A.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO

CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.

G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

Facts: On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina
Maloto- Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing
that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an intestate proceeding
for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. While the case was still in progress, they executed an extrajudicial
settlement of Adriana’s estate dividing it into four equal parts among themselves. They presented the same and
successfully gained court approval. Three years later, a document was discovered entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),” purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana.  Atty. Palma claimed to
have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer
formerly used by Atty. Hervas. Malotos opposed the probate of the Will stating among others that the said will was
revoked. Two witnesses were presented to prove that the will was burned by Adriana herself.

Issue: Whether or not the will was validly revoked. 

Held: No, the will was not validly revoked. It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in
this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi
on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.

A valid revocation must be done with animus revocandi or the intention to revoke coupled with an overt physical act
of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence
and under his express direction. The document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established–that such was the will of Adriana Maloto. And that the burning was not proven to have
been done under the express direction of Adriana. Also the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses stated
that they were the only ones present at the place where papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses could not
have constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s Will.
B. Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA.
DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.

G.R. No. L-2538             September 21, 1951

Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving
any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein
petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and
Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the
testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20,
1939.

On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition, seeking the
probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated.
However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set
aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered
decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed
in accordance with law. (Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure)

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed another
petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same court. Again, the same
oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from
seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and
(3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.

Issues:

1. Was Molo’s will of 1918 subsequently revoked by his will of 1939?

2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator’s belief
that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect,
can the earlier will be admitted to probate?
Held:
1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine that “a subsequent will, containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.”
Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps because of the
peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the subject of revocation of wills, the
court is of the impression from a review and the study of the pertinent authorities that the doctrine laid
down in the Samson case is still a good law.

2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of “dependent relative
revocation”. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the
original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the
 destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new
will.

There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the original
of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in
1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who
prepared it, gave the original and copies to the testator himself and apparently they remained in his
possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied probate on
November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she found the
duplicate copy among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.

If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the
revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein
petitioner, the most logical step for the testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it
may likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy remained
in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21) years since
the first will was executed, the original of the will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was
a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing exactly the same testamentary
dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn
fact is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the
testator.

If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would make the testamentary
disposition in her favor invalid and ineffective, because it is a "disposicion captatoria", which
knowledge she may easily acquire through consultation with a lawyer, there was no need her to go
through the order of filing the petition for the probate of the will. She could accomplish her desire by
merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps leading to the probate of
the will executed in 1918. But for her conscience was clear and bade her to take the only proper step
possible under the circumstances, which is to institute the necessary proceedings for the probate of
the 1939 will. This she did and the will was admitted to probate. But then the unexpected happened.
Over her vigorous opposition, the herein appellants filed a petition for reopening, and over her
vigorous objection, the same was granted and the case was reopened. Her motion for
reconsideration was denied. Is it her fault that the case was reopened? Is it her fault that the order
admitting the will to probate was set aside? That was a contingency which petitioner never expected.
Had appellants not filed their opposition to the probate of the will and had they limited their objection
to the intrinsic validity of said will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the
deceased would have perhaps been accomplished. But they failed in their strategy. If said will was
denied probate it is due to their own effort. It is now unfair to impute bad faith petitioner simply
because she exerted every effort to protect her own interest and prevent the intestacy of the
deceased to happen.

1.What is a disposition captatoria? Is it valid? Why?

ANSWER: It is a disposition made upon the condition that the heir shall make provisions in his will in favor
of the testator or of any person (Art. 875, NCC). It is void, because it makes the making of a will
contractual or with a consideration. Basically, a will is an act of pure liberality.
C. Gallanosa v. Arcangel

83 SCRA 676 June 21, 1978

FACTS: Florentino Hitosis executed a will on June 19, 1938. He died on May 26, 1939. On June 24, 1939, a
petition for the probate of his will was filed in CFI Sorsogon. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by
the testator's legal heirs, namely, his surviving brother, Leon, his nephews and nieces. The CFI Judge admitted the
will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. The testamentary heirs later submitted a project of partition
covering 61 parcels of land, which was approved by the judge. In 1952, the heirs of Florentino’s deceased brothers
and sisters instituted an action for the recovery of the parcels of land. Gallanosa moved to dismiss on the ground of
bar by prior judgment in the probate proceeding. Judge dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. 28
years after the probate of the will, plaintiffs filed another action in the same court for the annulment of the will of
Hitosis and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land. They alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud and
deceit, caused the execution and simulation of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of
Florentino Hitosis.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will that has passed probate can be annulled

HELD: No annulment of will. Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order
that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will is mandatory. The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity
of the will. Testator of sound mind, no fraud: these cannot be questioned in subsequent proceeding. That means that
the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the finality of the allowance of
a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.

Atty Tiu: Why is it that there is no such animal as “ANNULMENT OF PROBATED WILL”? The explanation is
very simple. When you say annulment, what is the basic ground for annulling a document? It’s basically vitiated
consent. Now, if a will has passed probate, there is now a conclusive finding as to the voluntariness of the execution
of the will. Necessarily, it being conclusive, it follows that at the time of the making of the will, the testator was not
suffering from any vitiated consent. So, there is no such remedy as annulment of a probated will because Sec 1 of
Rule 75 says that, “a will that has been probated is conclusive as to its due execution.”

Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe, cannot possibly apply to last wills trial testaments.

D. SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG,
CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

Facts:
Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor.
It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.

Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will
was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the
petitioner.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16,
1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the
invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid
except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein
petitioner.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed
upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only
purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute
the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by
the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a
declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom
the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.

Held: The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void.

The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any
inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or
legacy is premature. True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for
probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides
the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may
pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and
the petitioner.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as
universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter
how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to
remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does
not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation m ade between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art. 1028, it is also prohibited.

Final Issue: The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the
testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he
had been living in concubinage.