Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253

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Industrial Marketing Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/indmarman

Collaborating to shape markets: Emergent collective market work T

a,⁎ b
Jonathan J. Baker , Suvi Nenonen
a
Auckland University of Technology, Faculty of Business, Economics & Law, New Zealand
b
University of Auckland Business School, New Zealand

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Research into ‘market-shaping’ – the deliberate shaping by firms and other actors of market behavior, structures,
Market-shaping expectations and practices – has primarily taken either system-level or micro-level practice perspectives. Instead,
Social emergence this research focuses on ‘collective market work’ – the orchestrated purposeful actions of a collaboration to shape
Institutional work a market. In synthesizing the social emergence paradigm and the institutional work framework, this study ex-
Market work
amines the different types of market work undertaken as a meso-level collective evolves. Drawing on primary
Collaboration
Collective market work
and secondary data, this paper explores the historic case of a collaboration by small New Zealand wineries to
gain acceptance of the screwcap closure on premium wine in the early 2000s. We find collective market work
travels through three stages: ‘coalescing,’ ‘legitimizing,’ and ‘using market clout.’ Each stage functions as an
intermediate frame within the market system, progressively enabling and emboldening the collaborators to take
action and impact increasing numbers of larger actors and market gatekeepers.

“…it showed that you can shape the market even if you're small” However, as markets are generated and influenced by a multitude of
(Research participant) market actors, more attention is needed as to how collective action
creates change through time (Kindström, Ottosson, & Carlborg, 2018;
Taillard, Peters, Pels, & Mele, 2016). Collective action might be as
1. Introduction
elaborate as multiple actors or organizations formally collaborating, but
also might be as simple as two individual humans agreeing to work
As markets become more complex, an increasing number of scholars
together.
are adopting a systems-perspective of markets (Giesler & Fischer, 2017;
Here, we explore how coordinated collective action deliberately
Vargo, Wieland, & Akaka, 2015). Such a perspective recognizes that,
shapes markets, specifically regarding the collaborative efforts of small
rather than being fixed and stable, markets are ‘plastic’ (eco)systems
firms that do not have the power of large market influencers. To un-
capable of both holding and changing shape (Nenonen et al., 2014).
dertake this study we integrate two frameworks, one from neoinstitu-
This shaping results from activities enacted by any number of multiple
tional theory and the other from sociology. First, to enable analysis of
heterogeneous actors that comprise them (Harrison & Kjellberg, 2016;
the deliberate actions taken by a collective to shape institutionalized
Kjellberg, Azimont, & Reid, 2015; Nenonen, Storbacka, & Frethey-
market elements, we adopt the ‘institutional work’ lens (Chaney,
Bentham, 2019; Vargo et al., 2017). As activities change so does the
Carrillat, & Zouari, 2018; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Michel,
‘shape’ of the market, e.g., the behaviors or expectations of market
Saucède, Pardo, & Fenneteau, 2018). Institutional work is defined as
actors; the combination or numbers of competitors, customers or
“the purposive actions of individuals and organizations aimed at
others; or the structure or representations within the market (Nenonen
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence &
et al., 2019).
Suddaby, 2006, p.215). Inspired by this framework, the activities en-
To date, scholarly attention towards ‘market-shaping’ has been
gaged in by market actors to maintain or change markets are called
largely focused on either the micro-level practices performed by market
‘market work’ – the “purposeful efforts by a focal actor to perform and
actors that generate macro-market structures (e.g., Araujo & Kjellberg,
transform markets” (Nenonen et al., 2019, p.251). Although markets
2011; Azimont & Araujo, 2007; Harrison & Kjellberg, 2016; Kjellberg &
can be influenced by combinations of market actors, market work stu-
Helgesson, 2007; Nenonen, Storbacka, & Windahl, 2019), or the gra-
dies typically consider the actions of one focal actor (Chaney et al.,
dual evolution of macro-level market systems (e.g., Baker, Storbacka, &
2018; Kjellberg & Olson, 2017; Rosa, Porac, Runser-Spanjol, & Saxon,
Brodie, 2019; Giesler, 2008; Humphreys, 2010; Rosa & Spanjol, 2005).

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jonathan.baker@aut.ac.nz (J.J. Baker), s.nenonen@auckland.ac.nz (S. Nenonen).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2019.11.011
Received 23 June 2019; Received in revised form 7 October 2019; Accepted 8 November 2019
Available online 21 November 2019
0019-8501/ © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
1999; Rosa & Spanjol, 2005). Put differently, complex market systems
are not just the product of actions taken by singular market actors but
are shaped through the interactions of market actors (Storbacka, 2019).
Hence, the second framework we integrate into this study is the
social emergence paradigm (Sawyer, 2005; Taillard et al., 2016), which
considers how individuals, armed with their own personal qualities and
intentions, begin to interact, then mobilize as an ephemeral (tem-
porary) collective, then operate as a stable collective. The integration of
this framework enables exploration of the various types of collective
market work undertaken at different stages of a collaboration's evolu-
tion. Ultimately, collective market work can shape a complex market
system beyond what might have been thought possible by the colla-
boration's constituent parts.
Several recent studies in industrial marketing have adopted an in-
stitutional perspective of various B2B network phenomena, such as
temporary B2B network relationships (e.g., Michel, Saucède, Pardo, &
Fenneteau, 2018; Palmer, Medway, & Warnaby, 2017), industrial R&D
projects (Jabbouri, Truong, Schneckenberg, & Palmer, 2019), and the
power dynamics between suppliers and buyers (Palmer, Simmons,
Robinson, & Fearne, 2015). However, collaboration for the sake of
market-shaping remains under-researched in both the industrial mar-
keting and institutional literatures (Christiansen & Kroezen, 2016).
Hence, the question this study poses is, “What kinds of market work do
collaborators engage in to disrupt and transform incumbent market beliefs,
expectations and practices?”
We study an in-depth single-case study – the New Zealand Screwcap
Wine Seal Initiative (NZSWSI). NZSWSI was a collaboration by a group
of competing small-medium-sized family-owned New Zealand (NZ)
wineries in 2001 to institutionalize the screwcap as an acceptable clo-
sure on premium wine. As reflected in the opening quotation of this
paper from an NZSWSI founder, the success of the Initiative was sig-
nificant despite the relative diminutive stature of the member wineries
and NZ wine internationally.
In general terms, this paper contributes to the growing stream of
marketing research that employs institutional theory to examine mar-
kets as systems shaped by market actors (e.g., Baker et al., 2019;
Chaney, Ben Slimane, & Humphreys, 2016; Dolbec & Fischer, 2015;
Giesler, 2008; Kjellberg & Olson, 2017; Koskela-Huotari, Edvardsson,
Jonas, Sörhammar, & Witell, 2016; Vargo et al., 2017). However, where
extant research primarily adopts either system- or micro-level per-
spectives, the integration of the social emergence paradigm enables an
examination at the meso level: the different types of collective market
work undertaken as a collaboration takes shape. We establish collective
market work goes through three distinct phases. First, ‘coalescing’ in-
volves those with a shared problem envisioning options, establishing
their end goal, and selectively enrolling peer group members. Second,
‘legitimizing’ the collective involves negotiating and establishing rules
and agreed intermediate objectives, and further rallying a supporter
network. Third, the legitimized collective engages in ‘using market
clout’ – involving bundled market work such as promoting preferred
arrangements while undermining the incumbent, coercing when ne-
cessary, and neutralizing critics. Further, as a collective becomes more
established, it can target a growing number of market actors at in-
creasingly higher ‘levels’ within the market, including other meso-level
actors (e.g., important ‘gate-keepers’ in the market). In sum, integrating
the emergence paradigm enables simultaneous micro-scoping and tele-
scoping from system-level to micro-level practices. As each inter-
mediate level unfolds, different ‘frames’ are established within the
market system; frames through which collaborators are cumulatively
emboldened and enabled.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next, in Section
2 we present the theoretical background to the study and an in-
troduction to the frameworks we synthesize. Then Section 3 details our
research approach including the empirical context of the research.
Section 4 presents our findings, looking at the different types of market
work carried out through the evolution of NZSWSI. Finally, Section 5
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Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253
offers a discussion of our findings and the contributions and implica-
tions of the study.
2. Theoretical background
Markets can be defined as “complex adaptive socio-technical-ma-
terial systems, consisting of institutions, actors, practices, and dis-
courses that organize particular economized exchanges” (Nenonen
et al., 2019, p.252). Markets, then, comprise numerous elements be-
yond just firm-customer dyads, products, and economic exchanges
(Humphreys, 2010; Humphreys & Carpenter, 2018). The shaping of
markets requires the institutionalized logics of a market to be trans-
formed, hence, market change is “the emergence and institutionaliza-
tion of new solutions” (Vargo et al., 2015, p.64). Processes of (de)in-
stitutionalization may involve changes to institutionalized market
logics1 – elements such as taken-for-granted practices, beliefs, as-
sumptions, methods, or technologies (Schneiberg & Soule, 2005).
Therefore, the integration of institutional theory when studying mar-
kets is a particularly powerful proposition.
The role of collective action in driving institutional change has re-
ceived substantial scholarly attention, especially the role of social
movements (e.g., Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Schneiberg &
Lounsbury, 2008; Soule, 2012), including environmentalists (Hoffman,
1999), consumers (Rao, 1998), unionists (Soule, 2009), and interest
groups (Clemens, 1993; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009). From a business
perspective, some attention has been given to how firms impact social
movements, e.g., gay rights (Chasin, 2001); the role of trades and
professional associations in shaping contextual environments
(Greenwood, 2008; Marques, 2017); and firms undertaking collective
self-regulation (Yue, Luo, & Ingram, 2013). However, little attention
has been paid to how businesses collectively act to drive institutional
change in markets (Barley, 2010; Christiansen & Kroezen, 2016), a gap
we aim to fill.
In the marketing discipline, there is increasing use of institutional
theory to explore market change resulting from social processes. For
example, research to date includes market actors' roles in constructing
market definitions (Rosa et al., 1999; Rosa & Spanjol, 2005); the effect
of institutional complexity on brands (Ertimur & Coskuner-Balli, 2015);
the influence of legitimacy and adjacent markets in market emergence
(Humphreys, 2010; Kjellberg & Olson, 2017); and the impact of con-
sumers on market systems (Dolbec & Fischer, 2015; Scaraboto &
Fischer, 2013). Other studies have adopted a practice-perspective of
markets, examining the practices of market actors that ‘perform’ a
market (e.g., Araujo & Kjellberg, 2011; Harrison & Kjellberg, 2010;
Kjellberg et al., 2015; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007). Despite their va-
luable contributions, these studies do not uncover how orchestrated
collective action shapes a market. To do so requires a more detailed
understanding of what transpires at the meso-level of the market that
translates micro-level actions to macro-level structures. This study,
herein, adopts an institutional lens, that of ‘institutional work’
(Lawrence et al., 2009), to explore the purposeful actions taken by our
focal collective to drive change; and the social emergence paradigm
(Sawyer, 2005) to understand how these actions translate across dif-
ferent levels of the market system. These theoretical perspectives are
discussed next.
2.1. Institutional work
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p.219) “view institutional work as
1
The term ‘market logics’ is used here to refer to the ‘logics of the market,’ i.
e., beliefs, assumptions, expectations, and practices in a market. The term does
not refer to a ‘market logic’ (note the singular), one of the six institutional
orders found in the institutional logics approach (e.g., Thornton, Ocasio, &
Lounsbury, 2012).
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
intelligent, situated institutional action” taken by both individual or
collective actors that leads to the creation, maintenance or disruption of
institutions. The institutional work framework attempts to bridge the
traditional divide between critical theorists (typically focused on
agency and action), and institutional theorists (typically focused on the
influence of enduring institutional structures) (Lawrence, Suddaby, &
Leca, 2011). In so doing, Lawrence et al. (2011, p.56) assert institu-
tional work is “an institutional theory that problematized the status quo
as well as attempted to explain it.” There is no one definitive list of
work that actors can undertake to drive institutional change (Nenonen,
Gummerus, & Sklyar, 2018). Indeed, rather than being fully developed,
some argue institutional work is more “an umbrella concept and a
rallying point” (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, p.62) still very much in de-
velopment (Hayne & Free, 2014). However, this paper draws primarily
on Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), Battilana and D'Aunno (2009),
Kraatz (2009), and Zietsma and McKnight (2009) to inform Nenonen
et al.'s (2019) adaptation of institutional work – ‘market work.’
In the institutional work literature, various approaches have been
adopted to attempt to understand phenomena like the building of
clusters (e.g., Ritvala & Kleymann, 2012), or the creation of new
practices (e.g., Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Others have taken a
‘temporal’ (Granqvist & Gustafsson, 2016) or ‘relational’ approach
(Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013) to understanding institutional work
processes. In industrial marketing, institutional work has been used to
theorize the institutional- (as opposed to customer- or competitor-)
orientation of firms (Chaney et al., 2018), the way a major buyer
maintains power over suppliers (Palmer et al., 2015), and oppositional
institutional work within a business network (Michel, Saucède, Pardo,
& Fenneteau, 2018).
However, despite their valuable contributions, these approaches
focus on either the micro-practice-level, or micro- and system-level
interactions. None of them suitably explain the critical role of collective
agency in driving change. Perhaps even more striking, from an in-
stitutional perspective “the phenomenon of business collective action
remains surprisingly undertheorized” (Christiansen & Kroezen, 2016,
p.102, emphasis in original), despite institutional theory's potential as a
powerful lens through which to explore market-shaping (Michel,
Saucède, Pardo, & Fenneteau, 2018).
While actors are occasionally powerful and effective, in reality in-
stitutional change manifests from the collective agency – both delib-
erate and incidental, with intended and unintended consequences – of
numerous actors (Baker et al., 2019; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006).
This gap in understanding processes of collective agency as a colla-
boration evolves is further compounded by long-standing neglect in
neo-institutional theory towards understanding emergence (Lawrence
et al., 2011) – “the processes whereby the global behaviour of a system
results from the actions and interactions of agents” (Sawyer, 2005, p.2).
This is an important gap to fill as it will help explain how substantial
system-level change, disproportionate to the apparent capabilities of
institutional entrepreneurs, can occur. Hence, the overall purpose of
this paper is to explore how collective action taken to shape a market
manifests through different evolutionary stages of collaboration. To do
so, we integrate Sawyer's (2005) social emergence paradigm.
2.2. Emergence theory
In the late 1990s, complexity theorists began to focus on ‘emer-
gence’ to better understand the properties of complex systems (Sawyer,
2005). A ‘complex system’ is “one made up of a large number of parts
that interact in a nonsimple way. In such systems, the whole is more
than the sum of the parts” (Simon, 1962, p.468). In turn, ‘emergence’
means a system features capabilities and properties (emergent proper-
ties) not present in its constituent parts (Elder-Vass, 2010). Further-
more, Elder-Vass (2010, p.194) argues, “human beings…are entities
with emergent causal powers, but like other such entities they do not
have the power uniquely and totally to determine subsequent events.
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Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253
Rather, social events are always the outcome of many interacting fac-
tors, of which our input is only one.” Hence, contrary to practice-based
perspectives, social structures (such as organizations, governments, or
markets) do not simply emerge from individual enactment of practices.
Sawyer (2005) developed the social emergence paradigm as he
perceived shortcomings in the two dominant incumbent sociological
perspectives. First, a Structurationist perspective focuses on the re-
lationship between the (micro-) individual and the (macro-)social-
system (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Giddens, 1984), and perceives macro-
level social structures as endogenously generated by micro-level prac-
tices. But this perspective does not enable understanding of how in-
dividual intentions collect as shared intentions to generate change
through “process, mechanism, and interaction” (Elder-Vass, 2010;
Sawyer, 2005, p.197). Second, the Interactionist perspective does in-
clude a third, middle (meso-)level of interaction (e.g., Bourdieu's, 1984,
concept of habitus), thereby encompassing interactivity in its analysis.
However, the Interaction paradigm ignores mechanisms that explain
how micro-level collective intentions manifest as collective actions, and
how interactivity leads to social structure.
Instead, the social emergence paradigm (Sawyer, 2005) posits five
ontological levels of analysis – Levels A through E – depicted in Table 1.
While each of these levels, or ‘frames,’ from Level B up manifest from
the collective action of participating individuals, they also exist as
analytically separate from those individuals, as each frame has causal
power over them. In other words, while each frame is a product of the
actions of participating individuals, each frame also guides the beha-
viour of those individuals.
The micro-level includes individuals (and their intentions, com-
mitment, and values at Level A) and the interaction of individuals
(through conversations, meetings, and discourse at Level B). The meso-
level includes both ephemeral emergent collectives (at Level C, where
context, roles and structures are loosely agreed) and stable emergent
collectives (at Level D, where collective agency, shared practices,
agreed objectives, and routines are established). Importantly, stability
is a relative term. Sawyer (Sawyer, 2005, p.214) posits, “stable emer-
gents have different degrees of stability; some are stable over genera-
tions, and others are stable for weeks or months.” Therefore, a collec-
tive is considered stable when it continues the same for more than one
encounter. Level E is the macro-level (where social structures, market
logics, accepted procedures and systems reside).
In marketing literature, Taillard et al. (2016) have drawn on
Sawyer's (2005) social emergence paradigm as a framework within
which to integrate Bratman's (2014) theory of shared agency. Taillard
et al. (2016) explore the role of collective agency in the development of
service eco-systems, which enables understanding of how service eco-
systems emerge from the micro- (individuals and individuals' interac-
tions), to meso- (emergent and then stable collective action), to macro-
(societal-) levels.
Table 1
The social emergence paradigm, adapted from Sawyer, 2005; Taillard et al.,
2016
Social structure (Level E)
MACRO-LEVEL
Institutions, contracts, ecosystems
Stable emergent (Level D)
Shared intentions, norms, rules, routines,
shared practices MESO-LEVEL
Ephemeral emergent (Level C)
Roles, topics, preferences
Interaction level (Level B)
Conversations, negotiations, meetings
MICRO-LEVEL
Individual level (Level A)
Intentions, attitudes, cognitive processes,
value perceptions, determination
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253

The study, herein, similarly uses the social emergence paradigm Table 2
(Sawyer, 2005) as a framework for theoretical synthesis. Within each Interview participants.
frame of the social emergence paradigm we seek to explore the different Participant Role
types of market work undertaken by the focal collective, and the sub-
sequent outcomes of that work. We start with the four founders of the P1 NZSWSI committee member
P2 Winemaker not affiliated with NZSWSI
collective (at Level A) who initially interact (Level B), which enables
P3 Senior manager at wine industry body
the formation of an ephemeral collective (Level C) that then stabilizes P4 NZSWSI committee member
and becomes a formally established entity (Level D). P5 Wine commentator
The manifestation of the actions (at Level E) taken by the stable P6 Winemaker not affiliated with NZSWSI
emergent studied here was a change to the institutionalized market P7 Wine industry supplier
P8 Wine commentator
logics in numerous global markets. This was despite the collective being
P9 NZSWSI founder
initiated by just four founders in a geographically-isolated part of the P10 NZSWSI founder
world without a historic wine-making tradition. Hence, the system-level P11 NZSWSI founder
change that occurred is far in excess of what might be imagined possible P12 NZSWSI committee member
P13 Wine industry supplier
by the constituent parts of the initial collective. We now introduce our
P14 NZSWSI member
research approach, including a detailed description of our primary and P15 NZSWSI member
secondary data, and a summary of the empirical context in which the P16 Wine marketer; NZSWSI member
study is situated. P17 Wine commentator
P18 Wine commentator
P19 Wine marketer; NZSWSI member
3. Research approach
P20 NZSWSI member
P21 NZSWSI member
3.1. Method

Given the nascent nature of theory in the marketing discipline
concerning how and why actor collaboration rapidly shapes market
systems, we chose an inductive research method based on a rich case
study (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). A single case can provide a rich
illustration of a particular phenomenon (Siggelkow, 2007). The case
studied herein is “unusually revelatory” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007,
p.27) in that it is a good example of resultant change at a system-
(market-)level far in excess of what might be expected from the initial
collective's constituent parts. As our focal case is historic, in accordance
with recommended practice (McKee, Lubojacky, & Miller, 2019), nu-
merous procedural safeguards were adopted when gathering and ana-
lyzing data.
3.1.1. Data collection
Primary data in this study consist of in-depth semi-structured in-
terviews gathering retrospective accounts of events that occurred some
time ago. While 24 months is a recommended limit for reliable retro-
spective reports relating to subjective topics such as feelings, beliefs and
emotions (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997), recollections of concrete
events increase reliability considerably (Golden, 1992). Hence, ques-
tioning focused on events rather than subjective topics like opinions or
emotions experienced at the time. In addition, interview data were
combined with other data sources to ensure validity (Snow & Thomas,
1994) and credibility (Yin, 2014). While interorganizational relation-
ships typically generate few formal records (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson,
1993), as NZSWSI became a formally established entity, a wealth of
secondary organizational information was available. In this study, ad-
ditional data included archival NZSWSI documents including minutes
(between 2001 and 2004); technical reports, marketing collateral, etc.;
together with researcher field notes and photographs. Secondary data
include unpublished conference presentations from the International
Screwcap Initiative symposium in 2004 (481 pages of written submis-
sions and presentation slides) from nineteen international and domestic
participants, both NZSWSI members and independent observers. Other
secondary data sources include media articles, books (e.g., Stelzer,
2003, 2005; Taber, 2007; Tyack, 2012), academic articles, websites and
published wine commentaries.
Informants were selected carefully, ensuring a mix of closely in-
volved, extremely knowledgeable participants, together with a selec-
tion of people who were highly interested observers (e.g., critics)
(Huber & Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997). Such a selection process
enables cross-checking of retrospective accounts, limits bias, and miti-
gates retrospective sense-making (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).
Participant selection was achieved through a mix of both snowball
sampling and purposive sampling (Bahl & Milne, 2006; Yin, 2014)
where the researchers directly approached those publicly known as
observers, commentators or critics of NZSWSI. These participants were
often identified through secondary data such as historic newspaper
reports or wine commentaries, and acted as knowledgeable, interested
observers to off-set potentially subjective accounts by closely involved
respondents.
Of the interview participants who had been involved in NZSWSI,
three were founders, some joined the Initiative's committee in the first
few months of the Initiative, and others joined as NZSWSI members
later. Other interviewees included former executives from supplier
firms (of glass and cork/screwcap), a senior executive from the industry
trade organization, the managing coordinator (and committee member)
of NZSWSI, two winemakers not affiliated with NZSWSI, and four wine
commentators (observers and critics). Interviewees' identities are ob-
scured in this research and in the supporting quotations, especially
given the small size of the NZ wine industry. Nevertheless, Table 2
provides some basic information about each interview participant.
The main lines of questioning of interview participants included
their roles and backgrounds, recollections of their involvement with
NZSWSI, major events surrounding NZSWSI, how collaboration and
controversy were managed, perceptions of who comprised the ‘wine
market,’ and how norms, behaviors and practices in the wine market
had changed since the turn of the century or had been affected by
NZSWSI activities. Again, to mitigate the historic nature of the case and
to encourage candid responses relating to concrete events rather than
subjective topics, the interview questions were carefully crafted, re-
spondents guaranteed confidentiality, and follow-up probing questions
used to complement the pre-determined questions (Miller et al., 1997).
Interviews were carried out by both authors at different stages. One
author collected 4 interviews with 5 participants in 2016, the other
author conducted the remaining 19 interviews involving 16 partici-
pants in 2018. In total, 21 participants (17 male, 4 female) were in-
volved in 23 interviews lasting 25 h (averaging 72 min per inter-
viewee). All interviews were digitally audio-recorded for transcription,
including those conducted via online video-conferencing. As the detail
present in a transcript must match the intended level of analysis
(Drisko, 1997), all recordings were professionally transcribed verbatim
in their entirety, and transcripts checked for accuracy against the re-
cordings by one of the authors (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003).
This transcript-checking also contributed to researcher familiarity with

243
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
the data-set (Braun & Clarke, 2006).
Transcriptions totaled 197,000 words on 338 single-spaced pages
and went through a ‘member checking’ process by being returned to
participants who were then given two weeks to make changes for
clarity or accuracy (Kozinets, 2006). Only five interviewees chose to
make any changes while all others agreed their transcript was accurate.
Primary data collection ceased once theoretical saturation was achieved
and interview participants were no longer contributing original mate-
rial (Morse, 1994). Secondary data collection was carried out through
internet and database searches and as interviewees provided supporting
or illustrative material.
3.1.2. Data analysis
Two different phases of thematic analysis were undertaken: 1) in-
terpretative thematic analysis; and 2) theoretical thematic analysis.
First, interpretative thematic analysis involves “searching across a da-
taset” to “find repeated patterns of meaning” (Braun & Clarke, 2006,
p.86). In our analysis we were looking for the structural and socio-
cultural conditions that enabled what was in the individuals' accounts
we heard. From early in the data collection phase, transcripts were read
and re-read, and codes began to emerge. Quotes from transcripts for the
different codes were copied into Excel spreadsheets, and moved around
or duplicated as necessary as the coding process continued and themes
emerged. For the sake of reliability when capturing retrospective ac-
counts, we only incorporated data into the analysis that was corrobo-
rated by multiple informants, and/or was reflected in archival data
(Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, & Sutcliffe, 1990).
Hence, random or rogue statements were removed from consideration
and analysis.
This first phase of interpretative thematic analysis provided thirteen
major themes. The second phase of analysis, theoretical thematic ana-
lysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), was where the themes were analyzed
through the lenses of the chosen theoretical frameworks. Primary and
secondary data were classified according to the social emergence
paradigm then interpreted through the market work lens. Hence, in-
terview data themes were searched across and within for elements
pertaining to the research question. In sum, the two phases of analysis
enabled progression from 1) coding of semantic description, to 2) the-
orizing about the meanings and implications through our chosen the-
oretical lenses (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Our findings in Section 4 feature
a small number of illustrative quotes to add authenticity to our theo-
retical claims (Pratt, 2009). However, numerous other supporting
quotes are found in Appendix A.
Next, we explore the empirical context in which NZSWSI operated.
This involves identifying the beliefs, assumptions, and practices asso-
ciated with the use of cork as the only acceptable means of sealing
premium wine, and the preferred market logic of the members of
NZSWSI.
3.2. Empirical context: The international wine market
Sealing wine with natural cork, derived from Cork Oak bark, is a
tradition dating back to the 17th century (Rankine, 2005; Stelzer,
2005), and a classic social norm – functionally unreliable but embedded
in assumptions and customs. Closure-style has traditionally been an
indicator of wine quality (Barber, Meagher, & Kolyesnikova, 2008),
with cork a signal of fine wine, and screwcap a signal of lesser-quality
wine (Atkin, Garcia, & Lockshin, 2006; Barber & Almanza, 2007). Time-
honored rituals surround uncorking wine, coupled with a range of
material artefacts from basic wooden to expensive titanium corkscrews
(Atkin et al., 2006).
Yet for some years, 5–8% of cork-sealed wine worldwide was ren-
dered undrinkable because of cork failure (Barber, Taylor, & Dodd,
2009), as it is a natural product with variable cellular structure. Chiefly
amongst these problems is a mustiness or ‘wet cardboard smell’ due to a
chemical called 2,4,6-trichloroanisole (TCA) (Garcia, 2007).
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Accordingly, aluminum screwcaps were designed to eliminate this
problem in wine (Brajkovich et al., 2005; Rankine, 2005; Stelzer, 2005).
Although the screwcap was patented in 1889, it was not until the
mid-20th century that it was considered for use on wine (Courtney,
2004). In 1959, the French company Le Bouchage Mécanique produced
its first Stelcap screwcap, but commercial uptake languished due to
subjective resistance from consumers and retailers. Although some
markets in central Europe made greater inroads (especially Switzer-
land), consumers associated screwcaps with only mid- or low-priced
wine (Stelzer, 2005). In the mid-1970s, Australian Wine Research In-
stitute (AWRI) began trials of screwcaps on wines (adopting the name
Stelvin instead of Stelcap). Based on the success of these trials, several
major Australian producers made the move to screwcap in 1977, but
this met with major consumer resistance and financial losses (Courtney,
2004). By 1984, all producers had reverted to cork (Garcia, 2007).
Although a functionally superior option, the screwcap did not follow
the classic S-curve of innovation adoption (Atkin et al., 2006; Garcia,
2007).
By the new millennium, frustrations at unreliable cork closures
continued and numerous NZ winemakers suffered catastrophic cork
failures and major losses. Some were forced to make large insurance
claims, but insurers began to decline cover. Some UK supermarkets
were also becoming increasingly frustrated with the epidemic of cork
failures and were threatening to charge producers an ‘ullage fee’ as
protection against wine returns. In 2000, a group of fifteen Riesling
makers in South Australia's Clare Valley decided to bottle some of their
best wines under screwcap (Stelzer, 2005; Taber, 2007). Using ‘library
stock’ of Australian screwcap wines from the 80s, they determined
screwcaps allow wines to age while providing a superior closure. The
Clare Valley makers marketed the move collectively as ‘Riesling with a
twist’, and enjoyed favorable consumer acceptance (Taber, 2007).
Inspired by the Australians, in mid-2000 four leading en-
trepreneurial producers from NZ's Marlborough region resolved to stop
their wine being degraded by cork (Level B in Table 1). Following
various informal conversations, by February 2001 the Marlborough
group agreed to formally collaborate in order to influence the con-
ventions of cork wine closures. They expanded the group slightly to
include other small-medium family-owned wineries, all renowned for
producing some of NZ's best wine (Level C). After researching the sci-
ence and practicalities, the fledging collective decided on the Stelvin
closure and formally established the NZ Screwcap Closure Initiative in
July 2001 (Level D), later renaming it New Zealand Screwcap Wine Seal
Initiative (NZSWSI) in December 2001. Concurrently, UK supermarkets
reassured NZSWSI the threatened ullage fee would not be required of
producers sealing their wines under screwcap.
In the following five years, the movement gained momentum. Wine
production in NZ went from 0% under screwcap in 2000 to 96% by
2006. Internationally, more European wineries started trials with
screwcaps. In 2002, Tesco supermarkets in the UK formally began re-
questing screwcap closure as standard for New World wines and for
some Old World wines because of the marked drop in wine returns
(Courtney, 2004). In 2004, the first Bordeaux and Burgundy wines
under screwcaps were released (Fauchald, 2004), and by the late 2000s,
the NZ national wine competition introduced “a one strike policy” (P1)
by allowing winemakers to only submit one bottle instead of two (the
second bottle having been a backup in case the first was tainted by a
cork closure).
Today, the screwcap is largely accepted as a closure on quality
wines in most international markets. Cork closures on all wine packa-
ging sold globally (retail/off-trade and food service/on-trade) fell 8%
from 17.97 billion units (in 2007) to 16.53b (in 2017), while screwcap
closures grew 58% from 7.35b (2007) to 11.63b (2017) (Euromonitor
International, 2018). Additionally, in markets such as the UK, Australia
and New Zealand, a majority of consumers have a preference for
screwcap-sealed wine (Atkin et al., 2006; EAFA, 2015).
A recent study by AWRI (examining judges' rejection rates of wines
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253

under different closures at one of the world's largest wine shows) de- and just really focus together and just dive in (P12).
monstrated screwcaps were considerably more reliable than corks while
Put differently, a critical problem was enough to encourage the four
also having no worse tendency towards flavor ‘reduction’ than corks
founders to enter into an initial ‘pragmatic collaboration’ (Reay &
(Wilkes, 2016).
Hinings, 2009, p.631) as they saw no other way to accomplish the task
The empirical context of this case provides a rich backdrop to the
of eliminating corks acting individually.
market work undertaken by the NZSWSI collective, moving from a
market underpinned by tradition, myths and ceremony, to screwcaps on
4.2. From interaction level to ephemeral emergent (level B ➔ C): Mid-2000
premium wine underpinned by modern technology, reliability, and
– February 2001
convenience. As screwcaps were an already established technology, the
change achieved by NZSWSI was cultural and cognitive rather than
The beginning of the interaction stage was marked by two main
technological. The collective market work undertaken during the dif-
types of market work. First, the four founders engaged in envisioning
ferent phases of collaboration is detailed next.
and establishing their objective (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) of not
using cork. Although not yet convinced that screwcap was their pre-
4. Findings: market work through different stages of collaboration
ferred option, they wanted to avoid being undermined and delegiti-
mized in the future by a mass producer putting screwcaps on lesser-
Here, we explore the evolution of collective market work through
quality wines. Hence, they initially operated in a highly secretive
different stages of collaboration. Results are structured according to the
manner. Of the founders themselves, one stepped aside early on so that
social emergence paradigm (Sawyer, 2005). The date ranges provided,
an employee could take his place:
below, approximately mark the collective's movement from one emer-
gence frame to the next. Admittedly, these markers are somewhat ar- [The employee's] personality was more considered but more jovial and
tificial as the collective's evolution was not as tidy as depicted. Never- not quite as intense, I guess. He was a better collaborator so his addition
theless, they provide a suitable theoretical framework for the …in terms of the dynamics of that group, that assisted (P12).
presentation of the case. First, we consider emergence from the in-
Second, the founders began to surreptitiously establish their peer
dividual to interaction level (Levels A to B); second, initial interactions
group, knowing that they must only involve fellow premium producers.
to ephemeral emergent (Levels B to C); ephemeral to stable emergent
A small number of other winemakers in their home district of
(Levels C to D), and finally the collective's work to impact market logics
Marlborough were asked if they would like to collaborate. The group
(Levels D to E).
also called on the assistance of a highly efficient previous employee of
one of the founders to manage them and their efforts. The construction
4.1. From individual level to interaction level (level A ➔ B): Late 90s –
of this peer group was a critical first step in attempting to create new
2000
logics (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
At the end of this period their enrolment exercise was expanded
Typically, lower status or peripheral organizations are more likely
with an ‘industry tasting event’ in Marlborough. Critically, involved in
to engage in activity to upset the status quo, while high-status organi-
this event was NZ's smallest cork supplier who had the Stelvin screwcap
zations typically invest in maintaining it (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, &
agency for NZ, a measure he had taken three years previous as cork
King, 1991). All four of the NZSWSI founders' wineries were classified
issues increased. He also brought some experts from France to assist in
as small-medium in New Zealand terms (Coriolis Research, 2006).
promoting the screwcap to the founders and offered reassurance he
Three were at the small end of ‘medium,’ each producing between
could arrange the required bottling machinery. Library stock wines
200,000 and 400,000 l of wine per year (a medium-sized winery pro-
from Australia under screwcap were also brought in for the event. In the
duces 200,000-2,000,000 l per year); and one was ‘small’ (less than
end, nineteen local winemakers agreed to become involved and
200,000 l). Indeed, NZ's overall wine production was also small by
agreement reached to appoint a committee to oversee next steps –
international standards. In the year 2000, NZ processed a total of
marking the beginning of the ephemeral emergent collective.
60,200 t of grapes, compared to Australia's 806,300 t and France's
When considering the impact of this theoretical frame on the in-
5,754,100 t (Euromonitor International, 2019).
dividuals involved, the interaction of a growing number of members
Despite the collective's four founders being “extremely diverse men
meant:
and if you lobbed politics into the ring you would have four different views”
(P16), their businesses and professional goals were extremely similar …what came out of that [initial formal meeting in Marlborough] was
with a passionate commitment to quality and an ability (as family- that there was a pretty strong need to educate our customers as well as
owned companies) to make bold decisions without the interference of the rest of the industry and so that's when we formed the Screwcap
Boards of Directors. They self-identified as being innovative (“I think in Initiative (P1).
this part of the world we have a license to be innovative”, P16), some had
Additionally, despite being still only in early stages of collaboration,
academic backgrounds in winemaking, and they were not bogged down
the ephemeral focal entity encouraged supporting industry actors to
in Old World tradition and inter-generational ownership. Furthermore,
engage and interact with it. For example, the screwcap supplier even
aside from the obvious critical problem with corks, the founders were
“organized to fly out [Stelvin experts, such as an] amazing technical en-
all inspired by the technically successful use of screwcaps by Clare
gineer and the sales guy” (P7). Later, numerous others could be ap-
Valley Riesling-makers in Australia.
proached such as “the glass manufacturers, […] equipment importers, […]
When exploring the impact of this theoretical frame on the in-
where the caps could come from, whether they could be manufactured in
dividuals involved, collectively, the shared characteristics of the four
New Zealand or brought in” (P4). Additionally, the entity took on an
founders combined to prime the need for shared action: “I think we had
identity of its own based off the collective reputation of those involved:
a common goal; we were not bound by tradition – there is no question about
“We then agreed that if we were going to do it, we should invite key, other
that, and that is reflected in who we were” (P4). The wholesale agreement
premiere producers to be involved” (P4). They had to be:
of the shared problem gave this small group of individuals the con-
fidence to collectively act, and put aside their competitive natures: …bold people that we can trust, we need people who will do what they
say they'll do, they'll be people who are openminded and can identify this
So around the table there was a single vision based on quality, there was
as a real issue and will come together in a collaboration and will work
a willingness to put aside any personal history between them – and they
together (P12).
had head-banged some between a couple of the guys around the table –

245
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
Despite being competitors in the marketplace, the Initiative mem-
bers coalesced around a problem serious enough that their continued
existence was threatened:
…the industry worked together, has always worked together co-
operatively well on things, and people were used to sharing ideas and
sharing knowledge …it is easier in New Zealand because we're small, you
know, everybody knows everybody (P3).
People talk in the industry. We all share information and knowledge…
because I think we largely export …To tackle the world independently
would have been very hard (P19).
Hence, cooperation within the NZ wine industry was already well-
established.
4.3. From ephemeral to stable emergent (level C ➔ D): February 2001 –
June 2001
Later in February 2001, the ephemeral collective set about to build
on the market work currently underway. The most significant char-
acteristics of this period were the rapid shift from an ephemeral
emergent group that was searching for alternatives and allies, to five
months later as a stable emergent group with a clear strategy and ob-
jectives.
At first, numerous winemakers were now collaborating, searching
for a common strategic template (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009). This
search involved negotiating work – “the deliberate interaction by two
or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine
the terms of their interdependence” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p.3).
The effectiveness of negotiation is directly linked to the likelihood of
institutional creation (Helfen & Sydow, 2013), and the ephemeral col-
lective's members were notable for their shared commitment to market
change. The ephemeral emergent assembled a governing committee,
which sought the involvement of one of NZ's most highly respected
boutique producers, from the Auckland wine region. Having suffered
serious problems with cork the previous year, he would end up be-
coming the founding chairman of the Initiative. However, this wine-
maker's one condition on joining the collective, was:
Rather than it being a Marlborough initiative, which is what is was going
to be initially, it would become a New Zealand initiative, so it makes it
much more acceptable to people elsewhere (P1).
This ‘New Zealand’ moniker would later give the collective greater
legitimacy and assist in delivering more effective outcomes than the
earlier Clare Valley initiative: “…in Clare Valley it was Clare Valley. But
the New Zealand Screw Cap Initiative was the ‘New Zealand’ Screw Cap
Initiative. And so, we were a relatively small wine producing country, but it
had New Zealand on the brand, if you like” (P3). The greater legitimacy
was also reflected in the involvement of this Auckland winemaker and a
handful of others, to “give us some more gravitas” (P9).
Despite having already been exposed to the effectiveness of
screwcap, the second type of market work involved selecting from al-
ternatives (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009) by establishing a technical
committee, comprising the most qualified individuals, to investigate all
available closure options. This reflects how roles become more defined
as peer groups become established, and actors assume certain roles
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). The committee banned the Stelvin sup-
plier from their meetings, and instead sought to make sure screwcaps
were indeed the best option.
To establish legitimacy of the screwcap and the ephemeral emergent
collective, the initiative engaged in building and sustaining support of
constituents and stakeholders. This “entails efforts to knit together di-
verse constituencies and purposes, to engender cooperation and win
consent, and to create a ‘whole’ entity that is at least minimally co-
herent, integrated, and self-consistent” (Kraatz, 2009, p.73). In sum,
this work creates organizational integrity, critical to both the short-
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Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253
term credibility of NZSWSI, and the next stage of changing assumptions
and beliefs in others. This ‘whole’ entity would be reflected in the stable
emergent. The collective enrolled numerous others in their investiga-
tions including AWRI researchers and Clare Valley winemakers. As
screwcaps emerged as the preferred option, NZSWSI had to establish
the feasibility of bottling in NZ. This involved consulting with the local
glass manufacturer to ensure they would cooperate. Luckily, the only
growing segment for the glass manufacturer at the time was wine
bottles, they felt pressured to cooperate, and agreed they would buy the
necessary equipment to manufacture suitable threaded bottles.
Also, to gain support the committee instructed a member to ap-
proach the wine industry association, “to work under their auspices or
with their blessing” (P9). However, conservative elements on the asso-
ciation's Board turned them down, saying “the type of closure that wine
makers use is up to individual wine makers, it's a commercial decision” (P3).
This denial of support was perhaps not surprising as industry bodies are
often primarily focused on defending existing institutionalized ar-
rangements rather than driving new ones (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).
Towards the end of this period, several events reflected the move from
ephemeral emergent to stable emergent: 1) the Initiative officially named
itself the New Zealand Closure Initiative (NZCI); 2) the technical committee
produced an extensive manual (largely based on the collateral of the Stelvin
agent) about correctly applying screwcaps; 3), some of the winemakers
agreed to trial screwcaps on at least some of their 2001 vintage; and 4) rules
and norms were established for the collective. Establishing rules, ownership
rights and boundaries is achieved through political work (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006). This was driven by a need to ensure (the then) NZCI was
reliable and sustainable, and that screwcaps were themselves not under-
mined by incorrect application. The committee was aware if screwcaps
failed technically, the argument for doing away with cork would be de-
stroyed. Hence, they took it upon themselves to only let members use
screwcaps approved by the committee, and those committee members with
the greatest technical knowledge would even oversee bottlings at compe-
titors' wineries. Financial rules and commitments were established, with
members agreeing to pay a $1000 joining fee, and a levy of 2 cents per
bottle produced under screwcap (to a maximum of $10,000 per annum).
This money was used for marketing and paying for the coordinating man-
ager of the Initiative.
The now stable Initiative set about to work towards a nationwide
industry event that would happen in July 2001, the first step at at-
tempting to win over multiple external market actors. Having observed
the technical success of screwcaps in the Clare Valley, but the relatively
muted success in the marketplace, they agreed:
As always with the market, if you are going to hit it then you need to hit
at all the different layers at the same time so that you do develop a little
bit of critical mass (P4).
The impacts of this theoretical frame on those involved was a for-
malized, shared identity, under shared rules and agreed processes. The
members of the collective could assume a role of authority in for-
mulating and requiring standardized application procedures:
[NZSWSI] had a number of suppliers wanting to get screwcaps for us. So
we insisted that no one could use the screwcap unless the committee had
approved it. We're self-appointed… So we tried to put some standards
into it (P10).
This sense of authority also manifested in agreed formal rules
around membership of NZSWSI. This position of authority was enacted
despite admissions that, “Hell, we didn't know what we were doing. We
didn't have a clue” (P10). NZSWSI also provided the credibility where
formal institutions such as AWRI could now be “convinced… to release
their findings in NZ at effectively a public meeting” (P9).
4.4. From stable emergent to market logics (level D➔ E): July 2001–2006
The fourth and final period in the evolution of the collective, with
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
NZSWSI now stable and well-established, was marked by two broad-
ranging categories of market work being delivered simultaneously. First
was market work driving acceptance of screwcap, and second was
market work disrupting cork by undermining its ethical foundations
and demonizing its associated practices. The aim of these categories of
market work was to make lasting changes to the incumbent logics in the
wine market.
The first major class of market work involved creating acceptance of
the preferred logic within the broader wine market. This involved nu-
merous educational and promotional activities, coupled with coercing
others to accept screwcap. Educating market actors proved to be ex-
tremely valuable, and frequently leads to changes in meanings and
understanding (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
First, a special meeting for NZ wine producers, influencers, and
writers was hosted in July 2001. Scientific evidence for the move to
screwcap was showcased, presented by both the new Chairman of the
Initiative and the head researcher from AWRI, lending legitimacy to
their arguments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Globally, winemakers and
wine merchants had long argued wine had to breathe through porous
cork to age properly. This had been discredited by scientists in Bor-
deaux in the 1970s, and since (Eric, Leyland, & Rankine, 1976; Godden
et al., 2001; Rankine, Leyland, & Strain, 1980), who had demonstrated
wine-aging was an anaerobic process and all the oxygen needed for
aging was in the bottle when closed (Stelzer, 2003, 2005). At the
meeting was also the leader of the Clare Valley initiative, who brought
with him aged wines under screwcap to reinforce this scientific evi-
dence. For many in the room, this tasting of old screw-capped wines
was the defining moment of truth:
So, we open the bottles in front of people and pour them round the room
and you could've heard a pin drop …there's no way that you could have
actually orchestrated that better. It wouldn't matter how much research
you gave people, there's nothing like giving them an experience (P9).
Most of the wine press in NZ was captivated, and these commen-
tators proved a valuable asset. NZSWSI members were aware that if the
critics “had all collaborated together and decided to scuttle it we would have
been in trouble, but the evidence was there” (P12). Nevertheless, not all
industry actors were in favor. For example, one critic was strongly
against the move to screwcap because of the risk of flavor reduction in
the wine:
I was certainly not going to toe any party line and tell people, which other
writers went around and just said, ‘this is the greatest thing since sliced
bread’… I was getting feedback from wine makers who said, ‘please, tell
us what is going on, we are getting this rammed down our throats, we're
totally snowballed by this and we need information so that we can make
a good judgement on our own. They told us to toe the line, get in behind
and support it, get rid of cork and go to screwcap’ (P18).
The critic wrote several scathing commentaries about the move to
screwcaps in both NZ and international wine publications. However, his
regular writing contracts disappeared over a period of months – he “was
more or less frozen out” (P18); and “was just destroyed as far as his career
within New Zealand” (P6). This acrimony went both ways, with a pro-
screwcap critic arguing:
…particularly in those early years, I was under some quite personal
attacks through social media and other media …tempers flaring around
this whole topic …with some of the wine media, particularly in New
Zealand, who decided that the whole screwcaps thing was not perhaps
what the science said it to be. And so there was quite a strong us-and-
them kind of interplay (P5).
However, although a wine critic “can pick and choose [wines to re-
view] his pocket is not particularly deep because he doesn't get paid well, so
he is likely to only review wines which are forwarded or amongst those wines
which are forwarded” (P6). Hence, an irony exists that wine critics, as
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Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253
industry commentators, are heavily dependent on the cooperation of
the industry to fulfill their role. Once that cooperation is removed, a
critic is neutralized.
NZSWSI targeted multiple other market actors simultaneously from
this point on. First, they obtained the list of members of the World
Association of Wine Writers and Journalists and contacted every one of
them separately. In later months, collections of wine writers were as-
sembled in Australia, Los Angeles, and London to be given taste tests
and abridged presentations of the reasons for the move to screwcap.
This created enormous amounts of interest globally, as writers suddenly
had something new and controversial to write about:
…if you provide writers with copy they'll print it and especially if it's
about an issue that's making the headlines, then they make the headlines
(P16).
Needless to say, it was a lot of wine chatter and it was always ‘screwcaps’
and ‘New Zealand’ in the same sentence. What that did was to elevate the
awareness of New Zealand wine in the trade's mind (P19).
Later, in December 2001, NZCI was renamed NZSWSI. This was to
1) clear any misunderstandings regarding what type of screwcap they
were using (e.g., for wine and not whiskey or soft drinks); and 2) to
avoid one screwcap producer's product (especially Stelvin) being an-
ointed as preferred by the Initiative. This gave members a sense of
flexibility, while simultaneously improving the messaging around the
Initiative's purpose.
Additionally, from late-2001, many wineries began putting card-
board neck-tags on all their screwcap wines to explain the move to
customers. And Initiative members began enclosing bright yellow A4
flyers in every case of wine being shipped. The flyers explained the
benefits of screwcap wines and how to open them. Some cases were
destined for the domestic market, but most to the international market:
That yellow sheet went in every box of screw cap wine for the first year
because we wanted to inform and educate anybody that opened a box of
wine whether they were the store-man out the back… or a fine wine shop
(P16).
However, NZSWSI members were free to choose other marketing
techniques they thought would best suit their audience. Many NZSWSI
members personally targeted restaurants and sommeliers, seen as cri-
tical gatekeepers to success. Members were aware sommeliers may be
especially affronted with the move to screwcap – a sommelier's pro-
fessional standing might appear diminished by a more reliable, and
considerably less theatrical closure. One Initiative member, who espe-
cially exported to the USA, prepared pocket-sized cards for sommeliers:
“this was before the internet so we made little pocket guides so people can slip
it into their pockets, ‘this is how you do it’. Not only how you do it but how
you overcome the objections from the diners” (P19). Other members vis-
ited countless restaurants, stressing the reduction in hassle by serving
consistently reliable wines that were not in danger of being faulty.
Hence, although the NZSWSI committee carefully administered the
technical specifications and application of screwcaps, the agreed rules
around membership fees, and some general marketing tactics, member
wineries could customize marketing approaches most appropriate for
their stakeholders. For example:
We didn't strictly adhere to the Screw Cap Initiative. We went and did
our own thing. We paid our fees and listened, but we weren't proscribed
about what we should do and how we should do it (P19).
A game-changing promotional event was the First International
Screw Cap Symposium, held in Marlborough in 2004. The symposium
was attended by 250 delegates from 12 countries and further mani-
fested the need for an industry-wide approach to sharing information
and expertise related to screwcaps. To do so the International Screw
Cap Seal Initiative was established (Hughes, 2006; Pawsey, 2014). By
now, enthusiasm was widespread within the broader industry. The
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
critic who claimed to have been “blacklisted” insisted on attending the
Symposium:
I was the only person that wasn't totally in favor of screw caps. It was like
a huge evangelical American tent meeting! It was so religious, so over the
top!… I was sitting there in the midst of a huge number of hostile people,
it was a really strange situation” (P18).
Key to successful sharing of technical knowledge was the publica-
tion of a veritable ‘text-book’ covering all aspects of sealing wine under
screwcaps. This active diffusion of intellectual property, rather than
protecting it as commercially sensitive information, was one of the
defining activities of NZSWSI, and an effective way to create acceptance
(Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009). Hence, education of market actors in-
cluded industry-insiders as well as consumers and distributors.
One other important type of creation work undertaken was coer-
cion. Where earlier levels had involved negotiating and accom-
modating, by Level D the now stable collective had to coerce reluctant
importers and distributors into accepting screwcap. Many of these
market actors demanded wines under cork only, or under a mix of cork
and screwcap, on the basis that ‘the market’ would not accept a high-
priced screwcap wine. Instead, NZSWSI members adopted a ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ attitude. On their side was the immense and growing popu-
larity of NZ Sauvignon blanc, which had become the darling of the wine
world from the late 90s. Importers and distributors had no choice but to
accept the new closure if they wanted to stock this popular NZ wine.
One winemaker described introducing people around the world to NZ
Sauvignon blanc as being akin to:
…when you give a kid Coca-Cola for the first time, their faces just…that
lovely taste exploration that they get when they do that, it's the same with
Sauvignon blanc. People had never tasted anything like that before
(P19).
This take-it-or-leave-it attitude to Sauvignon blanc under screwcap
proved most effective, which reinforces other research that finds either/
or approaches to attempting institutional change are often ineffective
and may even be counter-productive (e.g., Garud, Jain, &
Kumaraswamy, 2002; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009; Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007).
The second major class of market work, carried out concurrently
with the first, was the disruption of the incumbent logic of cork closures
by both demonizing cork and undermining the ethical foundations for
its use (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Where promoting something new
through education modifies meanings and understandings, disruption
work drives changes in existing belief systems.
First involved changing the practices accepted in the wine market
(Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Practices are legitimized as “shared rou-
tines”, hence ‘practice work’ involves “efforts to affect the recognition
and acceptance of sets of routines, rather than […] simply engaging in
those routines” (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010, p.190). The effectiveness of
practice work is dependent on the degree to which existing practices are
accepted or challenged, and the existence of actors with the ability to
inspire and demonstrate new practices. At the London Wine Trade Fair
in 2002, some Initiative members worked together to present a NZSWSI
booth. They wore branded T-shirts (with ‘We've screwed ‘em’ printed on
the back), and supporters at the local tube station handed out flyers
advertising the booth as delegates arrived. At the booth, NZSWSI en-
gaged in blind taste-tests of the same wine, sealed under both closures.
Over the three days of the Fair, they also conducted a very simple visual
experiment of putting corks and screwcaps into glasses of acidified
water. Every glass suffered some color and flavor taint except the
glasses containing screwcaps. This experiment became a favorite of
NZSWSI members in following years that they would perform over
dinner in restaurants with distributors, importers, and restaurateurs.
Likewise, sealing small batches of wine under both closures and taking
comparative samples to importers, distributors and restaurateurs
proved effective.
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However, again, these demonizing activities did not go un-
challenged by all industry actors. One NZ winemaker who remained
resolutely pro-cork “did suggest to [the NZSWSI Chair] that they possibly
should promote screw caps without having to diss' corks because they were
also part of the New Zealand export effort” (P6). Nevertheless, the great
majority of NZ winemakers were captivated by the move to screwcap –
it became “Almost a religious movement!” (P3).
4.5. Refined perspective of collective market work
Received wisdom from institutional theory literature posits market
pressures, the power of actors, changes in macro-level logics, or a
combination of all three, are typically the drivers of change in institu-
tions (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). However, the case studied herein runs
contrary to this in all areas. First, market pressures were clearly
working against the wishes of the winemakers wanting to move to
screwcap. Consumer resistance to screwcaps was well documented and
earlier attempts had failed. Second, actor power was low. The founders
of NZSWSI all represented small-medium family-owned organizations,
geographically isolated from their export markets and major interna-
tional wine regions. Third, the incumbent dominant market logic was
powerfully opposed to screwcaps on premium wine and was embedded
in multiple market actor groups including producers, consumers, re-
tailers, etc.
To overcome these challenges, NZSWSI engaged in various forms of
market work as the vehicle for collective action evolved. Table 3
summarizes the different types of work through the collective's evolu-
tion – moving from being organizationally-focused in early stages to
externally market-focused later, including gradually targeting more
other actors through time. ‘Coalescing’ occurred from Levels BeC,
where a commitment to a shared problem drove visioning options, se-
lectively enrolling others, and establishing feasibility. ‘Legitimizing’ the
ephemeral collective (Levels C-D) involved establishing the credibility
of the collective, and rules and objectives. While work through the
‘coalescing’ and ‘legitimizing’ stages was temporary in nature, it was
key to establishing NZSWSI's status (Kraatz, 2009). Consequently, this
legitimacy of the stable collective (Levels D-E) enabled ‘using market
clout,’ comprising various types of market work undertaken simulta-
neously – promotion, coercion, neutralizing threats, and undermining
and demonizing incumbent approaches. This ‘bundling’ of work con-
siderably increases the rapidity of change (Hargrave & Van de Ven,
2009), and proved effective in this case.
Business collective action is generally expected to be achieved
through professional bodies or trade associations, but these organiza-
tions are primarily focused on institutional maintenance rather than
innovation (Christiansen & Kroezen, 2016). NZSWSI did not receive the
support of their industry body initially. Hence, the Initiative carefully
constructed a peer group, which is key to changing practices, ap-
proaches, and belief systems (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
Outside NZSWSI, other market actors involved during the collecti-
ve's evolution are depicted in Fig. 1. Through the lens of the social
emergence paradigm, two important changes are apparent as NZSWSI's
stature grew. First, the number and type of other actors with which the
entity interacted increased, and became ‘higher-level’ in character. As a
stable meso-level entity (from Levels DeE), NZSWSI could target larger
meso-level entities and, critically, reach large swathes of consumers
through the gatekeepers – supermarket chains and overseas dis-
tributors.
Communication patterns progressed through three different styles
through the Initiative's evolution. Initial interactions when ‘coalescing’
(Levels BeC) involved multi-directional communication patterns
(Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002), and while ‘legitimizing’ (Levels C-
D) communication patterns were both multi- and bi-directional, invol-
ving negotiating agreed objectives, rules, and connecting with other
supportive actors (e.g., other winemakers, AWRI, etc.). Later, when
‘using market clout,’ (Levels D-E), these former collaborative forms of
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253

Table 3
Framework of collective market work through the emergence process.

communication were replaced with uni-directional communication
patterns (Lawrence et al., 2002), reflecting market work promoting,
educating, coercing, demonizing and undermining. These different
communication patterns are represented by single- or double-arrow-
heads in Fig. 1.
Finally, at Level E, the new ‘institutionalized solutions’ (Vargo et al.,
2015) in the wine market offered increased value to many actors rather
than just one (e.g., a producer or consumer) or a dyad (e.g., producer
and consumer). Instead, the work of NZSWSI resulted in ‘win-win-win’
outcomes for multiple parties (including producers, distributors, re-
tailers, restaurateurs, and consumers). Ironically, NZSWSI members
admit to not recognizing the value-in-use of a screwcap to the consumer
as they were resolutely focused on wine quality. However, as “custo-
mers seek solutions and experiences, not products” (Lusch & Vargo,
2014, p.6), the ease and convenience of screwcaps versus corks proved
valuable to consumers.
5. Discussion
Previous research into market-shaping has primarily focused on
single focal actors (e.g., Kindström et al., 2018; Nenonen et al., 2019).
In contrast, this research sought to examine the ability of small firms to
engage in ‘collective market work,’ which we define as orchestrated
strategies, initiatives and deliberate actions that collaborating market actors
engage in to shape the rules, taken-for-granted expectations, assumptions,
and practices in a market. We employed a rich, in-depth single-case study
in NZSWSI, a collaboration to create acceptance of the screwcap closure
on premium wines.

Fig. 1. Market work through emergence stages with other involved actors.

249
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
5.1. Theoretical contributions
This study makes three main theoretical contributions. First, we
offer an original theoretical synthesis of market (institutional) work
(Lawrence et al., 2011; Nenonen et al., 2019) with the social emergence
paradigm (Sawyer, 2005). This synthesis enables two important per-
spectives to be considered: 1) the impact of individual actions on
system-level outcomes, and 2) the impact of different levels of inter-
action on agentic efforts. While valuable contributions in themselves,
when considering how interactions between markets actors result in
market-shaping, focusing on only micro- and macro- (e.g., Araujo &
Kjellberg, 2011) or system-levels (e.g., Humphreys, 2010) cannot ex-
plain the systematic unfolding of orchestrated collective action. Fur-
ther, while a goal of the institutional work framework is to bridge
critical theorist and institutional perspectives, our theoretical synthesis
enables both micro-scoping and tele-scoping of market-shaping phe-
nomena by linking micro-level actions to outcomes at different levels of
emergence. Nevertheless, it is not possible to predict with surety which
actions will lead to which outcomes ex ante – instead the end result is
more a ‘communal quilting project’ than a ‘predictive jigsaw’
(Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank, 2008; Weick, 1979).
Second, we contribute new understanding of how collective market
work drives market-shaping. Complex systems are generally hierarchies
comprising different layers of sub-systems that constitute the whole,
and “evolve from simple systems much more rapidly if there are stable
intermediate forms” (Simon, 1962, p.473). We find, the establishment
of different ‘intermediate frames’ occur as collective market work is
undertaken, which evolve through three stages. First, ‘coalescing’ oc-
curs (Levels BeC) when secretive interactions lead to a commitment to
overcome a shared problem, with market work of visioning goals and
selectively enrolling others. Second, at meso-level, ‘legitimizing’ the
ephemeral collective occurs (Levels CeD) as belief and confidence in
the shared commitment grow. This stage involves negotiation and
agreement (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) of rules and intermediate ob-
jectives, selecting from alternatives, and building and sustaining the
peer group and supporter network (Kraatz, 2009). Third, ‘using market
clout’ occurs (Levels DeE) as the stable collective – operating within a
common strategic template and legitimized as a coherent whole –
promotes its preferred logic while undermining the incumbent and
coercing where necessary (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). NZSWSI had
both the power to neutralize critics and adopt a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’
attitude with importers. As an entity formalizes, collective identity
emerges, and a sense of authority is bestowed on collective members so
that they can develop (and enforce) rules and processes. Growing le-
gitimacy, stature and gravitas emboldens members to actively engage in
more external market work targeting a growing number of market ac-
tors of increasing size and power. Last, through the different stages of
collective market work, interactions evolve from being multi- and bi-
directional (Levels A-B-C) to become unidirectional once stable (Level
D) (Lawrence et al., 2002). This reflects the growing clout of the col-
lective through time.
The third theoretical contribution relates to the conditions under
which competitors might collaborate to engage in collective market
work. Although our primary research interest was exploring collective
market work and not competitor collaboration, our findings demon-
strate that competitors might collaborate in market work when faced
with a critical existential threat and their level of desperation is high.
However, any collective response must involve clearly defined goals
and objectives that can be pursued jointly without risking being anti-
competitive or losing competitive edge. Additionally, being strategic
about who to collaborate with – so that they are similar in size, values,
and business objectives – would seem critical. By extension, who not to
collaborate with is important so that the market work of the collective
is not undermined by conflicting business goals or other tensions.
NZSWSI members actively ‘othered’ tensions from the outset when
constituting the ephemeral emergent collective, so that any issues were
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Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253
moved from being intra-collective to being between the collective and
others.
5.2. Managerial implications
The managerial approach to marketing has primarily been built on a
conceptualization of markets as pre-existing exogenous entities to
which firms ‘position’ themselves and ‘target’ current and potential
customers using their marketing toolkit (Geiger, Kjellberg, & Spencer,
2012) while carefully developing ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ strategies
(Varadarajan, 2015). However, more accurately, markets are complex
systems in constant change, capable of both holding and taking on new
shape (Nenonen et al., 2014). Hence, the question of how managers
might consciously and deliberately shape markets is critical.
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) argue that it is often large cor-
porations that act as institutional entrepreneurs, however, we propose
that change in mature markets is not always brought about by large
incumbents, but also relatively small, isolated actors can influence en-
trenched markets through collective mark work. This has implications
for managers of small-medium- and family-firms who feel they do not
have the clout of large competitors, regulators or industry associations.
Collective market work offers a potential strategic roadmap for small
market players wanting to drive change. By extension, market work is a
co-creative process through all levels and at all stages, involving in-
creasing numbers of actors coming together and collaborating (Baker
et al., 2019; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009), which undermines the notion
of super-human heroic entrepreneurs. Instead, agreement, coalescing,
collaboration, sourcing and legitimizing are fundamental first steps in
changing a market. In sum, the more collaborative small market actors
are, the more influence they attain.
Managers must better interrogate what must really change to shape
a market. Focusing on micro-level considerations (e.g., the marketer's
toolbox and products), meso-level ‘industry forces,’ and macro-level
indicators (e.g., environmental scanning) does not fully capture the
complexity of contemporary market systems and the ability of market
actors to purposefully shape the system. Managers should strategize
from a market work perspective by exploring the taken-for-granted
practices, assumptions, expectations and belief systems that need to
change when attempting to institutionalize new logics. Managers must
ask how and why practices are mindlessly repeated, what factors frame
the shared understandings of market actors (e.g., other producers,
consumers, regulators, etc.), and what market work is required to
change these incumbent logics. These questions involve considerations
far beyond just new products, suppliers, competitors and target seg-
ments.
Additionally, collaborations that emerge as actors coalesce around
shared problems presenting potential opportunities and threats (e.g.,
climate change activists). By extension, managers must investigate with
which actors might they cooperate, collaborate, and share information,
and who are those that need to be enrolled, educated, and perhaps
undermined or coerced. Perhaps most importantly, identifying gate-
keepers to broader audiences and how to persuade them is critical.
Context is also an important consideration. While managers of profit-
making ventures might engage in market work, managers of non-profits
or social movements would also seem capable of attempting collective
market work to drive more pro-social outcomes. This is especially so
when existential crises are present that might drive collective colla-
boration.
What constitutes win-win-win outcomes is debatable. Certainly, the
Portuguese cork industry have not experienced a win from the collec-
tive market work of NZSWSI. Hence, market actors must carefully de-
termine with whom to collaborate and with whom to compete, which
might even be possible simultaneously. Regardless, it would seem the
key goal should be a win for more than just one or two market actor
groups. Sometimes, this may even involve openly sharing intellectual
property if the end-goal is growing the market pie for the benefit of all.
J.J. Baker and S. Nenonen
5.3. Limitations and further research
Generalizability is always problematic when exploring a single case
study. Additionally, a case that studies a small industry, facing a critical
threat, in a geographically isolated country, is not necessarily com-
parable to larger industries in large-scale markets. Therefore, other case
studies of different sized market actors collaborating to shape markets
in different parts of the world need examination, which will aid in
further refinement of our collective market work framework. Moreover,
how might industry actors react to potential collaboration if products
are more commoditized and industry returns acceptable? Nevertheless,
an institutional lens is a powerful proposition for examining changes
that occur beyond products, customers, and market structures, there-
fore we argue collective market work is worthy of further investigation.
Battilana and D'Aunno (2009) highlight the need for attention to the
micro-foundations of institutional work because studies have primarily
focused on organization- and field-level phenomena. We assert effec-
tuation logic might enable a suitable perspective of early market work.
Effectuation logic (Read & Sarasvathy, 2012; Sarasvathy, 2001) per-
ceives entrepreneurial action as a relational and network activity,
driven by not just the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur, but
also what they know and whom they know. This view could be valuable
for investigating micro- (Levels AeB) and meso-levels (Levels BeC) of
collective market work.
Historic case studies present limitations to a study. Retrospective
accounts by managers can include both inadvertent and conscious
biases, errors and inaccuracies (Huber & Power, 1985). Nevertheless, in
gathering and analyzing the data, we followed recommended practices
associated with minimizing issues, including focusing on events rather
than subjective emotions (Golden, 1992), and gathering a broad range
of data enabling triangulation and validation (Miller et al., 1997; Snow
& Thomas, 1994). However, future longitudinal studies, captured in
real-time, may provide more accurate accounts of collective market
work than the study contained herein, particularly in relation to conflict
and compromise by collaborators.
The NZ wine industry features little in the way of regulative re-
strictions regarding the type of closure on wine. However, appellation
rules in many ‘Old World’ wine-making countries do present numerous
restrictions that might be a cause of inertia in adopting contemporary
closures. This needs further investigation. More generally, there is a
need to study collaborations within highly regulated environments and
the role of formalized industry bodies (e.g., trade associations or pro-
fessional bodies), e.g., do industry bodies attempt market-shaping or
are they more inclined to attempt to maintain status quo as in organi-
zational fields; is it possible for an industry body to engage in market-
shaping while simultaneously protecting industry status quo, or are
these constructs interdependent? Lastly, case studies examining inter-
actions between firms, industry bodies and regulators would be a pro-
mising line of inquiry.
Funding
This research was funded in part by a Marsden grant (UOA1333)
from the Royal Society of New Zealand.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the editor and anonymous reviewers for
their thoughtful and insightful comments. The authors are also grateful
to Professor Kaj Storbacka at University of Auckland Graduate School of
Management for his contributions to the development of this article.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2019.11.011.
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Industrial Marketing Management 85 (2020) 240–253
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