Existentialism – A Definition

Existentialism in the broader sense is a 20th century philosophy that is centered upon the
analysis of existence and of the way humans find themselves existing in the world. The
notion is that humans exist first and then each individual spends a lifetime changing their
essence or nature.

In simpler terms, existentialism is a philosophy concerned with finding self and the
meaning of life through free will, choice, and personal responsibility. The belief is that
people are searching to find out who and what they are throughout life as they make
choices based on their experiences, beliefs, and outlook. And personal choices become
unique without the necessity of an objective form of truth. An existentialist believes that a
person should be forced to choose and be responsible without the help of laws, ethnic rules,
or traditions.

Existentialism – What It Is and Isn’t

Existentialism takes into consideration the underlying concepts:

 Human free will

 Human nature is chosen through life choices
 A person is best when struggling against their individual nature, fighting for life
 Decisions are not without stress and consequences
 There are things that are not rational
 Personal responsibility and discipline is crucial
 Society is unnatural and its traditional religious and secular rules are arbitrary
 Worldly desire is futile

Existentialism is broadly defined in a variety of concepts and there can be no one answer as
to what it is, yet it does not support any of the following:
 wealth, pleasure, or honor make the good life
 social values and structure control the individual
 accept what is and that is enough in life
 science can and will make everything better
 people are basically good but ruined by society or external forces
 “I want my way, now!” or “It is not my fault!” mentality

There is a wide variety of philosophical, religious, and political ideologies that make up
existentialism so there is no universal agreement in an arbitrary set of ideals and beliefs.
Politics vary, but each seeks the most individual freedom for people within a society.

Existentialism – Impact on Society

Existentialistic ideas came out of a time in society when there was a deep sense of despair
following the Great Depression and World War II. There was a spirit of optimism in society
that was destroyed by World War I and its mid-century calamities. This despair has been
articulated by existentialist philosophers well into the 1970s and continues on to this day as
a popular way of thinking and reasoning (with the freedom to choose one’s preferred moral
belief system and lifestyle).

An existentialist could either be a religious moralist, agnostic relativist, or an amoral

atheist. Kierkegaard, a religious philosopher, Nietzsche, an anti-Christian, Sartre, an atheist,
and Camus an atheist, are credited for their works and writings about existentialism. Sartre
is noted for binging the most international attention to existentialism in the 20th century.

Each basically agrees that human life is in no way complete and fully satisfying because of
suffering and losses that occur when considering the lack of perfection, power, and control
one has over their life. Even though they do agree that life is not optimally satisfying, it
nonetheless has meaning. Existentialism is the search and journey for true self and true
personal meaning in life.

Most importantly, it is the arbitrary act that existentialism finds most objectionable-that is,
when someone or society tries to impose or demand that their beliefs, values, or rules be
faithfully accepted and obeyed. Existentialists believe this destroys individualism and
makes a person become whatever the people in power desire thus they are dehumanized
and reduced to being an object. Existentialism then stresses that a persons judgment is the
determining factor for what is to be believed rather than by arbitrary religious or secular
world values.

I hope the readers of this blog will consider submitting a paper to the 102nd
Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP), which is
being held here in Atlanta, GA, April 15-17, 2010 (and the philosophy program is
being run by Georgia State's new addition, Dan Weiskopf).  Here's the info:

SSPP Webpage: http://southernsociety.org/

Information on 2010 meeting: http://southernsociety.org/annualmeeting.htm
Call for papers: http://southernsociety.org/Call%20For%20Papers.doc

Submission of papers having interdisciplinary interest is strongly encouraged.

Papers should be no longer than 3000 words and be accompanied by an abstract
of no more than 150 words. Submissions for the philosophy side of the program,
accompanied by the abstract submission form from the website, should be sent to:

Daniel Weiskopf
Department of Philosophy
Georgia State University
sspp.submission@gmail.com

Submission deadline: November 16, 2009 (postmarked midnight for electronic

submissions)

Please look below the fold to see the impressive invited side of the program.

Continue reading "SSPP 2010 in Atlanta: Call for Papers" »

Posted by Eddy Nahmias on Tuesday, August 04, 2009 at 01:55 PM | Permalink |

Comments (1)

Comments on "Mental Representations: Old Ones for New" appreciated

Dear Experimental Philosophers,

I've put up fairly developed drafts of the Introduction and first four chapters of a book.  It's
at:

http://philosophyandneuroscience.wordpress.com/

I'd love to get any comments you feel like making, either there or to

ajjacobson@uh.edu

The central thesis is that there is a model of the mind's relation to its environment that
comes from Aristotle through at least Hume and that it provides a better model of 
"representations" in cognitive neuroscience that the current philosophical conception of
representation does.

The old representations I  recommend are "Aristotelian representations".

I should warn you that as "representation" is used in philosophy, the thesis I advance is
false by definition (or something like that).  I try to present a lead up through the
introduction and chapter one that will give one a firm enough grasp on the alternative sense
to make the later chapters intelligible.

To come are chapers one:

concepts/homology and normativity/perception/emotions/action.

Chapter three and four are in need of mild reformating, which I should get done Sat.
morning.

Posted by AnneJacobson on Friday, July 31, 2009 at 03:19 PM | Permalink | Comments (4)

CFP: British Society for Ethical Theory conference 2010

British Society for Ethical Theory (BSET) welcomes submissions in any area of normative
ethics, meta-ethics, or moral psychology to be considered for its July 2010 conference.

Word limit: 6500. Selected papers will also be considered for publication in Ethical Theory
and Moral Practice.

Deadline: Friday 11 December 2009.

Submissions must be made by email.

For full details, visit the BSET website.

Posted by Jonathan Webber on Friday, July 31, 2009 at 10:41 AM | Permalink | Comments
(0)

Professors on the Morality of Voting

[Cross posted at The Splintered Mind.]

Professors appear to think that voting regularly in public elections is about as morally good
as donating 10% of one's income to charity. This seems, anyway, to be suggested by the
results of a survey Josh Rust and I sent earlier this year to hundreds of U.S. professors,
ethicists and non-ethicists, both inside and outside of philosophy. (The survey is also
described in a couple of previous posts at The Splintered Mind.)

In one part of the survey, we asked professors to rate various actions on a nine point scale
from "very morally bad" through "morally neutral" to "very morally good". Although some
actions we expected to be rated negatively (e.g., "not consistently responding to student
emails"), there were three we expected to be rated positively by most respondents:
"regularly voting in public elections", "regularly donating blood", and "donating 10% of
one's income to charity". Later in the survey, we asked related questions about the
professors' own behavior, allowing us to compare expressed normative attitudes with self-
described behavior. (In some cases we also have direct measures of behavior to compare
with the self-reports.)

Looking at the data today, I found it striking how strongly the respondents seemed to feel
about voting. Overall, 87.9% of the professors characterized voting in public elections as
morally good. Only 12.0% said voting was morally neutral, and a lonely single professor (1
of the 569 respondents or 0.2%) characterized it as morally bad. That's a pretty strong
consensus. Political philosophers were no more cynical about voting than the others, with
84.5% responding on the positive side of the scale (a difference well within the range of
statistical chance variation). But I was struck, even more than by the percentage who
responded on the morally good side of our scale, by the high value they seemed to put on
voting. To appreciate this, we need to compare the voting question with the two other
questions I mentioned.

On our 1 to 9 scale (with 5 "morally neutral" and 9 "very morally good"), the mean rating
of "regularly donating blood" was 6.81, and the mean rating of "donating 10% of one's
income to charity" was 7.36. "Regularly voting in public elections" came in just a smidgen
above the second of those, at 7.37 (the difference being within statistical chance, of course).

I think we can assume that most people think it's fairly praiseworthy to donate 10% of one's
income to charity (for the average professor, this would be about $8,000). Professors seem
to be saying that voting is just about equally good. Someone who regularly donates blood
can probably count at least one saved life to her credit; voting seems to be rated
considerably better than that. (Of course, donating 10% of one's income to charity as a
regular matter probably entails saving even more lives, if one gives to life-saving type
charities, so it makes a kind of utilitarian sense to rate the money donation as better than the
blood donation.)

Another measure of the importance professors seem to invest in voting is the rate at which
they report doing it. Among professors who described themselves as U.S. citizens eligible
to vote, fully 97.8% said they had voted in the Nov. 2008, U.S. Presidential election.
(Whether this claim of near-perfect participation is true remains to be seen. We hope to get
some data on this shortly.)

Now is it just crazy to say that voting is as morally good as giving 10% of one's income to
charity? That was my first reaction. Giving that much to charity seems uncommon to me
and highly admirable, while voting... yeah, it's good to do, of course, but not that good. One
thought, however -- adapted from Derek Parfit -- gives me pause about that easy
assessment. In the U.S. 2008 Presidential election, I'd have said the world would be in the
ballpark of $10 trillion better off with one of the candidates than the other. (Just consider
the financial and human costs at stake in the Iraq war and the U.S. bank bailouts, for
starters.) Although my vote, being only one of about 100,000,000 cast, probably had only
about a 1/100,000,000 chance of tilting the election, multiplying that tiny probability by a
round trillion leaves a $10,000 expected public benefit from my voting -- not so far from
10% of my salary.

Of course, that calculation is incredibly problematic in any number of ways. I don't stand
behind it, but it helps loosen the grip of my previous intuition that of course it's morally
better to donate 10% to charity than to vote.

Posted by Eric Schwitzgebel on Tuesday, July 28, 2009 at 08:59 PM | Permalink |

Comments (10)

More Press on Experimental Philosophy: Süddeutsche Zeitung

Malte Dahlgrün, a German philosopher of mind and cognitive science, has recently written
an excellent article on experimental philosophy in the  renowned Süddeutsche Zeitung
(07/06/2009, p. 12).

Here is a copy of the article (click on it to see a larger version):

Posted by Edouard Machery on Friday, July 24, 2009 at 01:30 PM | Permalink | Comments
(1)

Review of Experimental Philosophy

I recently finished a draft of a review of the book Experimental Philosophy edited by

Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols:

http://www.joshdmay.com/wp-content/media/xphi-review.pdf

I’m reviewing it for Philosophical Psychology. I’ll be sending them the final version soon.
Feel free to take a look and tell me if there are any blunders! I focus mostly on the opening
chapter by the editors and cover some issues that were brought up on the Arche
Methodology Project blog (as Jonathan Weinberg mentioned here).

Update: I've revised the draft in light of some of the comments here. Thanks everyone!

Posted by Josh May on Thursday, July 23, 2009 at 05:49 PM in Books | Permalink |
Comments (17) | TrackBack (0)

Another group session of interest at the Eastern APA....

The Society for Empirical Ethics will also be hosting two group sessions at the Eastern this
December. The topic for the sessions is "The development of virtue: Insights from philosophy and
psychology".

For anyone interested, I'm posting the schedule and line-up below:

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, EASTERN DIVISION

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM
DECEMBER 27-30, 2009
GROUP PROGRAM
 
MONDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 28, 2009
GROUP SESSION II – 9:00-11:00 A.M.

GII-9. Society for Empirical Ethics

9:00-11:00 a.m.
Speakers:
Jennifer Baker (College of Charleston): “Oikeiosis in the 21st Century”
Melissa Seymour Fahmy (University of Georgia): “A Kantian Picture of Moral Development”
Nadia Chernyak (Cornell University) and Tamar Kushnir (Cornell University) (co-authored paper)
“Preschoolers’ Understanding of Freedom of Choice”

MONDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 28, 2009

GROUP SESSION III – 11:15 A.M.-1:15 P.M.

GIII-9. Society for Empirical Ethics

11:15 a.m.-1:15 p.m.
Speakers:
Craig Joseph (Northwestern University): “Virtue Theory as an Integrative Account of Moral
Psychology”
Mark Sheskin (Yale University): "Origins of Altruistic Punishment"
Deena Weisberg (Rutgers University): “What Influences Children’s Moral Judgments?”

Posted by Jen Wright on Tuesday, July 21, 2009 at 01:54 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Law and Neuroscience Blog

I thought some readers of this blog might be interested in The Law and Neuroscience Blog
we just launched as part of the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project.  If you have any
thoughts or suggestions, please don't hesitate to ask.  Given the interdisciplinary nature of
the LANP more generally, I think that much of what gets posted on the new blog should
appeal to the folks who frequent the X-Phi blog. Hopefully, I am right! 

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Tuesday, July 21, 2009 at 01:00 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

X-Phi at the Eastern APA

I am pleased to announce that we will hold the first group session for the recently formed
Experimental Philosophy Society (XPS) at the Eastern APA this December in New York
City.  The time and and program for the session is as follows:

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, EASTERN DIVISION

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

DECEMBER 27-30, 2009

GROUP PROGRAM
 
MONDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 28, 2009
GROUP SESSION VI – 7:30-10:30 P.M.
 
GVI-13. Experimental Philosophy Society
7:30-10:30 p.m.

Speaker: Stephen Stich (Rutgers University)

“Experimental Philosophy as a Subversive Activity”
Commentator: Alfred Mele (Florida State University)

Speaker: Jen Wright (College of Charleston)

“Stability of Intuitions: A Matter of Confidence?”
Commentator: John Bengson (University of Texas)

Speaker: Justin Sytsma (University of Pittsburgh)

“The Proper Province of Philosophy: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Investigation”
Commentator: Chauncey Maher (Dickinson College)

Speaker: Blake Myers-Schulz (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

“Judgments of Belief and Knowledge: Interactive yet Independent”Commentator: Mark
Phelan (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill)

Needless to say, I am excited about the program.  Hopefully, we will see all of you there. 
And in the event that you have yet to join XPS, please do so.  To date, the following folks
are members:

 Stephen Stich
 Eddy Nahmias
 Thomas Nadelhoffer
 Josh Greene
 Eric Schwitzgebel
 Liane Young
 Edouard Machery
 Jonathan Weinberg
 Jen Wright
 Josh Knobe
 Shaun Nichols
 Justin Sytsma
 William Rottschaefer
 Richard Gawne
 Bryony Pierce
 Josh May
 Tucker Lentz
 Blake Myers-Schulz
 Marshall Naylor
 Jon Buckwalter
 Mark Alfano
 Jennifer Giesselmann
 Thomas Lane
 Gunnar Bjornsson
 Justin Weinberg

Hopefully, more of you will join the ranks soon.  After all, the more members we have, the
more we can do in terms of organizing conferences, workshops, group meetings, grad
students travel stipends, etc.  So, please sign up if you have yet to do so!

p.s.  It is worth pointing out that owing to a rapidly approaching deadline, we could not do
a call for papers for this year's APA group session.  However, the next time around, we
plan to do so!

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Tuesday, July 21, 2009 at 12:50 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions: More X-Phi on Free Will

The post and discussion are at The Garden of Forking Paths blog here.

Posted by Eddy Nahmias on Monday, July 20, 2009 at 02:30 PM | Permalink | Comments
(0)

Experiment Month
Tamar Gendler, Joshua Knobe, and I are putting together a project to help philosophers interested
in applying experimental methods to philosophical topics. We are calling our project, “Experiment
Month”. In brief, we will encourage philosophers to submit proposed experiments in the Fall of
2010. A team of qualified volunteers will select the most interesting and viable proposals for
inclusion in the Experiment Month. They will provide helpful comments on selected submissions
and assign “experiment buddies” to help researchers further refine their proposed experiments.
In March of 2011 (the Experiment Month), revised versions of the selected experimental studies will
be made available on the project website, where we will encourage large-scale experimental
participation from the philosophical community and from the broader public.
 
As we move forward with this project, we would like to get your input on the attached proposal. The
proposal was submitted to the American Philosophical Assoniation on June 30th, in time to be
considered for a portion of the grant money the Eastern Division is making available to such
projects. We will be making further revisions to this proposal and plan to submit it for an NEH
Digital Humanities Start-Up Grant in April of 2010. Suggestions from the experimental philosophy
community would be much appreciated as we move forward with this project.
 
 
Download Experiment_Month_Final

Posted by Mark Phelan on Sunday, July 19, 2009 at 08:50 AM | Permalink | Comments (5)

Side-Effect Effect Without Side Effects and Side Effects without Side-Effect
Effect

Together with Hichem Naar, we just finished writing the full version of our paper about the
Knobe Effect, whose previous shorter version could be read here. The paper is about the
range of the Knobe Effect and contains two experiments.

Experiment 1 refutes the idea that Knobe Effect is limited to side effects and shows that
means are also in the range of the Knobe Effect.
Experiment 2 shows that good side effects in which the agent is considered to really care
about the side effect are judged strongly intentional, thus suppressing the asymmetry.
You can download the file here: Download KnobeMEANS2
I'm planning to submit the paper by the end of the week. Comments are welcome.

Posted by Florian Cova on Sunday, July 12, 2009 at 05:14 PM | Permalink | Comments (3)

"On Objecting to 'Experimental Philosophy'"

Jonathan Ichikawa & Josh May are having a conversation over here that may be of interest
to some of our readers.

Posted by jonathan weinberg on Friday, July 10, 2009 at 03:16 PM | Permalink | Comments
(1)

CFP

Hi fellow experimentalist,

The 2nd annual Interdisciplinary Approaches to Philosophical Issues Conference is

currently accepting submissions. This year's theme is perception, action, and consciousness.
Submissions that broadly meet any of these categories are encouraged. For the CFP, see
here.

Last year's meeting was well attended by the X-Phi community, and we are hoping for
another solid turnout.

This year's keynote speaker is Marcel Kinsbourne.

We are also hosting a series of special invited speakers that will include John Bickle,
Andrea Scarantino, and Daniel Weiskopf.

The conference will be held on Sept. 25 & 26 at the University of South Alabama in
Mobile, AL.

Posted by Jason Shepard on Thursday, July 02, 2009 at 10:45 AM | Permalink | Comments
(1)

Sad News...

Steve Stitch asked me to pass along the following:

There is some sad news.  Nicola Knight, a gifted young researcher who worked at the
intersection of anthropology, psychology and philosophy, died of a heart attack on June 9,
at the age of 33.  Nicola had done collaborative work with Justin Barrett, Scott Atran, Dick
Nisbett and others.  His groundbreaking study of the patterns of justification that people
offer for their moral judgments is currently under review.  There is a brief memorial notice
by Dan Sperber online here.

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Sunday, June 28, 2009 at 12:08 PM | Permalink |

Comments (1)

What Situationist Experiments Show

Long time reader; first time poster.   I'm breaking my silence because we've just finished a
paper on virtue ethics and the person-situation debate that might be of interest to some X-
Philes.  There aren't many philosophers (or psychologists for that matter) who would be
interested in a paper about the true meaning of the correlation coefficient and how it relates
to the person-situation debate.  But, given the discussion here, I'm guessing that some of
you might be.

Here are the details.

What Situationist Experiments Show.

John Campbell, Sarah Meerschaert, Anthony Chemero

Abstract:  Recent critiques of virtue ethics presume that the situationist side is the clear
winner in the person-situation debate in psychology. This widely shared presumption is
based on some striking findings on the power of situations to influence behavior. However,
careful consideration of the empirical evidence and, especially, the nature of correlation
coefficients shows that personality traits also account for a large proportion of the
variability in human behavior. So the presumed victory for the situationist side is premature
at best.

http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/campcoughchemsubmit.pdf

Comments most appreciated.

cheers, tony

Posted by Tony Chemero on Friday, June 26, 2009 at 10:55 PM in Ethics, Social
Psychology | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack (0)

X-phi on the BBC

The BBC programme Analysis has a show on moral x-phi this Sunday. But the pre-publicity is not very
encouraging.

Thought Experiments
Studies have shown that if the smell of fresh bread is in the air we are far more generous than otherwise. In the
past few years, a fascinating range of experiments has begun to shed light on the moral choices humans make.
Philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards asks whether the results can tell us not just how we tend to behave, but
how we should behave.

You can find the show at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00l55xp and there is a podcast

Posted by Paul Griffiths on Thursday, June 25, 2009 at 06:11 PM | Permalink | Comments
(7)

Conference on Conditionals

Thanks to Richard Dietz for sending me the following conference announcement:

Conditionals and Conditionalization Conference
Formal Epistemology Project (FEP), Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Institute of
Philosophy, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, Sept 4-6, 2009
Organizers: Richard Dietz and Igor Douven

While it strikes most as obvious that there exist close conceptual connections between
conditionals and conditionalization, it is far less obvious what these connections precisely
are. The aim of the workshop is to investigate these connections from an interdisciplinary
perspective, drawing on recent work in philosophy and experimental psychology. The time
is ripe for such an approach, given that both linguists and psychologists working on
conditionals are increasingly turning to the probabilistic theories of conditionals that
philosophers have been developing over the past forty years or so. On the other hand,
various philosophical claims have been made about conditionals – in particular concerning
their semantics and pragmatics – apparently on no other basis than the linguistic intuitions
of the philosophers making these claims. It would be interesting, and from a
methodological perspective desirable, to subject these claims to more rigorous testing,
which is where experimental psychologists could help (and, to some extent, have already
helped).

Speakers:

Horacio Arlo-Costa (Carnegie Mellon)

Jean-François Bonnefon (Toulouse)
Richard Bradley (LSE)
John Cantwell (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm)
Richard Dietz (Leuven)
Igor Douven (Leuven)
Shira Elqayam (De Monfort University, Leicester)
David Etlin (Leuven)
Alan Hájek (ANU)
James Hawthorne (Oklahoma)
Janneke Huitink (Frankfurt/M.)
Peter Milne (Stirling)
David Over (Durham)
Niki Pfeifer (Salzburg)
Gerhard Schurz (Duesseldorf)
Sara Verbrugge (Leuven)
Jonathan Weisberg (Toronto)

There is no registration fee. However, if you would like to attend talks, lunches and/or
dinners, please send an email to richard.dietz@hiw.kuleuven.be by August 15 at the latest.

Further particulars will be circulated nearer the time. For further information, please contact
Richard Dietz under the above email address.

Hopefully, some of the readers of this blog can make it.  If so, please post something
afterwards to let us know how it went!

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Monday, June 22, 2009 at 10:41 AM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

New Philosophy of Science Journal

Some readers of this blog may be interested by this new journal:

The European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) has signed a contract with Springer concerning the
establishment of a new journal: the European Journal for Philosophy of Science (EJPS). The Editorial Team is
a group of excellent philosophers of science with a variety of backgrounds and fields of expertise. The Editor-
in-Chief is Carl Hoefer (Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain) and the deputy editor is Mauro Dorato
(University of Rome III, Italy). Franz Huber (Konstanz, Germany) Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh, USA), Michela
Massimi (London, UK), Samir Okasha (Bristol, UK) and Jesús Zamora (UNED, Spain) are Associate Editors.
The Editorial Team will be assisted in its work by an Editorial Board of highly reputed philosophers of science
from around the world.
EJPS is the official journal of EPSA and will appear three times a year, beginning in January 2011. EJPS will
aim to publish first-rate research in all areas of philosophy of science. Information concerning submissions to
EJPS will be announced in the forthcoming weeks by the Editorial Team.

EJPS will be publishing (among other things) articles in the philosophy of psychology,
cognitive science, neuropsychology, and neuroscience.

Posted by Edouard Machery on Sunday, June 21, 2009 at 12:56 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

X-phi on Twitter

X-phi twits may be interested in the x-phi Twitter stream.

Posted by Eric Schwitzgebel on Sunday, June 21, 2009 at 12:11 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

Next »

XPS
 Experimental Philosophy Society (XPS)

Recent Posts
 SSPP 2010 in Atlanta: Call for Papers
 Comments on "Mental Representations: Old Ones for New" appreciated
 CFP: British Society for Ethical Theory conference 2010
 Professors on the Morality of Voting
 More Press on Experimental Philosophy: Süddeutsche Zeitung
 Review of Experimental Philosophy
 Another group session of interest at the Eastern APA....
 The Law and Neuroscience Blog
 X-Phi at the Eastern APA
 An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions: More X-Phi on Free Will

Recent Comments
 Search Engine Optimization - SEO Tips on Bibliography Update
 Jason Brennan on Professors on the Morality of Voting
 dissertation writing help on Explaining the Knobe Effect
 Anne Jacobson on Comments on "Mental Representations: Old Ones for New"
appreciated
 jonathan weinberg on Review of Experimental Philosophy
 Eric Schwitzgebel on Professors on the Morality of Voting
 Josh May on Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions
 Josh May on Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions
 Josh May on SSPP 2010 in Atlanta: Call for Papers
 Dorette van der Tholen on Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and
Knowledge Attributions

Google Search
 Google Search

WWW
 http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/

Coordinator
 Thomas Nadelhoffer

Contributors

 Adam Arico
 Adam Feltz
 Adina Roskies
 Alexandra Plakias
 Alfred Mele
 Anand Vaidya
 Anne Jacobson
 Aryn Conrad
 Benoit Hardy-Vallée
 Blake Myers-Schulz
 Brandon Towl
 Bryce Huebner
 Bryony Pierce
 Carlos Mauro
 Chandra Sekhar Sripada
 Chris S. of Mixing Memory
 Christopher Robertson
 Clayton Littlejohn
 Craig Roxborough
 Cristina Bicchieri
 Daryl Cameron
 David Faraci
 David Pizarro
 David Tannenbaum
 Dirk Derom
 Dushan Wegner
 Dustin Stokes
 Eddy Nahmias
 Edouard Machery
 Eric Mandelbaum
 Eric Schwitzgebel
 Felipe De Brigard
 Fiery Cushman
 Finn Spicer
 Florian Cova
 Francesco Guala
 Hagop Sarkissian
 Hichem Naar
 Horacio Arlo-Costa
 James Beebe
 Jen Wright
 Jennifer Nado
 Jesse Prinz
 Jill Cumby
 Joachim Horvath
 Joe Paxton
 John Alexander
 John Mikhail
 Jonathan Phillips
 Jonathan Webber
 Jonathan Weinberg
 Josh May
  Joshua Alexander
 Joshua Greene
 Joshua Knobe
 Jussi Jylkka
 Justin Sytsma
 Karola Stotz
 Kate Devitt
 Kathryn Norlock
 Kevin Timpe
 Liane Young
 Lisa Lederer
 Luis Manuel Ledo-Regal
 Manuel Vargas
 Marica Bernstein
 Mark Phelan
 Matteo Mameli
 Matthew James
 Meir Statman
 N. Ángel Pinillos
 Neil Levy
 Nicole Hassoun
 Paul Bloom
 Paul Griffiths
 Pete Mandik
 Peter Jaworski
 Ram Neta
 Rob Wilson
 Ron Mallon
 Sandra Pellizzoni
 Sarah Allen
 Scott Ewing
 Shaun Nichols
 Stephen Stich
 Steve Guglielmo
 Susana Cadilha
 Sven Nyholm
 Tamar Gendler
 Theresa Lopez
 Thomas Grundmann
 Thomas Nadelhoffer
 Tiziana Zalla
 Tony Chemero
 Travis Proulx
 Valerie Tiberius
 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
 Wes Anderson
 Wesley Buckwalter

Special Thanks:
 Dickinson College Department of Philosophy

Categories
 Action theory
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  Philosophy of law
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 November 2008

More...

Subscribe to this blog's feed

I hope the readers of this blog will consider submitting a paper to the 102nd
Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP), which is
being held here in Atlanta, GA, April 15-17, 2010 (and the philosophy program is
being run by Georgia State's new addition, Dan Weiskopf).  Here's the info:

SSPP Webpage: http://southernsociety.org/

Information on 2010 meeting: http://southernsociety.org/annualmeeting.htm
Call for papers: http://southernsociety.org/Call%20For%20Papers.doc

Submission of papers having interdisciplinary interest is strongly encouraged.

Papers should be no longer than 3000 words and be accompanied by an abstract
of no more than 150 words. Submissions for the philosophy side of the program,
accompanied by the abstract submission form from the website, should be sent to:

Daniel Weiskopf
Department of Philosophy
Georgia State University
sspp.submission@gmail.com

Submission deadline: November 16, 2009 (postmarked midnight for electronic

submissions)

Please look below the fold to see the impressive invited side of the program.

Continue reading "SSPP 2010 in Atlanta: Call for Papers" »

Posted by Eddy Nahmias on Tuesday, August 04, 2009 at 01:55 PM | Permalink |

Comments (1)

Comments on "Mental Representations: Old Ones for New" appreciated

Dear Experimental Philosophers,

I've put up fairly developed drafts of the Introduction and first four chapters of a book.  It's
at:

http://philosophyandneuroscience.wordpress.com/

I'd love to get any comments you feel like making, either there or to
ajjacobson@uh.edu

The central thesis is that there is a model of the mind's relation to its environment that
comes from Aristotle through at least Hume and that it provides a better model of 
"representations" in cognitive neuroscience that the current philosophical conception of
representation does.

The old representations I  recommend are "Aristotelian representations".

I should warn you that as "representation" is used in philosophy, the thesis I advance is
false by definition (or something like that).  I try to present a lead up through the
introduction and chapter one that will give one a firm enough grasp on the alternative sense
to make the later chapters intelligible.

To come are chapers one:

concepts/homology and normativity/perception/emotions/action.

Chapter three and four are in need of mild reformating, which I should get done Sat.
morning.

Posted by AnneJacobson on Friday, July 31, 2009 at 03:19 PM | Permalink | Comments (4)

CFP: British Society for Ethical Theory conference 2010

British Society for Ethical Theory (BSET) welcomes submissions in any area of normative
ethics, meta-ethics, or moral psychology to be considered for its July 2010 conference.

Word limit: 6500. Selected papers will also be considered for publication in Ethical Theory
and Moral Practice.

Deadline: Friday 11 December 2009.

Submissions must be made by email.

For full details, visit the BSET website.

Posted by Jonathan Webber on Friday, July 31, 2009 at 10:41 AM | Permalink | Comments
(0)

Professors on the Morality of Voting

[Cross posted at The Splintered Mind.]

Professors appear to think that voting regularly in public elections is about as morally good
as donating 10% of one's income to charity. This seems, anyway, to be suggested by the
results of a survey Josh Rust and I sent earlier this year to hundreds of U.S. professors,
ethicists and non-ethicists, both inside and outside of philosophy. (The survey is also
described in a couple of previous posts at The Splintered Mind.)

In one part of the survey, we asked professors to rate various actions on a nine point scale
from "very morally bad" through "morally neutral" to "very morally good". Although some
actions we expected to be rated negatively (e.g., "not consistently responding to student
emails"), there were three we expected to be rated positively by most respondents:
"regularly voting in public elections", "regularly donating blood", and "donating 10% of
one's income to charity". Later in the survey, we asked related questions about the
professors' own behavior, allowing us to compare expressed normative attitudes with self-
described behavior. (In some cases we also have direct measures of behavior to compare
with the self-reports.)

Looking at the data today, I found it striking how strongly the respondents seemed to feel
about voting. Overall, 87.9% of the professors characterized voting in public elections as
morally good. Only 12.0% said voting was morally neutral, and a lonely single professor (1
of the 569 respondents or 0.2%) characterized it as morally bad. That's a pretty strong
consensus. Political philosophers were no more cynical about voting than the others, with
84.5% responding on the positive side of the scale (a difference well within the range of
statistical chance variation). But I was struck, even more than by the percentage who
responded on the morally good side of our scale, by the high value they seemed to put on
voting. To appreciate this, we need to compare the voting question with the two other
questions I mentioned.

On our 1 to 9 scale (with 5 "morally neutral" and 9 "very morally good"), the mean rating
of "regularly donating blood" was 6.81, and the mean rating of "donating 10% of one's
income to charity" was 7.36. "Regularly voting in public elections" came in just a smidgen
above the second of those, at 7.37 (the difference being within statistical chance, of course).

I think we can assume that most people think it's fairly praiseworthy to donate 10% of one's
income to charity (for the average professor, this would be about $8,000). Professors seem
to be saying that voting is just about equally good. Someone who regularly donates blood
can probably count at least one saved life to her credit; voting seems to be rated
considerably better than that. (Of course, donating 10% of one's income to charity as a
regular matter probably entails saving even more lives, if one gives to life-saving type
charities, so it makes a kind of utilitarian sense to rate the money donation as better than the
blood donation.)

Another measure of the importance professors seem to invest in voting is the rate at which
they report doing it. Among professors who described themselves as U.S. citizens eligible
to vote, fully 97.8% said they had voted in the Nov. 2008, U.S. Presidential election.
(Whether this claim of near-perfect participation is true remains to be seen. We hope to get
some data on this shortly.)

Now is it just crazy to say that voting is as morally good as giving 10% of one's income to
charity? That was my first reaction. Giving that much to charity seems uncommon to me
and highly admirable, while voting... yeah, it's good to do, of course, but not that good. One
thought, however -- adapted from Derek Parfit -- gives me pause about that easy
assessment. In the U.S. 2008 Presidential election, I'd have said the world would be in the
ballpark of $10 trillion better off with one of the candidates than the other. (Just consider
the financial and human costs at stake in the Iraq war and the U.S. bank bailouts, for
starters.) Although my vote, being only one of about 100,000,000 cast, probably had only
about a 1/100,000,000 chance of tilting the election, multiplying that tiny probability by a
round trillion leaves a $10,000 expected public benefit from my voting -- not so far from
10% of my salary.

Of course, that calculation is incredibly problematic in any number of ways. I don't stand
behind it, but it helps loosen the grip of my previous intuition that of course it's morally
better to donate 10% to charity than to vote.

Posted by Eric Schwitzgebel on Tuesday, July 28, 2009 at 08:59 PM | Permalink |

Comments (10)

More Press on Experimental Philosophy: Süddeutsche Zeitung

Malte Dahlgrün, a German philosopher of mind and cognitive science, has recently written
an excellent article on experimental philosophy in the  renowned Süddeutsche Zeitung
(07/06/2009, p. 12).
Here is a copy of the article (click on it to see a larger version):

Posted by Edouard Machery on Friday, July 24, 2009 at 01:30 PM | Permalink | Comments
(1)

Review of Experimental Philosophy

I recently finished a draft of a review of the book Experimental Philosophy edited by

Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols:

http://www.joshdmay.com/wp-content/media/xphi-review.pdf

I’m reviewing it for Philosophical Psychology. I’ll be sending them the final version soon.
Feel free to take a look and tell me if there are any blunders! I focus mostly on the opening
chapter by the editors and cover some issues that were brought up on the Arche
Methodology Project blog (as Jonathan Weinberg mentioned here).

Update: I've revised the draft in light of some of the comments here. Thanks everyone!

Posted by Josh May on Thursday, July 23, 2009 at 05:49 PM in Books | Permalink |
Comments (17) | TrackBack (0)

Another group session of interest at the Eastern APA....

The Society for Empirical Ethics will also be hosting two group sessions at the Eastern this
December. The topic for the sessions is "The development of virtue: Insights from philosophy and
psychology".

For anyone interested, I'm posting the schedule and line-up below:
THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, EASTERN DIVISION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM
DECEMBER 27-30, 2009
GROUP PROGRAM
 
MONDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 28, 2009
GROUP SESSION II – 9:00-11:00 A.M.

GII-9. Society for Empirical Ethics

9:00-11:00 a.m.
Speakers:
Jennifer Baker (College of Charleston): “Oikeiosis in the 21st Century”
Melissa Seymour Fahmy (University of Georgia): “A Kantian Picture of Moral Development”
Nadia Chernyak (Cornell University) and Tamar Kushnir (Cornell University) (co-authored paper)
“Preschoolers’ Understanding of Freedom of Choice”

MONDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 28, 2009

GROUP SESSION III – 11:15 A.M.-1:15 P.M.

GIII-9. Society for Empirical Ethics

11:15 a.m.-1:15 p.m.
Speakers:
Craig Joseph (Northwestern University): “Virtue Theory as an Integrative Account of Moral
Psychology”
Mark Sheskin (Yale University): "Origins of Altruistic Punishment"
Deena Weisberg (Rutgers University): “What Influences Children’s Moral Judgments?”

Posted by Jen Wright on Tuesday, July 21, 2009 at 01:54 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Law and Neuroscience Blog

I thought some readers of this blog might be interested in The Law and Neuroscience Blog
we just launched as part of the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project.  If you have any
thoughts or suggestions, please don't hesitate to ask.  Given the interdisciplinary nature of
the LANP more generally, I think that much of what gets posted on the new blog should
appeal to the folks who frequent the X-Phi blog. Hopefully, I am right! 

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Tuesday, July 21, 2009 at 01:00 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

X-Phi at the Eastern APA

I am pleased to announce that we will hold the first group session for the recently formed
Experimental Philosophy Society (XPS) at the Eastern APA this December in New York
City.  The time and and program for the session is as follows:

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, EASTERN DIVISION

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

DECEMBER 27-30, 2009

GROUP PROGRAM
 
MONDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 28, 2009
GROUP SESSION VI – 7:30-10:30 P.M.
 
GVI-13. Experimental Philosophy Society
7:30-10:30 p.m.

Speaker: Stephen Stich (Rutgers University)

“Experimental Philosophy as a Subversive Activity”
Commentator: Alfred Mele (Florida State University)

Speaker: Jen Wright (College of Charleston)

“Stability of Intuitions: A Matter of Confidence?”
Commentator: John Bengson (University of Texas)
Speaker: Justin Sytsma (University of Pittsburgh)
“The Proper Province of Philosophy: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Investigation”
Commentator: Chauncey Maher (Dickinson College)

Speaker: Blake Myers-Schulz (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

“Judgments of Belief and Knowledge: Interactive yet Independent”Commentator: Mark
Phelan (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill)

Needless to say, I am excited about the program.  Hopefully, we will see all of you there. 
And in the event that you have yet to join XPS, please do so.  To date, the following folks
are members:

 Stephen Stich
 Eddy Nahmias
 Thomas Nadelhoffer
 Josh Greene
 Eric Schwitzgebel
 Liane Young
 Edouard Machery
 Jonathan Weinberg
 Jen Wright
 Josh Knobe
 Shaun Nichols
 Justin Sytsma
 William Rottschaefer
 Richard Gawne
 Bryony Pierce
 Josh May
 Tucker Lentz
 Blake Myers-Schulz
 Marshall Naylor
 Jon Buckwalter
 Mark Alfano
 Jennifer Giesselmann
 Thomas Lane
 Gunnar Bjornsson
 Justin Weinberg

Hopefully, more of you will join the ranks soon.  After all, the more members we have, the
more we can do in terms of organizing conferences, workshops, group meetings, grad
students travel stipends, etc.  So, please sign up if you have yet to do so!

p.s.  It is worth pointing out that owing to a rapidly approaching deadline, we could not do
a call for papers for this year's APA group session.  However, the next time around, we
plan to do so!

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Tuesday, July 21, 2009 at 12:50 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions: More X-Phi on Free Will

The post and discussion are at The Garden of Forking Paths blog here.

Posted by Eddy Nahmias on Monday, July 20, 2009 at 02:30 PM | Permalink | Comments
(0)

Experiment Month
Tamar Gendler, Joshua Knobe, and I are putting together a project to help philosophers interested
in applying experimental methods to philosophical topics. We are calling our project, “Experiment
Month”. In brief, we will encourage philosophers to submit proposed experiments in the Fall of
2010. A team of qualified volunteers will select the most interesting and viable proposals for
inclusion in the Experiment Month. They will provide helpful comments on selected submissions
and assign “experiment buddies” to help researchers further refine their proposed experiments.
In March of 2011 (the Experiment Month), revised versions of the selected experimental studies will
be made available on the project website, where we will encourage large-scale experimental
participation from the philosophical community and from the broader public.
 
As we move forward with this project, we would like to get your input on the attached proposal. The
proposal was submitted to the American Philosophical Assoniation on June 30th, in time to be
considered for a portion of the grant money the Eastern Division is making available to such
projects. We will be making further revisions to this proposal and plan to submit it for an NEH
Digital Humanities Start-Up Grant in April of 2010. Suggestions from the experimental philosophy
community would be much appreciated as we move forward with this project.
 
 
Download Experiment_Month_Final

Posted by Mark Phelan on Sunday, July 19, 2009 at 08:50 AM | Permalink | Comments (5)

Side-Effect Effect Without Side Effects and Side Effects without Side-Effect
Effect

Together with Hichem Naar, we just finished writing the full version of our paper about the
Knobe Effect, whose previous shorter version could be read here. The paper is about the
range of the Knobe Effect and contains two experiments.

Experiment 1 refutes the idea that Knobe Effect is limited to side effects and shows that
means are also in the range of the Knobe Effect.
Experiment 2 shows that good side effects in which the agent is considered to really care
about the side effect are judged strongly intentional, thus suppressing the asymmetry.
You can download the file here: Download KnobeMEANS2
I'm planning to submit the paper by the end of the week. Comments are welcome.

Posted by Florian Cova on Sunday, July 12, 2009 at 05:14 PM | Permalink | Comments (3)

"On Objecting to 'Experimental Philosophy'"

Jonathan Ichikawa & Josh May are having a conversation over here that may be of interest
to some of our readers.

Posted by jonathan weinberg on Friday, July 10, 2009 at 03:16 PM | Permalink | Comments
(1)

CFP

Hi fellow experimentalist,

The 2nd annual Interdisciplinary Approaches to Philosophical Issues Conference is

currently accepting submissions. This year's theme is perception, action, and consciousness.
Submissions that broadly meet any of these categories are encouraged. For the CFP, see
here.

Last year's meeting was well attended by the X-Phi community, and we are hoping for
another solid turnout.

This year's keynote speaker is Marcel Kinsbourne.

We are also hosting a series of special invited speakers that will include John Bickle,
Andrea Scarantino, and Daniel Weiskopf.

The conference will be held on Sept. 25 & 26 at the University of South Alabama in
Mobile, AL.

Posted by Jason Shepard on Thursday, July 02, 2009 at 10:45 AM | Permalink | Comments
(1)

Sad News...
Steve Stitch asked me to pass along the following:

There is some sad news.  Nicola Knight, a gifted young researcher who worked at the
intersection of anthropology, psychology and philosophy, died of a heart attack on June 9,
at the age of 33.  Nicola had done collaborative work with Justin Barrett, Scott Atran, Dick
Nisbett and others.  His groundbreaking study of the patterns of justification that people
offer for their moral judgments is currently under review.  There is a brief memorial notice
by Dan Sperber online here.

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Sunday, June 28, 2009 at 12:08 PM | Permalink |

Comments (1)

What Situationist Experiments Show

Long time reader; first time poster.   I'm breaking my silence because we've just finished a
paper on virtue ethics and the person-situation debate that might be of interest to some X-
Philes.  There aren't many philosophers (or psychologists for that matter) who would be
interested in a paper about the true meaning of the correlation coefficient and how it relates
to the person-situation debate.  But, given the discussion here, I'm guessing that some of
you might be.

Here are the details.

What Situationist Experiments Show.

John Campbell, Sarah Meerschaert, Anthony Chemero

Abstract:  Recent critiques of virtue ethics presume that the situationist side is the clear
winner in the person-situation debate in psychology. This widely shared presumption is
based on some striking findings on the power of situations to influence behavior. However,
careful consideration of the empirical evidence and, especially, the nature of correlation
coefficients shows that personality traits also account for a large proportion of the
variability in human behavior. So the presumed victory for the situationist side is premature
at best.

http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/campcoughchemsubmit.pdf

Comments most appreciated.

cheers, tony

Posted by Tony Chemero on Friday, June 26, 2009 at 10:55 PM in Ethics, Social
Psychology | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack (0)

X-phi on the BBC

The BBC programme Analysis has a show on moral x-phi this Sunday. But the pre-publicity is not very
encouraging.

Thought Experiments
Studies have shown that if the smell of fresh bread is in the air we are far more generous than otherwise. In the
past few years, a fascinating range of experiments has begun to shed light on the moral choices humans make.
Philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards asks whether the results can tell us not just how we tend to behave, but
how we should behave.

You can find the show at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00l55xp and there is a podcast

Posted by Paul Griffiths on Thursday, June 25, 2009 at 06:11 PM | Permalink | Comments
(7)

Conference on Conditionals
Thanks to Richard Dietz for sending me the following conference announcement:

Conditionals and Conditionalization Conference

Formal Epistemology Project (FEP), Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Institute of
Philosophy, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, Sept 4-6, 2009
Organizers: Richard Dietz and Igor Douven

While it strikes most as obvious that there exist close conceptual connections between
conditionals and conditionalization, it is far less obvious what these connections precisely
are. The aim of the workshop is to investigate these connections from an interdisciplinary
perspective, drawing on recent work in philosophy and experimental psychology. The time
is ripe for such an approach, given that both linguists and psychologists working on
conditionals are increasingly turning to the probabilistic theories of conditionals that
philosophers have been developing over the past forty years or so. On the other hand,
various philosophical claims have been made about conditionals – in particular concerning
their semantics and pragmatics – apparently on no other basis than the linguistic intuitions
of the philosophers making these claims. It would be interesting, and from a
methodological perspective desirable, to subject these claims to more rigorous testing,
which is where experimental psychologists could help (and, to some extent, have already
helped).

Speakers:

Horacio Arlo-Costa (Carnegie Mellon)

Jean-François Bonnefon (Toulouse)
Richard Bradley (LSE)
John Cantwell (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm)
Richard Dietz (Leuven)
Igor Douven (Leuven)
Shira Elqayam (De Monfort University, Leicester)
David Etlin (Leuven)
Alan Hájek (ANU)
James Hawthorne (Oklahoma)
Janneke Huitink (Frankfurt/M.)
Peter Milne (Stirling)
David Over (Durham)
Niki Pfeifer (Salzburg)
Gerhard Schurz (Duesseldorf)
Sara Verbrugge (Leuven)
Jonathan Weisberg (Toronto)

There is no registration fee. However, if you would like to attend talks, lunches and/or
dinners, please send an email to richard.dietz@hiw.kuleuven.be by August 15 at the latest.

Further particulars will be circulated nearer the time. For further information, please contact
Richard Dietz under the above email address.

Hopefully, some of the readers of this blog can make it.  If so, please post something
afterwards to let us know how it went!

Posted by Thomas Nadelhoffer on Monday, June 22, 2009 at 10:41 AM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

New Philosophy of Science Journal

Some readers of this blog may be interested by this new journal:

The European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) has signed a contract with Springer concerning the
establishment of a new journal: the European Journal for Philosophy of Science (EJPS). The Editorial Team is
a group of excellent philosophers of science with a variety of backgrounds and fields of expertise. The Editor-
in-Chief is Carl Hoefer (Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain) and the deputy editor is Mauro Dorato
(University of Rome III, Italy). Franz Huber (Konstanz, Germany) Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh, USA), Michela
Massimi (London, UK), Samir Okasha (Bristol, UK) and Jesús Zamora (UNED, Spain) are Associate Editors.
The Editorial Team will be assisted in its work by an Editorial Board of highly reputed philosophers of science
from around the world.

EJPS is the official journal of EPSA and will appear three times a year, beginning in January 2011. EJPS will
aim to publish first-rate research in all areas of philosophy of science. Information concerning submissions to
EJPS will be announced in the forthcoming weeks by the Editorial Team.

EJPS will be publishing (among other things) articles in the philosophy of psychology,
cognitive science, neuropsychology, and neuroscience.

Posted by Edouard Machery on Sunday, June 21, 2009 at 12:56 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

X-phi on Twitter

X-phi twits may be interested in the x-phi Twitter stream.

Posted by Eric Schwitzgebel on Sunday, June 21, 2009 at 12:11 PM | Permalink |

Comments (0)

Next »

XPS
 Experimental Philosophy Society (XPS)

Recent Posts
 SSPP 2010 in Atlanta: Call for Papers
 Comments on "Mental Representations: Old Ones for New" appreciated
 CFP: British Society for Ethical Theory conference 2010
 Professors on the Morality of Voting
 More Press on Experimental Philosophy: Süddeutsche Zeitung
 Review of Experimental Philosophy
 Another group session of interest at the Eastern APA....
 The Law and Neuroscience Blog
 X-Phi at the Eastern APA
 An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions: More X-Phi on Free Will

Recent Comments
 Search Engine Optimization - SEO Tips on Bibliography Update
 Jason Brennan on Professors on the Morality of Voting
 dissertation writing help on Explaining the Knobe Effect
 Anne Jacobson on Comments on "Mental Representations: Old Ones for New"
appreciated
 jonathan weinberg on Review of Experimental Philosophy
 Eric Schwitzgebel on Professors on the Morality of Voting
 Josh May on Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions
 Josh May on Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions
 Josh May on SSPP 2010 in Atlanta: Call for Papers
 Dorette van der Tholen on Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and
Knowledge Attributions

Google Search
 Google Search
 WWW

http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/

Coordinator
 Thomas Nadelhoffer

Contributors

 Adam Arico
 Adam Feltz
 Adina Roskies
 Alexandra Plakias
 Alfred Mele
 Anand Vaidya
 Anne Jacobson
 Aryn Conrad
 Benoit Hardy-Vallée
 Blake Myers-Schulz
 Brandon Towl
 Bryce Huebner
 Bryony Pierce
 Carlos Mauro
 Chandra Sekhar Sripada
 Chris S. of Mixing Memory
 Christopher Robertson
 Clayton Littlejohn
 Craig Roxborough
 Cristina Bicchieri
 Daryl Cameron
 David Faraci
 David Pizarro
 David Tannenbaum
 Dirk Derom
 Dushan Wegner
 Dustin Stokes
 Eddy Nahmias
 Edouard Machery
 Eric Mandelbaum
 Eric Schwitzgebel
 Felipe De Brigard
 Fiery Cushman
 Finn Spicer
 Florian Cova
 Francesco Guala
 Hagop Sarkissian
 Hichem Naar
 Horacio Arlo-Costa
 James Beebe
 Jen Wright
 Jennifer Nado
 Jesse Prinz
 Jill Cumby
 Joachim Horvath
 Joe Paxton
 John Alexander
 John Mikhail
 Jonathan Phillips
  Jonathan Webber
 Jonathan Weinberg
 Josh May
 Joshua Alexander
 Joshua Greene
 Joshua Knobe
 Jussi Jylkka
 Justin Sytsma
 Karola Stotz
 Kate Devitt
 Kathryn Norlock
 Kevin Timpe
 Liane Young
 Lisa Lederer
 Luis Manuel Ledo-Regal
 Manuel Vargas
 Marica Bernstein
 Mark Phelan
 Matteo Mameli
 Matthew James
 Meir Statman
 N. Ángel Pinillos
 Neil Levy
 Nicole Hassoun
 Paul Bloom
 Paul Griffiths
 Pete Mandik
 Peter Jaworski
 Ram Neta
 Rob Wilson
 Ron Mallon
 Sandra Pellizzoni
 Sarah Allen
 Scott Ewing
 Shaun Nichols
 Stephen Stich
 Steve Guglielmo
 Susana Cadilha
 Sven Nyholm
 Tamar Gendler
 Theresa Lopez
 Thomas Grundmann
 Thomas Nadelhoffer
 Tiziana Zalla
 Tony Chemero
 Travis Proulx
 Valerie Tiberius
 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
 Wes Anderson
 Wesley Buckwalter

Special Thanks:
 Dickinson College Department of Philosophy

Categories
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Archives
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