CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Title Four quash on this ground constitutes a bar to another
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman,
as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
Petralba vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337
Extinction of criminal liability does not
necessarily mean that the civil liability is also
extinguished.
Causes of extinction of criminal liability
distinguished from causes of justification or
exemption
Such arise after the commission of the
offense; while the causes of justification or
exemption from criminal liability arise from
circumstances existing either before the
commission of the crime or at the moment of its
commission.
That criminal liability is totally extinguished is a
ground for motion to quash
Under Sec. 3(g) of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, one of the grounds for
motion to quash is that the criminal action has been
extinguished. The order sustaining a motion to
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prosecution for the same offense. (Sec. 6, Rule
117)
By the death of the convict
The death of the convict, whether before or
after final judgment, extinguishes criminal liability,
because one of the juridical conditions of penalty is
that it is personal.
Civil liability is extinguished only when death
occurs before final judgment
The death of the convict also extinguishes
pecuniary penalties only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
Hence, if the offender dies after final
judgment, the pecuniary penalties are not
extinguished.
Where a person is charged with homicide,
for instance, the civil liability for indemnity is based
solely on the finding of guilt. If he is acquitted
because of self-defense, the heirs of the deceased
have no right to indemnity. Should the offender die
before final judgment, their right to indemnity is
likewise extinguished as there is no basis for the
civil liability. Civil liability exists only when the
accused is convicted by final judgment.
Criminal and civil liability is extinguished when
the offender dies before final judgment.
People vs. Castillo, C.A., 56 O.G. 4045
When the accused died while the judgment
of conviction against him was pending appeal, his
civil and criminal liability was extinguished by his
death.
In view of the death of the accused during
the pendency of this case he is relieved of all
personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to his
crime, his death occurring before rendition of final
judgment.
Definition of "final judgment."
People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 152007
The term "final judgment" employed in the
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. As long as a judgment has not become
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant
is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Section 7, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
likewise states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right
to appeal.
Effect of the death of the accused pending
appeal on his criminal and civil liability
General rule —
Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely on the offense
committed.
Exception — People vs. Bayotas, supra
The claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-
contracts and quasi- delicts.
Examples:
a) Belamala vs. Polinar, No. L-24098
The claim for civil liability based on law may
also be made — in the offense of physical injuries,
since Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action
b) Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-40336
Claim for civil liability based on contract may also
be made — in the offense of estafa when the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and
sale (as when accused had swindled the vendees
of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale).
Where action for recovery of damages must be
filed, when civil liability survives
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If the private offended party, upon
extinction, of the civil liability ex delicto, desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must, subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
file a separate civil action, this time predicated not
on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon
which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be
enforced. Thus —
a) If the same act or omission complained of
also arises from quasi-delict or may, by
provision of law, result in an injury to person
or property (real or personal), the separate
civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court.
b) If the same act or omission complained of
also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the
accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. (People vs. Bayotas, supra)
Right of offended party to file separate civil
action not lost by prescription when accused
dies pending appeal
The private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file the separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code. (People vs. Bayotas, supra)
Art. 1155, Civil Code: The prescription of
actions is interrupted when they are filed before the
court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand
by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Death of the offended party does not extinguish
the criminal liability of the offender
People vs. Misola, 87 Phil. 830, 833
The death of the offended party does not
extinguish the criminal liability of the offender,
because the offense is committed against the
State.
By service of sentence
Crime is a debt incurred by the offender as
a consequence of his wrongful act and the penalty
is but the amount of his debt. When payment is
made, the debt is extinguished.
Service of sentence does not extinguish the
civil liability. (Salgado vs. Court of Appeals)
By amnesty
Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S. 602
Amnesty is an act of the sovereign power
granting oblivion or a general pardon for a past
offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor of a
single individual, and is usually exerted in behalf of
certain classes of persons, who are subject to trial
but have not yet been convicted.
Amnesty extinguishes the penalty and all its effects
- par. 3, Art. 89
Amnesty may be granted after conviction
Tolentino vs. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300
The amnesty proclamation in favor of the
Hukbalahaps is applicable to those already
undergoing sentence upon the date of
promulgation.
Examples of amnesty;
1. Proclamation No. 51, dated January
28,1948, by President Roxas, granting
amnesty to those who collaborated with the
enemy during World War II.
2. Proclamation No. 76, dated June 21, 1948,
by President Quirino, extending amnesty to
the Huks and PKM (Pambansang Kaisahan
ng mga Magbubukid), who committed
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rebellion, sedition, illegal association, etc.
(See 44 O.G. 1794)
3. Proclamation No. 80, dated February
28,1987, by President Aquino, extending
amnesty to those who, in the furtherance of
their political beliefs, may have committed
treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit
the crime of treason, misprision of treason,
espionage, rebellion or insurrection,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
or insurrection, inciting to rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, inciting to sedition, illegal
assemblies, illegal associations, direct
assault, indirect assault, resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or
agents of such person or persons,
subversion, and illegal possession of
firearms and explosives.
Civil liability not extinguished by amnesty.
While amnesty wipes out all traces and
vestiges of the crime, it does not extinguish the civil
liability of the offender.
By absolute pardon
Pardon is an act of grace proceeding from
the power entrusted with the execution of the laws
which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for
the crime he has committed.
Kinds of pardon:
(1) Absolute pardon
(2) Conditional pardon
A pardon, whether absolute or conditional, is in
the nature of a deed, for the validity of which
delivery is an indispensable requisite. Until
accepted, all that may have been done is a matter
of intended favor and may be cancelled. But once
accepted by the grantee, the pardon already
delivered cannot be revoked by the authority which
granted it.
Pardon in adultery case.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A was charged with the crime of adultery
with a married woman. The married woman, after
conviction of both accused, was pardoned by the
Chief Executive.
Does the pardon of the woman have the
effect of extinguishing the criminal liability of A?
No, because (1) the power to extend
executive clemency is unlimited, and (2) that the
exercise ofthat power lies in the absolute and
uncontrolled discretion of the Chief Executive.
People vs. Infante, 57 Phil. 138, 139
But if the one giving the pardon is the
offended spouse in adultery, both offenders must
be pardoned by the offended party if said pardon is
to be effective.
Pardon of murder after evasion of service of
sentence – Alvarez vs. Director of Prisons
A was convicted of murder. Subsequently, A
evaded the service of the sentence. A was
prosecuted for and convicted of evasion. The
President thereafter pardoned A of the murder.
Held: The pardon refers only to the crime of murder
and does not have the effect of remitting the
penalty for evasion of the service of the sentence
committed prior to said pardon.
Limitation on power of the President to grant
pardon
The President may not extend in (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules, and
regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
(Sec. 19, Art. VII, and Sec. 5 Art. IX, 1987
Constitution)
Absolute Pardon
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666
The pardon granted by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to former President
Estrada on October 25, 2007 states, in part: "In
view
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hereof and pursuant to the authority conferred upon
me by the Constitution,I hereby grant executive
clemency to Joseph Ejercito Estrada, convicted by
the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights."
Is former President Estrada qualified to vote
and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him?
Held: Former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public elective office. The pardon granted to
former President
Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not
only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope,
complete and plenary in character, as the term
"political rights" adverted to has a settled meaning
in law and jurisprudence.
Conviction by final judgment prohibits grant of
pardon during pendency of appeal
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation
under Section 19, Article VIl of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether
full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the
trial court.
Any application therefor, if one is made,
should not be acted upon or the process toward its
grant should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned
must require proof from the accused that he has
not appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the
form of a certification issued by the trial court or the
appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of
a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole
before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render
those responsible therefor administratively liable
Accordingly, those in custody of the
accused
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the
release of the accused from confinement.
Pardon by the President and pardon by the
offended party, distinguished.
1. Pardon by the President must come after
final conviction; pardon by the offended
party in crimes against chastity must come
before the institution of the criminal action
except for rape where pardon by the
offended may be made after final judgment.
2. Pardon by the President extinguishes
criminal liability. Pardon by the offended
party does not extinguish criminal liability
except in rape and crimes of chastity where
pardon by the offended party is a bar to
criminal prosecution and marriage between
the offended and the offended party
extinguishes criminal liability.
3. Both do not extinguish civil liability but in
pardon by the offended party, civil liability
may be expressly waived.
4. Pardon by the President in election cases
requires the favorable recommendation of
the COMELEC; pardon by the offended
party who is a minor in rape and crimes
against chastity requires the concurrence of
the parents.
5. The power of the President to grant pardon
and its limitations are set forth in the
Constitution while the effect of pardon by
the offended party is provided in the RPC.
Amnesty and pardon distinguished
1. Pardon includes any crime and is exercised
individually by the President; amnesty is a
blanket pardon to classes of persons who
may be guilty of political offenses.
2. Pardon is exercised when the person is
already convicted; amnesty may be
exercised even before trial or investigation.
3. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the
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punishment, and for that reason it does "not
work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon." On the other hand,
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
Thus –
(a) Pardon does not alter the fact that the
accused is a recidivist, because it produces
the extinction only of the personal effects of
the penalty.
(b) Amnesty makes an ex-convict no longer a
recidivist, because it obliterates the last
vestige of the crime.
4. Both do not extinguish the civil liability of the
offender. (Art. 113)
5. Pardon, being a private act of the President,
must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned; while amnesty being by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice.
By prescription of crime and by prescription of
penalty – Santos vs. Superintendent, 55 Phil. 345
By prescription, the State or the People
loses the right to prosecute the crime or to demand
the service of the penalty imposed.
Definitions
Prescription of the crime is the forfeiture or
loss of the right of the State to prosecute the
offender after the lapse of a certain time.
Prescription of the penalty is the loss or
forfeiture of the right of the Government to execute
the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time.
2 conditions necessary in prescription of
penalty
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
(a) That there be final judgment.
(b) That the period of time prescribed by law for
its enforcement has elapsed.
By the marriage of the offended woman
People vs. Santiago, 51 Phil. 68, 70
Marriage of the offender with the offended
woman after the commission of any of the crimes of
rape, seduction, abduction or acts of
lasciviousness, as provided in Art. 344, must be
contracted by the offender in good faith. Marriage
contracted only to avoid criminal liability is devoid of
legal effects.
Final discharge of probationer
Sec. 16, P.D. 968, amended by R.A. 10707
The final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to
totally extinguish his criminal liability as to the
offense for which probation was granted.
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. — Crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal shall prescribe in 20 years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional
penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the
exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar
offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The offenses of oral defamation and
slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a
compound one, the highest penalty shall be
made the basis of the application of the rules
contained in the first, second, and third pars. of
this article. (amended by R.A. 4661)
Prescription of violations penalized by special laws
and ordinances — when it begins to run
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Prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission ofthe violation ofthe law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
(Sec. 2, Act No. 3326)
When interrupted.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
(Sec. 2, Act No. 3326)
Prescription of crimes
Prescription of the crime is the loss by the
State of the right to prosecute and punish the
same. Criminal liability is totally extinguished by
such.
Prescriptive period of penalties
1. Crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal – 20 years
2. Crimes punishable by prision mayor,
perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification, perpetual or temporary
special disqualification – 15 years
3. Crimes punishable by prision correccional ,
suspension, and destierro – 10 years
4. Crimes punishable by arresto mayor – 5
years
5. Libel and similar offenses – 1 year
6. Oral defamation, slander by deed – 6
months
7. Crimes punishable by arresto menor – 2
mos
In computing the period of prescription, the
first day is to be excluded and the last day
included
Facts: The accused committed slight physical
injuries on May 28, 1953. An information was filed
on July 27, 1953. This crime, being a light offense,
prescribes in two months according to Art. 90. The
Municipal Court sustained the motion to quash and
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
dismissed the case, holding that the information
was filed on the 61st day, not on the 60th day from
May 28, 1953, "the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party."
Held: The information should be considered as
filed on the 60th day. In the computation of a period
of time within which an act is to be done, the law in
this jurisdiction has always directed that the first
day be excluded and the last included. (Art. 13,
Civil Code.)
People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67, 70
A month is computed as the regular 30-day
month. The running of the prescriptive period
should commence from the day following the day
on which the crime was committed.
A leap year should be counted as separate days
in computing periods of prescription
Namarco vs. Tuazon, 29 SCRA 70
As regards the month of February of a leap
year, February 28 and 29 should be counted as
separate days in computing periods of prescription.
Thus, where the prescriptive period was
supposed to commence on December 21,1955, the
filing ofthe action on December 21,1965, was done
after the ten-year period had elapsed — since 1960
and 1964 were both leap years, and the case was
thus filed two (2) days too late.
Rule where the last day of the prescriptive
period falls on a Sunday or legal holiday
Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino, No. L-28841
Where the last day of the prescriptive period
for filing an information falls on a Sunday or legal
holiday, the information can no longer be filed on
the next day as the crime has already prescribed.
Prescription of oral defamation, slander by
deed
People vs. Maceda, 73 Phil. 679, 681
Distinction should be made between simple
and grave slander. Simple slander prescribes in
two months. Grave slander prescribes in six
months.
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Rep. Act No. 4661 not applicable to cases
already filed in court prior to June 18,1966
The provision of this amendatory Act
(reducing the prescriptive period ofthe crime of libel
or other similar offenses, from two years to one
year) shall not apply to cases of libel already filed in
court at the time of approval of this amendatory Act.
(Sec. 2, Rep. Act No. 4661, approved June 18,
1966)
Crimes punishable by arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding P40,000 prescribe in two months
The lower court ruled that the offense
charged was a light felony under par. 3 of Art. 9,
which, as provided in Art. 90, prescribes in two
months. The Solicitor General cites Art. 26 of the
same Code and contends that inasmuch as the
penalty imposable under Art. 195 of the Code is
arresto menor, or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos,
then a fine of200 pesos, imposable as a single or
as an alternative penalty, may be considered as a
correctional penalty and so under Art. 90, the
offense charged prescribes in ten years and not
two months. This Court has already ruled that a
violation of Art. 195, punishable with arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding P200.00 is a light felony
under Art. 9 of said Code and prescribes in two
months, according to Art. 90, par. 6, of the same
Code.
Two months in Art. 90, regarding the
prescriptive period for light felonies, means 60
days. (People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67, 71)
Penalty for attempted bribery is destierro,
which prescribes in 10 years, as a correctional
penalty
Dalao vs. Geronimo, 92 Phil. 1042, 1043
The period of prescription of the offense of
attempted bribery, penalized with destierro, is 10
yerrs according to Article 90, because destierro is
classified; is a correctional penalty under Art. 25.
Prescription of crimes punishable by fines
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Fines are also classified as afflictive,
correctional, or light penalty. (Art. 26)
People vs. Basalo, 101 Phil. 57, 61-62
The crimes punishable by fines shall
prescribe in 15 years, if the fine is afflictive; or in 10
years, if it is correctional; or in two months, if the
fine is light. The subsidiary penalty for nonpayment
ofthe fine should not be considered in determining
the period of prescription of such crimes.
Note: Since light felony is specifically
defined in Art. 9 as an infraction of the law for the
commission of which the penalty of arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding P40,000, or both, is
provided, a fine of P40,000 provided for a light
felony should not be considered correctional.
When the penalty is a compound one, the
highest penalty is the basis of the application of
the rules in Art. 90
There is no merit in the contention that the
crime of perjury, which is punishable by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period, has already prescribed.
People vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 255, 259
Where the penalty fixed by law is a
compound one, the highest penalty shall, according
to the last paragraph of Art. 90, be made the basis
of the application of the rules contained therein.
The penalty for the crime of perjury being a
compound one, the higher of which is correctional,
said crime prescribes in 10 years.
When fine is an alternative penalty higher than
the other penalty which is by imprisonment —
prescription of the crime is based on the fine.
People vs. Basalo, 101 Phil. 57, 61
Under Art. 319 of the Code, the penalty for
the offense is arresto mayor or a fine double the
value of the property involved. The accused sold 80
cavans of palay with a value of P320, which he had
mortgaged to the PNB, without the knowledge and
consent of the mortgagee.
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Held: The period of prescription applicable is ten
years, instead of five years. True, the offense under
Art. 319 insofar as it is penalized with arresto
mayor prescribes in 5 years, but the fine equivalent
to double the amount of the property involved may
also be imposed as a penalty, and when said
imposable penalty is either correctional or afflictive,
it should be made the basis for determining the
period of prescription.
The ruling in the Basalo case applies even if the
penalty is arresto mayor and fine
People vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-16945
When the penalty prescribed by the Code is
arresto mayor and fine (Art. 316, par. 2), and the
fine is afflictive (P15.000 to P45.000), the fine
should be the basis ofthe application of the rules in
Art. 90.
Prescriptive periods of offenses punished
under special laws and municipal ordinances
Act No. 3763, amending Act No. 3326, provides:
1. Offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both, prescribe after 1 year;
2. Offenses punished by imprisonment for
more than one month, but less than two
years — after 4 years;
3. Offenses punished by imprisonment for two
years or more but less than six years —
after 8 years;
4. Offenses punished by imprisonment for six
years or more — after 12 years;
5. Offenses under Internal Revenue Law —
after 5 years;
6. Violations of municipal ordinances — after 2
months;
7. Violations of the regulations or conditions of
certificate of convenience by the Public
Service Commission — after 2 months.
Act No. 3326 is not applicable where the special
law provides for its own prescriptive period. (People
vs. Ramos, No. L-25265)
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Defense of prescription may be raised during
the trial or during the appeal
The rule in Section 10, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court (now Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) that if the
accused failed to move to quash before pleading,
he must be deemed to have waived all objections,
which are grounds of a motion to quash, cannot
apply to the defense of prescription, which under
Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes
criminal liability. (People vs. Castro, 95 Phil. 462,
464-465)
Prescription, although not invoked in the
trial, may be invoked on appeal. (People vs.
Balagtas, 105 Phil. 1362-1363 [Unrep.]
The accused cannot be convicted of an offense
lesser than charged if the lesser offense had
been prescribed at the time information was
filed
Francisco vs. CA, 122 SCRA 545
Where an accused has been found to have
committed a lesser offense includible within the
offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the
lesser offense, if it has already been prescribed. To
hold otherwise would be to sanction the
circumvention of the law on prescription by the
simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the
graver offense.
People vs. Rarang (C.A., 62 O.G. 6458)
Facts: Defendant Dominador Rarang was charged
with the crime of grave slander in an information
filed on October 19,1962, for having allegedly
proffered and uttered, on or about July 18,1962,
slanderous words and expressions against
complainant Fausto Carlos, Jr., such as "hindi kami
natatakot sa inyo, mga tulisan." He filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the crime
had prescribed because the offense alleged in the
information, although designated as grave slander,
should properly be classified as slight oral
defamation which prescribes in two months; but
said motion, opposed by the prosecution, was
denied.
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After hearing the evidence, the Court of
First Instance of Manila found that "there is
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the herein
accused slandered the complainant, as established
by the prosecution, the said offense, however,
being slight in nature as it arose from the heat of
anger, the same being defined and penalized under
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code," but instead
of dismissing the case, the Court sentenced the
defendant to pay a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
Prescription does not divest court of
jurisdiction; it is a ground for acquittal
Santos vs. Superintendent, 55 Phil. 345, 349
When there is a plea of prescription by the
defense and the same appears from the allegation
of the information or is established, the court must
exercise jurisdiction, not inhibit itself, holding the
action to have prescribed and absolving the
defendant.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of
offenses. — The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
Outline of the provisions:
1. The period of prescription commences to
run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents.
2. It is interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
3. It commences to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
4. The term of prescription shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippines.
Illustration of rules Nos. 1, 2 and 3
A committed serious oral defamation
against Kin March, 1935. As K came to know of the
act complained of only on March 4, 1936, K filed
the complaint on that date.
Because his official duties needed him to be
in Mindanao, K was not able to attend the hearing
of the case. Upon motion of defendant A, the case
was dismissed on January 21, 1937, without
prejudice to the fiscal filing again the same action.
On February 13,1937, the case was revived
by the fiscal by filing a new information. Serious
oral defamation prescribes in 6 months.
From what date must the six-month period
be counted?
It must be counted from January 21, 1937.
(People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590)
It cannot be counted from March, 1935,
when the crime was committed, because it was
discovered by the offended party only on March 4,
1936, and the running of the period of prescription
stopped on that date by the filing ofthe complaint in
court. Hence, it must be counted from January
21,1937, because when the case was dismissed on
that date, the period of prescription commenced to
run again. Note that the proceedings terminated
without the accused being convicted or acquitted.
The period of prescription commences to run
from the date of commission of crime if it is
known at the time of its commission
People vs. Dinsay, C.A., 40 O.G., 12th Supp., 50
Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed
or needed to be discovered, because the entire
series of transactions was by public instruments,
duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in
connection with said transactions was known to the
10
offended party when it was committed and the
period of prescription commenced to run from the
date of its commission.
Cabral vs. Puno, No. L-41692
The offended party had constructive notice
of the forgery after the deed of sale, where his
signature had been falsified, was registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds on August 26,1948.
From the date of commission or from the date
of discovery
People vs. Tamayo, 40 O.G. 2313
The period of prescription of crime
commences to run from the commission of the
offense or its discovery, if the commission of the
same was unknown.
People vs. Monteiro, G.R. No. 49454
The period of prescription for the offense of
failure to register with the SSS shall begin from the
day of the discovery of the violation if this was not
known at the time of its commission. A contrary
view would be dangerous as the successful
concealment of an offense during the period fixed
for its prescription would be the very means by
which the offender may escape punishment.
It is discovery of crime, not discovery of
offender
The fact that the culprit is unknown will not
prevent the period of prescription from commencing
to run. The accused need not to be arrested.
Period of prescription of continuing crime
never runs – Arches vs. Bellasillo, 81 Phil. 190,
192
Facts: The accused was charged with violation of a
municipal ordinance in that he constructed dikes in
navigable waterways (river and creek) of the public
domain without authorization from the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The dikes were
constructed in 1939 while the case was filed in
1947. Did the crime prescribe?
Held: The prescriptive period of continuing crime,
cannot begin to run because there could be no
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
termination of continuity and the crime does not
end. The case would have been different had the
information alleged that the dikes existed until such
date obstructing the course of the streams,
because the crime ended on that date.
The crime is discovered by (1) the offended
party, (2) the authorities or (3) their agents
A saw the killing with treachery of B by C.
After the commission of the crime, C threw the
dead body of B into the river. The dead body of B
was never seen again or found. A was neither an
authority nor an agent of an authority, nor a relative
of B. For 25 years, A kept silent as to what he
witnessed. After 25 years, A revealed to the
authorities that C murdered B.
May C be prosecuted for murder even if 25
years already elapsed?
Yes, because the period of prescription did
not commence to run. The commission of the crime
was known only to A, who was not the offended
party, an authority or an agent of an authority. It
was discovered by the authorities only when A
revealed to them the commission of the crime.
Period of prescription was interrupted when
preliminary examination was made by
municipal mayor but accused could not be
arrested because he was in hiding
People vs. Parao, 52 Phil. 712, 715
The accused killed a man on June 19, 1911.
The municipal president, who began the preliminary
investigation because the justice of the peace was
absent, issued a warrant of arrest. The accused
could not be arrested because they fled to an
unknown place. The information for homicide was
filed on June 29,1927. Accused Isidro Parao was
captured in July, 1927. Did the offense prescribe?
Held: No. The preliminary investigation conducted
by the municipal president, in the absence of the
justice of the peace or auxiliary justice of the peace,
partakes of the nature of a judicial proceeding.
Judicial proceedings having been taken against the
accused and his arrest having been ordered, which
could not be carried into effect on account of his
default, the crime has not prescribed.
11
The crime of homicide prescribed in 15
years under the old Penal Code. The proceedings
in this case were stopped for reasons imputable to
the accused, that is, they fled to an unknown place,
making it difficult to arrest them for further
proceedings.
Filing of complaint with the prosecutor's office
interrupts running of period of prescription of
offense charged
Section 1, Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal actions. — Criminal
actions shall be instituted as follows:
(a)  For offenses where a preliminary investigation
is required pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 112, by
filing the complaint with the proper officer for the
purposes of conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation;
(b)  For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or
information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts or the complaint
with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and
other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed
with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
The institution of the criminal action shall
interrupt the period of prescription of the offense
charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."
The filing of the complaint in the municipal
court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation,
interrupts the period of prescription
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in
order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has re-examined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion
that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing
of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed
can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the
period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of de- lays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense
may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to
file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also
expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall
commence to run again when such pro- ceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted," thereby indicating that the court in which
the complaint or information is filed must have
power to acquit or convict the accused.
Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in convic- tion or acquittal, not
otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation where the proceedings
may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the
court should discharge the ac- cused because no
prima facie case has been shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the
Court hereby overrules the doctrine ofthe cases of
People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, Decem- ber 29,
1960, and People vs. Coquia, L-15456,
promulgated June 29, 1963. (People vs. Olarte, No.
L-22465, Feb. 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 494, 500-501)
The complaint or information that will interrupt
the period of prescription must be proper
corresponding to the offense
People vs. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616
On April 1, 1959, Felipe Abuy was charged
in the Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with the
crime of trespass to dwelling com- mitted against
Ruperto Carpio. Upon motion of the prosecution,
12
the case was dismissed on the ground that the
evidence so far presented would not sustain
accused's conviction. Subsequently, on Nov. 13,
1959, Abuy was charged before the same court
with the crime of unjust vexation committed on the
person of Michaela de Magadia. Abuy filed a
motion to quash the information on the ground of
prescription. The court sustained the motion.
The complaint or information that will
interrupt the period must be the proper information
or complaint corresponding to the offense. Here,
the first information was for trespass to dwelling,
the elements of which are entirely different from the
elements of the offense of unjust vexation. There is
nothing to show that the two offenses are related to
each other. Consequently, the filing of one does not
interrupt the prescriptive period as to the other.
Effect of filing amended complaint or
information upon period of prescription
If the original complaint or information is
filed within the prescriptive period and the
amendment was made after said period, a
distinction should be made between a new and
different act complained of and mere correction or
new specifications to amplify and give greater
precision to the allegations in support of the cause
originally presented.
LTB vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 41399, Aug. 9, 1934
If it is merely a correction of a defect, the
date of the original complaint should be considered.
The filing of the information in the court of
Batangas for estafa, even if erroneous, because
it had no territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged, tolls the running of the prescriptive
period of the crime, since the jurisdiction of a
court is determined in criminal cases by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and
not by the result of proof
People vs. Galano, No. L-42925
In a case, respondent judge, in sustaining
the ground of prescription, ruled that there was no
interruption ofthe prescriptive period during the
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
pendency of the case in his court, because it had
no territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged,
and that "[t]he proceedings contemplated by Article
91 are proceedings which are valid and before a
competent court."
Held: Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined in criminal cases by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and not
by the result of proof. It follows that the Batangas
court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the
criminal complaint filed with it, which expressly
alleged that the offense was committed "in the
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas,"
and that the proceedings therein were valid and
before a competent court, until the same court
issued its order, dismissing the case and declaring
itself without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of
the evidence presented to it by both the
prosecution and the accused.
"Proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted."
In the case of People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil.
588, 590, when the case was dismissed upon
petition of accused Aquino, the proceeding
terminated without the accused being convicted or
acquitted. The period of prescription commenced to
run again.
Suppose, the case was dismissed without
the consent or over the objection of the accused
who had already been arraigned?
In this case, the dismissal is final. A cannot
be prosecuted any more for the same offense, even
within the prescriptive period, on the ground of
double jeopardy.
The termination of a criminal case
contemplated in Article 91 on prescription of
crimes refers to a termination that is final as to
amount to a jeopardy that would bar a
subsequent prosecution
One Lauron was charged with the crime of
grave oral defamation which was discovered on
December 15, 1973. The information was filed in
court on January 24,1974. On March 14,1974, the
13
court, on Lauron's motion to dismiss, issued an
order of dismissal, on the ground that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal did
not comply with the requirements of Presidential
Decree No. 77. Lauron had not been arraigned.
The case was refiled in court under a new
information on March 3,1975. The crime ofgrave
oral defama- tion prescribes in six months.
Said the Supreme Court:
"We hold that the termination of a criminal
case contemplated in Article 91 refers to a
termination that is final, in the sense of being
beyond reconsideration, as in the cases of an
unappealed conviction or an acquittal."
Comment: Article 91 provides that the
period ofprescription (of offenses) "shall commence
to run again when such proceedings (the filing ofthe
complaint or information) terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted." (italics
supplied)
If the "termination x x x refers to a
termination that is final, x x x as in the cases of an
unappealed conviction or an acquittal," there would
be no occasion to speak of prescription of offenses,
no matter how long a time has elapsed, because
the accused is already convicted (and he does not
appeal) or acquitted.
Article 91 may be considered only when the
accused, who invokes it, is being charged with and
prosecuted for an offense that allegedly has
already prescribed. If the proceedings, which began
with the filing of the complaint or information,
terminate in the conviction of the accused or in his
acquittal (the termination being final), how may the
question of prescription arise? Or, what period of
prescription "shall commence to run again?"
This is why the law says, "without the
accused being convicted or acquitted." In such
case, the accused may still be prosecuted, but with
the previous termination of the proceedings, the
question of prescription may still arise, because the
period of prescription ran again. At the time of the
new prosecution, the crime may have already
prescribed.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
"Or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him."
Thus, if the proceedings are stopped for a
reason imputable to the accused, the period of
prescription does not commence to run again.
Example:
When the accused has evaded arrest and
the case has to be archived by the court, the
proceedings are stopped because of the fault of the
accused. The case cannot be tried if he is not
present.
The term of prescription does not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines
A published a libel in a newspaper and
immediately left for Hongkong where he remained
for three years. Later, he returned to the
Philippines. Can A be prosecuted for libel upon his
return to his country?
Yes, because the crime of libel did not
prescribe. A was absent from the Philippines during
the period when the crime would have prescribed.
Brief trips abroad are not included.
Prescription of election offenses — (1) if
discovery of offense is incidental to judicial
proceedings, prescription begins when such
proceeding terminates; otherwise, (2) from date
of commission of offense
If the discovery of the offense is incidental
to judicial proceedings in election contest,
prescription begins when such proceedings
terminate.
People vs. Carino, 56 Phil. 109, 114
But, if the falsification committed by the
inspectors in connection with the counting of the
votes and the preparation of election returns was
known to the protestants and their election
watchers before the filing of the election protests,
the period of prescription began from the date of
the commission of the offense.
Prescription of violations penalized by special
laws and ordinances – when it begins to run
14
Prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
(Sec. 2, Act No. 3326)
Prescription of violations penalized by special
laws and ordinances – when interrupted
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
(Sec. 2, Act No. 3326)
Panaguiton v. Department of Justice
The fling of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office signifñed the commencement
of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused and effectively interrupts the prescriptive
period.
The historical perspective on the application
of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act No. 3226 was
approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the
function of conducting the preliminary investigation
of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of
the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time xxx
is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once
a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of
the complaint signifies the institution criminal
proceedings against the accused. XXX
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al.
The nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act, another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport
Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term
"judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
appears before "investigation and punishment" in
the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up
whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it
refers to the trial and judgment stage.
With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Prescription of violations penalized by special
laws and ordinances runs when offender is
absent from the Philippines
Unlike Article 91 of the R.P.C. that
expressly states that the term of prescription shall
not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippines, there is nothing in Act No. 3326 that
states that absence from the Philippines will stop
the running of the prescriptive term.
Thus, for violations of special laws and
ordinances, the prescriptive term shall run
notwithstanding the offender's absence from the
Philippines.
Art. 91 may apply when a special law, while
providing a prescriptive period, does not
prescribe any rule for the application of that
period
Thus, in a case where the accused is
prosecuted for violation of the Usury Law, there
being no rule in Act No. 4763 regarding the
enforcement of the period of prescription
established thereby, pursuant to Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, the rule provided for in Article
91 ofsaid Code shall be applied, according to which
the period of prescription of crimes shall commence
to run from the time of the perpetration of the
offense and in case the commission of the same is
unknown, from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
15
their agents. (People vs. Tamayo, C.A., 40 O.G.
2313)
Prescription of offenses under Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) is
reckoned from the time of discovery of the
offense, if the violation was unknown at the
time of commission
Generally, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an
action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the
facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent
the running of the prescriptive period.
An exception to this rule is the "blameless
ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of
limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of
the
invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, the courts would decline to
apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff
does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action."
It was in this accord that the Court
confronted the question on the running of the
prescriptive period in People v. Duque which
became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130149, and
the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto
dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of
cases, that if the violation of the special law was not
known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, ie., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans Deciarto GR
No. 135715, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 586)
Prescription of the offense of false testimony —
from time principal case is finally decided.
People vs. Maneja, 72 Phil. 256, 257-258
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Considering that the penalties provided
therefor are made to depend upon the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the
act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute
an actionable offense until the principal case is
finally decided. Before an act becomes a
punishable offense, it cannot possibly be
discovered as such by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents.
This is true only when the false testimony is
against the defendant. As regards false testimony
in favor of the defendant, there is a specific penalty
which does not depend on the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant. (Art. 181)
Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. —
The penalties imposed by final sentence
prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in 20 years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years, with the
exception of the penalty of arresto mayor,
which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
The penalties must be imposed by final
sentence
Hence, if the convict appealed and
thereafter fled to the mountains, the penalty
imposed upon him would never prescribe, because
pending the appeal, the sentence is not final.
In prescription of crimes, it is the penalty
prescribed by law that should be considered; in
prescription of penalties, it is the penalty
imposed that should be considered
A committed the crime of falsification
punishable by prision mayor. Twelve years elapsed
since the crime was discovered by the authorities.
Then, the fiscal filed an information for falsification.
A was arrested and prosecuted.
During the trial, A proved two mitigating
circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance. Did the crime prescribe?
16
No, because although the proper penalty to
be imposed is prision correccional, the penalty one
degree lower, in view of the privileged mitigating
circumstance (Art. 64, par. 5), is the penalty of
prision mayor which is prescribed by the law for the
crime that should be considered. Art. 90 uses the
words, "Crimes the crime did not prescribe,
because the time that elapsed is not more than 15
years.
But suppose that in the same problem, A
commenced to serve the sentence and after a
month, he escaped and remained at large for
twelve years, in case he is captured thereafter, can
he be required to serve the remaining period of his
sentence?
No, because the penalty of prision
correccional already prescribed. Art. 92 uses the
words "the penalties imposed by final sentence.
Fine as a light penalty
Under Art. 26, a fine of less than P40,000 is
a light penalty, and if not less than P40,000, it is a
correctional penalty. Under Art. 9, par. 3, a light
felony is punishable by a light penalty, whose fine
does not exceed P40,00. Under Art. 90, light
offenses prescribe in two months. If the fine
imposed be exactly P40,000, should it prescribe in
two months as a light penalty or in ten years as
correctional penalty?
People vs. Hu Hai alias Haya, 99 Phil. 725, 727
Where the question at issue is the
prescription of a crime and not the prescription of a
penalty, Art. 9 should prevail over Art. 26. Art. 26
has nothing to do with the definition of offenses but
merely classifies fine when imposed as a principal
penalty.
Illustrations:
1. A committed a crime for which the law
provides a fine of P40,000 as a penalty.
What is the prescriptive period of the crime?
Two months. The issue here is not the
prescription of penalty, because there is no
final sentence and A has not evaded the
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
sentence. Art. 9 shall prevail. Since the fine
does not exceed F200, the crime committed
is a light felony.
2. But suppose that A was convicted, he could
not pay the fine of P40,000; and was made
to serve subsidiary imprisonment. Then,
while serving subsidiary imprisonment, he
escaped, thereby evading the service of his
sentence. What is the prescriptive period?
Ten years. The issue here is prescription of
penalty. Art. 26 prevails. Since the fine is
not less than P40,000, it is a correctional
penalty.
The subsidiary penalty for nonpayment of the
fine is immaterial
People vs. Salazar, 98 Phil. 663, 665
A fine of P525, being a correctional penalty,
prescribes in 10 years. That the subsidiary
imprisonment could not exceed 6 months is
immaterial.
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of
penalties. — The period of prescription of
penalties shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured,
should go to some foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
Outline of the provisions:
1. The period of prescription of penalties
commences to run from the date when the
culprit evaded the service of his sentence.
2. It is interrupted if the convict —
(1) Gives himself up,
(2) Be captured,
(3) Goes to a foreign country with which we
have no extradition treaty, or
(4) Commits another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
17
The period of prescription of
penalties shall commence to run again
when the convict escapes again, after
having been captured and returned to
prison.
Elements:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final
sentence;
2. That the convict evaded the service of the
sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence;
3. That the convict who escaped from prison
has not given himself up, or been captured,
or gone to a foreign country with which we
have no extradition treaty, or committed
another crime;
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of
the lapse of time from the date of the
evasion of the service of the sentence by
the convict.
Evasion of the service of the sentence is an
essential element of prescription of penalties
According to Art. 93, the period of
prescription of penalties commences to run from
the date when the culprit should evade the service
of his sentence.
Infante vs. Warden (92 Phil. 310)
Facts: In this case, the accused was convicted of
murder and sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusiOn temporal. After serving 15 years, 7
months and 11 days, on March 6, 1939, he was
granted a conditional pardon. The condition of his
pardon was that he should not commit any crime in
the future. On April 25, 1949, he was found guilty of
driving without license. He was committed to prison
for violation of said conditional pardon. Between
March 6, 1939, and April 25, 1949, more than 10
years elapsed.
The accused interposed the defense of
prescription, contending that since the remitted
portion of his original penalty was less than 6 years
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
(like prision correccional), the prescriptive period od
that penalty was only 10 years.
Held: The defense of prescription will not prosper
because there was no evasion of the service ofthe
sentence. There was no evasion of the service
ofthe sentence in this case, because such evasion
presupposes escaping during the service of the
sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.
Period of prescription that ran during the time
the convict evaded service of sentence is not
forfeited upon his capture
The period of prescription that ran during
the evasion is not forfeited, so that if the culprit is
captured and evades again the service of his
sentence, the period of prescription that has run in
his favor should be taken into account.
Example:
A committed a crime punishable by prision
correccional. He was convicted after trial. While
serving sentence for one month, A escaped.
He remained at large for 5 years. Then, he
was captured. After staying in prison for two
months, he escaped again and remained at large
for 6 years.
In this case, if captured again, A cannot be
required to serve the remaining portion of his
sentence, because the penalty of prision
correccional prescribes in 10 years. On two
occasions, A evaded the service of his sentence for
a total of 11 years.
"Should go to some foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty."
Suppose the Government has extradition
treaty with the country to which the offender
escaped, but the crime committed is not included in
the treaty, will that fact interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period?
It is believed that it would interrupt the
running ofthe prescriptive period.
"Should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription."
18
Thus, if A, sentenced to suffer 4 months and
11 days of arresto mayor, escaped from jail and
remained at large for 4 years, 11 months and 28
days, but on the next day he committed theft and
was arrested 6 months after, A can be required to
serve the remaining period of his sentence of 4
months and 11 days. The reason is that A commit-
ted a crime (theft) before the expiration of five
years, the period of prescription of the penalty of
arresto mayor.
Where accused was never placed in
confinement, the period for prescription never
started to run in his favor
Pangan v. Hon. Gatbalite, et al,, G.R. No. 141718
The prescription of penalties found in Article
93 of the R.P.C. applies only to those who are
convicted by final judgment and are serving
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty.
The period for prescription of penalties begins only
when the convict evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. Since
petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty
before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a
consequence never evaded sentence by escaping
during the term of his service, the period for
prescription never began
"Escape" means unlawful departure of a
prisoner from the limits of his custody
Article 93 of the RPC provides that the
prescription of penalties shall commence to run
from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157, evasion of
service of sentence can be committed only by
those who have been convicted by final judgment
by escaping during the term of his sentence.
"Escape" in legal parlance and for purposes
of Articles 93 and 157 of the R.P.C. means unlawful
departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Evading the service of the sentence is not
committing a crime before the expiration of the
period of prescription of penalties.
It has been asked whether or not the
evasion of the service of the sentence, being in
itself a crime (Art. 157), should interrupt the running
of the period of prescription of penalties.
The clause "should commit another crime
before the expiration of the period of prescription"
refers to crime committed when the period of
prescription has already commenced to run. On the
other hand, Art. 93 specifically provides that "the
period of prescription of penalties shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should evade
the service of his sentence.
Hence, this evasion of the service of the
sentence, which is a requisite in the prescription of
penalties, must necessarily take place before the
running of the period of prescription and cannot
interrupt it.
Acceptance of conditional pardon interrupts the
prescriptive period
People vs. Puntillas, G.R. No. 45269
The acceptance of a conditional pardon also
interrupts the prescriptive period, likening such
acceptance to the case of one who flees from this
jurisdiction.
Reason why evasion of service of sentence is
taken in favor of the convict in prescription of
penalties
"If a convict under confinement, at the risk
of being killed, succeeds in breaking jail and also
succeeds in evading re-arrest for a certain period of
time which by no means is short, despite the efforts
of all the instrumentalities of the Government
including sometimes the setting of a prize or reward
on his head, which thereby enlists the aid ofthe
citizenry, the law calls off the search for him, and
condones the penalty. But during that period of
prescription the escaped convict lives a life of a
hunted animal, hiding mostly in the mountains and
forests in constant mortal fear of being caught. His
life far from being happy, comfortable and peaceful
19
is reduced to a mere existence filled with fear,
discomfort, loneliness and misery.
As the distinguished penal law
commentator, the convict who evades sentence is
sometimes sufficiently punished by his voluntary
and self-imposed banishment, and at times, that
voluntary exile is more grievous than the sentence
he was trying to avoid.
And all the time he has to utilize every
ingenuity and means to outwit the Government
agencies bent on recapturing him. For all this, the
Government extends to him a sort of condonation
or amnesty."
Prescription of crimes and prescription of
penalties, distinguished
1. In prescription of Crimes, the State loses
the right to prosecute and punish the
offender; in prescription of penalties, the
State loses the right to enforce the penalty.
2. In prescription of crimes, the prosecution of
the offender has not commenced; in
prescription of penalties, the offender has
been convicted by final sentence.
3. In prescription of crimes, the period of
prescription commences from the date the
offense is discovered; in prescription of
penalties, the period of prescription
commences from the date the convict
evades the service of his sentence.
4. In prescription of crimes, the period of
prescription is interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information; in prescription of
penalties, the period of prescription is
interrupted if the defendant gives himself
up, is captured, goes to some foreign
country with which the Philippines has no
extradition treaty, or commits another crime
before the expiration of the period of
prescription.
Chapter Two
PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. —
Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the
culprit may earn while he is serving his
sentence.
Conditional pardon, defined
This refers to the exemption of an individual,
within certain limits or conditions, from the
punishment which the law inflicts for the offense he
had committed resulting in the partial extinction of
his criminal liability.
Nature of conditional pardon
Conditional pardon delivered and accepted
is considered a contract between the sovereign
power of the executive and the convict that the
former will release the latter upon compliance with
the condition.
Usual condition imposed upon the convict in
conditional pardon
In conditional pardon, the condition usually
imposed upon the convict is that "he shall not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
Commutation of sentence
Commutation of sentence refers to the
reduction of the duration of a prison sentence.
It is a change of the decision of the court
made by the Chief Executive by reducing the
degree of the penalty inflicted upon the convict, or
by decreasing the length of the imprisonment or the
amount of the fine.
Specific cases where commutation is provided
for by the Code
1. When the convict sentenced to death is
over 70 years of age. (Art. 83)
2. When eight justices of the Supreme Court
fail to reach a decision for the affirmance of
the death penalty.
In either case, the degree of the penalty is
reduced from death to reclusion perpetua.
20
Biddle vs. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480)
In commutation of sentence, consent of the
offender is not necessary. The public welfare, not
his consent, determines what shall be done.
For good conduct allowances.
Allowances for good conduct are deductions
from the term of the sentence for good behavior.
(Art. 97)
This is different from that provided in Art. 29
which is an extraordinary reduction of full time or
four-fifths of the preventive imprisonment from the
term of the sentence.
A prisoner is also entitled to special time
allowance for loyalty. (Art. 98) A deduction of 1/5 of
the period of his sentence is granted to a loyal
prisoner. (See Art. 158.)
Parole should be added as No. 4 in the causes
of partial extinction of criminal liability
The parole granted to a convict by the
Parole Board should be added. A parole may be
granted to a prisoner after serving the minimum
penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Definition of parole
Parole refers to the conditional release of an
offender from a correctional institution after he has
served the minimum of his prison sentence.
Parole consists in the suspension of the
sentence of a convict after serving the minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty, without granting
a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the
sentence shall be suspended.
If the convict fails to observe the conditions
of the parole, the Board of Pardons and Parole is
authorized to direct his arrest and return to custody
and thereafter to carry out his sentence without
deduction of the time that has elapsed between the
date of the parole and the subsequent arrest.
Reports to be submitted on Parolee/Pardonee
(1) A Progress Report should be submitted by
the Probation and Parole Officer to the
Board of Pardons and Parole when a
parolee/pardonee commits another offense
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
during the period of his parole surveillance,
and the case filed against him has not yet
been decided by the court.
(2) An Infraction Report should be submitted by
the Probation and Parole Officer on
violations committed by a parolee/pardonee
of the conditions of his release on parole or
conditional pardon while under supervision.
Any violation of the terms and conditions
appearing in the Release Document or any serious
deviation or non-observance of the obligations set
forth in the parole supervision program shall be
immediately reported by his Probation and Parole
Officer to the Board. The report shall be called
Infraction Report when the parolee/pardonee has
been subsequently convicted of another crime.
When paroleelpardonee may be ordered
arrested or recommitted
Upon receipt of an Infraction Report, the
Board may order the arrest or recommitment of the
convict. If recommitted, he shall be made to serve
the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence for which he was originally committed to
prison.
Is conviction necessary to revoke parole?
The mere commission, not conviction by the
court, of any crime is sufficient to warrant parolee's
arrest and reincarceration. (Guevara)
Fortunato vs. Director, 80 Phil. 187, 189
In a petition for habeas corpus, it was
contended that the recommitment order was
premature, because it came down before his
convictions of the series of estafa committed by him
during the period of the parole. It was held that it
was now rather academic, even assuming that final
conviction is necessary in order to constitute a
violation of the condition of the parole.
“Without eligibility for parole."
The Supreme Court en banc issued AM.
No. 15-08-02-SC, the Guidelines for the Proper
Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole in
21
Indivisible Penalties. It aims to promote uniformity
in the court's promulgated decisions and
resolutions and thus prevent Confusion. It provides
that the phrase without eligibility for parole is to be
used to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua
when circumstances are present warranting the
imposition of the death penalty but which penalty is
not imposed because of R.A. No. 9346.
The pertinent portion of the resolution is
quoted: XXXX
In these lights, the following guidelines shall
be observed in the imposition of penalties and in
the use of the phrase without eligibility for parole:
(1) In cases where the death penalty is not
warranted, there is no need to use the
phrase without eligibility for parole to qualify
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; it is
understood that convicted persons
penalized with an indivisible penalty are not
eligible for parole; and
(2) When circumstances are present warranting
the imposition of the death penalty, but this
penalty is not imposed because of R.A. No.
9346, the qualification of "without eligibility
for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion
perpetua in order to emphasize that the
accused should have been sentenced to
suffer the death penalty had it not been for
RA. No. 9346.
Conditional pardon distinguished from parole
1. Conditional pardon, which may be given at
any time after final judgment, is granted by
the Chief
2. Executive under the provisions of the
Administrative Code; parole, which may be
given after the prisoner has served the
minimum penalty, is granted by the Board of
Pardons and Parole under the provision of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
3. For violation of the conditional pardon, the
convict may be ordered rearrested or
reincarcerated by the Chief Executive, or
may be prosecuted under Art. 159 of the
Code; for violation of the terms of the
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
parole, the convict cannot be prosecuted
under Art. 159. He can be rearrested and
reincarcerated to serve the unserved portion
of his original penalty.
Art. 95. Obligation incurred by a person granted
conditional pardon. — Any person who has
been granted conditional par- don shall incur
the obligation of complying strictly with the
conditions imposed therein, otherwise, his
noncompliance with any of the conditions
specified shall result in the revocation of the
pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall
be applied to him.
Outline of the provisions:
1. He must comply strictly with the conditions
imposed in the pardon.
2. Failure to comply with the conditions shall
result in the revocation of the pardon. Under
Sec. 64(i), R.A.C., the Chief Executive may
order his arrest and reincarceration.
3. He becomes liable under Art. 159. This is
the judicial remedy.
Condition of pardon is limited to the unserved
portion of the sentence, unless an intention to
extend it beyond that time is manifest
Infante vs. Warden, 92 Phil. 310, 314
The duration of the conditions subsequent,
annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period
of the prisoner's sentence, unless an intention to
extend it beyond the term of his sentence was
manifest from the nature of the condition or the
language in which it was imposed.
Illustration:
Thus, if a convict was sentenced to 12
years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum term of the indeterminate penalty, and
after serving 5 years he was granted a conditional
pardon, the condition being that he should not
commit any crime in the future, that condition must
be complied with by him until the end of the 7 years
from the grant of the conditional pardon, it being the
22
unserved portion of his sentence. If he commits a
crime after the expiration of the 7 years, he is not
liable for violation of the conditional pardon. The
condition of the pardon is no longer operative when
he commits a new offense.
But if he commits a crime before the
expiration of the 7 years, he is liable for violation of
the conditional pardon.
Penalty under Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code for violation of conditional pardon
Under Art.159 of the R.P.C., the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period (6
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) shall
be imposed upon the convict who shall violate a
conditional pardon. If the penalty remitted by the
pardon is higher than six years, the convict shall
suffer the unexpired portion of his original
sentence.
Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. The
commutation of the original sentence for another of
a different length and nature shall have the legal
effect of substituting the latter in the place of the
former.
Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good
conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall
entitle him to the following deductions from the
period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of 20 days for each
month of good behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
23 days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year,
inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of 25 days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
30 days for each month of good behavior during
detention, and;
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment,
he shall be allowed another deduction of 15 days,
in addition to numbers 1-4 hereof, for each month
of study, teaching or mentoring service time
rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive
him of entitlement to the above allowances for good
conduct. (amended by R.A. 10592)
Amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
10592 to Article 97
1. Allowance for good conduct also granted to
detention prisoners
Prior to its amendment, allowance for good
conduct was not granted to detention prisoners.
Thus, in the evaluation of their petition for parole or
executive clemency where eligibility depends on
the period of time served, the release of a detention
prison is correspondingly delayed for a period equal
to the good time allowance he could have earned
had he been under confinement by virtue of
conviction by final judgment.
2. Increase in deduction from period of sentence.
The deduction from the period of a
prisoner's sentence was increased from -
(a) 5 to 20 days: for first 2 years of
imprisonment;
(b) 8 to 23 days: from 3rd to 5th year of
imprisonment;
(c) 10 to 25 days: 6th to 10th year of
imprisonment;
(d) 15 to 30 days: 11th and successive years of
imprisonment
3. Additional deduction granted.
Aside from the deduction of from 20 to 30 days
per month of good behavior, an additional
deduction of l5 days is granted for each month of
study, teaching or mentoring rendered.
4. Effect of Appeal.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him
of
23
entitlement to the above allowances for good
conduct.
Application of the provisions of Art. 97
The release of appellee Tan by the
provincial warden, after an imprisonment of only 2
years, 8 months and 21 days, was premature.
Under paragraph No. 1, Article 97 of the Revised
Penal Code, he may be allowed a deduction of five
(5) days for each month of good behavior during his
first two years of imprisonment, which would be 24
months multiplied by 5, or 120 days; under
paragraph No. 2, he may be allowed a deduction of
eight (8) days a month for the next three years. For
the balance of eight (8) months, multiplied by 8, we
have 64 days; so that the total credit for good
behavior would be 184 days, equivalent to 6
months and 4 days.
People vs. Tan, No. L-21805
The prisoner's actual confinement of 2
years, 8 months and 21 days, plus his possible total
credit of 6 months and 4 days, would give the result
of 3 years, 2 months and 25 days. Since the
maximum term of his sentence is 4 years and 2
months, appellee Tan has an unserved portion of
11 months and 5 days.
No allowance for good conduct while prisoner
is released under conditional pardon
People vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122, 125
The reason is that the good conduct time
allowance is given in consideration of the good
conduct observed by the prisoner while serving his
sentence. In this case, the accused was enjoying
liberty under a conditional pardon. He was not
serving the remitted penalty in prison.
Baking vs. Director of Prisons, No. L-30603
By a consideration of the terms of Article 97
alone, and also in conjunction with other parts of
the Revised Penal Code, the phrase "any prisoner"
in Article 97 thereof is to be regarded as referring
only to a prisoner serving sentence.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Disqualification from good conduct time
allowance
Recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees,
those charged with heinous crimes and an accused
who, upon being summoned for the execution of his
sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before
a court of law, are excluded from good conduct
time allowance under R.A. No. 10592. (Rule IV,
Sec. 2)
Prisoners disqualified under R.A. No.
10592, such as heinous crime convicts, but who
were convicted before the law became effective in
2013 shall be entitled to good conduct time
allowance under the RPC. (Rule XIII, Sec. 1, 2nd
par.)
Prisoners disqualified under R.A. No.
10592, such as heinous crime convicts, and who
were convicted after the law became effective
in 2013, shall not be entitled to any type of good
conduct time allowance. (Revised Implementing
Rules of R.A. No. 10592)
Non-entitlement to Good Conduct Time
Allowance (GCTA) for violation of prison rules.
A person deprived of liberty who violates
prison rules within a month shall not be entitled to
the grant of GCTA for said month, provided that
such would not prejudice the imposition of other
penalties. (Sec. 3, Uniform Manual on Time
Allowances and Service of Sentence)
Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A
deduction of one fifth of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who,
having evaded his preventive imprisonment or
the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this
Code, gives himself up to the authorities within
48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation announcing the passing away of
the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said
article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of
his sentence shall be granted in case said
prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a
24
calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article
158 of this Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner
whether undergoing preventive imprisonment
or serving sentence.
What is special time allowance for loyalty of
prisoner?
It is a deduction in the period of the
sentence of a prisoner who, having evaded the
service of his sentence during the calamity or
catastrophe mentioned in Art. 158, gives himself up
to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of the proclamation by the President
announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe.
A higher special time allowance is given to
those who chose to stay in the place of
confinement
A deduction of 2/5 of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to a prisoner who chose
to stay in the place of his confinement while a
deduction of 1/5 of the period of his sentence shall
be granted to a prisoner who, having evaded the
service of his sentence, gives himself up to the
authorities within 48 hours after the issuance of a
proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe.
Prior to the amendment of Article 98, only
those who evaded service of their sentence were
granted special time allowance to encourage them
to surrender. Since prisoners who, despite having
all
the chances to escape, chose instead to remain in
their prison cells,
The deduction is based on the original
sentence
While this article mentions "the period of his
sentence," it should be understood that the convict
is to be credited for loyalty with 2/5 or 1/5 of his
original sentence, not of the unexpired portion of
his
sentence.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 – TITLE IV: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The deduction applies to all prisoners
The special time allowance for loyalty shall
apply to any prisoner, whether undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.
Article 158 provides for increased penalty
Under Article 158, a convict who evaded the
service of his had been confined, on the occasion
of disorder resulting from a conflagration,
earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe or
during a mutiny in which he did not participate, is
liable to an increased penalty (1/5 of the time still
remaining to be served not to exceed six months), if
he fails to give himself up to the authorities within
48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
by the Chief Executive announcing the passing
away of the calamity.
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. –
Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology and/or the
Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or
city jail shall grant allowances for good
conduct. Such allowances once granted shall
not be revoked.
Good conduct allowance may be granted by the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief
of the BJMP, and the warden of provincial,
district, municipal or city jails
Prior to the amendment of Article 99 by R.A.
No. 10592, only the Director of Prisons (now
Director of the Bureau of Corrections) was allowed
to grant time allowance for good conduct.
Three government agencies currently have
supervision over prisoners and jails, namely:
1) the Bureau of Corrections, under the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which has
supervision and control over their prison
facilities that house national prisoners or
those serving prison terms of more than
three years;
25
2) the provincial governments, which has
supervision and control over provincial jails
that house provincial prisoners or those
serving prison terms of more than six
months up to three years; and
3) the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) under the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG),
which has jurisdiction over all city,
municipal, and district jails that house
municipal prisoners or those serving prison
terms of one day to not more than six
months in municipal jails and not more than
three years in city jails.
Since city and municipal prisoners are not
under the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, the amendment to Article 99 seeks
to fast-track the application and grant of good
conduct time allowance by likewise granting to the
Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology and/or the warden of a provincial, district,
municipal or city jail, the authority to grant time
allowance for good conduct.
Allowances for good conduct is not an
automatic right. It cannot be revoked once
granted
It must be granted by either the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology and/or the
warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail.