LEDESMA V CLIMACO

G.R. No. L-23815; June 28, 1974

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte (an attorney
appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant in a criminal action or to represent a destitute
party in a case) for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge Hon. Rafael C.
Climaco. On October 13, 1964, Petitioner Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to
withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed
him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could
prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a
grave abuse of discretion?

HELD: No, Petitioner Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty
required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with
conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer
may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice.
The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

“Rule 138, Section 35, RRC. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No

judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of
the bar or give professional advice to clients.”

The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did not file a
motion to withdraw as defendant-appellant’s counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor
was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the defendant-appellant
(People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963).

To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a
criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and
there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this
regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950).
Henceforth, the trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de
officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)

WHO CAN BE APPOINTED COUNSEL DE OFFICIO?

The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise shall
appoint as counsel de officio:

1. A member of the bar in good standing;

2. And such member, by reason of his/her experience and ability, can competently defend
the accused.

Exception: But, in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint
any person who is:

1. A resident of the province;

2. And of good repute for probity and with ability to defend the accused.