03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty.

1
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CONTENTS

IV. 4th week (common carriers; carriage of passengers).................................2

Study: Civil Code, article 1755 – 1766...............................................................2
Memorize: Civil Code, Article 1755 (KP: WITH BULLETS).......................2
V. 5TH WEEK (common caarriers; carriage of passengers).............................2
1 Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil 768 –Tandoc................................2
2 Isaac v. A.L. Ammen Transportation Co, 101 Phil 1046 –Tiu................4
3 Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., 30 SCRA 69 –Puno...........................5
4 Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil 657 –Sanchez............................................................6
5 Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil 75 -Nathan Oducado.......................................7
6 Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil 84 –Bascara........................................................9
7 La Mallorca v. De Jesus, 17 SCRA 23 –Aquino...........................................10
8 Landingan v. Pantranco, 33 SCRA 284 –Benedicto.................................11
9 Juntilla v. Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624 –Chan..................................................13
10 Gatchalian v. Delim, 203 SCRA 126 –Cortez............................................14
11 Yobido v. CA, 281 SCRA 1 -Cruz Nenzo.....................................................16
END OF ASSIGNMENT FOR 06 DEC 2013......................................................19
 03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 2
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IV. 4TH WEEK (COMMON CARRIERS; CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS)
STUDY: CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 1755 – 1766
SUBSECTION 3. - Safety of Passengers
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Art. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as
required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation,
by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.
Art. 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common
carrier's liability for negligence is valid, but not for wilful acts or gross negligence.
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
SUBSECTION 4. - Common Provisions
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance
with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the
death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 1765. The Public Service Commission may, on its own motion or on petition of any
interested party, after due hearing, cancel the certificate of public convenience granted
to any common carrier that repeatedly fails to comply with his or its duty to observe
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in this Section.
Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of
common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws.
MEMORIZE: CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 1755 (KP: WITH BULLETS)

The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier's liability.
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
Art. 1755. A common carrier
 is bound to carry the passengers safely
 as far as human care and foresight can provide,
 using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
 with a due regard for all the circumstances.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all V . 5 T H WE E K ( C O M M O N C A A R R I E RS ; C A RR I A G E O F P A S S E N G E R S )
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
1 CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD CO., 38 PHIL 768 –TANDOC
Art. 1760. The common carrier's responsibility prescribed in the preceding article
cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements Common Carrier: Manila Railroad;
on the tickets or otherwise. Passenger: Cangco
Problem? CANGCO tripped over watermelons, eventually causing his arm to be
amputated
Art. 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
Who won? CANGCO
injury to himself.
Emergency Recitation:

Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of
damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the
common carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.

 CANGCO one night alighted from the train onto the platform but stepped on some
watermelons placed there which caused him to trip. He rolled across the platform
and was eventually run over by a moving car. His arm was crushed and was
amputated.
 He now sues MANILA RAILROAD for its negligence in allowing its employees to
leave the watermelons there thus causing his accident
 MANILA RAILROAD claims that CANGCO was also negligent in alighting from the
train and thus should not be allowed to claim based on the doctrine of contributory
negligence
 MANILA RAILROAD USES AS A DEFENSE THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN
THE SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES
ISSUE: WON MANILA RAILROAD can use as a defense the exercise of due diligence
in the supervision of its employees  NOPE!
RATIO: The diligence in the supervision of Manila Railroad over its employees is NOT a
defense in a breach of contract. This is different from torts. An employer can exempt
itself from liability if it is able to prove that it exercise the diligence required in the
supervision of its employees.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise
from contract, rests upon the fact that
in cases of NON-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
FACTS:
 Jose Cangco (CANGCO) was clerk for the Manila Railroad Company
 He had a card from Manila Railroad that allowed him to travel on the trains for free
 He took the train every day to and from work
 January 20, 1915 – CANGCO was on his way home one night when as he got off from
the train he accidentally stepped on some watermelons which made him trip. He
fell on the platform, rolled from the platform and ended up under a moving car. His
arm was badly crushed by the car and when brought to the hospital, was amputated
 CANGCO now sues Manila Railroad for its negligence in allowing its employees to
place watermelons on the platform which caused his accident
 MANILA RAILROAD, on the other hand, claims that CANGCO was also negligent in
going down from the train. It is alleged that CANGCO went down from the train
while the train was still slightly moving. Hence, since CANGCO was also guilty of his
contributory negligence, he is barred from collecting from MANILA RAILROAD
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 3
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ISSUE: WON MANILA RAILROAD can use as a defense the exercise of due diligence
in the supervision of its employees
HELD: Nope
RATIO:
 It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is
the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which
plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of
the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
 That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants,
imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
 Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu,
but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Difference between liability arising from contractu and ex-contractu:
 It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control
of the servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts — on the
contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed.
 As Manresa says the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based
upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
 A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into
consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties
which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence,
thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual
ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer
damage.
 True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption
that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this
respect.
 On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or
omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages
which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of
the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the
utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability
for the breach of his contract.
 Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-
contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual
duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these
relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society
constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in

character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of
society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere
inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the
injured party.
 The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character (ex- contractu)
and those which arise from contract (contractu), rests upon the fact that:
o in cases of NON-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act
or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
o whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into
the contractual relation.
2 ISAAC V. A.L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO, 101 PHIL 1046 –TIU
Common Carrier: A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.
Passenger: Cesar Isaac
Route: Ligao, Albay to Pili, Camarines Sur
Problem: Collision resulting to injury (severance of arm)
Who won: Ammen
ER: Cesar boarded Bus 31, owned by Ammen, a common carrier that operates in Bicol.
During the trip, the bus collided with a pick-up, which led to Cesar’s left arm being
complete severed. Cesar was treated for a total of 5 months and thereafter, he brought
an action for damages, alleging negligence on the part of the bus driver and culpa
contractual on the part of Ammen. Ammen argued that it the incident was entirely due
to the fault of the pick-up, which was totally out of its control, as well as contributory
negligence on the part of Cesar. The RTC ruled in favor of Ammen and the SC affirmed.
Did Ammen observe extraordinary diligence under the circumstances? Yes. The SC
outlined the principles that govern the liability of common carriers: (1) the liability of a
carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation, which exists if there is
failure to extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances; (2) a carrier is obliged
to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due
regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted
negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers; but (4) the carrier is not an
insurer against all risks of travel. Moreover, when the carrier is confronted with a
sudden emergency, he is still required to exercise due diligence, but only that of an
ordinary prudent person, such that failure on its part to exercise the best judgment will
not hold it liable (JT: a la emergency rule in torts). Here, it was proven by evidence
adduced in the trial court that Bus 31 was running at moderate speed when the collision
happened because it had just stopped at a school zone, while the pick-up was speeding
and running outside of its proper lane. The driver tried to avoid the collision, but it only
had little space to manuever, as there was a pile of stones at the rampart of the road. In
this case, the SC found that the driver did everything that a prudent man would have
done under the circumstances. Carrier wins.
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 4
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COMPLETE
Facts: A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., (Ammen), is a common carrier transporting
passengers by land for compensation in Bicol. One of the lines it operates is the one
connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City, Camarines Sur.
- On 31 May 1951, Cesar Isaac (Cesar) boarded Bus 31 in Ligao, Albay bound for Pili,
Camarines Sur. Bus 31 collided with a pick-up (coming from the opposite direction) and,
as a result of which, Cesar’s left arm was completely severed, which fell inside the bus.
- Cesar was rushed to a hospital in Camarines Sur, where he was given blood transfusion
to save his life. After 4 days, he was transferred to another hospital in Albay, where he
under went treatment for 3 months. He was moved later to the Orthopedic Hospital,
where he underwent treatment for 2 months. For these services, he incurred expenses
amounting to P623.40, excluding medical fees, which were paid by Ammen.
-Cesar brought an action against Ammen for damages, alleging that the collision, which
resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and
recklessness of the driver of the bus and that Ammen incurred in culpa contractual
arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport him safely to his
destination. Cesar prayed for judgment against Ammen as follows:
(1) P5,000 as expenses for his medical treatment;
(2) P3,000 as the cost of an artificial arm
(3) P6,000 representing loss of earning;
(4) P75,000 for diminution of his earning capacity;
(5) P50,000 as moral damages; and
(6) P10,000 as attorneys' fees and costs of suit.
- Ammen set up, as special defense, that the injury was due entirely to the fault or
negligence of the driver of the pick-up car and to the contributory negligence of Cesar
himself. Also, that the accident was one which it could not foresee or, though foreseen,
was inevitable.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint, as it found that the collision occurred due to
the negligence of the driver of the pick-up and that the driver of Bus 31 did everything
he could to avoid the same. Cesar appealed from the trial court decision.
- Before the SC, Cesar argued that when an action is based on a contract of carriage, all
that is necessary to sustain recovery is proof of the existence of the contract of the
breach thereof by act or omission.
- Ammen disagreed and claimed that such a wrong presentation of the rule, as
jurisprudence holds the carrier liable not upon mere breach of its contract of carriage
but also upon the finding that its negligence was found to be the direct or proximate
cause of the injury complained of.

ISSUE: Has Ammen observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost diligence of every
cautious person, having due regard for all circumstances, in avoiding the collision which
resulted in the injury caused to Cesar? Yes.
HELD: The following are principles governing the liability of a common carrier: (1) the
liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is
breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of each
case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed
to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it
being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is
not an insurer against all risks of travel.
- One who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise such coolness or accuracy of
judgment as is required of him under ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore
be expected to observe the same judgment, care and precaution as in the latter . For this
reason, authorities abound where failure to observe the same degree of care that as
ordinary prudent man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when confronted
with a sudden emergency was held to be warranted and a justification to exempt the
carrier from liability.
- "Where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is
obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account,
and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be required to
exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any
ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and
the failure on his part to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible does not
establish lack of care and skill on his part which renders the company liable
 Here, it appears that Bus 31, immediately prior to the collision, was running at a
moderate speed because it had just stopped at the school zone. On the other hand, the
pick-up was at full speed and was running outside of its proper lane. The driver of the
bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was then running, swerved the bus to
the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile
of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. The bus driver could not move
the bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was
about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers. And
notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.
 This notwithstanding, Cesar insists that the collision took place because the bus
driver was going at a fast speed. He contends that the act of the bus driver in squeezing
his way between the oncoming pick-up and the pile of gravel under the circumstances
was considered negligent.
 The SC held that this matter is one of credibility and evaluation of the evidence, which
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is the function of the trial court. In the end, considering all the circumstances, the SC
ruled that the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid
the collision and such relieves Ammen from liability.
BONUS:
- When Cesar boarded the bus, he seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left
arm on the windowsill, but with his left elbow outside the window, this being his
position in the bus when the collision took place.
- Cesar was the only victim of the collision.
3 NOCUM V. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., 30 SCRA 69 –PUNO
HERMINIO L. NOCUM v. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY
October 31, 1969 G.R. No. L-23733 Barredo, J.
Shipper: Nocum
Common Carrier: Laguna Tayabas
Problem: Contents of box contained Fireworks which exploded during the trip
Who won? Laguna Tayabas, Common Carrier
Appeal on purely questions of law
EMERGENCY RECITATION
A fellow passenger misrepresented to the bus conductor the contents of a box. The man
said the box contained clothes and miscellaneous items. In truth, it contained
fireworks which exploded and injured 37 people. Nocum, one of the passengers, filed
a case against Laguna Tayabas, the bus company. The lower court ruled in favour of
Nocum. On appeal, the SC reversed saying that the bus company, through its agent,
the bus conductor who inquired as to the content of the box prior to loading,
exercised the extraordinary diligence according to the circumstances as required
by law.
CASE SUMMARY
FACTS
 On the morning of December 5, 1960, while waiting for Bus No. 120 to leave the
Manila Terminal to travel to Lucena, according to Severino Andaya, one of the
passengers, a man with a box went up to the baggage compartment of the bus
and placed the box under a seat.
o The bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, testified that he inquired from the
man, whose name he did not know, what was in the box which weighed
12 kilos. The Unknown man said that it contained clothing and some
miscellaneous items. Due to company regulation, the Sancho charged the
man an additional P0.25.
 It turns out the passenger misrepresented its contents since the box
contained firecrackers which exploded while the bus was within the barrio of
Dita, Municipality of Bay in Laguna.

o The explosion injured 37 people including Nocum.
 Nocum filed a civil case
 CFI-Batangas RULING: Favored passenger NOCUM. Sentenced the bus company to
pay Nocum P1,315 as actual damages and P500 as attorney’s fees with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint plus costs.
o It found that Tayabas did not exercise the extraordinary or utmost
diligence of a very cautious person as required by Articles 1733, 1755 and
1756 of the Civil Code. The lower court decided that the explosion could
not be a fortuitous event since the unexpected event must be independent
of the will of man or something which cannot be avoided. If proper and
rigid inspection was observed by Tayabas, the contents of the box could
have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger
to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by
Dispatcher Cornista, company policy stated that employees should call the
police if there were packages containing articles against company
regulations.
 From the judgment, the Bus company appealed.
ISSUE: WON the bus company is liable. NOPE
HELD: No. The Bus company exercised extraordinary diligence according to the
circumstances.
RATIO:
 The box was “folded and tied with abaca”. The owner of the box cannot be subjected
to any unusual search, in violation to his right to privacy, when he protests the
innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in
the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of
a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond
this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Calling a policeman to the aid of the conductor, as suggested by the service manual
invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid
inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere
clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a
constitutionally protected domain.
 Also, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its
passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the
sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is
to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to
the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own.
 Article 1733 is not as unbending for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported
by them to be "according to all the circumstances of each case."
 Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances."
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 6
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 Similar to the opinion in the case of Clarke v. Louiville, Clarke was a passenger on
the defendant’s train when gasoline which another passenger carried ignited and
exploded burning the coach which Clarke was riding on. While the court there
instructed the jury to find the culprit, it said that in regard to the liability of a
railroad to its passengers for injury done by another passenger:
o “only where the conduct of this passenger had been such before the injury
as to induce a reasonably prudent and vigilant conductor to believe that
there was reasonable ground to apprehend violence and danger to the
other passengers, and in that case asserting it to be the duty of the
conductor of the railroad train to use all reasonable means to prevent
such injury, and if he neglects this reasonable duty, and injury is done, that
then the company is responsible; that otherwise the railroad is not
responsible.”
 It noted that the rule in the United States regarding Explosive or Dangerous
Contents stated that a carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers from
fires or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances by other
passengers, in the absence of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees,
was aware of the nature of the article or had any reason to anticipate danger
therefrom.
 Ending, the court said:
o Since we hold that Tayabas has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of
negligence by showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the
safety of its passengers, "according to the circumstances of the (each)
case", we deem it unnecessary to rule whether or not there was any
fortuitous event in this case.
4 LASAM V. SMITH, 45 PHIL 657 –SANCHEZ
HONORIO LASAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-
appellant. PALMA AND LEUTERIO FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.
MARIANO ALISANGCO FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Ostrand, J.:
Carrier: Smith
Passengers: Lasam and his wife
Problem: steering wheel problems caused driver to zigzag car crashed down a ditch
Who won: Lasam
Vehicle: “A Ford automobile”
ER: Lasam and his wife entered into a contract of carriage with Smith for their
transport from San Fernando to Currimao, La Union. The drivers changed at the town of
San Juan, and the new driver had no license. After they crossed the Abra river, the
steering wheel had problems which caused the driver to lose control and zigzagged,
causing the car to go down a ditch—Lasam had a dislocated rib and his wife had
compound fractures and a nervous breakdown. Lasam sued Smith at the trial court and
won. Smith appealed to the SC.

Issue: WON Smith is exonerated because of caso fortuito? (NO). Caso
fortuito does not apply. As far as the records shows, the accident was caused either by
defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver . The elements
are not present.
COMPLETE
Facts:
- Smith is the owner of a public garage engaged in the business of carrying
passengers for hire from the one point to another in the Province of La Union and
the surrounding provinces.
o he undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao,
Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile.
o On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by a licensed
chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur
allowed his assistant, Remigio Bueno, to drive the car.
o Bueno had no driver’s license, but had some experience in driving.
- The car was functioning well until the car crossed the Abra river. A defect in the
steering wheel made the car zigzag and went down a steep embankment.
- Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a “dislocated” rib , but his wife,
Joaquina Sanchez, received serious injuries, among which was a compound
fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. She also appears to have suffered a
nervous breakdown
- Lasam and his wife filed a case for damages against Lasam.
o  It alleges, among other things, that the accident was due to defects in the
automobile as well as to the incompetence and negligence of the
chauffeur, and the case appears to have been tried largely upon the theory
that it sounds in tort and that the liability of the defendant is governed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code.
o The trial court held, however, that the cause of action rests on the
defendant’s breach of the contract of carriage and that, consequently,
articles 1101-1107 of the Civil Code, and not article 1903, are applicable.
The court further found that the breach of the contract was not due to
fortuitous events and that, therefore, the defendant was liable in damages.
- Lasam won in the Trial Court. Smith appeals to the SC.
Issue: Whether Smith is liable as a common carrier. (YES)
Held: For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs in
this instance. So ordered.
Ratio:
- It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is the
contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry
the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 7
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he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was
due to causes mentioned in article 1105: 
o No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which,
even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which
the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation
itself imposes such liability.
- “Caso fortuito” arises when “In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to
contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
o (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of
the human will.
o (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
o (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And
o (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.” (5 Enciclopedia
Juridica Españ ola, 309.)
Turning to the present case, it is at once apparent that this element of caso
fortuito is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of
God or to adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen. As far as the
records shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else
through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.
5 NECESITO V. PARAS, 104 PHIL 75 -NATHAN ODUCADO
NECESITO v. PARAS
GR No. L-10605
June 30, 1958
Carrier: Phil Rabbit
Passengers: Severina Garces and her 1 y.o. son Precillano Necesito
Problem: defective steering knuckle causing bus to swerve and fall down a creek
Who won: German NECESITO, plaintiff
Emergency Recit: A bus of the Phil Rabbit Bus Lines fell into a creek, due to the driver
losing control. It is revealed that the steering knuckle was found to have been defective.
Claiming non-liability, Phil Rabbit contends that it regularly conducts visual inspections
every thirty days to ascertain the functionality of the steering knuckle. However, the SC
said that such visual inspection is not adequate enough so as to warrant the
exercise of the degree of diligence required by law for common carriers. Any defect
in the parts of a vehicle used by the carrier, if discoverable by the carrier, is the carrier’s
responsibility, and not that of the manufacturer.
Doctrine:

Carriers; Liability for Damages Caused by Mechanical Defects.—While the carrier is not
an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should nevertheless be held to answer for
the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the
manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and
the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The
rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the
manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while
the carrier usually has.
Carriers; Mechanical Defects.—A carrier is liable to its passengers for damages
caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance.
Facts
1. In the morning of January 28, 1954, Severina Garces and her one-year-old son
Precillano Necesito boarded bus no. 199 of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Agno,
Pangasinan. They brought with them vegetables, some money, and a wristwatch. The
bus was driven by Francisco Bardonell.
2. The bus ran its normal route, and proceeded to enter a wooden bridge. However the
front wheels of the bus swerved to the right, and the driver lost control. The bus
then fell to the creek with breast-deep water.
Severina drowned, while Precillano suffered a fracture.
3. Two actions for damages against the carrier were filed. The carrier pleaded
engine/mechanical trouble independent beyond the control of the carrier and the driver
Bardonell.
4. The CFI found that the bus proceeded slowly because of the bad situation of the road,
contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion. The CFI also held that despite the conduction of
regular 30-day inspections, the right steering knuckle was found to be “bubbled and
cellulous,” a fact which could neither be known nor ascertained by Bardonell. Also, such
knuckle was designed for “heavy duty” and can last for up to ten years. Hence, the CFI
held that the accident was due to a fortuitous event.
Issues/Held:
 WON Philippine Rabbit (the carrier) is liable for the manufacturing defect of the
steering knuckle—YES
 WON Phil. Rabbit exercised the diligence required by law—NO
Ratio
A. The carrier is not the insurer of the passengers’ safety.
 The liability of the carrier rests on negligence, or the failure to exercise the utmost
degree of diligence required by law
 Citing Art. 1755: “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for the all the circumstances.”
 Thus, according to American jurisprudence:
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 8
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o A passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury
resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,
whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the
carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances
was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the
necessary tests.
o For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being
in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of
constructing the appliance.
o According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not
relieve the carrier from liability.
 The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice
nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances
in use by the carrier.
o Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the
defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the
carrier usually has.
o Thus, while not in insurer of the safety of his passengers, the carrier
should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such
flaws were at all discoverable.
o Citing Francis v. Cockrell: Unless, therefore, the presumed intention of the
parties be that the passenger should, in the event of his being injured by
the breach of the manufacturer's contract, of which he has no knowledge,
be without remedy, the only way in which effect can be given to a different
intention is by supposing that the carrier is to be responsible to the
passenger, and to look for his indemnity to the person whom he selected
and whose breach of contract has caused the mischief.
o Citing Morgan v. Chesapeake:
 The carrier, in consideration of certain well-known and highly
valuable rights granted to it by the public, undertakes certain
duties toward the public, among them being to provide itself with
suitable and safe cars and vehicles in which carry the traveling
public.
 There is neither such duty on the manufacturer of the cars, nor a
reciprocal legal relation between the manufacturer and the
public.
 When the carrier elects to have another build its cars, it ought
not to be absolved by that facts from its duty to the public to
furnish safe cars.
 The carrier cannot lessen its responsibility by shifting
undertaking to another's shoulders.
 Its duty to furnish safe cars is side by side with its duty to furnish
safe track, and to operate them in a safe manner.
 The liability is not in the nature of a vicarious liability, but that of respondeat
superior.
o Citing Morgan v. Chesapeake: Where an injury is inflicted upon a
passenger by the breaking or wrecking of a part of the train on which he is

riding, it is presumably the result of negligence at some point by the
carrier.
o In such case, the carrier must show, if the accident was due to a latent
defect in the material or construction of the car, that not only could it not
have discovered the defect by the exercise of such care, but that the builders
could not by the exercise of the same care have discovered the defect or
foreseen the result.
 This rule applies the same whether the defective car belonged to
the carrier or not.
B. Philippine Rabbit is liable for damages
 It shows that the only test conducted by the carrier to see if the knuckles
were functioning was a visual test conducted every 30 days.
 Given the legal doctrines above, therefore, Phil. Rabbit did not exercise the
diligence required of carriers.
o The steering knuckle is an important part of a vehicle, and the carrier
must know this fact.
o A mere visual inspection, more so one that is conducted only
after 30 days, could not directly determine whether a knuckle is
properly functioning or not.
o Phil. Rabbit should have employed other tests to determine the
functionality of the knuckles, and not just mere visual inspections
o Thus, the inspections did not satisfy the legal requirement of
diligence.
 Final note:
o It may be impracticable, however, to require of carriers to test the
strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip
o But, a due regard for the carrier's obligations toward the
traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine
the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure
of which may endanger the safe of the passengers.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the PHIL BUS
RABBIT/PARAS is sentenced to indemnify NECESITO in the following amounts: P5,000
to Precillano Necesito, and P15,000 to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces, plus
P3,500 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Costs against PHIL BUS
RABBIT/PARAS. So ordered.
6 NECESITO V. PARAS, 104 PHIL 84 –BASCARA
Resolution on Motion To Reconsider
Carrier: Phil Rabbit
Passengers: Severina Garces and her 1 y.o. son Precillano Necesito
Problem: defective steering knuckle causing bus to swerve and fall down a creek
Who won: German NECESITO, plaintiff, STILL WON
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 9
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ER: Same facts as Case 5. PARAS et al submitted MR. Among others, they wanted the
SC to reconsider its holding that the carrier is liable for the breakage of the steering
knuckle that caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn.
ISSUE: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the breakage of the
steering knuckle which caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn - YES
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction as established in previous decisions of
this Court, cited in our main opinion, is that a carrier is liable to its passengers for
damages caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance.
It can be seen that while the courts of the United States are at variance on the
question of a carrier’s liability for latent mechanical defects, the rule in this jurisdiction
has been consistent in holding the carrier responsible.
The new evidence sought to be introduced do not warrant the grant of a new
trial, since the proposed proof was available when the original trial was held. Said
evidence is not newly discovered.
Facts:
 Natividad Paras et al submitted a motion to reconsider its decision of June 30, 1958
and that the same be modified with respect to
o (1) its holding that the carrier is liable for the breakage of the steering
knuckle that caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn, whereby the
passengers riding in it were injured;
o (2) the damages awarded, that appellees argue to be excessive; and
o (3) the award of attorneys’ fees.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the breakage of the steering knuckle
which caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn – YES
2. Whether or not the damages awarded are excessive- NO
3. Whether or not attorney’s fees should be awarded- YES
Held: Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.
1. Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the breakage of the steering
knuckle which caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn - YES
 The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction as established in previous decisions of this
Court, cited in our main opinion, is that a carrier is liable to its passengers for
damages caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance.
 As early as 1924, in Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 659 this Court ruled:
o As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in
the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not
caso fortuito.

 And in Son vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892, this Court held a common
carrier liable in damages to passenger for injuries cause by an accident due to the
breakage of a faulty drag-link spring.
 It can be seen that while the courts of the United States are at variance on the
question of a carrier’s liability for latent mechanical defects 1, the rule in this
jurisdiction has been consistent in holding the carrier responsible. This Court has
quoted from American and English decisions, not because it felt bound to follow the
same, but merely in approval of the rationale of the rule as expressed therein, since
the previous Philippine cases did not enlarge on the ideas underlying the doctrine
established thereby.
 The new evidence sought to be introduced do not warrant the grant of a new trial,
since the proposed proof was available when the original trial was held. Said
evidence is not newly discovered.
2. Whether or not the damages awarded are excessive- NO
 With regard to the indemnity awarded to the child Precilliano Necesito, the
injuries suffered by him are incapable of accurate pecuniary estimation,
particularly because the full effect of the injury is not ascertainable
immediately. This uncertainty, however, does not preclude the right to an
indemnity, since the injury is patent and not denied (Civil Code, Art. 2224).
 The reasons behind this award are expounded by the Code Commission in its
report:
o There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that
there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one’s commercial credit or
to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty in
terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge
should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases,
rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress, from the
defendant’s wrongful act.” (Report of the Code Commission, p. 75)
 In awarding to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces an indemnity for the loss
of her “guidance, protection and company,” although it is but moral damage, the
Court took into account that the case of a passenger who dies in the course of an
accident, due to the carrier’s negligence constitutes an exception to the general rule.
While, as pointed out in the main decision, under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code
there can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of contract in the absence
of fraud malice or bad faith, the case of a violation of the contract of carriage leading
to a passenger’s death escapes this general rule, in view of Article 1764 in
connection with Article 2206, No. 3 of the new Civil Code.
 ART. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in
accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall
also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a
comman carrier. ART. 2206. . . .
1 Latent defect - In the law of the sale of property, a latent defect is a fault in the property that could not have
been discovered by a reasonably thorough inspection before the sale.
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 10
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 The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
 Being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, these articles prevail over the
general rule of Art. 2220. Special provisions control general ones.
 It thus appears that under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a carrier’s
negligence, the heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral damages, even
though a passenger who is injured, but manages to survive, is not entitled to them.
There is, therefore, no conflict between our main decision in the instant case and
that of Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 101 Phil. 523, where the passenger
suffered injuries, but did not lose his life.
3. Whether or not attorney’s fees should be awarded- YES
 In the Cachero case this Court disallowed attorneys’ fees to the injured plaintiff
because the litigation arose out of his exaggerated and unreasonable deeds for an
indemnity that was out of proportion with the compensatory damages to which he
was solely entitled.
 But in the present case, plaintiffs’ (German Necesito et al) original claims can
not be deemed A PRIORI wholly unreasonable, since they had a right to
indemnity for moral damages besides compensatory ones, and moral
damages are not determined by set and invariable bounds.
 Neither does the fact that the contract between the passengers and their counsel
was on a contingent basis affect the former’s right to counsel fees. As pointed out
for appellants, the Court’s award is an party and not to counsel. A litigant who
improvidently stipulate higher counsel fees than those to which he is lawfully
entitled, does not for that reason earn the right to a larger indemnity; but, by parity
of reasoning, he should not be deprived of counsel fees if by law he is entitled to
recover them.
We find no reason to alter the main decision heretofore rendered. Ultimately, the
position taken by this Court is that a common carrier’s contract is not to be regarded as
a game of chance wherein the passenger stakes his limb and life against the carrier’s
property and profits. Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
7 LA MALLORCA V. DE JESUS, 17 SCRA 23 –AQUINO
LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA Bus COMPANY, petitioner, vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS,
MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
By Alexis Aquino
Doctrine:
Moral damages; Common carrier; Breach of contract.—In this jurisdiction moral
damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of

contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of
the New Civil Code.
(AA: We don’t need E.R. for this one. The case is very very short. #swerts)
Carrier: La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company (La Mallorca-Pambusco)
Passengers: Lolita de Jesus
Problem: left front tire of bus exploded  head-on collision between bus and a freight
truck
Who won: Parents of Lolita (coz Lolita died)
Facts:
 La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company (La Mallorca-Pambusco), filed this appeal
by certiorari from the decision of the CA, which affirmed that rendered by the CFI
Bulacan.
 The court sentenced La Mallorca, “to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P2,132.50 for
actual damages; P14,400.00 as compensatory damages; P10,000.00 to each plaintiff
by way of moral damages; and P3,000.00 as counsel fees.”
 The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter
of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision
between La Mallorca’s bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck
traveling in the opposite direction.
 The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus Iost
control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded.
 La Mallorca maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise
to no liability for negligence
Issue:
1. Whether or not the incident caused by a blow-out of one of the tires of the bus is
a caso fortuito. NOT a caso fortuito!
2. Whether or not La Mallorca is liable for moral damages.
Held: Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.
Ratio:
1ST ISSUE: Not a caso fortuito
 In the present case, the cause of the blow-out was known. The inner tube of the
left front tire, according to La Mallorca’s own evidence and as found by the CA, “was
pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped
out of the wheel.”
 This was, said Court correctly held, a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a
fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been
subjected to a more thorough or rigid check-up before it took to the road that
morning.
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 11
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 Then again both the trial court and the CA found as a fact that the bus was running
quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which
exploded was not new—petitioner describes it as “hindi masyadong kalbo,” or not
so very worn out the plea of caso fortuito cannot be entertained.
SECOND ISSUE. The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this
jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764,
in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
8 LANDINGAN V. PANTRANCO, 33 SCRA 284 –BENEDICTO
SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.
SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-28014-15 May 29, 1970 VILLAMOR, J
DOCTRINE: A common carrier is duty bound to carry its passengers "safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances."
Passengers: Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia
COMMON CARRIER: PANTRANCO
PROBLEM: Passengers of the bus died on the way to Baguio
Who WON: Lower Court (Pantranco); SC (Spouses Landingin and Garcia)
Cause of Action: Damages and/or Breach of Contract of Carriage
Key Words: Open Bus, Defective Cross-Joint
EMERGENCY DIGEST: Leonila and Estrella were among the passengers in a Pantranco
bus driven by Marcelo Oligan on an excursion trip from Dagupan City to Baguio City.
The bus was open on one side and enclosed on the other. Upon reaching an uphill point
in Kennon Road, bus stalled and stop, motor stopped causing the bus to slide back, the
driver suddenly swerved causing the passengers to be thrown out of the open side of the
bus causing the death of Leonila and Estrella. The parents of the two girls filed separate
complaints against Pantranco and the driver for damages and/or breach of contract of
carriage. Issue: Whether Pantranco and the driver measure up to the degree of care and
foresight required it under all circumstances? No. The Court did not find that the
carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances in connection with the inspection of
the cross-joint which caused the motor to stop. The bus in which the deceased were
riding was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be traversing mountainous,
circuitous and ascending roads. The entire bus, including its mechanical parts, would
naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under ordinary circumstances. The
mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to be in order would not
exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that the particular circumstances
under which the bus would travel were also considered.

COMPLETE DIGEST
The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were filed by the spouses
Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia
Landingin, for damages allegedly suffered by them in connection with the death of their
respective daughter, Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia, due to the alleged negligence
of the Pantranco and Driver Marcelo and/or breach of contract of carriage.
 In the morning of April 20, 1963, Leonila Landigin and Estrella Garcia were among
the passengers in the bus driven by Marcelo Oligan and owned and operated by
PANTRANCO on an excursion trip from Dagupan City to Baguio City and back. The
bus was open on one side and enclosed on the other, in gross violation of the rules
of the Public Service Commission. PANTRANCO acted with negligence, fraud and
bad faith in pretending to have previously secured a special permit for the trip
when in truth it had not done so.
 Upon reaching an uphill point at Camp 8, Kennon Road, Baguio City, on the onward
trip, Marcelo, through utter lack of foresight, experience and driving knowledge,
caused the bus to stall and stop for a few moments; that through the driver's fault
and mishandling, the motor stopped, causing the bus to slide back unchecked; the
driver suddenly swerved and steered the bus toward the mountainside, Leonila
and Estrella, together with several other passengers, were thrown out of the bus
through its open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries as a result of which
Leonila and Estrella died at the hospital and the same day.
 Marcelo was charged and convicted of multiple homicide and multiple slight
physical injuries on account of the death of Leonila and Estrella and of the injuries
suffered by four others.
 Marcelo and Pantranco filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints alleging
that the bus was driven with extraordinary care, prudence and diligence; that
PANTRANCO observed the care and diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly of defendant driver; and that the decision convicting Marcelo was not
yet final, the same having been appealed to the CA where it was still pending.
 The two cases were tried jointly. CFI of Manila made the following findings: that
upon reaching the fatal spot at Camp 8, a sudden snapping or breaking of metal
below the floor of the bus was heard, and the bus abruptly stopped, rolling back a
few moments later; as a result, some of the passengers jumped out of the bus,
while others stepped down; that driver maneuvered the bus safely to and against
the side of the mountain where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring the safety
of the many passengers still inside the bus; that while the driver was steering the
bus towards the mountainside, he advised the passengers not to jump, but to
remain seated; that Leonila and Estrella were not thrown out of the bus, but that
they panicked and jumped out; that the malfunctioning of the motor resulted from
the breakage of the cross-joint; that there was no negligence on the part of either
of the driver and Pantranco; that only the day before, the said cross-joint was duly
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 12
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inspected and found to be in order; and that PANTRANCO had exercised the
requisite care in the selection and supervision of its employees, including Marcelo.
 The court concluded that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act
of God brought about by some extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the
will of the Pantranco or its employees."
 RTC absolved Pantranco and the driver from any liability on account of negligence
but the two appealed to the SC the order of the court to pay the Parents P6.5T and
P3.5T not in payment of liability because of any negligence on the part of the
defendants but as an expression of sympathy and goodwill. (Emphasis supplied.)
* There was as a matter of fact during the pre-trial of these two cases a continuing offer
of settlement on the part of Pantranco without accepting any liability for such damages,
and the Court understood that the Pantranco would be willing still to pay said amounts
even if these cases were to be tried on the merits. In the spirit of the offer of Pantranco
to appease the feelings of the parents, an award of P6,500.00 for the spouses Marcelo
Landingin and Racquel Bocasas whose daughter Leonila was, when she died, a third-
year Commerce student at the Far Eastern University, and P3,500.00 for the spouses
Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin whose daughter Estrella was in the fourth year
High at the Dagupan Colleges when she died, is hereby made in their favor. This award is
in addition to what Pantranco might have spent to help the parents of both deceased
after the accident.
Issues:  Did PANTRANCO measure up to the degree of care and foresight required it
under all circumstances? - No
Held: It was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints. The awards made by the
court should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of contracts of carriage.
The judgment appealed from is modified, and PANTRANCO is ordered to pay to the
spouses the amounts stated in the judgment appealed from, as damages for breach of
contracts.
 As a common carrier, PANTRANCO was duty bound to carry its passengers "safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." (Article 1755, CC)
 The court below found that the cross-joint of the bus in which the deceased were
riding broke, which caused the malfunctioning of the motor, which in turn resulted
in panic among some of the passengers. In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this
Court held that an accident caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso
fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that "the passenger has
neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the
equipment and appliances in use by the carrier." (Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al.,
104 Phil. 75.)
 When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is
at fault or that it acted negligently (Article 1756). This presumption is only
rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed the "extraordinary
diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of very cautious

persons" required in Article 1755 (Article 1756).
The lower court considered the presumption rebutted on the strength of Pantranco's
evidence that only the day before the incident, the cross-joint in question was duly
inspected and found to be in order. It does not appear, however, that the carrier gave
due regard for all the circumstances in connection with the said inspection. The bus in
which the deceased were riding was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be
traversing mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the entire bus, including
its mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under
ordinary circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and
found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that
the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.
9 JUNTILLA V. FONTANAR, 136 SCRA 624 –CHAN
Juntilla vs Fontanar
G.R. No. L-45637
May 31, 1985
Common Carrier: Jeepney
Driver: Camoro
Registered owner, franchise holder: Fontanar
Actual owner: Banzon
Passenger: Juntilla
Problem: right rear tire exploded
Who won: passenger Juntilla
EMERGENCY RECIT
Juntilla rode a jeepney coming from Danao City to Cebu City. Suddenly the right rear tire
exploded. The jeepney turned turtle and Juntilla was thrown out of the jeepney. He had a
lacerated right wrist and was injured in the other parts of his body. Because of the
injuries, he went back to Danao City. On his way, he realized he lost his Omega watch so
he asked his father-in-law to go to the place of the accident and look for it there. The
wristwatch wasn’t found. Upon his arrival at Danao City, he went to the hospital. He then
filed a civil case for breach of contract against Camoro, Fontanar, and Banzon (driver,
franchise owner, actual owner). Fontanar, et al. filed their answer alleging that the
accident was due to a fortuitous event because the tire was new. Civil Court decided in
favor of Juntilla. CFI of Cebu reversed, favored FONTANAR et al. MR of Juntilla denied.
ISSUE: WON defendants and/or their employee failed to exercise "utmost and/or
extraordinary diligence" required of common carriers contemplated under Art. 1755 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. YES, FAIL!!!
There was no caso fortuito in this case. It has been shown that the driver was
negligent. He was traveling at a very fast speed. Also, the jeepney was overloaded at
the time of the accident (3 passengers in front, 14 at the back). In order for there to be
caso fortuito, 4 elements must be present (see elements in detailed digest ratio). Here,
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 13
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there was no caso fortuito because the occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or
because of mechanical defects in the tire.
DETAILED DIGEST
FACTS
- Juntilla was a passenger of a jeepney (plate#PUJ717) from Danao City to Cebu City.
Jeep was driven by Camoro, registered under the franchise of Fontanar, actually
owned by Banzon.
- When jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the jeep
to turn turtle into a ditch.
- Juntilla was thrown out of the vehicle and he lost consciousness. When he came to
his senses, he found that his right palm was lacerated. Also, he suffered injuries on
his left arm, right thigh, and on his back. Because of the injuries, he went back to
Danao City. On the way, he discovered that his Omega watch was lost. Upon arrival
in Danao City, he entered the city hospital to attend to his injuries. He requested his
father-in-law to proceed to the place of the accident to look for the lost wristwatch.
However, it was nowhere to be found.
- Juntilla filed civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of
Cebu City against Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro.
- Fontanar, et al., filed their answer alleging that the accident that caused the losses
was beyond their control because the tire that exploded was newly bought and was
only slightly used at the time it blew up.
- Judge Senining of the Civil Court rendered judgment in favor of Juntilla.
- Fontanar, et al., appealed to the CFI of Cebu. Judge Canares reversed the City Court
decision upon a finding that the accident was due to a fortuitous event.
- MR of Juntilla was denied.
ISSUE
- WON defendants and/or their employee failed to exercise "utmost and/or
extraordinary diligence" required of common carriers contemplated under Art.
1755 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. YES, fail!!!
- WON the present case was decided by the lower court contrary to the doctrine laid
down by the SC in the case of Necesito et al. v. Paras, et al. YES, contrary!!!
HELD - WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IV
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the City Court of
Cebu, Branch I is REINSTATED, with the modification that the damages shall earn
interest at 12% per annum and the attorney's fees are increased to SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P600.00). Damages shall earn interests from January 27, 1975.
RATIO
- The CFI-Cebu erred when it absolved the carrier from any liability upon a finding
that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event.
o CFI said that a tire blow-out is an inevitable accident that exempts the
carrier from liability, there being absence of a showing that there was

misconduct or negligence on the part of the operator in the operation and
maintenance of the vehicle involved. The fact that the right rear tire
exploded, despite being brand new, constitutes a clear case of caso fortuito
which can be a proper basis for exonerating the defendants from liability.
o CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation
Co., where the CA said that a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence
unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all.
Indeed, this would be a clear case of fortuitous event.
o In this case, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the
respondents.
 Jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
 Jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident (3
passengers in front, 14 in the rear)
o While it may be true that the tire was still good because the grooves were
still visible, this does not make the explosion a fortuitous event. No
evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse
road conditions or that precautions were taken by the driver.
o In Lasam v. Smith, the essential characteristics of caso fortuito are:
 The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of
the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be
independent of the human will
 It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the
caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid
 The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner
 the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor
o There was no caso fortuito because the occurrence was not independent
of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence
of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers
should teach their drivers:
 Not to overload their vehicles
 Not to exceed safe and legal speed limits
 To know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus
insuring the safety of passengers at all times.
o In the case of Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al.
 The passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for
an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from
a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have
been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of
care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with
regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests.
 For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered
as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as
regards the work of constructing the appliance
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 14
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10 GATCHALIAN V. DELIM, 203 SCRA 126 –CORTEZ
Reynalda Gatchalian vs Arsenio Delim and Hon. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-
56487, October 21, 1991)
PASSENGER: Reynalda Gatchalian
COMMON CARRIER: “Thames” minibus owned by Arsenio Delim
Problem: “snapping sound” was heard, bus fell into ditch
Who won: passenger Gatchalian
*NOTE: See bold in the ratio for doctrines
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
On July 11, 1973, at noon time, Reynalda Gatchalian (Gatchalian) boarded as paying
passenger in a minibus called “Thames” which was owned by Arsenio Delim (Delim).
While the minibus was running along the highway a “snapping sound” was heard, and
after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a
ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their hospitalization expenses
were paid by Delim’s spouse, Mrs. Adela. She then had the injured passengers sign an
already prepared joint affidavit stating, “they were no longer interested in filing a
complaint either criminal or civil against the driver and the owner because it was an
accident and the said driver and owner have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated
for our injuries. Gatchalian signed. But despite the waiver, she still filed an action extra
contractu to recover damages in CFI La Union. CFI dismissed the case and ruled that the
waiver was valid. CA ruled that the waiver was not valid but still dismissed the case by
denying the claim for damages.
ISSUE: WON the waiver was valid (NO); and W/N the common carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence (NO)
HELD & RATIO: CA ruling REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Delim was ordered to pay
damages. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether
petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the
instance of Delim) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any
right of action against Delim.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for
injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier
must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported
waiver most strictly against the common carrier.
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured
passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to
dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law
from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. A
purported waiver is against public policy.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises
that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves
that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
1755”. To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court
that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries.
Evidence did not show that Delim and the driver had exercised the
extraordinary diligence required by law. The minibus was not roadworthy. And the

driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton
disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the
part of the carrier.
FACTS:
On July 11, 1973, at noon time, Reynalda Gatchalian (Gatchalian) boarded as paying
passenger in a minibus called “Thames” (Plate No. 52-222 PUJ Phil. 73), from San
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, La Union.
 The minibus was owned by Arsenio Delim (Delim).
While the minibus was running along the highway (National Highway No. 3) in Barrio
Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, a “snapping sound” was heard, and after a short while, the bus
bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their hospitalization expenses were
paid by Delim’s spouse, Mrs. Adela.
 She then had the injured passengers sign an already prepared joint affidavit
stating that “they were no longer interested in filing a complaint either criminal
or civil against the driver and the owner because it was an accident and the said
driver and owner have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated for our
injuries.”
 Gatchalian signed.
Notwithstanding the said document, Gatchalian filed in CFI La Union an action extra
contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint
that her injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap:
 had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the
forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part;
and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her
friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and
deprived her of opportunities for employment.
 Delim raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by Gatchalian.
The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but
affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages:
ISSUES:
1) W/N there was a valid waiver with respect to the common carrier’s liability ( NO,
waiver not valid)
2) W/N the common carrier exercised extraordinary diligence (NO , it was negligent)
HELD:
CA decision is REVERSED & SET ASIDE. Delim is ordered to pay Gatchalian actual and
moral damages, and attorney’s fees
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 15
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RATIO:
No valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by Gatchalian. A waiver, to be
valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a
person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to
abandon a right vested in such person.
The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by Gatchalian need to be
considered. She testified that:
 she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident when the
purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for
signing;
 that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the
other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too
signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety.
Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner
understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of
Delim) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of
action against Delim.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must
exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver
most strictly against the common carrier.
 To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured
passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would
be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted
by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable.
 A purported waiver is against public policy.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had]
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755."
 To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the
court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the
injuries.
 The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers
is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence.
 A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

The evidence did not show that Delim and the driver had exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of Delim to look after the
roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop
the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the
passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of Delim and his driver.
11 YOBIDO V. CA, 281 SCRA 1 -CRUZ NENZO
[G.R. No. 113003. October 17, 1997.]
ALBERTA YOBIDO and CRESENCIO YOBIDO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LENY TUMBOY, ARDEE TUMBOY and
JASMIN TUMBOY, respondents.
DOCTRINE: An accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the
negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability
for damages. Proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook
extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier such as conducting daily routinary
check-ups of the vehicle's parts.
COMMON CARRIER: ALBERTA YOBIDO (bus owner) and CRESENCIO YOBIDO (bus
driver) , petitioners
PASSENGERS: LENY, ARDEE and JASMIN TUMBOY, respondents.
PROBLEM: Bus Trip, tire explode, passengers are injured, their dad dies
Who WON: Passengers : tire explosion is not caso fortuito
ER
Apouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children, Ardee and Jasmin, boarded a
bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left
front tire of the bus suddenly exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet
from the road and struck a tree which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy and physical
injuries to other passengers. Thereafter, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage,
damages and attorney's fees was filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido,
the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the action for lack of merit.
The Tumboys appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 23, 1993, CA rendered a
decision reversing that of the lower court.
In this instant petition, the Yubidos assert that the tire blowout that caused the death of
Tito Tumboy was a caso fortuito and the CA misapprehended the facts of the case,
therefore, its findings cannot be considered final which shall bind the Court.  it was rough with crushed rocks.
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 16
Ampil
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no reason to overturn the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners' contention that they are exempted from
liability because the tire blowout was a fortuitous event that could not have been
foreseen, must fail. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the
automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would
exempt the carrier from liability for damages. Proof that the tire was new and of good
quality is not sufficient proof that petitioner is not negligent. Petitioners should have
shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier such as
conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts. Accordingly, the challenged
decision is affirmed
FACTS
Sps. Tumboy +2 kids While on a Bus ride, tire explodes, death + injuries
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children named
Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Liner bus bound for
Davao City.
 the left front tire of the bus exploded.
 The bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet from the road
 and struck a tree.
 28-year-old Tito Tumboy died, and physical injuries to other passengers.
Breach of contract filed vs. Bus owner and driver
A complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees was filed by
Leny and her children against
Alberta Yobido : the owner of the bus, and
Cresencio Yobido: bus driver,
 Defense: raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito.
 They also filed a third-party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and
Insurance, Inc.
o Upon a finding that the third party defendant was not liable under the
insurance contract, the lower court dismissed the third party
complaint. No amicable settlement having been arrived at by the
parties, trial on the merits ensued. 
 
Passengers claim: negligence, violation of contract of carriage
The plaintiffs asserted that violation of the contract of carriage between them and the
defendants was brought about by the driver's failure to exercise the diligence required
of the carrier in transporting passengers safely to their place of destination.
How the accident went down
 The bus left Mangagoy at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
 The winding road it traversed was not cemented and was wet due to the rain;
 The bus which was full of passengers had cargoes on top.

 Since it was "running fast," she cautioned the driver to slow down but he
merely stared at her through the mirror.
 At around 3:30 p.m., in Trento, she heard something explode and immediately,
the bus fell into a ravine.
Bus Defense: Brand new tires + purely fortuitous event = absolved
For their part, the defendants tried to establish that the accident was due to a fortuitous
event.
 Abundio Salce, the conductor claims:
o 32 passengers only out of 42
o Bus speed : "60 to 50" and that it was going slow because of the
zigzag road.
o He affirmed that the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new
tire" that he mounted only five (5) days before the incident.
 The Yobido Liner secretary, Minerva Fernando, claims
o Confirmed purchase of Goodyear tire from Davao Toyo Parts
o and she was present when it was mounted on the bus by Salce.
o All driver applicants in Yobido Liner underwent actual driving tests.
before they were employed.
Lower Court : caso fortuito  because the reason why it blew out is a mystery
The lower court rendered a decision ”the falling of the bus to the cliff was a result of no
other outside factor than the tire blow-out."
 It held that the ruling in the La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De
Jesus doctrine was held inapplicable.
o What happened in that case: that the tire blowout… was a mechanical
defect that was easily discoverable … if the bus had been subjected to
a more thorough or rigid check-up
o Why its not applicable here: It reasoned out that in said case, it was
found that the blowout was caused by the established fact that the
inner tube of the left front tire "was pressed between the inner circle
of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel." In
this case, however, "the cause of the explosion remains a mystery
until at present."
 As such, the court added, the tire blowout was "a caso fortuito which is
completely an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will" of the
defendants who should be relieved of "whatever liability the plaintiffs may
have suffered by reason of the explosion pursuant to Article 1174  of the Civil
Code."
CA reverses: extraordinary diligence, so Bus can’t rely on “mystery” Bus must
PROVE caso fortuito
the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision reversing that of the lower court. It held
that:
 "To Our mind, the explosion of the tire is not in itself a fortuitous
event.
 The cause of the blow-out, if due to a factory defect, improper
mounting, excessive tire pressure, is not an unavoidable event.
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 17
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 On the other hand, there may have been adverse conditions on the
road that were unforeseeable and/or inevitable, which could make
the blow-out a caso fortuito.
 The fact that the cause of the blow-out was not known does not
relieve the carrier of liability.
 Owing to the statutory presumption of negligence against the carrier
and its obligation to exercise the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons to carry the passenger safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, it is the burden of the defendants to prove that
the cause of the blow-out was a fortuitous event.
 It is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the cause of
the blow-out is not caso fortuito.
o Proving that the tire that exploded is a new Goodyear tire is
not sufficient to discharge defendants' burden.
o Moreover, there is evidence that the bus was moving fast,
and the road was wet and rough.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the explosion of a newly installed tire of a passenger vehicle is a
fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from liability for the death of a passenger.
HELD :
THE DOCTRINES WE ALREADY KNOW
Fortuitous event; characteristics thereof.
A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure
of the debtor to comply with his obligations must be independent of
human will;
b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of
the injury resulting to the creditor. As Article 1174 provides, no
person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen was inevitable. In other words,
there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of
injury or loss.
When a passenger is injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes
that the common carrier is negligent.
 When a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks
incidental to the mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not
an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely
and at all events to carry them safely and without injury.
 However, when a passenger is injured or dies while travelling, the
law presumes that the common carrier is negligent. . . . Article 1755
provides that

o "(a) common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances."
 Accordingly, the culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured
the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently.
 This disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
o the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed by Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the Civil
Code or
o that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event.
 Consequently, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for
damages sought by the passenger.
TOPIC DOCTRINES
DAMAGES
An accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the
negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the
carrier from liability for damages.
The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There
are human factors involved in the situation.
 The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the
vehicle.
 Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of
a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it
could not explode within five days' use.
 Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects
in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso
fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages.
Proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is not negligent.
It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary
measures considering partially dangerous condition of the road.
 Again proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient
proof that it was not negligent.
 Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary
diligence in the care of its carrier such as conducting daily routinary
check-ups of the vehicle's parts.
03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 18
Ampil
Why so much burden on CCs?
 As the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It may be impracticable, as
appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and
every part of its vehicles before each trip, but we are of the opinion
that a due regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling
public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition
and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may
endanger the safety of the passengers."
Presence of contradictory facts must be resolved in favor of liability in
view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law
It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor,
Salce, that the bus was running at "60-50" kilometers per hour only within the
prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony of
Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the driver to
slow down. These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of
liability in view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law.
Damages; for the death of a passenger, the heirs are entitled to
p50,000.00
Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence
with clear and convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for
damages. Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code prescribes
the amount of at least three thousand pesos as damages for the death of a
passenger. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of damages under
Article 2206 has been increased to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
Moral damages; recoverable when there is a breach of contract of
carriage resulting in the death of a passenger.
Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when
bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be recovered
when breach of contract of carriage results in the death of a passenger, as in
this case. 
Exemplary damages; respondents are entitled to p20,000.00 as
exemplary damages because petitioner is deemed to have acted
recklessly.
Exemplary damages, awarded by way of example or correction for the public
good when moral damages are awarded, may likewise be recovered in
contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
 03 Transpo Compiled Digests. 3C. Atty. 19
Ampil
oppressive, or malevolent manner. Because petitioners failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, which resulted in the
death of Tito Tumboy, it is deemed to have acted recklessly. As such, private
respondents shall be entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00. 

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that petitioners shall, in addition to the monetary awards therein, be liable
for the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.

END OF ASSIGNMENT FOR 06 DEC 2013