(New Perspectives on South-East Europe) Alexander Kleibrink - Political Elites and Decentralization Reforms in the Post-Socialist Balkans_ Regional Patronage Networks in Serbia and Croatia-Palgrave Ma

New Perspectives on South-East Europe
Series Editors:
Spyros Economides, Associate Professor in International Relations and European
Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Kevin Featherstone, Eleftherios Venizelos Professor of Contemporary Greek
Studies and Professor of European Politics, London School of Economics and
Political Science, UK
Sevket Pamuk, Professor of Economics and Economic History, The Ataturk
Institute for Modern Turkish History and Department of Economic, Bogaziçi
(Bosphorus) University, Turkey
Series Advisory Board:
Richard Crampton, Emeritus Professor of Eastern European History at

St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford, UK
Vladimir Gligorov, Staff Economist specializing in Balkan countries, The Vienna
Institute for International Economic Studies, Austria
Jacques Rupnik, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre d’études et de recherches
internationals, Sciences Po, France
Susan Woodward, Professor, The Graduate Programme in Political Science at The
City University of New York, USA
South-East Europe presents a compelling agenda: a region that has challenged
European identities, values and interests like no other at formative periods of
modern history, and is now undergoing a set of complex transitions. It is a region
made up of new and old European Union member states, as well as aspiring ones;
early ‘democratising’ states and new post-communist regimes; states undergoing
liberalizing economic reforms, partially inspired by external forces, whilst coping
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and recurring issues of security, identity, well-being, social integration, faith and
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This series examines issues of inheritance and adaptation. The disciplinary reach
incorporates politics and international relations, modern history, economics and
political economy and sociology. It links the study of South-East Europe across a
number of social sciences to European issues of democratization and economic
reform in the post-transition age. It addresses ideas as well as institutions, policies
as well as processes. It will include studies of the domestic and foreign policies of
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region and beyond. The EU is an obvious reference point for current research on
South-East Europe, but this series also highlights the importance of South-East
Europe in its eastern context: the Caucuses, the Black Sea and the Middle East.
Titles in the series include:
Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyürek and Umut Özkirimli (editors)

NATIONALISM IN THE TROUBLED TRIANGLE
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey
William Bartlett, Jadranka Božikov and Bernd Rechel (editors)
HEALTH REFORMS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, James Ker-Lindsay and Denisa Kostovicova (editors)
CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITIONS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis
and Georgios Niarchos
THE LAST OTTOMANS
The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1941–49
Alexis Heraclides
THE GREEK–TURKISH CONFLICT IN THE AEGEAN
Imagined Enemies
Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl
THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF POST-YUGOSLAV STATES
From Yugoslavia to Europe
Markus Ketola
EUROPEANIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Turkish NGOs as Instruments of Change?
Alexander Kleibrink
POLITICAL ELITES AND DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS IN THE
POST-SOCIALIST BALKANS
Regional Patronage Networks in Serbia and Croatia
New Perspectives on South-East Europe

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Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Political Elites and
Decentralization Reforms
in the Post-Socialist
Balkans
Regional Patronage Networks in Serbia
and Croatia
Alexander Kleibrink
Senior Fellow at the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building
& Associated Fellow at the Free University Berlin
© Alexander Kleibrink 2015
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
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First published 2015 by
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Za Mambu
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Contents
List of Figures and Tables ix
Preface x
Acknowledgements xiii
List of Abbreviations xv
1 Centre–Periphery Relations in the Balkans 1

1.1 Problem definition and research question 4
1.2 Regional autonomy and decentralization 6
1.3 The case studies: Serbia and Croatia in the context
of former Yugoslavia 14
1.4 Research design, methodology and case selection 21
1.5 Outline of the book 33
2 A Framework for Studying Elite Access to Resources 36

2.1 Existing accounts of decentralization 36
2.2 Resource dependency and elite agreements between
centre and periphery 44
2.3 Conclusion 58
3 The Role of Institutional Legacies from Yugoslav

Decentralization 60
3.1 Pre-socialist legacies 65
3.2 Socialist legacies: Accommodation 67
3.3 Nationalist authoritarian legacies from the 1990s:
Confrontation 77
3.4 Conclusion 81
4 Access to Electoral Resources 83

4.1 Electoral resources in the centre and periphery 86
4.2 The electoral systems in Serbia and Croatia 88
4.3 Access to electoral resources at regional and national
levels 91
4.4 Conclusion 99
5 Information Exchange and Cooperation 102

5.1 Centre–periphery relations during autonomy
negotiations since 2000 102
vii
viii Contents
5.2 Methodological note 106

5.3 Information exchange between centre and periphery 110
5.4 Strategic cooperation between centre and periphery 116
5.5 Conclusion 117
6 Access to Patronage Resources 121

6.1 Access to patronage resources as a causal mechanism 124
6.2 The extent of patronage in Serbia and Croatia 130
6.3 Methodological note 132
6.4 Expert survey results 133
6.5 The politicization of SOEs and government funds 140
6.6 Allocation of government funds 145
6.7 Conclusion 148
7 Conclusions 152
7.1 Main findings 153
7.2 Varying extent of shared resources 154
7.3 Empirical contribution to the study of Balkan states 156
7.4 Theoretical contribution 159
7.5 Methodological contribution 165
7.6 Elite networks and their relation to structural accounts 166
7.7 Policy implications for the donor community 169
Appendix 176
Notes 184
Bibliography 199
Index 225
Figures and Tables
Figures
1.1 Classifying the territorial structure of Serbia and Croatia 9

1.2 Map of Serbia 18
1.3 Map of Croatia 19
2.1 A resource-dependent framework for studying
decentralization reforms in transition societies 55
4.1 Vote share of winning coalitions in national elections in
Vojvodina and Istria 95
4.2 Vote differential for winning presidential candidates in
Serbia and Croatia 98
5.1 Information exchange concerning decentralization 114
5.2 Strategic cooperation concerning decentralization 118
6.1 Growth of employment in public administration at
national and regional levels 131
6.2 Expert assessment of the partisan influence in regional
public sector recruitment 134
6.3 Expert assessment of the motivation for political parties
to use patronage in Serbia and Croatia 139
6.4 Expert assessment of organizational types that are most
prone to patronage in Serbia and Croatia 141
6.5 Relations between political parties and SOEs in
Vojvodina 148
6.6 Relations between political parties and SOEs in Istria 149
7.1 Extent of sharing resources and interacting between
parties in the centre and periphery 154
A3.1 Boxplot comparing the answers of male and female
respondents on public sector effectiveness 181
Tables
1.1 The territorial structure of post-socialist states in Europe 15

6.1 Share of political appointees in regional SOEs 146
A3.1 Analysis of variance of answers within and between
occupational groups of respondents 180
A3.2 Values for effectiveness score across occupational groups 180
ix
Preface
When travelling through the Balkans, one is confronted with many

ambiguities and even more contradictions. Simply observing the var-
ious everyday aspects of the regional question provides a hint of the
complexities that continue to accompany the issue of centre–periphery
relations and decentralization. When entering Croatia, you notice that
the five historical regions appear in a central position on the national
flag and coat of arms. Even more surprising is the Italian flag that is
found on almost every building of the regional administration in the
Croatian region of Istria, which borders Italy. In Serbia, there is no indi-
cation or allusion to regions in the most central symbols of the Serbian
nation-state. It is also unthinkable to put the Hungarian flag on the
buildings of the regional government in Serbia’s northern province of
Vojvodina, which is adjacent to Hungary. What do these symbolic and
commonplace differences tell us about Serbia and Croatia and about
decentralization reforms in transition countries more broadly?
At first, it seems that the regional question is much more present
in Croatia than in Serbia. Yet, when looking at the actual way of
dealing with decentralization issues, there has been little political will-
ingness on the part of Croatia to accommodate any particularities of
its historical regions, while Vojvodina enjoys a much more pronounced
degree of self-rule and recognition of its specific regional history within
Serbia. Making sense of these puzzling contradictions is at the heart of
this book.
Historically, the regional question and the issue of decentralization
are at least as old as Yugoslavia itself. From the beginning, these issues
have been deeply intertwined with economic aspects of decentraliza-
tion. Both the regional question – tied to nationalities and nations – and
unequal economic development went hand in hand as justification for
demanding more decentralization. In socialist Yugoslavia, formal and
institutionalized relations existed between the centre and the periph-
ery. Apart from the self-rule of the republics and the autonomous
provinces and regions, there was considerable shared rule at the fed-
eral level. In addition, the federal and republican elites were connected
via strong formal and informal relations, the latter manifested in back-
door decision-making on essential reforms. In post-socialist times, these
formal inter-linkages between centre and periphery evaporated. Shared
x
Preface xi
rule was abolished in Croatia and Serbia. What was left was a predom-
inantly informal interaction limited to party elites which increased the
uncertainty about political reforms on the relation between centre and
periphery. In other words, the intertwined process of decentralization
and development during the socialist period continued after democra-
tization began in the year 2000, with the exception that the context
and mechanisms through which it unfolds have changed. The context
is now one of democratic representation and decision-making, yet party
elites have significantly dominated these processes and have adapted
their behaviour to this new and formally democratic setting. Moreover,
the scale has changed: what was once a question between a federal state
and its constituent republics has become an issue between the central
state and its regions, but the underlying problems are comparable to
those of socialist Yugoslavia.
John Stuart Mill underlined the difficulties of having several national-
ities under the roof of one common state because of the lack of a sense of
community (Mill 1958 [1861]). Consider what this sense of community
and the accompanying political institutions mean for policy outcomes.
In their seminal work on civic community, Robert Putnam (1993) pro-
vides a masterly analysis of the effects that social capital and strong
citizen networks have on economic and policy outcomes.
I embarked with a similar attitude on my field trip to the Balkans
to study the desire of historical regions for autonomy and self-rule in
nationalist environments that are hostile to such ideas. But as often in
life, what I found in reality was not only the consociationalist utopia
of righteous struggle for regional autonomy and minority protection.
Rather, a much more sobering and nuanced picture emerged in which
the virtuous aspects of autonomy and local community turned out to
be closely entangled with elite interests and the vices of unaccountable
government.
As with most work on regionalism, I had originally paid less attention
to the potential vices of giving more discretion and powers to regional
communities. While Putnam himself underlined the consequences of
lacking social trust in Italy’s Mezzogiorno, much of the policy-relevant
literature concentrated on the virtuous implications of social capital
(Grootaert 1998; Fukuyama 2000). Of course, the advice to support
and build up social capital implicitly assumes that the lack thereof is
problematic and that societies need “social networks and the norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000:
19). But in many social processes worldwide, we are at least as likely to
observe issues stemming from a lack of public trust and the prevalence
xii Preface
of power and interest in narrow elite networks. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986)

earlier work on social capital deals more with this ‘dark side’ of social
capital, and the privileged access to resources that membership in dif-
ferent groups entails. This latter notion is widespread, particularly in
developing and transition countries where political elites often have
disproportionate access to such resources. This book reveals how vir-
tuous ideals of regional self-rule and local community – to be achieved
through decentralization reforms – can be hijacked by old and new elites
to advance their own interests. These questions are not limited to tran-
sition societies in the Balkans. In the past transition process in Spain
similar phenomena can be observed, albeit their implications only sur-
faced almost 40 years after transition began. In the aftermath of the
current financial and economic crisis, consolidated democracies such
as Spain also exhibit very similar problems: elites have used decentral-
ized powers to bloat the public sector to advance their influence, which
has contributed to unsustainable debt levels and triggered fiscal turbu-
lences across the Eurozone. And in relation to current crisis hotspots
in Iraq and Ukraine, countries with weak institutions and widespread
corruption, similar mechanisms driving or impeding decentralization
have been at play. When I started writing this book, I did not even
think of such parallels. But they point to the severe policy implications
of ill-designed decentralization reforms and their relevance for donor
policies.
Acknowledgements
During this long project, many people have helped me to ask the
right questions, find the right sources, prepare interviews and endure
the writing phase. First and foremost I thank Tanja Börzel and
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi for guiding me towards a firm research design.
Many thanks go also to the participants of the 11th Mediterranean
Research Meeting of the European University Institute, and particu-
larly to Milica Uvalić and Vojmir Franičević for their valuable com-
ments. For the right input on decentralization and regional stud-
ies at the right time I am indebted to the organizers and par-
ticipants of the 2010 ECPR Summer School on Federalism and
Regionalism at the University of Edinburgh. Wilfried Swenden com-
mented on critical points when I first presented substantial parts of my
book.
Many people have helped me to prepare my field interviews in
Serbia and Croatia. I am grateful to Will Bartlett, Dejan Stjepanović,
Dubravka Jurlina-Alibegović, Mihaela Bronić, Sanja Maleković, Sonja
Avlijas, Tin Pažur, Helena Hirschenberger, Aleksandar Ivanović, Nevena
Ivanović and Biljana Pešalj. Equally, I am thankful for the time my
interviewees and survey respondents invested in this project. For
my various methodological and general questions I could rely on
advice from Jeffrey Checkel, László Bruszt, Roger Schoenman, Karoline
Krenn, Klaus Brösamle, Arolda Elbasani, Gary Marks and Christine
Ante. Having been part of the structured doctoral programme at
the Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies has indeed also
helped to structure my own thoughts. Finally, I found good and
critical friends in the Myxa Group, where we discussed not only
our drafts but also life and what it means to start and finish a
book.
Special thanks go to the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Fritz
Thyssen Foundation and the Dahlem Research School. Without their
financial support this book would not have been possible. This book
has benefitted from the financial and intellectual support of the Kolleg-
Forschergruppe “Transformative Power Europe” at the Freie Universität
Berlin.
xiii
xiv Acknowledgements
My family has provided me with so much support through all the

years of study and moves to other countries that I will never be able
to fully repay the faith they have put in me. And my wife gave me the
necessary calm and connection to real life during times of doubt and
writer’s block.
Abbreviations
APV-GOV Government of the Autonomous Province Vojvodina

ASSOC-MUN Croatian Association of Municipalities
ATP Autotransport Company Vojvodina
CENREG Centre for Regionalism
CeSID Centre for Free Elections and Democracy
CiU Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió)
CROAT-GOV Croatian government
DA Dalmation Action (Dalmatinska Akcija)
DfID UK Department for International Development
DOS Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS Democratic Party
DSS Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije)
DS-VOJV Democratic Party branch in Vojvodina
DZVM Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians
EIZ Economic Institute Zagreb
ERC Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de
Catalunya)
EU European Union
G17+ G17 Plus
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska
zajednica)
HNS Croatian People’s Party – Liberal Democrats (Hrvatska
narodna stranka – liberalni demokrati)
HSLS Croatian Social Liberal Party
HSS Croatian Peasant Party
HZZ Croatian Association of Counties
IDA Istrian Development Agency
IDF Istrian Democratic Forum
IDS Istrian Democratic Assembly (Istarski demokratsi sabor)
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMO Institute for International Relations
IO International organization
ISTRIA-GOV Istrian County Administration/Government of the
Istrian Region
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LGI Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative
xv
xvi List of Abbreviations
LS Liberal Party
LSV League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (Liga
socijaldemokrata Vojvodine)
MADMIN Ministry of Justice, Public Administration and Local
(Croatia) Self-Government
MADMIN Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, Public
(Serbia) Administration and Local Self-Government
MERR Ministry of Economy and Regional Development
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOF Ministry of Finance
MP Member of Parliament
NGO Non-governmental organization
NIP National Investment Plan
NISPAcee Network of Institutes and Schools of Public
Administration in Central and Eastern Europe
NSWP Non-statewide party
PP People’s Party
PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero
Español)
RCPAR Regional Centre for Public Administration Reform
RDS Democratic Alliance of Rijeka (Riječki Demokratski Savez)
SDP Social Democratic Party of Croatia (Socijaldemokratska
partija Hrvatske)
SDSS Independent Democratic Serb Party
SEIO Serbian Office for European Integration
SERB-GOV Serbian government
SKGO Permanent Conference of Cities and Municipalities in
Serbia
SNS Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka)
SOE State-owned enterprise
SPO-NS Serbian Renewal Movement – New Serbia (Srpski pokret
obnove)
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka)
SVM Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (Savez vojvoąanskih
Maąara)
SWP Statewide party
UDBA State Security Administration/Service (Uprava državne
bezbednosti – armije)
URS United Regions of Serbia (Ujedinjene regije Srbije)
1
Centre–Periphery Relations in
the Balkans
Young democracies and transition societies face many challenges that

typically emerge in the early stages of state-building processes. Among
them, one central concern for national governments stands out: the
core objective to consolidate the newly acquired national statehood and
unity. In this endeavour, elites in the central government (centre) are in
a continuous struggle with elites in the state’s subnational units (periph-
ery). Nationalist elites often perceive demands for decentralization as
a threat to the national unity of the state. Centralists base their argu-
ment for unity on the alleged and historically grown indivisibility of
nation and state (Gellner 1983; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Brubaker
1995b; Hechter 2000; Migdal 2004a: 21–22; Bunce 2005). Without such
“an ultimate unity of allegiance” the legitimacy of centralized rule is
questioned (Laski 2003: 5).
As Stein Rokkan has shown, centre–periphery relations are, thus, “rel-
evant to almost all organisations and institutions of a political system”
(Rokkan and Urwin 1982; Flora et al. 1999: 7). Against this background,
it is not surprising that the question of why some states are more decen-
tralized than others has been central to political analyses ever since the
writings of Montesquieu and the authors of the Federalist Papers in the
United States (Wibbels 2006: 165). While centre–periphery structures
tend to be relatively stable in mature democracies with consolidated
institutions, in transition societies they are more in flux because of
the rapid institutional changes. This is why the analysis in this book
concentrates on the aspect of relations between centre and periphery
rather than on the structural features and cleavages in which they are
embedded.
Former Yugoslavia provides a rich environment for the study of
centre–periphery relations because of its multi-national composition
1
2 Political Elites and Decentralization Reforms in the Post-Socialist Balkans
and the quasi-inbuilt need for some kind of decentralization arrange-

ments since the foundation of a joint southern Slavic state following
the First World War. This was reflected during the imperial and social-
ist rule in the changing division of powers between different levels of
government. Indeed, borders and questions of territorial integrity were
at the forefront of the civil wars in the 1990s in former Yugoslavia and
remain highly divisive today. In this part of Europe, “unresolved secu-
rity problems [ . . . ] seem to prioritize capacity-building at state centres
at the expense of regional revival, and dictate a hardening of borders,
rather than softening them” (Batt 2002: 27). Subnational elites and
regions in the periphery have put forward particularistic demands to
gain more autonomy from central governments in order to guarantee
cultural rights and achieve better prospects for steering their economic
development (Wolczuk 2002b: 205; Scherpereel 2007). This tension in
centre–periphery relations exemplifies vividly how “issues of the social
and territorial boundaries of the community surface in the construction
of new democracies” (Horowitz 1994: 41).
In its most extreme form, such demands may lead to the
“Balkanisation” of states; that is, an increased fragmentation of states
and the often-violent secession of subnational entities as the result of
ethnic conflict. While the break-up of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s
provides ample evidence for this and has been reflected in a wide array of
academic studies, we know much less about the underlying mechanisms
of non-violent centre–periphery relations and how elite interaction in
this context matters for differences in decentralization reforms. It is
regrettable that the more enduring aspects of centre–periphery rela-
tions in former Yugoslavia have received far less scholarly attention
than those focusing on ethnic violence. This neglects the myriad of
peripheral regionalist movements in this part of Europe that have chal-
lenged centralized policies and politics without resorting to violence or
secession.
How can we then explain decentralization reforms when elites in the
centre have few incentives to accommodate demands for more decen-
tralization from the periphery? This conflict is particularly strong in
transition societies such as Yugoslavia’s successor states that have a
recent history of ethnic conflict. In what follows I develop a novel
argument for understanding decentralization reforms in such conflict-
laden contexts. On the basis of a comparative study of Serbia and
Croatia, I argue that elites anticipate their access to electoral and patron-
age resources before adopting decentralization reforms. The resource-
dependent approach I suggest emphasizes that differential elite access
to these resources is associated with different kinds of decentralization
Centre–Periphery Relations in the Balkans 3
reforms that result in varying territorial structures. I substantiate this

association by dissecting two causal chains that have resulted in differ-
ent outcomes in Serbia and Croatia. The added value of this book lies in
the analysis of these two less-studied cases in the post-socialist Balkans.
Moreover, the book provides original micro-level data on the relation-
ship between anticipated elite access to patronage resources and elite
decisions to support decentralization reforms. My analysis contributes
to our understanding of comparative politics and the study of centre–
periphery relations in post-socialist transition states. At the same time,
I complement the existing literature on the Balkan states that has obses-
sively focused on ethnic identity as the prime causal factor explaining
decentralization and conflict in this region and in other multi-ethnic
societies.
By stressing the importance of elite access to resources, this book fills
a gap in the academic literature on the study of Balkan societies. Non-
violent and contemporary decentralization processes in the Balkans
have been almost absent in the literature. This constitutes a selec-
tion bias because many studies only concentrated on secession which
is only one possible outcome of centre–periphery relations. Yet many
observers still persist in the belief that the civil wars in the 1990s are
a highly illustrative example of the association between ethnic conflict
and decentralization. In this view, the escalation of conflicting demands
for decentralization and centralization was inevitable. But contempo-
rary centre–periphery relations in the Balkans are more complex than
this simplistic notion from the past suggests.
After the end of the Cold War, there was a surge of studies on
ethnic conflict and civil war in the literature on comparative politics
and international relations (Horowitz 1985; Posen 1993; Diamond and
Plattner 1994; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hechter 2004; Jenne et al. 2007;
Cederman et al. 2009). Given the large number of intra-state conflicts
since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the decline of wars between states,
scholars have increasingly focused on the causes of civil and ethnically
motivated conflicts. Unfortunately, many studies take for granted the
fact that the appearance of war and conflict is solely an outcome that
has to be explained. But we should be careful when engaging in one-
dimensional analyses of such complex phenomena. In this light, the
term “ethnic conflict” in the sense of ethnically motivated hatred is
misleading because it assumes a historically determined sentiment that
under certain conditions explodes into violence.
Kaplan’s simplistic notion of historical hatred among the different
ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia that was determined to break out
one day is an example of such a one-dimensional view (Kaplan 1993).
Several others have already provided more nuanced and profound

descriptions of ethnic violence as a collateral of the struggle by elites for
political and economic power (Mueller 2000; Gagnon 2004). Indeed, we
do not get very far by simply treating ethnic identities as fixed (Chandra
2012). Analysing decentralization reforms necessitates a more encom-
passing approach because ethnicity and other socio-economic factors
crystallize jointly through centre–periphery relations. This is why this
book provides an important complement to the research on ethnic
conflict in transition societies.
There is a vast literature on the traditional federal or regionalized
states in the western hemisphere (de Winter and Türsan 1998; Keating
2003a; Swenden 2006; Erk and Koning 2010; Hooghe et al. 2010), but
very few detailed studies on decentralized states in other parts of the
world. By now we know much about the reasons why federal systems
vary across the globe, but we have much less to say about the variation
between the myriad of unitary states that have some form of decentral-
ized powers short of federations (Hooghe and Marks forthcoming).1 But
theory development in the area of comparative regionalism, as in the
social sciences, depends more broadly on the study of those relatively
unknown and understudied countries (see Geddes 2003: 32).
Post-socialist transition societies are very exciting cases in this regard
because centralization and authoritarian rule have suppressed periph-
eral interests for almost five decades, and democratic institutions are
now giving them more voice (Keating 2003b; Pitschel and Bauer 2009).
Empirically, we observe on average a much more pronounced tendency
to decentralize in transition countries than in advanced and established
democracies in the western hemisphere (Marks et al. 2008: 177).
1.1 Problem definition and research question
This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between

centre and periphery in post-socialist states in the Balkans. I argue
that it is more appropriate to start from general patterns of centre–
periphery relations and elite interaction than to solely focus on their
ethnic dimension or on other structural factors. The process of the ter-
ritorial structuring of states is not merely about top-down imposition
by the central government. Rather, it is at least as much a bottom-up
process in which regional elites pursue broader cultural, socio-economic
and political goals that aim at more autonomy from the central govern-
ment. However, the results of these endeavours vary greatly. While some
regions have been relatively successful in obtaining more autonomy,
others have failed. Against this background, the research question this
book seeks to answer is the following: How can we explain the varying
outcomes of decentralisation reforms in Serbia and Croatia? To answer this
question, I begin by examining the role of political elites and parties
in the centre and periphery who are key actors in my analysis. Given
the importance of regional political parties for driving decentralization
demands, a broader approach that encompasses different kinds of rela-
tions across the centre–periphery divide has the advantage of covering
the complex interactions and varying preferences inside a region (Greer
2007).
The countries that have emerged from former Yugoslavia provide a
rich testing ground to explore these processes and varying outcomes.
They are critical cases against the background of the civil wars in the
1990s and the predominance of identity-driven politics and violence in
the past. A comparative case study of two states and two regions within
these states constitutes the core of the empirical analysis in this book.
Istria in Croatia and Vojvodina in Serbia are illustrative examples of
places that have a historical regional identity marked by their ethnic
minorities; Italian in the former, Hungarian in the latter. As these two
cases clearly exhibit, we can observe very different ethno-regional move-
ments in the Balkans, whose pursuit of economic, political and cultural
goals has led to varying institutional outcomes. Istria and Vojvodina
both share common legacies as a part of socialist Yugoslavia. They are
historically grown regions with ethnic minorities. Both are part of states
where national unity is still a highly contentious issue that stirs debates
and contestation by nationalistic elites when autonomy demands are
voiced. Yet autonomy demands from the periphery have led to very dif-
ferent decentralization reforms in the two regions: while in Serbia the
national parliament granted a new autonomy statute to Vojvodina that
triggered a more far-reaching decentralization initiative, Istria’s efforts
of pushing for more autonomy and general decentralization have not
led to any significant institutional change. Such variance is puzzling
given the commonalities that stem from their past of belonging to
the same ethno-federal state and their long-standing regional identity,
which separates them from other regions in their respective states.
A very important factor for understanding the decision to adopt or
reject decentralization reforms is the role of political elites and parties.
As the two cases outlined above vividly illustrate, it is not sufficient to
have the necessary social and cultural pre-requisites for decentralization
to be successful. It is rather the political willingness of elites who can
make use of these pre-requisites and other resources to actively pursue
regional interests that may lead to an institutional accommodation of

regional autonomy demands. This also resonates well with the find-
ings of scholars working on decentralization processes in Central and
Eastern Europe who have highlighted that domestic factors, and par-
ticularly political elites, have been central in shaping territorial reforms
in post-communist states (Hughes et al. 2004; O’Dwyer 2006a; Brusis
2010).
1.2 Regional autonomy and decentralization
The language and the choice of terminology have a strong and subtle
influence on the way we perceive reality. The same holds true for rela-
tions between centre and periphery. Regionalism as a very broad school
of thought has, for instance, mainly used the term regional autonomy
to analyse centre–periphery relations and adopts the perspective of the
periphery (Keating and Loughlin 1997b; Suksi 1998). It looks at histor-
ically grown regions with particular characteristics that separate them
from other regions in their respective nation-states. Expressed differ-
ently, regional autonomy stresses regional community and the struggle
for autonomy in cultural, socio-economic and political aspects. As such,
the term is somewhat normative, especially when one remembers that
regionalism as an approach is itself an “ism”; that is, it is about a
political ideology. Most importantly, however, regional autonomy as a
term focuses more on the political–legal status of a region and less on
the continuous process of centre–periphery relations. Autonomy has a
teleological outlook as it implies a narrowly pre-defined final status.
The term “autonomy” is derived from the Greek autonomia and lit-
erally means “self-law”. Adapted to regional affairs, it means regional
self-rule or the law-making powers of a region. From the view of a cen-
tral state, this notion is very much contested because it implies special
treatment for one or more regions and in its strongest form is associ-
ated with as little interference from the centre as possible. This has been
true in the case of Yugoslavia throughout recent history. Terms such as
autonomaši in Serbia and autonomisti in Croatia indeed carry with them
rather negative connotations.
Elazar (1987), one of the scholars who established the field of com-
parative federalism, identified self-rule and shared rule (the degree to
which regional governments co-determine national policy-making) as
the essential features of federations. The main distinction between a
federal and non-federal state is that, in the former, the federal govern-
ment is not entitled to withdraw unilaterally any power or competence
from the subnational government. This is where the term “autonomy”

comes in. In abstract terms, autonomy refers to what Huntington (1968:
20) saw as delineation between the values and interests of a political
institution and those of other social forces. Autonomy can be seen very
broadly as the “self-governance of a demographically distinct territorial
unit within the state” that is enshrined either in the constitution or in
a separate autonomy statute (Weller 2009: 115).
More substantially, autonomy refers to the “legally entrenched power
of ethnic or territorial communities to exercise public policy functions
(legislative, executive and adjudicative) independently of other sources
of authority in the state, but subject to the overall legal order of the
state” (Weller and Wolff 2005: 13). It is important to note that central
authorities are not allowed to unilaterally withdraw autonomy rights
without the consent of the autonomous community. Thus, mere decon-
centration of powers according to this understanding would not be
an autonomy-granting process. Rather, autonomy stands between the
federal and unitary endpoints of a continuum. It is this continuum
in which decentralization processes take place (Hutchcroft 2001: 31).2
Hence, the term decentralization implies a more process-oriented way
of approaching centre–periphery relations.3 I adopt this term in my
analysis because it denotes the process of attaining regional autonomy
rather than the political–legal status that would be the outcome the
process.
We can place different categories of decentralized states on this
broader continuum. It is better to adopt more clearly defined categories
of decentralized states than to focus on the ambiguous term “auton-
omy”, which is multi-faceted and sometimes blurry as an analytical
category as discussed above. Swenden proposes four different kinds
of contemporary states with regional layers of government based on
the degree of fiscal, administrative and legislative powers of regionally
elected assemblies and executives: confederations, federations, region-
alized states and unitary decentralized states (Swenden 2006: 13ff.).4
I discard confederations and federations from further discussion because
the main focus of this book is the self-rule of subnational units, not the
additional shared rule at the federal level that is, as I previously men-
tioned, the key defining feature of federations. Very different rules apply
to centre–periphery relations in federations because the periphery can
veto certain policies and legislation. Hence, I only discuss regionalized
and unitary states within the domain of my research question.
Let me now first turn to regionalized states. Regionalized states have
established regional tiers of governance with elected assemblies and
governments that still “remain subordinate to the central government”

(Swenden 2006: 14). Spain and the United Kingdom are typical cases of
regionalized states in Western Europe. Unitary decentralized states, on the
other hand, lean towards the centralization end of the continuum and
constitute a very broad category encompassing many different states
from Italy and Scandinavia to Greece.5 They also have elected regional
assemblies and executives, but these have far less fiscal, legislative and
administrative powers than their counterparts in regionalized states.
In most cases, regional and local tiers mainly implement policies that
the central government has adopted.
Although Swenden himself is not very sympathetic to the idea of
placing his rather broad categories on a continuum, this book acknowl-
edges that ideal types by definition encompass very different kinds of
states, which makes it difficult to identify and analyse smaller changes
in dynamic centre–periphery relations. States can fall anywhere between
the two extremes of centralization and decentralization, and the non-
federal states that I examine in this book are either regionalized or
unitary decentralized states. That is why I primarily use the term “decen-
tralization” throughout this book, as it denominates the process of
centre–periphery relations on a continuum rather than referring only
to the end-state of the process, which in many cases is not fixed but
undergoing continuous changes in degree.
Before classifying Serbia and Croatia according to the two outlined
categories, it is important to briefly discuss another important differen-
tiation concerning the territorial distribution of powers in decentralized
political systems, namely that between symmetric and asymmetric
arrangements. Symmetric decentralization refers to a system in which
each subnational unit enjoys the same constitutional powers, whereas
in asymmetric arrangements some subnational units have more powers
than others (Swenden 2006: 63). This aspect is important because the
unequal treatment of regions within the same state has often triggered
other less favoured regions to demand similar powers and competen-
cies. A prominent example is Spain, where the Basque Country and
Navarre have far-reaching taxation rights based on medieval rights
(fueros), which other historical regions lack. In the background of the
current financial and economic crisis, this difference in taxation powers
raised tensions with Catalonia, which had to ask the central government
for a bail-out because the Catalan government had to transfer most of its
fiscal revenues to Madrid.6 Generally speaking, many if not most decen-
tralized states (both unitary and regionalized) possess some degree of de
facto asymmetries that are often the result of historical developments
Unitary decentralized Regionalized
Serbia (2002)
Serbia (1990) Serbia (2006–09)
Croatia (1991) Croatia (2001–03)
Centralized Decentralized
Figure 1.1 Classifying the territorial structure of Serbia and Croatia

Source: Own compilation based on categories from Swenden (2006: 13ff.).
(Keating 1999; von Beyme 2003: 240; Swenden 2006). In federal or

regionalized states, asymmetric decentralization can endanger the sta-
bility of the state because non-advantaged regions are likely to demand
equal treatment (Zuber 2010).
A decentralization reform, the outcome of interest in this book, means
the establishment of an autonomous sphere of self-government guar-
anteed in the national constitution or in a regional autonomy statute.
A veritable decentralization reform moves a country from one category
to another on the continuum of decentralization depicted in Figure 1.1.
Put differently, I look at the factors that explain why Serbia has become
a regionalized state, while Croatia has remained a unitary decentral-
ized state. Serbia used to be a relatively centralized state in which the
authoritarian national government suspended the autonomy statutes of
the subnational entities of Vojvodina and Kosovo in the early 1990s.7
However, Serbia leaned more towards being a regionalized state in
the categorization I just introduced. Vojvodina slowly regained parts
of its autonomy only after the ousting of the Milošević government
in 2000. In 2002, the Serbian Parliament passed a law that gave the
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina the competence over education and
cultural policy (Omnibus Law). The return of Serbia to a truly region-
alized state was further manifested in the new constitution of 2006,
and also when Vojvodina received a new autonomy statute that the
national parliament adopted after fierce debates in November 2009. This
statute granted Vojvodina significant competencies and the right to take
measures for promoting economic development, such as establishing
a development bank, entering inter-regional agreements and opening
representative offices in Brussels and other regions.8 Thus, Vojvodina

appeared to enjoy very far-reaching autonomy.
Compared with other regions in Serbia, such as Šumadija and Sandžak
that do not have any kind of political recognition or elected regional
government, Vojvodina certainly has achieved a new degree of auton-
omy within an asymmetrically regionalized Serbia. But it is important to
note that this autonomy falls short of the de facto status of a republic that
Vojvodina had in socialist Yugoslavia. Some critics of the new auton-
omy statute, such as politicians from some regionalist parties, have
questioned how far-reaching the autonomy statute truly is. A promi-
nent politician from a Hungarian minority party even called it “façade
autonomy”.9 At the same time, the statute is an accomplishment and
advancement compared with the Milošević regime under which the
region had lost its self-rule. But as I will show in this book, govern-
ing political elites in the region used the autonomy statute mainly to
enhance their access to state resources rather than to achieve veritable
autonomy.
Croatia, in contrast, remains a unitary decentralized state, despite the
constitutional provisions for self-government through directly elected
regional governments. In 2001, the upper chamber of parliament repre-
senting the regions was abolished through a constitutional amendment.
This move was countered by the Istrian regional government, which
unilaterally adopted a declaration that made all public institutions in
the region officially bilingual (Italian and Croatian). As a consequence,
the Istrian regional party – the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) –
was put under pressure to leave the national government. This led to a
reshuffling of the cabinet and the IDS went into opposition. Since then,
regional elites in Istria have continuously demanded more autonomy
and decentralization of competencies for the 20 regions or županije (offi-
cially termed counties). Yet Croatia remains a highly centralized state
with symmetrically decentralized administration tasks for its regions.
In a nutshell, decentralization reforms in Serbia have led to an asym-
metrically regionalized state with special autonomy provisions for the
province of Vojvodina. Croatia, on the other hand, continues to be a
unitary decentralized state, in which mainly implementation powers are
decentralized to democratically elected regional governments. Figure 1.1
illustrates how decentralization reforms over the period 1990–2010 led
to different territorial structures in Serbia and Croatia. In this figure,
I only included the two outcomes of interest covered in this book,
namely the unitary decentralized state in Croatia and the asymmetri-
cally regionalized state in Serbia. During the 1990–2010 period, both
states moved within these broader categories towards becoming more
decentralized. But Croatia has remained a unitary decentralized state,

while Serbia returned to being a regionalized state.
Decentralization as an incomplete contract

Decentralization reforms can be the cure for ethnic tensions and can act
as the catalyst for conflict. A fruitful way to approach this ambiguity
is to depict decentralization reforms, and more generally most reforms
in fast-changing transition societies, as an incomplete contract between
elites in the centre and periphery. Political elites in transition societies
are arguably the most relevant actors because they negotiate and decide
on state reforms and compete for access to state resources (Geddes 1991;
Grzymala-Busse 2008). Any decentralization reform, through constitu-
tional changes or separate autonomy statutes and laws, is essentially
a contract between centre and periphery on their respective rights
and duties. But such a contract is never entirely complete because of
two main reasons: bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson
1981). Simon (1991) identified bounded rationality as a key obstacle to
decision-making because the cognitive limits of human beings hamper
their intentions to act rationally. Opportunistic behaviour is another
reason why contracts are not likely to be complete. None of the parties
that enter into a contract can be entirely sure that the terms of the con-
tract will be respected and sustained (Williamson 1981: 554). In other
words, the involved parties face a commitment problem because they
cannot accurately assess the trustworthiness of the other if there are no
credible institutions to provide sufficient guarantees (see also North and
Weingast 1989). Given the redistributive implications of institutional
change more generally, elites face incentives to change them ex post
(Przeworski 1991; Greif and Laitin 2004). Such commitment problems
are compounded in transition societies that are plagued by weak formal
institutions, partial reforms and a prevalence of strong informal rela-
tions (Hellman 1998; Hellman and Kaufmann 2003; Ledeneva 2006).
These inherent limits of the decentralization contract tend to aggra-
vate an agreement on decentralization between centre and periphery.
As I will show in greater depth in Chapter 2, political elites and parties
may use other formal and informal ways of relational contracting that
compensates for the problems of incomplete contracts (Macneil 2001;
Rodrik 2008). If formal institutions cannot provide a framework for cred-
ible commitment, an agreement on the distribution of critical resources
may suffice to ensure durable elite agreements. This understanding of
decentralization as an incomplete contract is even more relevant for
multi-ethnic societies that undergo radical changes. It is also a more
general feature of reform processes in transition societies that are very
often partially complete, resulting in a plethora of incomplete contracts

and institutions (Bunce 1999; Vachudová 2009).
Elites continuously interact to decide on reforms. In a similar vein,
decentralization reforms are rarely singular events at one point in time.
Rather, they constitute long-term and on-going processes in which pow-
ers are switched back and forth between centre and periphery. It is
improbable that a final solution can be found concerning the power
balance between centre and periphery. It is rather likely that “conflict
resolution” becomes a continuous process (von Beyme 2003: 253–254).
Furthermore, the actual implementation of reforms is likely to evolve
because it is not possible to foresee any potential problem ex ante when
the original legal provisions for reforms are drafted. This is why infor-
mal agreements on the distribution of critical resources are important as
substitutes for strong institutions.
This book does not explicitly address the consequences of decentral-
ization reforms, but we need a basic understanding of the potential out-
comes in order to infer how elites and political parties factor them into
their decisions. Decentralization can have three broad consequences: it
may be only superficial with no real policy change, it may lead to the
delinking of single territorial units pursuing their own interests or it
may result in the veritable emergence of territorial policy communities
(Keating et al. 2009). The last two are problematic for national elites and
political parties, as they challenge their prerogatives over policy-making.
Decentralization in transition societies and donor policies

It is important to note that multi- and bi-lateral donor agencies have
been strong supporters of decentralizing powers to subnational levels
in transition states. By stressing the virtues of decentralization as a
conflict-mitigation tool that also allows for better citizen participation
and public service delivery, the funding for such reform projects has
risen drastically in the past two decades. Decentralization has indeed
become a central programmatic concern of most donors (OECD 2004).
In 2006, bi- and multi-lateral donors established the informal net-
work “Development Partners Working Group on Decentralization &
Local Governance” with its main secretariat based in Bonn, the former
capital of Germany’s post-Second World War federation. The location
can be seen as a symbolic choice, since the allied forces and espe-
cially the US government insisted on a decentralized federal system for
post-war Germany to avoid unchecked centralized power and ensure
democratic accountability. This network seeks to coordinate the various
donor efforts to support decentralization across the developing world. In
this process of decentralization becoming a development paradigm, the

donor community has at times closed its eyes to the potential pitfalls
of decentralization. Yet, in most heterogeneous societies, decentraliza-
tion is a highly political process that can change the power balance in
these societies. Rather than using decentralized authorities for effective
public service delivery for citizens, regional elites can use newly created
institutions to advance their own interests at the expense of the com-
mon good. Furthermore, it is very difficult to find an optimal degree of
decentralization for very different policy areas. It is even more daunting
to design and install appropriate and functioning coordination mech-
anisms for reaping potential benefits of the decentralized provision of
citizen services (Prud’homme 1995).
Questions of broader liberalization reforms have been intimately
connected to this somewhat biased and uncritical support for decentral-
ization reforms by the donor community. After all, almost no transition
state government has been capable of strategically sequencing reforms
because the need for drastic changes in the institutional set-up of
the state, its economic system and civil society was so overwhelming
that many of these processes started simultaneously and even con-
tradicted each other at times (Lavigne 1995; Kornai et al. 2001; Barr
2005). Analysts often fail to recognize the overwhelming challenges that
policy-makers have faced in times of transition: many reforms seem and
are urgent in many very different, but often interdependent, fields.
Political elites and newly created political parties have been central
actors during transition periods. Reforms have winners and losers, and
the main struggle in the early period of transition has been often about
the distribution of spoils and rents. For example, cutting government
size and public employment formed part of the overall macro-economic
reform package adopted in Central and Eastern Europe and in the
Balkan states. Aiming at a more rationalized, efficient and effective pub-
lic sector, the room for manoeuvre by governments to make public
policies declined together with the overall size of public employment.
Yet my analysis shows that too much reform emphasis has concen-
trated on the national level. Guided by the gloomy prospects and
perceived benefits of decentralization outlined above, donors paid much
less attention to the structure and content of regional and local public
institutions. With opportunities for politicization and patronage declin-
ing or stagnating at the national level as a result of externally imposed
cuts in public employment, elites in the centre and periphery resorted
to lower levels of government to extend their influence through the
politicization of public sector recruitment. Indeed, at lower levels of
government, on average a stronger increase can be observed in pub-

lic employment growth in the past decade. These findings highlight the
relevance of political economy for decentralization reforms in transition
societies. Elites have proven to be creative when it came to diverting
their efforts to more subtle ways of colonizing the state. While they
could present their neo-liberal reform achievements by showing their
public sector reduction at the national level, politicized public employ-
ment increased at lower levels of government under the guise of more
representative state institutions that accommodate ethno-regional dif-
ferences. In that sense, partisan state-building efforts through public
sector growth became what O’Dwyer (2006b) succinctly coined “run-
away state-building”. It is this informal aspect of centre–periphery
relations that deserves closer attention, which is why I analyse informal
relations in chapters 5 and 6.
1.3 The case studies: Serbia and Croatia in the context

of former Yugoslavia
The wide array of studies on decentralization and federalism in

Yugoslavia and its successor states highlights that Yugoslavia is a very
good case for understanding decentralization reforms (Pleština 1992b;
Ramet 1992; Bunce 1999; Lampe 2000; Trbovich 2008; Basta 2010).
Former Yugoslavia is a critical case study that can illuminate how
centre–periphery relations unfold after authoritarian rule and conflicts.
Serbia and Croatia serve as two most similar countries for which many
factors can be held constant (a more detailed discussion of the case selec-
tion follows in Section 1.4). Both states share common legacies as a part
of socialist Yugoslavia, and in both states demands for more decentral-
ization have met strong opposition from nationalist elites. In addition,
I look at one historically grown region in each state. While Serbia
returned to an asymmetrically regionalized state with fiscal, admin-
istrative and political powers devolved to the northern Autonomous
Province of Vojvodina, Croatia remains a mainly unitary state but has
a decentralized system in which the županije are mostly restricted to
administrative implementation tasks. Within Croatia, the county of
Istria shares several characteristics with Vojvodina: they are both histor-
ically grown regions with ethnic minorities and pronounced political
demands for stronger decentralization. It is particularly interesting to
examine two historical regions because small and close-knit societies in
which ethnic ties are politically relevant provide the opportunity for a
rich analysis at the regional level (Peters 2006). What matters here is
that the paired comparison of two very similar states and regions within
these states allows us to control for other intervening factors that might
be related to decentralization reforms (see Tarrow 2010). Thus far, little
use has been made of Serbia and Croatia’s striking similarities for this
kind of comparative approach.10 I believe this is a lamentable neglect,
given the need to examine especially less-studied countries for theory
development in comparative politics (Geddes 2003: 32).11
In 2000, both Serbia and Croatia embarked on their democratization
and state-building path and the European Union (EU) formally offered
a membership perspective to all countries in the Western Balkans.12
Concerning their territorial structure, both states differ in the degree
to which central governments have delegated legislative, administra-
tive and fiscal powers to regional assemblies and governments. With
the exception of Bosnia–Herzegovina, they are the only states with
truly regional governments in the Western Balkans (i.e. having a meso-
level tier of government between national and local authorities). Within
the broader universe of post-socialist Eastern Europe, unitary decen-
tralized states are most widespread, followed by regionalized states (see
Table 1.1). In other words, powerful regional governments and assem-
blies are the exception rather than the rule in European transition
Table 1.1 The territorial structure of post-socialist states in Europe

DECENTRALIZED
State system Post-socialist countries
Confederation Serbia and Montenegro (until

2006)
Federation Bosnia–Herzegovina (since 1995),
Czechoslovakia (until 1992)
Regionalized Poland, Hungary, Serbia (after 2002)
state
Unitary Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania,
decentralized Romania, Macedonia, Slovenia,
CENTRALIZED
state Serbia (1990–2002), Croatia

Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Albania,
Montenegro
Source: Own compilation based on a report by the European University Institute

written for the Committee of Regions (EUI 2008). In order to account for the
differences within the broad category “Unitary decentralized state”, the more
centralized countries are placed in the lower right-hand corner.
societies. In most of these countries, the regional entities are mainly

concerned with implementing regional development policies supported
by EU cohesion funds (Davey 2003; Bruszt 2008). Hence, Croatia
belongs to the larger group of transition countries that remained uni-
tary with limited symmetric decentralization to the regional level. It will
be easier to draw parallels to this set of countries than to the much
smaller group of regionalized states, in which Serbia is the only one
with asymmetric arrangements.
Unnoticed by many scholars, the regional level has played an impor-
tant role in the Western Balkan countries since the civil wars in the
1990s and the Kosovo crisis. What we can observe in many Balkan states,
and particularly in former Yugoslav states, is an on-going back and forth
between centralization and decentralization. Put differently, decentral-
ization is a process that is continuous and fluid with no clear end state.
In the Balkans, this process is influenced and accompanied by many
different notions ranging from ethno-nationalism to regional develop-
ment. Borrowing from Herbert A. Simon, this process is what we might
call “satisificing regionalism”: regional elites might choose an alterna-
tive that corresponds to their “level of aspiration” that falls short of the
seemingly optimal solution (see Simon 1978: 356). Given the highly
contentious nature of regional autonomy demands in the modern his-
tory of the Balkans, there are very few examples of landmark changes
and nothing in sight resembles a grand federal bargain. Rather, the
context of nationalist politicians and discourses have limited the ways
in which decentralization can unfold. Thus, actors in the periphery in
many cases have had to rely on small steps of satisficing as in the case of
Croatia, whereas Vojvodina in Serbia regained the symbolically impor-
tant autonomy through partial political decentralization (see Annex 4
for a detailed timeline of the relevant developments since 1990).
Vojvodina and Istria are two prominent examples of regionalist move-
ments. They are similar in terms of historical regionalism and identity;
both have ethnic minorities and are relatively wealthy in economic
terms compared with other regions in their respective states. A brief
look at the basic statistics reveals that both regions have less unem-
ployment and higher economic production than the national average.
While Vojvodina’s two million population is larger than Istria’s 240,000,
they both have lower unemployment rates than the national average
and contain a politically significant ethnic minority. In Vojvodina, the
Hungarian ethnic minority has a population share of 14.3 per cent,
whereas the Italian minority in Istria constitutes roughly 7 per cent of
the total population.13
Serbia: A regionalized state

In Serbia, the question of decentralization is at least as old as its exis-
tence as a modern nation-state. Somewhat paradoxically, the question
of regional autonomy in Vojvodina was at its outset an issue advocated
by the Serbian minority in what was then a Hungarian province within
the Habsburg Empire.
In Vojvodina, Hungarians are the largest minority group, account-
ing for 14.3 per cent of the population. Vojvodina also formed part
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the Hungarian side. It enjoyed de
jure privileges as an “autonomous province” in Titoist Yugoslavia. These
were formally expanded in the 1974 constitution. Under Slobodan
Milošević, most self-rule rights were abolished de facto and only re-
installed with the Omnibus Law in 2002. The autonomous province
is relatively wealthy in economic terms compared with other regions
in Serbia. Unlike Croatia, that joined the EU in 2013, Serbia received
EU candidate status earlier in 2012 and began accession negotiations
in 2014. Thus, Serbia does not yet benefit from all the components of
EU funding (only parts of the funding for capacity-building can be used
for regional and local authorities). Despite the many similarities with
Istria, Vojvodina achieved the adoption of a new autonomy statute in
late 2009, while Istria remains unsuccessful in its endeavours to achieve
stronger decentralization and general regionalization.
Vojvodina’s regained autonomy has challenged the preconception of
many nationalistically oriented politicians and raises essential questions
for Serbia’s political system: what kind of community is Serbia, the rump
of former Yugoslavia, and which groups constitute it (see Batt 2005)?
Indeed, the president of Serbia’s Constitutional Court is right when he
states that the legal case concerned with the constitutionality of the Law
Confirming the Powers of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina was
the most important decision of the court (Tanjug 2012).14 Despite the
highly politicized Constitutional Court, which so far has failed to build
up its credibility with landmark rulings, this statement hints at the con-
troversial nature of any autonomy arrangement. In Serbia, asymmetry
has turned out to be both a blessing and a curse. It has been a blessing
because there is no real concern that other regions might enter the com-
petition for more autonomy. Besides Kosovo, there is no other region
with a history of modern-day self-government, let alone self-rule.15 But
asymmetric and hence preferential treatment for only one region in the
country has also brought opposition from nationalist politicians who
stress the indivisible unity of the Serbian state.
Figure 1.2 Map of Serbia

Source: Serbian map from 2006, Central Intelligence Agency.
We can, therefore, categorize contemporary Serbia as an asymmetri-

cally regionalized state in which Vojvodina’s self-rule is enshrined in a
special autonomy statute that was adopted in November 2009 and pro-
vided for in the constitution of 2006. This arrangement is asymmetrical
because only one region enjoys autonomy, while other parts of the
country – except the outstanding resolution of Kosovo’s final status –
do not have regions that are established as such and do not possess any
substantial decentralized authority (see Figure 1.2).
Croatia: A unitary decentralized state

Croatia, in contrast to Serbia, is a unitary decentralized state in which
20 županije (in addition to the capital region Zagreb) have directly
elected regional assemblies and prefects but have few powers beyond
implementation tasks (see also Swenden 2006). Croatia is hence a sym-
metrical unitary system in which all regions or counties have the same
degree of decentralized powers, which are mainly constrained to limited
Figure 1.3 Map of Croatia

Source: Croatian map from 2001, Central Intelligence Agency.
administrative and fiscal competences (see Figure 1.3 for the territorial
borders).
In Istria, around 15 per cent of the total population are ethnic
minorities, roughly half of whom are Italians. Istria has a long-standing
history as an independent region that belonged to the Austrian part
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Prior to that it was closely asso-
ciated with Italy, with which it shares a border. A particular trait
that Istria shares with Vojvodina is the distinctively multi-national
and multi-cultural character of the regional identity (Ashbrook 2006;

Dragojević 2008; Hagan 2009). It is economically more developed than
most other Croatian regions. In 2001, the national parliament abolished
the upper chamber of parliament (House of Counties), through which
regions could participate in national legislation. The central govern-
ment has not yet accommodated Istria’s on-going demands for further
regionalization and more autonomy.
In the Croatian Parliament (sabor) elections in December 2011, the
regionalist party IDS, together with Kukuriku coalition partners from
the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) and the Croatian People’s
Party – Liberal Democrats (HNS), was successful in ousting the con-
servative Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) government. This is only
the second time in the young history of independent Croatia that the
conservatives lost their government mandate. The IDS has consistently
propagated decentralization since the 1990s. Indeed, the “IDS was the
only major opposition party in Croatia to fundamentally challenge
the historical statehood narrative” of the nationalist Tuąman regime
(Bellamy 2003: 84).
IDS politicians make regular allusions to the Spanish system, in which
three historical regions have functioned like an avant-garde in demand-
ing and receiving more autonomy in the new democratic setting since
Franco’s death. This, in turn, has allowed other regions to follow suit
and demand more self-rule. In Istria, this comparison with and admira-
tion of the Spanish case went so far that the IDS consulted parties from
Catalonia when they drafted their new autonomy statute in 2001.16
The symmetric arrangements in Croatia have so far counter-
intuitively hampered decentralization. In the 1990s, a front of several
regionalist parties formed in order to jointly put forward demands of
common interest, namely the devolution of powers to regional gov-
ernments. But it quickly became apparent that the interests of the
different parties were too dissimilar. Competition rather than coop-
eration came to the forefront. From the perspective of the Croatian
government, the fear of a domino effect might have played a role in
their reluctance to grant regional autonomy to Istria and to embrace
comprehensive political decentralization. Once Istria received a special
autonomy arrangement, other historical regions would follow suit with
demands for more decentralization. That is why late President Franjo
Tuąman used a divide and rule tactic to avoid any strong regionalist
front.
In sum, I selected my cases on the basis of the dependent variable
or outcome of interest, namely different degrees of decentralization
manifested by Serbia as an asymmetrically regionalized state and Croatia

as a unitary decentralized state. However, such a case selection based on
the outcome is problematic despite the variation in both cases. There is
always the risk of bias and unrepresentativeness, which can be mitigated
by selecting typical cases that are most similar with regard to relevant
context variables. I will discuss this challenge in greater detail in the
next section.
1.4 Research design, methodology and case selection
In this section, I first present my methodological approach and research

design and discuss how I deal with several pitfalls associated with com-
parative case studies and case selection. Then, I show why process
tracing and causal mechanisms are the appropriate methods to over-
come these challenges by outlining two causal mechanisms that are
further elaborated in Section 2.2. In a third step, I explicate why combin-
ing process tracing with social network analysis is fruitful when it comes
to examining interdependent processes, relations and resource exchange
between elites. On the basis of this discussion of methods, I give an
overview of the data generated and how I combine them for each step
of the causal mechanisms in subsequent chapters. Finally, I critically
assess the advantages and disadvantages of the semi-structured inter-
views that I conducted in both countries in order to achieve a more
intimate knowledge of the relevant actors, processes and perceptions on
the ground.
Throughout this description of my methodological approach, I refer
to my analytical framework based on resource dependence to illustrate
how I proceed in answering my research question. Note, however, that
I leave the comprehensive discussion of alternative explanations and
my resource-dependent approach to Chapter 2. At this point, I only
highlight the main cornerstones.
As discussed in the previous section, this book is based on a paired
comparison of two most similar countries and two regions within
these countries. Paired comparisons are superior to single-case stud-
ies in that they reduce the “possibility that a supposed determining
variable is as critical as it might seem from a single-case study alone”
(Tarrow 2010: 244). This comparison aims at explaining the variation in
decentralization reforms found in both countries and regions; that is,
it seeks to identify the causes of effect and hence is backward-looking,
as it takes the dependent variable or outcome of interest as the start-
ing point (Scharpf 1997; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). My comparative
case study encompasses Serbia and Croatia, and Vojvodina and Istria as
regions within these states. While the main focus of this comparison is
the time period of fully democratic politics in both countries between
2000 and 2010,17 I also add a deeper temporal dimension through an
analysis of accommodative elite practices and institutions, their evolu-
tion in socialist Yugoslavia and their challenges in the 1990s (Chapter 3).
In sum, the methodological approach adopted in this book is a paired
comparative case study that examines decentralization reforms both
across and within cases and contains a historical element (Gerring 2007:
28; Tarrow 2010).
Dealing with typical problems of case studies

When adopting a focused comparative case study as an approach, sev-
eral issues arise that are typical pitfalls in such comparisons. With regard
to the selection of cases and relevant explanatory factors, two prob-
lems constitute persistent challenges to any case study research: (1) the
problem of an overly deterministic research design and (2) the poten-
tial pitfalls stemming from selection on the basis of the dependent
variable, or selection bias more generally. Although these issues are
more relevant for large-N (i.e. large sample) studies that use quantitative
methods, both also deserve close attention in case study research. I argue
that over-determination constitutes a more fundamental problem than
selection bias and is more difficult to deal with. Statistical analysts are
right to raise these issues in any social science study, but at the same
time we should be careful when applying these criteria, borrowed from
statistics, one-to-one to case study research. After all, case studies by
definition do not aim at generalization to a broader set of cases; their
main aim is to advance the development and refinement of theories
(Geddes 2003; George and Bennett 2005). Case studies allow researchers
to open up the black box and show through detailed analysis how social
processes evolve and the conditions under which they turn to different
paths.
Over-determination
Most comparative case studies are exposed to the risk of over-
determination or the risk of using more variables than the number of
cases they study. This is problematic because it is very difficult to control
for the correlation of all independent variables. Statistically, this issue
translates into insufficiently large degrees of freedom; that is, the large
number of different independent variables case study researchers choose
contributes very little to the explanation of the variation in the depen-

dent variable. Given the problem of correlation of independent variables
mentioned earlier, it becomes very difficult to make any robust causal
inferences. This is particularly true for most similar research designs
(Przeworski and Teune 1970: 34).
As I use Mill’s method of difference, the danger of an overly deter-
mined research design is indeed acute. Nonetheless, my approach is the
most appropriate method for selecting cases in backward-looking or y-
centred research (Mill 1846; Hönnige 2007). According to this research
design, the different outcomes of two cases that share the same char-
acteristics except the independent variable of interest can be explained
(at least partially) by that one independent variable. This resembles the
most similar systems research design advanced by Przeworski and Teune
(1970). In this book, the main explanatory factor includes the degree to
which political elites and parties in the centre and periphery have access
to electoral and patronage resources and the extent to which trust facili-
tates an agreement on the distribution of these resources (see Section 2.2
for a detailed description of the analytical framework). This factor varies
in the two countries I examine. Although we can never completely
exclude that another factor or intervening variable affects the outcome
of interest, we can try to control for the main structural factors that both
countries and regions have in common. Another way to assure valid
causal inferences is to use process tracing and account for “different
paths” to the outcome of interest (George and Bennett 2005: 215).
The case selection was guided by the focus on post-socialist countries
in the Balkans. I begin with the successor states of former Yugoslavia
because they have undergone very similar and comparable develop-
ments under the Tito regime. This, in turn, makes it easier to hold
other independent variables constant. In the successor states of for-
mer Yugoslavia, elected regional governments exist only in Serbia,
Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina.18 Unlike Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia–
Herzegovina has no region with historical roots, as the current territorial
organization is the result of the Dayton Peace Agreement from 1995.
As the goal is to control for potential explanatory factors except the one
of main interest, the entities and cantons in Bosnia–Herzegovina are
discarded. This leaves us with Croatia and Serbia.
So far, very few studies have tapped the potential of the vast sim-
ilarities these two countries share. Of these, most focus on questions
of nationalism and identity (Stjepanović 2012) or on the legacies of
the civil wars (Zakošek 2008). These two countries are thus well-suited
for the most similar research design. One region from each state was
chosen: Istria in Croatia and Vojvodina in Serbia. The two regions are
similar in terms of historical regionalism and identity, both have ethnic
minorities and both are relatively wealthy in economic terms com-
pared with other regions in their respective states. In addition, both
Croatia (acceding country) and Serbia (candidate country) have been
subject to EU incentives as part of the enlargement process, which
makes it possible to control for external variance (see Sartori 1991).
Choosing both cases from states that have a common past as mem-
bers of socialist Yugoslavia makes it possible to get somewhat close to
a controlled environment because holding socialist legacies constant
here is easier than in most other cross-country studies (see Gerring
and McDermott 2007). Being able to control for most other poten-
tial explanations increases the internal validity of the argument and
helps to avoid over-determination, although it is difficult to draw
general implications beyond the two cases. However, the suggested
causal mechanism can provide a starting point for further comparative
analyses.
I discuss the relevant alternative explanations in Section 2.1 at greater
length. At this point, it suffices to outline them briefly in order to show
that my cases of Vojvodina in Serbia and Istria in Croatia are indeed
most similar with regard to these existing accounts. In the literature on
decentralization reforms, we can identify three structural factors that are
conducive to more decentralization: identity pressures, distributional
pressures and the pre-existing institutional framework.
First, citizens and political elites mobilize when identity pressures
based on ethnic belonging are adequately strong. A typical example
is an ethnic minority group that is discriminated against by an ethni-
cally different majority group. Second, distributional issues may arise
from varying socio-economic developments. Often, more developed
regions demand decentralization to safeguard their tax revenues and
wealth. Another important aspect in the European context arises from
the European Union’s accession requirements and regional policy that
empowers regional elites and creates new opportunities for regional
development. A third approach posits that successful decentralization
reforms are largely contingent on the prior existence of an institu-
tional framework or historically grown institutions at the regional level.
They act as enablers of or impediments to the mobilization of regional
political elites and parties.
Vojvodina has historically contained a Hungarian minority and the
autonomy question has been highly disputed in national politics
throughout most of the 20th century. The region enjoyed regional
autonomy in socialist Yugoslavia. Economically more developed than

the national average, Vojvodina has access to the pre-accession funds
of the European Union. Several regional political parties were founded
in 1990 and there has been a multi-party composition in the regional
assembly since 1992.
Istria has a historical Italian minority and the autonomy question
has been highly disputed in Croatian national politics. In socialist
Yugoslavia, Istria enjoyed limited local autonomy within the Croatian
republic. Mainly thanks to tourism, the region is economically more
developed than the national average. Since the accession of Croatia
to the EU in 2013, Istria has full access to EU regional funds. Several
regional political parties were founded in 1990 in Croatia, which has
elected regional governments since 1993.
The careful consideration of the case selection makes it possible to
avoid as best as possible the risk of over-determination, which case
studies face in general. Along with process tracing as the main method
discussed below, this ensures that the effect of the independent vari-
able can be isolated (King et al. 1994; Snyder 2001; George and Bennett
2005). I acknowledge that focused comparisons of this kind rest on very
strong assumptions that are rarely met in the real world outside truly
experimental settings, since it is very difficult to hold all these param-
eters constant (George and Bennett 2005: 156). That is why the causal
chains outlined in this section are traced meticulously in order to be
transparent about their comparability in the two cases under study.19
Selection bias
Another problem often associated with case studies is selection bias.
There are inherent conceptual problems when researchers select cases
on the basis of the dependent variable, as I briefly touched upon ear-
lier in this section (Geddes 2003: 89ff.). Causal inference is difficult if
researchers only choose cases with a given outcome that pertain only
to one end of the continuum of possible outcomes. With such a biased
case selection, other important cases might be omitted and the assumed
strength of the highlighted explanatory factor might not be high and
reliable in these other cases. In other words, researchers have to be
careful not to choose cases that are non-representative of the entire pop-
ulation of other cases. This can lead to an over-representation of cases
with very high or very low scores on any important variable.
A first aspect that reduces the risk of a biased selection of cases is the
variation in the outcome of interest. I compare two cases with vary-
ing outcomes of decentralization reforms: in Serbia reforms gave more
decentralized powers to Vojvodina, which restored Serbia as an asym-

metrically regionalized state; in Croatia, by contrast, decentralization
reforms rather further cemented the unitary decentralized structure of
the state. Thus, the two cases show variation with regard to the depen-
dent variable or outcome under study. Another aspect concerns the
generalisability of the findings. As outlined in Sections 1.1 and 1.2,
the domain of my research question covers asymmetrically regional-
ized and unitary decentralized states in transition contexts. As I do not
cover federal states or symmetrically regionalized states, it is difficult to
draw parallels to these state categories based on my findings. My more
modest objective is to unveil causal chains that help to generate new
hypotheses. These could then be tested with a larger sample of transition
countries and regions that have symmetrically regionalized or unitary
decentralized structures. With the necessary adjustments, my findings
could also be tested with states and regions that have fundamentally
different socio-economic contexts in Western Europe and beyond. The
fundamental critique of selection bias, therefore, cannot be applied fully
to case studies where the focus lies on laying out a detailed account
of what happened in each case and how one’s own analysis links to
alternative explanations (Bennett and Elman 2006a).
Process tracing for identifying causal chains and unveiling

mechanisms
I use process tracing to partly overcome the problems of over-
determination and selection bias discussed earlier. Process tracing as a
method helps me to identify the causal mechanism that provides a plau-
sible explanation for the varying decentralization reforms that I exam-
ine. In social sciences, an increasing number of scholars have turned
to mechanistic explanations of social phenomena that contribute to
the development or refinement of mid-range theories (Elster 1998;
Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Mayntz 2004; Gerring 2008; Bennett and
Checkel 2014). While different definitions exist of what constitutes a
causal mechanism, I concur with Mayntz who succinctly defined it as
a sequence “of causally linked events that occur repeatedly in reality if
certain conditions are given” (Mayntz 2004: 241). A causal mechanism
establishes a clear chain of events and explains how they are linked. The
overall aim of my approach is thus to meticulously “trace the operation
of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation” which is partic-
ularly useful for revealing interactions between different actors (Checkel
2008: 116). Re-constructing the process of elite interaction and event
sequence contributes to our understanding of different decentralization
reforms and territorial structures in transition countries. I discuss the

causal mechanism of differential elite access to resources in greater
depth in Section 2.2. This mechanism is the overarching brace of the
causal chains I discuss in the following paragraphs and is an inherent
part of my process tracing. Together, they are particularly useful for
comparative studies that examine the causes of an effect (Mayntz 2004).
While some authors also see process tracing as a means to test hypothe-
ses derived from theories, I agree with Büthe (2002) that the true power
of process tracing lies in constructing plausible explanations and not
in testing alternative theories (see also Falleti 2006: 4–5). After all, it is
not feasible to judge a narrative’s truth claims from within the narrative
itself.
The aim of this book is to develop different causal chains that link
the independent variables deduced from the theoretical discussion in
Chapter 2 with the outcome of interest, namely decentralization reform
(George and Bennett 2005; Hönnige 2007: 237). Understanding how
all elements of the causal chain relate to one another is the broader
causal mechanism. Despite the limitations of generalizing from case
studies, process tracing allows us to “identify relationships between con-
ditions and outcomes that can be applied to other contexts” (Falleti
2006: 5). The challenge with this approach is to show how my analytical
framework relates to initial or scope conditions identified in the litera-
ture. The above-outlined structural factors (identity and distributional
pressures as well as pre-existing institutional frameworks) are treated as
initial conditions that have to be accounted for, as they might act as
triggers of a causal chain (Mayntz 2004).
By employing process tracing, I identify the causal mechanism and
each part of the causal chain. The plausible explanation for varying
decentralization reforms put forward in this book is the following mech-
anism: differential elite access to critical resources between centre and
periphery has an impact on the shape of decentralization reforms and
the territorial structure of transition states. The main unit of analysis
is political elites whose main arena for interaction is political parties.
Both are composite actors with the capacity for strategic action (see
Scharpf 1997). In sum, the overall aim of this book is to provide a com-
prehensive and comparative analysis of elite interactions and how they
shaped decentralization reforms in Serbia and Croatia during the period
2000–2010.
In contrast to structural accounts, I suggest an agency-based approach
that emphasizes the interaction, relations and agreements of political
elites and parties with regard to the distribution of different resources
and their impact on decentralization reforms (see Section 2.2). “By iso-
lating and unpacking such mechanisms”, I make a contribution to the
structural accounts mentioned above in similar ways that Bates et al.
suggested in their work on analytic narratives (quoted in Geddes 2003:
38). I argue that the differential elite access to electoral and patronage
resources in the periphery is the causal mechanism that has influenced
subsequent decentralization reforms in Serbia and Croatia. In Istria,
mainly regionalist elites and parties have access to these resources at
the regional level, and there is little trust between elites in the centre
and periphery; in contrast, in Serbia these resources are shared between
elites in the centre and periphery, which is also facilitated by statewide
parties that act as brokers between centre and periphery. What is similar
in both Serbia and Croatia is the uncertainty related to decentralization
debates and reforms. In both countries, national elites fear secessionism
from the periphery. Elites in the periphery, on the other hand, cannot be
certain that a decentralization reform imposed from above will not sim-
ply off-load administrative burden without granting the desired fiscal
and political powers.
Against the background of the broad elements of the causal mecha-
nism outlined here, I outline the parts of the causal chain derived from
my detailed theoretical discussion in Section 2.2 in the following:
(1) Governing elites and parties from the centre and periphery con-
stitute durable coalition governments at the regional level; they
share electoral resources. They cooperate regularly through formal
and informal channels, and exchange information during negotia-
tions on decentralization reforms. These ties are channelled through
mutually accepted brokers that facilitate the build-up of trust in
close-knit networks across the centre–periphery divide. They agree
on the distribution of patronage appointments in the public sector
at the regional level. The likely outcome is a regionalized state.
(2) Governing elites and parties from centre and periphery do not
constitute durable coalition governments at the regional level; shar-
ing electoral resources is limited. They cooperate only on certain
issues through formal channels and only few parties exchange lim-
ited information during negotiations on decentralization reforms.
No mutually accepted broker facilitates the creation of trust and net-
works across the centre–periphery divide. Elites and parties from the
periphery monopolize the distribution of patronage appointments
in the public sector at the regional level. The likely outcome is a
unitary decentralized state.
Differential elite access to critical resources is the mechanism that

undergirds the above causal chain. Having access to electoral resources
(forming coalition governments) is the necessary first step to gain access
to patronage resources. The latter are highly relevant state resources for
elites in transition societies. But taking this step necessitates repeated
information exchange and cooperation that builds trust and thus facil-
itates an agreement on the distribution of patronage resources. In the
following paragraphs, I describe why and how I combine process tracing
with social network analysis.
Social network analysis for studying interdependent relations

and resources
Having derived the main cornerstones of the causal mechanism that
I further elaborate in Section 2.2, I now turn to social network anal-
ysis as the other main method used in this book in combination
with process tracing. It should become apparent from the outlined
causal chains that the relations between elites are multi-faceted and
cover both formal and informal aspects. Social network analysis is
an appropriate tool to study the emergence and content of relations
between actors and their effect on socio-political and economic out-
comes (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Lazer 2011). Especially in transi-
tion societies, informal relations often serve as complements or even
substitutes for formal institutions that are still weak. Political elites
are likely to engage in informal relations in order to reconcile their
interests with formal rules or to undermine formal democratic rules
when it benefits them in such contexts. More specifically, elites form
networks that are durable negotiation systems in which they bar-
gain over decentralization reforms (see Mayntz and Scharpf 1995:
61). In these networks, different resources are exchanged and differ-
ent opportunity structures emerge, which influence the behaviour of
elites. Network analysis provides powerful analytical tools to study
the linkages between interdependent actors (Levine and White 1961),
the exchange of material and immaterial resources (Coleman 1990;
Cook and Whitmeyer 1992), elite decision-making (Laumann and
Knoke 1987; Knoke 1993) and the opportunity structure for broker-
ing between different actors and networks (Gould and Fernandez 1989;
Wasserman and Faust 1994; Burt 2005). Through the lens of network
analysis, I operationalize each of the steps of the causal mechanisms
discussed above. In addition, I explain what data I collected and how
I generated the relevant relational data on interaction patterns of
elites.
My resource-dependent framework presented in Section 2.2 rests on

the relations between political elites and parties in the centre and
periphery and their differential access to interdependent resources.
As I have stated, social network analysis differs from other social science
methods inasmuch as it includes measures on the relations between dif-
ferent individuals or groups (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 28). Acquiring
relational data is sometimes difficult but possible by means of common
social research tools such as interviews and surveys.
The core of my empirical analysis begins in Chapter 4, which
concentrates on the electoral and coalition patterns in national and
regional governments during the period 2000–2010. I use electoral
data for Serbia and Croatia, and for Vojvodina and Istria, in order to
describe the influence of statewide parties (SWPs) and non-statewide
parties (NSWPs) and elites on one another, and the resulting pat-
terns of coalition governments. My analysis explicates the conditions
under which SWPs can co-opt regional parties and elites and draw
them towards their preferred policy positions. The networks of gov-
erning parties are relatively broad also because of the fragmented party
systems.
Chapter 5 presents an elite survey I conducted on the exchange
of information and cooperation patterns between political parties,
state institutions and non-governmental organizations. I generated data
through the survey that asked respondents to assess the relevance of
other organizations and the intensity of their information exchange and
cooperation with others during decentralization negotiations (I provide
more details on the survey in Section 5.2). By means of social network
analysis, I fathom the extent of informal relations between centre and
periphery. More specifically, I show how certain political parties and
governing elites act as brokers that bridge the centre–periphery divide
and thus create trust within close-knit elite networks. These information
and cooperation networks are narrower than the networks of governing
parties discussed in Chapter 4.
Building on these findings, in Chapter 6 I continue with an analysis
of informal patronage practices and the extent to which elites from the
centre and periphery share patronage resources at the regional level. For
this, I conducted an expert survey among public administration experts
in both countries in order to explore the degree of politicization and
growth of the public sector at different levels of government, and to
identify the kind of organizations that were most prone to politicization
by political parties. I also present data on the growth of public sector
employment at national and regional levels. An important finding is
that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the regional level are the most
politicized organizations, according to expert assessments. In a second
step, I provide data on the degree of politicization in these enterprises
by looking at the political affiliations of supervisory and executive board
members and of senior management.20 My findings suggest that these
patronage networks are more close-knit and narrower than the other
two networks discussed earlier.
I explain the exact steps of the measurement and data collection in
detailed methodological notes in chapters 5 and 6. I also conducted 32
semi-structured interviews with political elites, public administration
officials and experts in the region (refer to Annex 1 for a detailed list
of all interview partners). The information provided by them has been
an important element in structuring my argument and understanding
centre–periphery relations in the two cases I examine. Hence, I elabo-
rate on the advantages and potential pitfalls of interviewing for social
research in the next sub-section.
Qualitative interviews for understanding local contexts

Let me now turn to the interviews I conducted with elites and experts
in the region in order to better understand the local contexts and rel-
evant issues. A common problem with data derived from interviews is
the difficulty to assess the validity and reliability of responses (Berry
2002). Particularly open-ended questions make it very difficult to com-
pare answers across respondents. Apart from this reliability criterion,
validity is an even more profound challenge because we can never be
entirely sure whether our questions and the subsequent answers truly
measure what they ought to measure. Again, open-ended questions
aggravate this problem, as they give the respondent large leeway to
dwell on aspects of the question that are of special interest to them
while neglecting or even ignoring other, more inconvenient pieces of
information. The result is a stark distortion of answers that must be
treated carefully and needs double-checking through additional sources
and data. In addition to these severe and general issues of reliability
and validity, interviewing elites in post-socialist transition states can be
even more arduous as many additional hindrances arise: unclear institu-
tional roles of respondents, difficulties in contacting elites directly and a
widespread suspicion towards Western interviewers or interviews more
generally (Rivera et al. 2002).
In order to deal with these problems, I decided in favour of a semi-
structured questionnaire that would allow some basic comparability
across interviews and hence would minimize the risk of distorted data
(Leech 2002). I grouped questions into four different blocks: informa-

tion about the role of respondents concerning decentralization, their
view on developments since 2000, the position of their respective
organization on these issues and their relations with other elites and
organizations. At the end, I also asked each respondent whether he or
she could recommend any additional person knowledgeable about the
issue. As the focus of this book lies on political elites, I drafted the ques-
tionnaire with political elites and political parties in mind. I used the
same questions, with minor changes, for the interviews with experts
and public administration officials.
Sampling is another obstacle in obtaining sound data from interviews
because researchers need a relatively representative sample of respon-
dents who are knowledgeable about the topic and who represent or
intimately know the true interests of their organizations. After having
drafted the questionnaire, I compiled a comprehensive list of poten-
tial interviewees based on my prior work on decentralization reforms
in Serbia and Croatia. Getting access to senior political figures turned
out to be a major problem (Goldstein 2002). I had to resort to local
contacts and acquaintances among fellow researchers in order to get
my foot in the door of political elites. Thanks to my Serbo-Croatian
language skills, I was able to use different channels to establish a
contact. An additional advantage of my knowledge of the local lan-
guages was the greater ease of elite responses when conversing with
me in their native tongue. This mitigated any potential bias towards
Western researchers. Croatia turned out to be particularly problematic
because the national elections were scheduled six months after my field
research, and politicians from the governing coalition that ended up
being ousted from the government were very reluctant to reply to my
enquiries.
To sum up, I use process tracing in order to identify the causal mecha-
nisms in my comparative case study covering Serbia and Croatia, two of
the less-studied countries in terms of decentralization processes. I com-
bine process tracing with social network analysis in order to grasp the
relational aspect of elite negotiations on decentralization reforms. Com-
bining both methods and generating a substantial amount of original
data through interviews and surveys refines the measurement of interde-
pendent relations and exchange of resources. This, in turn, contributes
to a more comprehensive account of the underlying causal mechanism
(Wasserman and Faust 1994: 21ff.; Gilardi 2012). This latter aspect in
particular is an important contribution to the broader literature on pol-
icy and political networks that at times fails to establish a causal effect
of actor relations and network structures on socio-political outcomes

(Börzel 1998; Fowler et al. 2011).
Being able to triangulate data from so many different sources allows
for a highly detailed analysis of the two case studies that substanti-
ates each step of the causal chain. In doing this, I combine a vast
array of sources encompassing both perception-based data (expert and
elite surveys, semi-structured interviews) and quantitative and replicable
measures (electoral and coalition data, political affiliations in regional
SOEs), which increases the quality of the data as well as the validity of
my argument based on the resource-dependent framework I introduce
in Section 2.2. This innovative triangulation of different sources lays the
foundation for this book’s empirical analysis of the formal and infor-
mal aspects of centre–periphery relations at the level of political elites
and parties. I concentrate my analysis on the process of negotiation by
political elites and parties over critical resources and decentralization
reforms.
1.5 Outline of the book
After having laid out the research question and methodology for this
study of decentralization reforms in transition societies in this first
chapter, I discuss the existing accounts from the literature on decen-
tralization. Chapter 2 describes how existing accounts explain the
antecedent conditions of decentralization reforms. As these are not suf-
ficient to understand the mechanism of elite interaction and agreement
on decentralization, I suggest a complementary resource-dependent
approach that captures these elite dynamics. In this chapter, I expli-
cate the causal mechanisms discussed in the previous section, which
constitute the framework for the empirical analysis of centre–periphery
relations and decentralizations reforms in chapters 4–6.
In Chapter 3, I examine how centre–periphery relations have evolved,
especially during the socialist regime. While stable federal institutions
facilitated credible elite agreements under the Tito regime, the dissolu-
tion of institutions in the 1990s was associated with a more confronta-
tional mode of interaction between centre and periphery. Through this
historical account based on secondary literature, I show how the inter-
action logic concerning the accommodation of subnational interests
changed over time, making it difficult to identify clear patterns of insti-
tutional legacies and their potential effects on decentralization choices
in a democratic setting. Special attention is paid to studies that look at
federal institutions that facilitated centre–periphery relations until the
early 1980s, while weak institutions and confrontation between centre

and periphery dominated the 1990s.
In Chapter 4, I begin the analysis of democratic politics after the year
2000 by looking at government coalition patterns and the distribution
of what I call “electoral resources” among political elites and parties
in the centre and periphery. Repeated coalition-building crossing the
centre–periphery boundary is a first step that decreases uncertainty and
makes decentralization reforms more likely because elites and political
parties have more reason to trust in the negotiated terms of the reform.
Electoral data from parliamentary, regional and presidential elections
serves as a basis for explaining the rationale of political elites and parties
to either support or block decentralization reforms.
In Chapter 5, I look at the informal relations between political parties.
To understand the implications of uncertainty on decentralization nego-
tiations, the strategic cooperation and communication between elites
and political parties in the centre and periphery, outside the electoral
calculation too, are important; repeated interactions between actors
increase trust more substantially and allow access to information that
otherwise might be unavailable. With regard to the study of decen-
tralization, such a focus on relations between actors is well-suited to
analysing the “working connections” between elites in the centre and
periphery that facilitate decentralization negotiations (Agranoff 2004:
26). For this, data gathered through interviews and a survey will be used
to map the relations between political and bureaucratic elites with the
help of network analysis.
Chapter 6 analyses how widespread patronage practices are at differ-
ent levels of government. I argue that decentralization reforms open up
new opportunities for political elites and parties to influence the pub-
lic sector. Indeed, public employment growth and its politicization at
regional levels are closely associated with prior decentralization reforms.
Elites in the centre are more likely to support decentralization reforms if
they can expect to have access to patronage resources in the region that
would benefit from such reforms.
In Chapter 7, I summarize the findings from the preceding chapters.
My resource-dependent approach explains the mechanism by which
differential elite access to electoral and patronage resources influences
the agreement and shape of decentralization reforms. Trust-building
through repeated communication and cooperation in ever closer-knit
elite networks facilitates such agreements and reduces the uncertainty
associated with decentralization reforms. On the basis of empirical find-
ings, I highlight this work’s added value with respect to the literature on
Balkan societies. I also reflect on the broader theoretical and method-

ological contribution of this book for comparative decentralization and
the study of transition states. To support theoretical contributions,
I describe elite networks and how they can solve information prob-
lems, the implications of weak institutions, the relationship between
elite networks and social capital as well as the need for further research
on selection mechanisms in elite networks. To support methodologi-
cal contributions, I make an argument for combining process tracing
with network analysis to study complex social phenomena such as
centre–periphery relations in transition states, where informality looms
large. I then show how this book complements structural accounts of
decentralization. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of ill-designed
decentralization reforms and how my framework may be used for the
study of other regions in in Europe and beyond.
On the whole, this book examines both formal and informal aspects
of centre–periphery relations with a focus on the first ten years of demo-
cratic transition in Serbia and Croatia. I argue that in a context of weak
institutions and uncertain consequences of decentralization reforms,
elite interactions and negotiations are central to our understanding of
decentralization reforms and territorial structures. I show that more far-
reaching decentralization reforms are more likely when the elites and
parties in the centre and periphery can agree on an enduring distribu-
tion of electoral and patronage resources, and close-knit elite networks
that bridge the centre–periphery divide are able to build trust, so that
a durable agreement on the distribution of these resources is rendered
possible.
2
A Framework for Studying Elite
Access to Resources
This chapter lays out the analytical framework of the book. It first
summarizes existing approaches that explain decentralization reforms
and highlights their shortcomings in explaining the variation found in
Serbia and Croatia. While they provide structural context for under-
standing demands for decentralization more broadly, they have less
application to the role of agency in determining why some courses of
action are preferred by political elites and parties over other alternatives.
The focus on transition countries and decentralization has guided the
choice of the approaches presented here. I then make the argument that
a resource-dependent approach is more suitable for analysing decentral-
ization reforms. For this I conceptualize the interactions of elites and
parties in the centre and in the periphery. Trust between actors in the
centre and the periphery facilitates the distribution of critical patron-
age resources after elections. Uncertainty is an important background
condition, as it affects how political elites and parties come to an agree-
ment on decentralization reforms. This chapter thus makes a conceptual
contribution to the lively scholarship on comparative regionalism and
federalism and to the research examining reforms in Eastern European
transition societies that has somewhat lost its dynamic since the Eastern
enlargement of the European Union (EU).
2.1 Existing accounts of decentralization
In the literature we find different approaches that try to explain decen-

tralization reforms and varying degrees of regional autonomy. The
political science literature and that of related disciplines offer alterna-
tive explanations of why we observe varying degrees of decentralization.
These accounts may be very good at explaining antecedent conditions
36
A Framework for Studying Elite Access to Resources 37
and identifying relevant elites, but they offer fewer insights about the
substantial mechanisms of elite interactions and their outcomes.
There are many different approaches to the study of contempo-
rary decentralization. These range from identity-based explanations
(Fearon and Van Houten 2002; Nimni 2005) to distributional or effi-
ciency pressures to international factors such as European integration
(Hooghe 1995; Hooghe et al. 2010) and globalized economic competi-
tion (Ohmae 1993; Zürn and Lange 1999; Conversi 2001), which might
fuel regional autonomy demands and therefore have an impact on
decentralization reforms. I concentrate on three broad strands under
which most relevant approaches can be subsumed: identity pressures,
distributional pressures and pre-existing institutional framework (Riker
1964; Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Hooghe et al. 2010). While all these
strands explicate the cleavages and structural conditions that underlie
regional mobilization, they have less explanatory power when it comes
to understanding varying elite choices and the resulting decentraliza-
tion reforms. They often do not lay out in sufficient detail the elements
of the causal chain that are in between regional mobilization and insti-
tutional outcomes, and they underestimate the agency of political elites.
As the approach in this book focuses on the agency of political elites, in
this section we confine ourselves to a succinct overview of the most
relevant elements of these structural accounts.
Identity pressures
When analysing the demands of subnational groups and regions for
more autonomy in post-conflict settings, scholars have often resorted to
identity pressures to explain why particularistic regional demands arise
and why some are accommodated by central governments while oth-
ers are not. Although these accounts provide important insights about
structural pre-conditions that can explain why regional elites and par-
ties in the periphery demand more autonomy and decentralization, they
cannot fully grasp the direction institutional outcomes take when it
comes to accommodating regional demands for more autonomy.
This sub-section addresses this question by examining the underly-
ing assumptions of these approaches. The assumption that societies are
kept together by the “glue of cultural identity and national belong-
ing” (Kohler-Koch 2005: 7) is the common point of departure of many
studies that look at identity as a driving force of regionalism. In stud-
ies on the Balkans, this aspect has often been subsumed under identity
pressures that are based on ethnic considerations. While primordialists
argue that ethnically motivated behaviour is a result of fixed preferences
of individuals and group members who are strongly bound by their

kinship and cultural background (Geertz 1973), instrumentalists view
ethnic belonging as comparable to other collective actors, which allows
for establishing causal mechanisms to explain their actions (Barth
1969; Hechter 1992). In the cases studied here and elsewhere, both
accounts cannot comprehensively explain diverging decentralization
policies and their outcomes because political elites can instrumentalize
ethnic belonging in very different ways, which leads to very different
institutional outcomes.
There has been an explosion of studies on questions of (territori-
ally concentrated) ethnic minorities and their accommodation within
the majority population. Broadly speaking, these studies deal with the
particularities of ethnic minorities themselves, the relations with their
kin-state and those with the majority population (Brubaker 1995b;
Kelley 2004). Some studies try to incorporate all these dimensions
into one model of ethnically motivated bargaining between minori-
ties and central governments, which assumes that the implications of
ethnic belonging are key in understanding autonomy claims and poli-
cies (Jenne 2006; Jenne et al. 2007). Two important caveats concerning
the assumptions of the ethnically based approach deserve closer atten-
tion. First, ethnicity is a very complex and dynamic concept which
cannot be easily reduced to specific indicators (Brubaker 1995a). Also,
on a more conceptual level, ambiguities very often arise from the choice
of dimensions that constitute ethnicity (Gilley 2004; Chandra 2012).
Second, having strong assumptions about the role of ethnic belonging
in taking far-reaching political decisions runs the risk of being overly
deterministic, because group identity cannot be considered to be a suffi-
cient condition for collective action (Hechter 1992: 273). When wearing
ethnic glasses, everything looks like the result of ethnic features.1
An important causal mechanism suggested in the literature starts from
the finding that in times of regime change “the center cannot credibly
promise the minority as much as it can expect to gain from fighting
for independence” (Posen 1993; Jenne et al. 2007: 544). In other words,
centre and periphery face a security dilemma: if elites in the periph-
ery lend too much trust to the centre and moderate their demands, they
may fail to reach their decentralization goals because the centre has little
incentive to truly accommodate such claims; secessionism then becomes
the preferred course of action. But the problem with this idea lies in
its main assumption that pre-supposes a security dilemma. Instances
where the periphery does not resort to outright secessionism are dis-
carded, which constitutes to some extent a selection bias in favour of
secessionist minority groups. In addition, many of these approaches fail

to acknowledge the role external commitment providers play to ease
the security dilemma. Take, for instance, the EU enlargement process
that allows the Union to act as a commitment provider for peace-
ful inter-ethnic relations (Fearon 1998; Keating 2004; Kymlicka 2007).
In a democratic setting, the majority population can impose what
Tocqueville coined tyrannical rule; that is, it can impose laws that run
to the detriment of the minority. In the context of EU enlargement,
central governments that aspire to join the EU are closely monitored
by the European Commission, and the protection of minority rights
is an important part of the conditions attached to this process (Bieber
2004; Anagnostou 2007). Thus, the EU and other international actors
can serve as a guarantor or “commitment provider” that can sanction
countries that do not sufficiently protect minority rights. In the pres-
ence of this commitment provision, demands for autonomy or even
secession are not likely to be pursued by claiming minority protection.
While this book acknowledges that ethnicity is an important param-
eter in accounting for the choices of actors in the periphery, it is not
sufficient to explain, for example, why some actors pursue decentral-
ization demands while others do not. Identity pressures are a necessary
condition for regional mobilization and decentralization demands, but
not sufficient to explain the shape of reforms. More importantly, eth-
nicity may be associated with very different kinds of behaviour, and
other norms that challenge ethnically motivated decision-making have
spread in the past decades. After the conflicts in the 1990s and with the
beginning of democratization in the Balkan countries, we can observe a
similar tendency as in Western European countries concerning the de-
ethnicization of politics. Ethnically motivated politicians have moved
away from separatist objectives towards the less radical accommoda-
tion of “plurinational” diversity (Keating 2001a; Dragojević 2005, 2008).
One might argue that external and endogenous shocks, such as the
current economic crisis and the subsequent austerity measures, can
increase separatist sentiments in historical regions with a narrative of
politico-economic deprivation.2 But this does not change the overall
trend towards less radical decentralization demands, in which indepen-
dence can only be one option among several for more self-rule. That
is why it remains necessary to move beyond purely ethnicity-based
approaches to more general features of historical legacies that I discuss
in Chapter 3.
There are also studies that combine both historical and ethnically
motivated regionalism (Keating and Loughlin 1997a: 3–4; Keating
2001a; Caramani 2003: 23–27). They illustrate vividly that in many

countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, regional
actors have increasingly put pressure on central governments to accom-
modate specific ethnic and broader regional interests. Often, these
claims were rejected by central governments because they “delivered
a blow to the cherished ideal of ‘national unity’ and bred a sense of
insecurity stemming from the fear that centrifugal forces may lead to
territorial disintegration” (Wolczuk 2002b: 205). Serbia is a particularly
good example of this. There, “the historical memories surrounding the
themes of defeat, decentralization, and armed struggle had particular
resonance” in the 1980s and thereafter (Bunce 1999: 94, my italics).
Nevertheless, the demand for more decentralization is on the rise in
the Balkan countries but has been more multi-dimensional than the
predictions of the conventional identity approaches suggest (Marcou
2004: 13).
In sum, identity pressures and ethnic composition provide an under-
standing of the antecedent conditions that influence or constrain polit-
ical processes and outcomes. What is missing in these accounts is a
more nuanced picture on territorial aspects of transformation and the
bargaining between centre and periphery.
Furthermore, identity pressures as such do not tell us much about the
direction of regional movements and the consequent institutional out-
comes. This is partly due to an inherent bias of such an approach to
decentralization in the Balkan countries. Scholars who single out iden-
tity pressures as the key driving force of regional autonomy movements
often overestimate the intrinsic significance of ethnic kinship. Identity-
based approaches tend to focus on the macro-dimension or structural
variables, which leaves little room for analysing the specific choices
of actors in their respective institutional setting (Bauer and Pitschel
2007). I argue that it is about political elites and their strategic use of
ethnicity that matters in the end. Researchers studying party politics
echo this important qualification in their work on “ethno-regionalist”
or “autonomist parties”, which acknowledges the political competition
side of ethnically based regional movements (de Winter and Türsan
1998; de Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). Regional movements can trans-
late their partly identity-driven demands and interact strategically with
SWPs and central governments only via the political process. In other
words, mapping the structural features of regional identity in Balkan
countries can only be the first step. In order to comprehensively analyse
regional autonomy outcomes, I suggest a resource-dependent approach
in Section 2.2.
Distributional pressures
Decentralization demands have distributional implications in both eco-
nomic and political terms (Tiebout 1956; Williamson 1965; Oates 1972;
Hooghe and Marks 2009). Economic disparities can partly explain why
regional elites choose to make decentralization demands to advance
their interests (Jenne et al. 2007: 543). Actors in wealthy regions are
reluctant to subsidize poorer regions and thus might wish to avoid any
policy of fiscal equalization. Paradoxically, poorer regions also might
demand autonomy. If they feel marginalized and exploited by the cen-
tral government, they may voice demands for more decentralization,
even if this entails less access to government funds. In a European con-
text, these two logics are influenced by the provision of EU funds for
regional development that redistribute resources and create “ ‘winners’
and ‘losers’, both in terms of social groups and territories” (Bartolini
2004: 41).3 That is, the EU through its regional funds provides incentives
and creates new opportunity structures that may fuel regional mobiliza-
tion but also competition between regions (see Hughes et al. 2004).4 The
advancing EU integration process of all East and Southeast European
states has hence opened new opportunities through the provision of EU
(financial) incentives to tackle socio-economic disparities through terri-
torial reform and decentralization (O’Dwyer 2006a; Brusis 2010; Bache
et al. 2011).
What is important is how these distributional pressures are chan-
nelled. Bargaining has already been used by students of federalism
to explain the creation of federal states as a contract to join mainly
military forces in the face of a common external enemy (Riker 1964;
Rodden 2004: 489; Ziblatt 2006). However, for analysing contemporary
regionalism in non-federal states, this approach is only of limited value.
In this context, the surging research on regional political parties is more
helpful because it pays tribute to the fact that regional parties have
become important actors in mainstream politics across Europe because
they transmit identity and distributional pressures onto the political
stage (de Winter and Cachafeiro 2002; Brancati 2005; Swenden 2006:
141ff.; Hepburn 2009).5 Regional political parties are very often still
predicated on their territorial interests, but they are increasingly partic-
ipating in agenda-setting, policy formulation and implementation on
a broad range of issues that often imply distributional aspects. That
is, they have become strategic actors that challenge the prerogatives of
national political parties (Hepburn 2010).
On the other hand, SWPs have addressed this challenge by paying
more attention to regional questions and engaging in regional affairs
(Hopkin and van Houten 2009). The politicization of regional demands

and how SWPs respond to them is crucial for understanding different
elite agreements and decentralization reforms. In this context, both the
framing of autonomy issues as being good for the overall economic
development of the state (away from particularistic regional demands)
and the success of regional parties to set the agenda are important (Brusis
2010).
Institutional framework
The institutionalist literature focuses on the formation of national party
systems and its effects on decentralization. Early work by Riker (1964),
also taken up by others (Garman et al. 2001; Eaton 2004), suggested
that a decentralized party system allows a more pronounced voicing
of regional interests and therefore is likely to lead to more decentral-
ized governments. In contrast, more recent work on institutionalism
claims the causal relation to be vice versa, namely that even limited
decentralization reforms may lead to the establishment of a more decen-
tralized party system in which newly founded political parties in the
periphery are likely to demand further decentralization (Chhibber and
Kollman 2004). In a way, this debate tackles the chicken–egg problem of
decentralization and party politics: once a state introduces some kind
of decentralization, this can mobilize different actors in the respec-
tive region to create platforms and political parties in order to benefit
from the newly won competences. This, in turn, leads to demands for
more autonomy and decentralization. But these findings are mainly
based on research on federal countries such as Canada and India, where
subnational units enjoy both self-rule within their territory and shared
rule in the centre. In such systems, political elites and parties in the
periphery play a much more important role for national parliaments
and central governments because they have constitutional co-decision
rights on issues of national importance. But in most cases, the periphery
is largely dependent on the centre in order to achieve more autonomy.
That is why party systems are more likely to be relevant for the “con-
struction of political space”, in which elites and parties from the centre
and periphery interact and bargain over decentralization and regional
affairs (Keating 2003a: 266).
The institutional context is important because it frames the relations
and interactions of elites and political parties, albeit much more in
advanced than in transition democracies. In countries that are going
through a radical change, institutions lose their ordering force, and sit-
uational as well as individual characteristics gain in impact (Mayntz
and Scharpf 1995: 66). Hence, this book carefully analyses why and
how institutions are created in these times of transition and radical
change, and how elites and parties interact while these institutions are
still unclear and instable. To take institutions as a given and as the
only important framework determining the actions of actors fails to
acknowledge their secondary importance in these exceptional circum-
stances. In addition, it is very hard to avoid the problem of endogeneity
when one tries to explain institutional outcomes only through pre-
existing institutional frameworks and without looking in greater detail
at other antecedent factors (Wibbels 2006). In the field of comparative
politics we still “know relatively little about the processes by which his-
tory assigns countries to institutional categories” (Thelen 1999; Rodden
2009: 335).
To summarize, three antecedent conditions or structural factors
are necessary for decentralization reforms. First, identity pressures
stemming from ethnic belonging act as triggers of elite behaviour.
As I pointed out earlier, this approach is very dominant in the study of
former Yugoslavia and other post-conflict transition societies. A second
factor concerns distributional issues that arise from varying socio-
economic developments. These developments create opportunity struc-
tures through which elites in the periphery raise demands for more
autonomy. Because decentralization reforms often entail distributional
effects, distributional pressures and economic disparities inside states
might partly determine the degree of mobilization and the subsequent
institutional outcome. A specific form of opportunity arises from EU
accession requirements and cohesion policy. Many studies have tried
to single out the impact of EU conditionality and incentivization on
decentralization reforms in EU candidate countries, although domes-
tic responses and the outcome of territorial restructuring have differed
greatly across Eastern Europe. The third structural condition in the study
of decentralization reforms is the prior existence of an institutional
framework or historically grown institutions that may enhance or limit
the options and mobilization of political elites and parties.
These three factors clearly explain the structural (pre-)conditions
under which elites interact and negotiate on the decentralization of
authority and power from the centre to the periphery. Put differently,
they are necessary conditions for decentralization reforms but are insuf-
ficient. However, my research interest lies in the direction and shape
that decentralization reforms have taken. In order to understand this,
I advance a relational approach that takes into account elite interests
and their interactions. I take the structural conditions as given and treat
them as complementary narratives that provide the institutional and

socio-economic context in which elites interact (see also Hönnige 2007:
237).
The main analytical narrative I propose in the next section is about
elite agreements between centre and periphery. The interaction between
political elites and parties at the micro-level contributes to our under-
standing of the direction decentralization reforms take with given struc-
tural pre-conditions. Hence, this book adopts an elite-centred approach
to analyse the different outcomes of decentralization reforms in two
Balkan countries by looking at the access of these actors to electoral
and patronage resources in the periphery.
Given the benefits of the most similar cases design adopted in this
book, the structural conditions can be held constant for the countries
studied, as explicated in Section 1.4. Both regions I examine have polit-
ically relevant national minorities and are economically more advanced
than the national average. In both regions we have fertile ground for
regionalist demands for more decentralization. Regionalist elites have
grown their decentralization discourse and agenda on these grounds
and sentiments. This is also mirrored by the surge of regionalist parties
since 1990, when the one-party monopoly of the League of Communists
was abolished. Finally, both regions enjoyed some sort of autonomy
in socialist Yugoslavia, with the qualification that Istria’s self-rule was
much more limited and based at the local rather than at the regional
level. But the question of how decentralization evolved in socialist
Yugoslavia is very important to understand subsequent elite interests
and behaviour. That is why I provide a succinct account of this period
in Chapter 3.
My approach that I present in the next section dissects the mecha-
nism of differential elite access to resources into each element of the
causal chain. I provide a better understanding of the conditions under
which decentralization is more or less likely to occur in transition soci-
eties. This book, therefore, takes these background conditions as a given
and seeks to complement them by unveiling the processes and mecha-
nisms “that translate such macrohistorical forces into specific political
outcomes” (Bates et al. quoted in Geddes 2003: 38).
2.2 Resource dependency and elite agreements between

centre and periphery
In order to complement the structural pre-conditions of regional mobi-

lization presented thus far, I suggest a resource-dependent account to
explain the varying outcomes of elite interaction in the centre and

the periphery and subsequent decentralization reforms. My approach
is based on the assumption that political elites and parties adapt their
behaviour to the resources and constraints offered and imposed by
their environment. In that sense, decentralization reforms are not the
result of efficiency considerations or the accommodation of ethnic
minorities but rather a “by-product of bargaining by power-seeking
politicians who make choices under varying degrees of uncertainty”
(Frye 1997: 524).
The basic assumption of the framework I advance here is that varia-
tions in the degree of decentralization in different transition countries
are rooted in differential elite access to critical resources that has an
impact on their decision to support or reject decentralization. Uncer-
tainty is an important background condition under which elites in
transition states bargain in times of complex socio-economic and polit-
ical changes (Offe 1991). An agreement between political elites and
parties in the centre and the periphery on the adoption of certain kinds
of decentralization reform is necessary in order to hedge against uncer-
tainty. In order to credibly commit to such an agreement, political elites
in the centre factor in their current and future access to critical resources
in their decisions. If they have access to such resources, uncertainty is
reduced and credible commitment is made possible. One factor that
makes such constellations difficult is the interdependent nature of these
resources: political elites in the centre and periphery depend on one
another in order to obtain these resources.
For my resource-dependent approach I draw on insights from orga-
nization studies beginning with the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (2003
[1978]) and other scholars from that field.6 So far, little use has been
made of this literature in the study of reforms and decentralization
in transition societies.7 In my view, this is a regrettable neglect of
what constitutes a very useful framework that pays attention to vari-
ous important elements typically present in transition contexts: among
others, these studies examine how organizations deal with uncertainty
and interdependency, and how they compete for critical resources. As I
show in further discussion, adopting a resource-dependent account of
decentralization reforms yields new insights on how elite interaction
matters for political outcomes. At the same time, it opens up new
venues for exciting methodological work that includes various sources
and tools.
In brief, the analytical framework I develop incorporates two criti-
cal resources for which political elites and parties compete: electoral
and patronage resources. In order to facilitate the agreement on the

distribution of access to these resources, political elites and parties have
to interact regularly, which in turn generates trust. Trust is particularly
important for credible commitment in the context of the distribution
of patronage resources. If political elites and parties in the centre have
reliable access to these resources in the periphery, they are more likely
to adopt decentralization reforms. In contrast, when political elites and
parties in the periphery constrain such access, the centre is less likely to
support and adopt decentralization reforms.
Before going into the details of my analytical framework and the
description of critical resources, I first establish my unit of analysis and
explain why uncertainty is an important background condition for elite
interactions. In this book, I concentrate on political elites as the main
unit of analysis. This narrow focus on political elites is justifiable because
incumbent political elites negotiate and decide on decentralization
reforms with the necessary parliamentarian majority. More importantly,
studies on regional political parties (de Winter and Türsan 1998; Luther
and Deschouwer 1999) and transition societies (Hughes et al. 2002,
2004; O’Dwyer 2006b) have stressed the role of political elites in centre–
periphery relations. Political parties constitute the organizational setting
for elite interaction inside and between parties.8 Parties are conceived
as organizations that are constituted by their members. While their
ideology and political programme make parties more cohesive, I empha-
size the role of party elites, which shape these programmes and are
most relevant for striking political agreements. Throughout this book,
I speak of “political elites and parties” in order to capture this notion.
These elites compete for the same kind of resources, but analytically it
is important to distinguish between elites in the centre and periphery,
as we cannot “study elites or decision-makers without looking at their
territorial ties” (Flora et al. 1999: 114). After all, power imbalances per-
sist between the two groups and the implications of decentralization
differ.
Unlike structural approaches that highlight legacies, socio-economic
conditions or other macro-phenomena as the main drivers of or imped-
iments to decentralization reforms (see McGarry and O’Leary 1994), my
approach highlights the role of political elites and parties within their
contingent environments, which shape their preferences. This does not
mean that institutional legacies do not have an impact on consequent
developments. Rather, the interactions between political elites through
parties – also manifested in political institutions such as decentral-
ized government – are central to the understanding of decentralization
reforms. Bargaining and negotiations between political elites favouring

either regionalist or centralist models are decisive for political out-
comes and the shape of a state’s territorial organization (Brusis 2002:
546ff.).9
When it comes to the interests that elites and parties pursue, I concur
with Mayntz and Scharpf that access to critical resources is a plausible
and pre-determined standard interest of any organization or individ-
ual (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 54). In my framework, electoral and
patronage resources are critical because they form the power basis for
political elites and parties.10 Electoral resources relate to the extent to
which elites in the centre and periphery enter into coalition govern-
ments; patronage resources refer to partisan recruitment practices and
political influence in the public sector. Elites and parties “will attempt
to manage the constraints and uncertainty that result from the need
to acquire resources from the environment” (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003
[1978]: xxiv). Yet we have to first substantiate why uncertainty matters
and why these critical resources are relevant for elites and parties in the
centre and periphery.
Uncertainty is an important background condition that hinders cred-
ible commitment to elite agreements. In itself, uncertainty is not
necessarily problematic. Human beings have faced uncertainty through-
out large parts of human history and in many decisions pertaining to
everyday life (North 2005: 14). Uncertainty becomes a problem only in
particular circumstances. Take the example of political elites who come
to power after democratization sets in. These elites face the challenge
of adopting and implementing radically new policies while having to
rely on the old elites in the administration and economy whose loyalty
towards the new system cannot be taken for granted. Any policy reform
under such conditions can have severe consequences for the power dis-
tribution that cannot be accurately known ex ante. That means the new
elites have to be cautious about maintaining control over the policy
process and government funding in order to reduce uncertainty, and
for this they partially depend on the old structures they have inherited
and the economic and administrative elites from the previous regime.
Rather than being a general problem, uncertainty thus becomes a prob-
lem for actors involved when they depend on others for obtaining access
to critical resources, because in order “[t]o acquire resources, organiza-
tions must inevitably interact with their social environments” (Pfeffer
and Salancik 2003 [1978]: 19). In such interdependent relations, uncer-
tainty is a background condition that influences the ways in which elites
take decisions.
Federal paradox and uncertainty

To grasp the role of uncertainty in the framework of this book, the
federal paradox serves as a starting point: while political elites and
parties at the centre may grant autonomy to regions in the periph-
ery with the aim to mitigate conflicts, the very same action might
also lead to increasing radical autonomy demands from their counter-
parts in the periphery (Ziblatt 2004; Brancati 2006; Erk and Anderson
2009; Deiwiks et al. 2012).11 When national elites are challenged with
regional demands for more autonomy, they cannot be completely sure
whether elites in the periphery will moderate their demands once basic
decentralization is agreed upon. This is similar to the ethnic security
dilemma mentioned in Section 2.1 and adopted by conflict studies
(Posen 1993; Jenne et al. 2007), with the difference that secessionist
demands empirically occur less often than demands for decentraliza-
tion within the overarching state.12 Once powers are decentralized to
lower levels of government, it is much more difficult for the centre
to return these powers than it is for the periphery to maintain them
(Hooghe et al. 2010). Another potential pitfall for the centre is that
other regions in the periphery may follow suit and also demand more
autonomy.13 In other words, the federal paradox points to the notion
of decentralization as an incomplete contract and to the underlying
commitment problems, an aspect I already briefly touched upon in
Chapter 1. Given the inherent uncertainty and complexity of decen-
tralization and its far-reaching implications, such “contracts are costly
to write and to enforce” partly due to information asymmetries between
the actors involved (Williamson 1981: 553).
On a more abstract level, this aspect of uncertainty mainly relates to
the true preferences of other actors.14 Just because actors show goodwill
with their first actions does not necessarily mean that they are really
interested in maintaining that commitment. This problem, also known
as time inconsistency, constitutes a severe obstacle for credible com-
mitments because today’s commitments by actors might not be upheld
tomorrow (Williamson 1985; North and Weingast 1989). Particularly,
political elites and parties in the centre face this uncertainty over the
true preferences of actors in the periphery, since they cannot possess
complete information about their intentions.15
At the same time, in most cases the political elites in the periphery
cannot veto any unfavourable decentralization reforms that off-load
administrative obligations without backing them up with financial
means and political clout, instead of granting true political autonomy.16
Even though elites might act rationally to maximize their power, their
actions may not lead to the desired outcomes (Merton 1936).17 This
second aspect of uncertainty is mostly relevant for political elites in
the periphery.18 It is impossible to know ex ante the exact outcome
of any social action because of the various paths that any subsequent
process may take. Any action taken by an actor, regardless of their orig-
inal intentions, may result in unintended consequences. As outlined
in the depiction of the federal paradox, decentralization reforms may
result in unintended outcomes like administrative off-loading and over-
burdening that can be negative for political elites and parties in the
periphery.19
As we can see from this discussion, the issue of decentralization is
plagued with different elements of uncertainty. In essence, the federal
paradox highlights the inherently uncertain nature of decentralization
reforms and their consequences. For the centre, uncertainty is mainly
about not knowing the actual preferences of elites in the periphery.20
In contrast, for the periphery uncertainty is primarily about the unin-
tended consequences of decentralization reforms. While elites in the
periphery have in theory an interest in supporting decentralization
reforms, such reforms may turn out to be unbeneficial for them. In brief,
different forms of decentralization may have unintended consequences
for both the centre and the periphery; hence the importance of uncer-
tainty as a background condition under which elites bargain over
decentralization reforms.
High uncertainty makes credible commitment to reforms very diffi-
cult because the centre and periphery cannot be sure if they can trust
each other. More generally, reforms and policy change almost always
produce winners and losers, and the “distribution of gains and losses
whose incidence is partially uncertain” (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991:
1155). As a consequence, political elites and parties factor in their likely
share of the gains of any proposed decentralization reform before they
decide on them. The creation of new political institutions and the
adaptation of old ones is also an attempt to overcome this underlying
uncertainty (Bunce and Csanádi 1993; Frye 1997).
Uncertainty about the state of the world and other actors’ preferences
is particularly high in multi-ethnic societies and post-socialist transi-
tion countries where formal institutions are weak and in the process
of creation or adaptation.21 For states emerging from socialist authori-
tarian rule, the defining feature “has been the political competition to
control economic resources in an effort to minimise political risk and
uncertainty during the turbulent period of transformation” (Schoenman
2005: 42; see also Stark and Bruszt 1998). Access to critical resources
is thus the basic interest of political elites and parties in transition

societies.
We must now consider how elites make decisions under such condi-
tions of uncertainty. In this context, the behaviour of elites and parties
is likely to be one of “organisational hedging [ . . . ] by diversifying their
assets, redefining and recombining resources” (Stark 1996: 997). Again,
the actions of political elites and parties can be understood as a func-
tion of their access to resources. Because no elite group can be certain
about the actual benefits or costs of decentralization reforms, they have
to resort to compensatory measures that can off-set any potential neg-
ative outcome. In other words, they have to hedge against the risk of
uncertain outcomes. In order to do this, they are also likely to exercise
self-constraint in terms of their scope for manoeuvre and to focus on
those social resources that make the actions of all organizations more
predictable (Beckert 1996: 820); they are unlikely to credibly commit to
the distribution of resources in the absence of complete decentralization
contracts. Relational contracting then becomes a means for elites to deal
with the federal paradox by agreeing formally and informally with one
another on their access to critical resources before adopting or rejecting
decentralization reforms (see Macneil 2001; Rodrik 2008).
Defining critical resources

Exchange theory is a good starting point to define critical resources.
We expect that critical resources are what actors involved perceive as
valued items worth exchanging (Cook and Whitmeyer 1992: 110ff.).
To be more precise, “the value of a resource lies in what an actor who
controls it can gain from exchanging it, and the interest a resource
holds for an actor lies in the potential it has for affecting his satisfac-
tion” (Coleman 1990: 133).22 What we learn from this theory of social
action is that the value of resources is determined not by single actors
but rather by the whole system, and the process of determining the
value is interdependent: someone who controls a resource must have
an interest in exchanging it; otherwise others are excluded from obtain-
ing the resource. Conflicts over such an exchange are likely if resources
are concentrated or scarce, which makes an agreement on their distribu-
tion more difficult despite the need for cooperation on interdependent
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]). In that sense, the power of
an actor and the value of a resource are functions of the distribution
of resources in a given social system (Coleman 1990: 134). An actor’s
access to resources is essentially dependent on their embeddedness in
exchange relations with other actors (Uzzi 1996). Actors interact and
bargain over these resources in relatively durable negotiation systems

that constitute networks (Scott 1991; Knoke 1993; Mayntz and Scharpf
1995: 61).
Take, for instance, the negotiations on autonomy statutes for the
periphery that embody the decentralization of government functions.
Political elites in the periphery know that they depend on the centre
in order to achieve more autonomy enshrined in a legal statute or
constitutional amendment. This is why the centre expects concessions
for its agreement on autonomy that devolves powers to the periphery.
In order to agree on such reforms, negotiations take place that seek to
find compromise solutions for concessions, which may include formal
and informal arrangements.
The distribution of resources is contingent on the nature of the sub-
system or policy domain we study. We can understand decentralization
as a very broad policy domain within which “collectively binding deci-
sions are made, implemented, and evaluated with regard to a specific
type of public policy” (Knoke 2001: 333). Given the need for elites and
parties to maximize their share of the distribution of critical resources,
it lies in their interest to be central actors in the domain of decentraliza-
tion. In order to become and remain central actors, elites and parties
have to “[ . . . ] acquire and deploy information [ . . . ] and resources”
(Knoke 2001: 333). Possessing the right information about the future
distribution of resources reduces uncertainty over unintended conse-
quences and preferences of other elites. As I argued earlier, access to
critical resources is a default interest of any individual or organization.
As a consequence, this book first identifies the control over resources
before analysing how information exchange facilitates an agreement on
this distribution. Both the formal electoral process and informal rela-
tions matter in this respect (O’Donnell 1996). Consequently, I focus
on electoral and patronage resources as the most critical resources for
political elites in transition societies.23
Electoral resources
Control over electoral resources is central for elites and parties in demo-
cratic states and thus the first critical resource. Votes and vote shares
in elections constitute the basis for political elites and parties to enter
into government coalitions. On the basis of the works of Lijphart and
Geddes, we can sum up this primary motivation and posit that “politi-
cal actors seek to maximize their individual political power by securing
office and by designing institutions that will allow them to exercise their
power to the greatest extent possible” (Frye 1997: 532; see also Geddes
1994; Lijphart 1977). What matters in this context resembles Sartori’s

(1976) concept of “governing potential”, that is, the extent to which
parties in the periphery matter for national coalitions and the electoral
role of parties from the centre in regional governments and assemblies.
This governing potential becomes an electoral resource once a party
achieves a sufficient number of votes and consequently parliamentary
mandates for incumbency.
Having access to others’ electoral resources is critical for elites and
parties to maintain power as “[ . . . ] elections provide members of the
parliamentary party with a democratic legitimacy and an authority that
other components of the party do not have” (Cotta 2000: 59, my ital-
ics). For the relations among political elites and parties at the heart of
this framework, political authority is vital because it opens up oppor-
tunities to shape formal and informal institutions in such a way that
they provide access to other resources, such as SOEs and government
funding. As in most countries in post-socialist Europe coalition govern-
ments are the rule, political elites and parties in the centre and periphery
depend on one another for the formation of governments (O’Dwyer
2006b).24 Hence, access to these electoral resources is interdependent.
In the post-socialist context, being a dominant force in the legislative
and executive in the centre and periphery creates opportunities for elites
and parties to design formal and informal institutions as well as prac-
tices that determine for which additional resources they can compete
(Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002: 535). This is why they are so essen-
tial for elites and parties. Being left out of this resource competition
amounts to being excluded from all additional resources to which oth-
ers have access (such as SOEs and economic and financial resources for
pork barrel more generally).
Informal relations and trust

When analysing political elite networks in terms of the formal electoral
considerations, we get only a very limited understanding of what is hap-
pening in transition countries where informality is widespread and elites
bargain informally over access to critical resources. Formal relations
alone do not capture the underlying processes that occur in “extraor-
dinarily fluid organizational contexts” typical for transition societies
(McDonough, quoted in Bunce and Csanádi 1993: 273). In order to
complement this picture, this book also examines how elites and par-
ties interact informally and how these relations allow for credible
commitment through informal exchanges. Once groups of elites and
parties have access to the electoral resources of one another, they form
coalitions and interact. Repeated interaction and cooperation increase

the trust between these groups and therefore facilitate additional agree-
ments over the distribution of other resources.25 Once the distribution
of all critical resources is agreed upon, elites and parties are more likely
to agree on decentralization reforms. Trust, then, becomes one form of
organizational hedging because it allows political elites and parties to
credibly commit to the distribution of resources.26
Trust follows both an individualistic rationale and a relational logic.
As Hardin (1993: 526) rightly points out, an actor is likely to trust
only if there is an “[u]nderstanding that others will be trustworthy
when their incentives are right”. Although we can find such common
ground between rational choice approaches to trust and the literature on
social capital (Hardin 1993; Kramer 1999: 574ff.), important differences
remain. Rational choice understandings of trust view the decision to
trust another person essentially as a situation of decision-making under
risk or uncertainty: individuals with “consistent value systems” make
efficient choices that maximize their benefits and keep their losses as
low as possible (Schelling, quoted in Kramer 1999: 572). Yet scholars
from the social capital school posit that generalized trust is mainly the
result of the socialization of individuals into shared norms of reciprocity
(Granovetter 1985; Putnam 1993; Powell 1996). Some of these authors
criticize rationalist approaches by referring to the bounded rationality of
individuals that prevents them from efficiently calculating the benefits
they might receive from trusting another person (March 1994). Oth-
ers stress that trust also involves moral and not only material resources
(Hirschman 1984).
Powell reminds us that social capital is more likely to be created and
become self-reinforcing in a context of stable governance institutions
(Powell 1996). Transition countries such as Serbia and Croatia are indeed
far from more mature democracies with stable institutions that promote
and enshrine a norm of reciprocity, and that tame the elites’ pursuit
of self-interest and material resources. That is why the concept of trust
I adopt in this book is fundamentally rational. But even a rationalist
understanding of trust can be combined with a relational component.
As I stated previously, trust is principally about the trustworthiness of
others and about mutual reliance. Trust can “promote the relations and
networks and [it] enhances the utility of embedded resources” (Lin 1999:
33). As such, trust can solve information problems that stem from the
federal paradox outlined earlier. Enforcing decentralization reforms is
very costly. Regular exchange of information and repeated cooperation,
namely informal relations, increase the trustworthiness among elites in
the centre and periphery and can overcome information problems. This
trustworthiness becomes more credible when other elites have no incen-
tives to defect. I will explicate later why sharing patronage resources
locks in the commitment to honour agreements.
Trust and uncertainty

The relation between trust and the uncertainty stemming from the
federal paradox discussed earlier is based on information. We must
remember that it may be useful to see decentralization reforms as an
incomplete contract. When deciding on the “signing” of such con-
tracts, elites in the centre cannot be sure about the true preferences of
their counterparts in the periphery, and vice versa. In other words, both
elite groups face information problems. Only through repeated cooper-
ation and information exchange is trust created, which, in turn, serves
as a lubricant for an agreement on the access to tangible commodi-
ties such as patronage resources. Without trust, elites are less likely to
enter binding informal agreements on the distribution of these material
resources, and elites know that they cannot afford to not compete over
the distribution of patronage resources if they want to stay in power.
In conclusion, trust reduces the uncertainty of the true preferences of
other elites.
But trust cannot completely reduce the other aspect of uncertainty,
namely the unintended consequences that even intentional actions
might trigger. The only way trust can reduce this more fundamental
issue is through indirect channels. Elites in the centre can assure elites
in the periphery that no matter what the actual institutional conse-
quences of a decentralization reform might be, the latter will continue
to have access to material resources in the region, and vice versa. In that
case, trust could also indirectly lower the uncertainty stemming from
unintended consequences.
Patronage resources
Patronage resources are an additional critical resource for elites and
parties.27 Having patronage resources at their disposal enables elites to
recruit their affiliates for public sector jobs and thus to enhance their
control over policy-making (Katz and Mair 1995; Van Biezen 2004).
At the same time, patronage allows elites to reward loyal supporters
and to create dependent public employees (Johnston 1979; Blondel
2002). Access to patronage resources at the regional level affects the
susceptibility of national elites and parties to support decentralization
reforms. Elites and political parties in the centre are more likely to sup-
port decentralization reforms if they can use them to increase their own
patronage resources (Shefter 1994; O’Dwyer 2006b).28 Even if adopt-
ing decentralization reforms leads to even stronger claims for more
autonomy, statewide elites and parties can benefit from decentraliza-
tion by placing their affiliates in public administration and SOEs. In this
way, national elites maintain control over the policy process in the
periphery.29 For actors in the periphery who have little support at the
centre for their decentralization demands, patronage is an instrument to
consolidate their control over policies and institutions within their con-
stituency. In both cases, patronage is a critical organizational resource
for furthering the agenda, policy preferences and governmental objec-
tives of elites and parties (Kristinsson 1996; Ware 1996; Kopecký and
Scherlis 2008). An additional aspect of patronage relates to trustwor-
thiness. Because politicizing the public sector is an informal practice
that is controversial if made public, elites have no incentives to defect
from their agreement on the distribution of patronage resources and
the implementation of decentralization reforms. Elites who share such
resources are bound to secrecy, which increases trustworthiness.
Resource dependency and causal chains

Figure 2.1 summarizes the resource-dependent approach as an exchange
between elites in the centre and periphery that is facilitated through
information exchange and cooperation. If elites across the centre–
periphery divide can agree on the distribution of these resources,
decentralization reforms are more likely.
Let me now relate the two causal chains I sketched out in Section 1.4
to the framework in Figure 2.1. I proposed two different processes
Electoral resources
Elites in Information exchange & cooperation
Elites in
Centre Periphery
Patronage resources
Agreement on
decentralization reforms
Figure 2.1 A resource-dependent framework for studying decentralization

reforms in transition societies
leading to varying decentralization reforms and consequently to two dif-

ferent territorial structures. In the first causal chain (1), governing elites
and parties from the centre and periphery constitute durable coalition
governments at the regional level. In other words, they share electoral
resources. They cooperate regularly through formal and informal chan-
nels, and exchange information during negotiations on decentralization
reforms. These ties are channelled through mutually accepted brokers
that facilitate the build-up of trust in close-knit networks across the
centre–periphery divide. They agree on the distribution of patronage
appointments in the public sector at the regional level. They share
patronage resources. The likely outcome of this path is a regionalized
state. As I will argue throughout the empirical analysis in subsequent
chapters, Serbia and Vojvodina have followed this path.
In contrast to this, the second causal chain (2) starts with governing
elites and parties from the centre and periphery who do not constitute
durable coalition governments at the regional level; that is, their sharing
of electoral resources is limited. They cooperate only on certain issues
through formal channels and only few parties exchange limited infor-
mation during negotiations on decentralization reforms. No mutually
accepted broker facilitates the creation of trust and networks across the
centre–periphery divide. Elites and parties from the periphery monopo-
lize the distribution of patronage appointments in the public sector at
the regional level. In other words, the sharing of patronage resources
between centre and periphery is limited. The likely outcome is a uni-
tary decentralized state as exemplified by Croatia and Istria’s failure to
achieve more comprehensive decentralization.
Resource dependence acknowledges the power-seeking nature of
political elites outlined at the beginning of this section. Regular inter-
action, cooperation and information exchange generate trust, which
is the missing link between sharing electoral and patronage resources.
Under conditions of high uncertainty, broad electoral coalitions are not
sufficient to directly allow credible commitments to share patronage
resources. Rather, they have to be followed by a period of cooperation
and information exchange that increases mutual trust. This, in turn, lays
the basis for a stable distribution of patronage resources and thus facil-
itates elite agreement. Elites are more likely to strike an agreement on
decentralization reforms when their share of future patronage resources
is certain.
Essentially, the same resources are critical for the strategic choices of
elites and political parties in both the centre and the periphery. Despite
their different motivations and interests, I argue that the way in which
these elites and parties hedge against uncertainty is comparable. In this

sense, the framework I put forward incorporates that which parts of the
scholarly literature treat separately. Some authors focus solely on the
centre and carefully track how the mindset and behaviour of central
state elites change over time (Bulpitt 1983). This approach makes sure
to distinguish between the various “cognitive maps” that are very likely
to differ across actors in the centre and periphery (see Axelrod 1976;
Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 53). On the other hand, many studies on
regionalism and federalism go to great lengths when describing regional
politics but do this at the expense of a detailed analysis of the processes
at the centre (Keating 2001b). These studies pay strong attention to the
dynamics at the regional level and to their impact on decision-making
at the centre. But to understand the underlying dynamics, I show that
because actors on both sides depend on the same critical resources,
we should treat the interaction between centre and periphery as one
unifying framework. Elite options and choices in such a framework
are interdependent (see also Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 60). While the
resources are the same, the strategies available to elites and parties in
the centre and periphery differ. The former have an advantage because
their veto in non-federal systems can block any demand for decentral-
ization. That is why national elites are more likely to be able to use
co-optation vis-à-vis the periphery. Co-optation becomes the most use-
ful tool for elites and parties in the centre to bind their counterparts
in the periphery. Both electoral coalitions and patronage relations help
national elites to co-opt their counterparts in the periphery. Where the
periphery resists such attempts, decentralization is less likely to occur.
Centre–periphery relations during early democratization

There are different options to ensure reciprocal guarantees between
centre and periphery once democratization sets in. One way is to create
appropriate institutions that enshrine the commitment to grant propor-
tionate access to power positions and resources to all groups. Electoral
institutions and devolving powers to subnational units, for instance,
are viable tools to curb centrifugal tendencies and conflict (Horowitz
1985, 1991a). Another way is through political parties that bridge the
ethnic–territorial divide and can broker between different groups in the
periphery and the centre (Diamond and Plattner 1994: xxii; Brancati
2008). While democracy does institutionalize uncertainty through open
elections and thus offers means and channels to deal with uncertainty in
a democratic and systemic way (Przeworski 1991), institutions and the
capacities of the state in post-socialist countries are very weak. That is
why elites and citizens alike cannot rely on institutions alone to ensure
compliance with rules and procedures. The early democratization phase,
in particular, constitutes a period of “high indeterminacy of interac-
tions, strategies, and outcomes” (O’Donnell et al. 1986: 4). During such
dramatic shifts, opportunity structures emerge that “redefine – or at least
threaten to redefine – the resources available to publics, elites, and elites-
in-waiting” (Bunce 1999: 18). In such contexts, the analysis should focus
on the situational environment and action motivation of elites and par-
ties rather than on institutional procedures (Bunce and Csanádi 1993;
Mayntz and Scharpf 1995).
Another problem is that institutions in countries facing drastic socio-
political changes such as the adoption of democracy first have to be
created. And these institutions are created by old and new elites who
interact through political parties; indeed, “bargaining over institutions
is a central feature of regime change” (Geddes 2003: 45). That is why
this book pays attention to elites as the most important actors in these
steps of state formation because they are involved in creating institu-
tions and in the subsequent opportunities and constraints they bring
about. Forming a state is essentially based on “elite competition over
the authority to create the structural framework through which poli-
cies are made and enforced” (Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002: 531).
To understand decentralization reforms and the accompanying creation
of political institutions, this book examines the mechanisms through
which they emerge.
2.3 Conclusion
In order to grasp the entire chain of elite relations and interactions that
are understood as hedging behaviour, this book looks at three different
manifestations of elite and party relations in the centre and periph-
ery that have had an influence on elite agreement on decentralization
reforms since 2000. As the research design is backward-looking and
seeks to identify the causal mechanism of elite agreements on decen-
tralization reforms, the analytical framework has to be sufficiently broad
to capture all alternative explanations. I conceptualize the analysis of
post-2000 developments through the mechanism of resource depen-
dency. The causal chain developed in this section encompasses the
following elements: electoral resources, cooperation and information
exchange, and patronage resources. Having access to electoral resources
and forming coalition governments is the necessary first step towards
gaining access to patronage resources. The latter are highly relevant state
resources for elites in transition societies. But taking this step necessi-
tates repeated information exchange and cooperation that builds trust
and facilitates an agreement on the distribution of patronage resources.
As discussed in the introduction, the interaction between elites and
political parties and hedging against uncertain outcomes in the centre
and periphery is key in understanding decentralization reforms. A cen-
tral assumption in this respect can be derived from transaction theories
that stipulate how repeated interaction and communication contribute
to stronger social cohesion and less conflict (see Deutsch 1964). For the
elite level, this means that “everyone is in a way a broker because con-
nections are themselves major resources. It is through connections [ . . . ]
that access and information can be exchanged” (Legg, quoted in Putnam
1976: 112).
But before I begin my analysis of centre–periphery relations in tran-
sition societies in Serbia and Croatia since 2000, the next chapter will
describe to what extent institutional legacies are relevant for enabling or
limiting elite interactions and decentralization reforms in a democratic
setting.
3
The Role of Institutional Legacies
from Yugoslav Decentralization
In this chapter I describe how centre–periphery relations have evolved

in former Yugoslavia, with particular focus on Istria and Vojvodina.
The objective is to show to what extent path-dependent processes and
institutions have shaped these relations. As a corollary, I illustrate the
arguments that were used historically to justify changes to the status
quo of centre–periphery relations. It is this very discourse that political
elites have been using instrumentally since the late 1980s in order to
mobilize for or against decentralization.1
Two aspects concerning institutional legacies matter for the theme
of this book: the embeddedness of elite relations in stable institutions
and the interaction between elites in the centre and periphery. For both
these aspects, special attention is paid to the socialist time marked by
accommodative elite practices and the developments in the nation-
alist authoritarian period of the 1990s dominated by confrontation.
Accommodation of decentralization demands was a means to mediate
between different interests in the centre and periphery and it took place
within relatively stable institutions of federal Yugoslavia. This, however,
changed in the nationalist authoritarian period in the late 1980s and
1990s when these institutions were largely dismantled, and confronta-
tion between centre and periphery became the order of the day. In other
words, we observe different patterns of elite interaction depending on
their institutional environments.
Decentralization reforms adopted under socialist authoritarian rule
faced a backlash in the 1990s when nationalist elites in the Yugoslav
republics enforced national unity at the expense of their peripheries.
While institutional stability allowed for inter-republican accommo-
dation in socialist Yugoslavia, the disintegration and dissolution of
institutions was associated with confrontation both across and within
60
The Role of Institutional Legacies from Yugoslav Decentralization 61
republics. That also explains why the democratic change in 2000 did
not automatically lead to accommodative elite practices in centre–
periphery relations across the new states that emerged from the ruins
of Yugoslavia. In the absence of stable institutions that bridge the
centre–periphery divide, it is very difficult to reach an elite agreement
on decentralization because institutions help to overcome information
problems resulting from the federal paradox (see Section 2.2). In chap-
ters 4–6, I build on this idea when I show how elite exchanges can act
as substitutes in the absence of strong institutions.
While the major part of this book looks at developments since full
democratization set in Serbia and Croatia after 2000, we cannot neglect
the impact of socialist legacies on reform efforts in that period. Accord-
ingly, it is important to first depict and understand how elites and parties
have engaged in centre–periphery relations in the past under author-
itarian regimes in socialist Yugoslavia and in the newly independent
republics in the 1990s. However, this chapter has neither the inten-
tion nor the ambition to provide a comprehensive historical account of
Yugoslavia. Rather, it casts spotlights on the relevant periods of centre–
periphery relations and their implications for subsequent reforms. In the
history of Yugoslavia, the balance of power has continuously oscillated
between elites seeking centralization and those demanding decentraliza-
tion. But the degree to which these struggles were channelled through
institutions and the extent to which they were balanced has varied.
As this book focuses on varying decentralization reforms and subse-
quent territorial structures in post-socialist transition states, I describe
first the emergence of centre–periphery relations. In this chapter, I intro-
duce the relevant literature on legacies and path-dependent processes
in post-socialist countries. Then I sketch how centre–periphery relations
emerged before, during and after the socialist regime in Yugoslavia. I put
particular emphasis on the embeddedness of elite relations in political
institutions.
The literature on transformation and democratization is pronounced
in its focus on historical legacies that I mentioned in Section 2.1. Trans-
formation scholars put strong emphasis on the socialist legacy and its
implications for socio-economic and political reforms (Elster et al. 1998;
Kitschelt 2003; Bunce 2005; Pop-Eleches 2007; Meyer-Sahling 2009).
Various kinds of legacies are studied, but public administration and its
structure is the most widely chosen desideratum because of its central
role in the socialist state. Aspects related to the nature of the admin-
istration often form the basis for these analyses that seek to identify
factors that act as impediments to democratic and market reforms. Many
of these scholars adopt a rather descriptive approach highlighting the

context-specific uniqueness of each case, which also makes them shy
away from comparative studies (Crawford and Lijphart 1995: 173). In
the Yugoslav case, comparing legacies in Serbia and Croatia is less prob-
lematic because they formed part of the same political system for more
than 70 years, albeit with important differences concerning the way the
central elites constrained or enabled ethnic regionalist demands at the
federal, republican and regional levels. This already indicates that in
Yugoslavia, being a multi-national federation with substantial auton-
omy for its constituent units, centre–periphery relations were not only
a question of socialist state structures. Inside these institutions, the pat-
tern of political elites in the federal and republican administrations
and the positions they occupied within the structures of the socialist
state were important. Indeed, the importance of individuals was equally
present at the local level where self-management was an innovative way
of organizing relatively autonomous economic activities in a socialist
system (Ramet 2006: 190).
As I mentioned in Section 2.1, structural legacies are also the com-
mon point of departure for the work on regionalism that concentrates
on pre-conditions and outcomes of subnational reforms (Marcou 2002;
Wolczuk 2002a; Pitschel and Bauer 2009). A legacies approach suggests
that changes to the territorial structure of states are dependent on pre-
existing institutional structures and legacies (Börzel 2002; Brusis 2002;
Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Pitschel and Bauer 2009 ). Special reference has
often been made to historical institutionalism that tries to explain this
path dependence as a locking-in device that aggravates an alteration
of given structures and eventually perpetuates them (Hall and Taylor
1996; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000). A more functional interpretation of
this would argue that path dependence “arises due to increasing returns
to concentration of competencies in existing jurisdictions” (Marks and
Hooghe 2001: 15). However, in the context of the historical aspect of
decentralization, pre-existing structures are better conceived as focal
points that create an ethnic or regional identity around which the
population can be mobilized (Bunce 2006; Jenne et al. 2007: 22).
While past state structures clearly have some kind of impact on cur-
rent structures and choices, it is often difficult to first identify which
parts from the past matter for which subsequent development. Many
studies on Central and Eastern Europe, for example, do not address the
problem of identifying the time period which in the end is most sig-
nificant as a reform impediment or facilitator (Crawford and Lijphart
1995: 194; Meyer-Sahling 2009; Pitschel and Bauer 2009: 339). With
regard to local self-government, Austro-Hungarian legacies turned out

to be enabling factors for reforms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
parts of Poland. In contrast, with regard to the administrative territo-
rial division, the legacies inherited from socialist times were impeding
change because the newly elected democratic leaders rejected any social-
ist remainders “as relics of authoritarian rule” (Brusis 2002: 545). The
traditions of decentralization originating from Habsburg rule were coun-
tered by the strong centralization under Communism (Caramani 2003).
For the Balkan states, some scholars posit that Communist legacies by
far outweigh Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian legacies when it comes to
their impact on developments in the past two decades. In other words,
“[i]t is the communist past much more than the precommunist tradi-
tion that pre-determines the value maps and behavioral patterns in the
region” (Krastev 2002b: 9).
However, only few studies on territorial organization have so far sys-
tematically analysed whether and to what extent legacies determine
current reform paths in Balkan countries (Jordan 2008). Historical evi-
dence suggests that the centralization of state power is not only a legacy
of socialist times in the Balkans, but dates back to the 19th century when
nation-states emerged from the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires
(Bechev 2010). But what we can learn from these varieties of legacies is
the inherent indeterminacy of centre–periphery relations. We should,
hence, accept the “notion of multiple legacies” that acknowledges the
differences in socialist administrative structures, pre-socialist institu-
tions and paths to democratization (Meyer-Sahling 2009: 513). As a
consequence, we cannot predict reform outcomes after the year 2000 by
solely deriving explanations from the structure of inherited institutions
because there is no linear relationship between these two developments.
Instead, I show in chapters 4–6 how elite relations and exchanges unfold
when there are no stable and strong institutions through which their
interactions can be facilitated.
Yet this does not mean that one should not try to identify the most
relevant institutional legacies for specific domains such as decentral-
ization. With a view to the relevance of different legacies I concur
with Krastev’s view that the socialist period is the most relevant legacy
for understanding current developments in Balkan countries (Krastev
2002a, 2002b).2 Because the bourgeois capitalist development was very
limited in Balkan states prior to socialism, socialism was indeed the
great rupture that initiated the modernization process in this region
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 56). Furthermore, the question of nation-
alities and their autonomy within a federal state has been a defining
feature of socialist Yugoslavia (Banac 1984; Ramet 1992). From the very
beginning, the debate between centralizers and decentralizers was at the
very heart of socialist Yugoslavia.
On the basis of the elite-centred approach of this book, I concentrate
on elite practices in order to describe the development of centre–
periphery relations. According to Dahl, a history of “accommodative
elite practices” matters greatly for democratization to be sustainable
(quoted in Diamond and Plattner 1994: xix). Similarly, democracies
are more likely to adopt decentralization reforms if elite relations
between centre and periphery have been accommodative in the past.
Lijphart’s early work on consociationalism shared this basic idea that
elite accommodation across socio-ethnic lines is a necessary condi-
tion for stability: “organizations involved in important conflicts often
reach an accommodation with others” (Lijphart 1975: 42, 1977; Dahl
1982). Consociationalism assumes that a benevolent “cartel of elites”
in a divided society will accept power-sharing arrangements in which
also minority groups enjoy guarantees to be represented in the gov-
ernment in order to ensure the existence of the state (Lijphart 1969).
Accommodation in this context means that the interests of majority and
minority groups are mutually accepted and enshrined in consociational
arrangements. Having past experience in accommodation provides a
feeling of mutual security for both majority and minority groups. If any
given group is not able to unilaterally change the existing distribution
of power, elites do not have any other choice but to seek accom-
modation (Pappalardo 1981). Reaching an agreement on the relations
between these groups becomes very burdensome if minority groups in
the periphery are excluded from power at the centre and from access to
vital resources (see Dahl 1971: 36ff.). Thus, the crucial question is how
to assure groups in the centre and periphery that their essential interests
are safeguarded. In that sense, it is necessary to establish an accommo-
dation mechanism allowing all groups to have a say when it comes to
their interests and intense preferences.
But how do such accommodative practices emerge? Unlike the clas-
sical consociational argument that one elite group voluntarily chooses
to accommodate another group’s interests (Lijphart 1975, 1977), we can
as well expect that the party system significantly constrains the choices
of elites and parties to accommodate one another (Mair 1998). An addi-
tional factor that impedes elite accommodation is the differential access
of elites and parties in the centre and periphery to vital resources. If one
elite group is excluded from access to such resources, it is less likely
to support accommodation (Dahl 1971: 36ff.). This latter aspect also
resonates well with the resource-dependent framework I outlined in

Chapter 2.
Past developments in Yugoslavia have indeed strongly shaped the
political discourse and the decisions of today concerning the regional
question and decentralization. But this path dependency argument
alone does not suffice because social processes are indeterminate. It is
easy to claim that choices from the past influence present ones. Yet it is
much more difficult to clearly assign how the past matters for successive
events. Most researchers would agree that “[h]istorically given structures
and experiences affect choices, but they must be continually reproduced
to have the same effects they had in the past” (Levi 1996: 46). As I show
in the admittedly succinct historical analysis in this chapter, in socialist
Yugoslavia accommodative elite relations between centre and periph-
ery prevailed with the help of stable institutions, whereas in the 1990s
confrontation was dominant due to the lack of such institutions. That
is, within socialist Yugoslavia accommodation has been possible in the
case of Vojvodina and with some limitations within the Croatian repub-
lic, while inside the newly independent republics in the 1990s this was
not the case.
3.1 Pre-socialist legacies
Although I have argued that the socialist legacies are by far the most rele-
vant for centre–periphery relations, it is important to briefly recapitulate
earlier developments in order to better understand the particularity of
centre–periphery relations under socialism. Authors focusing more on
the question of nationalism point to the interwar period during which
the future path of inter-ethnic relations was set in a certain direction
(Banac 1984). What we find in Croatia and Serbia is a very mixed pic-
ture of changing minorities and their role in decentralization efforts:
in Istria (Croatia), decentralization and autonomy have been related
to the Italian presence, while in Vojvodina (Serbia) the original strug-
gle for autonomy emanated from the Serb minority population vis-à-vis
the Austro-Hungarian imperial rule. Only later the autonomy question
became associated with the Hungarian minority. While centralization in
the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia increased until the begin-
ning of the Second World War under Serbian King Aleksandar, in 1939
concessions were made to Croatian demands for more decentralization.
In Croatia, Istria itself has seen many different rulers in its long history
during which it was ruled for most of the time by Venice and Vienna.
The idea of regional self-rule has undergone quite some turbulence ever
since Croatia’s national emergence. Issues of decentralization date back

to early medieval times when the first Slavs settled on the Balkan Penin-
sula (Banac 1984: 31ff.). At that time, the tribal societies structured
themselves along family lines and districts in županije, the term now
used for the country’s regions. After the rise of Ottoman influence on
the Balkan Peninsula, the county structure became less important. It was
only re-established in the 18th century. In 1797 Istria became part of the
Habsburg Empire, with a brief period of Napoleonic rule for eight years.
In 1869 the Istrian city of Poreč even became the seat of the regional
parliament in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following the creation of
the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, the Vidovdan Constitu-
tion from 1921 dismantled the county structures.3 After King Aleksandar
abolished the constitution and installed a dictatorial regime in 1929,
he sought to reinforce the integrationist idea of a pan-Southern Slav
state by substituting the old local government structure with a new one.
He streamlined the 33 departments (oblasti) into 9 dukedoms (banovine)
that followed a geographical logic rather than being based on historical
borders (Biondich 2008: 61).
Only the fascist collaboration regime of the Independent State of
Croatia formally re-introduced counties during a brief period between
1941 and 1943.4 For most of the interwar period, Istria belonged to Italy
on the basis of the provisions of the Treaty of Rapallo from 1922. Dur-
ing a brief period, parts of today’s Istria, together with other Italian and
Slovenian territories, formed the Free Territory of Trieste between 1947
and 1954 when an agreement led to the incorporation of the entire
Istrian peninsula into socialist Yugoslavia. Against the background of
Istria’s multi-layered history, historians have stressed the Italian past, the
belonging to Croatian statehood or a more nuanced picture that blends
both accounts (Ashbrook 2008). The latter perspective offers the most
comprehensive account. But politically, the question of regional partic-
ularity and distinct ethno-linguistic history has remained a controversial
issue in Croatian politics ever since the interwar period.
In contrast to Croatia, Serbian history has been strongly marked by
the 500 years under Ottoman rule and much less so by the Habsburg
Empire. Ottoman rulers established and tolerated a system of decen-
tralized rule through the Orthodox Church communities, the millet
system (Alter 1995). The millet system became the main institutional
arrangement managing inter-ethnic relations (Bataković 1995). But
more importantly for this book’s theme, the northern part of today’s
Serbia has remained largely under Habsburg influence. It comes as a sur-
prise that the question of Vojvodina’s autonomy has not always been
linked to the Hungarian minority there. Originally, it was the Serbian

minority who voiced the first substantial autonomy demands coming
from this territory in the middle of the 19th century in what was then
the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Šajti 2010). So the
very idea of Vojvodina as a separate socio-political entity originally
formed part of the Serbian political programme of emancipation from
foreign rule. But between 1849 and 1860 – very much to the disappoint-
ment of the Serb elites – large parts of today’s Vojvodina remained under
the tutelage of the Viennese court. After the First World War, Vojvodina’s
Hungarians for the first time in their recent history became a minority
with the inclusion of Vojvodina in the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and
Slovenia. For a very brief period, Vojvodina returned to Hungary during
the fascist occupation that began in 1941. After Tito’s partisans regained
the territory three years later and a peace treaty was crafted in 1947, the
fate of Hungarians as a minority in socialist Yugoslavia was sealed. What
began as the Serb minority’s struggle for autonomy had become a central
aspect of decentralization reforms in the Tito regime.
Following imperial rule, newly established nation-states often saw the
remaining “minorities” as “relics” of former domination and repression
from Ottoman and Habsburg rule (Horowitz 1994: 40). In the interwar
period, earlier “problems of dissatisfied nationalities re-emerged as prob-
lems of dissatisfied minorities” (Seton-Watson 1989). But in socialist
Yugoslavia most minorities that constituted majorities in their respec-
tive republics and provinces were to enjoy far-reaching decentralization.
3.2 Socialist legacies: Accommodation
The traditions of decentralization originating from the Habsburg rule

were countered by the strong centralization under Communism in
wider Central and Eastern Europe (Caramani 2003). Yet socialist
Yugoslavia, owing to its historical evolution from the Kingdom of Serbia,
Croatia and Slovenia, was an exception in this regard. Here, a dis-
tinct system of socialism and centre–periphery relations had emerged
in which the federal leadership had to strike a delicate balance between
elites wishing to centralize and those demanding stronger decentraliza-
tion. It is important to look beyond the stable territorial structure that
on paper has remained essentially the same throughout socialist rule.
Underneath this structure, power struggles between the centre (federal
state) and periphery (republics and autonomous provinces) have been
the order of the day. In different periods, the balance of power tipped in
favour of either the centre or the periphery.
Another important aspect is the unique shape socialism took in

Yugoslavia. Unlike other socialist states with monolithic one-party
rule, in Yugoslavia self-management offered “unimaginable flexibility”
and became “the ideological justification of the regime, interpreted as
decision-making at the most basic social, political and economic levels”
such as republics and autonomous provinces in the periphery (Pleština
1992b: 27, 93).5 The socialist programme of the Yugoslav Commu-
nist Party was codified in the National Road to Socialism and a new
constitutional act in 1953. It was constituted by:
[ . . . ] social rather than state ownership of the means of production;

worker management as the fundamental principle of social orga-
nization; decentralization of political and economic decisions from
the federal government to republic communes and enterprises; and
finally, as a result of the principle of self-management, a greater
reliance on the market as a guide to the allocation of resources.
(Pleština 1992b: 27)
On the basis of this programmatic credo, the federal government had

to consider the in-built need for decentralization reforms that sought to
pay tribute to the socialist idea of self-management and were acceptable
to elites in the constituent units.
In the following sections, I describe how an instrumentalist logic pre-
vailed in the early 1960s when federal institutions were the main arenas
for political action, and the chosen territorial structure aimed at curbing
Serbian expansionist efforts. Elites from the periphery slowly but sub-
stantially increased their influence, which reduced the importance of
federal institutions. After this had culminated in mass demonstrations
led by Croatian reformers in the early 1970s, Tito and the federal lead-
ership violently suppressed them and tried to recentralize the state. But
despite the shifting power balances, federal institutions throughout the
socialist period facilitated centre–periphery relations. Only once nation-
alist mobilization in the republics was overwhelming, this system of
institutionalized relations broke down.
While Tito was undoubtedly the undisputed authoritarian ruler
in the centre of power, he was very much dependent on the sup-
port of the other party leaders from the Yugoslav republics in a
complex federal state structure encompassing six republics (Serbia,
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro)
and two autonomous provinces within the Serbian republic (Vojvodina
and Kosovo). As Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) remind us, not only
democratic but also authoritarian rulers have to cooperate with other

relevant social actors in order to maintain their power. Clearly, in
most cases authoritarian rulers at the centre have the final say over
key decisions, and they do not allow regional rulers to veto them.
But at the regional level, the extent to which elites have a rela-
tively autonomous sphere for managing regional and local affairs can
vary quite significantly.6 Furthermore, Yugoslavia’s veritable federal
structures were based on consensual decision-making at the centre
which made an agreement across the centre–periphery divide essential
(Gagnon 1995: 146).
What all republics and autonomous provinces had in common was
their participation in the political leadership of the League of Com-
munists, the main political body managing centre–periphery relations.
In the words of late dissident Milovan Ðilas, “the decision-making
power of the proletariat had been transferred not just to the party, but
to the party elite” (quoted in Cohen 1989: 44). And the elites were
fragmented into groups in the centre and periphery.
Divide and rule: Centralization in the 1950s and early 1960s

When Tito and the federal leadership designed the territorial struc-
ture of Yugoslavia, they followed an instrumentalist logic aiming at
maintaining the delicate balance between the periphery and the federal
government. Institutions and the granting of autonomy and devolved
powers were used instrumentally in order to ensure the ideational pri-
macy of a joint multi-national federation over competing subnational
interests. These interests resulted partially from the conflicts that had
been fought out during the Second World War. Divide and rule was
Tito’s way of keeping elites in the periphery at arm’s length while
cementing the pivotal role of the federal government. The socialist lead-
ership denied concessions to regions in most constituent republics of
Yugoslavia. But Tito decided to establish two autonomous provinces in
Serbia, namely Vojvodina and Kosovo. His particular intention was to
reduce the strength of Serbian nationalism that had led to the author-
itarian centralization under King Aleksandar and to keep expansionist
ideas (“Greater Serbia”) under control.7 The symbolic act of achieving
a separate recognition as a region had already occurred in 1945 when
Vojvodina was formally proclaimed as autonomous. Yet this autonomy
was only enshrined formally with the constitutional changes in 1968
and 1974.
In contrast, Istria in Croatia did not achieve any special autonomy
arrangement with the Croatian republic mostly because it has been torn
between Italian and Yugoslav demands until the mid-1950s. Istria had
been under Italian fascist rule before the Second World War and under
an interim administration afterwards until the London Memorandum of
1954 confirmed that Istria (without Trieste) would be part of Yugoslav
territory. Fears of secessionist claims were high so the socialist lead-
ership pursued a Slavicization of the region by settling Slavic citizens
there (Ballinger 2004). This changed the demographic structure of the
region and reduced the Italian population to a relatively small minority.8
Following this, Istria was reduced to a small territorial unit being part
of the local government system of Croatia known as “associations of
municipalities” (zajednice općina). By fragmenting the historical region
into much smaller and weaker local units, autonomy demands were
silenced until 1990 despite the legitimate claim that Istria would qual-
ify for a special autonomy arrangement just like other regions (Trbovich
2008: 146). The Croatian republic remained highly centralized without
the recognition of any significant regional level of government. Rather,
the focus lay on the local level where zajednice općina were mainly
responsible for regional planning.
In order to justify this unequal treatment of republics and regions,
Tito and the League of Communists constructed the principle of con-
stituent nations (dominant ethnic groups of the founding republics)
and nationalities (Trbovich 2008: 148). The latter term referred to other
minorities such as Hungarians, Albanians and Italians who were not
constituent nations of the republics. Despite the formally equal treat-
ment of these nationalities, autonomy was granted only to those groups
that helped to weaken the Serbian state and reduce the risk of Serbian
expansionism. This was the case with Vojvodina and Kosovo. In Croatia,
Istria with its Italian “nationality” minority did not receive substantial
autonomy because the Croatian political elites did not accept any weak-
ening of their centralized power. Tito could not afford to open another
front with republican elites like he did in Serbia and he needed Croatian
elites on his side to counteract any Serbian hegemonic move.9 After all,
giving in to other regionalist demands would have undermined the inte-
grationist Yugoslav idea and hollowed out the federal institution right
from the onset.
Decentralization and republican oligarchies in the 1960s

While the building of the socialist multi-national Yugoslav federation
had been the prime objective of the earlier period, in the 1960s decen-
tralization shaped by republican interests gained momentum. Also in
the composition of the Politburo (Party Executive Committee) we can
see how republican national elites moved to the forefront: in 1948 the
Politburo consisted only of nine members from five different nations;10
until 1963, the size had grown to 20 members with Croats and Serbs
having five members each (Pleština 1992b: 54). Republican interests
gained more weight in decision-making and the demands for further
decentralization grew. In order to guarantee political stability, “satis-
fying ethnic-national aspirations through a devolution of power from
the federation to the republics and regions” became essential (Pleština
1992b: 82). Indeed, a series of constitutional reforms paid tribute to
these demands and further strengthened the periphery.
Since the early 1960s, Yugoslavia underwent a process of liberalization
and decentralization, which increased the autonomy of the constituent
republics. It was the only truly decentralized socialist federation when
compared with other states in socialist Eastern Europe that were federal
only on paper.11 This gave substantial powers to political elites in the
republics to defend their “national”/regional economic interests. Even
in comparison with other authoritarian regimes in the world that were
formally federations such as Argentina and Brazil, socialist Yugoslavia
was indeed uniquely equipped with mechanisms for subnational par-
ticipation and contestation (see also Dahl 1971: 12). It was clear to
everyone that Tito and the federal government could not unilaterally
withdraw autonomy rights from the republics without the consent of
the other political elites. Elites in the periphery benefitted from the
fact that the territorial organization of Yugoslavia did not follow ethnic
boundaries, but was rather “a mixture of historical (or colonial) bound-
aries and the regional organization of party committees in the inter-war
period” (Bataković 1995: 31). The territorial division reinforced the role
of established elite structures in the republics that had partially existed
before.
The implications of decentralization and self-management reforms
have been grave and created centrifugal forces that eventually led to
secession and havoc. These forces illustrate vividly one aspect of the
federal paradox discussed in Section 2.2: the centre cannot be sure
whether single decentralization reforms will not in the end create a
stronger subnational constituency that would demand ever more radi-
cal decentralization. In this process, the economic sphere and questions
of unequal regional development became important for creating and
mobilizing constituencies both for more decentralization in the more
developed republics (Slovenia and Croatia) and for more centraliza-
tion in Serbia (Pleština 1992b). Each republic and autonomous province
began to create their own industries without paying attention to the
“functional integration in the entire Yugoslav market” which led to

vast inefficiencies and duplications (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 111).
When the Executive Committee of the Communist League discussed
essential questions about the distribution of powers in the federation
in 1962, it was mainly a debate on how much discretion in economic
policy republics should have. In other words, decentralization became
the default option; the question was mainly about how much decen-
tralization was sustainable. Republican elites from Slovenia and Croatia
were successful in obtaining far-reaching autonomy provisions, but
there was no sustainable formula for a functioning common Yugoslav
market. Serbian demands for centralization and stronger empowerment
of Belgrade-based federal institutions were less successful. What was
decided was essentially a “ ‘decentralized’ centralism” that opened the
way for republics to gain more and more features of a full-fledged state
(Schiller 2010: 104).12 These developments underscore that decentraliza-
tion reforms triggered centrifugal forces that loomed large in the events
that led to Yugoslavia’s eventual dismantling.
The series of constitutional changes that had begun in 1963 were
the beginning of Yugoslavia’s path towards a “de facto confederation”
of republics and autonomous regions with comprehensive decentral-
ization (Cipek 2003: 81). Kardelj, one of the most influential socialist
leaders and Tito’s close Slovenian associate, was the key proponent
of politico-economic decentralization, which also led to the recogni-
tion of Vojvodina and Kosovo as constitutive entities (“autonomous
province/region”) of the federation in 1968. In his own words, decen-
tralization was essential to allow for the “pursuit of self-managed
interests” of Yugoslavia’s constituent units (quoted in Pleština 1992b:
168). Again, this change was Tito’s way of dealing with increasing pres-
sure, which stemmed from the republics whose prime objective was to
gain more powers and rights. It highlights the perpetual balancing act
concerning centre–periphery relations in Yugoslavia (Calić 2010: 231).
Former Yugoslavia was “an essentially elite-managed multi-ethnic soci-
ety with various confederal features” (Cohen 1989: 298). The system
had several features that are similar to the consociational model as a rel-
atively small group of central and peripheral elites was recruited based
on an ethnic key. Given the vast heterogeneity of the state in terms of
socio-economic development, historically grown institutions and eth-
nicity, socialist Yugoslavia was not the usual suspect for relative political
stability. As I have outlined earlier, one factor that contributed to this
unexpected stability is the very close collaboration between administra-
tive elites from different ethnic groups at the federal level (Cohen 1989).
However, in the late 1960s the balance of power increasingly shifted

towards the periphery where vocal critics emerged. Croatian economist
Branko Horvat eloquently describes this shift: republican elites “let Broz
[Tito] have a lifetime term in the Presidency in exchange for leaving the
republics alone to decide on everything” (quoted in Pleština 1992b: 92).
Horvat went on to describe how this lenience from the part of Tito had
produced “regional oligarchies” that were keen to maintain and extend
their power.
Other decisions further strengthened the party oligarchies in the
periphery. Following the reforms at the Fourth Plenum of the League
of Communists in Brioni in 1966, the Federal Executive Council had
lost large parts of its powers to appoint new administrative elites to the
republican party organizations in the periphery, and even the Presidium
members of the Communist League’s Executive Committee were elected
at the republican level (Cohen 1983: 14ff.; Pleština 1992a: 139). More-
over, republican party congresses were scheduled before the all-Yugoslav
congress of the League of Communists which gave the periphery strong
agenda-setting powers while reducing the federal meeting to the task
of synthesizing republican views and looking for compromise solutions
(Pleština 1992a: 139). With these changes, elites from the periphery
slowly had come to dominate the composition of the federal administra-
tive leadership, and their loyalties were often with their home republics
rather than with the federal state. Given the varied economic and polit-
ical interests of the republics and the provinces, competition between
peripheral elites increased in comparison with that before, when fed-
eral institutions had ensured stronger accommodation (Cohen 1989:
311). But despite this rise of the power of the republics, federal insti-
tutions were central for legislation and policy-making, and hence an
important venue for centre–periphery interactions. Federal administra-
tors kept very close contacts with legislators in the Federal Assembly,
and both these groups increasingly accommodated regional interests in
decision-making (Cohen 1989: 237).
Several groups fiercely opposed the decentralization reforms that had
begun in the late 1960s. Among the most fervent opponents were
Serbian and Croatian elites, yet they did not share the same rationale
for their critique. Croatian elites wanted even stronger decentralization,
while large parts of Serbian conservatives demanded a more robust fed-
eral state. Among the Serbian conservative intelligentsia, dissent grew.
Dobrica Ćosić, one of the most prominent advocates of Serbian interests
and an influential member in the Committee of the League of Commu-
nists in Serbia, claimed that the on-going decentralization of Yugoslavia
would lead to the “growth of distinctly antimodernizing local bureau-

cracies in every republic and province” (quoted in Miller 1997: 299).
It was his outspoken and public critique that established the association
between decentralization and an excessive growth of the public sector
and bureaucracy. Milošević referred to this resentment when arguing
for centralization in the 1980s. Moreover, Ćosić’s analysis did foretell
the anti-modernizing tendencies and rise of nationalist interests in the
republics in the 1990s.
Inside Croatia, republican elites rejected the idea to recognize a
regional level of government below the republican level during social-
ist times. Instead, they opted for a further fragmentation of historical
regions by strengthening the local level. In 1967, they enlarged the size
of communes to districts with an average population of 40,000 that were
loosely joined to 11 zajednice općina with the intention of engaging them
in regional development projects (Jordan 2011: 79–80). As a corollary,
regional sentiments were silenced particularly with a view to the coastal
regions where irredentist fear towards Italian influence loomed large.
Fear of irredentist claims from Italy over Croatia’s coastal regions pre-
vailed and republican elites rebuffed any recognition or accommodation
of regional particularities. As a consequence, regions mainly functioned
“as a lever for development that not only threaten[ed] regional heritage,
but also directly destroy[ed] the anatomical structure of national iden-
tity” (Rogić 1995: 75, my translation). This attitude continued with the
Tuąman regime (1992–2000), which was keen to establish national unity
and a common narrative for an independent Croatian nation-state at
any cost. Any demand for political decentralization was rejected.
Efforts to re-centralize in the 1970s

When the Croatian crisis unfolded between 1970 and 1971, the fed-
eral leadership came to realize the extent to which decentralization had
hollowed out their power. Mass demonstrations in Croatia had forced
Tito and his close associates to face the new reality and adapt their
policies. But the efforts to re-centralize the federal system were very
much limited by the institutional structure that had been built under
the eyes of federal elites: after constitutional amendments in 1971, the
federal government only had the competence over six areas explic-
itly assigned to it; all other residual competences were by default in
the hands of the republics. In many of these areas, the republics and
autonomous provinces enjoyed co-decision rights. Two federal cham-
bers were established of which one represented the interests of the
periphery. The implementation of an ethnic key for elite recruitment
ensured parity across nations and republics; and, the creation of a

Collective Presidency in 1967 consisting of nine members (eight rep-
resentatives from the constituent units and one from the party) ensured
consensual decision-making (Pleština 1992b: 93–94).
Before these changes, Tito’s federal leadership had proven effective in
containing the tensions typical for the historical evolution of federal
states: he was “unyielding enough to forge a national government but
[ . . . ] accommodating enough to make federal concessions to the sub-
units” Yugoslavia had absorbed (Ziblatt 2004: 12). But ultimately, the
totality of the enumerated institutional changes reduced Tito to “the
ultimate arbiter in political conflict”; he became more of a mediator and
less of an authoritarian ruler (Pleština 1992b: 94). Despite one-party rule
on paper, rising powers in the hands of republican elites had resulted in
a highly fragmented system with an interlocking institutional architec-
ture in which consensual decision-making depended on the agreement
of nine different units.13
The addition of new institutions to the original federal ones expanded
the number of arenas in which centre–periphery relations unfolded.
Therefore, the accommodation of regional interests continued to be
facilitated through their embeddedness in various institutions at the
federal level. This is why in spite of Tito’s wish to strengthen the
federal state his efforts could not stall the overall trend towards
stronger decentralization, which eventually weakened the federal insti-
tutions.
While the 1970s could not turn back the degree of decentralization,
elites in the periphery also came to realize their own limitations and
the red lines they could not cross. As an ultimate instrument the fed-
eral state was willing to use force in order to maintain political stability.
It became very clear that the centre and Tito’s leadership would not
allow any unilateral action from the periphery. The shattering of the
Croatian spring uprising in the early 1970s clearly showed that the
centre was willing to use suppression against any open challenge to
the unity of the socialist federation. Furthermore, elites in the periph-
ery had fewer formal powers when it came to actively shaping public
policies. They could veto decisions at the federal level, but they “could
not necessarily ensure the passing of legislation which would benefit
them” (Pleština 1992b: 102). In sum, the violent suppression of the mass
demonstrations in Zagreb highlighted the institutional constraints for
both the centre and the periphery. Yet a careful analysis also unveils
how much more Tito had become dependent on the periphery than
vice versa. Tito’s violent re-centralization was in fact an attempt to
re-establish a balance of power that had been lost through excessively

far-reaching decentralization reforms.
Against this open expression of state violence, elites in the periph-
ery did not have any other choice but to return to more consensual
and accommodative practices. Hence, they pursued incremental decen-
tralization after 1974 when the last Yugoslav constitution was crafted.
While the demonstrations of reformers in Croatia and elsewhere led to
a weakening of Yugoslavia’s internal market, the confederal structure
remained solidly in place and was anchored in the 1974 constitution
(Gagnon 1995: 144).
1980s: Economic interests of the periphery prevail

Civil and social unrest in Kosovo marked the beginning of the turbulent
1980s that brought to the forefront how economically unsustainable the
socialist system of self-management had become. Ironically, “despite the
relative equalization of political power, the center which had become
far more representative of all republics and regions was also too frag-
mented to pursue policies of economic equalization” (Pleština 1992b:
175). Attempts were made to ease the tensions through a more inten-
sive regional economic cooperation inside Yugoslavia, but no political
agreement on the criteria for the disbursement of public funds ever
materialized (Pleština 1992b: 173ff.). Equally important were Tito’s
death in 1980 and the lack of a successor capable to fill the role of
arbiter between centre and periphery. The Collective Presidency very
quickly turned out to be ineffective and has often been paralysed when
important decisions had to be taken (Gagnon 1991).
Centre–periphery relations unfolded “between two equal and co-
dependent socio-political communities” in a process that went back
and forth between centralization and decentralization (Accetto 2007:
200). Efforts to balance the power between centre and periphery have
accompanied this movement alongside the continuum centralization–
decentralization, and elite interactions through which these efforts were
materialized were firmly embedded in federal institutions.
Accommodative elite practices through federal institutions made
a compromise between centre and periphery more likely in Titoist
Yugoslavia. Interaction and communication among elites from the
centre and periphery was necessary for sustainable accommodation
(Cohen 1989: 312). Elites in Serbia’s periphery in Vojvodina and Kosovo
were certain that their demands would be well received by the elites
in the centre within the Communist League under Tito. There was
a mutual interest and assurance that both Vojvodina and Kosovo
were granted essentially the same autonomy as the other republics

in order to contain Serbian nationalism (Bataković 1995).14 Once the
socialist framework of “brotherhood and unity” fell apart and socialist
Yugoslavia dismantled, the populist regime under Milošević withdrew
autonomy rights in order to impose Serbian domination.
In conclusion, elite agreements on decentralization reforms in social-
ist Yugoslavia can be framed within the logic of balance of power (Ramet
1992). Reaching a delicate compromise between constituent nations and
nationalities was the dominating pattern of Tito’s policies that consti-
tuted a “hegemonic exchange relationship” with elites in the periphery
(Lake and Rothchild 2005: 118). For staying in power and preserv-
ing the Yugoslavia he had crafted he was very much dependent on
the support from the party elites in the republics. Despite the official
and publicly displayed agreement on the continuation of the Yugoslav
project, tensions between republics and provinces were present features
in the behind-the-door meetings of the Federal Cabinet where party
leaders clashed over their personal as well as their constituents’ differ-
ent interests (Lake and Rothchild 2005). Regardless of these clashes, it
was certain that the autonomy of republics and provinces could not be
withdrawn and the trend towards further decentralization could not be
stopped. Indeed, with this process the erosion of power and the division
of party elites at the centre slowly set in, which resulted in “repub-
licanized” politics and economics comparable to that of the socialist
federations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (Bunce 1999: 89).
While these arrangements proved ill-designed and unsustainable after
Tito died and the Communist regime faltered, they had been relatively
stable during his regime.15 More importantly, the hegemonic exchange
relationship was channelled through federal institutions that facilitated
elite interaction between centre and periphery.
At this point I do not enter the debate on why Yugoslavia finally dis-
solved. There is no lack of comprehensive and convincing accounts on
that topic (Cohen 1997; Allcock 2000; Lampe 2000; Glaurdić 2011).
Rather, I recapitulate in the following paragraphs how elites managed
centre–periphery relations after the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia.
3.3 Nationalist authoritarian legacies from the

1990s: Confrontation
In contrast to the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, in former

Yugoslavia the immediate post-socialist transition period in the early
1990s was not about democratization. Rather, this period marks the
advent of civil war and ethnic conflict under authoritarian rule in Serbia
and Croatia. While socialist legacies have paved the way for the estab-
lishment of centre–periphery relations, we also have to look at the
interim period between the end of socialist Yugoslavia and the opening
up towards democratic politics. In that period, Tuąman and Milošević
were key figures who sought to consolidate their power in the centre
at the expense of the periphery in their new and unitary nation-states.
Confrontation between centre and periphery became the order of the
day as a result of the nationalist conservatives who had risen to power
and the dismantlement of federal and republican institutions.
Critical junctures are connected to the question of legacies as they
provide windows of opportunity for regional elites to demand changes
in the status quo, thus making institutional change more likely (Flora
et al. 1999: 303ff.; Marks and Hooghe 2001). At the same time, such
junctures change the logic of elite interaction because the nature of
their relation changes. The opening up of the party system in 1990
was such a moment as it allowed other political parties to be formed
and to compete with the League of Communists in partly free elec-
tions. Rapidly, the number of political parties grew and plummeted in
1991 with 250 parties (!) in Yugoslavia (Bartlett 2008: 15). Of these,
many had an ethno-national ideology, but also regional parties thrived.
However, this apparent party competition was limited by the author-
itarian traits of the regimes led by Tuąman and Milošević. Nation-
alist elites in the new nation-states forcefully supressed subnational
demands for more decentralization. Unlike the relatively stable period
of elite accommodation during Tito’s reign, confrontation between
centre and periphery became the dominant logic of interaction. Iron-
ically, conservative elites in Croatia now pursued centralization in their
own state after they had called for more decentralization in former
Yugoslavia. On the other hand, in Serbia conservative nationalist elites
remained within their centralization discourse when socialist Yugoslavia
fell apart by calling for a strong central state without autonomous
provinces.
Tito’s socialist government had not re-established county institutions
at the regional level, so they fell into a long sleep until the Croatian
Republic declared its independence. The Christmas Constitution in
1990 reinstalled the county structure based on the existing associa-
tions of districts, and this structure was kept after the democratization
in 2000.16 It was formalized by law in 1992 and came into force one
year later. In the midst of civil war and Serbian military threat the
Croatian leadership chose a very centralistic territorial organization in
order to maintain what at that point was a porous national unity (Jordan
2011: 80).
The waging civil wars in the 1990s constituted critical junctures for
the states of former Yugoslavia as they led to the (re-)establishment
of independent statehood and the slow turn to democratic systems in
some of them. The actions of political elites were decisive for the newly
constructed political systems and their constitutional provisions. The
latter provided the framework for the territorial organization of the state
and the competences of centre and periphery that also have an impact
on the concerned political communities (Migdal 2004b: 60–62; see also
Mann 2003; Flora et al. 1999: 16).
In Croatia “in the 1990s the only region to successfully assert its
political and regional identity” was Istria (Bellamy 2003: 122). But the
assertiveness of peripheral elites in Istria met with strong opposition
from nationalist politicians in the centre insisting on the indivisible
national unity of the Croatian state. In part, the new territorial organiza-
tion very much resembled the historical system of županije, but only the
historically grown administrative borders of Istria and Dalmatia were
maintained. Issues pertaining to minority protection were assigned to
the local and individual level, which meant the non-recognition of the
Italian minority in Istria and an emphasis on the Croatian ethnicity of
the peninsula (Bellamy 2003: 122–123; Ballinger 2004).
Croatia had a very lively regional landscape with several regionalist
parties in Istria, Dalmatia and Slavonia. In Serbia, several regionalist
parties emerged in Vojvodina. Yet this critical moment was rather dif-
ficult for most of these parties in the periphery because national elites
in the former republics pursued centralist policies, also as a corollary of
the civil war. The objective was the creation of strong unitary and inde-
pendent nation-states, which contributed to the silencing of regional
autonomy demands.
In 1988, President Milošević – under the pretext of removing ineffi-
cient bureaucracy – had withdrawn all autonomy rights from Vojvodina
and Kosovo and dismissed the entire leadership that he substituted with
people close to him (Calić 2010: 274). Mass mobilization accompanied
these events and Milošević instrumentalised them to pursue his “anti-
bureaucratic revolution” (Vladisavljević 2008). Four years earlier the
Serbian government had presented a highly contested proposal meant
to strengthen the federal institutions and to abolish the veto rights
of the autonomous provinces (Calić 2010: 271). The ultimate goal of
these actions was to underline “Serbia’s right to statehood” in a unitary
fashion (Pavlowitch 2003: 69).
Similar developments occurred in Croatia. President Tuąman had a

unitary idea of the new independent Croatian state. His main objective
was a “society without internal conflicts led by [his political party] the
HDZ” (Goldstein 1999: 260). For achieving this, he declared any auton-
omy demands from regions in the Croatian periphery to be a threat
to Croatian unity. For instance, he pressured the prosecution office to
bring several politicians from the increasingly popular regionalist party
Dalmatian Action to trial for terrorist activities and portrayed them as
traitors (Amnesty International 1995; Ashbrook 2008: 69). Although the
court acquitted these politicians three years later, regionalist demands in
Dalmatia were crushed. Regional issues were so highly politicized during
Tuąman’s reign partly because of potential repercussions on the ques-
tion of the Serbian minority in Croatia. His government undermined
efforts by international donors to measure regional inequalities and
poverty across ethnic groups in the country.17 Tuąman faced more per-
sistent pressure from Istria where the regionalist party IDS dominated
all local and regional elections (Ashbrook 2006). To summarize, this
period of (semi-)authoritarian rule and civil war did not lead to more
decentralization in Serbia and Croatia. Unlike during Tito’s rule, the out-
break of civil war and the centralist policies of national elites in Serbia
and Croatia resulted in quite the opposite of decentralization, namely
centralization and confrontation.
Civil war delayed urgently needed reforms in most of the former
Yugoslav republics. Like other transition societies, post-Yugoslav states
faced the dilemma of simultaneity (Offe 1991): drastic political and
economic reforms were to take place immediately, coupled with the
post-war re-construction and the creation of civil society. Another
important aspect is the consolidation of national statehood which was
far more contested than in other parts of Eastern Europe. This over-
whelming pressure for drastic changes opened up various opportunities
for old and new elites to pursue their interests. In the socialist regime,
federal institutions facilitated centre–periphery relations and ensured
social order, or what Max Weber called Herrschaft. But in the 1990s,
these institutions were dissolved which allowed elites to use power in its
unrestrained form, or Macht as Weber called it (Weber 1972 [1921]: 542;
Elster et al. 1998: 19). Power in this unrestrained form meant that the
nationalist elites could enforce national unity by supressing decentral-
ization demands from their periphery. Maximizing centralized control
became “the order of the day” at the expense of the periphery (Elster
et al. 1998: 33).
As we have seen from the developments in the 1990s, path-dependent
processes of decentralization reforms from socialist times did not
linearly lead to further decentralization in the following decade in the

states that emerged from former Yugoslavia. While Vojvodina enjoyed
substantial autonomy in socialist Yugoslavia, it had de facto lost its
autonomy in 1988. For Istria, the 1990s began promisingly with a strong
regionalist party putting forward autonomy demands. Yet national elites
rejected any accommodation of such demands. What we learn from
this development is that past autonomy arrangements are by no means
the sole predictor of future autonomy outcomes. Rather, this book
examines the broader balance of power between elites in the centre
and periphery and the extent to which this delicate balance is facili-
tated by institutional arrangements. It is important to identify which
formal and informal institutions help to bridge the centre–periphery
divide.
Because decentralization has a significant impact on the concerned
political communities, it is likely to lead to a persistent and continu-
ous struggle between centre and periphery (Migdal 2004b: 60–62; see
also Flora et al. 1999: 16; Mann 2003). Incremental steps towards either
centralization or decentralization embody this process. In order to facil-
itate the conduct of centre–periphery relations in this struggle, stable
institutions or other forms of enduring informal relations are necessary.
3.4 Conclusion
That history matters is a strong argument to make and is easily stated.

But how it matters under specific conditions, and why some institu-
tional legacies have a sustained impact whereas others do not, is more
difficult to establish. In this brief discussion of legacies, we cannot
observe recurring repetitions of similar patterns concerning centre–
periphery relations over decades. Rather, different kinds of logics have
prevailed in different episodes of centre–periphery relations, which have
oscillated between centralization and decentralization. Accommodative
elite practices mostly dominated the Titoist era with stable federal and
regional institutions, whereas confrontation was the prevailing pattern
in the 1990s when institutions for managing centre–periphery relations
were dissolved. This also points to the indeterminacy of these pro-
cesses: only the fact that Vojvodina was granted far-reaching autonomy
under socialist autocracy did not mean that autonomy would be neces-
sarily maintained and restored in another autocratic regime or within
a democratic setting, for that matter. The federal socialist leadership
decided to decentralize Serbia mainly to curb Serbian nationalism and
less so to pay regard to the ethno-historical differences of Vojvodina
and citizens’ preferences. Therefore, it is very difficult to assess to
what extent this decentralization arrangement can hold in a completely

different democratic setting (Tripković and Tripković 2009: 337).
In addition to the temporal dimension, I have shown that territorial
reconfiguration is at the same time a question of scales.18 Take republi-
can elites in Croatia and their ardent struggle for more decentralization
in socialist Yugoslavia. While they were preaching the decentralization
of political, fiscal and administrative powers away from the federal to
the republican level, inside their republic centralization was the order
of the day. Centralization became even more pronounced in the 1990s
when nationalist elites around Tuąman suppressed any challengers to
national unity, which went as far as denouncing regionalist politicians
as terrorists.
Following the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia and civil war, Croatia
and Serbia faced another critical juncture, namely the move towards
democracy in 2000. In the view of Horowitz (1985: 580), such junc-
tures in the aftermath of civil war in which all sides have suffered
losses “stand the best chance of producing even-handed and enduring
accommodative policies”. But this holds true only if the losses are evenly
distributed which is not the case in former Yugoslavia, neither after the
Second World War nor after peace treaties in 1995 and 1999 that put
an end to civil wars. My analysis in the remaining empirical chapters
focuses on the different elite dynamics at play that have led to very dif-
ferent outcomes concerning decentralization in democratic Serbia and
Croatia.
How do such accommodative elite practices then play out in demo-
cratic politics and the decision of elected governments and parliaments
to decide on decentralization reforms? When political elites and par-
ties compete for votes and other resources in a democratic setting, the
nature of the competition changes. While smaller regional parties can-
not change the status quo themselves, they can tip the scales for larger
SWPs, especially in more fragmented party systems. In the next chapter,
I analyse how electoral considerations have been an important first step
for elite agreements on decentralization reforms.
4
Access to Electoral Resources
This chapter outlines the electoral basis of the relations between centre
and periphery in Serbia and Croatia. It shows how, in the two cases
I analyse, political elites and parties form coalitions and thus gain access
to electoral resources. At the same time, coalition-building across the
centre–periphery divide has not been embedded in stable institutions
as it had been in most of the socialist period. In that sense, the dis-
tribution of electoral resources between centre and periphery has had
to compensate partly for the lack of or weak institutions. This distribu-
tion constitutes the basis for more informal centre–periphery relations
and the division of patronage resources that will be dealt with in the
subsequent two chapters.
As I outlined in Section 2.2, access to electoral resources is central for
elites and parties in democratic states. Sharing electoral resources in the
understanding put forward here means to form coalition governments
at national and regional levels. From earlier academic work on democ-
racy and democratization we know that the standard interest of political
elites is to gain public office and adapt existing institutions and create
new ones in such ways that they increase their opportunities to exercise
power (Geddes 1994; Frye 1997; Lijphart 1977). But these institutions
are likely to be weak in transition societies because they are either inef-
fective or not yet fully embedded in the new socio-political system, a
process that is time-intensive. In the absence of strong and stable insti-
tutions, coalition formation between elites in the centre and periphery
becomes a very important first step for an agreement on decentralization
reforms.
In the electoral competition, a political party’s relevance vis-à-vis
other parties depends to large degrees on coalition tactics. Regionalist
parties in the periphery are mainly relevant for elites and parties in
83
the centre to the extent that they are viable coalition options for form-
ing governments in the centre and periphery. The same holds true vice
versa: SWPs are relevant for elites and parties in the periphery only if
these have access to electoral resources in regional elections.1 Electoral
resources are critical for elites and parties in order to maintain power
and legitimacy through their parliamentary mandate (Cotta 2000).
In that sense, electoral resources are similar to what Sartori (1976)
calls the governing potential of parties. Governing or coalition poten-
tial refers to the degree to which a given political party is a viable
coalition partner for other parties. Two reasons guide the decision to
adopt the term “electoral resources” in this book rather than govern-
ing potential. First, using the term resources implies that these items
can be exchanged. As I explained in Section 2.2, electoral resources
form the basis for the exchange of other kinds of resources, patronage
resources in the public sector being the most relevant ones in the scope
of this book. Rational elites enter government coalitions at national
and regional levels. When entering into coalitions, they have to decide
on the subsequent distribution of patronage resources (see Chapter 6).
A second reason for choosing the term electoral resources pertains to
the relational quality of governing potential. Parties may allow access
to their electoral resources or block such access towards other parties.
Put differently, electoral resources stress the interdependent nature of
elite and party relations. Particularly in fragmented multi-party systems
such as those in Serbia and Croatia, most parties depend of the coalition
potential of more than one other party in order to gain public office.
Political competition in transition states with weak institutions is very
much marked by elite exchanges of interdependent resources. Access to
electoral resources is important for political elites and parties because
it allows them to build and to maintain their power base on the basis
of their public office. Access to these resources is negotiable, tradable
and interdependent in similar ways that patronage resources are. Only
if political elites and parties hold public office can they attempt to
politicize the public sector in a democratic system.2
In the post-socialist transition countries where new institutions are
formed and old ones are changed, membership both in the legislative
and in the executive creates opportunities to actively shape these pro-
cesses. This applies both to the centre and to the periphery. Hence, in
these contexts, being part of the legislative and the executive is a pre-
condition for political elites and parties to have a formal impact on
the new and adapted institutions in the making. Apart from the for-
mal authority and legitimacy that such mandates entail this book pays
Access to Electoral Resources 85
attention to the informal processes and relations among political elites

and parties, because the formal institutions in transition countries are
relatively weak and still strongly under the shadow of elite struggles for
power in the new democratic systems (Bunce 1999; Grzymala-Busse and
Luong 2002; Vachudová 2005). In this chapter, I examine the formal
electoral aspects and, building on this, I then discuss the informal pro-
cesses in greater detail in the following two chapters. Political parties,
in the view I present here, are primarily understood as arenas for the
interaction of elites. Although I speak of parties in this chapter in terms
of their access to electoral resources, I simultaneously refer to political
elites who steer the decisions of parties to form coalitions or to abstain
from doing so.
Electoral resources become critical for elites particularly in the initial
phase of democratization. When elites and parties have access to elec-
toral resources and hold public office, they have much more influence
on the negotiations on decentralization reforms than when in opposi-
tion. At the same time, sharing electoral resources allows them to engage
in regular interaction which increases the trustworthiness of parties
involved and hence reduces the uncertainty stemming from the federal
paradox outlined in Section 2.2. By the same token, elites and parties
face more difficulties for acquiring their share of patronage resources
when they do not enter electoral alliances and do not interact on a reg-
ular basis. I will explicate this latter aspect in more depth in Chapter 6.
At this point it suffices to say that access to electoral resources is the
first step in the process leading towards interactions between centre
and periphery and resulting in differential elite access to patronage
resources. When national elites cannot expect to have access to patron-
age resources in the periphery, they have fewer incentives to support
decentralization. Regionalist and national elites are central actors in this
process.
Against this background, this chapter argues that access to electoral
resources at both regional and national levels is a crucial factor that can
partly explain the different outcomes of decentralization reforms. More
precisely, the degree to which the influence of regional parties or NSWPs
is constrained to the periphery or can be extended to the centre is highly
relevant. While in Istria the main regionalist party IDS has dominated
the regional government for two decades, it played only a marginal role
in the national parliament and government. Still, the IDS defended its
electoral stronghold in Istria while pushing for stronger decentraliza-
tion at the national level. In Vojvodina, on the other hand, regional
parties were only junior partners in the coalitions that formed regional
governments. But they were twice as much a part of the winning elec-
toral coalitions at the national level and therefore had an influence on
the formation of national government policies. Moreover, the support of
regional parties in Vojvodina proved to be central for the re-election of
President Tadić from the Democratic Party (DS) who in return endorsed
their decentralization demands. In this case, regional parties proved to
be indeed kingmakers for political elites in the centre. In the end, this
was an important basis for the adoption of a new autonomy statute in
November 2009.
4.1 Electoral resources in the centre and periphery
Regional parties or NSWPs have increasingly become important actors in

national politics. Studies on party politics in Western European federal
and regionalized states find that elections and coalition formations at
regional and national levels are interdependent and constitute a multi-
level game (Deschouwer 2009a; Jeffery 2010). Therefore, this chapter
acknowledges the need to study the interaction of SWPs and NSWPs in
the centre and periphery. A party is defined as statewide when it com-
petes in elections in at least two-thirds of a country’s constitutive regions
(Swenden 2006: 141ff.). NSWPs, on the other hand, are those parties
whose prime political goal is achieving more regional autonomy. His-
torically, these two categories of political parties mirror the emergence
of the cleavage between centre and periphery that was central for the
creation of modern nation-states (Flora et al. 1999). The modern nation-
state was created through a centripetal process during which the elites
in the centre harmonized different spheres of society and concentrated
material and symbolic capital within its territory at the expense of the
periphery (Bourdieu 2012). In the past 30 years, we have observed that
many NSWPs are trying to partially reverse this process by demanding
more decentralization and autonomy (Tarrow et al. 1978; Urwin 1985;
Hooghe et al. 2010).
While numerous studies on Western Europe and multi-level politics
incorporate both political elites and parties at the centre and periph-
ery (Deschouwer 2003; Hopkin 2003; Orte and Wilson 2009), there is
very little research on transition societies that distinguishes between
these two kinds of parties analytically and empirically. In both Serbia
and Croatia, we can find instances in which NSWPs have proven to be
relevant for coalition formation at the national level where their elec-
toral resources were at times critical for the formation of government
coalitions, albeit to different degrees and with varying incumbency
time. At the same time, NSWPs are also key actors in regional elections.
In Istria, the IDS dominated the regional assembly and government for
more than 20 years. This left little space for any significant influence
from SWPs in regional affairs. In contrast, the case of Vojvodina illus-
trates how the regional branches of SWPs successfully adapted their
programmes to regional affairs because of the electoral significance of
this autonomous province and the electoral resources of NSWPs.
What makes NSWPs thrive? Here one should differentiate between
their success in their regional constituency and at the national level.
Three points are essential for a successful NSWP at the national level,
success understood in terms of gaining more scope for self-rule.3
(1) As Sartori (1976: 122) pointed out, the earlier mentioned “govern-
ing potential” of a party is what matters most. An NSWP that wants to
successfully influence central government policies and exert pressure on
SWPs has to either be a potential coalition partner or be able to black-
mail SWPs at the national level. (2) More importantly, at one point in
time it has to be part of the national parliament and in the best case
become junior partner in a coalition government at the national level
(de Winter and Türsan 1998). It is this relative political weight that pro-
vides them with a certain degree of leverage in bargaining situations
with statewide elites and parties. (3) Finally, a more general and obvi-
ous factor for being successful is the attraction of voters. That is, citizens
should see NSWPs as legitimate and effective advocates of their region.4
Translating the above points in terms of resources, the extent to
which NSWPs are able or willing to grant SWPs access to their elec-
toral resources can be at times crucial for the formation of national
governments and policy preferences regarding decentralization reforms.
Without sharing their electoral resources inside a national coalition
government, NSWPs are less likely to influence policy outcomes.5 Sim-
ilarly, SWPs that want to have a say in regional affairs ought to be
in regional government. This way, SWPs can influence what kind of
decentralization demand is voiced.
The distribution of electoral resources allows us to identify the truly
relevant parties in a system and their relative power; at the same
time, it serves as a measure of a party system’s fragmentation (Sartori
1976). The more fragmented a system is the more important the role
of smaller NSWPs becomes in the formation of national and regional
governments.6 NSWPs that share their electoral resources with SWPs
and are regularly involved in national coalition governments become
de facto “ ‘centric-regional’ parties, because they regularly co-rule at the
centre” (Stepan 2008: 9).7
What is even more important at the regional level is the degree to

which NSWPs have established a stronghold by dominating regional
governments or being the only viable coalition partner at the regional
level. Particularly in post-communist countries that are still re-building
their state structures through political and socio-economic liberaliza-
tion, this opens up a variety of patronage and rent-seeking opportunities
for local politicians (Hale 2007). Given the already-existing widespread
corruption practices at the national level, decentralization efforts grant-
ing more discretion to regional and local officials are likely to compound
this problem even further (Treisman 2003; Cohen 2010). Summing up,
NSWPs face critical trade-offs between office, policy and vote-seeking at
both national and regional levels, and their predictable success might
foster rent-seeking in their constituencies (de Winter et al. 2006).
SWPs, on the other hand, face additional challenges when confronted
with regionalist demands. Their regional branches have to strike a bal-
ance between the overall party line and programme, and the necessary
responsiveness to particular needs in their constituency. In this endeav-
our, conflicting policy preferences are likely to arise between the party
headquarters of an SWP that generally represents rather national objec-
tives and its regional branch that has to be somewhat responsive to
particularistic regional interests. One way to conceptualize this delicate
relationship is a principal-agent framework in which the national lead-
ership of the SWP delegates competences and thus discretion to the
regional leadership of the same party (van Houten 2009a). The main
line of conflict is the varying significance of elections on different levels:
SWP leaders care most about their national votes, leaders of the regional
branch about their regional election outcomes. But after all, the bottom
line is that SWPs care most about maximizing their votes in national
elections.8 But this preference does not stop at parliamentary elections.
Especially in (semi-)presidential systems, SWPs want to secure a high
share for their candidate in regions with a large population. Also in this
case the access to electoral resources in the periphery is critical.
How then does this two-level game play out in the cases examined
in this book? The next section provides an empirical overview of the
interaction between SWPs and NSWPs in Istria and Vojvodina.
4.2 The electoral systems in Serbia and Croatia
Since democratization began in both Serbia and Croatia in 2000, party

systems in both countries emerged that have the predominance of elec-
toral platforms in common. The relations between SWPs and NSWPs
are highly interwoven in Croatia and Serbia, mainly because of the

fragmented landscape of political parties, which makes it necessary to
form pre-electoral platforms at the national level that very often include
NSWPs.
In Serbia, broad electoral coalitions have dominated the political
scene and elections ever since the multi-party Democratic Opposition
of Serbia (DOS) overthrew the Milošević regime in 2000. Because none
of the democratic parties individually stood a chance of winning a sig-
nificant share of votes and of being able to form a stable government,
prior to every election most political parties came together in electoral
coalitions or lists. Several implications follow from this particular polit-
ical system. First, detailed party programmes that outline a substantial
policy programme were secondary to broader policy issues under which
these different parties could rally together. Support or rejection of the
European integration process, cooperation with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in The Hague and reconciliation more
generally were among the key issues that divided political platforms.
Second, NSWPs had an important role to play as supporters of the DS
that has dominated the political landscape in the past decade. Third,
in a way this highly fragmented system is a continuation of the more
patrimonial political system from the 1990s in what was then rump
Yugoslavia, because the loose political platforms were only superficially
held together by party programmes and rather bound by the personal
leadership of single politicians. In Croatia, electoral platforms exist but
they are limited to the opposition parties that sought to counterbalance
the dominant position of the conservative HDZ. In all elections since
the 1990s, the HDZ went to the ballot on their own while the opposi-
tion in most cases had to form pre-election platforms in order to be a
serious contender.
We can derive two inter-related consequences from the existence
of electoral platforms. First, electoral systems that are populated to
a large degree by electoral platforms are more complex than systems
where single parties organize electoral campaigns. The fact that most
of these pre-election platforms consist of more than two political par-
ties increases the complexity and opens up the opportunity for single
parties to either confront or mediate between the others.9 Second, the
personality of senior politicians and political elites involved is likely to
be very important in order to maintain a minimal degree of coherence
within a platform of ideologically very diverse party preferences and to
communicate the key messages to the broader public.10 In other words,
electoral campaigns are less programmatic and more personalized. That
means that political elites in such contexts are decisive when impor-
tant and far-reaching questions such as those of decentralization are
discussed.
Another element that is important pertains to presidential elections.
In both countries constitutions set up new institutional framework,
but they differed with regard to the powers assigned to the president.
In Croatia, the presidential system inherited from Tuąman was substi-
tuted by a parliamentary system (Fisher 2006). Whereas the omnipotent
president in the former system was able to effectively influence any
decision on regional autonomy and decentralization, in the new parlia-
mentary system there was a need to obtain majorities for such decisions.
Indeed, Tuąman had the power and offered some limited amount of
autonomy to the regionalist elites from the IDS in 1993. He wanted
to withdraw his HDZ from running in regional elections in Istria, but
regionalist IDS leader Ivan Jakovčić turned down these offers.11 Failure
to reach an agreement surely was partially the result of the stark ide-
ological differences between the liberal and multi-cultural IDS and the
nationalist conservative HDZ (Ashbrook 2006). But equally important
was the little credibility of the HDZ and the fear that they would not
truthfully uphold their commitment.
In Ivica Račan’s government (2000–2003), the reform agenda of the
first truly democratic coalition government was overloaded mainly as
a result of the isolationist legacy inherited from Tuąman and the need
to engage in the EU and NATO accession processes. In the end, only
the IDS truly wanted a far-reaching decentralization reform but failed to
lift this demand on the reform agenda of the coalition government.12
One small and symbolic achievement was a clause in the new consti-
tution that foresaw that each region had to adopt their new statute on
regional self-government without the participation or consultation of
the national parliament (which led to an unsuccessful appeal to the
Constitutional Court by HDZ politicians). But the constitution-making
process was very brief and occurred in a rush. Already one year after
the first post-Tuąman government took office the new constitution was
adopted in 2001. All parties involved, including Tuąman’s HDZ, were
aware of the need for a new constitution given the many issues that had
piled up in the 1990s. Adopting a new constitution was a core priority
for the new government, particularly with a view to reducing the vast
powers vested in the president.13
In Serbia, by contrast, a semi-presidential system was largely main-
tained after the ousting of the Milošević regime. The president was
stripped of some of his powers, but retained a central role in the
policy-making process (Bochsler 2008). In addition, the new 2006

constitution called for the adoption of a new autonomy statute for
Vojvodina. The regional government in Vojvodina drafted the text of
the new statute that was amended and adopted by the Assembly of the
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. The adopted text had to be passed
twice to the national parliament which constituted a breach of the
constitutionally defined deadlines. Elites in the national government
postponed the issues several times partly because of the strong opposi-
tion from nationalist parties in the parliament. Only after the second
reading the national parliament voted in favour of the new statute.
4.3 Access to electoral resources at regional and

national levels
In this section, I examine the strategic interaction between SWPs and

NSWPs. Empirical evidence supports the argument that NSWPs in
Serbia – whose electoral resources are significant in both the centre and
the periphery – were most successful in pushing through their decen-
tralization demands. In contrast, the Croatian NSWP that concentrated
on its regional electoral stronghold was not able to achieve more decen-
tralization because it did not turn out to be a viable coalition partner at
the national level. In other words, SWPs in Serbia had access to electoral
resources in the periphery, while in Croatia this was not the case to the
same extent.
Before looking at electoral results, turnout rates tell us something
about the mobilization at the regional level.14 At first sight, the numbers
concerning voter turnout seem to confirm the widespread argument
that regional elections are second-order elections. With the exception of
the high voter mobilization in Vojvodina in 2008, in all other regional
elections voter turnout was significantly lower. Yet, when accounting
for the fact that in 2008 elections were held simultaneously at the
regional and national levels, this is not too surprising because there is
strong empirical support associating simultaneous elections with higher
turnout rates (Geys 2006). In Serbia, the difference between national
and regional electoral turnout was on average 10 per cent and in Croatia
even 20 per cent. This might reflect the fact that regions in Croatia have
very limited powers and hence do not attract the attention of voters in
the same way as national elections. On the other hand, in Vojvodina cit-
izens perceive the regional government to have more competences and
influence on the daily lives of citizens, which renders the ballot more
meaningful.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will use electoral data to empirically

show (1) if and how NSWPs share their electoral resources at national
and regional levels, (2) how SWPs deal with their regional branches and
(3) the extent to which regional votes matter for presidential elections.
Let me now discuss each point at greater length.
The seat share of NSWPs in regional and national parliaments indi-
cates the potential for either establishing a regional stronghold or being
a viable coalition partner for SWPs. It tells us something about the abil-
ity of NSWPs to share their electoral resources. The IDS, which has been
by far the strongest NSWP in Croatia, has clearly dominated the regional
assembly and thus regional government in Istria. It has dominated polit-
ical life in Istria for 20 years. NSWPs have accounted for more than
50 per cent of the Istrian regional assembly, which leaves SWPs with
little access to their electoral resources because they are not dependent
on SWP support to form regional governments.
At the national level in the Croatian Parliament, NSWPs play a much
less important role but on average they still hold more seats than in
Serbia. The IDS only at one point in time helped the SDP break the
dominance of the conservative HDZ government and participated in
the governing coalition in 2000.15 Although it left the coalition govern-
ment after disputes about economic policy and the bail-out of an Istrian
bank after only one year and did not achieve its goal of achieving more
regional powers and autonomy (Ashbrook 2008), it again joined forces
with the social democrats and other parties and won parliamentary elec-
tions in 2011.16 One of the main disadvantages for NSWPs in Istria is the
relative small population and the resulting limited electoral significance
for national elections. SWPs are often not dependent on votes from this
region. The only way for the IDS to lift their demands onto the national
level is to enter a coalition with SWPs that otherwise could not build a
majority in the national parliament. This surely constrains the scope of
action for the IDS.
In Vojvodina the picture is reverse. While regional parties were in the
past decade part of winning electoral coalitions at the national level
for five years, they were only junior partners in the regional parliament
where the statewide democratic party DS has been the dominant party.
Serbia shows particularly well how NSWPs can tip the balance in frag-
mented party systems. After ousting the Milošević government out of
office, the broad democratic opposition DOS that consisted of 18 differ-
ent parties – including NSWPs – was struggling to maintain the upper
hand against the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS). National elec-
tions in 2003 proved to be crucial in this regard as the nationalists came
out as the single strongest party with almost 28 per cent of the vote.
Nonetheless, the democratic alliance of the Democratic Party of Serbia
(DSS), G17+ and the Serbian Renewal Movement – New Serbia (SPO-NS)
was able to form a coalition government, and the votes they had gained
in Vojvodina turned out to be decisive. In Vojvodina, where almost one
quarter of the national electorate lives, they gained more than 80 per
cent of the votes. More importantly, Vojvodina served as an arena for the
DS to strengthen its electoral base after it had lost in the 2003 national
elections (Vejvoda 2004: 47). It also proved to be an electoral stronghold
in the 2008 elections that saw the pro-European alliance led by the DS
reach 40.8 per cent of the votes.
With the DS as an SWP constituting the regional government, achiev-
ing the adoption of the new autonomy statute in 2009 was made pos-
sible by this congruent party constellation.17 That is, both in Vojvodina
and at the national level the DS was the strongest political force, which
made a compromise on the hotly debated autonomy statute more likely.
A second aspect to consider is the relationship between the national
headquarters of SWPs and their regional branches, and especially the
extent to which regional votes are relevant for the winning coalition
at the national level. More often than not regional interests differ from
national interests, which may at times lead to divergent opinions within
SWPs.18 Whether regional branches of SWPs succeed in putting regional
interests first in regional elections depends largely on the degree of their
organizational autonomy from the headquarters and the importance of
regional votes for SWP vote shares in the national elections.
In Croatia, most political parties have not overcome the legacies of
socialism in terms of their very hierarchical organization and the pre-
dominance of the central party leadership in the management of party
affairs (Čular 2004). Particularly the conservative HDZ leaves almost
no room for manoeuvre to its local branches, whereas the other rele-
vant SWP, the SDP, allows some space for autonomous decisions (Čular
2004: 41).
Despite the fact that the electoral resources of NSWPs have been of rel-
atively small importance at the national level, Croatia’s coastal regions
have been very significant for SWPs. The coastal regions in Croatia’s
northwest, together with the capital Zagreb, are the economic power-
houses of the country and hence symbolically and economically impor-
tant constituencies. Leading SDP politician Zlatko Komadina, county
prefect of Primorsko-goranska and in 2012 briefly Minister of Maritime
Affairs, Transport and Infrastructure, spelt out that the conservative HDZ
government had systematically neglected these regions. Because the
conservative HDZ traditionally did not have strong electoral prospects

there and it did not allow its regional branches to autonomously articu-
late regional interests, in fields such as health policy and other domains
central government funding was scarce. Komadina posited that “time
has come to undo this injustice” and demanded a comprehensive decen-
tralization reform in the wake of his party’s electoral win in December
2011 (Glas Istre 2011). This statement, coming from a leading figure
of an SWP, illustrates how difficult it is for SWPs to strike a balance
between the national interest and electorate, and regional demands.
The SDP’s regional branch supported the cause of regional autonomy
and decentralization in Istria which was echoed by the party leader-
ship in the headquarters. The SDP incorporated decentralization into its
party programme as early as 1995. Moreover, Komadina has been among
the key promoters of decentralization and became the first president of
the newly established Croatian County Association (Hrvatska zajednica
županija) in 2003.19 But despite this apparent consensus on decentraliza-
tion as a policy priority, Istria’s struggle for more far-reaching autonomy
was met with hesitation by the SDP when it came to decide on ver-
itable political decentralization. It even entered into the government
programme of the SDP-led Račan government in 2000, but was largely
dropped after the IDS had left the coalition in 2001.
The HDZ, on the other hand, had no interest in letting its regional
branch develop a constructive approach concerning the decentraliza-
tion question because of the very limited access it had to electoral
resources in Istria. All in all, regional votes in national elections in
Croatia were on average not of great importance. As Figure 4.1 shows,
the vote share of winning coalitions in Istria was most of the time
below the total share in Croatia. This highlights that the HDZ – having
led all governments between 2003 and 2010 – was not dependent on
Istrian votes. In this case, the HDZ had no access to electoral resources
in Istria and thus little incentive to accommodate decentralization
demands. Only in 2000 when the regionalist IDS briefly formed part of
the national government did its winning coalition achieve higher vote
shares in Istria than at the national level. For all other national elections,
party coalitions that would eventually constitute national governments
had to rely less on votes from Istria, and were less responsive to Istrian
decentralization demands.
In Serbia, too, most political parties are rather centralized which
results in very constrained freedom for local and regional branches
(Spoerri 2008). But the party regulations concerning the selection of
national and regional party presidents and the formulation of policy
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
23-12-2000 28-12-2003 21-01-2007 11-05-2008
Vote share in national elections in Vojvodina
Total vote share in national elections in Serbia
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
19-01-2000 13-11-2003 25-11-2007
Vote share in national elections in Istria
Total vote share in national elections in Croatia
Figure 4.1 Vote share of winning coalitions in national elections in Vojvodina

and Istria
Source: Own compilation. Vojvodina above and Istria below. Data from the Serbian and
Croatian Electoral Commissions.
positions are very vague and leave some room for interpretation.
For instance, the statewide DS is organized in such a way that the
party leader in Vojvodina is to a certain degree autonomous in his
programmatic approach towards regional affairs. One example for this
is the drafting of the new autonomy statute that became necessary
after the new constitution was adopted in 2006.20 The new constitution
was adopted by the national parliament and confirmed in a national
referendum.
Figure 4.1 indicates that the winning coalition in Serbia had to rely
strongly on the vote shares obtained in Vojvodina in 2003, which were
twice as high as the national vote share. One year before these elections
the multi-party coalition government constituted by DOS had passed
the Omnibus Law that returned autonomous powers to Vojvodina and
transferred competences in the areas of education and culture. Some
parties from DOS hence benefitted from the partial return of Vojvodina’s
autonomy and Serbia’s return to a regionalized state.
But citizen support for the national government in Vojvodina faded

in the next elections. The central government drafted a law that was
passed by the national parliament. It effectively curtailed Vojvodina’s
still limited self-rule. The new Law on Government from 2005 explicitly
empowered the central government to suspend regulations and statutes
adopted by the Vojvodina government. This partly explains why, in the
next elections in 2007, the relative weight of vote shares of the win-
ning coalition decreased compared with that of the statewide vote share.
Another reason was the fading popularity of DSS Prime Minister Vojislav
Koštunica. Although the new government party DS gained vote shares
in Vojvodina, the overall vote share of the winning coalition decreased.
The 2008 elections saw the pro-European alliance led by the DS win with
almost 50 per cent of votes in Vojvodina (see Figure 4.1). It is important
to note, however, that the significance of Vojvodina for winning coali-
tions has overall substantially declined compared with elections in 2000
and 2003.
The first important step towards more autonomy was taken in 2002
when the Omnibus Law devolved powers in cultural and educational
policies to Vojvodina. In national elections in the following year,
Vojvodina turned out to be very important for the winning coalition
whose vote share in Vojvodina was twice as high as that in the rest
of the country. We can plausibly assume that this support is related
to the prior decision to grant some degree of autonomy which was
well received among the citizens in Vojvodina.21 However, the electoral
importance of Vojvodina for the winning coalition at the national level
declined thereafter. When further steps were taken to expand the degree
of decentralization with the constitution of 2006 and the new auton-
omy statute of 2009, the region’s electoral significance was lowest for
national coalitions. Pure electoral considerations at the national level
thus cannot explain why SWPs in the end agreed to support the new
autonomy statute. Rather, the regional branch of the DS and its charis-
matic President Bojan Pajtić played a key role in reaching an agreement
on the new autonomy statute. The significance of votes in Vojvodina
for supporting the DS presidential candidate Tadić was an important
incentive to give Pajtić large discretion over drafting the new autonomy
statute and to support its adoption in the national parliament. I fur-
ther develop this aspect in the next section. At this point, it suffices to
know that Pajtić enjoyed far-reaching freedom when he drafted the new
autonomy statute. He, together with two other leading DS politicians,
formulated the draft in a behind-the-door manner with the approval of
the DS headquarters.22
Having the leverage over the drafting process, Pajtić was able to co-
opt one NSWP, the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), by
offering them a new autonomy statute that was short of the region-
alists’ maximal demands but sure to win approval in the national
parliament Skupština.23 In an interview, a leading figure from the rival
regionalist party the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) criti-
cized the concessions the LSV has made during their partnership with
the DS: “Their position weakens the efforts for that idea [of regional
autonomy] . . . which is problematic. If only the political party of a
national minority fights for autonomy, the secessionist qualifications in
the country are strengthened.”24 Sharing their electoral resources with
the DS has effectively prevented the LSV from remaining a veritable
regionalist party demanding full autonomy and further decentraliza-
tion. For the DS and their regional branches, on the other hand,
co-opting and binding the LSV successfully secured their electoral base
in Vojvodina and gave them sufficient “regionalist credibility” in the
eyes of the electorate. In sum, particularly one NSWP in Vojvodina pro-
vided the necessary electoral resources for SWPs given the significance
of regional votes for government formation. For tapping this potential,
SWPs had strong incentives to accommodate some of the regionalist
demands, and in this case the DS gave significant leeway – short of max-
imalist decentralization demands – to their regional branch for drafting
a new autonomy statute.25
A third aspect to consider relates to the role of presidential elec-
tions. As outlined earlier, Croatia and Serbia have different kinds of
semi-presidential systems. In Croatia, the president mostly possesses
representative powers, whereas in Serbia the president has ample oppor-
tunities to steer government policies and to remain the head of his
political party. But in both cases we could observe a kind of “hyper-
presidentialism” since the end of the Bosnian civil war in 1995 when
presidents were engaging very actively in daily policy affairs by instru-
mentalising the prime minister and making excessive use of decrees
(Arato 2000: 318). In the case of Serbia, this trend has continued
after 2000.
Incumbent presidents or their contenders normally occupy central
positions within their parties, and hence their support for decentraliza-
tion reforms is often a pre-requisite for their success. We can approx-
imate these preferences by looking at the winning margin between
the top two candidates of a given presidential election (a measure of
how tight the outcome was) and the vote differential between national
and regional votes (the total vote share minus the vote share that
40
Koštunica, DSS
30
20
Tadić, DS Tadić, DS
10
0
13-10-2002 27-06-2004 20-01-2008
−10
−20
Vote Differential (Vojvodina MINUS national vote share)
Winning Margin
40
Mesić
30
Josipović, SDP
20
Mesić, HNS
10
0
13-12-2002 16-01-2005 27-12-2009
Vote Differential (Istria MINUS national vote share)

Winning Margin
Figure 4.2 Vote differential for winning presidential candidates in Serbia and
Croatia
Source: Own compilation. Serbia is above and Croatia below. Data from Serbian and Croatian
Electoral Commissions.
the winning presidential candidate obtained in the respective region)

(see Figure 4.2). Where the electoral outcome is very narrow and the
regional vote differential large, presidents should be more likely to sup-
port decentralization. Basically, the main idea is that electoral resources
in the regions are particularly important when the presidential race is
narrow.
The winning margin in presidential elections in Croatia was not
narrow but always larger than 10 per cent. In more than ten years
since democratization began, Croatia had only two different presidents:
Stjepan Mesić from the liberal HNS in Croatia, who later ran as an inde-
pendent, and Ivo Josipović from the SDP. In all three elections, the
winning candidate had a relatively stable advantage. At the same time,
the vote differential is relatively high; that is, the support for the win-
ning candidate was larger in Istria than in the country as a whole. Taken
together this indicates that regional votes – while not alone decisive
for the outcome of presidential elections because of the relatively small

electorate – mattered for the winning presidential candidates who could
be relatively sure of their support in the region.26 However, this was not
decisive for decentralization reforms, since the 2001 constitution had
reduced the presidential role to mainly representative functions.
In Serbia, we observe a reverse pattern concerning the winning margin
of presidential candidates. The margin between the winning candidate
and the runner-up has narrowed constantly in the past decade. DS and
then Serbian President Tadić won the last election in 2008 by a margin
of only 2.3 per cent. In other words, he could not have won without the
votes from Vojvodina with its large electorate and the endorsement of
most NSWPs from this autonomous province. Another finding that crys-
tallizes from Figure 4.2 is the simultaneously rising relevance of votes
from Vojvodina for the winning presidential candidate. In the last pres-
idential elections in 2008, incumbent President Tadić from the DS could
rely on almost 10 per cent more votes in Vojvodina than in the rest of
the country. Together these two trends might also be the main reason
why Tadić, moreover party president of the DS, gave large discretion to
the DS leadership in Vojvodina to draft a new comprehensive auton-
omy statute. This draft met with strong resistance from the nationalist
opposition but found Tadić’s full support. It was finally adopted by the
national parliament after amendments and changes were made in the
Vojvodina Assembly (Nova Srpska Politička Misao 2009). For Tadić, elec-
toral resources in Vojvodina have been pivotal to secure his re-election
in 2008.
In 2003 in Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić from the nationalist SRS obtained
a majority of votes but the quorum was not met which led to new elec-
tions in 2004. In Croatia, Mesić was supported by a cross-party coalition
without the HDZ before elections and was no longer member of the
liberal HNS.
In both cases examined here, access to electoral resources has been
important for developments at the national level, particularly with a
view to questions of shifting territorial competences to regions. This
highlights that we cannot understand the outcomes of bargaining in
such contexts without looking at the interaction between state- and
regional-level political parties (Jeffery 2010).
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the electoral patterns at centre and periph-
ery. I have argued that students of Balkan territorial politics should pay
attention to electoral resources at both the centre and the periphery in

order to grasp the dynamic interplay of political parties and elites when
they bargain over decentralization reforms. I described the first element
of the causal chain presented in this book, namely the degree to which
governing elites and parties from the centre and periphery constitute
durable coalition governments or not.
Coalition patterns tell us something about which elites and parties are
more likely to influence one another. Co-optation is an instrument that
especially SWPs may use to bind NSWPs and pull them towards their
preferred policy positions. If an SWP enters a coalition with an NSWP
as junior partner, it is likely that the SWP will over time have a stronger
influence on its junior partner. We can expect this to apply even more
when “[s]elect groups of elites who participate in decision making in
secrecy with few ties to other groups invariably develop social consen-
sus” (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]: 164). Such consensus, generally,
is closer to the SWP’s original preference than to the NSWP’s.
A very good example for this is the DS in Vojvodina. As the most
influential party it was successful in co-opting one of the regionalist
parties, the LSV, which held the most significant electoral resources
among Vojvodina’s regionalist parties. The LSV had no other viable
coalition option at national and regional levels because the national-
ist opposition – represented by the DSS, the SRS and its splinter faction
the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) – consistently rejected any kind
of special powers devolved to Vojvodina or other regions. Thus, the
LSV became more dependent on the DS than the other way around.
This undermined and prevented the creation of a joint regionalist front
against which DS would have had to compete. Other regionalist par-
ties differ from the LSV because of their explicit programme based on
Hungarian minority issues. Moreover, the SVM – which fights for votes
in constituencies similar to those contested by DS – had to maintain its
own profile and thus could not fully support the DS in public.27 The
LSV was the only regionalist party with a broader appeal not limited by
ethnic considerations. As shown in Chapter 6, this co-optation was also
extended to SOEs where the DS bound its coalition partners through
the provision of patronage appointments in executive and supervisory
boards and the distribution of government funds.
Admittedly, at first sight the access to electoral resources in itself seems
to explain why Croatia remained a highly centralized state. In brief,
the narrative might be the following: the dominant statewide HDZ,
which has held government power for most of Croatia’s young history
as an independent state since 1992, simply had nothing to gain from
giving autonomy to Istria and other regions. In terms of their electoral

resources, regionalist parties were never truly relevant for the national
level. Only in the late 1990s there were hopes that a joint regionalist
platform with several parties could become a significant force in the
national parliament. But this superficial look at the situation is mis-
leading. If this was true, why then did Tuąman offer a special kind
of autonomy arrangement to the IDS in 1994 during informal talks?
Regardless of what Tuąman’s real intentions were, it was clear that he
would have benefitted from a solution to the Istrian autonomy ques-
tion and decentralization more broadly, because the IDS leadership was
among the most vocal and prominent opponents to his policies.28
As I go on to argue in the following two chapters, elite and party
considerations of electoral resources constitute only the foundations
for their interactions and decisions on decentralization reforms. Rather
than fully explaining different decentralization reforms, electoral pat-
terns help us to understand the basis for the interaction of political elites
and parties in the centre and periphery. From other studies we know that
post-socialist state-building is associated with particular problems such
as informal politics and clientelism. As Vachudová (2005) convincingly
shows, we cannot understand change in post-communist countries or
the lack thereof without looking at political elite competition includ-
ing its informal aspects. But these informal aspects build on and are
connected to the electoral patterns outlined in this chapter.
In the following chapter, I show how access to electoral resources has
paved the way to repeated interactions between political elites and par-
ties. In Serbia, this has led to the emergence of a stable elite network
across the centre–periphery divide. On the other hand, elite interactions
have been largely bound to either the centre or the periphery.
5
Information Exchange and
Cooperation
This chapter deals with what follows once elites in the centre and
periphery have gained access to electoral resources and formed coali-
tions. It examines the informal relations of political actors beyond
purely electoral considerations. I show how political elites and parties
interact between national and regional levels. The main assumption is
that repeated and strong interactions reduce the uncertainty of unin-
tended consequences that reforms may entail, thus making national
elites and parties more likely to support decentralization reforms. Once
the access to electoral resources between SWPs and NSWPs is clear,
different patterns of interaction emerge that structure the relations
between centre and periphery. My findings suggest that brokerage is
a central mechanism that SWPs use to co-opt elites and parties in
the periphery. Given the focus on informal relations I employ social
network analysis to depict and analyse the interaction patterns and
their consequences as a result of its particular usefulness for unveiling
informal relations.
In Serbia, such interactions in terms of exchanging information and
engaging in strategic cooperation created trust inside an elite network
consisting of the DS, G17+ and some regionalist parties. This made an
agreement on decentralization reforms and their implementation more
likely. In Croatia, on the other hand, interactions and networks have
not crossed the centre–periphery divide in any significant way.
5.1 Centre–periphery relations during autonomy

negotiations since 2000
In this chapter, I argue that uncertainty has had a strong influence on

the decisions of actors in the periphery and in the centre concerning
102
Information Exchange and Cooperation 103
decentralization reforms. For understanding the implications of uncer-

tainty on decentralization negotiations, the relations between actors
in the periphery and the centre are important, since repeated interac-
tions between actors increase trust and allow the access to information
that otherwise might be unavailable. As decentralization is a highly
contested issue in post-conflict societies with heterogeneous ethnic
composition, regular interactions can reduce uncertainty and facilitate
negotiated outcomes by providing information that makes it easier to
anticipate the consequences of decentralization reforms. If elites and
parties interact across the centre–periphery divide, they are more likely
to come to a mutually acceptable agreement because they trust the other
side will maintain its commitment. In contrast, if interactions are con-
fined to the centre or the periphery respectively, an agreement is less
likely because elites and parties cannot foresee what the actual impli-
cations of decentralization reforms might be in terms of their access to
critical resources. As discussed earlier, electoral resources are the first crit-
ical resource. The second critical resource is patronage and it builds on
the electoral resources analysed in the previous chapter.1 I show which
interaction patterns facilitated or hindered information exchange and
cooperation between centre and periphery. In Chapter 6, I extend this
analysis by examining how this had an impact on the distribution of
patronage resources.
As such, this chapter focuses on the – mostly informal – relations
between elites and parties in the centre and periphery. Relations
between individuals and organizations are central to our understand-
ing of social processes and outcomes more generally. Political science
scholarship is increasingly paying attention to the embeddedness of
actors in their various relationships with one another (Tilly 2005).2
More specifically, many scholars now recognize that we can learn
immensely from previous studies in the fields of sociology and anthro-
pology by employing social network analysis more systematically
(Lazer 2011). Such an approach allows researchers to study the emer-
gence and content of relations between actors and their effect on
socio-political and economic outcomes. Very often, informal aspects
of relations are central to our understanding of these relationships.
Because formal institutions in transition societies are in the mak-
ing, political elites engage in informal relations in order to reconcile
their interests with formal rules or to undermine formal democratic
rules when it benefits them. Informal relations are constituted by
“socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communi-
cated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke
and Levitsky 2004: 727). This means that similar to formal institutions,
informal relations spanning the centre–periphery divide make credible
commitment to an agreement more likely because defecting parties can
be punished.
With regard to the study of decentralization, such a focus on rela-
tions between actors is well suited to analyse the “working connections”
between central and regional actors that facilitate decentralization nego-
tiations (Agranoff 2004: 26). More importantly, when studying early
transformation countries with weak institutional frameworks that are
undergoing radical changes, informal relations become paramount for
our understanding of decision-making (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 66).
In such contexts, analysts ought to focus on the informal relations
between relevant actors who are embedded in networks. Networks are
understood as relatively durable negotiation systems that we can find in
different policy domains (Scott 1991; Knoke 1993; Mayntz and Scharpf
1995: 61). In this chapter, and throughout this book, I focus on political
elites as the main unit of analysis for whom political parties are the main
arenas for interaction. A more stable interaction and negotiation pattern
that involves elites from two or more parties is a network. With this
approach I do not follow the steps of scholars studying policy networks
all through the policy cycle as a specific mode of interaction (Kriesi et al.
2006; Bevir and Richards 2009). Rather, I emphasise the interaction of
political elites who exercise “power derived from the resources and legit-
imacy of the organisations they command” (Hughes et al. 2002: 397; see
also Knoke 1993).
Within such networks, brokerage is a mechanism that facilitates bar-
gaining and creates trust, thus reducing the uncertainty associated with
decentralization reforms. Under the condition of uncertainty, actors can
use brokerage for binding two or more actors who in turn may consti-
tute a new entity different from its original actors (Borgatti et al. 2009).
A broker who can connect otherwise unconnected actors can facili-
tate communication and negotiations and coordinate actors “between
whom it would be valuable, but risky, to trust” (Burt 2005: 97). While
the previously discussed electoral considerations in Chapter 4 are in
the first place an expression of formal aspects of the democratic pro-
cess, we should look beyond procedural formality in the Balkan context
and in most other regions outside the OECD world. As Horowitz (1994:
48) succinctly underlines, we do not get far by looking solely at the
procedural dynamics: “Purely procedural conceptions of democracy are
thus inadequate for ethnically divided polities, for the procedure can be
impeccable and the exclusion complete.”
Indeed, exclusive and isolated networks are associated with strong

internal cohesion and relations that may foster corrupt and undemo-
cratic behaviour (Grießhaber and Geys 2011; see also Granovetter 1973).
That is why in this chapter I examine how information exchange and
strategic cooperation unfold through informal channels within and
between elite groups. My findings suggest that it matters greatly which
actor holds the broker position. In one of the cases studied here, namely
Serbia, national elites and parties used their broker position to bind
their counterparts in the periphery, thus allowing for sustained coop-
eration that reduced uncertainty. In the absence of an accepted broker,
centre and periphery are more likely to be disconnected – as in the case
of Croatia where the division between centre and periphery remained
strong. There, informal networks did not bridge this divide.
Trust is an important pre-condition for the formation of stable net-
works. In this context, the density of networks is important because
very small and close-knit networks facilitate the detection of defection
and make punishment in that case possible. Such enforcement of agree-
ments is a result of fast information flows, well-established reputation
patterns among actors involved and the possibility to collectively act
when one actor defects. This is why brokerage is so important. Infor-
mation exchange leads to the creation of trust which, in turn, serves
as a lubricant for the access to tangible commodities such as electoral
and patronage resources. In sum, trust is more likely to be prevalent
in small elite circles in which elites can enforce informal agreements
(Schoenman 2014). Stable networks that cross the centre–periphery
divide at the same time facilitate agreements on decentralization. With-
out trust, actors are less likely to enter binding informal agreements on
the distribution of material resources such as patronage resources that
will be dealt with in Chapter 6.
But how can we then conceptualize the generation of trust? As I
argued in Section 1.3, decentralization reforms can be conceived as
incomplete contracts that are associated with high uncertainty over
true preferences of other actors and unintended consequences. A key
issue relates to information that is not symmetrically divided between
centre and periphery. For the analysis in this chapter, I concentrate
on the reduction of uncertainty that results from repeated information
exchange and cooperation. In this context, brokerage is an important
mechanism because actors who serve as brokers can bridge other-
wise unconnected actors and thus contribute to recurring exchanges
of information. Such exchanges and cooperation occur both formally
and informally. Information exchange in this view is essential for
decision-making in transition countries that lack strongly institution-

alized channels for interactions. That is why repeated interactions
between elites in the centre and periphery are so important. They cre-
ate trust within elite networks and minimize the likelihood of defection
when elites and parties with partially diverging interests have to agree
on decentralization reforms (see Granovetter 1985). In the next section,
I explain how I employ network analysis and the kinds of measures
for relational data. I describe the sampling process, how I measure the
intensity of information exchange and cooperation and how I identify
meaningful brokers.
5.2 Methodological note
As outlined at the beginning, the aim of this chapter is to describe

and analyse the networks of political elites and parties. In contrast to
other chapters of this book, at this point I additionally include gov-
ernment bureaucracies and non-governmental organizations in order
to capture the outreach of elites to other social actors in Serbia and
Croatia during the relevant decision-making period and decentraliza-
tion negotiations. While the addition of other organizations enriches
the analytical conclusions I can draw, my findings from the interviews
in the region and from the network analysis itself suggest that govern-
ing party elites in many cases have had a substantial influence over
the other organizations. Especially government bureaucracies are highly
politicized, as I show in Chapter 6. Indeed, despite the inclusion of
other organizations, political elites turn out to be the dominant actors
in decentralization negotiations.
Delineating the relevant sample of organizations

Specifying the boundaries or the complete sample of all relevant actors
in any network is the crucial first step before beginning the analy-
sis. To select the most relevant actors/organizations, I combine several
approaches as suggested by network scholars (Kriesi 1982; Wasserman
and Faust 1994: 33ff.; Marsden 2005; Jansen 2006).
In a first step, I determined the most important decision-making peri-
ods for the issue of decentralization in the two countries I study. This
decisional approach is meant to delineate the relevant actor set by look-
ing at who participated in important events and decisions (Scott 1991:
60). Concerning the question of Istrian autonomy in Croatia, nego-
tiations took place in 2001 when the new constitution and county
statute were adopted. Concerning Vojvodina’s autonomy in Serbia,
negotiations took place between the adoption of the constitution in

2006 and 2009 when the autonomy statute was adopted.3 Negotiations
in Serbia took so long because the central government and national par-
liament hesitated for a long time to process the new statute that was
drafted by the Vojvodina Assembly. In sum, I pre-selected only orga-
nizations that were active in these periods: negotiations on the new
constitutions and self-government statutes in Croatia (2000–2001) and
Serbia (2006–2009). In this preliminary list of actors I only included
those organization that already existed in the decision periods under
consideration.4
In a second step, I followed the nominalist approach that recommends
beginning with a ready-made comprehensive list of relevant actors
before conducting the survey (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 10). I com-
piled a rather comprehensive list aimed at covering all actors who have
had a – formal or informal – role in the deliberations, negotiations
and decisions on decentralization in both countries for the periods
mentioned earlier. My theoretical and research interest were the main
guidelines for this list.
The third step was to double-check with two policy experts in each
country to comment and make adjustments if necessary to this compre-
hensive list. This is a limited kind of snowball sampling or “expanding
selection” for identifying the entire network of interest (Wasserman and
Faust 1994: 10). It has the advantage that also actors that are not obvi-
ously part of the network at first sight can be included, and it is most
suitable in cases where either access to informants is difficult or the
study is explorative with little prior knowledge of the network.5
In the fourth and final step, I used what network scholars call the real-
ist approach to arrive at the final list of organizations that I included
in the formal network analysis. I re-considered the list on the basis
of what other elites and experts had told me in semi-structured inter-
views. In this way I included the reputation of actors according to expert
and elite assessments ex post because the perception of others is very
important for studying interdependent elite relations. I assume that the
reputation of actors is a characteristic that is relatively stable over time.
In this way I could eliminate organizations that proved irrelevant in the
view of experts and elites.
With this mix of different sampling approaches I arrived at a list with
12 organizations for Croatia (seven political parties and five govern-
mental actors) and 19 organizations for Serbia (12 political parties, five
governmental actors and two non-governmental organizations) (refer
to Annex 2 for the full list of organizations). Focusing on the general
reputation of all actors was the best way to delineate the boundaries of
the network – that is, to identify the sample of relevant actors – and
then to make inferences about their relations during the constitutional
and statutory drafting process. This final sample includes organizations
with formal and informal influence in the decision-making process. It is
dominated by political parties and ministries that to a large extent had
a role to play in the formal processes concerned with the adoption of
decentralization reforms (see also Knoke 1993).
Generating relational data

In his seminal study on political networks, Knoke showed how power
relationships are constituted by two dimensions and modes of interac-
tion, namely influence and domination, which affect policy-making and
eventually outcomes. Concerning the first mode of interaction, influ-
ence, he argues that “information exchanges can empower an actor by
giving it access to data on conditions, threats and opportunities” (Knoke
1990: 12). Furthermore, access to information reduces the uncertainty
associated with decentralization reforms.
Domination is the other dimension of power relations mentioned by
Knoke. It is more directly related to the power and prestige of an actor
and equally central to our understanding of social relations. Knoke
defines domination in the Weberian sense as making another actor
do something that he would not do in the absence of credible sanc-
tions. To me this definition is so all-encompassing that it contradicts to
some extent his distinction between influence and domination. One is
tempted to see the tautology in defining power relations with Weber’s
power concept while merely adding an auxiliary aspect of influence. But
what matters more in Knoke’s approach is the indirect nature of power
in most social relations.
To capture the indirect aspects of power, I pay more attention to the
position of an actor vis-à-vis other more powerful actors, namely the
actor’s relative position. In many instances of social life, being close
to someone powerful can be either positive (e.g. having access to their
resources) or negative (e.g. having less bargaining power in the shadow
of an omnipotent actor). That is why I use the measure of centrality and
prestige of actors developed by Bonacich (1987). The Bonacich score
is a very good indicator for the proximity of actors to more powerful
actors who are relevant for strategic cooperation and decision-making.
With regard to relational data, I rely on responses to an elite survey that
I conducted in Serbia and Croatia. I operationalize influence through the
frequency of communication patterns and domination by looking at the
frequency of strategic cooperation among political parties, government

institutions and non-governmental organizations.
To obtain information on these relations between the different orga-
nizations, I conducted an elite survey that incorporated three different
aspects of their relations with others: assessment of other organiza-
tions’ relevance in the process, their information exchange and their
strategic cooperation. I asked respondents to make their assessments
on an ordinal scale from 1 to 2 with 1 = some relevance/information
exchange/strategic cooperation and 2 = strong relevance/information
exchange/strategic cooperation. If respondents deemed there was no
relation or relevance, they were asked to leave the box blank (for
the design of the survey questionnaires, see Schmedes 2008). I gave
this survey to the respondents for filling in after I had conducted a
semi-structured interview.6
With these closed-survey questions I obtained answers from more
than 90 per cent of all these organizations including the most relevant
ones based on their formal authority to influence decision-making on
decentralization reforms.7 On the basis of the additional information
I gathered through the semi-structured interviews, I can say with confi-
dence that most of the organizations that did not respond to my query
turned out to be of negligible importance in the domain of decentraliza-
tion reforms.8 The respondents answered questions on their perception
of influential organizations, their exchange of information with other
organizations and their strategic partners.
Identifying brokers
There are different network metrics that capture which actor serves as an
information broker. Gould and Fernandez (1989) introduced a measure
of relative brokerage that looks at five different kinds of brokerage roles.
I employ their measures for capturing gatekeeping and representation
by measuring the positions in which an actor controls the access from
an outside group to his own group (gatekeeper) or his own group’s access
to an outside group (representative).
When employing network analysis it is relatively easy to identify and
describe existing elite networks. The hard part of the analysis is to estab-
lish the link between different kinds of networks and policy outcomes
(Börzel 1998; Fowler et al. 2011). But this problem is not unique to net-
work analysis. For instance, Geddes’ (1991) seminal study on electoral
patterns and public administration reform also had to connect the elec-
toral considerations of elites with their willingness to adopt meritocratic
recruitment in the public sector. What is more specifically problematic
for network studies is the danger to jump too quickly from description to
causal conclusions. In order to sidestep this pitfall, I carefully use several
network measures together with other methods and data sources to sub-
stantiate the resource-dependent approach of this book and to trace the
entire causal chain of centre–periphery relations. That is, the descriptive
usefulness of network analysis is supported by additional data in order
to identify how these networks matter for outcomes.
What follows are the results on the information exchange between
these different organizations and their strategic cooperation resulting
from my network analysis.
5.3 Information exchange between centre and periphery
While it seems plausible and commonsensical to state that actors and

their social relations matter, scholars often fail to show first how they
matter for policy outcomes and what we can learn from non-existent
relations between actors (Salancik 1995; Börzel 1998). Therefore, we
should pay attention to existing ties between actors as well as explain
why actors do not report ties. Taking relations between actors for
granted is faulty because
[n]ot every interaction-capable actor in a social field communicates,

cooperates or exchanges resources with all others, not every actor
is equally dependent on others and not everyone has the same
influence on everyone else.
(Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 62–63, my translation)
As I show in this section, two measures help us to understand the struc-

ture of networks: centralization and brokerage. First, highly centralized
networks exhibit many missing ties among actors that are not central.
Second, the existence of one or more brokers who bridge the centre–
periphery divide is very important for the creation of trust and the
attainment of binding agreements. In the absence of such brokerage,
which may be caused by different factors, agreement on decentralization
reforms becomes more difficult.
As a first step, it is useful to measure and assess the degree of centraliza-
tion of the information network. Centralization measures whether there
is one central actor through whom all other actors have to go in order
to get access to information (high centralization) or, rather, whether
there is a dispersed network where actors can exchange information
in a decentralized fashion (low centralization). Centralization scores in
general indicate the percentage to which a network is centralized, which
is at the same time the variation of the different centralities of all actors
in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 167ff.). A completely central-
ized network would have a centralization score of 100 per cent, which
means that one single actor constitutes the central hub and all other
actors in the network have to go through this actor to reach others;
that is, the most central actor would also have a 100 per cent centrality
and all others 0 per cent. So, the larger the variation between the most
central actor and all others, the larger the centralization of the network.
For this, I compare the centralization scores for both countries in
terms of communication patterns. Degree centralization is a measure
that looks at the number of relations all actors have among themselves
(Wasserman and Faust 1994: 199). If there is one central actor with many
relations and all others have only few relations, the score is 100 per cent.
In the case that all actors have the same number of relations, the score
is 0 per cent. In both countries, degree centralization is similar: in Serbia
it is 14.05 per cent, whereas in Croatia it is 18.18 per cent. This indicates
that no one central actor dominates all relations.
Another relevant centralization measure is betweenness centralization
(Wasserman and Faust 1994: 200). This measure captures the share of
actors that are similar with regard to their betweenness score or the
extent to which they connect other actors (a maximum value of 100 per
cent means that there is one central actor through whom all informa-
tion has to flow, a minimum of 0 per cent refers to a situation in which
all actors are equally relevant for information flows).9 In the two cases
of Serbia and Croatia, centralization scores of the networks are rela-
tively low (6.54 per cent for Serbia and 4.13 per cent for Croatia). This
indicates that the communication networks are rather fragmented and
disconnected, which increases the importance of brokers that can con-
nect otherwise disconnected actors. But there is no one central actor
around whom the entire network revolves and through whom all other
actors have to go in order to communicate with one another.
Consider now organizations that occupy broker positions as gate-
keepers and representatives. For this I divide the organizations into
three different subgroups (political party, government institution, non-
governmental organization) in order to define an actor’s relations to his
own group and to an outside group. Remember that gatekeepers connect
an outside group to their own group, whereas representatives do the
opposite by connecting their own group to an outside group. If a politi-
cal party has a high gatekeeper score, another group (in this case either
a government institution or a non-governmental organization) can use
this party to gain access to other political parties. In the same way, a
government institution that has the highest representative score serves
as a bridge for other government institutions to connect to political

parties and non-governmental organizations.
I computed the relative brokerage score for all organizations in
the sample in order to identify the most relevant gatekeepers and
representatives.10 Relative brokerage is calculated by dividing the actual
brokerage (1 being a perfect broker and 0 no broker at all) by the
expected values that take into account group sizes.11 Large relative bro-
kerage scores above 1 indicate that actors are serving their broker role
more than expected, whereas low scores indicate that they are serving
their broker role less than expected.12
The brokerage scores for both countries show that (a) organizations
have stronger brokerage roles than we would expect,13 and (b) different
kinds of organizations occupy brokerage positions in the two countries.
Let us first discuss those organizations occupying gatekeeper positions,
namely those channelling information from an outside group to their own
group. Apart from the gatekeeper role of connecting with other kinds
of organizations, brokerage in this case implicitly also encompasses the
relations between centre and periphery because all respondents referred
specifically to the issue of decentralization. Either political parties or
central government institutions have served as gatekeepers that con-
nect the centre to the periphery in the two case studies. In Serbia, the
regional branch of the statewide DS in Vojvodina (DS-VOJV) with a score
of 4.46 was the most important gatekeeper bridging centre and periph-
ery, whereas the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in Croatia with a score
of 3.77 fulfilled this function. This indicates that the relevant SWPs
at the centre in Serbia are directly connected to Vojvodina through
the regional branch of the DS. In other words, the information flow
is channelled through a political party and in this case via the party
elites of the DS. But in Croatia the MOF, a central government insti-
tution, is the most important organization through which information
flows from the centre to Istria. My findings from the interviews and
the limited degree of decentralization support this view: decentraliza-
tion in Croatia has been very limited in scope and mainly concerned
with the devolution of administrative tasks to the regions. At the same
time, no far-reaching fiscal decentralization was introduced which made
financing a key concern for regional authorities and consequently the
MOF a central organization for them (Bajo and Bronić 2005). In turn,
this also shows that there is no political or partisan gatekeeper that
enables information flow from the centre to the periphery.
When we look at the organizations occupying positions of represen-
tatives, we get an idea of the information flow from their own group to
an outside group, that is, in the opposite direction to the gatekeepers.

In the case studies here we observe the reverse situation: in Croatia, the
regionalist political party IDS is the main information broker for infor-
mation leaving Istria (score of 3.23), whereas the regional government
of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (APV-GOV) is the primary
information broker towards the centre (score of 2.68).
In 2008, Bojan Pajtić became the prime minister of Vojvodina and
the head of the provincial government. At the same time, he was vice
president of the DS and presided over the regional branch of the DS in
Vojvodina. This union of being both the regional leader and a senior
figure in the DS Belgrade headquarters gave him large leeway to achieve
a mutually beneficial agreement on asymmetrical decentralization for
Vojvodina.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the findings of the network analysis of commu-
nication ties between the various organizations that form part of the
network. As we can see, the communication patterns in both countries
differ significantly. We see clearly divisions between centre and periph-
ery in Serbia when it comes to political parties, which had the strongest
formal power in negotiations on decentralization. Please pay particular
attention to the organizations serving as representatives (shown as dark
circles) or as gatekeepers (shown as white diamonds).
In the case of Serbia (top part of Figure 5.1), it was the regional DS-
VOJV that was a crucial information gatekeeper between the demands
of regionalist parties in Vojvodina and the other political parties in
the centre. The DS-VOJV has effectively connected the provincial gov-
ernment with other regional parties and their statewide DS that has
constituted the national government since 2008. This is also reflected
by the central position APV-GOV had as a representative that connected
other state institutions with political parties. Organizationally and with
a view to the party’s presidential elections, the DS left its regional branch
more room for manoeuvre compared with most other political parties in
Serbia (Spoerri 2008).
In addition, NSWPs such as the LSV have benefitted from participat-
ing in three out of four national government coalitions since 2000. With
this continuous access to SWPs and state actors in the centre it was
easier to establish good working relations with the centre. This find-
ing corroborates what respondents from the political parties involved
said concerning the period before the adoption of the new autonomy
statute and decentralization in 2009. It was indeed a very small circle
of politicians and elites from the DS and its regional branch who agreed
on the cornerstones of the new autonomy statute. According to a former
114
LSV
DZVM
SNS
SRS
SVM
SERB-GOV
APV-GOV DSS
DS
-V
OJ
MOF
V
MERR
DS
SEIO
G17+
CENREG
MADMIN
SPS
SKGO
LDP
SDP
HSS
ISTRIA-GOV
HDZ
HNS
MADMIN
IDS
CROAT-GOV
HSLS
MOF
LS
MFA
Figure 5.1 Information exchange concerning decentralization

Source: Own data based on interviews and survey. The position of organizations is based on
the spring embedding configuration that puts organizations with the shortest path length
close to one another. The size of the box area next to the organization acronyms indicates
the size of the relative brokerage scores. Representatives are in dark circles and gatekeepers
in white diamonds. For Serbia, I only included the two gatekeepers and representatives with
the highest scores. I used the UCINET software package for compiling these figures.
senior government official from Serbia, a trojka of senior DS individu-

als negotiated an informal agreement on the new autonomy statute:
Dragoslav Petrović (head of the DS in the Vojvodina Assembly), Pajtić
and a senior advisor of President Tadić.14
In the view of this interviewee, governing elites used the autonomy
statute for their own purposes. Pajtić, prime minister and senior DS
politician, instrumentalized the autonomy statute in order to increase
his personal and his party’s credibility vis-à-vis the voters in the periph-
ery. In this reading of the process, the actual content of the statute and
the accompanying Law on Vojvodina’s Competences were secondary to
the political benefits the adoption of a rather symbolical statute tailored
for the benefits of the governing elites. Later developments substantiate
this claim. In 2012, the Constitutional Court deemed that 22 of the pro-
visions in the Law on Vojvodina’s Competences were in breach of the
constitution (Serbian Constitutional Court 2012). Through this land-
mark ruling of the otherwise very weak Constitutional Court it became
apparent that the drafting process of the law was not conducted cau-
tiously with the aim to substantiate the competences of the regional
bodies. Rather, the quick adoption of the law indicates that its symboli-
cal power for governing elites was more important than its contribution
to substantiating the province’s autonomy and to decentralization more
broadly.
Other organizations that brokered information between different
groups did so to a smaller degree. Also, the Ministry of Economy and
Regional Development (MERR) acted as a gatekeeper for information
flows towards other state institutions. Similarly, the MOF was another
representative that channelled information flow from state institutions
to political parties. Both these organizations dealt with financial and
regional development issues that have gained in importance through
the EU integration process and the financial incentives it provides to
subnational units.
In the case of Croatia (bottom part of Figure 5.1), we see that the net-
work is less clearly divided in comparison with Serbia. The IDS and the
liberal statewide HNS serve as representatives. They channel informa-
tion flows to other groups. But the IDS has entertained relations only
with its partners – SDP, HSLS and HNS – during the brief coalition in
the national government between 2000 and 2002. The IDS did not have
any relations with the conservative HDZ that dominated national gov-
ernments for most of the first post-Tuąman decade. Put differently, the
communication pattern indicates that the IDS in the periphery and the
HDZ in the centre did not exchange information during negotiation on
decentralization reforms. This, in turn, has prevented the build-up of

trust that could mitigate the risk of secessionist tendencies associated
with the federal paradox. Concerning state institutions, the MOF acted
as a gatekeeper that channelled information to other state institutions.
This also points to the overemphasis on administrative and limited
scope of fiscal decentralization in Croatia that entails a highly central-
ized financing of public services. That is why many information flows
from political parties were channelled via the MOF to other state entities
during negotiations on decentralization reforms.
Qualitative data collected through interviews supports the widespread
view that the conservative statewide HDZ has used its predominance in
national governments over the past ten years to block any significant
decentralization reform and to reject the granting of regional auton-
omy to Istria or other historical regions. As mentioned earlier, the HDZ
under President Tuąman used a strategy of divide and rule to out-
play regionalist parties and avoid any concession to decentralization
demands.15
On the basis of my data, I find another complementary factor with
regard to information flows. NSWPs from the periphery were only
involved in information exchange networks at the margins. The same
holds true for Istria’s regional government and the dominant Istrian
regionalist party IDS. Moreover, the network is not concentrated in
terms of information flows but rather dispersed, which makes it even
more difficult for actors at the margins to get access to valuable infor-
mation since they do not have any broker to go through. This supports
the claim that NSWPs in Istria faced high uncertainty of decentralization
reforms as they were rather cut-off from overall information flows in the
absence of brokers. Furthermore, the IDS was only once part of a gov-
erning coalition at the national level and left the coalition government
after one year. Owing to an overloaded agenda of the first post-Tuąman
and non-HDZ coalition in Croatia, the question of regional autonomy
and decentralization was sidelined by the other coalition partners. In
Vojvodina, on the other hand, NSWPs benefitted from their access to
the centre via the regional DS-VOJV. With a relatively low level of cen-
tralization of information flows, NSWPs have had several access points
to information.
5.4 Strategic cooperation between centre and periphery
But communication channels are only one part of the narrative. Equally
important are patterns of actual cooperation between actors. How actors
interact with each other and how they perceive their strategic partners
is relevant because they compete for interdependent resources. There-
fore, their perception of how well they cooperate with others indicates
implicitly if they deem other actors as trustworthy. If this were not
the case, they would be likely to deny cooperating with untrustworthy
actors. In addition to asking representatives from organizations their
communication activities, I asked them to assess their strategic coop-
eration with others. This is the operationalization of what I introduced
earlier as Knoke’s domination aspect of power. In order to find out which
actors are the most central cooperation partners, I identify the actors
that are connected to other central actors. This measurement is called
Eigenvector centrality and is similar to a multiplier effect (Bonacich
1987). For instance, a person having an infectious disease has a high
Eigenvector centrality when he or she comes into contact with people
who themselves meet many more other individuals, thus multiplying
the risk of infection. In Figure 5.2 I present the findings.
What is striking is that the most prestigious and central actor (accord-
ing to the Bonacich score) in Serbia was the provincial government
APV-GOV. As you can see on the right-hand side, the DS together with its
regional branch (DS-VOJV) dominated the relations and excluded other
important SWPs such as the nationalist SRS and SNS that did not form
part of their cooperation network (right side of Figure 5.2). Indeed, the
dominance of the DS-VOJV in its relationship with the regionalist LSV
testifies that “it is advantageous to be connected to those who have few
options” (Bonacich quoted in Hughes et al. 2002: 401): without the DS,
the LSV would not have played any significant role in regional politics
because it has been dependent on DS-led pre-electoral platforms to enter
government. This is why the DS could co-opt the regionalist LSV.
For Croatia (see first part of Figure 5.2), we see how the periphery
in Istria is isolated from other central state actors and SWPs. The most
central actor is the statewide SDP that formed a coalition government
at the national level together with the regionalist IDS. While the IDS
dominated the relations in the periphery, it did not cooperate with any
central state institutions. The opposite applies to the statewide HDZ
(at the very top right), which was relatively isolated and confined itself
to interactions with central state institutions.
5.5 Conclusion
Summing up the results from the network analysis in this chapter, the
relations in which political elites and parties – and particularly NSWPs
in the periphery – are embedded tell us something about the possi-

bilities and constraints of decentralization reforms. NSWPs that have
frequent information exchange and cooperation with SWPs have better
chances to overcome the federal paradox and come to an agreement on
decentralization reforms. The closer the working relations are, the bet-
ter the flow of information and the more intensive cooperation patterns
Croatia
MADMIN
MOF
MFA HDZ
CROAT-GOV
SDP ISTRIA-GOV
IDS HNS
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
HSS 15.0
HSLS
10.0
8.3
LS
Figure 5.2 Strategic cooperation concerning decentralization

Source: Own data based on interviews and survey. Those actors with most relations to other
powerful actors serve as brokers and are placed in the centre (using the Bonacich Eigenvector
measure). The size of the box area around or close to the labels of political parties indicates
the share of national parliamentary seats in the period under investigation (Croatia 2001;
Serbia 2008), the height of the box area indicates the number of outgoing relations from
other actors and the width of the box indicates the amount of incoming relations to other
actors. State institutions are represented by squares, political parties by circles and non-state
actors by diamonds. I used the Visone software package for compiling these figures.
Serbia
CENREG LSV
MERR MOF
SKGO
SEIO MADMIN
SVM
SERB-GOV
APV-GOV
DS-VOJV
LDP
12.0
DS
DSS
10.0
8.0
SNS
6.0 SPS
SRS 4.0
G17+
0.5 DZVM
Figure 5.2 (Continued)
become. This, in turn, increases trust between actors in the periph-

ery and in the centre, which reduces the uncertainty associated with
any decentralization reform. But this process is not only about trust.
Repeated interactions and communication ties make it easier for elites
and parties to agree on the distribution of resources that decentralization
reforms entail. This is the second element of the causal chain presented
in this book.
This is even more evident in the analysis of strategic cooperation
patterns in both countries. In Serbia, the provincial government in
Vojvodina together with the regional branch of the DS acted as the most
relevant brokers between powerful actors. The regional branch of the
DS effectively co-opted one of the most important regionalist parties in
the periphery, the LSV. In contrast, in Croatia the central government
remained the most central broker but it did not use this potential to
bridge the divide between centre and periphery. Instead, the conserva-
tive statewide HDZ in the centre and the IDS in the periphery remained
in opposing camps which contributed neither to the build-up of trust
nor to the reduction of uncertainty. They were in a position to decide
on the distribution of critical resources inside their spheres of influence.
In the following chapter, I analyse the most critical resource for elites
and parties: patronage. Patronage resources are essential because they
allow elites and parties to control public administration and maintain
their constituents’ support by rewarding people associated with them.
6
Access to Patronage Resources
This chapter deals with the distribution of patronage resources once

trust has been built within elite networks that in most cases share elec-
toral resources. Patronage is a means for elites to politicize the public
sector and thus gain influence over it. Decentralization reforms create
many new opportunities for appointing people in state institutions at
subnational levels of government. In Serbia, elites in the centre could
be sure of their persistent access to patronage resources in Vojvodina
also after decentralization took place. In Croatia, on the other hand,
patronage resources in Istria were mainly confined to regionalist par-
ties, leaving little incentives for elites in the centre to support more
far-reaching decentralization.
Since 2012, several corruption cases at national and regional levels
have made the headlines in Serbia and Croatia. Some had legal conse-
quences; others remained hearsay but left a bitter aftertaste. In February
2012, the Serbian State Audit Institution pressed criminal charges in
an unprecedented action against 143 public officials who had allegedly
violated rules concerning government expenditure and procurement.
Among these were several former ministers and state secretaries as well
as the president of the regional government together with other senior
politicians from Vojvodina (B92 2012). More than one-third of those
accused were employed in SOEs. Another major case was raised by the
Anti-Corruption Agency in Belgrade that passed charges against the
mayor and the City Council in Novi Sad, Vojvodina’s administrative seat
(Politika 2012). They are said to have failed to prevent major losses to a
private investor amounting to 100 million euros because the city did not
comply with its contractual obligations concerning privatization of the
city’s transport company ATP Vojvodina.1 Instead, the city decided to
concentrate all its support on the other main transport company owned
121
by the city, the JGSP. It was headed by the regionalist politician Branislav
Bogaroški from the LSV. At the regional level, LSV has been the strongest
ally of the DS that constituted the city government in Novi Sad and in
the region of Vojvodina.
In neighbouring Croatia, the largest corruption scandal was linked to
the role of SOEs, too. In 2012, former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader from
the HDZ was found guilty for his abuse of public office. Most accusa-
tions were related to the privatization of the formerly state-owned oil
company INA-MOL and the public gas and electricity providers Plinacro
and HEP. A close affiliate of a state secretary and director of the pri-
vately held marketing company Fimi Media allegedly supported the
extraction of public funds from these SOEs through pre-arranged and
partially fake public tenders (Nacional 2010). In another case in Istria,
the regional administration sold 62 per cent of their shares in the state
company Arena Turist for 2.1 million euros in 2002. Two major figures
in this privatization were Jakovčić, the head of the regionalist party IDS,
and Slavko Linić, then vice prime minister from the SDP. Some years
later, Goldman Sachs bought the same company for 116 million euros.
Despite public debate, no legal examination of the privatization pro-
cess has taken place.2 How can we make sense of all these seemingly
disparate and unconnected stories?
As this chapter shows, political elites and parties have transformed
public sector positions at the regional level into patronage resources. The
politicization of the public sector has spread and is deeply linked to the
decisions and discussions on decentralization reforms. Self-government
and regional autonomy, after all, do not automatically result in better
government. Rather, they have an impact on the incentive structure
both in the periphery and in the centre in terms of the distribution of
critical resources. This entails potential virtues and vices, the prospect
for better government as well as the perils of bad government.
At the regional level, there is a pattern behind such politicization and
the impact it has on the decision of elites to agree on decentralization.
More specifically, patronage resources at the regional level are closely
related to the decision to adopt decentralization reforms. This chapter
examines the spread of patronage at different levels of government and
to what extent elites in the centre and periphery have access to patron-
age resources. The assumption behind this relationship is that elites in
the centre are more likely to support regional autonomy and decentral-
ization reforms if they open up opportunities to dispense patronage to
their affiliates and partisans in the regional bodies gaining new powers.
By the same token, decentralization reforms are less likely, if elites in
Access to Patronage Resources 123
the periphery have an almost exclusive access to patronage resources in

their own region. In that case, national elites cannot be certain of their
share of patronage resources. There is little incentive for national elites
to support decentralization because they cannot be certain that this will
not in the end cement power structures in regional institutions in favour
of peripheral elites and at the expense of their own access to patronage
resources. Being excluded from beneficial patronage practices is likely
to have lasting negative effects on the influence of national elites in
the regions concerned. It is plausible to assume that national elites and
SWPs factor in the likelihood of access to patronage resources when they
make decisions on the devolution of powers to regions.
My empirical analysis unveils a clear pattern: the growth of public
sector employment is most pronounced at the regional level and it
is strongest after decentralization reforms were adopted. This surge in
public sector jobs has opened up opportunities to fill positions with
political appointees. According to expert assessments I collected through
an online survey, political elites and parties in Serbia and Croatia have
made significant use of patronage practices at the regional level through
appointments in SOEs and agencies. But access to patronage resources
has differed in these countries with regard to which elites dominate this
practice. In the two case studies, I find different patterns of elite access to
regional SOEs. While in Serbia statewide elites and parties have had their
share of political appointees in SOEs at the regional level, in Croatia they
have been mostly excluded. These findings corroborate and comple-
ment the electoral data I presented in Chapter 4. Parties’ electoral results
in the past regional-level elections are to a large extent mirrored by
their share of partisan appointees in regional SOEs. Having control over
SOEs allows elites to influence the dispersion of public funds towards
their constituencies. For national elites and SWPs with low electoral
outcomes in regional elections there is very little likelihood of gaug-
ing patronage resources and influencing government spending to their
advantage. This, in turn, reduces their incentives to support decentral-
ization reforms because they are not likely to benefit from additional
patronage resources at the regional level.
In order to analyse this association of patronage practices and decen-
tralization reforms, I first discuss what patronage is and how it relates
to decentralization. In doing this, I highlight the vices and virtues of
both as discussed in the relevant literature. Patronage is mostly dis-
cussed in the literature as a consequence of decentralization and not
as a cause. But access to patronage resources can also be part of a causal
chain that runs in the opposite direction. I argue it is a mechanism that
explains partially why elites decide in favour of or against decentraliza-

tion reforms. I show how public sector employment has consistently
grown stronger at the regional level than at the national level in 2002–
2008 in Serbia and Croatia. In the final two sections, I present original
data that I generated through an expert survey, document analysis and
interviews. This data indicates varying degrees of and motivations for
politicization at different levels of government.
6.1 Access to patronage resources as a causal mechanism
Political appointment of public officials is a common practice in virtu-

ally every democracy. Ruling political parties fill most senior positions
such as heads of department and state secretaries with party affiliates.
This practice remains uncontroversial and publicly acceptable as long
as there is no deeper politicization of public bodies that systematically
and across positions uses political affiliation as the prime selection cri-
terion for employment. In other words, only if the scope of patronage
becomes too large and systemic does it pose a problem to the demo-
cratic functioning of the state.3 If the merits of candidates are not the
main criterion for their selection, public and semi-public bodies become
dominated by patronage which can be associated with less efficient and
effective outcomes of public service provision. Even more problematic
is the undermining of the rule of law according to which all candidates
for public office should be treated equally and only their merits should
be the guiding criterion for employment decisions.
For the purpose of this chapter, I follow the definition of Kopecký and
Mair (2011: 1) who understand patronage as the “power of a party or
parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life”.
In this understanding, patronage is distinct from corruption because
political parties may use it as a legal means to increase their reach
into society and strengthen their control over the policy process. Thus,
patronage is not corruption per se but it can constitute a covert form
of illegitimately influencing public sector recruitment and an abuse of
public resources. In this perspective, patronage resembles what Daniel
Kaufmann calls legal corruption, namely when elites “unduly influ-
ence the rules of the game, shape the institutions, the policies and
regulations and the laws for their own private benefits” (quoted in
Rothstein 2011: 387; see also Kaufmann and Vicente 2011). Taken to
an extreme, patronage undermines the rule of law and hollows out
administrative regulations. In post-socialist transition states, the prob-
lem of patronage is even more deeply engrained in the system than in
more advanced democracies because of the legacy of total domination

off all spheres of society and the state by one political party (Kopecký
2006).
The scholarly literature mainly treats decentralization as one of the
causes of patronage. Decentralization in this view is a process that
increases the opportunities for patronage because it is often associated
with increased public sector employment at lower levels of government
and more fragmented policy-making and implementation with larger
discretion for recruitment of public sector employees (Treisman 2007).
Since the 1970s, we have been witnessing an on-going and increasing
global trend towards decentralization of administrative, fiscal and polit-
ical powers to subnational levels of government (Tarrow et al. 1978;
Keating 1988; Le Galès and Lequesne 1998). This global trend has been
even more pronounced in transition societies in Eastern Europe where
democratization has often been linked to decentralizing powers so as to
avoid a return to excessively centralized policy-making (Hooghe et al.
2010). Yet this chapter adopts another perspective. I argue that elites
and political parties at the national level factor in their expected access
to patronage resources at the regional level when they make decisions
on decentralization reforms. That is, I treat patronage as a causal mech-
anism that partially explains the degree of decentralization (O’Dwyer
2006a). Considering the expected access to patronage resources in this
view precedes the actual decision to support or to block decentralization
reforms.4
Let us now first consider the vices and virtues of both decentralization
and patronage that are discussed in the literature. As briefly outlined in
Chapter 1, very different views exist on the potential advantages and pit-
falls of decentralization reforms. On the one hand, the optimists claim
that decentralization has significant virtues: it leads to higher alloca-
tive efficiency (Oates 1972), supports the development of a modern and
efficient public administration (Shah and Gurgur 2005; Shah 2006) and
increases democratic participation rights and opportunities for differ-
ent citizen groups (Lijphart 1999). What is common to this camp is the
belief in the “promise of good governance” that decentralization entails
(Grindle 2007).
In contrast, the scholarship on corruption and decentralization
emphasises that decentralization fosters corrupt behaviour and lists
all of its potential vices. We may call this group of scholars the pes-
simists who believe that decentralized governance is often associated
with excessive growth of the public sector and highly fragmented and
opaque structures, which are susceptible to the spread of corruption
(Treisman 2007). Another rather gloomy finding comes from research

that stresses the prevalence of undersupply of public goods in het-
erogeneous societies and the association of exclusive social networks
with corruption (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Grießhaber and Geys 2011).
As decentralization reforms are often used to mitigate socio-ethnic cleav-
ages in multi-ethnic societies, ill-designed decentralization reforms can
indeed impede the effective and impartial delivery of public goods at
regional and local levels.
There is no clear empirical support that either of these two camps (pes-
simists vs. optimists) is entirely right.5 As often the case, the implications
of decentralization reforms depend very much on the specific coun-
try context and socio-political environment. One thing we can learn
from the scholarly dissent is that decentralization is empirically associ-
ated with costs that “are more certain than its benefits” (Prud’homme
1995: 218). That is why I would rather side with the pessimists because
the unprecedented support for decentralization reforms worldwide has
yielded very mixed results. What has become a Western donor obses-
sion of decentralization as the perfect conflict resolution tool for civil
conflicts and panacea for fostering local economic development in
developing countries is, if at all, a mixed blessing (Brancati 2009). One
of the reasons that the track record is ambiguous relates to the role of
elites and parties and the discretion they have for informal practices that
are invisible to most citizens. Wibbels (2006: 168) reminds us that overly
optimistic assumptions about the benefits of decentralization ignore the
more complex reality: “decentralized politicians have been less benev-
olent than hoped, and voters appear less informed about the public
goods provided by different levels of government than the normative
tradition had implied”. As I show, political elites are very much aware
of the opportunities and risks associated with decentralization reforms.
That is why national elites and parties anticipate their access to patron-
age resources at the regional level when deciding on decentralization
reforms. If they are not likely to have such access, there is little incen-
tive to support decentralization reforms that will only strengthen the
stronghold of regionalist parties in the periphery.
For understanding the linkage between patronage and decentraliza-
tion, this chapter contains a brief discussion of the vices and virtues of
patronage. Let us begin with the potential advantages or virtues. While
at first sight patronage practices are closely associated with corruption
and abuse of public office and resources, they can at the same time serve
as a means to control policy-making. Earlier work on public adminis-
tration assumed that controlling policy-making through patronage is
mainly a phenomenon of industrialized countries and not so much of

developing and transition societies (Peters and Pierre 2004: 2). But we
should not underestimate the need to also employ informal means to
draft and implement policies in transition societies. For instance, when
liberally minded political elites hold public office, they have to make
and implement policies in a context in which the old elites and officials
from the previous regime dominate the public sector. In order to this,
liberal elites have to rely on informal channels and practices (Kopecký
and Spirova 2011).6
Despite the negative connotations of patronage as being only asso-
ciated with corruption and economic underdevelopment, patronage is
at the same time a critical organizational resource of political parties for
furthering their agenda, policy preferences and governmental objectives
(Kristinsson 1996; Ware 1996; Kopecký and Scherlis 2008). In studies on
advanced Western democracies this approach is more prominent, but it
is also valid for Eastern European transition states.
A second virtue of patronage relates to its function of employment
generation. In post-socialist states with high unemployment rates, pub-
lic sector employment is an important instrument for political parties
to maintain social peace and welfare in economically difficult times
(Vanhuysse 2009; Avlijas and Uvalić 2011).7 Even more importantly, in
such situations the government is an important provider of employ-
ment at the regional and local level given the lack of private sector jobs
(Chubb 1982: 225). For many young people in Serbia, for instance, the
main motivation for joining a political party is the prospect of a bet-
ter and more secure job (Danas 2012). The main problem with this job
creation machine is that it is not sustainable. If the public sector rises
without having the factual need for new employees, the inefficient use
of public funds will soon lead to fiscal deficits. Thus, any artificial growth
of the public sector – following a partisan rather than a public manage-
ment logic – can only last for a limited period of time. In the worst
case, excessive growth of public employment becomes part of a political
machine that converts “the products of public authority into rewards
for the faithful” party affiliates (Johnston 1979: 385).8 The current eco-
nomic and financial crisis in southern Europe amply demonstrates the
consequences of bloated public sectors.
Let us now turn to the vices of patronage. As mentioned at the
beginning, systemic and large-scale patronage undercuts the rule of law
because it does not treat all candidates for public sector jobs equally
and often breaches formally adopted regulations for public recruitment.
As a consequence, the public sector is not filled with people who are
most qualified for the position and becomes less effective and less effi-
cient in the conduct of policy-making and provision of public services.
Thus, patronage can undermine the democratic functioning of the state
because it violates impartiality, which is a guiding and legitimizing norm
of democracy (Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 170). Moreover, we have
good reason to believe that public sector performance suffers under high
politicization (Kaufmann et al. 2002). When comparing the potential
implications of patronage with those of decentralization that I have
discussed in this section, we get a very ambiguous picture of the posi-
tive and negative aspects of decentralization. In the worst-case scenario,
we see the severe and negative implications when the vices of patron-
age and decentralization are combined: low quality of governance and
democracy with an inefficient and wasteful public sector. As I show in
the remainder of this chapter, Serbia and Croatia follow mostly that
pattern.
With regard to the study of patronage itself, the relevant literature
identifies several challenges. Despite the significance of patronage for
understanding politics in post-socialist countries, researchers are strug-
gling to come to terms with this phenomenon because of conceptual,
empirical and methodological challenges that all have repercussions for
research design and data collection (Kopecký 2006: 258).
Conceptually, most patronage studies take it for granted that there is
only one set of (formal and informal) rules of the game in a given state.
Yet this ignores the strong empirical variance within states that we can
observe. Are the mechanisms of corruption in Milan and in Palermo
the same? Why is it that clientelism seems to be much more spread in
Southern Spain than in the Basque Country? This variation is central
particularly in transition societies where democratic reforms have to be
anchored and implemented at the regional and local level in order to be
durable (Hughes et al. 2002).
The same applies to patronage practices and empirical challenges.
Patronage practices differ both across and within countries (Hale 2007).
The Balkan states are a critical case because ethnic aspects play into
politics. Even though the legal framework is the same, socio-economic
practices and developments in the coastal area of Croatia differ from
those in the eastern part. Similarly, the functioning of the state in the
north of Serbia is very different from that in the south. Only with
more empirically firm analyses on the subnational level can we grasp
the entire causal chain of how patronage unfolds within the context
of ever-more decentralized governance. We do not have many studies
that analyse how the prospect of gaining additional patronage resources
at the regional level may induce decentralization reforms. O’Dwyer’s

(2006b) impressive work on Central and Eastern Europe is a notable
exception to this. That is why we are in dire need for more empirical
data that captures developments below the national level.
Methodologically, we are still far away from a satisfactory measurement
of patronage. Concerning corruption research, a related field, we still
have to rely largely on perception-based indicators as they remain the
easiest ones to collect for cross-country studies. Still, these are almost
entirely generated at the national level and often do not tell us enough
about informal practices (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). Some recent and excit-
ing research projects are expanding data availability to the subnational
level (Quality of Government Institute 2010). We should build on these
new datasets and complement perception-based data with additional
information from case studies that would allow us to tell in-depth nar-
ratives and unveil causal mechanisms. One promising way to limit the
potential downsides of perception-based measurements is to triangulate
many different and original data sources so that we can accurately anal-
yse the nature, extent and rationale for patronage and its relation with
decentralization reforms (Olken 2009).
Against this background, this chapter contributes to the debate by first
providing original micro-level data and suggestions for further empirical
work on patronage itself. In a second step, I use this data to trace how
patronage resources became a strategic consideration for elites and polit-
ical parties when they decided on decentralization reforms. My focused
paired comparison of two post-socialist states in the Balkans has the
added value of providing a very detailed account of the inner workings
of patronage. What are the motivations of political parties to politicize
the public sector? What kind of organizational types are most prone to
patronage? How can we measure the extent of patronage at different lev-
els of government? I unveil the mechanisms that help to answer these
questions through original data from an expert survey, government
sources and document analysis.
In many transition countries, political parties and elites have contin-
uously increased their reach into societies. While this may be seen as a
legacy of socialist authoritarian one-party systems, the mechanisms by
which societies are politicized during democratization differ with regard
to one essential aspect: in most democracies, patronage resources have
to be distributed among several political parties. There is no one single
party holding an undisputed monopoly over the allocation of patron-
age. In other words, elites and political parties do not only compete
for electoral gains, they are also in competition for the distribution of
patronage (Geddes 1991; O’Dwyer 2006b). In a context where patron-

age is a widespread practice, it is even more valid that “[n]o politician in
competition with others engaged in trading jobs and favors for votes can
afford unilaterally to eschew reliance on patronage” (Geddes 1991: 375).
Political parties seek to maintain and extend their power base by
appointing people affiliated to them for positions in public adminis-
tration and SOEs. Opportunities to do so abound: privatization, the
creation of new institutions and other reforms offer ample possibili-
ties to foster further politicization and increase the control of political
parties.
A particularly good example for this is decentralization because it is
often accompanied by a growth of public administration and new allo-
cations of power across different levels of government. Both increase the
opportunities to inject new personnel into the system that is loyal to
political parties and their elites. The question here is how exactly decen-
tralization and patronage are linked. Poland, another post-socialist state
in Eastern Europe, is a prime example where we see how political parties
abused partisan bargaining over decentralization reforms for their own
gains by maximizing patronage and bloating public sector employment
(O’Dwyer 2004).
The next section provides original empirical data on patronage at dif-
ferent levels of government in Serbia and Croatia. It highlights the need
to include the subnational level and to resort to different sources for
grasping the whole chain of patronage, why political parties engage in
it and where it is most pronounced.
6.2 The extent of patronage in Serbia and Croatia
Patronage as an instrument for political parties is most easily used

where politicians have plenty of opportunities to appoint public sec-
tor employees. As O’Dwyer (2006b) forcefully shows, large increases in
public sector employment in post-socialist Eastern Europe are often not
associated with more effective governance. In other words, the potential
for patronage resources is larger where the public sector grows, and both
factors are likely to be associated. That is, one indication of patronage
is a quantitative surge of employment figures in the public sector.9 We
should therefore first look at the development of government size over
time. When looking at Figure 6.1, we see a surprising pattern: stagna-
tion of public employment growth at the national level and an increase
of public employment growth at the regional level. During the period
2001–2004, public employment has steadily grown; it grew significantly
80
60
% Growth
40
20
0
National Regional Regional National Regional
(total) (Istria) (Vojvodina)
Croatia Serbia
Figure 6.1 Growth of employment in public administration at national and

regional levels
Source: Own compilation based on data for the period 2002–2008, from the International
Labour Organization, the AP Vojvodina Department for Human Resources, Bajo (2009) and
the Croatian Ministry of Finance. As Vojvodina is the only region in Serbia with a regional
government and administration, there are no figures for other regions.
more at the regional level than at the national level in both Serbia and
Croatia.
From 2002 to 2003, public sector employment in Vojvodina’s admin-
istration more than doubled (from 200 to 470 employees). This occurred
after the Omnibus Law was passed in 2002 that restored parts of
Vojvodina’s autonomy and decentralized competences in education and
culture to the province. While this indicates that there was some need
for additional staff to cope with new tasks, the growth was excessive and
persisted at lower levels over the following two years with around 15 per
cent. In Istria, on the other hand, the strongest public sector growth
took place during the period 2007–2008 although no prior decentral-
ization reform would have justified such an increase of 31 per cent.
Istria is not the only region/county that has witnessed such substan-
tial growth. On average, public employment rose by 27.8 per cent in
the period 2007–2011 in all 20 Croatian županije (Franić 2012).10 One
can plausibly assume that the increase that followed the regional elec-
tions in 2005 and national elections in 2007 was at least partly based
on partisan considerations and less so on the need for more efficient

administration.
At the national level, it is not too surprising that public employment
stagnated. Following austerity measures by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in the past and the monitoring by the European Com-
mission for preparing EU accession, governments in both states were
constrained in their fiscal spending (Bartlett 2008). What is more sur-
prising is the surge of public sector employment at the regional level.
Figure 6.1 shows that particularly in Croatia there was a doubling of
employment growth in the regional administration. The same holds
true for the Istrian županija where figures have doubled since 2001.
Interestingly, in the past decade mostly administrative powers and no
veritable political powers were devolved to the regional level in Croatia.
In the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, we observe a less stark
increase in the number of public employees.
To sum up, the data presented in Figure 6.1 illustrates the stark varia-
tion between national and regional levels in terms of rising public sector
employment for the period 2002–2008. In Croatia, the rise in public
sector employment at the regional level was almost 14 times higher
than at the national level; in Serbia it was almost eight times higher
in percentage points.
While these figures serve as a rough illustration of the growing patron-
age resources at the regional level, we need more data in order to make
inferences about whether this increase in public employment is associ-
ated with more patronage. That is why I conducted an expert survey
on the degree of politicization in the public sector in both countries.
While expert surveys possess the same downsides that are typical for
all perception-based surveys, they can help us to explore trends and ten-
dencies of the ways in which political parties influence the public sector.
As such, the expert survey serves to explore the extent of patronage,
where it is most prevalent and what the underlying mechanism is.
6.3 Methodological note
Specifically for this chapter, I designed and implemented an expert

online survey. Sampling is an inherent problem in the conduct of expert
surveys. Many critics point to the potential systematic bias of conve-
nience sampling. For mitigating this risk, I follow the suggestions of
Laver and Hunt (1992) and turned to professional directories of experts
working on public administration and decentralization. I first searched
for experts in the databases of the Network of Institutes and Schools
of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) and

the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI). Care-
ful attention was necessary to identify those experts who have worked
on public administration and decentralization in both countries. Entries
that stated too broad a variety of fields of expertise were discarded.
However, these databases neglect many academics from the respective
countries who are often only to a small extent affiliated to European
networks. That is why, in a second step, I pursued snowball sampling by
asking two recognized researchers and practitioners in each country to
suggest other experts working in these fields. In addition to these refer-
rals, I searched for experts and academics with a view to participation
in workshops and conferences as well as publications. For this, I also
looked up the activities and staff members of relevant institutes such
as the Institute for Public Administration in Zagreb and the Regional
Centre for Public Administration Reform (RCPAR) established by the
United Nations Development Programme in Bratislava. I sent an invi-
tation to 146 experts in Croatia and Serbia. The net response rate was
55 per cent (81 out of 146) while the share of those who completed the
entire questionnaire was 36 per cent.11 The remainder of this section will
show the results from this survey concerning the scope of patronage and
the motivations of political parties to politicize the public sector.
In addition to this expert survey, I searched for publicly available
information on the Internet on the political affiliation of senior man-
agement and the members of supervisory and executive committees in
24 regional SOEs. Taken together, I searched for the political affiliation
of 151 individuals of which 65 turned out to be members of political
parties. This data is a proxy for the degree of politicization in SOEs that,
according to the results of the expert survey, is most pronounced at the
regional level. Descriptive statistics that test the reliability of the experts’
answers and shows that there are no systematic differences based on
respondent attributes can be found in Annex 3.
6.4 Expert survey results
It is interesting to compare expert responses with the quantitative data

on public employment growth I presented in the previous section. This
way we get an impression of the relation between replicable numerical
data and expert perceptions (Figure 6.2).
As we can see, strong partisan influence on public sector recruitment
appears to have increased on average in both regions from 2000 to
2011. Put differently, the quantitative growth of public employment
Vojvodina (Serbia)
80%
Share of responses
60%
40%
20%
0%
2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2011
Little influence Some influence Strong influence
Regional level (Croatia)

80%
Share of responses
60%
40%
20%
0%
2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2011
Little influence Some influence Strong influence
Figure 6.2 Expert assessment of the partisan influence in regional public sector
recruitment
Source: Own compilation. Total number of respondents: Serbia, n = 12; and Croatia, n = 26.
Experts were asked to give their assessment of the extent to which political parties have
influenced public sector recruitment in the listed periods. For Croatia, the responses relate to
the entire regional/county level and not only to Istria. It was difficult to find enough experts
with sufficient expertize on this particular region.
numbers has been accompanied by growing partisan influence on the

recruitment to the public sector. Let me now briefly compare this expert
assessment with the quantitative surge in public sector jobs that I pre-
sented in Section 6.2. In both Serbia and Croatia, public employment
has steadily grown during the period 2001–2004. It grew significantly
more at the regional level than at the national level. In Vojvodina, pub-
lic sector employment more than doubled within one year from 2002 to
2003. In Istria, the strongest growth in public sector employment (31 per
cent) occurred between 2007 and 2008. How do these numbers compare
with the expert assessments?
In Vojvodina, the periods 2000–2004 and 2008–2011 seem to have
been dominated most by partisan recruitment practices according
to experts. Both expert estimates and growth figures indicate that
the period 2002–2004 deserves closer attention. As I mentioned, the
Omnibus Law was passed in 2002 which assigned more competencies
to the regional government in education and cultural policy. Given this
very limited degree of decentralized powers, it is not plausible to assume
that the entire job growth in the public sector during this period was
due to the need for more staff to execute and administer the new pow-
ers. This lends more weight to the expert judgements that this period
was marked by partisan recruitment, especially since 16 political parties
(all members of DOS) constituted the regional government in Vojvodina
in that period. Many different party interests had to be accommodated,
also with a view to the distribution of patronage resources. But how
to make sense of the fact that public job growth did not increase as
much in 2009 when a decentralization reform established a new auton-
omy statute for Vojvodina? Two reasons come to mind. First, the fact
that job growth was less strong does not mean it became less politi-
cized. It could as well be that partisan influence was simply constrained
to fewer but potentially more senior positions. Second, a related reason
could be fiscal constraints. In early 2009, the Serbian government agreed
on a Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF in which fiscal restraint was
included as part of the conditionality package. In other words, even if
governing elites wanted to expand the public sector, they were severely
hindered by fiscal constraints.
Another aspect from Figure 6.2 that is in need of clarification relates
to the decrease of strong politicization during the period 2004–2008 in
Serbia. This period was largely dominated by the DSS government of
then Prime Minister Koštunica. He became prime minister in 2003 and
was ousted by a coalition around the reform-party DS who set up a
minority government in 2008. During his tenure the decentralization
process and shift of powers to Vojvodina was partially taken back. A law
passed in 2005 enabled the central government to suspend regulations
and statutes adopted by the Vojvodina government. This might partly
explain why politicization of public sector recruitment halted in this
period. The discretion of the governing parties and the regional gov-
ernment in Vojvodina led by the DS was curtailed because the central
government enhanced its supervision over regional affairs; Koštunica
was generally reluctant to accept any significant decentralization reform

with a view to the continuous tensions with the breakaway province
Kosovo in the south.
In Croatia, the majority of the surveyed experts believe that politi-
cal parties have increasingly had a strong influence on the recruitment
in the županija administrations from 2000 to 2011. Together with
the figures on public employment growth that peaked at 31 per cent
in the period 2007–2008, partisan recruitment and public job expan-
sion were both most pronounced in 2007–2008. Again, as in Serbia,
patronage-driven growth of the public sector occurred after limited
decentralization reforms had been adopted. With regard to administra-
tive decentralization – the most pronounced expression of decentral-
ization in the Croatian unitary state – major reforms were adopted in
the period 2001–2003 during the Račan government that also encom-
passed the regionalist IDS who forcefully pursued a decentralization
agenda. Why did the public sector grow only four years after adminis-
trative decentralization reforms had been adopted? Here, three reasons
come to mind. First, after the 2003 national parliamentary elections
the previously omnipotent conservative HDZ returned to power and
remained the strongest political force at the national level until 2011.
Given the strong centralist approach of the HDZ, it was very difficult
for the regionalist IDS and Istrian administration to obtain the neces-
sary resources for more public sector employees. Second, the IDS had
to accommodate increasingly the interests of other political parties at
the regional level. In Istria, the dominance of the IDS continued, albeit
with decreasing electoral results in regional elections: their vote share
was 50 per cent in 2001, 42 per cent in 2005 and 45 per cent in 2009
when, for the first time, the IDS had to enter a coalition government
at the regional level together with the liberal HNS. The relative increase
of the number of political parties with significant representation in the
regional bodies could be associated with more partisan recruitment of
public sector employees. More parties wanted to have a “fair” slice of
the cake, here constituted by patronage resources. Third, the Croatian
government, like the Serbian, had to face budgetary constraints in the
years 2003 and 2004 that were under the conditionality of IMF Stand-
By Arrangements. This also limited the fiscal resources for increasing the
number of public sector jobs at the regional level.
In sum, expert judgements suggest that we can expect patronage as
the de facto default option for political parties in Serbia and Croatia.
Limited administrative decentralization in the domain of education and
health policies occurred in Croatia during the period 2001–2003. Parts of
the earlier public sector growth can thus be explained by more adminis-
trative implementation tasks at the regional level. Yet the strongest hike
in public sector expansion in Istria occurred between 2007 and 2008.
In that period, no substantial decentralization of powers took place that
would justify growing public employment. In Serbia, strong partisan
influence on public sector recruitment prevailed at the beginning and at
the end of the first decade of democratic politics in Serbia. In both these
periods, decentralization reforms that gave more discretionary powers
to the regional assembly and government in Vojvodina were enacted.
From the discussion on both the quantitative and perception-based
data, we can conclude that in Vojvodina the extent of patronage prac-
tices was strongly linked to decentralization reforms. In Istria, patronage
appears to have expanded also in the absence of veritable decentraliza-
tion reforms towards the end of the decade. Therefore, we can exclude
that decentralization reforms and related functional necessities were the
only drivers of growing public employment at the regional level. Rather,
it is plausible to infer that the surge of public sector employment was
driven by partisan logic.12
Within the resource-dependent approach of this book this forms part
of the causal mechanism explicated in Section 2.2: elites in the centre
anticipate their access to future patronage resources when deciding on
decentralization reforms. On the other hand, when elites in the centre
do not expect to gain access to patronage resources through a compre-
hensive decentralization reform, they are not likely to support it. In this
case, the regional elites can consolidate their stronghold through the
extension of patronage practices. On the basis of the assumption of
rational elites, my resource-dependent approach is consistent with the
findings presented thus far. If we assume that rational elites compete
for interdependent resources, it is not very likely that patronage is an
accidental epiphenomenon of decentralization reforms. Rather, rational
elites anticipate their access to patronage resources.
Patronage across different levels of government

Let me now put the extent of politicization in the greater context of
the entire country. How does the extent of a partisan regional pub-
lic sector compare with the national and local levels of government?
As I mentioned at the beginning, patronage is problematic in terms
of democratic standards and effectiveness if its scope or extent is very
high. In the survey, a significant number of experts believe that patron-
age is widespread and most pronounced at subnational levels. What also
emerges is the stronger prevalence of patronage in Serbia compared with
that in Croatia. One reason for this could be that Vojvodina had large
multi-party coalitions that increased the number of parties that had to
be considered in the distribution of patronage resources. In Istria, in
contrast, regionalist IDS monopolized the distribution of patronage and
hence other parties did not have to be considered to the same extent.
I substantiate this issue by analysing patronage patterns in SOEs in
Section 6.5.
The further we move down to subnational levels of government, the
larger the share of politicized public sector employees appears to be.
This supports the notion that the more decentralized and fragmented
political systems become, the more plentiful are the opportunities for
patronage practices. In other words, we see some indicative proof for the
vices of patronage and decentralization when clear accountability struc-
tures are missing. I will discuss this lack of accountability regulations
in more detail in the next section. These expert judgements concerning
the high politicization of the public sector at regional and local levels
resound well with survey findings on citizen trust in political institu-
tions. In South-Eastern Europe and Turkey, regional governments are
the least trusted state institutions (EBRD 2011: 44). Citizens perceive
public sector employees to be susceptible to bribes, which is the main
factor that reduces public trust in regional governments. While corrup-
tion is not the same as patronage, I already equated patronage to “legal
corruption” that is present when elites unduly influence the implemen-
tation of state regulations on public sector recruitment (Kaufmann and
Vicente 2011). Such undue influence is likely to be associated with citi-
zen perceptions of bribery because officials installed in the public sector
by the grace of political elites enjoy protection from their patrons even
when they are corrupt.
At this point we should remember that Offe’s (1991) dilemma of
simultaneity applied to the Balkans does not constitute a triple but
rather a quadruple transition that requires drastic changes in different
fields of society at the same time: transition to a democratic political sys-
tem, to a full market economy and to new arrangements for dealing with
questions of nationalities and statehood (Kuzio 2001). Related phenom-
ena are the relatively weak civil society and low social capital resulting
from the civil wars and the great human and socio-economic losses from
the 1990s (Gligorov et al. 1999; Fagan 2010). In this setting, political
elites and parties are perceived to be the sole beneficiaries of the new
democratic system, and elites at the regional level are closer to the every-
day experience of citizens. Hence, citizen’s frustration is channelled first
to those elites and parties closest to their daily lives.
Motivations for patronage

An important aspect to consider is the motivation of political parties
to provide patronage. In order to uncover the underlying rationale
for patronage we should first try to identify the main driving forces.
Figure 6.3 reveals the expert assessment of the different rationales for
resorting to patronage. Rewarding political loyalty is the prime reason
for political parties to influence public sector employment in Serbia and
Croatia. Yet the second strongest rationale according to expert assess-
ments is the control over policy-making. We have thus some evidence
that patronage is not only about clientelistic reward for loyal support-
ers, but to a lesser extent also a means to increase the grip over the
policy process. This finding supports the argument from the literature
on cartel parties that emphasises the need for political parties to control
policy-making (Katz and Mair 1995).
Another intuitive finding is that benefits to family members or the
same ethnic group are more relevant at regional and local levels than
at the national level. Again, this speaks to the argument that close-
knit communities provide fertile ground for patronage (Peters 2006)
(Figure 6.3).
Until now we have only looked at aggregate levels of the entire pub-
lic sector. However, the notion of public sector is very broad. It covers
Regional/ethnic favouritism
Croatia
Benefits to family & friends

Control public policies
Reward political loyalty
Regional/ethnic favouritism
Serbia
Benefits to family & friends

Control public policies
Reward political loyalty
0 10 20 30
Frequency of responses
National Regional Local
Figure 6.3 Expert assessment of the motivation for political parties to use
patronage in Serbia and Croatia
Source: Own compilation. What we see here is the frequency of experts who answered for
the four different items shown above with “Almost always” (What do you think is the primary
motivation for political parties to influence the recruitment of public sector employees?). Total num-
ber of respondents: Serbia, n = 29; and Croatia, n = 50. To give an overview of all levels of
government, I also included the local level.
both general government (public administration including agencies and

military forces are not included) and SOEs. If we want to know more
about the inner mechanism of patronage, we have to dig deeper. The
next section explores which parts of the public sector are most prone
to patronage. It elaborates why we should focus more on SOEs in
post-socialist states.
6.5 The politicization of SOEs and government funds
Party patronage is the key mechanism to “colonise” the state appara-

tus (Panebianco 1988: 13). That is one of the reasons why large parts
of the literature concentrate solely on the state administration as the
central domain for patronage. Yet researchers should not neglect other
parts of the public sector. We should not forget that patronage consti-
tutes the “power of a party to appoint people to positions in public and
semi-public spheres” (Kopecký and Mair 2006: 1, my italics). It is very
important to also include quasi-governmental organizations and other
state-controlled institutions and companies whose significance for pol-
icy formulation, implementation and regulation is on the rise (Spirova
et al. 2007: 9).
In this section, I describe why SOEs at the regional level were impor-
tant venues for elite access to patronage resources. By providing original
micro-level data on partisan appointments to the executive and super-
visory bodies of SOEs, I show varying patterns of patronage. In Istria,
the regionalist IDS has monopolized the distribution of patronage,
while the statewide DS has been dominant in dispersing patronage in
Vojvodina.
The findings from the expert survey indicate that SOEs are indeed
highly susceptible to patronage (see Figure 6.4), just like the anecdotal
evidence at the beginning of this chapter suggested. While we have seen
on average a decline or stagnation of public sector employees in gen-
eral government, employment figures at the subnational level and here
especially in SOEs have been on the rise. This holds true despite the
overall trend to privatize large national SOEs. As Falleti (2010) reminds
us, we should consider the socio-economic context in which decentral-
ization reforms take place. For transition economies in the Balkans, the
context is one of radical overhaul of the economic system towards a
liberal market economy (Bartlett 2008). The privatization of SOEs has
been a key feature of this process and was strongly advocated by inter-
national and European institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and
the European Commission. But the privatization process was neither
strategically conducted nor successful. It was rather ad-hoc and often

associated with large losses to social welfare and lacked proper par-
liamentary oversight (Anti-Corruption Council 2003; Čučković et al.
2011).13 In Serbia, the process began in the early 1990s but was reversed
by the Milošević regime that monopolized the process in order to award
their supporters and strengthen clientelistic networks (Cohen 2001).
Only after 2001, the privatization process was resumed. In addition,
many companies persist where the state holds shares and thus can influ-
ence company actions. Particularly in Croatia, the government has kept
hold of its shares in many companies (Bartlett 2008: 65).
In post-communist states where the politicization of the public sector
is generally relatively high, we observe “that ownership rights were more
closely linked to political patronage”, when compared with states with
more successful de-politicization reforms (Milanović et al. 2008: 3). And
according to the expert assessments from the survey I conducted, SOEs
seem to be most prone to politicization. Figure 6.4 indicates that across
different levels of government the recruitment of employees based
on political affiliations is most frequent in SOEs. Overall, government
agencies come second with public administration only in the third place
in terms of politicized appointment practices. Indeed, this underscores
the current tendency in emerging economies in which state companies
Government agencies
Croatia
SOEs
Public administration
Government agencies
Serbia
SOEs
Public administration
0 4 8 12 16
Frequency of responses
National Regional Local
Figure 6.4 Expert assessment of organizational types that are most prone to
patronage in Serbia and Croatia
Source: Own compilation. Number of experts who answered for the three different items
shown above with “Almost always” (In what kind of organization is recruitment of employees
based on political affiliations most frequent?). Total number of respondents: Serbia, n = 14; and
Croatia, n = 16.
constitute “great sources of jobs and patronage” (The Economist 2012).

For transition states, earlier studies have also identified SOEs and their
privatization as major resources for political elites (Stark 1992; Bićanić
1993; Anti-Corruption Council 2003; Schoenman 2005; Schwartz 2006;
CPES 2010) (Figure 6.4).
While the share of public ownership in SOEs is mostly around or
below 50 per cent, this still provides ample opportunities for political
parties to appoint their affiliates to senior positions because the govern-
ment has a say in senior positions when it is a minority shareholder.
It is important to include also companies where the state is a minority
shareholder. The expert assessments show the necessity to closer exam-
ine SOEs but it remains a perception-based judgement that cannot tell
us the whole narrative about actual practices. Despite widespread use
of surveys for various corruption indices from the World Bank (Gover-
nance Indicators) or Transparency International, perceptions alone are
no reliable proxies for measuring actual practices.
When it comes to measuring practices, we face methodological chal-
lenges. It is no surprise that only very few studies try to overcome
this obstacle. Both country and language expertise and legal–technical
knowledge are necessary in order to collect meaningful data on the
political affiliations of SOE employees. A few impressive studies from
the countries themselves indicate how worthwhile such an endeavour
is (Pešić 2007; CPES 2010). They point to the problem of partitoc-
racy in Serbia. According to their analyses, political elites have secured
their influence over state institutions, in particular SOEs, and have been
prone to allow state capture by economic elites.
Anecdotal and piecemeal evidence abounds. In both Serbia and
Croatia, the news has been filled with stories on SOEs and their
politicization. In Serbia, it is an acknowledged fact that SOEs have con-
tinued to be highly politicized despite the democratic reforms enacted
since 2000. Even high-ranking members of the ruling DS recognize
openly that there is a pressing need to curb the widespread politi-
cization of SOEs.14 Interestingly, this occurred after the same party
had been in government for over three years. Indeed, the OECD con-
firms this view and underscores how political parties have used public
agencies and SOEs “to foster patronage networks” in Serbia (OECD
2009: 2).15
Apart from the anecdotal evidence presented at the beginning of
this chapter, we also have some more reliable and systematic data.
In Croatia, we can observe a strong rise of employment figures, for
instance, in public utility companies. These companies in Croatia
employed almost 30,000 persons in 2007. The capital Zagreb is a case in

point: employment in the holding that comprises all public utilities rose
by 14.2 per cent between 2005 and 2008, and more than 20,000 employ-
ees provided public services in that period (Bajo 2009: 6). Again, there
is a stark contrast between stagnation and even decline at the national
level, and growth of public sector at the subnational level. Clearly, this
does not automatically mean that only patronage accounts for all of this
growth, but it is plausible to assign patronage an important role in these
processes.
While the indicators discussed so far tell us that patronage is
widespread in regional SOEs in Serbia and Croatia, we still have to
look at the way in which these patronage resources are shared between
elites and parties from the centre and periphery. By understanding
the distribution of patronage resources we can make valid inferences
on the motivations of national elites and political parties to support
decentralization.
Despite demands from the European Commission to privatize SOEs
and the requirements to modernize public administration by making it
more effective and efficient (European Commission 2009: 5; Avlijas and
Uvalić 2011),16 political elites are still hesitant to go the last mile of pri-
vatization and administrative reform. It is likely that they are also afraid
of the implications large job losses would entail and the resulting risk
of social turmoil and vote losses. But another reason is that elites care
at least as much about maintaining their control over SOE directors and
senior management with the prospect of private gains through opaque
financial transfers (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 2007). To what
extent are SOEs politicized in the two historic regions of Istria (Croatia)
and Vojvodina (Serbia)?
Before giving a measurement of SOE politicization, I contextualize
how SOEs are regulated in Croatia and Serbia. It is important to know
the sets of laws and rules for the executive and supervisory bodies of
SOEs in both cases. Opaque and lax regulations gave large discretion
to regional decision-makers regarding the appointment to senior posi-
tions in SOEs and their remuneration. That way, incentives were created
for elites and parties to use their discretion for making partisan choices.
At the same time, the appointees had an incentive to engage in this
patron relationship because of the material benefits they could expect.
From the interviews I conducted in both countries I learnt that elites and
parties used regional development and investment agencies and their
SOE off-springs to dispense both patronage jobs and funds. Elites and
parties also gained control over the allocation of funds and investments
that they could gear towards their constituencies.17 What we find at

the regional level is thus an intermingling of SOEs and agencies that
lies at the heart of elite competition for patronage resources. In the
following section, I first describe how SOEs are regulated and present
original data on their politicization. After that, I explain how elites and
parties use some of these SOEs to channel government funds to their
constituencies.
Patronage patterns in SOEs

In Istria, the members of executive and supervisory bodies of SOEs
receive financial compensation for their activities. They are nomi-
nated by the Istrian Regional Assembly which the IDS has dominated
for almost 20 years. While financial compensation is common prac-
tice, there are several problems in Istria that make the system opaque
and unaccountable.18 First, the amount of remuneration is not clearly
defined. Second, public employees working for the regional administra-
tion receive an additional compensation for their work in supervisory
bodies. Third, the regional administration was very active in creating
new SOEs in the past decade which has led to an explosion of supervi-
sory bodies that in some cases have more members than staff employed
in the SOE.19 While the politicization of the executive and supervisory
bodies was not discussed in public before, it has provoked a motion
from local opposition parties to ban this practice.20 In addition, the
national law had significant gaps in the regulation of conflict of inter-
est. According to Croatian law, until recently conflict of interest was
limited to core public sector employees and did not cover the direc-
tors and the leadership of SOEs. Changes to this law in 2010 generally
prohibited holding a public office and being member in the super-
visory or executive board of SOEs. The only exceptions are SOEs of
special state interest21 in which a public official can hold a maximum
of two positions in executive bodies or supervisory boards.22 The cat-
egory “public official” entails also those who work in SOEs where the
state or regional and local authorities own more than 50 per cent of the
company.
In Vojvodina, it was common practice for members of the regional
parliament to occupy more than one paid public position which
also included SOEs.23 Although this is constitutionally prohibited for
national members of parliament (MPs), there was a loud uproar among
politicians of all colours when the newly established Anti-Corruption
Agency demanded the enforcement of the law that limited MPs to one
public office. The agency required from all MPs with more than one
public mandate or occupation to make a choice and give up any super-

numerous mandate until 1 April 2010. This requirement stems from
the law that established the agency in 2008. In order to allow several
MPs in the national parliament and Vojvodina’s regional assembly to
keep several functions until the next elections, President Tadić from
the DS signed off amendments to the law that established a transition
period (Press 2010). One year later, the Constitutional Court deemed
this amendment unconstitutional. Another equally problematic issue
concerns the financial benefits that political parties enjoy when they
appoint individuals for senior positions. President Pajtić of Vojvodina’s
Provincial Government publicly stated that his party DS receives 5 per
cent of their appointees’ remuneration (CPES 2011: 22). That way
patronage becomes a direct instrument for party funding. In sum, until
very recently we have had a situation of very loose regulation of conflict
of interest and informal practices that have fostered patronage in both
regions.
For measuring the degree of SOE politicization, I collected data on
all directors and members of supervisory and executive bodies as well
as on senior management where such information was available for all
regional SOEs in Istria (n = 80) and Vojvodina (n = 71). I assumed all com-
panies under the term “SOEs” for which the regional government had
a share of the ownership. In a second step, I searched for any recorded
affiliation of these names with political parties. These data serve as prox-
ies for the politicization of SOEs. Table 6.1 shows the results. In both
regions, more than 40 per cent of all directors and members of executive
and supervisory bodies have political affiliations. The last two columns
show that the ranking of political parties’ share in the appointment cor-
responds largely to their electoral share in the past regional elections.
These findings are likely to underestimate the degree of politicization as
I could only make use of publicly available records of party affiliation
(mostly found in news articles). Actual party affiliations are likely to be
even higher.
6.6 Allocation of government funds
Merely filling positions inside regional SOEs is only one step in the
causal mechanism of patronage. Beyond the control of individual SOEs
that vary in their economic significance, elites and parties benefitted
from the influence they gained in the way state agencies (established
as SOEs) dispersed government funds. In Vojvodina, five out of nine
regional SOEs were tasked with investments through grants and loans: a
Table 6.1 Share of political appointees in regional SOEs
No. SOEs No. Share of Party Average

employeesa political share of vote share
appointeesb appointees at regional
electionsc
Istria 15 3, 240 42.5% IDS: 21% IDS: 46%

(Croatia) (n = 80) SDP: 5% SDP: 11%
HDZ: 4% HDZ: 10%
Vojvodina 9 3,114 44% DS: 65% DS: 28%
(Serbia) (n = 71) SVM: 23% LSV: 10%
LSV: 6% SVM: 8%
Notes:
a: Only for SOEs where data was publicly available.
b: This is the share of all members of supervisory and executive boards (and senior
management where data was available) who have a recorded affiliation to a political party.
c: For the period 2000–2009 (three elections in Istria, two elections in Vojvodina). The 2000
elections in Vojvodina are not included because almost all democratic parties ran on the
joint platform of the DOS. Where parties stood for election on multi-party platforms and no
data was available for single parties, I used the composite results. Regional election results
for Vojvodina are those from the proportional representation quota (Vojvodina has a mixed
electoral system where one half of the regional assembly seats are filled with candidates from
proportional representation lists and the other half is based on majoritarian lists).
development bank, a fund for capital investments, a guarantee fund,

a fund for development and an office for EU funds. This highly frag-
mented system of different agencies established as SOEs was related to
an elite agreement to assign different funding streams from the National
Investment Plan (NIP) to different political parties in Vojvodina. The
former Serbian vice prime minister described that this practice was com-
monly known inside the political elite circles in Vojvodina.24 Each of the
parties that currently form the regional government in Vojvodina – the
DS, the Hungarian minority party SVM and the SPS – had one funding
stream under its control. These funding streams are internally labelled
in colours: green (Hungarian minority party SVM), yellow (DS) and red
(SPS). That way a small circle of political elites has had a de facto grip
over all major investments and government funds in the region.
When we visualize the patronage relations of political parties with
these agencies, it becomes clear how important they are compared with
other SOEs. Figure 6.5 is a network graph that visualizes, based on the
data presented in Table 6.1, how many political appointees political
parties sent to all regional SOEs in Vojvodina. The size of circles that
represent SOEs indicates the number of political appointees in that SOE.
The larger the circle, the more political appointees are in the main bod-
ies of that regional SOE. The size of the arrows indicates the number
of appointees a party has in an SOE. We clearly see that the statewide
DS has been a central actor with strong influence over state agencies
that are responsible for the major amounts of government spending
and investment. Together with the regionalist parties SVM and LSV they
have had most political appointees in regional SOEs. It is important to
note that the statewide DS has successfully co-opted the LSV but has
been less successful in making the SVM depend on them. A reason for
this is their competition for similar electorates in Vojvodina, despite the
SVM’s focus on Hungarian minority rights. In the words of a senior
figure from the SVM, “the DS significantly enters into our electorate.
[ . . . ] You have the interesting situation that the DS is our partner and
at the same time one of the biggest dangers to our independent politi-
cal role.”25 This also explains why long-standing President Ištvan Pastor
rejected the very generous DS offer to take the position of deputy prime
minister and serve as a minister in the cabinet in 2008 (B92 2008). SVM
has limited its cooperation to sharing patronage resources with the DS,
but is less inclined to share electoral resources because of the similar con-
stituents they have. From other contexts in Latin America and Central
and Eastern Europe we have good evidence that sharing electoral and
patronage resources go together (Geddes 1994; O’Dwyer 2006b). But in
this special case, strategic electoral considerations from one NSWP led
to a rather unusual situation in which cooperation is constrained to
patronage resources (Figure 6.5).
In Istria, several new agencies constituted as SOEs have been founded
by the regional administration since 1999. Four out of fifteen SOEs
were de facto agencies whose various tasks include tourism, energy, rural
development and regional development. The IDS has used these agen-
cies to create new jobs for their affiliates, a common practice in many
counties in Croatia as one of the interviewees who works as a regional
development consultant pointed out.26 A specific characteristic of Istria
is that senior positions in SOEs have been used as bargaining chips by
political elites who saw this as a compensation for supporting IDS-led
coalition governments at the regional and local level.27 In addition,
some of these agencies were tailored in such a way that they cater to the
traditional rural constituencies of the IDS in Istria’s interior.28 Similar to
Vojvodina, patronage in Istria has served to create and staff agencies that
distributed government funds through various development projects.
For these operations to be effective, informal relations of the agencies
with the IDS-led regional administration have been very important; they
National Park Fruška gora LSV

Fund for European Affairs
Water Vojvodina
DS APV Fund for Development
APV Fund for Capital Investment
Development Bank Vojvodina SVM
Vojvodina Forest
PSS Reformisti APV Guarantee Fund
Urban Institute Vojvodina
Figure 6.5 Relations between political parties and SOEs in Vojvodina

Source: Own compilation. I used the UCINET software package for compiling the figure. The
data is for the year 2012.
included revolving poor practices of staff exchange.29 Only that this did
not occur via general-purpose agencies but rather through highly spe-
cialized agencies that are responsible for dealing with specific policies
that cater to special interests. As we can see in Figure 6.6, the regionalist
IDS was the central actor concerning the politically motivated appoint-
ments in SOEs. It had strong control over the Istrian Development
and Energy Agencies and over the waste disposal firm Kaštijun. Both
statewide SDP (on the left) and HDZ (on the right) do not share any
appointments in the same SOEs (Figure 6.6).
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined the third and final element of the
causal chain developed in this book. I have shown the association
between differential access of political elites and parties to patronage
resources in the periphery and decentralization reforms. Where NSWPs
monopolized politicization of the public sector at the regional level
Uljanik (Shipbuilding)
Istrian Roads
HDZ
Istrian Water
Protection
SDP
Istrian Development
Agency (IDA)
Brijuni Rivjera
Kastijun
Energy Agency HSS

DC (IRENA)
IDS
Istrian Tourism Development Agency (IRTA)
IDF
TV NOVA Rural Development Agency (AZZRI)
MIH
Gas utility
Figure 6.6 Relations between political parties and SOEs in Istria

Source: Own compilation. I used the UCINET software package for compiling the figure. The
data is for the year 2012.
as in the case of Istria, national elites had little incentive to support

comprehensive decentralization. If, however, elites and parties from the
centre had access to such patronage appointments, it is in their inter-
est to embrace decentralization and grant regional autonomy as in the
case of Vojvodina. Patronage is an important tool for political par-
ties to exert influence. How legitimate this practice is depends on its
nature and scope. As shown in this chapter, even limited decentraliza-
tion reforms have been intimately linked with plenty of new patronage
resources in Serbia and Croatia. More generally, this is valid for most
post-socialist states where informality and the reach of political parties
into society continue to be deeply ingrained. Although most studies
rely only on either perception-based or quantitative data on politi-
cization and public sector growth, I have argued that these aggregate
measures should be complemented with additional data on actual prac-
tices. In particular, researchers and donor agencies should pay more
attention to subnational levels of government because this is where
patronage practices are most widely spread. My dataset and expert ques-
tionnaire provide a template for expanding research on patronage at
different levels of government to other countries. More fine-grained
and additional information on other cases can serve to inform policy-
making and decentralization reforms. Policy-makers must be aware that
decentralization reforms in states with weak rule of law are prone to be

hijacked by elites for their own interests (Shah 2006).
Supported by original data from an expert survey, interviews with
politicians and document analysis, I have shown that public sector
growth and its politicization at the regional level have been very closely
linked to decentralization reforms in the case of Serbia. It is not easy
to determine whether elite access to these state resources resulted in
a certain kind of decentralization reform or whether it was the other
way around. But the data on public sector growth in Vojvodina clearly
highlights that the most pronounced expansion of the increasingly
politicized public sector occurred after decentralization reforms had
been adopted. I have also demonstrated that both politicization and
public sector growth in Croatia occurred after the major administrative
decentralization reforms were enacted during the period 2001–2003: in
Istria, the strongest hike in public sector growth was in 2008, though
generally the politicization of regional administrations in Croatia has
steadily increased according to expert responses.
When we zoom into the kind of state institutions that are most
prone to patronage, SOEs crystallize as the central bodies that should
be studied to improve our understanding of post-socialist patronage
and decentralization reforms in the Balkans. Grand corruption cases
such as the one of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in Croatia high-
light the severe consequences that excessive patronage in SOEs can have
for these societies. While cross-national studies offer many insights on
general patterns, the mechanisms by which patronage is dispersed and
used differ greatly from country to country. In Serbia and Croatia, elites
and political parties across the reformer/liberal vs. nationalist conserva-
tives/illiberal divide have used patronage in regional SOEs to influence
the distribution of government funds. The one aspect in which patron-
age has differed in these two countries is the extent to which national
elites and SWPs have access to patronage resources at the regional level.
In Serbia, their access was secured through their electoral victories and
subsequent colonization of regional public bodies in Vojvodina. In con-
trast, Istria has to a large degree remained a stronghold of the regionalist
party IDS and thus left little opportunities for SWPs to acquire a share
in patronage resources. Indeed, even key officials from the IDS did no
longer demand more far-reaching decentralization reforms that would
entail a change to the constitution. One of the interviewees, a senior
official from the regional government and IDS member, described that
in Croatia politicians are “still playing democracy and still getting used
to the democratic setting. Our democracy works somewhat like this:
When I come to power, then you will see that everything will be
mine.”30 That is why many of the IDS politicians I interviewed stressed
the need for more fiscal and administrative decentralization and not so
much for more political clout. Within their periphery, governing elites
from NSWPs in Istria were relatively content with the status quo and
their dominant position concerning access to electoral and patronage
resources. As a consequence, SWPs in Croatia have had no incentive to
support further decentralization for Istria. In Serbia, in contrast, SWPs
and elites have had access to regional patronage resources and accord-
ingly strong incentives to pursue decentralization reforms that would
benefit them.
Going back to theoretical concepts from sociologists and organization
scholars, the present chapter speaks very much to the two broad types
of inter-organizational linkages, namely resource transfer and the inter-
locking across organizations (Laumann et al. 1978: 463). Political parties
are the main organizations that interact, and they have considered
patronage resources as a key exchange good with a view to decentral-
ization reforms. If SWPs in the centre can benefit from exchanging
patronage resources with NSWPs in the periphery, they are more likely
to support decentralization.31
But statewide elites and their parties needed assurances on the durabil-
ity of the distribution of patronage resources. This is where interlocking
membership in the senior management and the executive and supervi-
sory bodies of SOEs played an important role. Through regular exchange
and interaction in these bodies, political elites and parties from the
centre could rest assured of their access to patronage in the periphery
also after decentralization reforms. The interlocking membership of par-
ties in SOEs has hence grown out of the exchange of patronage resources
(see Laumann et al. 1978: 465).32 In Serbia, the DS has used this inter-
locking in order to co-opt regionalist parties. In a more formalized way
the interlocking mechanism also contributes to the creation of trust,
as discussed in Chapter 5, between those parties that share appoint-
ments in the same SOEs. Regular interactions and the “routinization
of boundary transactions” in these formal settings provide important
information on the intentions and actions of other parties (Laumann
et al. 1978: 470).
7
Conclusions
How is it possible to explain decentralization reforms when elites in

the centre have few incentives to accommodate demands for more
decentralization from the periphery? In this book, I have answered this
question by conducting a focused comparison of varying outcomes of
decentralization reforms in Serbia and Croatia. I have argued that shared
elite access to resources is associated with different kinds of decentral-
ization reforms in transition societies in the Balkans. Moving beyond
this association, I have substantiated the argument that elite access to
resources affects decentralization reforms by explicating the causal chain
that has led to a unitary decentralized state in Croatia, in contrast to
a regionalized state in Serbia. By comparing one region in each coun-
try, I have illustrated that political elites in the centre anticipated their
access to patronage resources before agreeing to the decentralization of
powers to regions.
In this concluding chapter, I first discuss the main findings of the
book. I emphasise the need to develop a more comprehensive research
agenda for the study of Balkan societies. Second, I summarize my
theoretical contribution by turning the spotlight on four interrelated
aspects: how elites can overcome information problems in networks,
the implications of weak institutions, the relationship between elite net-
works and social capital, and selection mechanisms in elite networks.
Third, I highlight the methodological advantages of combining process
tracing with social network analysis. Fourth, I describe how my agency-
based account complements other structural approaches. Finally, I give
an outlook on the possibilities and constraints in applying the argu-
ment developed in this book to other states and regions in Western
Europe.
152
Conclusions 153
7.1 Main findings
I developed two generic causal chains to explain why decentralization

reforms in transition states have led to varying territorial structures:
(1) Governing elites and parties from the centre and periphery consti-
tute durable coalition governments at the regional level. In other
words, they share electoral resources. They cooperate regularly
through formal and informal channels and exchange information
during negotiations on decentralization reforms. These ties are
channelled through mutually accepted brokers that facilitate the
build-up of trust in close-knit networks across the centre–periphery
divide. Elites in the centre and periphery agree on the distribution
of patronage appointments in the public sector at the regional level.
Put differently, they share patronage resources. The likely outcome
is a regionalized state.
(2) Governing elites and parties from the centre and periphery do not
constitute durable coalition governments at the regional level. They
do not share electoral resources. They cooperate only on certain
issues through formal channels and only few parties exchange lim-
ited information during negotiations on decentralization reforms.
No mutually accepted broker facilitates the creation of trust and
networks across the centre–periphery divide. Elites from the periph-
ery monopolize the distribution of patronage appointments in the
public sector at the regional level. In other words, the sharing of
patronage resources between centre and periphery is limited. The
likely outcome is a unitary decentralized state.
I found that differential elite access to resources is the causal mechanism

that explains varying degrees of decentralization in Serbia and Croatia.
In a context of weak formal institutions, national elites in the centre
have to anticipate the extent to which they will have access to two
critical resources in the periphery, namely electoral (forming coalition
governments) and patronage (partisan appointments in the public sec-
tor) resources. The former is a pre-condition for the latter. Agreement on
the distribution of these resources is made through networks elites use
to communicate and cooperate. Relations within these networks facili-
tate credible commitment to the distribution of these resources and the
implementation of agreed reforms.
As I argued in chapters 2 and 5, information exchange and repeated
cooperation between elites in the centre and periphery were important
steps between election and the distribution of patronage resources

which are critical for an agreement on decentralization reforms. It was
the combination of electoral resources and trust generated through
repeated interactions that facilitated the more difficult agreement on
patronage resources and can explain why the degree of decentralization
in Serbia and Croatia varies (see also Fowler et al. 2011: 470).
7.2 Varying extent of shared resources
In this concluding chapter I summarize the various degrees of elite

access to resources. Figure 7.1 quantifies the degree to which political
elites in the centre and periphery shared access to electoral and patron-
age resources and the degree to which they exchanged information
and cooperated. The figure presents the density scores for the differ-
ent relations between political parties in Serbia and Croatia. Density is
a measurement from social network analysis that indicates the actual
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
0
Croatia Serbia
Elections Interaction
Patronage
Figure 7.1 Extent of sharing resources and interacting between parties in the
centre and periphery
Source: Own compilation based on the original data from chapters 4 to 6. Scale runs from
0 (= no connections among parties) to 1 (= all possible connections between parties are
realized). “Interaction” indicates the extent to which parties exchanged information and
cooperated during decentralization negotiations.
Conclusions 155
strength of relations across all possible relations among actors. It is cal-

culated by dividing the values of all present relations by the number
of all possible relations. A score of 1 means that all parties share the
respective resources and exchange information and cooperate, whereas
a score of 0 indicates that no parties share resources and they do not
exchange information or cooperate; the lower the score, the narrower
the elite network. Therefore, the data presented indicates the values of
shared access for each element of the causal chain. I calculated density
scores of three different dimensions for all relevant political parties and
their relations during the period 2000–2010.
To obtain the scores I present in Figure 7.1, I followed three steps. First,
I used the electoral data from Chapter 4 to calculate how often parties
formed government coalitions across the centre–periphery divide.1 I did
this for all national and regional government coalitions and then cal-
culated the average scores across both. Second, I calculated the average
of the density scores based on the data on strategic cooperation and
information among political parties in Chapter 5. I call this variable
“Interaction”, which captures the informal relations between politi-
cal parties according to their own perceptions during negotiations on
decentralization reforms. Finally, I calculated density scores for networks
in which parties share political appointees in the same SOEs at the
regional level. This data from Chapter 6 indicates the extent to which
many or only few elites share patronage resources.
A look at the figure reveals an almost linear downward trend when
moving from left to right. This indicates that elite networks are very
broad with regard to the sharing of electoral resources and the forma-
tion of coalition governments between centre and periphery. At the
same time, it illustrates the very fragmented party systems we find in
both Serbia and Croatia that often result in very broad coalition govern-
ments. But as we move to the right of the figure, we see that interaction
and patronage networks exhibit significantly lower density scores, indi-
cating relatively narrow and closed groups of elites and more limited
sharing of resources. In other words, the informal relations between
political elites tend to be much more concentrated and exclusive than
their formal coalition patterns would suggest. We have seen in Chapter 4
that coalition formation through shared electoral resources resulted in
varying patterns that included several political elites from the centre
and periphery. But these elite networks become narrower when it comes
to exchanging information and cooperating. That means some parties
and elites are excluded from the inner elite network. Concerning shared
patronage resources, the elite networks contract even more; that is,
only a relatively small group of elites share patronage resources. This

data substantiates my claim that elites seem to prefer smaller circles
in which information sharing and credible commitment is more likely.
In small networks, regular interaction builds up trust and diminishes
information problems. This makes the subsequent agreement on the
distribution of patronage resources easier.
7.3 Empirical contribution to the study of Balkan states
This book enriches the scholarship on Balkan societies in two ways. First,
I compare Serbia and Croatia, two countries that have received scarce
attention in the academic debate. By examining two less-studied coun-
tries we can draw important lessons for theory-building and refinement
that enhance our understanding of decentralization processes. Second,
I go beyond assumptions based on ethnic belonging and mobilization
and look at the micro-processes of centre–periphery relations at the elite
level. Many studies of the Balkans since the 1990s have concentrated
on ethnic conflict (Kaplan 1993), war legacies (Gligorov et al. 1999;
Jenne 2009) and, more recently, the influence of the European Union
on domestic reforms (Elbasani 2010; Freyburg and Richter 2010). But
very few studies examine the non-violent and contemporary decentral-
ization processes in Balkan states (Stjepanović 2012).2 In sum, this book
underscores the importance of examining the less-studied countries in
the region and moving beyond one-sided research agendas.
In the reminder of this sub-section, I describe at greater length how
differential elite access to resources affected decentralization reforms.
I concentrate on the aspect of patronage resources because Serbia and
Croatia exhibited different degrees of elite access to these. The extent
of sharing patronage resources was substantially less in Vojvodina than
in Istria. How can we understand this difference? To make sense of
this variation necessitates going back to the elites’ anticipation of their
access to patronage resources in both states.
Shared elite access to resources and the regionalized state of Serbia

In Serbia, a very small circle of elites from three different political parties
across the centre–periphery divide shaped and agreed on the autonomy
statute for Vojvodina. This very exclusive network is mirrored in the dis-
tribution of patronage resources in SOEs in the region. As discussed in
Chapter 5, the regional branch of the statewide Serbian party DS served
as a broker between centre and periphery. While the DS has had long-
standing electoral and governmental relations with the regionalist party
Conclusions 157
LSV in Vojvodina, their relationship has been based on a stark power

asymmetry: the LSV depended very much on the electorally stronger
DS to be part of governing coalitions at the regional level. Through this
dependence, the DS was able to co-opt the LSV and other regionalist par-
ties and design decentralization reforms in such ways that their access to
patronage resources was secured. At the same time, the DS already had
a strong presence in the public sector nationwide. Thus, the DS elites
have dominated the exchange relations with regionalist elites.
The first element of the causal chain in Vojvodina was the govern-
ing elites and parties from the centre and periphery that constituted
durable coalition governments at the regional level, meaning they
shared electoral resources. They cooperated regularly through formal
and informal channels and exchanged information during negotiations
on decentralization reforms within smaller networks compared with
the previously formed governing coalitions. These ties were channelled
through a mutually accepted broker, the regional branch of the DS,
which facilitated the build-up of trust in close-knit networks across the
centre–periphery divide. They agreed on the distribution of patronage
appointments in the public sector at the regional level. Again, the net-
work for sharing patronage resources became smaller than the network
in which information was exchanged. The result of this process was a
regionalized state with regained autonomy for Vojvodina.
Those elites who can build trust through informal and repeated com-
munication exchange and cooperation are more likely to agree on
the distribution of patronage resources. The sequencing of elite agree-
ments begins with government formation, continues through informal
interactions and finally leads to the sharing of patronage resources.
In Serbia, elites from the DS formed coalition governments at national
and regional levels with the support of regional parties. With some of
them, particularly with the regionalist LSV and SVM, they exchanged
information and cooperated informally. This resulted in shared patron-
age resources at the regional level in a narrow elite network. Throughout
this process, the elite networks have become narrower and allowed for
more credible commitment of all parties involved across the centre–
periphery divide. At the end, only a small circle of trusted elites decided
on the distribution of critical resources and agreed on the shape of
decentralization reforms.
Indeed, this close-knit elite network has rendered credible the com-
mitment of all parties to sustain that distribution. Their repeated
interaction and communication led to stronger social cohesion and less
conflict which, in turn, has allowed them to agree on the distribution
of patronage resources as a pre-condition for adopting decentraliza-

tion reforms. It was easier to develop consensus over the distribution
of patronage resources inside this small group of elites also because
exclusive and isolated networks are associated with strong internal cohe-
sion and relations that may foster corrupt and undemocratic behaviour
(see Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]: 164; Grießhaber and Geys 2011).
Given the cohesion among few elites, their embeddedness in joint rela-
tions enhanced the utility of interdependent resources (see Lin 1999:
33). In short, these elite groups become a narrow exchange network in
which they were able to agree on the distribution of critical resources
and on decentralization reforms.
Constrained sharing of resources and the unitary decentralized

state of Croatia
In Croatia, the causal chain took other directions at important cross-
roads. Governing elites and parties from the centre and periphery did
not form durable coalition governments at the regional level. They
cooperated only on certain issues through formal channels, and only
few parties exchanged limited information during negotiations on
decentralization reforms. No mutually accepted broker facilitated the
creation of trust and networks across the centre–periphery divide. Elites
and parties from the periphery monopolized the distribution of patron-
age appointments in the public sector at the regional level. This process
has established Croatia as a unitary decentralized state.
For Croatia, we observe on average broader networks in all the
domains: the sharing of electoral and patronage resources and the
exchange of information and cooperation. The patronage network in
particular encompassed more relations and parties than in Serbia. Such
a broader patronage network was the result of the various kinds of rela-
tions many political parties had previously engaged in, but less so across
the centre–periphery divide. Relations were mostly confined either to
the national level or to Istria. Thus, these previous networks were less
likely to lead to credible commitment from all parties involved. Trust is
more difficult to achieve in broader networks than in close-knit elite
circles because in the latter monitoring and sanctioning defection is
more difficult. In narrow networks it is more likely that other elites
are deemed trustworthy because nobody has an incentive to defect
if all elites have access to patronage resources. In this context, the
absence of brokers who could bridge the centre–periphery divide has
severe implications. Without a mutually accepted broker, agreements on
decentralization reforms became more difficult because elites could not
Conclusions 159
be certain of the distributional implications such reforms could entail.

There were no actors who could bridge the centre–periphery divide.
Therefore, the accommodation of regional interests from the periph-
ery was aggravated because elites from the centre, especially from the
dominant statewide HDZ, could not expect to have substantial access to
electoral and patronage resources in Istria.
What is striking in my findings is the susceptibility of new liberal elites
in transition societies to rather illiberal practices, such as widespread
patronage. Normally, we would expect that the extension of patronage
practices is mainly limited to the old elites who try to hang on to their
power (Kopecký and Spirova 2011). Although conceptually it is very use-
ful to distinguish between liberal and illiberal elites (Vachudová 2005),
in practice it is difficult to do so. In Serbia, the liberal DS needed patron-
age to sustain its difficult position in minority governments against a
strong nationalist opposition. In Croatia, however, the regionalist IDS
was in direct confrontation with the dominant conservative-nationalist
HDZ. To counter this pressure, the IDS had to create a regional
stronghold through patronage networks in order to maintain power.
In the reminder of this chapter, I describe the contribution of this
book to theory-building and methodology. At the end, I provide an
outlook on the utility of my approach for examining centre–periphery
relations in countries beyond the realm of my research.
7.4 Theoretical contribution
This book’s contribution to the comparative study of regionalized states

and transition societies lies in its focus on the mechanisms of elite
interactions. By adopting insights from organization studies and their
attention to the effect of interdependent resources on actor behaviour,
I concentrated on the mechanisms that help us to understand the
mutually accepted rotation of elites on the key power positions of
a state. What Horowitz (1994: 48) calls “democratic remediation” is
similar to the continuous process concerning the devolution of pow-
ers to lower levels of government in the periphery. At the end of the
day, any reform has varying pay-offs for elites in the centre and in
the periphery (Horowitz 1991b). Resource dependence and approaches
taken from organization studies provide relevant insights on how elites
act and interact within these opportunity structures. The causal mech-
anism of differential elite access to electoral and patronage resources
and its impact on decentralization reforms enhance our understanding
of reforms in transition societies. By meticulously dissecting the entire
causal chain of elite interactions, I show how networks and information

sharing help to overcome information problems and ease cooperation.
To achieve credible commitment in both the distribution of patron-
age resources and the terms of decentralization reforms, elites are likely
to choose a small network of trusted elites. Elites who are embedded
in small networks face less uncertainty over the intentions of others.3
That is one reason why interaction densities are lower than those for
coalition patterns and the sharing of electoral resources. There are two
additional reasons that might explain low density scores for informal
interactions. First, the interaction network is limited to small groups of
actors and therefore by definition more narrow. Second, while many
scholars acknowledge the importance of informal relations in under-
standing reforms in transition societies (Ledeneva 2006; Grzymala-Busse
2007; Hale 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), measuring informal
relations remains a daunting task which many studies avoid.4
Overcoming information problems in networks

On the basis of the conceptual idea that elites and parties interact under
the condition of uncertainty, we are well advised to analyse the interme-
diary step between elections and the distribution of patronage. Simply
treating this part of the causal chain as a black box is not satisfactory
if the aim is to make our explanation as complete as possible. That
is why I included measures that capture the informal relations consti-
tuted by information exchange and cooperation. I show how networks
can solve information problems and facilitate elite cooperation. Indeed,
uncertainty stemming from information problems “can motivate orga-
nizations to develop interorganizational relations [ . . . ] to cope with
uncertainty” (Galaskiewicz 1985: 287). Through the qualitative find-
ings in the previous chapters, I substantiate my claim that informal
relations are the missing link between elections and the distribution of
patronage resources. The exchange of information keeps commitments
credible, as elites can mutually rely on one another. Brokers matter
greatly in this regard because they can connect parties in networks and
thus facilitate agreements between elites in the centre and periphery by
providing more symmetrically distributed information to both sides.5
There are several studies in the decentralization literature that stress the
role regional branches of SWPs play in terms of facilitating autonomy
negotiations (Roller and Van Houten 2003; Hopkin and Van Houten
2009; Van Houten 2009b).
This relates also to the broader relationship between trust and the
uncertainty stemming from the federal paradox. While elites in the
Conclusions 161
centre may grant autonomy to regions in the periphery with the aim
to mitigate conflicts, the very same action might also lead to ever more
radical autonomy demands from their counterparts at the periphery.
Coupled with the idea that decentralization reforms constitute a form
of incomplete contract, information exchange creates trust and reduces
uncertainty. When elites “sign” a decentralization contract, they can-
not be sure about the true preferences of their counterparts; this means
they face information problems and uncertainty. Repeated informa-
tion exchange and cooperation contribute to the generation of trust
and make credible commitment possible. Once trust within a close-
knit network has been achieved, elites can agree on more sensitive
issues such as the informal politicization of the public sector and the
distribution of patronage resources. After all, elites in both the centre
and the periphery face a dilemma: if they do not compete with oth-
ers over patronage resources, they are likely to be trumped and lose
influence; if they compete, other elites will join the competition in
fear of losing out, which in turn heats up the competition (Geddes
1994).
But how can we determine the direction of causality in this narra-
tive? Is the differential access to critical resources only the manifestation
or rather the cause of decentralization reforms? The discussion in the
previous chapter showed that access to resources, primarily patronage
resources, is the principal part of the mechanism which leads to different
kinds of decentralization reforms, rather than a mere epiphenomenon
thereof. Rational elites anticipate their access to patronage resources in
their utility considerations prior to their agreement on reforms. Both
public sector growth and the politicization of recruitment practices
increased after decentralization reforms had been enacted. Together
with my findings from elite interviews that underlined the importance
of anticipation of elite access to patronage resources, this lends sig-
nificant weight to resource dependence as the prime mechanism that
explains varying decentralization reforms. This process, like most social
processes,6 becomes self-reinforcing, as decentralization reforms open
up new opportunities for patronage which then might trigger further
reforms.7 Indeed, causal mechanisms often describe potentially self-
reinforcing processes when the same actors repeat their actions over
time and feedback loops develop (Büthe 2002; Mayntz 2004: 242). Yet
elites seeking access to critical resources may well have started these
processes in Serbia and Croatia. In Serbia, statewide governing elites
were able to benefit from decentralization through the expansion of
their patronage practices at the regional level. But in Croatia, regionalist
elites monopolized the access to patronage resources, which made it less

beneficial for national elites to support decentralization.
Furthermore, my analytical framework began with the assumption
that rational elites adapt their behaviour to the resources and constraints
offered and imposed by their environment. With this in mind, it is not
very likely that elites accidently gain access to patronage resources only
after decentralization reforms set in. If we assume that they rationally
seek access to critical resources, with patronage the most critical one,
then they are very likely to anticipate expected access to them. There-
fore, my resource-dependent approach is internally consistent with the
empirical findings and shows how two different paths have led to dif-
ferent kinds of decentralization reforms. In this way, I also circumvent
a typical problem of process tracing by identifying two causal paths
that are commensurate rather than contradictory (George and Bennett
2005: 222).
Weak institutions
Another contribution to the literature on decentralization and compara-
tive regionalism relates to weak institutions. Although certain aspects of
centre–periphery relations in transition states and in more consolidated
Western-type democracies are comparable, they do differ substantially
in terms of institutions. Studies examining Western European states
have, for instance, stressed the importance of domestic institutions for
mediating the impact of the European Union on its member states (Benz
and Eberlein 1999; Börzel 2002), or the broader importance of stable
institutions in the centre for better economic and political outcomes
(Weingast 2005). But centre–periphery relations in transition states
are not embedded in durable and established institutions. Even more
contingent studies of decentralization in transition societies largely dis-
regard the effects weak institutions have on elite interactions (O’Dwyer
2006b). These studies focus on the formal electoral process and polit-
ical party’s seat shares in national parliaments. On the basis of these
patterns, they infer how elites agreed on partisan appointments in the
public administration, but pay less attention to the mechanism by
which elites deal with uncertainty when strong institutions that would
otherwise facilitate cooperation are missing. Elites compete for access
to resources and opportunities within weak formal institutions that
inhibit credible commitment to respecting agreements on the sharing of
patronage resources and the terms of decentralization reforms. Against
this background, this book emphasises the need to pay more attention
to resource dependence and opportunity structures in order to better
Conclusions 163
understand decentralization processes in transition and post-conflict

states. As such, this book complements other studies on transition soci-
eties that identify weak institutions to be severe hindrances for effective
reforms (Krastev 2002b; Migdal 2004a; Börzel 2011).
Elite networks and social capital

Policy-making in transition societies with weak institutionalized rela-
tions between centre and periphery is highly complex. That is why
elites often resort to informal means to draft and implement policies.
Even liberal political elites in transition countries depend on chan-
nels of informal relations to achieve their policy goals against the
interests of the old elites. In essence, elites competing with others
for access to patronage resources cannot afford to stay out of this
game if they want to remain in power (Geddes 1991: 375). While it
is legitimate that governing elites seek to maintain power and con-
trol policy-making, the normative question remains open. When does
such behaviour become illegitimate in a democratic society? Clearly, my
findings and other previous studies point to the inherent problems of
widespread politicization and patronage practices at the regional level
(Chubb 1982; O’Dwyer 2006b; Peters 2006; Remmer 2007; Gordin 2009)
and for society as a whole (Johnston 1979; Müller 2000; Blondel 2002;
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kopecký and Spirova 2011; Kopecký et al.
2012).
It is difficult to develop social capital, understood as a more gener-
alized trust in any given society, in the context of strong patronage
networks at the elite level and with low citizen trust in regional insti-
tutions (EBRD 2011: 44). After all, privileged access to resources within
elite networks greatly differs in terms of the general socialization into
shared norms of reciprocity (see Bourdieu 1986). In the absence of
strong state institutions or other mechanisms that ensure cooperative
attitudes, even limited degrees of social capital are not likely to become
self-reinforcing. Rather, elite bargaining on state resources behind closed
doors might have the opposite effect: “social capital, particularly when
associated with groups that have a narrow radius of trust, can pro-
duce negative externalities and be detrimental to the larger society”
(Fukuyama 2000; see also Rothstein and Stolle 2008: 445). It is indeed
difficult to escape this trap of weak institutions and lack of strong social
capital. Balkan states exhibit more persistent problems of low social cap-
ital and weak institutions than other transition states in Central and
Eastern Europe (Gligorov et al. 1999; Börzel 2011). In order to break this
downward spiral of citizen distrust in government and elite exploitation
of the state, reforms would be needed that de-politicize the public sector
and establish impartial state institutions.
Trust and selection mechanisms in patronage networks

On the basis of earlier studies, we should expect to find congruent or
at least similar patterns of patronage and political party competition
(Geddes 1994; O’Dwyer 2006b). Put differently, elite networks in which
electoral and patronage resources are shared should be of the same size.
This is based on the idea that sharing electoral resources and being
elected are pre-conditions for gaining access to patronage opportuni-
ties. Given that only governing elite coalitions can influence public
sector recruitment, all elites who form coalition governments should
have shares in patronage appointments. Yet, in both Serbia and Croatia,
shared access to electoral resources is substantially larger than shared
access to patronage resources. How can we make sense of this puzzling
finding which is not consistent with theoretical expectations?
I suggest two arguments to make sense of this puzzle. First, this dis-
cordance indicates that something is missing between the point in time
that elites enter electoral alliances by sharing electoral resources and the
decision on the distribution of patronage resources. According to my
earlier argument, regular interactions should create trust, which in turn
facilitates the distribution of patronage resources. Patronage resources
can be distributed more easily when based on the expectation that agree-
ments will be respected. Therefore, regular interactions and trust help to
explain why the extent to which elites share electoral resources is much
greater than the one concerning patronage resources. For an informal
agreement on the distribution of patronage resources, elites cooperate
within close-knit circles because defection can be more easily punished
within small elite groups.
Second, this indicates that some form of selection among elites took
place. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, elite networks
for the distribution of patronage resources are much closer knit than
networks for information exchange, cooperation and government coali-
tions. How, then, do we know why some elites are excluded from
patronage resources while others are included? It could be that per-
sonal biographies of elites and their common socialization play a role.
Only few studies systematically examine elite composition and selec-
tion in transition societies (Hughes et al. 2002; Buck 2010). Links to the
nomenklatura, to corrupt officials and organized crime groups have all
received scholarly attention (Hellman and Kaufmann 2003; Vachudová
2009; Kopecký and Spirova 2011). But we do not know which factors
Conclusions 165
drive elite composition and why some elites in government coalitions

are excluded from sharing patronage resources. More conceptual and
empirical work is needed in order to illuminate how such selection
mechanisms play out (Laumann et al. 1978: 474).
7.5 Methodological contribution
This book has made a point in favour of more innovative combinations

of various methods and data sources. Combining process tracing and
network analysis is very helpful to researchers in understanding how
actors relate to one another and how this matters for political outcomes.
Social network analysis – which is still only rarely employed in compar-
ative politics – is very valuable, especially for analysing and measuring
informal relations. Network analysis allowed me to conceptualize and
measure exchange relationships, which encompass patterns of govern-
ment coalitions, information exchange and cooperation and the sharing
of patronage resources.
To my knowledge, process tracing has been rarely combined with
network analysis in the study of comparative politics. This is surpris-
ing, given the multitude of advantages this innovative mix of both
methods entails. Process tracing helps to remedy one of the main down-
sides of network analysis; it allows for better and more robust causal
inference. Measuring coalition patterns, informal interactions such as
information exchange and cooperation, and the distribution of patron-
age positions requires different tools and sources in order to trace the
entire causal chain. Furthermore, studying elite relations rather than
only attributes of different elite groups has an added value because
elites are interdependent in their choices and their access to differ-
ent resources. Acknowledging these interdependencies is an important
assumption that can yield exciting new research on centre–periphery
relations and decentralization reforms.
Furthermore, my empirical work shows the way forward to novel
approaches of measuring both formal and informal elite relations. I have
measured informal relations without claiming they are perfect mea-
sures. To improve the validity of the data, I used several measures of
the same network and compared them, which enhances data quality
(Fowler et al. 2011: 460). The data on communication and cooperation
patterns is based on the perceptions of the elites themselves and thus
very much prone to distortion. We have to be aware of their limitations
and seek to complement and advance our measures of informality, but
by triangulating these elite perceptions with more reliable data on the
politicization of regional SOEs, we get a more complete picture of the

underlying causal mechanism. For this, I provide original micro-level
data on the extent of patronage at the regional level. This approach can
easily be applied to other cases. More methodological work is necessary
in order to refine the tools to measure informal relations. Despite the
apparent importance of informality in comparative politics, it is surpris-
ing to see that we are still far from a satisfactory framework for the study
of informal relations and institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). For
such a framework, we would need to go beyond the narrow focus on
political elites and include other relevant elite groups from business,
military and public administration (see Mills 1999 [1956]).
7.6 Elite networks and their relation to structural accounts
My resource-dependent approach complements and relates in various

ways to the existing structural accounts of decentralization reforms
I discussed in Section 2.1. The elite-based causal mechanism I devel-
oped applies to contexts in which certain structural pre-conditions are
present. Identity and distributional pressures as well as pre-existing
institutions trigger demands for decentralization and are thus neces-
sary conditions for decentralization reforms. The question of necessary
structural conditions is related to the sequencing of different reforms
and path dependency (Falleti 2005). This is why I describe the emer-
gence of centre–periphery relations in socialist Yugoslavia and their
embeddedness in stable institutions in Chapter 3. We can indeed estab-
lish that party-building and state-building are sequential: where political
elites and parties are established prior to well-functioning state institu-
tions, patronage practices are far more likely (Shefter 1994; O’Dwyer
2006b). My findings substantiate and confirm these earlier studies
that illustrate how electoral results and subsequent government for-
mations influence the politicization of the state apparatus. But how
does my approach relate more generally to the structural accounts of
decentralization reforms?
Ideational pressures
With regard to ideational pressures that stem from the ethnic belong-
ing of territorially concentrated minorities, my approach concentrates
on the material interests that underlie demands for decentralization
in the periphery. Although in most historical regions with a distinct
minority group demands for some sort of self-rule seem legitimate,
it would be naïve to expect that such demands are only based on
Conclusions 167
the interests of the regional community as a whole. Like most pol-

icy reforms, decentralization entails far-reaching distributional conse-
quences for political elites. For instance, the decentralization of powers
increases the discretion of regional elites and can remove patronage
resources in the regional administration from the reach of national
elites. Similarly, elites in the centre should be reluctant to completely
cede powers and influence, particularly in economically important
regions, as my analysis of Vojvodina in Serbia and Istria in Croatia have
underscored.
On the other hand, if regional elites want to remain in power, they
must maintain participation in governments and their access to patron-
age resources in order to influence policy-making in their region. But
elites in the centre cannot remain unresponsive to decentralization
demands because of the possible electoral consequences in the con-
cerned region. Ideational pressures are mainly relevant for the discourse
of decentralization demands and in order to justify them (Agnew 1995;
Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008; Mazzoleni 2009). Yet this is not suffi-
cient to explain the concrete direction elite agreements take because we
have to account for the material interests of the parties involved. Other-
wise, decentralization demands from the periphery would be bound to
questions of cultural autonomy that are truly ideational (Nimni 2005).
However, this is not what we see in almost all historical regions of
Europe where economic and political interests are at the heart of the
debate (Ohmae 1993; Keating 1997, 2001b).
Distributional pressures
With regard to distributional pressures as a structural pre-condition for
decentralization reforms, elites in both poor and wealthy regions have
various reasons to demand decentralization reforms. For transition soci-
eties in the Balkans, the prospect of getting access to regional funds
during the EU integration process is particularly relevant. There is a
need for effective and efficient administrative capacities at the regional
level in coping with the requirements of receiving and managing these
funds. But having decentralized powers to deal with regional develop-
ment issues does not mean that regional elites are likely to use such
funds impartially to advance socio-economic development. There are
currently several studies that confirm the instrumental use of EU-related
arguments and funds by regionalist elites (Hughes et al. 2004; Brusis
2010; Hepburn 2010). My analysis in Chapter 6 substantiates this argu-
ment. I show how elites in the centre and in the periphery have gained
control over key development agencies that distribute government and
EU funds. In some cases, as in Istria, specialized agencies were created

to cater to the particularistic interests of core constituencies, in this case
the rural population. Again, broad distributional questions play a role
in legitimizing certain decentralization reforms, but the politically more
relevant distributional issues pertain rather to elite interests and concern
their main constituencies.
Pre-existing institutional framework

In Chapter 3, I described how stable institutions in socialist Yugoslavia
enabled the accommodation and management of decentralization
demands from the periphery. Once these institutions dismantled, con-
frontation between centre and periphery became the dominant mode
of interaction in the 1990s. The fragmented party system in demo-
cratic Serbia and Croatia led to the emergence of several regionalist
parties demanding decentralization reforms. Their emergence was asso-
ciated with regional institutions that had existed in socialist Yugoslavia.
In Vojvodina, this association was more pronounced than in Istria. This
supports the more recent institutionalist view that even limited decen-
tralization reforms are associated with stronger political mobilization
in the periphery, which in turn increases the likelihood of more far-
reaching decentralization reforms in the future (Chhibber and Kollman
2004).
In sum, my resource-dependent approach replenishes the structural
accounts with a focus on the micro-processes and mechanisms of elite
interactions and their contribution to decentralization reforms. It goes
beyond the instrumental use of identity and distributional issues of
elites in the periphery. Material interests and elite access to interde-
pendent resources provide a more complete narrative that explains why
Croatia remained a unitary decentralized state, whereas Serbia returned
to a regionalized state during the first decade of democratic transition.
Regional elites have been dependent on elites in the centre for their
access to critical resources, and they have had to make concessions con-
cerning their decentralization demands. In Vojvodina, regional elites
came to embrace a more modest goal of autonomy, compared with
their previous maximalist demands for far-reaching decentralization.
Regional elites in Istria, on the other hand, have been keen to defend
their regional stronghold, where they hold the most important patron-
age resources against the influence of the centre. Again, we have to pay
attention to the mechanisms of elite interaction and exchange in order
to understand elite agreement or non-agreement on decentralization
reforms.
Conclusions 169
7.7 Policy implications for the donor community
My findings primarily concern post-socialist transition states that

emerged from one-party rule and conflict in former Yugoslavia. Given
the inherent limitations of comparative case studies, from the con-
clusions drawn in this book it is not possible to generalize about
other groups of countries. Also, the domain covered is principally lim-
ited to asymmetrically regionalized and unitary decentralized states in
transition contexts. As I do not cover federal states or symmetrically
regionalized states, it is difficult to draw parallels to this set of states
on the basis of my findings. But the causal mechanism I developed and
the broader argument applies, mutatis mutandis, more generally to other
countries in which centre–periphery relations are important features of
the political system and have historical roots. It is very difficult to draw
parallels to other cases that do not meet these basic requirements. With
the necessary adjustments, my findings could also be relevant for other
states and regions within fundamentally different socio-economic con-
texts. To what extent does the argument I developed apply to other
regions and contexts? What are the policy implications?
At this point I suggest venues for further research that go beyond
the realm of this book. During this research, the implicit question
on the relationship between decentralization and good governance
emerged as an important and understudied field. I briefly touched upon
this issue in Chapter 6. If my and others’ findings are correct and
there is a strong association between patronage opportunities for polit-
ical elites and decentralization reforms (O’Dwyer 2006b; Peters 2006),
the effective functioning of the state is in peril where ill-designed
reforms are adopted. When patronage practices become systemic and
widespread, regional self-government can undermine good governance.
What are the consequences of centre–periphery relations triggered by
patronage-based decentralization?
Recent studies on European regions indicate strong within-country
variation concerning the quality of government at the regional level
(Charron et al. 2012). Economically less-developed European states
exhibit the strongest variation. Further research is necessary to under-
stand the implications when elite access to patronage resources guides
decentralization reforms. In order to understand the prospects of
effective decentralized government, “it is essential to understand
the relationship between underlying conditions and the emergence
and evolution of institutions” (Wibbels 2006: 178). Without any
claim to provide a comprehensive overview, I highlight parallels to
developments in current and former transition countries in Europe and

beyond that have some form of regionalized state structures. Over the
past years, the regional question has been a pertinent issue in Spain,
Ukraine, Afghanistan and Iraq.
To draw parallels to other transition countries is difficult but not
impossible. While some authors rightly point to the inherent diffi-
culty of comparing decentralization processes, for instance, in Eastern
and Western European states owing to specific characteristics of transi-
tion societies (Pasquier and Perron 2008; see also Bunce 2003), I pro-
vide some tentative thoughts on the applicability of my argument
to other contexts. If we accept that decentralization is primarily an
endogenously driven process, then we should also be able to apply
insights, mutatis mutandis, from comparative decentralization studies
more broadly (Wibbels 2006).
In former transition countries that are now considered consolidated
Western democracies, the financial and economic crisis that began to
spread across the globe in 2008 brought patronage to the forefront of
public debate. Regions in Spain turned out to have a bloated public
sector, mainly because of decades of patronage-driven decentralization
reforms.8 This was very much related to national elites and SWPs, who
have used their discretion especially during the early period of transition
towards democracy to build vast patronage networks. The expansion of
patronage and the adoption of a series of decentralization laws have
coincided. Decentralization reforms empowering the regional level have
“increased the patronage capacity of regional governments” (Wilson
2009: 9).
During the third wave of democratization between 1974 and 1990 at
least 30 states have undergone transitions to democratic forms of gov-
ernment (Huntington 1991). In Europe, democratic states emerged from
military authoritarian rule in the 1970s first in Portugal, Greece and
Spain. Of these countries, Spain is the only truly regionalized state with
17 autonomous communities. Indeed, Spain became a paradigmatic
example of a transition state in the late 1970s and 1980s when it formed
part of the global third wave of democratization after the end of the
Franco regime (Linz and Stepan 1996: 87ff.). Centre–periphery relations
are regulated by the 1978 constitution, which established an asymmetri-
cally regionalized state with 17 autonomous communities.9 Spain had a
formally regionalized structure since the First Republic in 1873. Regular
adaptations concerning the decentralization of powers and the sub-
stance of autonomy statutes have taken place in democratic Spain since
1978, driven by the strong presence of NSWPs in the three historical
Conclusions 171
regions.10 Yet SWPs successfully used decentralized government for the

extension of their patronage resources.11 A comprehensive re-shuffling
of administrative positions has usually followed regional elections in
the past three decades. Instead of professionalizing public manage-
ment, the main changes to public sector recruitment resulted from the
devolution of powers to the regions and the ingrained discretion to dis-
perse patronage (Parrado 2000; Kopecký and Mair 2011: 7). There was
also an abundance of patronage opportunities given the growth of pub-
lic sector employment by more than half a million between 1982 and
1994 (Heywood 2005: 52). The two dominant SWPs, the PSOE and the
People’s Party (PP), have used political appointments in regional admin-
istrations to extend their influence in the context of confrontational
centre–periphery relations (Pujas and Rhodes 1999). This was mainly
possible in regions without a predominance of NSWPs. In Andalusia,
the most populous region, the socialist PSOE has dominated regional
government since 1978 and has established widespread patronage net-
works in the administration and in crucial state agencies (Montero 2001;
Wilson 2009). Similarly, PP has ruled Valencia since 1995, which was
accompanied by the dispersion of patronage in the previously PSOE-led
administration. Large parts of the regional budget in 2011 (38 per cent),
for example, were spent on the salaries of public sector employees.12
SWPs, however, have faced more obstacles to disperse patronage in
the two historical regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country, which
are the two economic powerhouses of the country with strong regional
nationalism. There, mainly regionalist parties have constituted regional
governments and elite agreements across the centre–periphery divide
were aggravated by confrontational views on the allocation of powers
in the political system. Patronage practices have been less pronounced
in Catalonia (Gordin 2009),13 where regionalist parties such as the Con-
vergence and Union (CiU) and the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)
have maintained a stronghold, providing few incentives to the conserva-
tive PP to support Catalonia’s demands for more autonomy (Hopkin and
Mastropaolo 2001: 167; Keating 2009: 9). Among other factors, extended
patronage has contributed to unsustainable public spending. Up until
2012, regional governments in Spain accumulated over 140 billion euros
in debt. Interestingly, the current economic and financial crisis has
brought the costs of ineffective regional institutions and patronage-
based decentralization to public attention. Regions in Spain and in other
Southern EU states have become “fiefs for local barons and vehicles
of party patronage” (Financial Times 2012). However, given the limited
degree of sharing patronage resources between national and regionalist
elites, a truly regionalized or even federal solution for Spain remains

doubtful.
When I started writing this book, it did not cross my mind that my
findings might also relate to very recent decentralization efforts driven
by civilian revolts, military intervention and nation-/state-building in
Northern Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In what is to
some extent the fourth wave of democratization triggered both by
active democratization from abroad and by civil society movements, the
regional question indeed is a pertinent one.
Let us turn to these contemporary transition countries. Political elites
in many countries across the globe use corruption and patronage to
extract or withhold resources from the state. The recent Arab Spring
that triggered regime change and created several new “transition” states
was partially a citizen revolt against the lack of rule of law and demo-
cratic participation rights. The practice to use patronage strategically is
not confined to illiberal elites, but can also be found among rhetorically
liberal and pro-democratic elites and parties. One thing to consider is
whether the distinction between liberal and illiberal elites does not dis-
tract from the continuity we can observe under the surface. It remains
to be seen whether the democratically elected governments in Tunisia
and Egypt will follow the patronage practices they inherited from their
authoritarian predecessors. For these countries it is not yet clear to what
kind of state their transition will lead (Carothers 2011). After all, elites
circulate; they do not suddenly disappear. One obstacle to democratic
reform is the persistence of informal exchanges. In many would-be tran-
sition countries in Northern Africa, a “social contract of informality”
exists under which participation rights of citizens are substituted by
informal exchange and patronage networks (Harders 2009: 300).
But to what extent is this prevalence of patronage in transition con-
texts linked to decentralization? The answer to this question becomes
more complicated when turning to multi-ethnic or tribal-based states
such as Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq, all of which have to build and
re-build state structures and create nations. There, centre–periphery
relations are very much about the access to critical resources. Decentral-
ization reforms will be important elements of nation- and state-building.
In Iraq, many elites have resisted the establishment of a division of
powers across different levels of government through patronage politics
(Wimmer 2003: 112). In the early 1970s, an “autonomy experiment with
some promise [of Kurdish self-rule] ended in cynical boundary manipu-
lations, and ethnic expulsions” (O’Leary 2012: 501). The consequences
of this forced nation-/state-building and divide-and-rule tactics can still
Conclusions 173
be felt today. Strong patronage networks built under Saddam Hussein’s

Ba’athist Party have survived despite US efforts of de-Ba’athification
(Hill 2014). Dealing with this legacy was one of the objectives of the
overall excessive centralization drive under the Shia Prime Minister al-
Maliki in the period 2006–2014. Kurdistan was an exception to this
centralization. Kurdish political elites achieved a special autonomy sta-
tus enshrining Kurdistan’s self-rule and its partial shared rule within
Iraq. In fact, the Kurdish elites have acted as kingmakers when they
twice supported al-Maliki’s premiership. Other constitutional features
such as proportional representation and the need for multi-party coali-
tions have mitigated the risk of too strong a centralization (O’Leary
2012). At the same time, they have created new tensions between the
economic aspirations of a forceful Kurdistan Regional Government and
Bagdad. Coupled with the questions about national identity this “could
also potentially take tensions between the centre and the periphery to
breaking point” (Spencer et al. 2013: 3). Kurdish contentions that nego-
tiations with the Shia government in Bagdad were very difficult coupled
with the Sunni perception of being marginalized indeed bear witness
that decentralization in Iraq is political powder keg (Financial Times
2014). Given these tensions, it will be very burdensome to find an elite
agreement on sharing critical resources. New dynamics have developed
with the rise of the Islamist State terror, which forces Iraqi elites to coop-
erate in security matters. It remains to be seen whether this cooperation
will have positive effects on decentralization negotiations.
Also in Afghanistan patronage and informal relations constitute seri-
ous barriers to decentralizing government. Following the retreat of the
international forces led by the US, the country is not governable because
of prevailing patronage relations and warlord competition (Radnitz
2004: 524; Nixon and Ponzio 2007: 31). Even if veritable decentraliza-
tion is to occur in Iraq and Afghanistan, entrenched patronage interests
will play a central role in the dispersion of critical resources. Also there,
successful decentralization will depend on prior elite agreements on the
sharing of critical resources.
Ukraine is another point in case. While the tender flower of demo-
cratic politics blossomed after the Orange Revolution in 2004, the
country is at the verge of full-fledged civil war ten years later. The
regional question and the politicization of regional differences have
been at the forefront of the conflict between the Ukrainian authori-
ties and Russia-backed separatist forces in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
that broke out in 2014. During the strong centralization under Presi-
dent Viktor Yanukovych and the consolidation of a patronage network
around him, he appointed willing and loyal regional governors espe-

cially in Eastern Ukraine who did not demand veritable decentralization;
after all, they had beneficial access to critical resources similarly to the
period of President Leonid Kuchma’s reign. His administration force-
fully rejected regionalism, which they portrayed as being led by corrupt
regional elites outside their home base; elites in the Eastern regions saw
autonomy and decentralization as means to gain control over regional
resources and consolidate their “patrimonial/clan hierarchies [ . . . ] based
on informal intra-elite relations” (Matsuzato 2001: 438; Sasse 2001).
Despite running for his Party of the Regions, Yanukovych pursued
no true decentralization during his mandate. Predominantly, he rep-
resented the interests of Eastern regions and sought better relations
with Russia. This backfired when Western-oriented protesters took the
Maidan Square in the winter of 2013–2014 and forced the government
and president to quit. This, coupled with anti-Russian draft legislation
by the newly installed government, triggered separatist movements in
the East. But despite this radical escalation, neither side of the conflict
has put forward a serious plan for decentralization. With Crimea being
immediately absorbed into the Russian Federation, now “clientelistic
and corrupt practices [in Ukraine’s regions] can reign rather than actual
programmatic politics” (Washington Post 2014).
These recent developments highlight that decentralization has not
lost its highly contentious core. In many states worldwide where dif-
ferent ethnic belongings are used for regional mobilization, decentral-
ization reforms are likely to be instrumentalized for the establishment
of patronage networks and pursuit of secessionist policies benefitting
regional elites (Hechter 2004). An important implication that stems
from this relates to donor policies. Support for decentralization reforms
must pay attention to these power struggles, otherwise it is likely to
remain futile. Giving too much power and discretion too early to
regional elites might backfire in the end through secessionist conflicts.
Rather, decentralization should proceed slowly with firm supervision
by bureaucrats and citizens from the centre and periphery and inter-
national advisors. At this point in time, it seems that we are quite far
from witnessing the “end of the transitions era” (Plattner 2014). Quite
the opposite seems to be true. The current uprisings, civil wars and
civilian revolts are an indicator for the demand for better governance
and partly more local and regional self-rule. With hindsight, we will be
able to assess whether these movements towards decentralization will
pass the test of time. But more importantly, the patronage networks
accompanying these elite-driven processes will require more attention
Conclusions 175
by academics, analysts, practitioners and aid workers alike. Decentraliza-

tion alone is not a panacea for better and more democratic governance.
It must be accompanied by an effective and transparent public sec-
tor at the service of the citizens and not at the service of rent-seeking
political elites. A recent review of decentralization and development
outcomes commissioned by the UK Department for International Devel-
opment indeed emphasises the importance of the political economy of
reform, which is manifested by “vote buying, patronage and elite cap-
ture on resource allocation and service delivery” (Local Development
International 2013: 44).
Despite the turn to democratic politics and institutions in Spain more
than 30 years ago and in other countries in the Balkans, Southern
and Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the past 15 years, infor-
mal practices have persisted among governing elites and parties in
most of these (former) transition countries. This is a stark reminder
of the strength of deeply engrained informal relations. Whereas formal
institutions “[ . . . ] may be changed overnight, the informal norms usu-
ally change only gradually” (North 1993). The persistence of informal
exchanges constitutes a severe obstacle to the democratic and effective
functioning of decentralized government. An important policy impli-
cation of this is that more transparency is needed concerning public
sector recruitment and public expenditure at the regional level. Centre–
periphery relations are very vulnerable to being hijacked by political
elites for their own interests. Therefore, any account of decentraliza-
tion reforms should incorporate the distribution of patronage resources
among elites, who are key actors in the decision to decentralize govern-
ment powers. In essence, elite opportunities for patronage are central
for understanding the consequences of ill-designed decentralization.
Appendix
Annex 1 List of interviewees
Institutional Date
acronym & function∗
Interviewee 1, Centre for Regionalism CENREG, Director April 2011

Interviewee 2, League of Social LSV, Senior politician April 2011
Democrats of Vojvodina
Interviewee 3, Democratic Fellowship DZVM, Senior politician April 2011
of Vojvodina Hungarians
Interviewee 4, Vojvodina Chamber of PKV, Acting Director April 2011
Commerce
Interviewee 5, Alliance of Vojvodina SVM, Senior politician April 2011
Hungarians
Interviewee 6, Democratic Party branch DS-VOJV, Senior April 2011
in Vojvodina politician
Interviewee 7, G17 Plus G17+, Senior politician April 2011
Interviewee 8, Ministry of Economy MERR, Desk officer May 2011
and Regional Development
Interviewee 9, Former Vice Prime G17+, Former Deputy May 2011
Minister, G17 Plus (via phone) Prime Minister of Serbia
Interviewee 10, Government of the APV-GOV, Deputy May 2011
Autonomous Province Vojvodina Provincial Secretary
Interviewee 11, Democratic Party DS, Senior politician May 2011
Interviewee 12, Serbian Radical Party SRS, Vice President May 2011
Interviewee 13, Permanent Conference SKGO, Senior manager May 2011
of Cities and Municipalities in Serbia
Interviewee 14, Croatian Association of ASSOC-MUN, Senior May 2011
Municipalities manager
Interviewee 15, Croatian Association of HZZ, Senior official May 2011
Counties
Interviewee 16, Ministry of Finance MOF, Director General May 2011
Interviewee 17, Croatian Social Liberal HSLS, Senior politician May 2011
Party
Interviewee 18, Institute for IMO, Senior Research May 2011
International Relations Fellow
176
177
Interviewee 19, Economic Institute EIZ, Senior Research May 2011

Zagreb Associate
Interviewee 20, Independent Regional Senior regional May 2011
Development Consultant development consultant
Interviewee 21, Istrian County ISTRIA-GOV, Senior May 2011
Administration, Department for official
International Cooperation and
European Integration (IDS member)
Interviewee 22, Environmental Zelena Istra, Senior May 2011
NGO Zelena Istra (Green Istria) management
Interviewee 23, Ladonja Ladonja, City Councillor May 2011
Interviewee 24, Istrian Development IDA, Project Officer May 2011
Agency
Interviewee 25, Istrian County ISTRIA-GOV, Senior May 2011
Administration official
Interviewee 26, Croatian Democratic HDZ, Senior politician May 2011
Union
Interviewee 27, Istrian Democratic IDS, Senior politician May 2011
Assembly
Interviewee 28, Croatian People’s HNS, Senior politician May 2011
Party – Liberal Democrats
Interviewee 29, Istrian Democratic IDF, Former President May 2011
Forum
Interviewee 30, Social-Democratic SDP, Former Vice May 2011
Party of Croatia President
Interviewee 31, Croatian Peasant Party HSS, Senior politician May 2011
Interviewee 32, Former Country World Bank, Former March
Director, World Bank Country Director for 2012
Croatia
Note: ∗ In order to guarantee the anonymity of interviewees, in some cases their exact
function is intentionally not listed.
178 Appendix
Annex 2 List of organizations for network analysis
SERBIA
Acronym Organization’s full Type

name
APV-GOV Government of the Provincial government

Autonomous Province
Vojvodina
DS-VOJV Democratic Party Regional branch of DS led by the Prime
branch in Vojvodina Minister of Vojvodina
DS Democratic Party Originally founded in 1919 and
re-established in 1990
SVM Alliance of Vojvodina Regionalist party of the Hungarian
Hungarians minority founded in 1995; rather in
favour of territorial autonomy
DZVM Democratic Fellowship Regionalist party of the Hungarian
of Vojvodina minority founded in 1990; rather in
Hungarians favour of individual minority rights
LSV League of Social Regionalist party founded in 1990
Democrats of
Vojvodina
G17+ G17 Plus Economically liberal party founded
originally as an NGO/think tank by 17
economists in 1997; in 2010 it became
the core of the new electoral platform
URS (United Regions of Serbia)
DSS Democratic Party of Christian Conservative party founded in
Serbia 1992 from with the DS
LDP Liberal Democratic Liberal party founded in 2005
Party
SRS Serbian Radical Party Nationalist right-wing party founded in
1991
SNS Serbian Progressive Right-wing party founded in 2008 from
Party within the SRS
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia Founded in 1990
CENREG Centre for Regionalism Think tank that supports the autonomy
of Vojvodina; founded in 1998
SERB-GOV Serbian government National government
Appendix 179
MADMIN Ministry of Human and National ministry

Minority Rights, Public
Administration and Local
Self-government
MOF Ministry of Finance National ministry
MERR Ministry of Economy and National ministry; in 2007 regional
Regional Development development was added to its
responsibilities
SEIO Serbian Office for European National office coordinating
Integration government policies and alignment
with EU requirements; established in
2004
SKGO Permanent Conference of Representing the interests of cities and
Cities and Municipalities in municipalities; founded in 1953
Serbia (re-established in 2003)
CROATIA
Acronym Organization’s full name Type
ISTRIA-GOV Government of the Istrian Istrian County Administration

Region
IDS Istrian Democratic Regionalist party founded in
Assembly 1990
HDZ Croatian Democratic Nationalist Conservative party
Union founded in 1990
SDP Social Democratic Party Social Democratic party founded
in 1990
HSS Croatian Peasant Party Conservative party founded in
1904
HSLS Croatian Social Liberal Founded in 1989
Party
LS Liberal Party Founded in 1997 and merged
with HSLS in 2006
HNS Croatian People’s Left-leaning party founded in
Party – Liberal Democrats 1990
CROAT-GOV Croatian government National government
MOF Ministry of Finance National ministry
MADMIN Ministry of Justice, Public National ministry
Administration and Local
Self-government
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs National ministry
180 Appendix
Annex 3 Descriptive statistics of expert survey
Table A3.1 Analysis of variance of answers within and

between occupational groups of respondents
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Between groups 4.12 5 0.82 1.23 0.31

Within groups 26.09 39 0.67
Total 30.22 44 0.69
Bartlett’s test for equal variances: chi2 (5) = 1.9964; Prob > chi2 = 0.850.
Source: Own calculation. For this analysis of variance, I calculated aver-
age scores for the answers pertaining to the effectiveness of the public
sector at all three levels of government. Occupational groups of the
respondents are: academic, NGO, business, journalism, international
organization (IO) and public sector.
Table A3.2 Values for effectiveness score across occupational groups
Occupation Mean SD p50 Min Max N
Academic 3.1 0.74 3.08 2.06 4.89 20

NGO 2.81 0.96 2.56 1.67 4.39 6
Business 2.71 0.94 3.08 1.22 3.5 6
Journalism 3.69 0.51 3.69 3.33 4.06 2
IO 3.66 0.65 3.56 2.83 4.75 6
Public 2.93 1.04 2.92 1.33 4.09 5
Total 3.09 0.83 3.11 1.22 4.89 45
181
5
Total Effectiveness Score
2 3 1 4
1 2
Figure A3.1 Boxplot comparing the answers of male and female respondents on
public sector effectiveness
Source: Own compilation. The black line in the centre indicates the median; the first and
third quartiles are the edges of the grey-blue box area; and the extreme values are the vertical
lines extending beyond the box. What we see is that the answers from male and female
respondents are very similar, particularly with regard to the median and the range between
the extreme values.
182 Appendix
Annex 4 Timeline of decentralization in Croatia (Istria)

and Serbia (Vojvodina), 1990–2010
Istria Vojvodina
1990 Regionalist parties founded Regionalist parties founded

Christmas Constitution reintroduces Autonomy statute abolished
regional county institutions
1992 Law on the Area of Counties, Cities First time multi-party

and Municipalities establishes county composition in Vojvodina’s
institutions Assembly
Regional political parties form
electoral list and enter national
parliament (IDS, RDS – Riječki
Demokratski Savez, DA – Dalmatinska
Akcija)
1993 First election and plenary of Istrian

County Assembly
Regional leaders reject Tuąman’s offer
of far-reaching autonomy owing to
lack of constitutional guarantees
1994 First statute of Istria passed by Istrian

Assembly, and suspended by HDZ
government that challenged articles
on Italian minority
1995 Autonomy statute reinstated after Law on the Assets Possessed by

ruling by Constitutional Court (with the Republic (‘Šešelj Law’)
18 out of 36 articles that dealt with deprives local self-government
Italian minority abolished) units and provinces of the right
to manage their assets and of all
competences
1996 IDS loses splinter in the form of IDF

led by Pula Mayor Luciano Del Bianco
2001 New constitution adopted with Vojvodina’s Assembly forms the

administrative decentralization to the Platform on the Constitutional
county level coupled with the Position of Vojvodina
abolition of the upper chamber of
parliament (House of Counties)
New autonomy statute adopted after
intervention by Constitutional Court
IDS leaves national government
coalition after unsuccessfully insisting
on minority language rights and
controversy around Istrian bank
183
2002 Law on Protection of Rights and

Freedoms of National Minorities drafted
with advice from Council of Europe and
OSCE
Law on the Confirmation of Powers of
the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina
(‘Omnibus Law’) transfers competences
in the areas of education and culture
2005 New Law on Government allows central

government to suspend regulations and
statutes adopted by the Vojvodina
government authorities
2006 New constitution adopted with the two

Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina
and Kosovo; competences of Vojvodina
have to be established through a
separate law
2007 Three statistical

regions introduced
(NUTS-II) to allow for
implementation of EU
regional funds
2008 Constitutional Court Privatization agreement for Naftna

rejects motion to assess Industrija Srbije, the major oil company
constitutional with most assets in Vojvodina, signed on
conformity of Istrian 24 December without consultation of
statute after six years of the Vojvodina government
procedure
2009 Law on National Minorities Councils

Law on Regional Development
introduces seven statistical regions
(NUTS-II)
Vojvodina statute and accompanying
Law on Transfer of Jurisdiction
2010 Government adopts Law on Regional Development amended

Guidelines and and number of statistical regions
Principles lowered to five
on Functional
Decentralization
and Territorial
Reconfiguration
Source: Own compilation, based partly on Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia –
Annual Report (2007) and Freedom House.
Notes
1 Centre–Periphery Relations in the Balkans

1. An additional aspect that makes decentralization so complex is the
widespread feature of asymmetrical decentralization; that is, granting vary-
ing degrees of autonomy to different subnational units within the same
state. Some observers even stipulate that virtually all such systems have some
degree of de facto asymmetries (von Beyme 2003: 240).
2. Some authors suggest that decentralization and regionalization are better
understood within different categories such as a federal or regionalized state
(Keating 1997; Swenden 2006: 18). But more recent efforts to quantitatively
measure the degree of decentralization of countries worldwide show that
we can move beyond only looking at ideal types (Treisman 2007; Hooghe
et al. 2010). In a way, this debate is similar to the discussion on whether
to categorize democracy as a dichotomous or graded concept (Collier and
Adcock 1999). In the end, this choice depends largely on the kind of research
question asked.
3. Two other terms found in the literature on public administration are often
confused with decentralization, namely devolution and deconcentration. Both
refer to different degrees of administrative decentralization. Devolution is a
very far-reaching transfer of such powers to subnational units, whereas in
deconcentrated systems the central government remains the main authority
vis-à-vis subnational entities that are overseen by regional and local offices
with their non-elected prefects (Hutchcroft 2001: 30).
4. Swenden adds confederations as a category but rightly points out that by
now we mostly have only historical examples of states that were true con-
federations, such as the United States and the Swiss confederation in the
19th century. In post-Second World War times, the European Union is
arguably the only example of a true confederation of sovereign member
states.
5. Others suggest a more fine-grained categorization that distinguishes between
“decentralised unitary” and “centralised unitary” states (Loughlin 2000).
6. More significantly, this triggered a broad movement demanding an inde-
pendence referendum, that took place in November 2014 in the form of a
symbolical public “consultation”. The central government in Madrid deems
this plan unconstitutional.
7. I do not consider the rump Yugoslavia that survived the civil wars as for-
mally one state in the discussion here. Serbia was de facto a sovereign
republic that remained with Montenegro in a dysfunctional state. Between
2001 and 2002, Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy, brokered the Belgrade Agreement.
This established yet another malfunctioning loose confederation of “Serbia
and Montenegro”, which was eventually dissolved after the Montenegrin
referendum for independence succeeded in 2006.
184
Notes 185
8. Some of these competencies, such as the establishment of a separate

regional office in Brussels, however, were ruled to be unconstitutional by
the Constitutional Court in 2012 (Serbian Constitutional Court 2012).
9. Interviewee 5, Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM).
10. Admittedly, the question of decentralization and centre–periphery relations
on the territory of former Yugoslavia is equally important for several other
states, namely Bosnia–Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. But in these
cases, many of the advantages of a similar research design do not apply. In all
three cases, the international community and particularly the EU has had
strong influence. Moreover, all three states had different statuses in social-
ist Yugoslavia. This makes it very difficult to control for other explanatory
factors.
11. Several studies examine, for example, the “paradigmatic” cases of Québec,
Scotland and Catalonia based on Keating’s earlier work on regional nation-
alism (Keating 1996). Other well-studied countries are Belgium and Italy
(Agnew 2002; Deschouwer 2009b; Hopkin 2009).
12. Since the Vienna Summit in December 1998, the EU has subsumed
under it the (potential) candidate countries of Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Albania.
13. Data based on Croatian and Serbian Statistical Offices, the Istrian Govern-
ment and the Executive Council of Vojvodina.
14. At the end of 2013, the Serbian Constitutional Court gave its formal opinion
by stating that two-thirds of the provisions in Vojvodina’s new autonomy
statute were unconstitutional. In May 2014, the Serbian Parliament and the
Vojvodina Assembly confirmed the new version of the statute. The new
statute is not fundamentally different to the 2009 statute in its symbolical
substance.
15. Šumadija in Central Serbia certainly has had its own historical development,
as well as Preševo and Sandžak in the south with Muslim minorities. But
in terms of regional government experience, they hardly count as regions
on par with Vojvodina and Kosovo. Interestingly, recent political debates
have led to a new decentralization discourse that is dominated by the
newly formed party platform United Regions of Serbia (URS). This platform
demands more fiscal and administrative decentralization on a symmetric
basis for the entire country (while maintaining Vojvodina as the only de facto
autonomous province in Serbia).
16. Interviewee 21, Istrian County Administration, Department for Interna-
tional Cooperation and European Integration (IDS member).
17. It is disputable whether democratization in Croatia set in only in 2000.
Relatively free and open elections were held before the death of President
Tuąman. Yet I concur with Cohen (1997) that the way President Tuąman
led the country was authoritarian because his power was not controlled by
independent institutions and checks and balances.
18. Macedonia is another relevant case in which the Slavic and Albanian elites
engage in centre–periphery relations, albeit at the local level. Slovenia is a
homogeneous and centralized state with no politically relevant minorities
that are territorially concentrated.
19. Still, it is important to note that simply applying the logic of statistical
analysis and the degree-of-freedom problem to qualitative case studies is
186 Notes
not entirely appropriate. As Bennett and Elman (2006b: 473) argue, the
problem of over-determination in case study research rather “depends on
how the evidence within a case lines up with alternative explanations,
and how distinct or incompatible these explanations are in their predic-
tions about the processes within the case through which the outcome
arose.”
20. Designing such an affiliation matrix is very common in studies on interlock-
ing corporate directorates in sociology and business studies. See, for instance,
Mizruchi (1987).
2 A Framework for Studying Elite Access to Resources

1. But reality is often more complex. The reasons for the violent break-up of
Yugoslavia are far from being one dimensional and a sole consequence of
ethnicity-based group conflicts. Rather, it was a mixture of socio-political
and economic structures that paved the way to civil war (Crawford 1998).
Economic goals were crucial rationales for the decisions of political elites
to pursue secessionism and military conflict, and ethnicity was an instru-
ment to pursue these political interests (Iveković 1999; Kaldor 1999; Gagnon
2004).
2. Recent examples are the referenda on more autonomy or even independence
in Scotland and Catalonia in 2014. But even there, public opinion polls were
somewhat inconclusive. While large numbers of respondents would vote in
favour of independence, this support significantly falls once other options
on stronger decentralization are listed. Independence rhetoric is a consistent
feature of the discourse but by far not the dominant one because of the
unclear advantages and costs that full sovereignty would entail (Jeffery et al.
2012).
3. Dissatisfaction more broadly can be portrayed alongside three kinds of
policy problems: coordination problems, externalities/collective goods and
redistribution (see Scharpf 1997: 70–71).
4. Other authors stress Europeanization as a separate approach to understand-
ing domestic change (Börzel 1999; Bache and Jones 2000; Agh 2004; Hughes
et al. 2004). I chose to subsume the effect of the European Union on
decentralization reforms under “distributional pressures” because this con-
cept treats the new opportunities created by EU regional funds as one
form of opportunity structures among many others. After all, political elites
may instrumentalize both EU and governmental funds in comparable ways
(Brusis 2010).
5. Legislative theories of decentralization also highlight the importance of
rationally acting legislators or parliamentarians to understand the allocation
of competencies on different tiers of government. Parliamentarians seek re-
election. If they can gain vote shares by devolving competencies to regions
and are sufficiently powerful, they can trigger decentralization (Swenden
2006: 98).
6. I use their original framework to analyse the interdependent nature of the
relations between political elites and parties and their access to critical
resources. However, I do not examine the extent to which this embeddedness
Notes 187
has an impact on the organizational structure and its effectiveness, an aspect

that is beyond the scope of this book.
7. Notable exceptions to this exist but are explicitly confined to state–business
relations in transition countries. See, for instance, Nee (1992).
8. Elites are also key actors in connecting their parties to citizens via clientelist
relations rather than through programmatic campaigning (Kitschelt 2000).
9. Such elite pacts have figured very prominently in the democratization
literature. See, for instance, Karl (1990) and Przeworski (1991).
10. Weber alluded to the importance of patronage when he distinguished
between three practical orientations of political parties: to colonize the
administration through patronage, to defend class interests and to fight for
abstract principles (Weber 1972 [1921]: 167).
11. Other authors in the Rikerian tradition depict this paradox as a twin
dilemma: the centre can excessively intimidate the periphery, while the
periphery can free-ride and defect from cooperation (Riker 1964; de
Figueiredo and Weingast 2005). Federalism can overcome this dilemma
only by becoming self-reinforcing through pacts or explicit and strong
constitutions.
12. As a matter of fact, the post-Second World War history of Yugoslavia serves
as a vivid illustration: many elites in the periphery have been very keen
to expand their autonomy demands each time they have succeeded in
extracting concessions from the centre (Ramet 1992).
13. In Spain, for instance, this phenomenon is called café para todos: once
the four historical communities achieved more regional autonomy, other
regions followed and made similar demands which led to a series of new
autonomy statutes.
14. In the international relations literature, Koremenos et al. (2001: 778) sug-
gest that uncertainty has three dimensions that have an impact on any
attempt to rationally design international institutions: uncertainty over
actual behaviour, the state of the world and other actors’ true preferences.
Since the work of Keohane (1984) and others in the 1980s, international
institutions are suggested as the adequate means to reduce transaction costs
and the inherent uncertainties of international cooperation.
15. If the centre over-awes the periphery, resistance and secessionist rhetoric in
the periphery is very likely (Weingast 2005).
16. Subnational units have a veto over constitutional changes that alter the dis-
tribution of powers within the political system only in full-fledged federal
states. Otherwise, the centre is hierarchically superior to the periphery and
thus can force reforms on the periphery (Flora et al. 1999: 113ff.).
17. Here, it is important to note that even actors who rationally behave accord-
ing to classic economics may, in the end, face unintended consequences
of their actions, despite their goal-oriented conduct (Merton 1936). Even
institutional economics rely mainly on the rational actor assumption when
they suggest that institutions “limit the choice set of economic actors and
thereby reduce the uncertainty of the situation” (Beckert 1996: 813). In the
same vein, apparently irrational actor behaviour such as intuition – an action
that is based on an actor’s knowledge and experience at the time of the
decision – may actually result in the attainment of original goals. Unin-
tended consequences are thus an unavoidable problem of any purposeful
188 Notes
and non-purposeful action, and they contribute to the uncertainty that

underlies elite agreements on decentralization.
18. Haas (1992) argues that epistemic communities can, for instance, facilitate
international policy coordination by reducing the uncertainty that derives
from increasing technical complexities, particularly in the environmental
field.
19. It is also possible to conceive this aspect of uncertainty for the periphery
in terms of not knowing the true preference of national elites when they
promise decentralization reforms. Elites in the centre might have a spe-
cial interest in off-loading administrative burden to the periphery while
retaining most fiscal resources.
20. The centre has a dominant position in non-federal states concerning the
adoption of decentralization reforms because it steers the process and has to
agree to any reform. That is why the uncertainty stemming from potential
unintended consequences is less severe for the centre than for the periphery.
21. Uncertainty in transition societies that emerged from socialist rule is aggra-
vated by the “dilemma of simultaneity”: radical changes occurred in parallel
through the establishment of a democratic political system, a capitalist mar-
ket system and in many cases the creation of new or reborn nation-states
(Offe 1991; see also Habermas 1990).
22. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003 [1978]) suggest three criteria that make up the sig-
nificance of organizational resources: their critical nature (does the survival
of the organization depend on that resource?), the discretion over resource
allocation (is there a focal organization that controls that resource’s alloca-
tion?) and the degree to which control over that resource is concentrated
(are there alternative resources and how monopolized is control?).
23. A more encompassing approach to the study of resources deals with both
material and symbolic goods. The latter puts strong emphasis on the values
individuals and societies assign to different goods. For an overview, see Lin
(2001: 29ff.).
24. While some authors conceptualize patronage as one form of electoral
resource, the framework presented here treats them as distinct kinds of
resources. Patronage in my framework, as I will explain in more detail fur-
ther in this chapter, is more an organizational resource that allows parties
to influence policy-making and implementation and less about the individ-
ual relationship with citizens (Kopecký and Mair 2011; Kopecký et al. 2012).
In this understanding, votes and electoral resources are the basic require-
ment for patronage machines to work, but not the same concept (Johnston
1979).
25. As recent studies on international cooperation show, repeated interactions
are more likely to create trust between states if their relations are symmet-
rical, that is, if they hold similar degrees of relative power (Hafner-Burton
et al. 2009).
26. In the literature, authors attach different weights to the significance of
formal and informal institutions in the democratic process. On the one
side, early work on institutional economics (North and Weingast 1989) and
democratic consolidation (Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996) stresses
the role of formal democratic institutions, such as the electoral process
and horizontal checks and balances for consolidating new democracies.
Notes 189
On the other side, students of dysfunctional democracies emphasise that

informal institutions are at least as important as formal ones (O’Donnell
1996; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Especially where formal institutions are
weak, state and business actors resort to informal practices – such as blat
in Russia – as coping strategies for private gain, which often undermine
the democratic accountability of the state in transition societies (Ledeneva
2006).
27. Patronage resources in the periphery are only one kind of rent that the centre
can collect. Other rents derive from direct corruption and the redistribution
of income (de Figueiredo and Weingast 2005: 113).
28. In the corruption literature, Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) have used
a framework that also looks at different kinds of formal and informal
exchanges. They examine institutional and corrupt exchanges within net-
works of bribers and public officials.
29. Controlling the periphery is of course also a core objective in socialist author-
itarian states. Padgett (2012), for instance, finds that the Deng reforms in
1980s China equally constituted the turn towards a market economy and
the creation of a comprehensive patronage system in the provinces, which
cemented the Communist party’s reach into the periphery.
3 The Role of Institutional Legacies from Yugoslav

Decentralization
1. A more thorough and comprehensive analysis of centre–periphery relations
that encompasses the plethora of subnational units in former Yugoslavia is
beyond the scope of this book. For a general overview, see Ramet (1992).
2. Large parts of the legacies scholarship that examine public administration
reforms implicitly or explicitly refer mainly to post-socialist legacies (Meyer-
Sahling 2009).
3. It was only then that the term “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” was established in
order to express the integrationist nature of the state.
4. Prior to that, the king consented to an agreement (sporazum) with leading
Croatian politicians in which he made significant concessions to Croatia.
Among others, Croatia become one dukedom (banovina), thus uniting
different districts from Bosnia, Dalmatia and Dubrovnik (Lampe 2011: 92).
5. As a consequence, regional equalization and even regional development offi-
cially became the core objective of the federal state. However, first economic
problems and later on the political clout of some republics with strong polit-
ical representation prevented any form of effective re-distribution. Instead,
economic regionalism took the form of particularistic economic policies in
favour of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia at the expense of poorer republics and
provinces (Pleština 1992b: 169).
6. Latin American countries are very interesting in this regard. In authoritar-
ian Brazil under military President João Figueiredo, for instance, subnational
governors successfully demanded more authority (Eaton 2004; Falleti
2011).
7. Interestingly, in the 1950s Serbs were over-proportionally represented in the
federal administration and in the communist party (Pleština 1992b: 51). Yet
190 Notes
reforms against the immediate Serbian interest of being treated as a uni-

tary republic like all others could be passed. An explanation for this could
be the fact that most of the Serbs had been socialist partisans during the
Second World War and hence were more likely to believe in the superior
ideal of a multi-national socialist federation rather than in narrow national
interests.
8. Mussolini set a precedent for this when he pursued a radical Italianization of
Istria under his fascist rule.
9. E-mail correspondence with Prof. Darko Dukovski, University of Rijeka,
6 June 2011.
10. Bosnia was not a nation in its own rank in the early socialist categorization.
Only over time Bosnian Muslims obtained the status of a nation (Trbovich
2008: 143).
11. Polity II scores for centralization of political authority show that as of 1953
Yugoslavia was the only truly decentralized and federal state when com-
pared with the other so-called socialist federations of the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia.
12. Another part of state administration that was decentralized was the security
service. Under the insistence of Croat Ivan Krajačić the secret State Security
Administration/Service (UDBA) was decentralized, a decision taken at the
Brioni Plenum of the Fourth General Assembly of the Central Committee of
the Communist League (Schiller 2010: 139).
13. In addition to the six republics and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina
and Kosovo) the army had a veto right (Pleština 1992a: 140).
14. Partially, Serbian elites were compensated for this through their over-
proportionally high share in the presidencies of the League of Communists
at the regional level and their pre-dominance in the Yugoslav army (Cohen
1983). It was also the army leadership who had a formal veto right in federal
decision-making and supported the centralization efforts of Serbian conser-
vatives led by Milošević in the late 1980s (Pleština 1992a; Gagnon 1995:
151).
15. Indeed, the struggle between centralizers and decentralizers was central
to what should become the last significant effort of constitutional reform
to save faltering Yugoslavia in 1987. The Federal Presidency presented a
compromise proposal for reform that leaned towards the decentralization
demands of Slovenia while making the same concessions to the Serbian
desire for re-centralization (Dragović-Soso 2004: 178).
16. Smaller modifications were made in 1996 and 1997 with regard to the areas
dominated by Serbian forces during the war. The foreseen self-government
for predominantly Serb-populated areas was abolished because only a rel-
atively small number of Serbian refugees returned after the war (Jordan
2011: 80).
17. Interviewee 32, Former Country Director, World Bank.
18. Indeed, critical geography rightly posits that the question of scales as a
structuring element has not diminished with an ever more liberalized world
economy and the free flow of capital. Instead of an end of territoriality as
a basic ordering principle (Badie 1995), we have rather been witnessing an
on-going re-territorialization on different scales that are the result of social
construction (Brenner 1998; Keating 2003a).
Notes 191
4 Access to Electoral Resources

1. There are of course other factors that determine party relevance. For instance,
when NSWPs backed by large parts of the regional citizenry demand more
decentralization, other parties cannot ignore their demands. But for this
to apply, the NSWP has to be politically relevant which would be again
manifested in electoral results.
2. The question of what kind of political party constellation is associated with
effective policy outcomes merits further research but lies outside this book’s
scope. For a good overview, see Haggard and McCubbins (2001) and Roller
(2005) on the policy effectiveness of advanced democracies.
3. While my focus on electoral and related resources does not explicitly incor-
porate ideology and ideological affinity as a factor explaining coalition
formation (which Sartori (1976) views together with governing potential
as the two most important dimensions of party systems), it does of course
play into the decisions of elites from different parties to form governments.
Indirectly, this aspect is part of the decisions of NSWPs to grant access to
their electoral resources and enter into coalitions. But the main objective
for NSWPs remains the adoption of decentralization reforms according to
regional interests. For this, NSWPs may also support at first sight unlikely
parties that have a different ideological orientation. A prominent example is
Spain where regionalist parties in the 1990s supported the minority govern-
ments of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the conservative
Partido Popular despite ideological differences in exchange for progress on
granting more far-reaching autonomy (Keating and Wilson 2009).
4. In Western Europe, NSWPs that make moderate autonomy demands (short
of secessionism) and identify themselves ideologically along the left–right
spectrum are likely to gain more votes (de Winter et al. 2006). This aspect is
of course crucial at both the regional and the national level.
5. Blackmailing would be another effective way for NSWPs to influence decen-
tralization policies. But for this their coalition potential must be very high
or their support would have to be necessary for a reform that is of central
importance for a governing SWP.
6. As Deschouwer (2008) succinctly pointed out building on Sartori (1976), the
emergence of new parties follows a three-step process: first, they have to
show to established parties that they are important players with electoral
significance which increases their “blackmail potential”; second, new parties
have to demonstrate that they not only are using their electoral success for
opposing incumbent governments but rather have the ambitions and the
prerequisites to govern (governing or coalition potential); and finally, they
have to enter government and tap their governing or coalition potential
(Deschouwer 2008). In times when this potential is high, demands for more
autonomy are more likely to receive attention by central governments. So it
is not merely the share of seats NSWPs have in national parliaments that
determines their political influence but rather the extent to which they can
act as pivots in coalition formation.
7. If parties in such highly fragmented systems differ strongly in terms of their
ideological orientation, party competition becomes centrifugal: more and
more extremist views tend to become stronger.
192 Notes
8. Luhmann (1984) made a similar point based on different preliminary con-

siderations and hence he came to different conclusions. According to his
analysis, political parties have to reduce the number of policy options they
offer to the citizens in order to reduce complexity. That is why politicians
do not struggle for the right ideals, but for maximizing votes (Luhmann
1984). Luhmann sees this as a positive development that allows for discrete
choices by elected politicians that are likely to be accepted as legitimate by
the electorate. In the case of transition societies, however, I argue that vote
maximization becomes an end in itself that primarily serves the interests of
political elites and parties.
9. Simmel (1971) was the first to comprehensively elaborate why the qual-
ity of relations in groups with three or more individuals differs to simple
dyadic relationships which are the basis, for instance, of most game theo-
retic work. In triadic relations individuals are “less free, less independent,
more constrained” (Krackhardt 1999: 185).
10. From other cases of democratization, such as Brazil and other Latin American
countries, we know that fragmented and weakly institutionalized party
systems increase the autonomy and discretion of individual politicians
(Mainwaring 1999; Scherlis 2008).
11. Interviewee 29, Istrian Democratic Forum (IDF).
12. Interviewee 28, HNS.
13. Ibid.
14. Turnout data had to be gathered from different sources: the Electoral Com-
missions in Serbia and Croatia, the Economist Intelligence Unit, OSCE
Election Reports, Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), Freedom
House and Bochsler (2010).
15. Still, the dominance of the HDZ was restored in 2003, partly with the
help of re-designing electoral districts. Between 2003 and 2007, the ruling
HDZ established electoral districts for parliamentary elections in Croatia
that had little to do with natural units but rather aimed at the optimiza-
tion of HDZ votes (see also Fink-Hafner et al. 2011). That way, the votes
from Istria were even less attractive than their relatively modest number
would suggest. By optimizing their vote share, the HDZ was able to rule
for most of the post-2000 time. That way they also minimized HDZ’s need
for coalitional partners to form governments in the centre. This is a prime
example of how governing parties can use electoral rules and the size of
districts to shape political competition and the system as such (Lijphart
1994).
16. Together they formed an electoral alliance whose central promise is to give
more powers to the regional and local authorities. The IDS has stayed in
power in its own region and has once again become a serious challenger for
SWPs. Yet it remains to be seen to what extent decentralization reforms will
be adopted in the face of fiscal austerity measures since Croatia joined the
EU in 2013.
17. Vojvodina has a mixed electoral system in which half the seats in the
regional parliament are drawn from majoritarian lists and the other half
from proportional lists. This majoritarian element favours large parties. For
parliamentary elections, there are no electoral constituencies but rather the
entire country counts as one large unit. In contrast to Croatia, there is no
Notes 193
potential to manipulate the electoral law in such a way that it maximizes

vote shares.
18. More generally, in most of post-communist Europe political parties exhibit
a relatively strong degree of centralization and top-down organization (Van
Biezen 2003).
19. Interviewee 30, SDP.
20. Even more far-reaching was a provision (Art. 182, 3) that allowed other
regions to gain autonomy status if a majority of its citizens support the idea
in a referendum.
21. It is important to distinguish between the original population in Vojvodina
that has been living there for at least two generations and the refugees who
settled there during and after the civil wars in the 1990s. The latter are more
inclined towards conservative and nationalist political parties, and they have
not necessarily supported more autonomy for the province.
22. Interviewee 9, Former Vice Prime Minister, G17+.
23. According to the relevant constitutional provisions (Art. 179), the draft
statute was first amended and adopted in Vojvodina’s regional assembly.
In the national parliament it could only be rejected or adopted entirely
without any possibility for further amendments. That is why Pajtić knew he
could secure agreement both in the regional assembly where his government
enjoyed a comfortable majority of almost 60 per cent and in the national
parliament where the DS headquarters had signalled the government’s full
support.
24. Interviewee 5, Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM).
25. In a broader societal perspective, NSWPs were key supporters of pro-
democratic coalitions and contributed to keeping the radical nationalist SRS
at an arm’s length despite the latter’s electoral successes.
26. One reason for the steady support in Istria is that both presidents belong
to the social democratic and rather liberal spectrum of the political land-
scape. Traditionally, conservative candidates from the HDZ have had very
low support in Istria during Tuąman’s reign and thereafter.
27. Interviewee 5, SVM. On the question of Hungarian minority issues, see Zuber
(2013).
28. One reason why this proposal failed was that IDS elites were afraid that this
was not a faithful offer. Another more important reason is that the IDS did
not want to endanger its grip over regional affairs and institutions.
5 Information Exchange and Cooperation

1. Trust is indeed relevant both for virtuous and vicious relations and for the
democratic functioning of the state as well as the functioning of corrupt
exchanges that undermine democratic state institutions (Della Porta and
Vannucci 1999).
2. Embeddedness is a concept from sociology that stresses the interdependence
of actors and institutions and was introduced by Granovetter (1985). He
argued that “the behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained
by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a
grievous misunderstanding” (Granovetter 1985: 482).
194 Notes
3. As mentioned earlier, in 2002 the Omnibus Law returned some pow-

ers in education and cultural policies to Vojvodina. However, the main
negotiations on decentralization took place later.
4. In both countries, several new parties appeared on the political scene or
new associations or coordination bodies were founded after the period of
the drafting of new constitutions and autonomy statutes. The most relevant
example is the SRS that had most MPs in the Serbian Parliament and split
into two parties in October 2008; the SNS that emerged from this split was
the strongest opposition party in Serbia until 2012 but was disregarded from
the analysis because it was not present as a separate party in the parliament
during the period under consideration.
5. During the semi-structured interviews and surveys I conducted with repre-
sentatives of all organizations that were on this final list, I still asked each
interviewee for any additional organization they deemed important. This
helped me to avoid a biased selection of relevant actors.
6. In those cases where I was not able to arrange an interview, I sent an email
and asked respondents to send me their answers to the survey. This was done
in five cases.
7. However, not all the respondents themselves actively participated in the
negotiations on decentralization reforms. But given the relatively small elite
circles and the close connections within political parties, the responses
reflect the general patterns of interactions that were similarly present during
negotiations.
8. Only for three political parties in Serbia (SNS, SPS and DSS) I had to infer their
relations based on public statements of senior politicians and parliamentary
protocols. In my view, this approach is more suitable than using calculations
for missing values because the researcher can control which aspects and con-
tents of relations are relevant. As the relevant information is available in the
form of public statements and protocols, I chose a more conscious approach
to deal with missing values from the survey.
9. Betweenness measures to which degree information has to go through an
intermediary to reach others.
10. For Croatia, there was no non-governmental organization in the final
sample.
11. The expected value is based on the assumption that one would expect to find
more actors with coordination roles in large groups. It is calculated by ran-
domly assigning an organization to a different group. This step is repeated
more than a thousand times and the average of all scores is computed.
12. I used relative brokerage as metric that standardizes for group size (raw scores
divided by expected values of given group sizes) as suggested by Gould and
Fernandez (1989) and computed with UCINET. Because actual scores in the
numerator are higher than the expected scores in the denominator, all bro-
kerage scores are greater than 1. The more the brokerage score is above 1, the
stronger the position is compared to what we would have expected on the
basis of the size of the group.
13. Actual scores in the numerator are higher than the expected scores in the
denominator, which leaves us with values that are greater than 1 for all
relative brokerage scores.
Notes 195
15. We can observe this latter phenomenon in a slightly different modus

operandi, for instance, also in Ukraine where the central government has
installed itself as hub-and-spoke through which all relations among regional
and local units in the periphery must go in the form of clientelist relations
(Darden 2008; Stroschein and Kurtoglu Eskisar 2009).
6 Access to Patronage Resources

1. After the European Commission had criticized 24 privatization cases, among
them ATP Vojvodina, the Serbian state prosecution began investigations in
April 2012 after the European Parliament publicly called for an examination
of these cases. See European Parliament (2012).
2. According to World Bank Governance Indicators on the control of corrup-
tion, Croatian efforts to curb corruption have deteriorated since 2000. For
Serbia, the control-of-corruption scores have improved over the past decade
but are still lower than for Croatia.
3. Fukuyama (2011) shows convincingly how in a more historical trajectory
the transition from nepotistic and clientelist recruitment to meritocratic
systems has determined a society’s socio-economic development and the
establishment of stable political orders.
4. One might argue that endogeneity then becomes a problem because once
decentralization reforms are enacted the distribution of patronage resources
may change the expectations about access to patronage resources and, hence,
have an impact on future adaptations to such reforms. But as this chapter
shows, public sector recruitment and patronage considerations already play
a major role before the enactment of such reforms.
5. Empirically, the hypothesis concerning ethnic heterogeneity and its neg-
ative impact on public goods provision seems to be the most robust one
(Habyarimana et al. 2007).
6. An additional aspect is the nature of the newly established political parties in
transition societies. They are often centred on key political and charismatic
leaders. In other words, they still need time to become truly programmatic
parties. In the absence of programmatic parties, we are less likely to find
meritocratic public sector recruitment (Cruz and Keefer 2010).
7. This strategy, however, is by no means limited to transition societies. French
social policy in the 1980s, for instance, had a similar goal when it tried to
compensate for the losses imposed by necessary industrial reforms through
increasing public employment (Levy 2005).
8. Indeed, if such practices persist over long periods, clientelism and patron-
age become defining features of a state. For a historical study of Greek
governments, see Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2003).
9. Concerning the scope of conditions under which decentralization is associ-
ated with government growth, Rodden (2003) has shown that this relation-
ship is strongest when the subnational units are financed primarily through
inter-governmental transfers and not by collecting their own taxes. One rea-
son for this is the increased scrutiny and accountability exercised by citizens
regarding regional and local government spending when it is financed with
local tax money. In the absence of this accountability mechanism, local and
196 Notes
regional governments are more likely to increase spending with increasing

powers.
10. The expansion of public sector employment has only been stronger at the
municipal level with 28.7 per cent over the same period. But these figures
are likely to underestimate the real situation because data on public utilities
and regional and local SOEs is not consistently available and has thus not
been included in these figures.
11. For Serbia the net completion rate was 27 per cent, whereas for Croatia it
was higher with 46 per cent. One reason for this variation could be that
the regional level in Serbia only referred to the Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina. Given the specificities of Vojvodina, not all experts might have
felt comfortable answering questions not within their remit of expertize.
For Croatia, on the other hand, the regional level referred to all 20 coun-
ties and the capital Zagreb; thus, more valid assessments could be expected
from experts because research and data on county-level administration is
much more developed than in Serbia where it is limited to Vojvodina. Recent
reform debates on the need to regionalize and decentralize the Serbian polit-
ical system will most likely trigger more research on regional- and local-level
phenomena in the near future.
12. The World Bank’s governance indicators for Croatia during the period 2007–
2009 diagnose at the same time a deterioration of its control of corruption
scores from 0.08 to –0.02. The standard units of the index run from –2.5 to
2.5 with larger scores indicating better outcomes.
13. For specific economic sectors some analysts argue that delayed privatization
has been very costly for firms and employment rates. On the textile indus-
try in Serbia, see European Stability Initiative (2006). More generally, badly
managed privatization has not been able to compensate for the massive job
destruction resulting from two decades of deindustrialization in the Balkans
(Knaus and Udovički 2012).
14. Several leading politicians from the DS have called publicly for a de-
politicization of SOEs, claiming that SOEs are not professionally managed.
See Politika (2011).
15. The turn towards outsourcing public tasks to semi-independent agencies –
also propagated by new public management reforms – is often used as a
means to increase control over policy-making (Peters and Pierre 2004: 6).
16. Interestingly, in its strategy paper from 2009 the European Commission
stresses the need for further privatization under the heading of the rule
of law.
17. In that sense, patronage is far more effective than simple pork barrel: once
pork is distributed through government spending in a constituency, it can-
not be withdrawn; but political appointees in SOEs and agencies give elites
and parties control over the distribution of pork barrel and they must prove
their loyalty continuously because their benefits can be withdrawn (Green
2011).
18. Many of the interviewees in the region mentioned unaccountability as a
problem in Istria where one political party has been dominating political and
social affairs for two decades. This is the main reason why a new grassroots
movement led by a local businessman has emerged and turned into the
political party Ladonja. In their first regional elections in 2009 they obtained
18 per cent of the votes.
Notes 197
19. For a detailed account of all legal provisions, see the Law on the Remuner-
ation in Local and Regional Self-Government and the Law on Officials in
Local and Regional Self-Government.
20. See Istrian Assembly, Motion to Abolish Supervisory Bodies. Available at:
http://www.istra-istria.hr/index.php?id=2923 (accessed on 10 August 2011).
21. Odluka o Popisu pravnih osoba od posebnog državnog interesa, NN 144/2010
[Decision on the List of Legal Entities of Special State Interest].
22. Zakon o sprječavanju sukoba interesa, NN 26/2011 [Law on the Prevention of
Conflict of Interest].
23. It seems reasonable that politicians should only serve for one paid public
mandate that in most cases equals full-time employment. Interestingly, in
France for example, it is common practice that many members of parlia-
ment are at the same time mayors or municipal or regional councillors which
allows them to keep close contact with their electoral constituencies.
25. Interviewee 5, SVM.
26. Interviewee 20, Independent Regional Development Consultant.
27. This is facilitated by the Law on Officials and Employees in Local and
Regional Self-Government (Art. 5) that gives county prefects the power to
nominate heads of departments in the regional administration.
28. Interviewee 22, Environmental NGO Zelena Istra (Green Istria).
29. Interviewee 24, Istrian Development Agency.
30. Interviewee 25, Istrian County Administration (IDS member).
31. Indeed, the importance of informal linkages cannot only be found in post-
socialist states. In Italy’s First Republic, regional political elites have used
the periphery “as a resource in clientelistic linkages to the centre” (Keating
2003a: 266).
32. Interlocking directorates are a key element of business relations and serve
both competitive and cooperative purposes. See Mizruchi (1987).
7 Conclusions
1. I coded the relations in coalition governments of all relevant parties in the
centre and periphery on an ordinal scale: 0 = never together in a coalition
government, 1 = together in a coalition government for less than five years,
2 = together in a coalition government for five or more years.
2. Bosnia–Herzegovina is an exception. Various studies look at this supposedly
crucial case of ethno-federalism and war legacies (Andreas 2004; Whitt and
Wilson 2007; Bose 2008), but this rather reinforces the tendency to look at
the same countries under the perspective of ethnic politics.
3. In that sense, patronage exchanges are very similar to cases of corruption.
When individuals engage in corrupt exchanges, they have to trust each other
(Della Porta 2000). Defection and the uncovering of illegal or illegitimate
practices would be costly for all those involved.
4. Some scholars estimate the accuracy rate of measurements trying to capture
communication networks to be as low as 40–60 per cent (Marsden 1990;
Fowler et al. 2011).
5. When working with network data, we are well advised to specifically exam-
ine the interaction of different causal mechanisms: “Network data are, by
198 Notes
definition, interactional in character, so ‘search for mechanisms’ means

search for interactional mechanisms” (Fowler et al. 2011: 470).
6. See Myrdal’s (1971) seminal work on cumulative causation in the context
of economic development as an illustrative example for self-reinforcing
processes.
7. In a way, such self-reinforcing decentralization resembles what institution-
alists coined self-reinforcing federalism (de Figueiredo and Weingast 2005;
Weingast 2005). But it differs from their view because it relies more on
informal practices and relations and less on strong institutions. An open
question, then, is how durable such processes can be without strong formal
institutions.
8. As briefly touched upon in Chapter 2, current austerity measures result-
ing from the financial and economic crisis have also partly triggered new
demands for independence in the two historical regions of Scotland and
Catalonia. But even in such exceptional situations, I would argue that the
distribution of patronage resources matters. In Scotland, patronage networks
extend to business elites who are very much in favour of staying in the
United Kingdom (Hazel 2001). In Catalonia, the issue is more complex and
a more likely case for secession because regionalist elites have been more
concerned with autonomy questions rather than with bargaining over pork
barrel (Gordin 2009: 401).
9. Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia had special status and were
declared historical nationalities.
10. But the statewide People’s Party (PP) has dominated political life in Galicia
for decades (Wilson 2009).
11. Unlike in Croatia and Serbia, it is more difficult to assume that elite groups
and parties are unitary and cohesive. Most Spanish political parties have
varying degrees of internal factionalism concerning territorial questions
(Verge and Gómez 2012).
12. This is almost twice as much as in other comparable regions like the Basque
Country (20 per cent) or Catalonia (24 per cent). See Financial Times (2012).
13. Yet former president of the Catalan government Jordi Pujol declared in the
summer of 2014 that he had hidden large amounts of partly illicit funds in
foreign bank accounts during his 23-year mandate. This scandal involving
several family members triggered the creation of a Parliamentary Commis-
sion to investigate fiscal fraud and corruption in Catalonia more broadly (El
País 2014).
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Index
Afghanistan, 172–3 Linić, Slavko (1949–), 122

Arab Spring, 172 Mesić, Stjepan (1934–), 98–9
autonomy Ministry of Finance, 112, 116
autonomaši, 6 Parliament (sabor), 20, 85, 90, 92
autonomisti, 6, 40 political system, 62, 79, 90
cultural, 2, 25, 96, 135, 167 Račan, Ivica (1944–2007), 90
negotiations, 11, 29, 43, 46–7, 51 Slavonia, 79
regional autonomy, 6–8 Social Democratic Party of Croatia
self–governance, 6–7, 9, 169 (SDP), 20, 92–4, 115, 117, 122,
statute, 7, 9, 11 148
Tuąman, Franjo (1922–1999), 20,
Balkanization, 2 78, 80, 90, 101
Balkans, see Western Balkans Zagreb, 18, 75, 93, 143
Bourdieu, Pierre (1930–2002), xii, 86, see also Istria
163
brokerage, see social networks
Dayton Peace Agreement (1995), 23
decentralization
centre–periphery relations
cleavages, 1, 37, 86, 126 administrative, 7–8, 28, 48–9, 125,
see also resources 167
commitment problem allocative efficiency, 37, 45, 125
time inconsistency, 48 asymmetrical, 8, 169
see also decentralization bounded rationality, 11, 53
consociationalism, xi, 64, 72 commitment problem, 11, 39, 45–9,
corruption, 88, 121–8, 138, 150, 172 57, 104, 160–2
Croatia (1992–) democratic participation, 12, 125,
Christmas Constitution (1990), 78 172
Constitution (2001), 10, 90, 99, 106 distributional pressure, 24, 41–2, 43,
counties (županije), 10, 14, 18, 66, 167–8
79, 131 fiscal, 7–8, 15, 28, 41
Croatian County Association identity pressure, 3, 5, 16, 23–4,
(Hrvatska zajednica županija), 94 37–40, 62, 166–7
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), incomplete contract, 11–12, 48, 54,
20, 80, 89–90, 93–4, 99, 115–17, 105, 161
136, 148, 159 information asymmetries, 48
Croatian People’s Party – Liberal legislative, 186
Democrats (HNS), 20, 98–9, opportunism, 11
115, 136 pre–existing institutional
Dalmatian Action, 80 framework, 24, 42–4, 104, 168
divide and rule, 20, 69, 116, 172 promise of good governance, 125,
Fimi Media scandal, 122 169
House of Counties, 20 public administration efficiency,
Josipović, Ivo (1957–), 98 125, 143
225
226 Index
decentralization – continued seat share, 92, 162

regionalized states, 4, 7–8, 15, 17, voter turnout, 91
153, 156 winning coalitions, 93–6
symmetrical, 113 winning margin, 97–8
unitary decentralized states, 7–8, 15, elites, see political elites
18, 153, 158 ethnicity
democracy conflict, 2–4, 78, 156
democratization, 15, 39, 47, decentralization mitigating
57–8, 61, 63–4, 83, 85, 125, conflicts, 57, 126, 161
129 security dilemma, 38–9, 48
fourth wave of democratization, 172 violence, 2–5
manage uncertainty, 57–8 EU, see European Union
third wave of democratization, 170 European Union
see also electoral resources cohesion policy, 43
distributional pressure enlargement, 24, 36, 39
Development Partners Working European Commission, 39, 132,
Group on Decentralization & 140, 143
Local Governance, 12
donor policies, 12–14, 80, 126, 149, federalism
169–75 Federalist Papers, 1
EU incentives, 15, 24–5, 43, 156, federal paradox, 48–50, 53–4, 61,
162 71, 85, 116, 118, 160
implications of ill–designed self–rule, 6–7, 10, 39, 42, 87, 96,
decentralization, 126, 169, 175 166, 172–4
opportunity structure, 29, 41, 43, shared rule, 6–7, 42, 173
58, 159, 162
socialist federations, 77
UK Department for International
Fukuyama, Francis (1952–), xi, 163
Development (DfID), 175
see also decentralization
Granovetter, Mark (1943–), 53, 105
Eastern Europe, 15
Czechoslovakia, 15, 77 Huntington, Samuel P. (1927–2008), 7,
Czech Republic, 15, 63 170
Hungary, 15, 63, 67
Poland, 63, 130 Identity pressure
Slovenia, 65–8, 71–2 ethnic minorities, 5, 24, 38, 45
Elazar, Daniel J. (1934–1999), 6 national unity, 1, 5, 40, 80
electoral resources see also ethnicity
co–optation, 30, 57, 97, 100, 102, informality, 52, 165–6, 172
151, 157 informal relations, see resources; trust
electoral data, 30, 34, 92, 95, 98, information exchange
123, 155 credible commitment, 11, 45–9, 52,
electoral platforms, 42, 88–9, 117 56, 104, 153, 156, 161–2
electoral system, 88–91 enforcement of agreements, 48, 58,
fragmentation, 87 103, 105
governing potential, 52, 84, 87 see also social networks
hyper–presidentialism, 97 institutions
multi–level game, 86 weak institutions, 83–4, 104,
presidential elections, 90, 92, 97–9 162–3
Index 227
Iraq patronage resources

Kurdish autonomy, 172–3 citizen trust, 138, 163
patronage politics, 172 elite anticipation, 2–3, 103, 126,
Istria 137, 152–3, 156, 161–2
Arena Turist, 122 expert survey, 30, 124, 129, 132–3,
Austrian rule, 65 180
development agencies, 147–8
fiscal constraints, 132, 135–6
Free Territory of Trieste, 66
growth of public sector
Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS),
employment, 30, 123–5, 127,
10, 20, 78, 80, 122, 136, 138,
130–2, 134–5, 137, 171
144, 147, 150–1, 159
Italian rule, 65, 70 impartiality undermined, 126, 128
Jakovčić, Ivan (1957–), 90, 122 Institute for Public Administration,
opposition to Tuąman’s policies, 133
101 International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Italy 132, 135–6
fear of irredentism, 74 interorganizational linkages, 151
Mezzogiorno, xi legal corruption, 124, 138
Treaty of Rapallo, 66 Local Government and Public
see also Istra Service Reform Initiative (LGI),
133
Keating, Michael (1950–), 6, 12, 39 methodological challenges, 142–3
Krastev, Ivan (1965–), 63
micro-level data, 3, 44, 129, 140,
166
legacies
authoritarian, 4, 9, 49, 60–1, 77–81 monopolization, 28, 56, 138, 140–1,
chicken–egg problem, 42 148, 153, 158, 162
critical junctures, 78–9, 82 motivation for patronage, 124, 127,
historical institutionalism, 62 129, 133, 139–40, 143
multiple legacies, 63 Network of Institutes and Schools of
nationalist, xi, 16, 23, 60, 68, 74, Public Administration in
77–81 Central and Eastern Europe
path dependence, 60, 61–2, 65, 80, (NISPAcee), 133
166 partisan influence, 14, 47, 122–3,
pre–socialist legacies, 65–7 127, 132–7, 140, 143, 153, 162
socialist legacies, 24, 61, 63, 67–9 partitocracy, 142
see also decentralization; institutions patronage, 124
Libya, 172 political machine, 127
Lijphart, Arend (1936–), 51, 64
Regional Centre for Public
Administration Reform
Mayntz, Renate (1929–), 26, 29, 47,
(RCPAR), 133
104, 110
state–owned enterprises, 31, 33, 52,
Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873), xi
55, 121, 133, 140–51, 156, 166
millet system, 66
Transparency International, 142
North, Douglass (1920–), 175 undersupply of public goods, 126
Northern Africa, 172 see also public sector; resources;
transition states
Offe, Claus (1940–), 45, 80, 138 Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1946–), 45, 47–8, 100
228 Index
political elites research design

access to resources, 47, 50, 152, 154 agency–based approach, 27–8
bargaining, 29, 38, 40–2, 45, 49, backward–looking (y–centred), 21
51–2, 58, 87, 99, 104, 130, 163 case selection, 23–4
cognitive maps, 57 causal chain, 25–9
co–optation, see electoral resources causal mechanism, 26–7
durable agreement, 11 comparative case studies, 5, 21–2,
feedback loops, 161 169
networks, 104 method of difference, 23
norms of reciprocity, xi, 53, 163 most–similar, 23
politician’s dilemma, 161 over–determination, 24–5
power–seeking, 45, 56 paired comparison, 15, 21, 129
rationality, 11, 48, 53, 84, 137, process tracing, 23, 26–7, 165
161–2 selection bias, 3, 22, 25–6
rotation, 159 triangulation, 33, 129, 165
see also resources; strategic resource dependency
cooperation; social capital; trust organization studies, 45, 159
political parties see also resources
arenas for the interaction of elites, resources
27, 85, 104 dependence on external
“centric–regional” parties, 87 environment, 45–7, 58
non–statewide parties (NSWPs), 30 embeddedness, 50, 61, 103, 158,
principal–agent relationship, 88 166
statewide parties (SWPs), 30 exchange theory, 50
public sector extent of sharing across
effectiveness, 137, 180–1 centre–periphery divide,
meritocratic, 109–10 154–6
politicization, 55, 80, 84, 121–2, interdependence, 50–2
128–30, 137, 140–5 see also electoral resources;
rent–seeking, 88, 175 patronage resources; political
state–owned enterprises, 55, 121–3, elites; resource dependency;
140 information exchange
see also patronage resources Rokkan, Stein (1921–1979), 1
Putnam, Robert D. (1941–), xi, 53
Salancik, Gerald R. (1943–1996), 45,
47–8, 100
qualitative interviews
Sartori, Giovanni (1924–), 24, 52,
questionnaire, 31–2
84, 87
reliability, 31
“satisficing regionalism”, 16
sampling, 32
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1935–), 21, 26, 29,
validity, 31, 165
47, 104, 110
Serbia (1992–)
reforms Anti–Corruption Agency, 121, 144
liberalization, 13, 71, 88 Constitution (2006), 18, 91, 95–6,
partial reform, 11 107
regional development, 16, 24, 41, 71, Constitutional Court, 115, 145
74, 143, 147, 167 Democratic Opposition of Serbia
regionalism, 6 (DOS), 89, 92, 95, 135
Index 229
Democratic Party (DS), 86, 92–3, Eigenvector centrality, 117

96–7, 99, 145, 157 elite survey,
Democratic Party (DS) branch in 108–9
Vojvodina (DS–VOJV), 100, gatekeepers, 109, 111–13
112–13, 115, 117–19, 146–7, influence, 108–9, 110
157 information exchange, 108–9
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), overcoming information problems,
93, 96, 98, 100, 135 152, 160
G17+, 93, 102 relational data, 29–30, 106, 108–9
Kosovo, 9, 16, 17–18, 68–70, 72, 76, relative brokerage, 109, 112
79, 136 selection mechanisms, 164–5
Koštunica, Vojislav (1944–), 96, 98, semi–structured interviews, 21, 31,
135 33, 107, 109
Law on Government (2005), 96 social network analysis, 29–31, 35,
Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006), 103, 165
9–10, 17, 74, 77–9, 89–90, 92, strategic cooperation, 102, 105,
141 108–10, 116–17, 155
Ministry of Economy and Regional Spain
Development, 115 Andalusia, 171
Ministry of Finance, 115 Basque Country, 8, 128, 171
Nikolić, Tomislav (1952–), 99 Catalonia, 8, 20, 171
Omnibus Law (2002), 9, 17, 95–6, Convergence and Union (CiU), 171
131, 135 Francisco Franco Bahamonde
Parliament, 5, 9, 91, 95–7, 99, 107, (1892–1975), 20, 170
144–5 fueros, 8
Sandžak, 101 Navarre, 8
Serbian Radical Party (SRS), 92, People’s Party (PP), 171
99–100, 117 Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC),
Serbian Renewal Movement–New 171
Serbia (SPO–NS), 93 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
State Audit Institution, 121 (PSOE), 171
State Union of Serbia and Valencia, 171
Montenegro (2003–2006), 15 state–building, 1, 14–15, 101, 166,
Šumadija, 101 172
Tadić, Boris (1958–), 86, 96, 98–9, strategic cooperation
115, 145 interdependent resources, 50–2
see also Vojvodina see also social networks; trust
Simon, Herbert A. (1916–2001), structural accounts, 36–44
11, 16
social capital, xi–xii, 35, 53, 138, territory
163–4 boundaries, 2, 71
socialism, 63, 67, 68 policy communities, 12
social networks secessionism, 28, 38–9, 48, 70, 97,
Bonacich score, 108, 117 116, 174
boundaries, 106 transition states
brokers, 109–10 clientelism, 101, 128, 141, 174
centralization, 110–11 dilemma of simultaneity, 138
density, 105, 154–6, 160 informal institutions, 52, 81
domination, 108 privatization, 121–2, 130, 140–3
230 Index
transition states – continued Petrović, Dragoslav (1949–), 115

World Bank, 140, 142 see also Serbia
see also reforms; uncertainty
trust Weber, Max (1864–1920), 80, 108
organizational hedging, 50, 53, Western Balkans
58–9 Albania, 15, 70
trustworthiness, 11, 53–5, 85, 117, Bosnia–Herzegovina, 15, 23, 68, 97
158 low social capital, 138, 163
see also federalism – federal paradox; Macedonia, 15, 68
patronage; uncertainty Montenegro, 15, 68
Tunisia, 172 quadruple transition, 138
see also Serbia; Croatia
Ukraine, 170, 173–4
uncertainty Yugoslavia; Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
relational contracting, 11, 50 and Slovenes (1918–1929),
unintended consequences, 49, 51, 65–7
54, 102, 105 Yugoslavia; Kingdom (1929–1945)
see also federalism, federal paradox; departments (oblasti), 66
trust; resource dependency; dukedoms (banovine), 66
resources Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic
United States of America (USA), 1 (1945–1992)
accommodative elite practices, 60,
Vojvodina 64
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians Anti–Bureaucratic Revolution
(SVM), 97, 100, 146–7, 157 (1986–1989), 79
Autonomous Province, 9, 14, 17, associations of municipalities
68–9, 72, 74, 79, 87, 91 (zajednice općina), 70, 74
Autonomy Statute (2009), 5, 9–10, autonomous provinces, 67–9, 73–4,
17–18, 86, 91, 93, 95–7, 99, 107, 77–9
113, 115, 135, 156 Broz Tito, Josip (1892–1980), 23,
Autotransport Company Vojvodina 67–78, 80–1
(ATP), 121 centralization, 69–70
Government of the Autonomous Collective Presidency, 75–6
Province, 96, 113, 117, 135 constituent nations, 70, 77
Habsburg Empire, 17, 63, 66–7 Constitutional Act (1953), 68
Hungarian minority, 24, 65, 67, 70, Ćosić, Dobrica (1921–2014), 73–4
100, 146–7 decentralization, 70–4
Law on Establishing the economic equalization, 68
Competences of the federal institutions, 33, 68, 70, 72–3,
Autonomous Province of 75–7, 79–80
Vojvodina (2009), 115 Fourth Plenum of the League of
League of Social Democrats in Communists (1966), 73
Vojvodina (LSV), 97, 100, 113, Free Territory of Trieste
117, 119, 122, 147, 157 (1947–1954), 66
National Investment Plan, 146 hegemonic exchange relationship,
Novi Sad City Council, 121 77
Pajtić, Bojan (1970–), 96–7, 113, Kardelj, Edvard (1910–1979), 72
115, 145 London Memorandum 1954, 70
Pastor, Ištvan (1956–), 147 nationalities, 63, 67, 70, 77
Index 231
Party Executive Committee, 70–1 Yugoslavia (1992–2003)

regional oligarchies, 73 civil war, 2–3, 5, 16, 23, 78–80, 82,
republics, 60–1, 65, 67–74 97, 138
self–management, 62, 68, 76 International Criminal Tribunal for
see also Istria former Yugoslavia, 89

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New Perspectives on South-East Europe

Series Advisory Board:

Richard Crampton, Emeritus Professor of Eastern European History at

Titles in the series include:

Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyürek and Umut Özkirimli (editors)

New Perspectives on South-East Europe

List of Figures and Tables ix

1 Centre–Periphery Relations in the Balkans 1

2 A Framework for Studying Elite Access to Resources 36

3 The Role of Institutional Legacies from Yugoslav

4 Access to Electoral Resources 83

5 Information Exchange and Cooperation 102

5.2 Methodological note 106

6 Access to Patronage Resources 121

1.1 Classifying the territorial structure of Serbia and Croatia 9

1.1 The territorial structure of post-socialist states in Europe 15

When travelling through the Balkans, one is confronted with many

of power and interest in narrow elite networks. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986)

My family has provided me with so much support through all the

APV-GOV Government of the Autonomous Province Vojvodina

Young democracies and transition societies face many challenges that

and the quasi-inbuilt need for some kind of decentralization arrange-

reforms that result in varying territorial structures. I substantiate this

Several others have already provided more nuanced and profound

1.1 Problem definition and research question

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between

regional interests that may lead to an institutional accommodation of

1.2 Regional autonomy and decentralization

from the subnational government. This is where the term “autonomy”

governments that still “remain subordinate to the central government”

Unitary decentralized Regionalized

Croatia (1991) Croatia (2001–03)

Figure 1.1 Classifying the territorial structure of Serbia and Croatia

(Keating 1999; von Beyme 2003: 240; Swenden 2006). In federal or

representative offices in Brussels and other regions.8 Thus, Vojvodina

decentralized. But Croatia has remained a unitary decentralized state,

Decentralization as an incomplete contract

often partially complete, resulting in a plethora of incomplete contracts

Decentralization in transition societies and donor policies

this process of decentralization becoming a development paradigm, the

government, on average a stronger increase can be observed in pub-

1.3 The case studies: Serbia and Croatia in the context

The wide array of studies on decentralization and federalism in

Table 1.1 The territorial structure of post-socialist states in Europe

State system Post-socialist countries

Confederation Serbia and Montenegro (until

state Serbia (1990–2002), Croatia

Source: Own compilation based on a report by the European University Institute

societies. In most of these countries, the regional entities are mainly

Serbia: A regionalized state

Figure 1.2 Map of Serbia

We can, therefore, categorize contemporary Serbia as an asymmetri-

Croatia: A unitary decentralized state

Figure 1.3 Map of Croatia

and multi-cultural character of the regional identity (Ashbrook 2006;

manifested by Serbia as an asymmetrically regionalized state and Croatia

1.4 Research design, methodology and case selection

In this section, I first present my methodological approach and research

Dealing with typical problems of case studies

contributes very little to the explanation of the variation in the depen-

autonomy in socialist Yugoslavia. Economically more developed than

decentralized powers to Vojvodina, which restored Serbia as an asym-

Process tracing for identifying causal chains and unveiling

reforms and territorial structures in transition countries. I discuss the