Case 8

In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)

Facts

The Congress passed Republic Act No. 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953” which was allowed by
the president to become a law without his signature.

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50% in any subject, have obtained a general average
of 69.5% in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5% in 1952, 71.5% in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5% in 1954,
and 73.5% in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar.

Issue

Whether RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Ruling

The Court resolved that part of section 1 and the whole of section 2 of RA No. 972 is unconstitutional.

The portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and all of article 2 of said
law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

The part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955
inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, all the petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied,
and all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having
a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for
admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter,
and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and
those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
Case 9

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR, respondents.

Facts

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly for
having received the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, National Assembly
passed Resolution No. 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the National
Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the
Electoral Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period.
The Electoral Commission denied Angara's petition.

Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that there is no legal or constitutional
provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after
confirmation.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss
the Protest.”

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral
Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore
has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Issue

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy.

Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

Ruling

The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Court held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

From the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention it is evident in section 4 of Article 6 that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.
Case 10

Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 19 (1979)

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner;
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as
Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as
Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Facts

On December 2, 1974, President Marcos issued on Letter of Instruction No. 229 requiring all motor vehicles to be
equipped with an early warning device which shall be used whenever a vehicle is stalled, disabled or parked for 30
minutes or more.

Respondent Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 which provides for the
implementation of LOI 229 as amended,

Petitioner, an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car Model 13035, already equipped when it came out from the assembly
lines with blinking lights which could well serve as early warning device, assailed LOI 229 and Memorandum Circular No.
2 and filed a petition for prohibition with writ of prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction on the following grounds:

a) LOI 229 violates provision and delegation of police power because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory and therefore unconstitutional.

b) It will make manufacturers and dealers of early warning device (EWD) instant millionaires. Owners of motor vehicles
can provide practical substitutes to the required EWD

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways, including expressways
or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without appropriate early
warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207.

Issue

Whether the assailed LOI 229 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 is invalid and exceeded the proper exercise of the state’s
police power.

Ruling

The Court dismissed the petition. The particular police power that was being challenged was clearly intended to
promote public safety. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful
delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the
particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and
Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207.
Case 11

Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-4254. September 26, 1951

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

Facts

Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps on March 18, 1948
but was then later released. He was turned over to the Phil Commonwealth Government for appropriate disposition.

The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de
facto government whose decrees were law during the occupation.

But the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 and
ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia.

Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not found way and
means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the
deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.

He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. The petition was denied.

Issue

Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Ruling

The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from custody but be placed under reasonable surveillance of the
immigration authorities to ensure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him.

The Philippines is a member of the United Nations which promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Philippine Constitution likewise provides that it adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
its laws. Thus, as a state policy, the Philippines adheres to an individual’s right to liberty. No one shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law.

Petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the
detention be to eliminate a danger

The contention that he remains a threat of to the security of the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or the
Philippines are no longer at war.
Case 12

Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034. October 9, 2007

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEALTH SECRETARY
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY.
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR.
DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.

Facts

In 1986, by virtue of her legislative power, the late former President Corazon Aquino (Aquino) issued the Milk Code or
E.O. No. 51, to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, a code adopted
by the World Health Assembly.

The WHA through several resolutions, promoted breastfeeding, and that breast milk substitutes should not be permitted
to claim health benefits.

From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.

In May 2006, the DOH issues the assailed Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Milk Code (RIRR), which
bans advertisements on breastmilk substitutes, and was said to take effect on July of the same year.

The following month, petitioner, representing manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, along with hopes of the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction,
with the court ruling to their favor, issuing a resolution preventing the respondents from issuing the assailed RIRR.

Petitioner further assails the RIRR for going over the provisions in the Milk Code, expanding the coverage of the law,
while DOH rebuts that the contrary to the claim of the petitioners, the RIRR strengthens the Milk Code, as well as various
international instruments on child and infant nutrition, to which they cited Article II, section 2 of the 1987 in which
international instruments take for as part of the law of the land.

Issue

Whether resolutions of the World Health Assembly had attained the status of customary international law.

Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of
Health (DOH) is not constitutional.

Ruling

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. Legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

In the case of WHA resolutions, the powers of the different branches of the government shall be called upon. These
resolutions may only be adopted in the Philippines through the exercise of the senate’s legislative power, not the
executive power. Executive powers are only permitted to be adopted as part of the law of the land in the form of
executive agreements. Since the WHA was not transformed into a domestic law, it is then not part of the law of the land,
unlike the Milk Code.

It was held that all parts with regards to prohibiting the advertisements of breastmilk substitutes of A.O. No. 2006-0012
are declared null and void.

Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4 (f), 11 and 46, all with regards to prohibiting the advertisements of
breastmilk substitutes of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID.
Respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
Case 13

Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, 08 March 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

Facts

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May
2005.

She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good.

On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225.

In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship
to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that
she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of
them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency.

Issue

W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates

W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen

W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her COC

Ruling

Under the international law,

foundlings are presumed to have
been born of citizens
of the place where they are
found; Consequently, the petitioner
is considered as a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
Under the international law,
foundlings are presumed to have
been born of citizens
of the place where they are
found; Consequently, the petitioner
is considered as a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
Under the international law, foundlings are presumed to have been born of citizens of the place they are found.

That foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being
found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Grace is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals
of the Philippines.

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the
qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them. the Constitution provides that only the Senate
electoral tribunal and House of representatives electoral tribunal have sole jurisdiction over the election contests,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en
banc has sole jurisdiction.

Yes, Grace Poe is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that
only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of
her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4
of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new
domicile. Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the Bureau of Immigration.

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and
residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon.
Case 14

Tañada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE
LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Facts

In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration/clarification of that decision.

Specifically, they ask the What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general applicability.”

Tuvera argues that publication is not required when “otherwise provided” – such as in this case, as the PDs provided for
their own effectivity. Further, publication, when necessary, need not be made in the Official Gazette.

Issue

Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and Newspaper of General Circulation is a
mandatory requirement for the laws’ effectivity.

Ruling

YES. As the Presidential Decrees are laws, they must be published.

The “unless it is otherwise provided” clause in the Civil Code provision on publication refers to date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself. This clause does not mean that the legislative body may make the law effective
immediately upon approval. Publication can never be omitted.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Case 15

Tawang Multi-purpose Cooperative, petitioner, vs. La Trinidad Water District, respondent, G.R. No. 166471, 22 March
2011

Facts

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198 by President
Marcos under the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and
commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development Authority,
and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.

TMPC applied for a franchise with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public
convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang which is under the jurisdiction of
LTWD.

LTWD disputed the grant of CPC to TMPC by the NWRB under the authority of PD No. 198 which grants water districts
exclusive franchise.

PD No. 198 states “Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for
domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the
extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however,
shall be subject to review by the Administration.”

NWRB granted the CPC. LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration with NWRB, denied. LWTD appealed to RTC, granted.
TMPC appealed to SC. This is a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

WON the LTWD enjoys exclusive franchise.

WON Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is constitutional.

WON the Constitution can be subjugated by the Executive and Legislative through laws.

Ruling

1. No. The petition of TMPC is meritorious, the CPC of TMPC is upheld.

2. No. Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. It is patently
unconstitutional.

Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (emphasis supplied)

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive
in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (emphasis supplied)

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions are clear. Franchises for the operation of a
public utility cannot be exclusive in character. There is no exception.

3. In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is
the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare
void all laws that do not conform to it. Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power
is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic. The SC upheld
the principle “What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly.”