issued in 1989 and 2011, including that Defendants “review
and update of power plant weatherization programs.”11 Nonetheless, Defendants ignored these
recommendations.
48. The failure to weatherize by the Power Generator Defendants resulted in a variety
of equipment-related issues arising during Winter Storm Uri, including frozen sensing lines, frozen
water lines, frozen valves, ice accumulation on wind turbine blades, ice/snow cover on solar
8
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
CORPORATION, REPORT ON OUTAGES AND CURTAILMENTS DURING THE SOUTHWEST COLD WEATHER EVENT OF
FEBRUARY 1–5, 2011, at 197 (Aug. 2011) (“FERC 2011 REPORT”).
9
See e.g., FERC 2011 REPORT at 197–207.
10
FERC 2011 REPORT at 178 (emphasis added).
11
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, POLAR VORTEX REVIEW iii–iv, 19–20 (Sept.
2014).
22
panels, exceedances of low temperature limits for wind turbines, and flooded equipment due to
ice/snow melt. These resultant malfunctions resulted in systemic widespread outages.
49. Many of the generator units that had power outages in the 2011 weather event were
“repeated offenders” in 2021. Of the 150 generating units that reported weather related outages in
2011, 97 also reported weather related outages in 2021. This is approximately two thirds of the
units.
50. The following chart summarizes the “repeat offenders” by capacity:
51. The following list reflects the “repeat offender” entities responsible for reporting
unit outages in both in 2011 and 2021 seemingly having taken insufficient action to weatherize
their infrastructure since at least 2011:
• AIR LIQUIDE LARGE INDUSTRIES US LP (RE)

• BASTROP ENERGY PARTNERS LP
• BOSQUE POWER COMPANY LLC (RES)
• BRAZOS ELECTRIC POWER CO OP INC (RES)
• BULL CREEK WIND LLC
• CALPINE CORP
• CITY OF AUSTIN DBA AUSTIN ENERGY (RES)
• CITY OF GARLAND (RES)
• CPS ENERGY (RE)
• EXTEX LAPORTE LP 2
• GIM CHANNELVIEW COGENERATION LLC (RE)
• GUADALUPE POWER PARTNERS LP
23
• HAYS ENERGY LP
• INGLESIDE COGENERATION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
• KIOWA POWER PARTNERS LLC (RES)
• LOWER COLORADO RIVER AUTHORITY (RES)
• LUMINANT GENERATION COMPANY LLC (RE)
• NRG TEXAS POWER LLC (RE)
• NUECES BAY WLE LP (RES)
• OAK GROVE MANAGEMENT COMPANY LLC (RE)
• OCOTILLO WIND FARM
• ODESSA-ECTOR POWER PARTNERS LP
• OPTIM ENERGY CEDAR BAYOU 4 LLC (RE)
• OXY VINYLS LP
• RIO NOGALES POWER PROJECT LP
• SOUTH HOUSTON GREEN POWER LP
• SOUTH TEXAS ELECTRIC CO OP INC (RES)
• TENASKA GATEWAY PARTNERS LTD
• VICTORIA WLE LP (RES)
• WISE COUNTY POWER COMPANY LLC
• WOLF HOLLOW I LP
52. In November 2021, FERC and NERC issued their report after assessing the
February 2021 events.12 The FERC-NERC report observed that, despite prior recommendations
by FERC and NERC, as well as annual reminders via Regional Entity workshops, that generating
units take actions to prepare for the winter (and providing detailed suggestions for winterization),
26 generating units in ERCOT (7 percent, 3675 MW), still did not have any winterization plans,
and 81 percent of the freeze-generating unit outages occurred at temperatures about the unit’s
stated ambient design temperature.13 Moreover, the report noted that approximately 82 percent
of the ERCOT entities that had submitted a declaration for winter had at least one generating unit
outaged or derated to freezing issues. As recognized by the FERC-NERC report:
Freezing issues arise because the generating units are not prepared for the cold temperatures,
wind or freezing precipitation to which they are exposed. Within the freezing issues, certain
components and systems of the generating units freeze most often…. The top categories, such
as frozen transmitters, sensing lines, and instrumentation, frozen valves and inlet air systems,
and wind turbine blade icing, have repeatedly caused unplanned outages in multiple events….a
[Power Generator] need not guess where to focus in preparing for the winter. Protecting
12
FERC-NERC-REGIONAL ENTITY STAFF REPORT: THE FEBRUARY 2021 COLD WEATHER OUTAGES IN TEXAS AND
THE SOUTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES, November 2021 (“FERC-NERC 2021 REPORT”).
13
Id. at 17.
24
transmitters, sensing lines, and instrumentation, as well as turbine blades, against icing
and freezing could have cut MW of generating units experiencing an outage by 67 percent
in ERCOT….14
53. The 2021 FERC-NERC report reviewed its prior 2011 recommendations, and noted
that had the following recommendations been followed, this could have prevented the 2021 event:
(a) Power generators inspect and maintain heat tracing equipment and thermal insulation, erect
adequate wind breaks, based on an engineering assessment, develop and annually conduct
winter-specific and plant-specific operator awareness and maintenance training (including
the capabilities and limitations of freeze protection and methods for checking insulation
integrity and heat tracing reliability;
(b) Consider designing any new plants and modifications to existing plants (unless committed
solely for summer peaking) to be able to perform at the lowest recorded ambient
temperature for the nearest city); and
(c) Assess the temperature design parameters of existing generating units.15
54. And as the 2021 FERC-NERC further recognized “the extent to which the Event
was caused by the failure of all types of generating units to prepare for extreme cold weather or
associated freezing precipitation, cannot be overstated.”16
55. The February 2021 winter storm clearly shows what the Power Generator
Defendants had already known for decades—that corrective actions taken, if any, to weatherize
were inadequate. The wrongful acts and omissions of the Defendants had catastrophic
consequences and caused Plaintiff to suffer death, personal injuries, damage to their residential
and/or business property, and/or have substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of
Plaintiff’s residential and/or business property.
B. Weatherization issues associated with the natural gas system led to loss of natural gas
supplies to gas-powered electrical plants which substantially contributed to the
failure of the ERCOT power grid.
14
Id. at 167 (emphasis in original).
15
Id. at 48.
16
Id. at 162.
25
56. According to the UT Report, sampling data from 27 natural gas production facilities
in the Permian Basin indicate that natural gas output started to decline before the electricity-forced
outages (“load shed”) began early on February 15, with production declining about 700 million
cubic feet per day (“MMcfd”) from February 8–14. This decline in production was most likely
associated with freeze-offs at the wellhead and/or frozen pipelines and/or other weather-related
effects on infrastructure. As early as February 10, ERCOT received an email from Atmos-Pipeline
Texas, stating that beginning February 12, there would be level 4 restrictions on gas supply,
meaning that generating units supplied by Atmos would be cut off completely. ERCOT also
received multiple notifications and instructions regarding potential fuel supply issues from its
QSEs beginning on February 8.
57. Unit specific data indicate that natural gas supplied power plants were starting to
go offline or derate capacity as early as February 10 due to delivery curtailments with 3500 MW
offline by noon on February 14 because of fuel-related issues. These fuel-related issues all
occurred before the blackouts so that they most likely did not occur because of electricity
interruptions but rather resulted from a loss of natural gas.
58. The 2011 FERC Report had observed that natural gas companies had inadequate
winterization procedures in place and/or had failed to follow their procedures, and made a variety
of recommendations to address these failures.17 The Natural Gas Company Defendants ignored
the FERC recommendations; instead, the Defendants put profits over the safety of the Texans,
including Plaintiff.
59. Rather than focus on safety after the 2014 Polar Vortex, the Defendants focused on
how much money they could make during winter events. For instance, one of the Defendant’s
executives bragged to investors during a November 2014 earnings call that “to the extent we get
17
FERC 2011 REPORT at 10, 214–17.
26
another polar vortex or whatever, absolutely, we’ll be opportunistic and take advantage of those
conditions.”18
C. Avoidable loss of electricity to the natural gas system likely resulted in additional
power outages.
60. Going into the early morning hours of February 15, generation outages were already
at roughly 30,000 MW. By 9:00 a.m., total outages and derates had increased to over 50,000 MW
or roughly 40% of the total installed nameplate. The overwhelming majority of this increase
appears to be associated with natural gas-suppled plants going offline after ERCOT had begun
ordering blackouts on February 15.19 Thus it appears that this loss may not be wholly attributed to
weatherization issues and instead also resulted from a loss of electricity to the natural gas system
after the ERCOT-ordered blackouts began.20
18
See https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/22/texas-power-grid-extreme-weather (emphasis added).
19
Further discovery will be necessary to pinpoint the exact times that NG plants went offline vis-à-vis the ERCOT-
ordered blackouts and the reasons for the outages and derates.
20
According to the 2021 FERC-NERC Report, “freezing issues” accounted for an increase from a loss of 17,308
MW at midnight on February 15, 2021 to a loss of 29,680 MW by noon on February 15, 2021; and “fuel issues”
accounted for an increase from a loss of 2435 MW to 4194 MW over the same time period. 2021 FERC-NERC
REPORT at 125, Figure 66a. In addition, according the same report, certain gas plants (as well as coal plants)
tripped offline because of low frequency or rate of frequency change. Id. at 219-200 and Figure 107a.
27
61. The following chart is illustrative of the delayed onset of the outages until after
ERCOT’s implementation of blackouts on February 15:
1) Natural Gas Companies critically important in providing fuel to gas-powered

electric power plants entered into a load-shedding program with ERCOT for
monetary gain.
62. A load-shedding program, known as the ERS program, meant to reduce industrial
electricity use during emergencies, likely contributed to gas-powered power generators not getting
fuel necessary to continue operations. The ERS program pays large industrial users to shut down
when electricity supplies are short. Hundreds of major electricity users, including many natural
gas facilities that power generation companies depended on for natural gas, entered into these
“demand response” contracts with ERCOT, requiring them to install an automatic circuit switch
or manually shut down operations when power demand threatens to exceed supply on the grid.
The ERS program was activated by ERCOT during the winter event to reduce demand on the
28
system. It apparently achieved its targeted demand of roughly 1100 MW during the morning of
February 15.
63. According to the UT report, requests for information responses from QSEs
indicated that approximately 67 locations (electrical meters) that were in ERCOT’s ERS program
were also in the fuel supply chain for generation resources, including gas refining and pipeline
structures.21 A separate set of data indicated that 5 locations that self-identified as critical natural
gas infrastructure were in the ERS program.22 This data strongly suggests that some natural gas
companies were paid to have electricity cut-off to critical natural gas infrastructure that supplied
natural gas to gas-powered electric plants.
64. A Wall Street Journal analysis of ERCOT data and electrical substation maps found
several dozen instances where load was shed to facilities in the Permian Basin, the nation’s most
prolific oil and gas field. The Journal found that shed load occurred to five facilities in Loving
County in West Texas, where nearly all the industrial activity is related to oil and gas production.23
65. Prior to February 2021 winter storm, ERCOT and TDUs had been warned that
shutting off some industrial users could cause the loss of generation capacity. For example, the
2011 FERC Report found that Occidental Petroleum Corp.’s oil and gas production facilities were
shut down at that time because it had signed up to be part of the load-shedding program, and
observed that “[t]his interruption resulted in significant production losses,” even though the
Occidental facilities were shut off for just 90 minutes.24 ERCOT and the other Defendants ignored
this warning, and the ERS program expanded over the past decade. Industrial users can receive
21
UT Report 56.
22
Id.
23
Russell Gold and Katherine Blunt, As Texas Went Dark, the State Paid Natural-Gas Companies to Go Offline,
WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE, May 7, 2021, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-texas-went-dark-the-
state-paid-natural-gas-companies-to-go-offline-11620385201.
24
FERC 2011 REPORT at 164.
29
millions of dollars by entering into one of these “demand response” contracts with ERCOT. The
estimated total value of the ERS program to participants for the five days of the blackout associated
with the Winter Storm Uri was approximately $2 billion—and natural gas companies that should
have supplied natural gas to the Power Generators, earned a portion of that for shedding load
pursuant to the “demand response” contracts.
66. The following non-exhaustive list of QSEs25 were involved in the load-reduction
“demand response” program as revealed by limited data released by ERCOT:
• BROAD REACH POWER LLC

• CITY OF GARLAND
• CPS ENERGY
• CPS ENERGY WIND
• DUKE ENERGY RENEWABLE SERVICES LLC
• EDF ENERGY SERVICES LLC
• ENEL TRADING NORTH AMERICA LLC
• ENEL X NORTH AMERICA INC
• ENERWISE GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES LLC
• ETC ENDURE ENERGY LLC LAAR
• FORMOSA UTILITY VENTURE LTD
• HEN POWER MARKETING LLC
• LOWER COLORADO RIVER AUTHORITY
• LUMINANT ENERGY COMPANY LLC
• MP2 ENERGY LLC
• MP2 ENERGY TEXAS LLC
• NEXTERA ENERGY MARKETING LLC
• NRG TEXAS POWER LLC
• OCCIDENTAL POWER SERVICES INC
• PRIORITY POWER MANAGEMENT LLC
• RWE RENEWABLES QSE LLC
• SOUTH TEXAS ELECTRIC CO OP INC
• TENASKA POWER SERVICES CO
• TRQ7
• TWIN EAGLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT LLC
• VIRIDITY ENERGY SOLUTIONS INC
25
Note that some of these QSEs are Power Generators and/or appear to represent Power Generators. Discovery
will also be necessary to determine if any Power Generators went off-line as a result of their participation in the ERS
program.
30
2) Natural Gas Companies failed to file “critical facility forms” to classify
themselves in ERCOT as critical infrastructure so that they could be exempt
from being shut-off during blackouts.
67. Critical facilities—including Defendant natural gas facilities—were required to file
a “critical facility form” with the transmission entities, which would have caused them to be
exempt from blackouts implemented by ERCOT. However, shortly after the ERCOT blackouts
began, it became apparent that dozens of natural gas facilities could not deliver gas to power plants
after their power had been cut off because they had not filed the necessary forms. According to
the testimony before the Texas legislature of Allen Nye, the CEO of Oncor, the transmission
company responsible for implementing the blackouts in the Permian Basin, big natural gas
pipelines including Kinder Morgan, Targa Resources Corp., and Diamondback Energy, Inc. kept
Nye’s “phone ringing off the hook during the storm” requesting that power be restored to their
facilities. According to ERCOT, more than half of the state’s natural gas supplies were knocked
off-line by power losses, causing as much as 20% of the total power outages during the week. By
the end of the week, Oncor had added 168 new natural gas facilities to its “critical” list, a nearly
five-fold increase from just a few days prior. Remarkably, Grant Ruckel, vice president of
government affairs for Energy Transfer, one of the largest natural gas pipeline companies in the
country, testified that the first time he had learned about the “critical facility form” was after the
ERCOT blackouts had been ordered. A survey by the Texas Oil and Gas Commission found that:
(1) upstream gas producers indicated that loss of power constituted the cause of 65% of total loss
of production; and (2) midstream pipelines indicated that loss of power constituted the cause of
80% of disruptions or shutdowns of responses. Thus, it is apparent that numerous Defendants’
failure to file a simple form also contributed to the power outages and caused both the catastrophic
failure of the ERCOT power grid and the resulting injuries and damages. In addition to operating
and maintaining the delivery system, when a situation arises where electricity must be removed or
31
“shed” from the system, the decision falls to the individual TDU to determine which customers to
remove from the system and for how long.
D. The Power Generators failed to secure alternative fuel sources.
68. A review of detailed, unit-specific power plant outage information revealed that
some of the Power Generators reporting “fuel limitations” simply did not have a “firm” fuel supply
contract in place during the winter storm event. According to the 2021 FERC report, “the majority
of natural gas-fired generating units experiencing outages and derates had a mixture of firm and
non-firm commodity and pipeline transportation contracts or had interruptible transportation for
their contracted volumes. As a result, when they attempted to secure additional fuel during the
event, they were “unable to secure additional volumes above their contracted volumes to operate
at their expected capacity.”
69. Although extensive winterization standards and industry guidance existed, the
Power Generators failed to procure adequate and reliable fuel supply or alternative fuel sources.
The failure of Power Generators to secure reliable fuel supply during a winter storm is a
fundamental element of winterization for electricity generators. Yet, some Power Generators
operating natural gas-fueled generators failed to hedge existing natural gas positions or failed to
enter reliable long-term contracts for natural gas supply, exposing their business and their
customers to short-term market volatility during a well-predicted winter storm and resulting in a
failure to adequately procure natural gas during the storm event. Similarly, other Power
Generators simply failed to source and secure fuel supplies from reliable suppliers in advance of
the winter season, and/or failed to secure and store alternative fuel sources, such as fuel oil.
70. Numerous Power Generators chose to source critical natural gas supplies from
distributors who failed to designate their businesses as “critical load,” resulting in near certainty
that the flow of natural gas would be interrupted if load shedding became necessary and
32
compounding the danger of an energy emergency. A federal investigation has revealed that the
failure to designate natural gas suppliers as “critical load” was dangerously widespread, finding
that “most of the natural gas production and processing facilities surveyed by the inquiry team
were not identified as critical loads or otherwise protected from manual load shedding.”
71. Similarly, other Power Generators sourced natural gas from suppliers who, prior to
Winter Storm Uri, voluntarily enrolled in ERCOT’s emergency response program (“ERS”), a
program which was designed to incentivize and prioritize the cutting of power to these natural gas
suppliers. In essence, the ERS program provides that ERCOT pays large industrial users to shut
down when electricity supplies are short. To participate in the ERS program, industrial users enter
into “demand response” contracts with ERCOT, requiring them to install an automatic circuit
switch or manually shut down operations when power demand threatens to exceed supply on the
grid. Under ERCOT protocols, ERCOT can order the shut-down of participants in the ERS
program well before it orders load shedding to the rest of the ERCOT system, specifically allowing
ERCOT to shut down ERS participants at the EEA Level 1 emergency level, whereas the general
load-shedding may be ordered at EEA Level 3. The ERS program was activated by ERCOT during
the winter event to reduce demand on the system.
72. According to a Wall Street Journal investigation, the estimated total value of the
ERS program to participants for the five days of the blackout associated with the Winter Storm
Uri was approximately $2 billion—and natural gas companies that should have supplied natural
gas to PGCs, were paid a portion of that amount by ERCOT for shedding load pursuant to these
“demand response” contracts. According to the University of Texas report, approximately 67
locations (electrical meters) that were in ERCOT’s ERS program were also in the fuel supply chain
for generation resources, including gas refining and pipeline infrastructure. The same report also
found that five of the natural gas facilities which had enrolled in the ERS program had also self-
33
identified as “critical load.”
73. Prior to the February 2021 winter storm, ERCOT and the PGCs were well aware
that shutting off certain industrial users who operated critical infrastructure for the PGCs fuel
supply could cause the loss of generation capacity. For example, the 2011 FERC Report found
that Occidental Petroleum Corp.’s oil and gas production facilities were shut down during the
winter weather event because it had signed up to be part of the load-shedding program, and
observed that “[t]his interruption resulted in significant production losses,” even though the
Occidental facilities were shut off were just 90 minutes. ERCOT and the Power Generators
ignored this warning and the ERS program expanded over the decade leading up to Winter Storm
Uri, resulting in at least 67 critical locations withing the PGC fuel supply chain which were paid
by ERCOT to shut down operations during Winter Storm Uri.
74. In the 2021 FERC Report, regulators highlighted the Power Generators’ failure to
secure reliable fuel supply in their most urgent recommendation out of twenty-eight (28) separate
recommendations. The Report reveals that the Power Generators’ actions in failing to secure
reliable fuel supplies endangered the reliability of the entire energy grid when the Power
Generators failed to inform ERCOT of the fuel-supply risks they were taking. According to the
FERC, at the very least, Power Generators who choose to operate with elevated fuel risks must
inform ERCOT that their output “may be close to zero.” However, failing to communicate the
risks to ERCOT should not be an option. “Before this winter,” the FERC report concludes,
“Generator Owners/Generator Operators should identify and communicate reliability risks of their
natural gas fuel contracts to Balancing Authorities.”
75. Ensuring the availability of adequate fuel supply during winter storm events has
always been a critical responsibility of Power Generators under all applicable industry
winterization guidelines, standards, and best practices, including those voluntarily promulgated by
34
the Power Generators’ themselves. By relying upon suppliers enrolled in the ERS program and/or
who failed to designate their businesses as “critical load” with their local TDU, the Power
Generators knew or should have known that the flow of natural gas to their generation units would
be interrupted if load shedding became necessary. By failing to identify and communicate the
fuel-supply risks they were taking to ERCOT, the Power Generators endangered the reliability of
the entire energy grid, compounding the danger of a weather-related energy emergency.
E. Transmission/Distribution Utility Defendants mismanaged the removal of electricity

from their delivery systems.
76. In ERCOT’s 2020/2021 SARA report (Seasonal Assessment of Resource
Adequacy report), a system wide resource adequacy plan which was readily available to TDUs,
ERCOT planned to have 82,513 megawatts of total energy resources available to meet the peak
demand load for the 2021 winter season. In that report, ERCOT anticipated that “extreme” winter
conditions could result in a combined total of 13,953 megawatts of outages and an elevated demand
load of up to 67,208 megawatts, conditions which would leave the ERCOT system with an
operating reserve margin of 1,352 megawatts. Thus, long before Winter Storm Uri arrived in
Texas, the TDUs were well aware that ERCOT could result an operating reserve so low that it
would necessitate a Level 3 Energy Emergency and system-wide blackouts.
77. Even though the TDUs were well-aware from prior weather events and from
ERCOT’s 2020/2021 SARA Report that a Level 3 Energy emergency was foreseeable, the TDU’s
also were well aware that the did not have adequate procedures or sufficiently detailed monitoring
telemetry and control of circuits in order to manage which circuits to shed during an foreseeable
extreme weather event.
78. On February 11, 2021, ERCOT issued a press release stating:
Generators have been asked to take necessary steps to prepare their facilities for the
expected cold weather, which includes reviewing fuel supplies and planned outages and
implementing winter weatherization procedures. The grid operator is also working with
35
transmission operators to minimize transmission outages that could reduce the availability
of generation or otherwise impact the ability of the system to serve demand.
79. Notably the TDU’s were put on notice four days before the crisis that they were
going to be called on to minimize transmission outages that could reduce availability of generation.
That is exactly the crisis that occurred.
80. In advance of the cold weather, ERCOT issued a series of ever-increasing warnings
to the TDUs:
• On February 3, 2021, almost two weeks before the crisis, ERCOT warned the TDU
Defendants of the coldest weather of the year.
• On February 8, 2021, ERCOT issued an Operating Condition Notice for an extreme

cold weather event.
• On February 10, 2021, ERCOT issued an advisory for extreme cold weather and a
grid conditions update.
• On February 11, 2021, ERCOT issued a watch for cold weather event for extreme
weather expected.
• On February 13, 2021, ERCOT issued a Conservation Alert and Emergency notice
for extreme cold.
81. After each of these advisories, the TDUs failed to warn their customers of the
severity and duration of the impending catastrophe. In some instances, the TDUs made light of
the unfolding situation. CenterPoint suggested skipping laundry because it was Valentine’s Day.
Others suggested closing window blinds to conserve heat.
82. On February 15, 2021, at 1:20 a.m., ERCOT issued an Energy Emergency Alert
(Level 3) for the State of Texas. Pursuant to ERCOT’s Nodal Operating Guides, ERCOT is vested
with authority to coordinate with the TDU Defendants to reduce load on the grid. 26 ERCOT’s
Senior Director San Woodfin explained, “ERCOT deems how much power each regional
transmission owner needs to cut.” Importantly, Mr. Woodfin added, “those transmission owners
26
See, e.g., ERCOT NODAL OPERATING GUIDES at 2-3, 2-4 (Feb. 5, 2021).
36
then decide where to cut power and how to rotate outages.” (emphasis added). The TDU
Defendants had a legal and moral duty to do so in a manner that was safe for the public and did
not put the lives of Texas residents at risk.
83. ERCOT would ultimately instruct the TDUs to remove over 20,000 MW from the
grid. Each TDU was tasked with shedding a particular amount of the 20,000 MW total, which was
apportioned based on market share with Oncor and Centerpoint having the largest shares at 36 and
25 percent respectively. Within its service area, each individual TDU exercises discretion about
how best to achieve its required total reduction.
84. As the TDUs dispatched work crews and began flipping switches, it soon became
apparent that they were proceeding ad hoc, with no rational plan. Large sections of the grid were
de-energized without considering the effect of power loss on individual customers within that
section. In some cases, this resulted in critical infrastructure losing power when and where it was
most needed. In the aftermath, it became clear that certain customers or neighborhoods had
received preferential treatment and never lost power, in contrast to some who suffered for days on
end with no relief whatsoever. The Dallas City Council conducted a hearing on these issues which
lead to the frank admission from Mark Carpenter, Oncor’s Senior Vice President of Transmission
and Distribution, that “your electrical providers totally failed you.”
85. To the limited extent there was a “plan” for the power outages, it called for limited
duration, rolling blackouts. The TDUs promised outages of 15–45 minutes. And no customer
should have been subjected to an outage of more than twelve hours in any event. Even after the
TDUs knew that their lack of planning and preparation made rolling blackouts impossible, they
continued to fail to provide the public with accurate information regarding how long the blackouts
would last. There were consistent, systemic failures by all TDUs in regard to their customers. To
37
compound their failures, the TDUs failed to honestly and effectively communicate with their
customers about the danger that their customers faced because of these failures.
86. The TDU Defendants not only failed to deliver services to their customers, but
actually compounded the system-wide failures by failing to identify and protect critical
infrastructure. The TDUs knew that the Texas electric grid is highly dependent on natural-gas-
fired generation plants, especially when additional generation capacity needs to be brought online
quickly. The TDUs knew that gas system facilities and pipelines were dependent on electricity to
maintain their delivery systems. Without electric power, the gas would stop flowing. Despite this
knowledge, the TDU Defendants failed to take reasonable precautions to identify, locate, and
protect numerous gas system facilities and pipelines during Winter Storm Uri which increased
outages and derates to Power Generators reliant on natural gas for their operations.
87. TDUs are required to reserve 25% of their actual measured load for automatic
shedding in the event of frequency drops (“UFLS circuits”). However, as the FERC-NERC Report
determined, the amount of load connected to UFLS circuits substantially exceeded the ERCOT-
required levels at times for certain of the TDUs, and in fact one TDU noted that the load on its
UFLS circuits exceeded 60% of its load at times during the event.27 The failure of the TDUs to
have procedures in place to be able to calculate the difference between UFLS margin versus the
actual load on their UFLS circuits prevented the TDUs from being able to rotate outages and
contributed to lengthy blackouts.
1. Defendant Oncor Electric Delivery Company.
88. Oncor Electric Delivery Company is the largest TDU in Texas and the fifth largest
in the United States, serving more than 10 million Texans across 420 cities and 120 counties. Their
service territory includes east, west, and north-central Texas, including Dallas, Fort Worth, Irving,
27
2021 FERC-NERC REPORT at 213.
38
Plano, Arlington, Beeville, Midland, Odessa, Killeen, Waco, Wichita Falls, Tyler, and other
surrounding cities in Texas.
89. At no point in the days leading up to the February 2021 winter storm did Oncor
inform its customers that they should be prepared to go days without power, or that power would
go out at all.
90. As a result, Oncor’s customers believed that the loss of power was only temporary,
and that power would be restored on a rolling basis so that no one individual or family would bear
the brunt of Oncor’s failure to plan for the storm ahead of time.
91. As a result of its failure to disclose the truth, many customers were deprived of the
opportunity to make backup plans or seek to relocate to a location where electricity might be
available.
92. Oncor eventually admitted it failed to properly inform its customers. Charles Elk,
the director of customer operations at Oncor, stated “[i]t was changing minute-to-minute, and we
didn’t do a good enough job keeping our customers informed minute-to-minute.” “Clearly
communications has been an area where we simply did not do what we needed to,” Elk admitted.
93. On February 17, 2021, the PUCT explained that utilities like Defendant Oncor were
tasked with “load shedding obligations.” These load-shedding obligations, which Oncor and the
other TDUs knew would be potentially needed before the storm hit, were meant to be performed
in a manner such that no customer was subjected to an outage of more than twelve hours.
Defendant Oncor failed miserably in this respect. Plaintiff paid the price for this failure.
94. Oncor consciously chose to de-energize certain areas for days. Power cuts to certain
areas came at the circuit level, with Oncor choosing which circuits to shut down and when.
95. In a particularly short-sighted and foolish attempt to shed wattage from the entire
grid, Defendant Oncor apparently turned off power to the Permian Basin, which lies within its
39
service area. The Permian Basin is the most productive oil and natural gas region in Texas, but
without electricity, it cannot supply natural gas. Without natural gas, gas-powered power
generators cannot produce electricity, causing a cascading, downward spiral of the entire electric
grid.
96. A Texas Tribune investigation revealed:
By Wednesday, Feb. 17, natural gas supply in the state hit its lowest point during the storm,
experts said. Nye [the CEO of Oncor] told legislators during his testimony that they were
so concerned about the supply of natural gas that his chief operating officer called him and
said: “I’m just going to turn on the Permian and see what happens.” . . . “And we just turned
it on,” he said.28
97. Oncor’s CEO may have thought this exchange demonstrated some good-old-
fashioned ingenuity in the midst of a crisis. What it actually proves is that someone at Oncor made
the decision to turn off the Permian Basin in the first place. There was no plan, meaning there was
no priority given to critical infrastructure. Oncor was wholly unprepared and, caught in a crisis of
its own making, it panicked. Rather than taking responsibility for its failures, Oncor attempted
instead to shift blame to the natural gas companies for failing to register as critical infrastructure.
Nye testified:
“I don’t know where [power plants] are buying their gas, and I don’t know how that gas is
getting to them.” “They’ve gotta tell me, or, whoever’s delivering that gas [does]. Take your
pick.”29
98. Failure to designate the necessary natural gas producers as critical infrastructure
was not a one-sided failure. Instead, Oncor has sole discretion for maintaining the list of critical
infrastructure, for preparing and maintaining the forms designating customers as critical, and for
providing the necessary forms to customers. It has become apparent that Oncor failed to
28
Erin Douglas, Paperwork failures worsened Texas blackouts, sparking mid-storm scramble to restore critical
fuel supply, TEXAS TRIBUNE, Mar. 18, 2021, available at https://www.texastribune.org/2021/03/18/texas-winter-
storm-blackouts-paperwork.
29
Testimony of Allen Nye Before the Texas Senate Committee on Business & Commerce, 88th Sess. (Feb. 26,
2021).
40
adequately assure that their customers were designated as critical infrastructure. By February 18,
2021, Oncor had added 168 new natural gas facilities to its “critical list”—a nearly five-fold
increase from before the February 2021 winter storm. There is no reason other than gross
incompetence why this was not done prior to the storm.
99. Ultimately Oncor acknowledged its errors, as Mark Carpenter’s admissions to the
Dallas City Council, supra, show.
F. Oncor failed to ensure that Decedent’s its service area had a reliable supply of
electricity and failed to warn Decedent that Plaintiff would be without power for an
unreasonable amount of time.
100. Oncor sells electric energy to retail customers in the areas of Texas where the sale
of electricity is open to competition. A REP buys wholesale electricity, delivery service, and
related services, prices electricity for customers, and seeks customers to buy electricity at retail.
The REPs failed to ensure their customers had available electricity in their most critical time of
need. In fact, certain of the REPs are affiliated companies to and have entered into bilateral
electricity supply contracts with the very Power Generators who knowingly failed to weatherize
and/or otherwise properly maintain their equipment. For instance, NRG Energy, Inc. is the parent
company both of Reliant and Direct Energy, two large retail electric providers, and also of
numerous power generating facilities supplying electricity to the ERCOT power grid that failed
during the February 2021 winter storm. Similarly, Vistra Energy, Inc. is the parent company of
large retail electric provider, TXU Energy, and at the same time the parent company of Luminant,
which operates numerous power generation facilities that supply electricity to the ERCOT power
grid. NRG and Vistra ultimately control over 75% of the ERCOT retail electric market.
101. As if cutting Texans’ power was not enough, Oncor (including the REPs)
intentionally and knowingly failed to warn or notify their customers of the possibility that they
would be without power for any period of time. Defendants further failed to maintain any type of
41
communication with their customers during an emergency.
102. Had Oncor acted with minimal care by providing its customers with warning or
important information regarding the loss of power, they would have taken necessary precautions
prior to and during the winter storm which would have prevented injury, loss of property, loss of
income, and pain and mental anguish.
G. ERCOT failed to learn from its earlier failures and failure to assure the reliability of
its power grid.
103. Instead of learning the lessons of its failures in 1989 and 2011, and with full
knowledge that the failure to ensure system reliability during cold weather could result in death,
widespread misery, and the destruction of property, ERCOT repeated these failures yet again in
February 2021.
104. Indeed, ERCOT relied on many of the same Power Generators that failed in 1989
and 2011 during the February 2021 winter storm. Unsurprisingly, these Power Generators, and
others that were not properly suited to function in the forecasted conditions, failed yet again.
Millions were forced to needlessly suffer as a result.
105. In early February 2021, weather patterns in and around Texas suggested the
development of a cold weather event.
106. As early as February 9, 2021, ERCOT was warned that the impending cold weather
event may jeopardize the integrity of its electrical network if ERCOT failed to take reasonable
measures.
107. On February 12, 2021, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued a disaster declaration
on for all 254 counties in the State of Texas in anticipation of the impending cold weather event.
This should have further emphasized the need for ERCOT to take appropriate measures to ensure
system performance under the anticipated conditions.
42
108. Despite these clear and unambiguous warnings, ERCOT utterly failed to act with
appropriate seriousness or to prevent calamity from befalling its customers. Instead of properly
assessing its resources and ensuring that enough generating capacity would be available
throughout the duration the cold weather event, ERCOT’s failures to plan and prepare caused
cascading systems failures and widespread blackouts. Over 4.1 million Texans were forced to
endure freezing temperatures for dangerous lengths of time as a result.
109. The anticipated cold weather event arrived in Texas on or about February 14, 2021.
Predictably, the cold weather increased energy demands across the ERCOT network as Texans
utilized electricity to keep their homes and businesses warm. The total state energy demand during
the cold weather event peaked at around 69,000 megawatts—significantly less than the total
capacity of the ERCOT system or typical peak demands in summer.
110. ERCOT’s failure to meet foreseeable demand during the February 2021 winter
storm was a direct result of multiple failures to plan and prepare. Not only did ERCOT fail to
reserve enough capacity to meet such foreseeable demands, it completely failed to assess the
integrity of its infrastructure, the environmental limitations of its power sources, and how
abnormally cold weather could affect the availability of its power sources. As a result, the capacity
reserved by ERCOT was wholly unsuited and insufficient to perform or to ensure system reliability
during anticipated conditions in the February 2021 cold weather event.
111. ERCOT’s failure to reserve sufficient capacity from generating sources capable of
operating reliably in forecasted conditions caused numerous ERCOT generating units to fail, trip,
or derate during the February 2021 cold weather event. A total of 46,000 megawatts of ERCOT
generating capacity ERCOT intended to rely on was unable to function during the cold weather
event.
43
112. As a result, the ERCOT system became badly unbalanced and over 4.1 million
Texans lost power.
113. These failures were neither unprecedented nor unforeseen. In fact, ERCOT’s
failures are made all the more egregious because they were foreseen and had occurred before.
114. Because of these failures, millions were forced to endure days-long blackouts in
freezing cold weather. People died as a result. Millions more endured traumatic hardship short of
death.
115. Further compounding the hardship, ERCOT’s failures resulted in a loss of power
to potable water delivery systems throughout Texas, causing millions to go without both electricity
and potable water during the February 2021 winter storm.
116. Plaintiffs bore the costs of ERCOT’s failures.
117. Plaintiffs lost electrical services due to ERCOT’s failures to plan and prepare for
the February 2021 winter storm. The outages lasted several days, during which Plaintiffs endured
suffering, hardship, and damages as described further herein.
118. Plaintiffs suffered great inconvenience, anguish, and fear as a result of being forced
to endure dire conditions. This all could have been avoided had ERCOT exercised a modicum of
care in planning and preparing for the February 2021 winter storm.
119. ERCOT’s behavior was egregious, unreasonable, and in no way guided by good
utility practice.
120. At all relevant times, ERCOT had control of operational planning, load forecasting,
securing enough generating capacity to maintain system reliability, assessing the reliability of the
generating units within its region—in both normal and abnormal operating conditions, contingency
planning, planning for system reserves in the event of higher than anticipated demand and/or lower
44
than anticipated generating supply, and ensuring that adequate supply would be capable of meeting
demand during reasonably anticipated conditions.
121. The conditions during the February 2021 winter storm were both reasonably
foreseeable and actually anticipated by ERCOT and others. Days before the onset of the storm,
and when ERCOT still had the ability to take reasonable measures that would have prevented a
loss of system reliability, ERCOT was warned that such measures were necessary.
122. ERCOT’s loss of system reliability, and the resulting damages to plaintiffs, were
avoidable and would have been prevented had ERCOT acted reasonably or employed good utility
practice
VI. FACTS REGARDING DECEDENT KIMBERLY SMITH AND

PLAINTIFF ROBERT ALAN BROCKLEMAN
123. Kimberly Smith, deceased, lived in Garland, Texas at the time of the 2021 Winter
Storm with her son, Plaintiff Robert Alan Brockelman (“Alan”), and her minor grandson. Garland
is within the region controlled by the named defendant Oncor and its applicable power generation
companies. Ms. Smith’s electricity provider was named defendant Garland Power & Light.
124. The power in Ms. Smith’s home was turned off at approximately 12:00 AM on the
morning of Tuesday, February 16, 2021. The power outage was not intermittent, and electricity
was not restored for fourteen hours. The power was turned off again at 12:00 AM on the morning
of Wednesday, February 17, 2021. The power outage was not intermittent, and electricity was not
restored for twenty-one hours
125. During that time, the temperature in Garland, Texas was below freezing with a high
below 27˚ Fahrenheit during the day, and a low down to 19˚ Fahrenheit during the night.
126. With no alternative power source, the temperature in Ms. Smith’s home quickly
dropped below freezing exposing Ms. Smith and her family to extreme temperatures in their home.
45
Despite Mr. Brockelman’s forethought to insulate the doors and windows, and his continued
attempts to keep the home warm, the temperature inside dropped to at least 27˚ Fahrenheit during
each blackout according to the thermostat needle. This situation left Ms. Smith and her family in
below-freezing temperatures for more than thirty-five hours over the course of three days.
127. Ms. Smith, a former labor and delivery nurse, suffered a gunshot wound at work
and was rendered a quadriplegic. While Ms. Smith had no control of her lower body, she did retain
minimal use of her arms and hands. However, Ms. Smith was incapable of fully controlling her
upper body, including changing positions in bed, sitting up, or laying down without assistance.
128. Ms. Smith was dependent on an electric medical bed that allowed her to control her
body’s position as needed. She was also registered on Garland Power & Light’s emergency list,
which meant her home should never participate in a voluntary power outage. The electric company
was required to always maintain consistent electricity services to her home.
129. After the power was turned off the first time and the second time, Ms. Smith
contacted Garland Power & Light repeatedly to have her power restored but she never received a
response.
130. Ms. Smith’s medical condition made her susceptible to pneumonia because she was
unable to fully control her upper body, including expelling fluid from her lungs such as through
coughing. The inoperable electric bed prevented Ms. Smith from adjusting her position as needed
causing fluid to build up in her lungs.
131. On Friday, February 19, 2021, with the power back on, Mr. Brockelman made
dinner for the family. Ms. Smith ate around 8:30 PM and then went to sleep. Mr. Brockelman
checked on his mom several times, still concerned about her condition after the power outage, but
by 11:00 PM, Ms. Smith was still sleeping peacefully. Soon after 11:00 PM, Mr. Brockelman’s
14-year-old son went to check on his grandmother.
46
132. Ms. Smith’s grandson found her with foam and vomit around her mouth,
asphyxiating and nonresponsive. Mr. Brockelman cleaned out his mother’s mouth as best he
could, placed her flat on the floor, and performed CPR while his son called paramedics. Paramedics
were, likewise, unable to revive Ms. Smith on scene. She was transported to Dallas Regional
Medical Center in Mesquite, Texas.
133. On information and belief, Ms. Smith developed pneumonia through extended
exposure to freezing temperatures as well as her inability to utilize her electric medical bed. The
fluid buildup in Ms. Smith’s lungs caused her to asphyxiate, depriving her of oxygen and causing
catastrophic brain damage.
134. Doctors informed Mr. Brockelman that his mother was incapable of regaining
consciousness. On Saturday, February 27, 2021, Mr. Brockelman made the heartbreaking decision
to remove Ms. Smith from life support.
135. On information and belief, Kimberly Smith died of pneumonia asphyxiation as a
direct result of the power outage, which deprived her of electricity in her home.
VII. CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE: NEGLIGENCE AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE

AGAINST THE POWER GENERATOR DEFENDANTS
136. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth herein.
137. The Power Generator Defendants as market participants, resource entities, and/or
QSEs to the ERCOT power grid had the continuing duties (1) to properly weatherize and/or
maintain their facilities and equipment, (2) to assure they had adequate and properly qualified staff
during their operations, including foreseeable weather events, (3) to provide and to continue to
provide necessary reserve energy to the ERCOT power grid, and (4) to provide electricity to the
ERCOT power grid; and (5) to otherwise conduct their operations as a reasonably prudent Power
Generator in order to supply electricity to the ERCOT power grid so as to assure the reliability of
47
the ERCOT power grid. The Power Generator Defendants breached these duties, and as a
proximate result, Plaintiff sustained injuries and damages. The Power Generator Defendants’
individual and collective negligence and gross negligence included the following:
a. Failure to comply with applicable safety standards, protocols, customs, and

practices to make sure they weatherized their facilities and equipment to prevent
disasters like the one complained of herein, including the partial and/or complete
shutdown of their facilities and resulting harm caused to the ERCOT power grid;
b. Failure to properly supervise their facilities and equipment to make sure they
weatherized their facilities and equipment to prevent disasters like the one
complained of herein;
c. Failure to properly train their workers and provide requisite training for their
workers and those who supervised their facilities and equipment to make sure they
d. Failure to protect all Texans from a loss of power during a winter storm such as the
one complained of herein by assuring that their facilities and equipment were
weatherized and prepared to prevent disasters like the one complained of herein;
e. Failure to supply electricity to the ERCOT power grid and Plaintiff and/or failure
to provide reserve energy to the ERCOT power grid and Plaintiff as required by
applicable safety standards, protocols, customs, and/or practices;
f. Failure to assure that their facilities and equipment were exempted from ordered
blackouts by filing appropriate forms and/or taking other necessary or reasonable
actions;
g. Enrollment in ERCOT’s ERS program, which resulted in them being paid to have
their power cut off when ERCOT activated the ERS in an attempt to avoid more
widespread blackouts despite their operations being critical to the balance of the
ERCOT power grid; and/or
h. Other negligent and grossly negligent acts and omissions.
138. The Defendants committed various acts and omissions of negligence and gross
negligence, which both individually and collectively were the proximate cause of the occurrence,
property losses, illnesses and death, substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
property, and damages sustained by Plaintiff as set forth above.
48
139. The Defendants’ conduct as described herein, when viewed objectively from the
standpoint of the Defendants, at the time of its occurrence, involved an extreme degree of risk,
considering the extreme degree of risk and probability and magnitude of the potential harm to
others and of which the Defendants had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but
nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.
140. Defendants consciously disregarded the safety of all Texans as described herein,
for which Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.
141. As a result of Defendants’ negligence and gross negligence, Plaintiff incurred
property damages, substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of property, out of pocket
losses, medical expenses in the past and future, lost wages and lost future earning capacity, extreme
mental anguish and suffering, and other injuries and damages.
142. Plaintiff Robert Alan Brockelman, on behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries
of Decedent, and as representative of the Estate of Kimberly Smith, Deceased, seeks damages
under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes.
143. By reason of the occurrence made the basis of this lawsuit, the support, inheritance,
and contributions that Decedent would have made to Plaintiff, has been forever swept away.
Plaintiff seeks to recover a sum of money that would fairly and reasonably compensate for their
pecuniary losses, such as the loss, care, maintenance, support, services, advice, counsel, and all
other reasonable contributions having a pecuniary value. Plaintiff also seeks compensation for the
loss of inheritance and for all other damages resulting from the termination of familial
relationships, including the loss of the love, comfort, companionship, and society that they would,
in reasonable probability, have received from Kimberly Smith had she lived. Plaintiff also seeks
compensation for the emotional pain, torment, and anguish they will continue to suffer in
connection with Ms. Smith’s untimely death.
49
144. The heirs at law are entitled to recover damages for what Ms. Smith would have
been able to recover were she alive to bring a lawsuit. Recoverable survival damages include the
physical pain and suffering and the mental anguish that Ms. Smith experienced before dying,
medical expenses, and burial expenses.
COUNT TWO: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

AGAINST THE POWER GENERATOR DEFENDANTS
145. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
146. Ms. Smith had a retail contract in place for electricity service with a retail electric
provider and/or was a third party beneficiary of such contract.
147. By intentionally failing to weatherize their equipment and/or otherwise engaging
in the acts and/or omissions described herein, the Power Generator Defendants wrongfully
interfered with Ms. Smith’s retail electricity contracts.
148. The Defendants’ interference with Ms. Smith’s retail electricity contracts
proximately caused Ms. Smith to suffer and sustain damage to her property, health, and loss of
life.
COUNT THREE: NEGLIGENCE AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE

AGAINST THE NATURAL GAS COMPANY DEFENDANTS
149. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing herein as if set forth at length.
150. The Natural Gas Company Defendants, as suppliers of natural gas to market
participants, resource entities, and/or QSEs to the ERCOT power grid, had the continuing duties
to properly weatherize and/or maintain their facilities and equipment, to assure they had adequate
and properly qualified staff during their operations, including, foreseeable weather events, to
provide necessary natural gas to market participants, resource entities, and/or QSEs to the ERCOT
power grid, and to otherwise conduct their operations as reasonably prudent Natural Gas
Companies in order to supply natural gas so as to assure the reliability of the ERCOT power grid.
50
The Natural Gas Company Defendants breached these duties, and as a proximate result, Plaintiff
sustained injuries and damages. The Natural Gas Company Defendants’ individual and collective
negligence and gross negligence included the following:
a. Failure to comply with applicable safety standards, customs, and practices to make
sure they weatherized their facilities and equipment to prevent disasters like the one
b. Failure to properly supervise their facilities and equipment to make sure they
c. Failure to properly train their workers and provide requisite training for their
workers and those who supervised their facilities and equipment to make sure they
d. Failure to protect all Texans from a loss of power during a winter storm such as the
one complained of herein by assuring that their facilities and equipment were
weatherized and prepared to prevent disasters like the one complained of herein;
e. Failure to assure that their facilities and equipment were exempted from ordered
blackouts by filing appropriate forms and/or taking other actions;
f. Enrollment in ERCOT’s ERS program, which resulted in natural gas companies

being paid to have their power cut off when ERCOT activated the ERS in an attempt
to avoid more widespread blackouts despite their gas being critical to keeping
natural gas-powered power generators online; and/or
g. Other negligent and grossly negligent acts and omissions.
151. The Defendants committed various acts and omissions of negligence and gross
negligence, which both individually and collectively were the proximate cause of the occurrence,
property losses, illnesses and death, substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
property, and damages sustained by Plaintiff as set forth above.
51
153. The Defendants consciously disregarded the safety of all Texans as described
herein, for which Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.
154. As a result of the Defendants’ negligence and gross negligence, Plaintiff incurred
loss of inheritance and for all other damages resulting from the termination of spousal and familial
in reasonable probability, have received from Kimberly Smith had they lived. Plaintiff also seeks
connection with the untimely death of their loved one.
157. Decedent’s estate is entitled to the recovery of damages for what they would have
been able to recover if they were alive to bring a lawsuit. Recoverable survival damages include
52
the physical pain and suffering and the mental anguish that they experienced before dying, medical
expenses, and burial expenses.
COUNT FOUR: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

AGAINST THE NATURAL GAS COMPANY DEFENDANTS
158. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing herein as if set forth at length.
159. The Plaintiff had a retail contract in place for electricity service with a retail electric
provider and/or was a third-party beneficiary of such contract.
in the acts and/or omissions described herein, the Defendants wrongfully interfered with Plaintiff’s
retail electricity contract.
161. The Defendants’ interference with Plaintiff’s retail electricity contract proximately
caused Decedent to suffer and sustain damage to property, health, and loss of life.
COUNT FIVE: NEGLIGENCE AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE

AGAINST THE TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION UTILITY DEFENDANTS
163. The TDU Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining and
updating their generation, transmission, and distribution facilities in order to prevent cold weather
failures like those experienced during the February 2021 winter storm.
164. The TDU Defendants had a duty to properly effectuate the load shedding in a way
consistent with protecting human life.
165. The TDU Defendants had a duty to warn Texas residents that electricity would be
out for an extended period of time.
166. The TDU Defendants failed to properly prepare their facilities for winter storms,
including the February 2021 winter storm.
53
167. The TDU Defendants failed to put sufficient procedures in place for winter storms,
including the February 2021 winter storm.
168. The TDU Defendants failed to take reasonable corrective actions to prevent cold-
weather failures in their generation, transmission, and distribution facilities.
169. The TDU Defendants failed to properly effectuate the load shedding in a way
consistent with protecting human life.
170. The TDU Defendants failed to properly effectuate the load shedding by cutting
power to the natural gas production sites, which caused a shortage of natural gas and extended the
power outages even longer.
171. The TDU Defendants failed to warn Texas residents that electricity would be out
for an extended period of time.
172. Each of these acts or omissions of The TDU Defendants, singularly or in
combination with others, constituted negligence. The TDU Defendants’ negligence proximately
caused the tragic death of Ms. Smith and damages to Plaintiff. The TDU Defendants are liable for
Ms. Smith’s death and the injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiff.
173. Defendants committed various acts and omissions of negligence and gross
negligence, which were both individually and collectively the proximate cause of the occurrence,
property loss, illnesses and death, loss of services, and support, mental anguish, and other damages
sustained by Plaintiff as set forth above.
54
175. Defendants consciously disregarded the safety of all Texans as described herein,
for which Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.
COUNT SIX: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

AGAINST THE TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION UTILITY DEFENDANTS
55
181. Ms. Smith had a retail contract in place for electricity service with a retail electric
provider and/or was a third party beneficiary of such contract.
in the acts and/or omissions described herein, Defendants wrongfully interfered with Ms. Smtih’s
retail electricity contract.
183. The Defendants’ interference with Ms. Smith’s retail electricity contract
proximately caused Ms. Smith to suffer and sustain damage to her property, health, and loss of
life.
COUNT SEVEN: NEGLIGENCE AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE

AGAINST DEFENDANT ERCOT
Defendant ERCOT had a duty to ensure reliable performance of the ERCOT system during normal
and abnormal conditions. Defendant ERCOT further had the duties to assess, monitor, plan,
operate, and maintain the ERCOT system in a way that guaranteed the system would perform
reliably under anticipated conditions.
185. Defendant breached these duties by:
a. Failing to perform adequate operational planning and commit resources needed to

maintain reliability;
b. Failing to forecast load and resources needed for anticipated conditions in the seven
days preceding the week of February 14, 2021;
c. Failing to ensure the thermal capabilities of system components were capable of

withstanding anticipated conditions;
d. Failing to perform fault studies capable of adequately planning or designing system

capacities;
e. Failing to assess, monitor, and maintain the ERCOT system and its components;
56
f. Failing to maintain adequate Contingency Reserves for anticipated conditions;
g. Failing to adequately determine severe contingencies and develop and implement

appropriate operating processes to mitigate against weather contingencies;
h. Failing to ensure that reserves were useable and deliverable during weather
contingencies;
i. Failing to consider environmental limitations of available resources;
j. Failing to consider the impacts of the February 2021 cold weather event on capacity
availability;
k. Failing to properly model assumptions for emergency operation procedures and

make adequate reserves available;
l. Failure to obtain forecasts of real output capability in advance of the anticipated

February 2021 cold weather event;
m. Failing to account for temperatures beyond which the availability of generating

units could not be assumed;
n. Failing to account for potential natural gas curtailments; and
o. Failing to prepare for cold weather events.
186. Defendants’ conduct as described herein, when viewed objectively from the
standpoint of Defendants at the time of its occurrence, involved an extreme degree of risk,
others and of which Defendants had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but
187. Defendants consciously disregarded the safety of all Texans as described herein
and for which Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.
57
and contributions that Decedent would have made to Plaintiffs, have been forever swept away.
COUNT EIGHT: PRIVATE NUISANCE AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
193. All of the Defendants’ acts and omissions caused Ms. Smith to lose electrical
services to her home. These acts and omissions constituted a substantial and unreasonable
interference by Defendants with Ms. Smith’s use and enjoyment of her property.
58
194. Loss of power would and will cause unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to a
person of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy her property; especially a prolonged
loss of power during dangerously cold weather.
195. The conditions Defendants created and maintained caused damages to Ms. Smith’s
property and person, for which Plaintiff is entitled to compensation.
196. Additionally, Defendants are strictly liable because their acts and omissions that
substantially interfered with Ms. Smith’s use and enjoyment of her property was abnormally
dangerous.
COUNT NINE: CIVIL CONSPIRACY AND INDIVISIBLE INJURY

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
198. Plaintiff would show that the wrongful acts and omissions of Defendants joined to
produce an indivisible injury that cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty to any individual
defendant. Accordingly, each Defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entirety of Plaintiffs’
damages.
199. Defendants are liable under the principle of concert of action in that:
a. Defendants were grossly negligent;
b. Defendants’ torts were dangerous and likely to cause serious injury or death to a
person or harm to a large number of people.
c. Defendants agreed (explicitly or tacitly) to cooperate in a particular plan or to
accomplish a particular result; and
200. Defendants’ tortious conduct caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.
COUNT TEN: UNJUST ENRICHMENT AGAINST THE NATURAL GAS

COMPANY DEFENDANTS
201. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing herein as if set forth at length.
59
202. The Natural Gas Company Defendants, as suppliers of natural gas to market
participants, resource entities, and/or QSEs to the ERCOT power grid, entered into contractual
agreements with the PGC Defendants directly for the benefit of third-party consumers by agreeing
to provide the necessary resources to support the power grid that provided electricity to their homes
and businesses.
203. The Natural Gas Company Defendants breached their duty to consumers by failing
to protect Texans from a loss of power during the winter storm. The Natural Gas Company
Defendants were fully aware that their support of the power grid was critical to keeping natural
gas-powered power generators online and that the failure of those generators would lead to
additional, more severe, and longer-term blackouts across the state. Not only did Defendants fail
to ensure the stability of their supply to PGC Defendants, they knowingly and willingly allowed
their power to be turned off in exchange for payment.
204. During the 2021 Winter Storm Uri, Natural Gas Company Defendants accepted
payment to have their power cut off as part of ERCOT’s voluntary ERS program. The Natural Gas
Company Defendants were fully aware that allowing their power to be turned off would have
disastrous consequences. They were fully aware that their actions would cause harm to consumers
across the state who would be left without power. Despite this awareness and understanding,
Defendants took advantage of Plaintiffs’ crisis to afford themselves a financial bonus.
standpoint of the Defendants, at the time of its occurrence, can be seen as nothing more than taking
unconscionable advantage of the consumers who relied on them to support the Texas power grid.
The probability and magnitude of potential harm to others, of which the Defendants had actual,
subjective awareness, did nothing to stop Defendants from proceeding with conscious indifference
to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. Allowing the Natural Gas Company Defendants to retain
60
the financial benefit they wrongfully secured from breaching their duty to consumers would be
unconscionable.
206. As a result of the Defendants’ unconscionable actions, Defendants were unjustly
enriched at the cost of Plaintiffs damages, pain, suffering, and lives lost. The loved one’s estate is
entitled to the recovery of damages for what they would have been able to recover if they were
alive to bring a lawsuit. Recoverable survival damages include the repayment of the financial
benefit received by Defendants for which they had no just grounds to accept.
VIII. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
207. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury of all claims so triable.
IX. PRAYER
208. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Defendants be
cited to appear and answer, and that upon final trial and hearing hereof, Plaintiff recovers:
a. Compensatory damages;
b. Actual damages;
c. Consequential damages;
d. Exemplary damages;
e. Interest on damages (pre- and post-judgement) in accordance with law;
f. Costs of court;
g. Attorney’s fees; and
h. Such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled
Respectfully submitted,
FEARS NACHAWATI, PLLC
/s/ Gibbs C. Henderson

Gibbs C. Henderson
TX Bar No. 24041084
ghenderson@fnlawfirm.com
61
N. Majed Nachawati
TX Bar No. 24038319
mn@fnlawfirm.com
5473 Blair Road
Dallas, TX 75231
Tel. (214) 890-0711
Fax (214) 890-0712
Mikal C. Watts
Texas Bar No. 20981820
mcwatts@wattsguerra.com
Francisco Guerra IV
fguerra@wattsguerra.com
Alicia D. O’Neill
aoneill@wattsguerra.com
Meredith D. Stratigopoulos
mdrukker@wattsguerra.com
WATTS GUERRA LLP
Four Dominion Drive
Bldg. 3, Suite 100
San Antonio, TX 78257
Phone: (210) 447-0500
Fax: (210) 447-0501
Jerrold S. Parker
New York Bar No. 1894666
Pro hac vice application to be filed
jerry@yourlawyer.com
Raymond Silverman
rsilverman@yourlawyer.com
Melanie Muhlstock
mmuhlstock@yourlawyer.com
Nicholas F. Morello
New Jersey Bar No. 322572020
nmorello@yourlawyer.com
PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
6 Harbor Park Drive
Port Washington, NY 11050
Phone: (516) 723-4629
Fax: (516) 723-4729
62
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
In accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that
on this 28th day of January, 2022, true and correct copies of the above and foregoing instrument
has been served on all counsel of record.
/s/ Gibbs C. Henderson

Gibbs C. Henderson
63
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Tammy Covert on behalf of Gibbs Henderson

Bar No. 24041084
tcovert@fnlawfirm.com
Envelope ID: 61277418
Status as of 1/31/2022 3:00 PM CST
Case Contacts
Name
Bill Robins
Brent Coon
Ian Cloud
Robert ASchwartz
Sidney Robert
Saima Khan
McKenzie Crane
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Jerri Stewart
Christine Lee
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Bar No. 24041084
Case Contacts
Amanda Sotak
Elliot Clark
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Support Center 30
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Dallas Center 38
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Clerk Managing
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Bar No. 24041084
Case Contacts
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Bar No. 24041084
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Nabil Majed Nachawati
Patrick Luff
Stayton L. Worthington
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Michelle Pector
Susan Kay Thomas
Christopher Porter
Francisco Guerra
Gregory F. Cox
George Louis Legrand


Bar No. 24041084
Case Contacts
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Anna Rotman
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Mikal Watts
Tracy LeRoy
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R. Paul Yetter
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clerk clerk
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DCManagain AttorneysOffice
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WSHB LLP
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Texas Winter Storm Blackout Litigation

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Texas Winter Storm Blackout Litigation

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1/28/2022 10:15 PM

Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County

MASTER CAUSE NO. 2021-41903

IN RE: § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

ROBERT ALAN BROCKELMAN, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION [MDL Case No. 5.00026]

To the Honorable Judge of this Court:

COMES NOW, Robert Alan Brockelman, Individually, as Personal Representative of the

named Defendants, hereinafter referred to as the Power Generation Company (“PGC”)

Defendants, the Transmission/Distribution Utilities (“TDU”) Defendants, the “Natural Gas

(“ERCOT”), and respectfully show the Court the following:

transmission and distribution lines operated by Transmission/Distribution Utilities (“TDUs”) that

between the customer and the REPs:

3. ERCOT manages the delivery of that electricity. ERCOT’s function is “power

from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm on the day prior to the operating day.

Below is a typical “day-ahead schedule” utilized by a Power Generator in communicating

contractual obligations and ERCOT’s protocols.

failures to implement or enforce long-known and recommended measures to cause power

generating facilities/stations and equipment to be weatherized in order to protect against

the February 2021 Winter Storm Uri.

II. DISCOVERY PLAN

under a Level 3 Discovery Plan.

7. Plaintiff Robert Alan Brockelman is a resident of Dallas County and a citizen of

8. The named Power Generator Defendants, listed on the spreadsheet attached

10. The named Transmission and Distribution Utilities Defendants (“TDUs”), is

respective service areas.

11. Defendant Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) is an independent

the flow of electric power to 23 million Texas consumers.

answer in their correct name, if different than that outlined above.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

jurisdictional limit of this Court.

15. The incidents complained of herein occurred in the State of Texas.

16. The Defendants all conduct business in the state of Texas.

with the State of Texas.

e. Each Defendant has employees in the State of Texas.

in the State of Texas.

personal jurisdiction over all of the Defendants named herein.

V. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS

would not be able to be provided to Texas consumers.

February of 2021. The following timeline and chart are illustrative:

• February 8, 2021: ERCOT issues an Operating Conditions Notice (“OCN”) for

“every square inch of Texas was in a Winter Storm Warning.”

demand peaking at 69,692 megawatts by 8:00 p.m. on February 14, 2021.

increase by approximately 1,000 to 3,000 megawatts each year.

a “Level 3” Energy Emergency, ERCOT’s highest state of emergency, authorizing system-wide

of energy supply during a winter storm could have catastrophic consequences.

to “maintain frequency” across the ERCOT system.

am February 20 identified by power source, times of outage and resource entity:4

2/15/21 12:00 PAPALOTE CREEK I LLC CPS (RE)

or in part, perpetuating the crisis.

and derates from February 11 to February 19:

more capacity to go offline.”5

inadequate maintenance and/or inspection prior to this foreseeable weather event.

Texans affected by the power outages.

or operated 1344 units generate power using the following sources:

39. The twenty largest entities were:

40. These twenty generators comprise 44% of the outage MWh.

41. The twenty largest generating unit outages were:

inoperable as a result of their wrongful conduct.

A. The Power Generator Defendants’ failure to weatherize their facilities and

gas curtailments. Significant blackouts ensued as a result.

were experienced by the same generators.”10

ice/snow melt. These resultant malfunctions resulted in systemic widespread outages.

50. The following chart summarizes the “repeat offenders” by capacity: