© 2010 General Dynamics. All rights reserved. Image courtesy U. S. Navy.

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 April 2011 I Volume 25 I Number 2

U.S. Naval Institute I www.usni.org

18 The Sumter Conundrum

By Craig L. Symonds
For newly elected President Abraham Lincoln, Fort
Sumter was more than just a military problem—it
was a political tightrope-walk.

26 The Navy’s Evolutionary War

By Craig L. Symonds
The coastal and riverine challenges of the Civil War
spawned technological innovation and a futuristic-
looking U.S. Fleet.

36 Lincoln’s ‘Father Neptune’

By Craig L. Symonds
Brusque, widely disliked, oddly bewigged, Secretary

26
of the Navy Gideon Welles was nonetheless the
right man for a tough job.

40 Suggestions for Further Civil War Reading

By Craig L. Symonds
A selection of essentials for the Civil War navalist’s
library.

Special Center Spread

COVER: An unidentified U.S. Navy Sailor poses
for the camera in this photograph from the
Liljenquist Family Collection, a treasure trove of
more than 700 rare Civil War images donated to
the Library of Congress in 2010.
Naval Power’s Broad Reach During the Civil War.
42 Cold War Duty in the Black Sea Fleet
By Vladimir Mandel
A Ukrainian sailor remembers shipboard
propagandists, a friendly U.S. enemy, and everyday
life in the Soviet navy.

50 A Cup O’ Joe
By Captain Raymond J. Brown,
U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)
From the wardroom to the boiler room, the Sea
DEPARTMENTS
Services percolate along on the strength of that
4 On Our Scope most beloved ship’s staple: good, hot coffee.

6 Looking Back
8 In Contact
54 ‘An Appalling Calamity’
By Noah Andre Trudeau
10 Naval History News In the teeth of the Great Samoan Typhoon of 1889,
a standoff between the German and U.S. navies
12 Flight Line suddenly didn’t matter.
14 Historic Aircraft
66 Historic Fleets 60 The Sailor Who ‘Torpedoed’ a Train
By Carl LaVO
76 Book Reviews The target: a Japanese supply train. The weapon:
80 Museum Report an innovative U.S. submariner.

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 1

 Contributors
Captain Raymond J. Brown is a
retired U.S. Coast Guard officer who
has commanded at sea and is both
a USCG cutterman and a U.S. Navy
surface warfare officer. An award-
winning essayist, he has contributed
to Proceedings magazine and to
national cable news networks. He
currently is an all-hazards consultant,
working principally in transportation.
Vladimir Mandel served twice in the
Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet, first as
a seaman with a radio rating in 1966.
He later (1969–72) was a connection
and observation lieutenant in the
destroyer Komsomolets Ukrainy.
He holds a degree in physics from
Odessa State University and is vice
director of the Physical Scientific and
Research Institute in Odessa, Ukraine.
Noah Andre Trudeau is the author
of numerous books about the Civil
War, including, most recently, Robert
E. Lee: Lessons in Leadership
(Palgrave, 2009) and Southern
Storm: Sherman’s March to the Sea
(HarperCollins, 2008). His previous
Naval History articles include “A
Naval Tragedy’s Chain of Errors”
(February 2010) about the 1923
Honda Point disaster.
U.S. Naval Institute Reprint Program
U.S. Naval Institute’s Reprint Program is an opportunity
for you to have customized copies of articles featured in
Proceedings and Naval History.
For more information on U.S. Naval Institute’s
Reprint Program, or to order, please email:
magreprints@usni.org or call 410.295.1079
www.usni.org | 800.233.8764
Defending America through the Power of Ideas
2 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
www.downmagaz.com
Carl  LaVO, a frequent Naval History
contributor, is the author of The
Galloping Ghost: The  Extraordinary
Life of Submarine Legend Eugene
Fluckey (Naval Institute Press,
2007). He’s currently completing
work on a biography of Vice Admiral
Allan R. McCann, who pioneered
the submarine rescue chamber that
saved the lives of 33 men trapped in
the sunken USS Squalus (SS-192)
in 1939. 
Craig L. Symonds is professor
emeritus of history at the U.S. Naval
Academy and the author or editor
of 25 books on Civil War and naval
history. His book Lincoln and his
Admirals (Oxford University Press,
2008) won the Barondess Prize, the
Laney Prize, the Lyman Prize, the
Abraham Lincoln Book Award, and
the 2009 Lincoln Prize.
www.USNI.org Naval History (ISSN 1042-1920) is published bi-
monthly by the U.S. Naval Institute, 291 Wood
Road, Annapolis, MD 21402. To order subscrip-
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N
Editor-in-ChiEf
aval History has been fortunate to have top historians contribute to Richard G. Latture
its biannual “fold-out” issues, and this one, commemorating the 150th rlatture@usni.org
anniversary of the Civil War, is no exception. Craig L. Symonds, professor AssoCiAtE Editors
emeritus of history at the U.S. Naval Academy and an award-winning Robin Bisland
authority on the conflict’s naval battles, personalities, and strategies, is the author of our rbisland@usni.org
special section’s three feature articles. Eric Mills
Dr. Symonds starts at the beginning—examining in “The Sumter Conundrum” newly emills@usni.org
inaugurated President Abraham Lincoln’s efforts to dispatch a naval expedition to resup- Donald Ross
ply besieged Fort Sumter without touching off a war. In “The Navy’s Evolutionary War,” dross@usni.org
he takes a broad look at the U.S. Navy’s critical, albeit supporting, role in the conflict and Editor-in-ChiEf Proceedings
how the service was able to harness new technologies and ship designs to blockade the Paul Merzlak
Confederacy, capture its ports, and conquer the South’s Western river strongholds. pmerzlak@usni.org
Gideon Welles was often lampooned during the war for his eccentricities, including EditoriAl ProjECt CoordinAtor
his mismatched brown wig and white beard, but Dr. Symonds argues in “Lincoln’s ‘Father Liese Doherty
Neptune’” that the Secretary of the Navy proved ldoherty@usni.org
to be a skilled administrator during an era of mas- dirECtor of dEsign And ProduCtion
sive naval expansion. Finally, for those wanting Kelly Erlinger
to learn even more, Dr. Symonds offers advice in kerlinger@usni.org
“Suggestions for Further Civil War Reading.”
sEnior dEsignEr
While the outcome of the war was ultimately
Jen Mabe
decided on land, all too often its naval aspects jmabe@usni.org
are reduced to several ship duels. Our gate-
Photo Editor
fold, “Naval Power’s Broad Reach,” depicts the
Amy Voight
expansive and innovative roles played by the
avoight@usni.org
Union and Confederate navies. Chief credit for
Contributing Editors
this bonus feature goes to design director Kelly
Robert J. Cressman, Norman Polmar,
Erlinger and graphic artists James Caiella and Fred Schultz, Paul Stillwell
Karen Erlinger.
PublishEr
Beginning with “The Sumter Conundrum,” a
William Miller
recurring character in our gatefold package—and
wmiller@usni.org
one of the war’s greatest naval heroes—is an officer
AdvErtising sAlEs
who later exerted a paternal influence on the U.S.
Director—William K. Hughes
Naval Institute. Outspoken, ambitious David Dixon
wmkhughes@comcast.net
LIBRARy OF CONGRESS
Porter rose meteorically through the officers’ ranks
Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter stands Manager—David Sheehan
during the Civil War—from lieutenant in 1861 to
dsheehan@usni.org
behind only David Glasgow Farragut in the the Navy’s sixth-most senior admiral in ’65. Advertising Assistant—Michelle Mullen
pantheon of U.S. Navy Civil War heroes. Along the way he served on blockade duty, mmullen@usni.org
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
chased the commerce raider CSS Sumter, led naval
CEo
forces on the Mississippi, and helped conquer Fort
MGEN Thomas L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret.)
Fisher. Porter was also the war’s foremost naval practitioner of jointness, working effi-
twilkerson@usni.org
ciently with professional Army officers including Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh
Sherman—but displaying little patience for political generals such as Benjamin Butler and EditoriAl boArd
Nathaniel Banks. Chairman—CAPT Douglas M. Fears, USCG
An innovative commander, Porter relied on iron and steam to patrol Confederate Vice Chairman—CAPT Mark L. Stevens, USN
LCDR Claude G. Berube, USNR
waters and subdue enemy strongpoints. But, ironically, during a three-month period in
SGTMAG David K. Devaney, USMC
1869 when he was the de facto chief of the Navy Department, he oversaw the service’s
CMDCM Jacqueline L. DiRosa, USN
regression to reliance on sail power. The next year Porter succeeded his foster-brother,
LT Bradley D. Harrison, USNR
David Glasgow Farragut, in the largely ceremonial position of Admiral of the Navy. BMCM Kevin P. Leask, USCG
Despite being the service’s highest ranking officer, Admiral Porter had little power MAJ Marcus J. Mainz, USMC
to halt the Navy’s slide into the “dark ages” of the 1870s. But according to historian CAPT David M. McFarland, USN
Charles Oscar Paullin, he “vigorously and insistently declared the country’s need of a LCDR Jeffrey W. Novak, USCG
new navy.” And when a group of naval officers also concerned about the direction of CDR John P. Patch, USN (Ret.)
the Sea Service met in 1873 to form the Naval Institute “for the advancement of pro- LTC Kendric H. Robbins, USA
fessional and scientific knowledge of the Navy,” the venerable admiral agreed to serve COL Philip C. Skuta, USMC
as the organization’s first president.
Richard G. Latture Printed in the USA
Editor-in-Chief

4 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

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 Looking Back
The End of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’
S
hortly before Christmas,
President Barack Obama signed
into law a repeal of the contro-
versial “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
policy that prohibited gay and lesbian
personnel from serving openly in the
U.S. armed services. It’s an important
milestone in the nation’s military history
and a symbol of changing attitudes on
the part of the populace as a whole.
In 2001 our youngest son, Jim, told my
wife, Karen, and me that he is gay. Since
that time we have watched that evolu-
tion of society through his eyes as well as
our own.
I recall many years ago
hearing a rhetorical ques-
tion posed by my father,
who was an outspoken lib-
eral on the subject of racial
justice but not on sexual
matters. He asked, “Why
would anyone want to go to
bed with another guy when
there are so many good-
looking gals available?” My
own thinking at the time
was similar to his. When
Dad died in 2004 at the
age of 92, the minister who
spoke at his funeral made
a point of saying that my
father had come to embrace
his church’s open accep- ABOVE: U.S. NAVy (CHAD J. MCNEELEy); INSET: U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE
tance of gays and lesbians. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen told a Senate panel he was
My attitude had changed against a policy that forced service men and women, such as Commander Beth
by then as well. When I Coye (inset) to “lie about who they are in order to defend their fellow citizens.”
served on active duty in the • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
1960s, at Officer Candidate
School and on board ships, there were
jokes about “queers,” “homos,” and
worse. In many cases the speakers prob-
ably intended no malice, but the effect
depends on one’s viewpoint. Jim has told
us of the derision he has experienced per-
sonally, which brings the hurt home.
Because attitudes cannot be legislated,
the change in the law is likely to run into
problems as the Department of Defense
and individual services develop plans
and implement new policies. The law of
unintended consequences will probably
rear its head, and there may be delays.
It was more than 20 years from the time
President Harry Truman ordered the
racial desegregation of the armed services
6 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
www.downmagaz.com
in 1948 until Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, as
CNO in the early 1970s, directed proac-
tive steps toward equal opportunity.
People whom I respect opposed the
repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Some
based their objections on religious beliefs.
Marine Commandant James Amos tes-
tified to Congress against the change.
Amos argued that it would be disrup-
tive to introduce openly gay status dur-
ing wartime. At the same time,
he and the other service chiefs
pledged that they would carry
out the change in policy if
directed by Congress.
One of the telling statements on the
subject came during testimony from
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, “No matter
how I look at the issue, I cannot escape
being troubled by the fact that we have
in place a policy which forces young men
and women to lie about who they are in
order to defend their fellow citizens.”
That point was illustrated in the novel
My Navy Too (Cedar Hollow Press, 1997).
Retired Commander Beth Coye, whose
father was a decorated World War II sub-
marine skipper, wrote much of the book.
She spent 21 years in the Navy, and her
book, though fiction, is based on her expe-
riences as a serving officer and lesbian. To
By Paul Stillwell
remain in the Navy, Coye had to resort to
deception about her feelings. As a com-
manding officer, she saw the hypocrisy of
kicking gay subordinates out of the Navy.
She chose to retire in 1980, sooner than
planned, so she could be herself.
In 2005 I interviewed Admiral Charles
Larson, who saw much change during his
44 years on active duty. Drawing a con-
trast with the history of racial integration,
he predicted, “someday
gays will be accepted in
the military, but I think
that’s one issue that
society will have to be
ahead of the military.”
He added a personal
perspective: “Probably
about in 1984–85,
our oldest daughter
Sigrid . . . confided in
[my wife] Sally that she
was gay. She asked Sally
if she would tell me.
Sally said, ‘No, that’s
something you’ve got
to tell your dad yourself.’ I
think Sigrid was concerned
about how I, as a military
officer, might accept that.
But she came and told me,
and I told her that made
no difference to me—that
she was my daughter, and I
loved her. . . .
“After I got the news,
Sally said that if I had not
accepted Sigrid, that she
would have had trouble
continuing to live with me. . . . I got a
real test, because I had no warning. It
came to me, and I had to make a deci-
sion right there. There was no decision to
make; it was an instinctive reaction that
she had my support.”
An individual’s sexuality is but one
of many factors that make a person who
he or she is. Congress has decided that it
should no longer be a yes-or-no charac-
teristic that defines the ability to serve.
One of the important values in all the
services is honor. The nation asks its men
and women to serve with integrity, and
the recent change in the law will make
that possible for many who have been
excluded up to now.
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 In Contact
The Olympia Then and Now
Thomas S. Wyman
In “‘Hot Time in the Old Town
Tonight’” (February, pp. 32–37), Lieutenant
Commander Thomas Cutler graphically
recounts the decisive role of the Olympia
and her crew in the 1898 Battle of Manila
Bay. In doing so, he makes a compelling case
for saving this “Matriarch of the Fleet.” She
is a historical vessel that recalls the time
when coal was supplanting sail. Fire control
was a manual operation. This reminder of
times past offers a compelling overview of
how far naval design has evolved over the
last century. It should not be lost to future
generations.
  The author mentions only in passing
the cruiser’s last assignment in return-
ing the body of the Unknown Soldier to
his homeland some 90 years ago follow-
ing World War I. This was a ceremonial
voyage under the command of Captain
Henry Lake Wyman that captured the
nation’s attention. The homeward voyage
of the Olympia, with the Unknown’s cas-
ket lashed to an upper deck, had its tense
moments when the vessel encountered
gale-force winds and heavy seas in the mid-
Recollecting a Civil War Hero
Major Norman T. Hatch,
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
I was greatly surprised and pleased to read
in the December issue about John Bickford
of Gloucester, Maine, serving as a young
man on board the Kearsarge in the Civil
War (“‘I Didn’t Feel Excited a Mite,’” pp.
36–41). I first met him when I was about
five years old and he was the owner of
Bickford’s Float on Rocky Neck in East
Gloucester. He was known by the nickname
“Bunch” and was extremely kind to the
youngsters who hung around the float doing
minor jobs or getting sailing instruction.
Bunch owned, among other craft, several
ten-foot cat boats that he used for the latter
purpose. I was large for my age and hung out
with the older boys whenever possible, but
Bunch saw through my efforts and didn’t put
me in one of the cat boats.
To the best of my knowledge, Bunch
never told the youngsters of his exploits
on board the Kearsarge. Therefore, one
8 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
www.downmagaz.com
Atlantic and began to roll alarmingly. The
ship’s last assignment was completed as
the Navy formally transferred the casket
to the Army on 9 November 1921 at the
Washington Navy Yard. Two days later,
after an emotionally charged ceremony,
the Unknown Soldier was laid to rest at
Arlington Cemetery. (See “Known But to
God,” December 1996, pp. 45–48, by this
writer.)
This final assignment of the Olympia
and its importance in the consciousness
of the nation is an additional compelling
reason to assure that this historic vessel is
preserved. The ship is an integral part of
American history.
Commander Tyrone G. Martin,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
I attended the recent Maritime Heritage
Conference as an observer and heard
speaker after speaker bemoan the problems
of getting funds with which to maintain
their ships. None of them offered any solu-
tions to the problem. In private conversa-
tions around the conference area, how-
ever, could be heard such questions posed
as “Are there too many preserved ships?”
and “Would it be useful to establish a set
COURTESY OF MAJOR NORMAN T. HATCH, USMC (RET)
Long after John Bickford earned the Medal of Honor for actions during the Kearsarge’s Civil
War duel with the Alabama, reader Norman Hatch knew him as the kindly gentleman who ran
this boat float in East Gloucester, Maine. Later, Hatch also experienced combat, as a Marine
cameraman in the Pacific war.
• • • • • • • • • • • •
of nationally recognized standards against
which ship-preservation projects could
be measured with the aim of discouraging
impractical schemes?”
I attended the session concerned with
the Olympia, perhaps the session that gar-
nered the greatest interest, but the end
result again was only a series of hopeful
aspirations.
Lieutenant Commander Cutler’s enthu-
siastic article about the Olympia and the
Battle of Manila Bay echoed the enthu-
siasms of a century ago, when journalists
superhyped everything about the Spanish-
American War. But I wonder if, today,
many consider it less passionately and in
so doing make the Olympia’s importance
a harder “sell.” The war, after all, was a
lopsided affair in which a bullying United
States beat up on a decrepit Spain and
gained itself a cheap empire in the pro-
cess. And how many think it “iconic” and
“glorious” that an overpowering American
naval force shot up an essentially anchored
foe, pausing at one point and feeding the
crews, and suffering only six WIA in the
battle? A tough sell, indeed, when com-
pared with other U.S. naval actions before
and since.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
day in the pentagon when I was preparing to invite the
audiovisual media in to view a new exhibit extolling all
of the Medal of Honor winners, I was greatly surprised to
come across Bunch’s name among the names of the medal’s
recipients. To read the excellent article by Norman C.
El Dorado Canyon Reflections
and Insights
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn,
U.S. Navy (Retired)
Congratulations to Naval History and to
Lieutenant Commander Stanik for his article
“America’s First Strike Against Terrorism”
(February, pp. 24–31), reminding us all of a
very important event from 25 years ago: the
retaliatory strike against Moammar Gadhafi.
El Dorado Canyon was a signal event, the
first blow in what would become the War
on Terror, and the beginning of a shift from
the Cold War focus on the Soviets to other
missions for the Sixth Fleet. By and large the
author gives a clear description of the events
and what led up to them, but he gives the
U.S. Air Force far too much credit. It invited
itself in, and it wasn’t needed, except in the
context of interservice politics.
The aircraft carriers deployed to the
Mediterranean had more than enough assets
and firepower to carry out the mission. Yet
capable A-7s and F/A-18s were relegated to
support missions so the F-111s from Royal
Air Force Station Lakenheath could play.
At this late date it’s difficult to pinpoint
the source of the demand for the Air Force
to play, but all signs point to its influence
on the Commander-in-Chief Europe staff.
No matter where the idea originated, Air
Force participation was approved, and to
their credit, crews at Lakenheath geared
up. Unfortunately, there weren’t enough of
them on hand, so the operation had to be
delayed several days while needed aircraft
and crews flew from Barksdale Air Force
Base in Louisiana.
Once started, the 1,600-mile flight from
the U.K. to the scene of action had to be
supported by numerous refuelings, AWACs,
and command-ship logistics. Worse, some of
the crews had never before flown together
as a team. Some scholars believe that may
have been the root cause of the fly-into-the
water loss of one of the F-111s off the coast of
Tripoli. Meanwhile, except for A-6 Intruders,
capable and well-trained carrier-based Navy
and Marine crews and their A-7s and F/A-
18s either sat on the deck or bored holes in
the sky waiting for the Air Force to coast out
and start on that return 1,600-mile trek.
Time and again the value of joint oper-
ations has been shown, but it’s almost
always when more numbers are needed or
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011
Delaney outlining Bunch’s heroics at sea in those perilous
times put the frosting on the cake.
I have enclosed a color print of a painting by Emile Gruppe of
Bickford’s Float. Gruppe was considered the finest seascape artist
of his time and documented much of Gloucester’s fishing fleet.
one service has a needed capability the
other does not have. Joint operations for
purely political reasons is costly and never
makes sense. Operation El Dorado Canyon
was an example of such nonsense. One
would hope the record would be corrected.
Editor’s note: Vice Admiral Dunn was
commander Naval Air Forces, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet at the time of El Dorado Canyon.
Gary Hudson
While reading “America’s First Strike
Against Terrorism,” the phrase the “United
States’ first war against international ter-
rorism” brought to mind the actions taken
from September 1983 through February
1984, when several U.S. Navy combatants
fired into Druse and Syrian positions in the
hills east of Beirut. Targets were command
bunkers and artillery, rocket, mortar,  and
antiaircraft batteries, which had fired into
and around Beirut, at U. S. Marines ashore
and  at two U.S. Navy F-14s.  Retaliation
by A-6 and A-7 aircraft resulted in the loss
of an  A-6 and an A-7. Ships responding
to various attacks included the  battleship
New Jersey (BB-62), carriers Independence
(CV-62) and John F. Kennedy (CV-67), and
destroyers Caron (DD-970) and Tattnall
(DDG-19).
An interesting aspect of these bombard-
ments was that some of the 16-inch firing
was rather inaccurate. Investigation deter-
mined the cause was faulty ammunition; no
16-inch ammunition had been manufac-
tured for 30 years. Some analysts consid-
ered that the resultant collateral damage
may have contributed to the downgrading
of U.S. influence in the Middle East.
 
Frederick C. Leiner
I read with interest “America’s First
Strike Against Terrorism,” a well-written
account of the retaliatory strike against
Libya. Commander Stanik makes only a
brief reference to the fact that “few allies
would support the mission,” but the map
of the “F-111Fs’ Long Round-Trip” shows
the effect of their unwillingness to sup-
port the United States; when France, Italy,
and Spain forbade American warplanes
to overfly their territories, the F-111s had
to fly a circuitous route of double the dis-
tance, complicating the mission. In light
of the more recent contributions of many
nations in the ongoing struggle against
terrorism, this lack of cooperation by our
NATO allies—except for the British, who
allowed F-111s to fly from an RAF base—is
noteworthy. At “crunch time,” the United
States had little international support.
But our allies did not merely stay on the
sidelines. Two years ago, Libyan Foreign
Minister Abdel Rahman Shalgam disclosed
that in April 1986, Bettino Craxi, then
the Italian prime minister, warned Libyan
leader Moammar Gadhafi that the United
States would bomb his country two days
later (“Italy Warned Libya of Bombing,
Saved Qaddafi’s Life,” Bloomberg News,
30 October 2008). According to the
Bloomberg account, Giulio Andreotti, who
was Italy’s foreign minister in April 1986,
and Margherita Boniver, then the foreign
affairs chief of Craxi’s Socialist party, both
confirmed that the disclosure occurred.
The U.S. strike targeted Libyan military
sites, and at least 36 Libyans died in the
raids, including Gadhafi’s adopted daugh-
ter, although Gadhafi survived an attack
on his compound at Bab al Aziziya.
Andreotti called the U.S. strike on Libya
in 1986 “an uncalled-for initiative, an error
in international affairs,” and Boniver boast-
ed that Craxi had not only denied U.S. air-
craft permission to use Italian airspace, but
also “used all the channels available to him
to warn the colonel [Gadhafi].”
Guns and Ships at the ‘Canal’
George S. Mihalik
I enjoyed James Hornfischer’s arti-
cle “The Washington Wins the Draw”
(February, pp. 38–47) very much and look
forward to reading his book, Neptune’s
Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal.
On page 42 there is a reference to the
first naval officer to take fire from 16-inch
guns. This did not occur in this battle, but
in the May 1941 Bismark action during
which the German battleship’s captain,
Admiral Günther Lütjens, took 16-inch
gunfire from HMS Rodney. Also, the USS
Massachusetts (BB-59) fired her 16-inch
guns against the Vichy French squad-
ron of Admiral François Michelier on 8
November 1941 at Casablanca.
In Contact continued on page 68
9
 Naval History News
Shipwreck Yields Possible
Blackbeard Blade
Archaeologists working on a shipwreck
off the North Carolina coast announced
in January that they may have discovered a
truly iconic relic of pirate lore: the sword of
Blackbeard.
The sword—or rather, its fragmented
remains, including a gilded hilt and
pommel and parts of the broken, encrusted
blade—comes from a wreck site presumed
to be that of the Queen Anne’s Revenge,
Blackbeard’s flagship, which ran aground
in 1718 and was found in 1996. A North
Carolina Office of State Archaeology team
has been researching the wreckage for
more than a decade.
Arguably the most notorious pirate in
history, Edward “Blackbeard” Teach (or
Thatch) captured the 104-foot, 300-ton
French slaver La Concorde off Martinique
in November 1717. Releasing the
enslaved Africans and the French crew
on the Grenadine island of Bequia (after
liberating the Frenchmen from the gold
they carried), Blackbeard and company
made La Concorde their own. With her
armament beefed up to 40 guns and her
decks now trod by a pirate crew of 150,
the redubbed Queen Anne’s Revenge set
forth on an eventful seven-month piracy N.C. DEpARTMENT OF CULTURAL RESOURCES (WENDy WELSH)
rampage with the swaggering, fearsome- The sword of a sea-rogue? This gilded hilt
looking Blackbeard in command. and blade remnants were discovered amid the
The pirates plundered ships from St. wreckage of what’s believed to be Blackbeard’s
Vincent to Antigua, and in April 1718 they flagship.
appeared off Honduras, where they captured • • • • • •
Olympia Update: Beleaguered Ship West Coast–Bound?
In a new development in the ongoing effort to stave off the demise
of the historic U.S. warship Olympia, a San Francisco–area group
announced in January that it was launching a campaign to relocate
the vessel from its current philadelphia berth to San pablo Bay.
The world’s oldest floating steel warship and the sole surviving
naval vessel of the Spanish-American War, the Olympia served
as Commodore George Dewey’s flagship at the Battle of Manila
Bay. Her last official naval mission was to carry the body of the
Unknown Soldier from France to the United States in 1921. The
Olympia is steeped in history—but her recent history has been all
about the struggle to survive.
The aging cruiser, a National Historic Landmark, is in
need of substantial and costly hull repairs to prevent her from
sinking. Independence Seaport Museum in philadelphia, the
Olympia’s home since 1995, has spent in excess of $5.3 million on
10
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the Jamaican sloop Adventure and added
her to their motley flotilla. In May 1718,
Blackbeard pulled off his most audacious
piratical ploy ever, blockading the entire
port of Charleston, South Carolina, and in
a week’s time picking off eight or nine prizes
sailing in and out of the harbor. A few days
later, both the Queen Anne’s Revenge and
Adventure ran aground off Beaufort Inlet,
North Carolina—evidently a deliberate
move by Blackbeard to strand the bulk of
his crew and make off with a select few
(and the loot). Before the year was out,
Blackbeard himself would be dead, felled
by five musketball wounds and more than
20 sword cuts in a battle off Ocracoke Inlet,
North Carolina, on 22 November 1718.
The private firm Intersal discovered what
is believed to be the wreck of the Queen
Anne’s Revenge in 1996. State-coordinated
research efforts subsequently got under way.
To date, tens of thousands of artifacts have
been recovered from the site, including the
recently announced sword find.
According to researchers, the weapon
appears to be of French or English origin
and may have been an ornamental
addition to a well-to-do gentleman’s
outfit. The sword’s ornateness has led
some to make a stab of a guess that it
was just the sort of prize item that a
larger-than-life pirate captain such
as Blackbeard, who characteristically
bedecked himself with multiple pistols
and blades at any one time, would claim
• • • • • • • • • • for his own.
maintenance, repair, preservation, and restoration over the years.
But another $10 million is required to restore the hull and deck,
and possibly as much as $20 million is required for a complete
restoration.
Unfortunately, the museum announced in February 2010
that it is not able to raise the money needed to dredge the penn’s
Landing Marina, transport the Olympia to dry dock, and finance
the repairs necessary to ensure she will remain afloat. Her fate grew
more uncertain with talk last spring of sinking her and turning her
into an artifical reef in the waters off Cape May, New Jersey.
While various concerned groups endeavored to raise funds
to save the ship, Independence Seaport was slated to close the
Olympia to visitors for good last November. But the organization
gave the ship a six-month “stay of execution,” with limited
visitation hours during the time extension.
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 Still, the Olympia remains in limbo
and needs to find a new home—or maybe
she needs to return to her original home.
Enter the San Francisco contingent: the
Navy Yard Association of Mare Island.
The former naval-shipyard workers at
the heart of the effort seek to bring the
troubled ship back to her place of origin.
She was built at San Francisco’s Union
Iron Works, launched in 1892, and then
docked at Mare Island for outfitting. She
returned to the same yard a number of
times for repairs, and it was from there
that, on 25 August 1895, she set a
course for the Far East and her eventual
rendezvous with history at the 1 May 1898
Battle of Manila Bay.
The Mare Island group now joins others
seeking raise the requisite funds to save
the Olympia. At press time, Independence
Seaport was slated to issue a bid request
in February to organizations seeking to
acquire the ship.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND

The troubled Olympia may have a new lease

on life, as a San Francisco–based group is
hoping to bring the historic warship back to the
place of her birth.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Naval History News continued on page 72

TirPiTz and The imPeriaL German naVy

Patrick J. Kelly
“As both a definitive biography and detailed evaluation of the historiography of this period, Kelly
has produced a compelling portrait of Tirpitz that balances the views of those scholars who
have overestimated Tirpitz’s rationality in political, social and military affairs with those who
underestimated his opportunism.”
—Keith Bird, author of Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich
hardcover $45.00

Tirpitz
and the Imperial German Navy The LasT CenTury of sea Power
VoLume 2
From Washington to Tokyo, 1922–1945
H. P. Willmott
“H. P. Willmott is the finest naval historian and
among the finest historians of any discipline writing
Patrick J. Kelly
today. His latest work further strengthens that richly
deserved accolade.”
—Bernard D. Cole, author of The Great Wall at Sea
hardcover $39.95

800-842-6796
iupress.indiana.edu

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 11

 Flight Line By Hill Goodspeed, Historian,
National Naval Aviation Museum

The Great War Catalyst

N
aval aviation’s early Factory, to spur production by before America’s entry into
development occurred turning out designs of other the war formed the First Yale
largely insulated from the manufacturers. Unit and financed their own
cataclysmic events that By war’s end the Navy’s flight training in preparation
swept across Europe in 1914. While aircraft inventory numbered for service in the U.S.
a handful of naval personnel in the 2,107 heavier-than-air Navy. Thus, hundreds got
United States experimented with and types and 15 blimps; the to experience Ensign Wayne
evaluated the Navy’s small collection outstanding designs included Duffett’s feeling of taking to the
of flying machines, half a world away Curtiss flying boats, which would skies: “About three days ago I had my
nations were building sizeable aerial serve into the mid-1920s, and the first flight. . . . Where the big sensation
armadas and the press of combat was DeHavilland DH-4, which flew raids over comes is when you go ‘over the hump’
triggering dramatic technological and Belgium with the Northern Bombing [start to descend]. All of a sudden you
tactical developments in air warfare. Group. Those planes operated from pitch down and the first thing you know
That changed when America entered scores of coastal air stations in France, you are once more gliding over the water.
World War I. The ensuing 19 months Italy, and the British Isles, as well as Oh, it is the greatest sensation you can
brought unimaginable expansion in U.S. locales such as North Island in San Diego imagine.” Duffett would successfully

ALL PHOTOS: U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE

American-built Curtiss HS pusher flying boats were based at 10 of the 16 U.S. naval air stations in France. Left: After shipment from America,
HSs are reassembled at NAS Brest. Right: Navy pilots pose in front of their HS-1s at NAS Tréguier in Brittany.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

naval aviation, providing a foundation Bay; Key West, Florida; and Hampton receive his coveted wings of gold and
for a more prominent postwar place in Roads, Virginia—stateside installations head overseas, joining others serving
the Fleet. destined to play important roles in naval “Over There.”
Navy aviators claimed the distinction aviation for decades to come. Arriving on foreign shores, U.S. naval
of being the first American combatants From a handful of personnel in aviation personnel served alongside
to land in France, when members of 1911 grew a robust force that by British, French, and Italian aviators
the First Aeronautic Detachment went 1918 numbered in the thousands, experienced in the ways of air warfare
ashore on 5 June 1917. But perhaps including mechanics, gunners, and after months of fighting over the Western
the most important naval aviation some yeomanettes, the first women and Italian fronts. Similarly, the aircraft
developments in World War I came far to serve in naval aviation. Once the they flew—Sopwiths, Spads, Nieuports,
away from the front, with the building almost exclusive domain of graduates Capronis—were true combat types,
of the infrastructure to fight a world of the U.S. Naval Academy, the ranks in contrast to the training aircraft to
war. The Navy placed production of aviators expanded during wartime which the early American naval aviators
contracts for aircraft on a scale never to consist primarily of members of the were accustomed back in the States.
before seen and even established its own Naval Reserve Flying Corps. Its core was Foreign instructors trained the newly
manufacturing plant, the Naval Aircraft a collection of Ivy Leaguers who even arrived Yanks, and in some cases the

12 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

www.downmagaz.com
naval aviators were assigned to foreign
squadrons. Among them was Lieutenant
David S. Ingalls, Naval Aviator No. 85,
who became the U.S. Navy’s only fighter
ace of World War I while flying with a
squadron of Britain’s Royal Air Force.
Ensign Charles Hammann earned the
Medal of Honor for rescuing a fellow
aviator shot down by Austrian fighters,
and did so flying an Italian seaplane
fighter from Naval Air Station porto
Corsini, Italy.
U.S. Navy and Marine fliers constituted
the front ranks of the Northern Bombing
Group, which was organized by the
Department of the Navy for the purpose
of attacking German U-boat support
facilities and other military installations
in Belgium. The unit eventually boasted Sailors service an H-16 flying boat at NAS Queenstown, Ireland. In addition to HSs, the large
day and night wings. Smaller efforts led up twin-engine H-16s flew antisubmarine patrols.
to the bombing group’s first raid in force • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
on 14 October 1918, against a German-
held railroad junction. The war’s end afforded naval officers to witness
came before plans to carry out an around- the advancements of naval aviation
the-clock bombing campaign could be in Europe. Two innovations in
executed. particular—the aircraft-carrying ships
To be expected, given its early operated by the British and the long-
inventory of seaplanes, was U.S. range German Zeppelins that executed
naval aviation’s wide-ranging effort strategic bombing attacks on Great
in antisubmarine warfare. The 43 air Britain—were to have a far-reaching
stations in operation by war’s end, more impact on postwar operations in the
than three-quarters of them on foreign U.S. Navy.
soil, were primarily devoted to seaplane
operations. The daily routine of many
naval aviators consisted of long-range
patrols over wide expanses of ocean in From the Naval Institute
search of U-boats. On 25 March 1918, Photo Archive
Ensign John F. McNamara, flying out
of Royal Naval Air Station portland, During 2011 these and other
England, became the first naval aviator photographs tracing the
to attack a German submarine while history of U.S. naval flight
on patrol. He and his fellow airmen on can be viewed at www.usni.
both sides of the Atlantic logged some 3 org. Follow the Naval Aviation
David S. Ingalls, who left Yale University to serve
million nautical miles in their war against Centennial links. Slideshows as a naval aviator, became the Navy’s first fighter
the enemy’s undersea menace. change monthly. ace while flying a Sopwith Camel with No. 213
An important byproduct of front-
Squadron, Royal Air Force.
line experiences was the opportunity
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Leathernecks of the 1st Marine Aviation Force gather near their DeHavilland DH-4 bombers. The only U.S.-built land plane to see action in the
war, the DH-4 arrived in the skies over Europe during the last months of the conflict.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 13

 Historic Aircraft
Flying Camels
D
uring World War I U.S. naval
aviators in Europe flew almost
exclusively foreign-built
aircraft, among them the
Sopwith F.1 Camel. The Camel was one
of the most successful fighters of the war,
being flown by the British Army’s Royal
Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval
Air Service (RNAS) as well as the U.S.
Army and Navy.1 The biplane was fast,
maneuverable, and reliable. British avia-
tion historian Kenneth Munson wrote:
“Controversy over whether the Sopwith
Camel or the [German] Fokker D.VII was
the finest fighter aircraft of World War
I will probably always persist; but the
Sopwith F.1 Camel
Type:
Camel is undisputed champion in
terms of enemy aircraft destroyed,
its tally—during only sixteen
months of operations—being 1,294
victories.”2
Developed from the earlier—and
very successful—Sopwith Pup,
the Camel had a conventional
biplane appearance. A variety
of engines powered the prototypes and
early production aircraft, with ratings
up to 150 horsepower. The aircraft’s
short nose and stocky fuselage featured
a “hump” forward of the cockpit that
partially housed the aircraft’s twin Vickers
.303-caliber machine guns, synchronized
to fire through the two-blade propeller.
The hump undoubtedly led to the Camel
moniker, initially an informal label that
was later made official.
The first Camel was completed on 22
December 1916, and the RFC and RNAS
began receiving production aircraft in
14
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mid-1917. It was an immediate success
as a fighter, scout, close air support,
and bomber aircraft. In addition to the
twin Vickers (with up to 600 rounds of
ammunition), the Camel could carry
four 24-pound bombs or two 40-pound
phosphorous bombs. Alternatively, a
112-pound high-explosive bomb could be
carried aloft.
But it was as a fighter that the Camel
achieved renown, with a single victory
making it world famous. On 21 April
1918, the famed German fighter ace
Baron Manfred von Richthofen—the
“Red Baron”—was killed when his
Fokker Dr.I was shot down by a Camel
piloted by Captain Roy Brown of No. 209
Squadron, Royal Air Force.3 Victories
Fighter/Fighter-bomber
Length: 18 feet, 9 inches
Wingspan: 28 feet
Engine: various, 130-horsepower Clerget (typical)
Maximum Speed: 113 mph
Armament: Two .303-caliber Vickers machine guns
Crew: Pilot
Entered Service: June 1917
were chalked up at a rapid rate by Camel
pilots, with aerial kills being scored
over England (German bombers and
Zeppelins), France, Italy, the Aegean,
Macedonia, and Russia.
Among those Camel victories were
six—five aircraft and one balloon—
garnered by U.S. Navy Lieutenant David
S. Ingalls while flying with the No. 213
Squadron, RAF. He was the only U.S.
Navy fighter ace of World War I.
The Royal Navy flew the F.1 but
sponsored the 2F.1—often called
the “Ship’s Camel”—specifically for
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
By Norman Polmar
Author, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
OF THE U.S. FLEET
shipboard use. This may have been the
first aircraft developed for that role. The
2F.1 variant had only one hump-mounted
Vickers .303 machine gun, to the left of
the centerline, and featured a Lewis .303
machine gun fitted above the upper wing
(with a 47- or 97-round magazine). For
shipboard use, it had a shorter wingspan
and a two-piece fuselage, joined behind
the cockpit so it could be broken down
for stowage. An extra fuel tank took the
place of the right-side hump gun.
On the morning of 19 July 1918,
the pioneer British carrier Furious, in
company with a force of light cruisers and
destroyers, launched two flights of 2F.1
Camels against the Zeppelin sheds
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
J. M. CAIELLA
Aircraft A5658 was one of
four ex-U.S. Army Camel F.1s
transferred to the Navy along with
two 2F.1s. The aircraft depicted was
flown by Lieutenant Commander
Edward O. McDonnell when
he made the first flight from an
American battleship in March 1919.
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
at Tondern, Germany. The first
flight of three aircraft bombed
one of the large airship sheds. Of
the four aircraft in the second
flight, one went down at sea
when its engine failed, another
crashed shortly after takeoff, and
the third made a forced landing
in neutral Denmark. The fourth
plane made it to Tondern and
destroyed another Zeppelin
shed with its bombs. Each of the
destroyed sheds had contained an airship;
the Zeppelins L.54 and L.60 thus fell
victim to carrier air strikes.
Only one plane from each flight was
able to return to the Furious, and they
had to come down in the water alongside
because of problems with the landing
procedure on the ship’s abbreviated
landing deck. As a result of the losses, the
Admiralty decided against further carrier
strikes from the Furious.
The effect of the raid on the Germans
was considerable. Airship historian
Douglas Robinson wrote: “Until the
Armistice the [German] Naval Airship
Division lived in constant fear of a similar
attack on one of the other bases . . .
because of its exposed position, Tondern
was maintained on a standby basis as an
emergency landing ground only.”4
Subsequently, 2F.1 Camels were
launched at sea from another platform. It
was Royal Navy practice for ships to tow
to sea floatplanes that, when a Zeppelin
was sighted, would be cut loose to take
off and climb to attack. But floatplanes
were too slow to intercept Zeppelins.
RAF Colonel Charles R. Samson, who
had been the first Royal Navy pilot to
solo, proposed using a destroyer to tow
a fighter to sea on a barge. When the
warship reached full speed at more than
30 knots, the fighter—fitted with skids
for landing gear—would take off with a
deck run of just a few feet.
A barge was fitted with a “flight deck”
and a device to lock the plane in place
until the pilot had run its engine to
maximum power. Colonel Samson had
troughs built onto the deck to mate with
the skids on the aircraft to guide the
fighter in rough water. A 2F.1 was loaded
on the modified barge and a destroyer
towed the 40-foot “carrier” to sea. As
the destroyer picked up speed, Samson
climbed into the Camel’s cockpit.
A crewman—tethered to the barge
with a line so he would not be blown
overboard—turned the plane’s propeller
and the engine started at once. After
Samson had warmed up the engine,
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTe pHOTO ARCHIVe
On 31 July 1918, the Royal Navy’s second attempt to launch a Camel from a destroyer-towed
barge proved successful. The fighter is seen just as it lifts off.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTe pHOTO ARCHIVe
Seven Camels launched from HMS Furious on 19 July 1918 flew the first carrier-borne strike
against an enemy. They destroyed the Zeppelins L.54 and L.60 in their sheds at Tondern.
• • • • • • • •
a signalman on the barge flagged the
destroyer and the sleek ship held steady
at 31 knots. Samson opened his throttle,
and the Camel tugged at its restraining
wire. He pulled the release toggle and
the cable holding back the plane came
loose. A moment later the plane was
airborne . . . or almost so.
The biplane started to leave the deck
and then faltered. The skids apparently
left their troughs and fouled a crossbar.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The plane fell into the water in front
of the onrushing barge, which slammed
into the airplane, pushing it and the pilot
underwater. Luckily, Samson escaped
from the wrecked plane and was plucked
from the water, wet and frustrated but
otherwise all right.
The flight deck was modified so it
would be horizontal when the barge was
pulled at high speeds, another guide was
constructed to keep the tail of the airplane
up and straight for the first four feet of its
run, and wheels replaced the skids. On
31 July, Flight-Sub-Lieutenant Stuart
Culley successfully took off from a slightly
longer, 58-foot barge.
Then, on 11 August in the North
Sea, Lieutenant Culley launched from a
towed barge against the Zeppelin L.53.
As the Camel climbed above 14,000
feet its controls got sluggish; at 17,000
feet the engine coughed. After gaining
another 1,000 feet of altitude, Culley
broke through a layer of clouds and found
himself in bright sunshine some 200 feet
below the German airship. But his plane
would go no higher.
pulling back on the control stick,
Culley literally hung the Camel on its
propeller until the plane was aimed
straight at the airship. He then triggered
the plane’s two machine guns. The Vickers
jammed after seven rounds were fired; the
Lewis fired a double drum of incendiary
bullets into the Zeppelin. Bursts of flame
shot from the L.53, and moments later
• • • • • • • its charred metal frame dropped into
15
 the sea. Only one man three flights were made
escaped, having bailed out from each ship during the
from 19,000 feet, possibly a maneuvers. After taking off
record for the time. the planes landed ashore.
But now the young Six additional U.S.
British pilot had problems. battleships were fitted
As Culley’s guns stopped with turret platforms and
firing the Camel fell into takeoffs were made by
a stall, dropping 2,000 feet British-built Camels and
before he regained control. several other American
With his fuel almost gone and foreign aircraft. The
and the British task force last U.S. Navy flights from
nowhere to be seen, Culley battleship gun turrets were
headed toward the Dutch recorded in August 1920
coast. In the distance when the Navy ended its
several fishing boats experimentation with that
appeared, and he decided form of shipboard aviation.
to put down near them. As Led by Sopwith, several
he approached, the “fishing British firms produced
boats” seemed to grow NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND
Camels during World War
in size until he realized Shrouded in tarps, a Camel is mounted at the end of its platform atop a fore turret I, with a total of 5,490
his mistake. They were of the USS Texas (later BB-35) in 1919, most likely around the time of its first being built. There was one
destroyers! And, there launch in March. purely “American” Camel:
were cruisers. It was the • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The late cartoonist Charles
task force that had taken Schulz could magically (and
him to sea. Culley brought his plane to the United States (given numbers artistically) transform Snoopy’s doghouse
down on the water and was picked up. A A5658, A5659, A5729, A5730) and two into a Camel fighter for millions of
derrick salvaged the fighter. 2F.1 models (A5721, A5722). newspaper readers of his comic strip.
British naval historian S. W. Roskill Platforms were erected over a 14-inch The Camel’s career was relatively brief,
wrote of the destruction of the L.53: gun turret of the U.S. battleship Texas with the last combat flights probably flown
“So ended an undertaking which Culley (later BB-35) while the ship was in by Poles against the Russians in 1920. The
himself called ‘an excellent example of England in November 1918; later a success and popularity of the aircraft was
cooperation between the Royal Navy and platform was added atop another turret summed up by one anonymous wit who
the very new-born Royal Air Force.’ at the New York Navy Yard. The first declared: “It became so famous that the
But . . . it has also a wider significance takeoffs from the Texas were not made, Arabs named an animal after it.”6
in terms of history, for it was almost however, until fleet maneuvers in the
certainly one of the very first instances Caribbean the following spring with 1. Four U.S. Army Air Service aero squadrons—the
of a successful air interception by a ship- two Camels, a Hanriot HD-2, and a 17th, 41st, 148th, and 185th—used the Camel.
borne fighter aircraft.”5 Sopwith 1½-Strutter assigned to the ship. The aircraft is described in great detail in H. F.
King, Sopwith Aircraft 1912–1920 (London: Putnam,
The British also experimented with The first flight was made by Lieutenant 1980), pp. 146–178.
launching Camels from temporary Commander Edward O. McDonnell in a 2. Kenneth Munson, Aircraft of World War I (Lon-
platforms atop gun turrets on battleships Camel on 10 March 1919, while the ship don: Ian Allan, 1967), p. 108.
and cruisers. This scheme caught on was at anchor in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 3. The Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air
Service were merged on 1 April 1918 to form the
with the U.S. Navy and after the war six A similar platform was erected on
independent Royal Air Force. Claims for the down-
ex-U.S. Army Camels were transferred to the battleship Mississippi (later BB-41), ing of von Richtofen’s aircraft are many and include
the Navy: four F.1 aircraft brought back and she operated a Hanriot HD.1. In all, an unknown infantry rifleman of the Australian
51st Battalion and Sgt C. B. Popkin, a Vickers
gunner with the 24th Machine Gun Company, 4th
(Australian) Division.
4. Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat:
A History of the German Naval Airship Division,
1912–1918 (Henley-on-Thames: G. T. Foulis,
1962), p. 321.
5. Capt. S. W. Roskill, RN, “The Destruction
of Zeppelin L.53,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
ings (August 1960), p. 78. Culley’s Camel—serial
N6812—subsequently was placed in the Imperial
War Museum, London.
6. King, Sopwith Aircraft 1912–1920, p. 178.

Norman Polmar is a columnist for Proceedings

and Naval History magazines. Among his 50
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
published books is the two-volume Aircraft
Tow-tractors are a product of their time. In April 1920, a horse-drawn caisson worked perfectly Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its
well at Santa Cruz, California, to move a 2F.1. Influence on World Events (Potomac Books,
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2006, 2008).

16 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

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 The
Sumter
Conundrum
BY CRAIG L. SYMONDS

On his first day in office, President Abraham Lincoln faced

one of his most vexing problems: Should he dispatch a
naval expedition to resupply the besieged garrison at
Fort Sumter, or simply withdraw the force?

18 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

www.downmagaz.com
 O
ne hundred and fifty years ago, the
United States faced the greatest crisis in
its history. Following Abraham Lincoln’s
election as President on 6 November
1860, seven states declared their seces-
sion from the Union and laid claim to all U.S. govern-
ment property within their territories. Public attention
had fallen on one particular Federal possession: the
not-yet-finished masonry-and-brick fort in the middle of
Charleston Harbor that had been named for “the Caro-
lina Gamecock,” General Thomas Sumter, a hero of the
American Revolution. The simple fact that Fort Sumter
was on an island necessarily meant that almost any solu-
tion to the growing crisis would involve the U.S. Navy.
Lincoln did not seek or expect a military solution.
He had no intention of forcing the issue, believing as he
did that the majority of Southerners retained some latent
loyalty to the old flag and that they had simply been swept
up by the emotion of the moment. He hoped that a period
of quiet resolve would bring most of them to their senses
and allow a national reunification without the shedding of
blood. Time, he hoped, would be the great healer.1
But time was exactly what Lincoln did not have. On his
first full day in office, 5 March 1861, he read a letter from
Major Robert Anderson, the commanding officer of Fort
Sumter’s small garrison. In that letter, Anderson informed
the new President that he was running out of food for
his garrison and their dependents, which included fami-
lies plus a number of construction workers. Worse, from
Lincoln’s point of view, Anderson wrote that it would
require 20,000 well-trained troops to mount the kind of
campaign required to bring him the needed supplies. It
was an undisguised plea to withdraw him and his garrison
from their untenable and dangerous situation.
Only the day before, in his inaugural address, Lin-
coln had pledged to the country that he would “hold,
occupy, and possess” all Federal property within the se-
ceded states. To withdraw Anderson and his garrison
from Sumter now would mean beginning his administra-
tion with a violation of that pledge.

The Situation at Sumter

Even if one granted the legitimacy of secession—

which Lincoln did not—the ownership of Fort Sumter
was ambiguous. It had been authorized by Congress, paid
for with Federal tax dollars, and built by the U.S. Army
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

During the Fort Sumter crisis, President Abraham Lincoln,

pictured at left in a photo taken in the spring of 1861,
sought for the United States to avoid being perceived as
the aggressor. The Confederacy assumed that role when it
eventually bombarded the fort.

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 19

 Corps of Engineers on a man-made island constructed of
granite blocks shipped to Charleston from New England.
To be sure, the fort itself was in South Carolina waters, but
South Carolina had no more to do with its financing or
construction than any other state. Yet somehow during the
lame-duck period of James Buchanan’s failed presidency, it
had become the touchstone in the argument over South
Carolina’s sovereignty and therefore of secession itself. That
public attention made it a symbol of both Lincoln’s effort
to confirm the permanence of the Union, and the Southern
effort to assert its independence.
There were actually three Federal forts in Charleston
Harbor: Sumter; old Castle Pinckney, watched over by a
single ordnance sergeant; and Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s
Island, which was the home of the installations’ small U.S.
garrison. When South Carolina Governor William Henry
Gist pledged he would make no effort to occupy the three
forts if the Federal government promised it would not
Cooper
River
Mount
Pleasant
Charleston
Mount
Castle Pleasant
Pinckney Battery
Ashley River
Fort Moultrie
Fort Johnson Fort Sumter
James Island Cummings Point
Charleston Harbor
12 April 1861
0 1
Miles
Confederate Battery
K. ERLINGER
strengthen or reinforce them, President Buchanan accepted
the arrangement, though at the time no one questioned
exactly what it meant to “strengthen” the forts.
Buchanan’s pro-Southern Secretary of War, John B.
Floyd, who later became a Confederate general (though
a very bad one), handpicked Anderson for the command
of the Charleston forts mainly because the officer was a
Kentuckian and a slaveholder (or at least his wife was a
slaveholder—the slaves were in her name) and because he
was a consummate professional who would follow orders.
But Anderson believed that part of being a professional
soldier was displaying responsibility down as well as obedi-
ence up and that he owed it to his men to ensure their
safety. So long as he remained in Fort Moultrie, the 8 of-
ficers, 61 men, and 13 musicians of his command were
entirely dependent for their security on the forbearance of
20
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the South Carolina militia. Anderson and his men were,
in effect, hostages in their own fort. And so, despite Bu-
chanan’s agreement, Anderson resolved to move his garri-
son from the untenable Fort Moultrie to the more isolated,
though still unfinished, Fort Sumter. He did so secretly on
the night on 26 December, six days after South Carolina
formally declared its separation from the Union.
South Carolina authorities felt betrayed and insisted that
Anderson’s clandestine move was a violation of their agree-
ment. It was not quite a “reinforcement” of the garrison, for
there were no additional U.S. Soldiers in Charleston Har-
bor after the move, but unquestionably the redeployment
did “strengthen” Anderson’s position, for his men were no
longer directly under the gaze—and the effective control—
of local authorities. Southerners accused Buchanan of bad
faith and demanded he order Anderson back to Moultrie.
In the meantime, South Carolina troops occupied the aban-
doned fort as well as Castle Pinckney.
For once Buchanan stiffened. He had
agreed not to send reinforcements to
Charleston, and he hadn’t. Buchanan noted
that Anderson commanded all three of the
Charleston forts and that he had simply
moved his command from one to another,
d which was entirely within his authority.
n
’s Isla
li van First Shots Fired
Sul
Apparently rather liking the feeling of
standing up for the government he pu-
tatively headed, Buchanan decided that
he would next send Anderson reinforce-
ments and supplies. In January 1861, he
dispatched the chartered and unarmed ci-
Star of the vilian steamer Star of the West with 200
West Battery
Soldiers plus a cargo of food and medi-
cal supplies to Charleston Harbor. The
South Carolinians opened fire on her
on 9 January, the first shots being fired from a battery
on Morris Island that was manned by cadets from The
Citadel. They could easily have been the first shots of a
civil war, but after several rounds flew past his ship and
one caused minor damage, the Star of the West’s civilian
skipper turned back. Reverting to more characteristic be-
havior, Buchanan chose to ignore the fact that the U.S.
flag had been fired on.
The event highlighted Anderson’s precarious position.
With his heavy guns now mounted in Fort Sumter, he
could have covered the Star of the West’s approach with
counterbattery fire. But he knew if he did so, it would
start a war—though with whom it is not clear, for the
Confederacy did not yet exist. He had watched from the
ramparts of the fort as shot after shot was fired at the Star
of the West, which was flying not one but two American
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
flags. The major was on the verge of ordering
supporting fire when the side-wheel steamer
turned around.
An angry Anderson demanded an explanation
from the Charleston authorities for why the U.S.
flag had been insulted. The ensuing exchange of
letters resulted in a new agreement in which both
sides pledged not to upset the status quo. And so
Charleston Harbor slipped into a tense armistice
that lasted six weeks, from mid-January until Lin-
coln’s inauguration. During that period, Anderson
sent regular updates to Washington—the U.S.
mail and the telegraph were still working. If those
reports were read at all, they had no influence on
policy, for Buchanan was determined to do noth-
ing to rock the boat before he left office.
Lincoln Seeks Opinions

Those were the circumstances on 5 March

when Lincoln read the latest of Anderson’s
status reports—carefully numbered no. 58—in
which he reported that his garrison was about
to be starved out of its position and that it
would take 20,000 men to relieve him.
Lincoln first turned to the 74-year-old Gen-
eral of the Army, Brevet Lieutenant General
Winfield Scott. Scott told him that ships could
not get into Charleston Harbor past all the
batteries that the Rebels had erected and that
capturing the batteries would require the 20,000
men Anderson had asked for as well as several
months of siege work. That was more time than
Anderson, or for that matter Lincoln, had.
The next place Lincoln went for advice was
his Cabinet. The assembled members expressed
shock and surprise; until that moment, the pre- LIBRARY OF CONGReSS

cariousness of Anderson’s position was not widely The Fort Sumter standoff was front-page news in early 1861. This profile
known or fully understood. Most of Lincoln’s ad- of Sumter commander Major Robert Anderson noted that “a less able or
visers instinctively declared that Anderson must more impressible officer would, beyond the possibility of a doubt, have
be sustained. After all, if the secessionists were involved our country in a bloody fratricidal war.”
successful in driving the American flag from na- • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
tional forts, the government might as well acqui-
esce to a divided country. Lincoln had invited Scott to the tugboats, loaded with both supplies and reinforcements and
meeting, and the general patiently instructed them about escorted by warships, could run into Charleston Harbor at
the military realities that made a successful relief expedition night and deposit their cargo on Fort Sumter’s tiny wharf. It
to Fort Sumter impossible. would be virtually impossible, Fox insisted, for secessionist
postmaster General Montgomery Blair, who was a West batteries some three-quarters of a mile away, to hit such
point graduate, was especially adamant that Sumter must small, fast-moving targets.2
be held, and he subsequently introduced Lincoln to his Lincoln saw some drawbacks to the scheme. First of all,
brother-in-law, Gustavus V. Fox, who had an idea about sending a naval expedition into Charleston Harbor would
how to do it. Fox had served as a naval officer for 15 years, almost certainly be perceived by secessionists as an aggres-
left the Navy in 1853 to command mail steamers, and was sive act. Lincoln had promised in his inaugural address that
now a private citizen. He suggested that New York City “The government will not assail you. You can have no

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 21

 conflict without being yourselves the aggressors.” Perhaps
sensing the President’s wariness, Blair suggested that at least
Lincoln could send Fox to Charleston to talk with Major
Anderson and assess the situation. Always willing to ob-
tain more information, Lincoln agreed, though he made no
commitment and was still leaning toward evacuation when
he bade Fox farewell.3
Leaving Washington on 19 March, Fox traveled south
by train through Virginia and the Carolinas, arriving in
Charleston on the 21st. There, he met with South Caro-
lina’s new governor, Francis Pickens, who agreed to let him
go out to Fort Sumter and talk with Anderson if Fox as-
sured him that his visit was for peaceful purposes. With
perhaps a qualm or two, Fox agreed.
Murky View from the Fort
Rowed out to Sumter after nightfall, Fox was able to give
Anderson the good news that the government had granted
him two brevet promotions—from major to colonel—in rec-
ognition of his stalwart resistance. But the news did not lift
the fort commander’s gloomy outlook, for Anderson contin-
ued to believe that any naval expedition to resupply him was
doomed. As he and Fox stood on the ramparts of Fort Sum-
ter in the darkness, Anderson pointed out the silhouettes of
new fortifications the Southerners had erected on every side.
Fox, however, looked at the harbor defenses with different
eyes and continued to believe that the batteries posed little
threat to a small, fast-moving target at night. For him, the
clincher came when the boat that had brought him out to
Fort Sumter returned two hours later to ferry him back. Fox
could hear the creak of the oarlocks, but the boat remained
virtually invisible from the fort’s small pier “until she almost
touched the landing.” If a small boat could not be seen from
Sumter at 20 feet, how could it be seen from Fort Moultrie
at three-quarters of a mile? Fox returned to Washington on
24 March more convinced than ever that “he could reinforce
the garrison with men, and supply it with provisions.”4
Fox’s information, as well as news from others who re-
ported that there was no apparent latent Unionism in the
state, led Lincoln to consider a rescue mission to Fort Sum-
ter more seriously, but what finally changed his mind was
a disturbing memorandum from Scott, who proposed that
the government should evacuate both Sumter and Fort
Pickens off Pensacola, Florida. The gratuitous advice was
well outside Scott’s authority as commanding general, for
it was based on a political judgment, not on military cir-
cumstances. Still, its contents gave Lincoln “a cold shock.”
Indeed, Scott’s recommendation was nearly as distressing as
the letter Lincoln had received from Anderson three weeks
before. The public might eventually come to understand
the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity, but
Pickens was not under any immediate threat. To surrender
both forts would signal a deliberate policy of accommoda-
22
www.downmagaz.com
tion, the same policy that had been pursued by Lincoln’s
discredited predecessor.5
After a sleepless night, the President decided sometime
on the morning of 28 March that he would hold both Fort
Pickens and Fort Sumter, which meant that in addition
to sending reinforcements to Pickens, he would have to
authorize a naval expedition to provision Sumter as well.
By then, however, time was running out. Anderson had
already reported that he could hold out only until 15 April.
Lincoln wanted the Sumter expedition to move by 6 April.
Mounting the expedition at all proved almost too much
for the young administration. Lincoln wanted Fox to com-
mand it, though he was no longer a naval officer, which
caused some confusion. Moreover, gathering the naval
forces needed for both Sumter and Pickens betrayed both
a lack of clear channels of communication and a lack of
coordination between government departments.
The Powhatan’s Conflicting Orders
On 1 April, Secretary of State William H. Seward
showed up in Lincoln’s office with two middle-grade offi-
cers: Army Captain Montgomery Meigs and Navy Lieuten-
ant David Dixon Porter. They had a plan, Seward told the
President, to make certain of the security of Fort Pickens.
All that was needed was to dispatch the Navy steamer
Powhatan—recently returned to New York from Vera Cruz
and decommissioned prior to undergoing repairs—to escort
a steamer loaded with a battalion of Soldiers down to the
fort. Lincoln wondered if Seward had cleared the idea with
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. Seward assured him
that he would “make it right with Mr. Welles.” Thereupon,
Lincoln gave permission for Porter to write out orders for
the President’s signature. They instructed the commandant
of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Captain Andrew Hull Foote,
to prepare the Powhatan for sea for an undisclosed mission,
and to replace her commander, Captain Samuel Mercer,
with Porter. To keep the expedition secret from Southern
spies, Porter wrote into Foote’s orders that “under no cir-
cumstances” was he to “communicate to the Navy Depart-
ment the fact that she is fitting out.”6
But despite his promise, Seward did not “make it right”
with Welles, nor did Seward know that Welles had al-
ready planned to use the Powhatan for Fox’s expedition
to Fort Sumter. Worse, Foote’s orders forbade the captain
even to tell Welles that he was sending one of the na-
tion’s few available steam warships off on a secret mission.
Foote found that more than a little awkward, but because
the order pledging him to secrecy was signed by the Presi-
dent himself, he perforce obeyed. As a result of all this, in
the first week of April, Seward and Welles each planned
a secret naval mission—one to Fort Pickens, one to Fort
Sumter—each expedition spearheaded by the same ship,
and neither secretary was aware of the plans of the other.7
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 Not until 5 April—the day before the expedition for Fort equate notice. He now told Lincoln that the administration
Sumter was to depart—did anyone begin to realize what must live up to that pledge. Welles argued that Seward had
had happened. That morning, Welles telegraphed Captain no right to make such a pledge on behalf of the government
Mercer his orders to take the Powhatan to Charleston where and the government had no obligation to live up to it. After
he was to rendezvous with Fox on 11 April. Meigs com- all, he pointed out, a key element of Fox’s expedition was
plained to Seward by telegraph that Welles was “interfering” stealth. To notify the secessionists that an expedition was en
with porter’s command of the Powhatan, and Seward went route jeopardized its potential for success and put Fox and
to Welles to straighten him out. The Navy Secretary was at all those who sailed with him in increased peril.
first baffled and then angered. porter had no command, he Seward insisted, however, and, typically, Lincoln settled
insisted. Mercer was in command of the Powhatan, and he on a kind of compromise. He would send a notification to
was under orders for Charleston. Not so, Seward declared. Governor pickens, but only after the expedition had sailed.
He claimed that the Powhatan was porter’s command and she The note Lincoln sent stated that if local authorities did
was going to pensacola. Characteristically, Welles became not resist the resupply effort, the government would not
excited, and no doubt raised his voice. He demanded they land any reinforcements, but if they did resist, then both
go to the White House and talk to Lincoln.8 supplies and reinforcements would be landed.11
Though it was near mid-
night, Lincoln was still at
his desk. He listened to both
men and at first sided with
Seward, declaring that the
Powhatan was not among
those ships intended for the
Sumter expedition. Welles
knew better. He rushed off
to get copies of the orders,
and after Lincoln read them,
he agreed that Welles was
correct. The Powhatan was
to go to Charleston. The
president ordered Seward
to telegram porter in New
York and tell him so.9
But Seward did not send NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND

the telegram until late the As the crisis heightened in early April, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles ordered that the side-
next morning, and when he wheel frigate powhatan accompany a relief expedition to Sumter, while Secretary of State William
did, all it said was that por- H. Seward persuaded President Lincoln allow the warship to escort a relief mission to Fort Pickens,
ter was “to give up the Pow- off Pensacola, Florida.
hatan to Captain Mercer.” It • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
was signed “SEWARD,” but
porter had different orders in his pocket that were signed It is impossible to know what Lincoln expected such a
by the president. “This is an unpleasant position to be in,” message to accomplish. Many have argued that it was a de-
the lieutenant told Foote. In the end porter decided that liberate ploy to compel the Rebel leaders to assume the bur-
Lincoln’s orders took precedence. “I received my orders den of making a decision. According to this view, letting the
from the president and shall proceed and execute them,” secessionists know that the expedition was en route forced
he declared. Then he steamed out of New York Harbor and them into a provocative act that cast the Union as the vic-
headed off toward pensacola.10 tim. And, indeed, that is what finally happened. But Lincoln
may have had more modest expectations. At the very least,
Crisis Comes to a Head
the message would absolve him of making a treacherous as-
Nor was that the end of the confusion. Lincoln’s decision sault on South Carolina—of being the aggressor, as he said
to relieve Fort Sumter put Seward in an awkward diplomatic in his inaugural address. It was always possible that local
position, because the Secretary of State had taken it on him- authorities might acquiesce in the sending of supplies, which
self to promise Southern representatives that the government would prolong the crisis and allow more time for all sides to
would make no attempt to reinforce Sumter without ad- find a peaceful solution. To be sure, it might also provoke

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 23

 the secessionists to act, and in acting, assume the burden of
starting hostilities. But Lincoln could not count on that, and
for the most part he was feeling his way during this crisis.
On 9 April, Fox headed south on the chartered steamer
Baltic that carried most of the supplies. Two tugs from New
York were supposed to rendezvous with him off Charleston
AMERICAN ANTIqUARIAN SOCIETY, WORCESTER, MA/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL
The Union relief expedition to Sumter misfired when bad weather turned back tugboats that were eracy more time, cast Lincoln
to ferry the supplies to the fort. However, Lincoln’s announcement to the besiegers that he planned in the aggressor’s role, and won
to resupply the garrison led Confederate President Jefferson Davis to decide to force the fort’s
surrender, and Southern guns opened fire in the early hours of 12 April.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
and carry the supplies to the fort, but though the Baltic
arrived at the rendezvous at 0300 on 12 April, the tugs
never made it. Bad weather had thwarted them off New
Jersey and the Carolina Capes and forced the boats to turn
back. Nor was the Powhatan there, for Porter was taking
her down to Fort Pickens. Two other U.S. Navy warships
did arrive—the Pawnee (see “Historic Fleets,” p. 66) and
Pocahontas—but without the tugs, nobody was quite sure
what to do next. While Fox and the two Navy captains
discussed their options, they heard the distant sound of
cannon fire echoing out of Charleston Harbor.
The note Lincoln had addressed to Governor Pickens had
arrived in Charleston on 8 April. By then the seven states that
had seceded from the Union had organized themselves into
the Confederacy and appointed Brigadier General P. G. T.
Beauregard as the area commander for Charleston. Pickens
therefore passed Lincoln’s note to Beauregard, who in turn
passed it on to the Confederate government in Montgomery,
Alabama. In the end, therefore, it was Jefferson Davis, the
Confederacy’s Provisional President, who decided how to re-
spond. He concluded that allowing Fort Sumter to be resup-
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plied would violate the Confederacy’s claim to sovereignty.
More afraid of looking weak than he was of starting a war,
Davis ordered Beauregard to demand Anderson’s surrender.
If that demand were refused, the general was to reduce the
fort by gunfire. The first shot was fired just minutes after
Fox, in the Baltic, reached the rendezvous ten miles offshore.
That initial shot galvanized
both sections. Political divi-
sions in the North instantly
dissolved, and Northerners ral-
lied around their new President
and the war to save the Union.
The effect was just as powerful
in the South, and for a time it
appeared that Davis’ decision
had provided the boost the na-
scent nation needed to solidify
its cause. On the other hand, it
is hard to resist the conclusion
that if the Confederate Presi-
dent had simply protested Lin-
coln’s resupply effort in an angry
note, labeled it as a violation
of his inauguration pledge, and
let the crisis play itself out, it
would have bought the Confed-
sympathy abroad. Taking that
course would have made it very
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
difficult, if not impossible, for
Lincoln to initiate a subsequent
war to save the Union without being, in fact, the aggressor.
Davis’ was, in short, a catastrophically bad decision.
1. The central argument of this essay is adapted from Craig L. Symonds, Lincoln
and His Admirals: Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 1.
2. Ibid., p. 11.
3. Lincoln’s inaugural is in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Complete Works of Abraham
Lincoln, vol. 4 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), p. 261.
4. Symonds, Lincoln and his Admirals, p. 13.
5. The “cold shock” quotation comes from the diary of Montgomery Meigs,
“General M. C. Meigs on the Conduct of the Civil War,” American Historical Re-
view (January 1921), 26:300.
6. Meigs to Seward, 1 April 1861, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress; David
Dixon Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War, (New York: Appleton,
1885), pp. 13–15.
7. Lincoln to Foote, 1 April 1861, Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Navies in the War of the Rebellion (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1894-1922) (hereinafter cited as ORN), ser. 1, vol. 4, pp. 108–9.
8. Welles to Mercer, Rowan, and Gillis, 5 April 1861, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 4, pp. 235–6;
Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson,
ed. by Howard K. Beale (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), undated entry, vol. 1, p. 24.
9. Gideon Welles, Diary, vol. 1, p. 24.
10. Seward to Porter, 6 April 1861, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 4, p. 112; Porter to Foote,
ibid., pp. 111–12.
11. Gideon Welles, “Facts in Relation to the Reinforcement of Fort Pickens in
the Spring of 1861,” Galaxy (January 1871), in Welles, Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion, Selected Essays (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1959), p. 50.
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 Navy’s The

Evolutionary War
By Craig L. SymondS

26 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

www.downmagaz.com

During the Civil War, the U.S.
Navy harnessed revolutionary
technologies and designs—
and pioneered extensive joint
operations with the Army—
along the Confederacy’s shores
and on its rivers.
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011
T
he Civil War was essentially a land war. The
Union won it because the Northern public
proved willing to sustain the Lincoln admin-
istration through four long years of bloodshed
and sacrifice, and the Confederacy lost it be-
cause it could not match Union superiority in manpower
and industrial production. Still, naval forces on both sides,
but especially on the Union side, affected the trajectory of
the conflict, and very likely helped determine its length.
Moreover, because the war took place during a time of
dramatic changes in technology, it marked a milestone in
the character of naval warfare itself.
Even before the war began, wooden sailing ships firing
solid shot from iron guns were giving way to steam-pow-
ered, propeller-driven iron warships firing explosive shells
from much larger rifled guns. The best known example of
this revolution during the conflict was the famous duel be-
tween the ironclads Virginia and Monitor on 9 March 1862
in Hampton Roads, Virginia, but the battle the day before
was the real watershed, marking as it did the supremacy of
iron over wood. On 8 March, the Confederate Virginia (for-
merly the Union screw frigate Merrimack) sank two wooden
U.S. warships in a single day, inflicting on the Navy its
worst defeat from its founding in 1775 until 7 December
1941. Wooden warships did not become obsolete, nor did
the armored warship become the new universal standard,
but the Battles of Hampton Roads unleashed the genie of
technology. The changes were manifested in other ways as
well, including a shift in the presumed balance of relative
power between ships and forts.
As the weaker naval power, the Confederacy was quicker
to embrace many of the new innovations, including mines,
David boats (essentially early pT boats), and even an opera-
tional submarine, the H. L. Hunley, which sank the Union
screw sloop Housatonic off Charleston on 17 February 1864.
But the South could not produce such novel weapons in
the kind of numbers needed to change the balance of sea
power, and from the beginning, the Confederacy all but
conceded control of the sea to its foe.
That put the U.S. Navy in the unfamiliar role of being the
dominant naval power. In both the American Revolution
and the War of 1812, the smaller U.S. Navy had neces-
sarily avoided fleet engagements with its powerful enemy
and relied instead on attacking British commercial shipping,
a strategy known by its French name as guerre de course.
The British had countered by attempting to blockade the
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
BEVERLEY R. ROBINSON COLLECTION, U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY MUSEUM
Three City-class gunboats bombard Fort Henry on 6 February
1862 as a Rebel shot bursts the smaller Essex’s boiler.
Innovative City-class ironclads—all seven built within three
months and commissioned in January 1862—would become the
backbone of the Union effort to secure Western rivers.
27
 American coast both to interfere with trade and to prevent
potential commerce raiders from getting to sea in the first
place. In effect, the superior navy employed a blockade, and
the weaker naval power turned to commerce raiding. That
is also what happened in the Civil War; the Union Navy
employed a blockade, and the Confederates turned to a
guerre de course. In addition to the blockade, the U.S. Navy
played a critical role on the Western rivers and conducted
a determined, though only partially successful, pursuit of
Confederate commerce raiders.
Initial Blockade Problems
President Abraham Lincoln’s declaration of a blockade
on 19 April 1861, only four days after the surrender of
Fort Sumter, was the administration’s first important stra-
tegic decision, and from the very start there were two huge
problems to be overcome.
The first was legal. A declaration of a blockade was an
act of war, and Lincoln’s pronouncement therefore seemed
to grant belligerent status to the Confederacy. For his part,
the President insisted that the Confederacy had no legal
standing—as far as he was concerned the conflict was
simply a rebellion against the government. Consequently,
a blockade declaration that seemed to acknowledge the
Confederacy was something of an embarrassment. Lincoln
and his Secretary of State, William H. Seward, tried to get
around the implications of a formal blockade by announc-
ing that domestic unrest in some of its Southern ports re-
quired the closing of them to commerce.
This transparent subterfuge did not work, however, be-
cause the European powers recognized a blockade when
they saw one. Besides, merely closing certain ports would
not have allowed Union warships to patrol for blockade
violators beyond the immediate coastline. In the end, the
Union government had to accept the term “blockade”
along with whatever it might imply about the legal status
of the Confederacy.1
Lincoln’s declaration was one factor that led to the Brit-
ish decision to grant belligerency status (though not for-
mal recognition) to the Confederacy. Initially, the United
States saw that as a danger. In fact, the decision worked
to the Union advantage since it meant that warships and
privateers from both sides were barred from using British
ports as bases. Though the British would stretch the mean-
ing of neutrality to the near-breaking point during the war,
Confederate commerce raiders remained barred from bring-
ing their prizes into British ports—including those in the
West Indies—a circumstance that severely limited their
effectiveness.
The second problem with the blockade declaration was
that according to international law, neutral powers did not
have to respect a blockade unless the blockading power es-
tablished a naval presence off every port that was declared to
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be under blockade. You could not simply say that a coast was
blockaded, you actually had to do it. And that was a problem
for the Union because the Confederacy claimed a coastline
of some 3,550 miles that was pierced by 189 harbors, inlets,
and navigable river mouths. Clearly the Union Navy’s few
score warships could not be physically present off all of those
places at once. Indeed, at most of those ports and harbors
a single ship would be wholly inadequate; at some of them
it would require more than a dozen ships even to make a
pretense of an “effective force.” Consequently, in spite of the
fact that it was already greatly superior to its foe, the U.S.
Navy’s first order of business was to expand exponentially to
5, 10, even 15 times its prewar strength.
Most of the new ships were converted merchantmen.
Sometimes all it took to turn a steam merchant ship into
a man-of-war was strengthening the decks enough to en-
able them to sustain the weight of the naval ordnance and
constructing a magazine below the water line. Those con-
versions took place at various Northern naval yards. During
the course of the war, men working 12-hour shifts at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard successfully refitted some 190 ships.
In one exceptional case, workers transformed the merchant
steamer Monticello into a warship in less than 24 hours.2
Seizing a Base of Operations
The North’s ability to mobilize so many ships so quickly
was a measure of its industrial and maritime supremacy over
the South, but maintaining that force off a hostile coast for
four years was equally challenging. Since all but a very few
of the ships were steam powered—and therefore coal burn-
ing—keeping them on the blockade necessitated seizing
and holding a number of bases along that coast where they
could be refueled and resupplied. One of the first recom-
mendations of the Blockade Strategy Board, established by
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles at the beginning of
the war, was to secure two coaling stations along the South
Atlantic coast. Initially, the board recommended Bull’s Bay,
South Carolina, and Fernandina, Florida, but after further
consideration, the initial target was shifted to Port Royal,
South Carolina.
Port Royal became the objective for two reasons. First
was its location between Charleston and Savannah, which
would afford blockading squadrons at both those cities a
convenient base. A second factor was Port Royal’s ge-
ography. Not only was it an enormous roadstead, large
enough to accommodate the entire Union Navy, but also
its swampy marshes separated the offshore islands from the
mainland and protected occupying Union forces from a
counterattack by the Rebel army.
Flag Officer Samuel Francis Du Pont, who had chaired
the Strategy Board, commanded the fleet that would con-
duct this first major operation against the enemy shore. He
led a huge armada—75 ships in all—the largest naval force
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
ever assembled under the American flag. En route to the ron with the base it needed to maintain the blockades of
target, a terrible storm off Cape Hatteras scattered the fleet Charleston and Savannah. For the rest of the war, only
all over the ocean—a few of the transports fetched up on Hampton Roads surpassed port Royal in importance as
the coast of Ireland. Over the next several days, however, a Union naval base on the enemy coast. Indeed, it is
most of the ships came in, one by one, and at 0900 on 7 hard to imagine how the North could have maintained
November 1861, Du pont led his warship squadron into its blockade of the South Atlantic coast at all without
port Royal Sound. possession of port Royal. The Union blockading fleet also
Up to that point, conventional wisdom was that guns in relied on Key West, Florida, and Ship Island, near the
forts were superior to guns in ships. After all, ships were mouth of the Mississippi River, as supply bases for the
made of wood, and forts were usually constructed of stone. other squadrons.
Forts often had bigger guns and an un-
limited supply of ammunition. Finally
and decisively, forts did not sink. As
the New York Tribune had declared dur-
ing the Fort Sumter crisis, “ships are no
match for land batteries.”3
But those assumptions did not take into
consideration recent dramatic changes
in naval technology. Du pont’s wooden
steamers, led by the frigate Wabash, could
remain in motion while firing; they could
maneuver independent of the wind; and
their new and much larger naval guns
were more than a match for anything the
Confederates had in either Fort Walker or
Fort Beauregard, the two works guarding
port Royal. Moreover, the forts were not
masonry structures, like Fort Sumter in
Charleston. They were log-and-dirt for-
tresses thrown up just a few months ear-
lier and armed with mostly older, smaller
artillery pieces.
Du pont attacked the larger of them,
Fort Walker, first. When the Union
ships opened fire, the navigator on
board the Wabash remembered that “the
air over the fort was filled with clouds
of sand, splinters, and fragments of
gun carriages and timbers.” After three LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

passes, the Federal gunners had disabled In late 1861, Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont became the war’s first great U.S.
most of the fort’s guns, and the defend- naval hero for capturing Port Royal Sound, South Carolina, a key base for Union ships
ers were down to only 500 pounds of enforcing the blockade of the Confederacy’s South Atlantic ports.
powder. Accepting the inevitable, the • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
garrison struck its flag and abandoned
the fort, as did Beauregard’s defenders, leaving the road- The successful seizure of port Royal also affected Confed-
stead in the hands of the Union. Du pont’s destruction erate strategy. One interested observer of the engagement was
of Fort Walker demonstrated that a squadron of modern General Robert E. Lee, then acting as Confederate president
steam warships was more than a match for such defenses. 4
Jefferson Davis’ military adviser. Sent to South Carolina to
The Federal victory at port Royal had several important observe and report on coastal defense efforts, Lee concluded
consequences. psychologically, the news was extremely that the superiority of the Union Navy, its ability to move
welcome in the North, which was still burdened by the quickly from place to place, and the impact of its heavy
incubus of the defeat at Bull Run that summer. Strategi- guns meant that the South simply could not defend its coast
cally, it provided the South Atlantic Blockading Squad- everywhere. It would have to choose a handful of specific

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 29

 sites that could be defended, and let the rest go by default.
From then on, the Confederacy energetically defended only
a half dozen key ports: Galveston, Texas; New Orleans, Loui-
siana; Mobile, Alabama; Savannah, Georgia; Charleston,
South Carolina; and Wilmington, North Carolina. Most of
the rest of the Confederate coast was subsequently occupied
by Union forces that were supplied and maintained by sea
because of Union naval superiority.
Assessing the Blockade’s Effectiveness
Southern supply bases greatly simplified the U.S. Navy’s
job, but maintaining the blockade remained a challenging
NAVAL HISTOry & HErITAGE COMMAND
Painted gray, fast-steaming blockade runners such as the Vance, shown at Nassau, the Bahamas, in 1863, were difficult for Union
warships to spot and then catch at night. After making more than 20 runs through the blockade, the Vance’s luck ran out on 10
September 1864 when she was captured off Wilmington, North Carolina.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
and often thankless task. The general pattern of trade was
for conventional cargo vessels from Europe to bring their
goods to a neutral port such as St. George in Bermuda,
Nassau in the Bahamas, or Havana, Cuba. There the car-
goes were off-loaded into low, fast blockade runners. The
Was the
V irtually every general history of the Civil
War emphasizes how unprepared for
war the United States was in 1861. If these
books mention the Navy at all, they report
that it was in more or less the same situation.
After all, in 1861 the U.S. Navy had only
90 vessels listed on its Register of Ships, fewer
than half of which (42) were capable of active
service, and most of those were on distant
stations from Brazil to China. Soon after he
was inaugurated, President Abraham Lincoln
asked his Secretary of the Navy, Gideon
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vessels, almost always unarmed, then attempted to run
into a blockaded port, usually at night. Blacked out and
painted a dark gray, they sought to dash past Union war-
ships without being sighted, or if they were spotted, to
outrun their pursuers. Those that made it into port would
later attempt to dash out to sea, usually loaded with cot-
ton or other exports.
Given the difficulty of spotting or catching them, it is not
surprising that most of the ships that tried to run the block-
ade did so successfully. A more important factor, however,
was that relatively few ships tried it. In the last full year of
peace, some 20,000 ships entered or left Southern ports, but
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
during the war, that number dropped to only 2,000 ships
per year. Even more telling, cotton exports from the South
dropped from just under 3 million bales a year before the
war to just over 50,000 in the first year of the conflict—less
than 2 percent of the prewar total.5
U.s. Navy Ready foR WaR iN 1861?
By Craig L. Symonds
Welles, what kind of naval force could be
made available in case of war, and Welles
named only 12 ships that could “at once” be
Civil War marked the culmination of an
era of technological innovation that had
a dramatic impact on the character of
put into service. Clearly that was not a Navy naval warfare. These innovations included
that was prepared to command the South’s the screw propeller, more efficient steam
coastline, impose an impervious blockade, engines, rifled and banded naval guns,
pursue Confederate commerce raiders, fight and exploding ordnance, among others.
on the Western rivers, and do all the other To employ the new technologies, the
jobs it would be assigned in the forthcoming United States had authorized and built
struggle. from the keel up no fewer than 24 major
On the other hand, the catalog of new combatants in the decade before
inadequacy overlooks the fact that the the outbreak of war. It was the country’s
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 A precise calculation of just how much the Union
blockade hurt the Confederacy is elusive. On the one
hand, the South was able to import the essential matériel
it needed to sustain its economy and war effort—includ-
ing 400,000 rifles, 3 million pounds of lead, and more
than 2.2 million pounds of saltpeter for manufacturing
gunpowder. Historian Stephen Wise is undoubtedly cor-
rect in concluding that “without blockade running the
nation’s military would have been without proper supplies
of arms, bullets, and powder.”6
On the other hand, the blockade had a cumulative
eroding effect on the Southern economy and contributed
to inflation and war weariness within both the civilian
population and the Army, thereby undermining the Con-
federate war effort. As historian William H. Roberts put
it, if the blockade was “never airtight” it “was constricting
enough that the South was constantly gasping for eco-
nomic breath.” It is likely that the Union would have
won the war even without the blockade, as long as the
Northern population sustained the Lincoln administra-
tion, but almost as surely the war would have lasted longer
and been more costly. So it is possible to argue that the
blockade probably saved many thousands of lives. 7
south like the Mississippi, or south to north like the Ten-
nessee and the Cumberland. As a result, the latter served
as potential avenues for Union advances. Both sides knew
that whoever commanded the Western rivers had a tre-
mendous strategic advantage.
As in the saltwater war, the Union had the benefit of
possessing an industrial base that allowed it to produce more
and better warships for use in the river war. Even before
the transformation of the Merrimack into the Virginia or the
construction of the Monitor, salvage expert James Buchanan
Eads of St. Louis built a flotilla of small river gunboats that
were armor plated and powerfully armed yet still capable of
maneuvering in relatively shallow water. Major General Wil-
liam Tecumseh Sherman is said to have remarked admiringly
that they could navigate in a heavy dew.
The South, too, attempted an ironclad-building program
for the Western rivers and laid down two big ironclads
at New Orleans and two more at Memphis. In the end,
however, the Confederacy’s inferior industrial base and the
rapid conquest of both of those Southern cites derailed the
effort. Only one of the four ironclads was ever completed
(the CSS Arkansas), and for the most part, the South had
to depend on shore fortifications to try to prevent Union

Advantages, Disadvantages
on the Western Rivers

After the blockade, the most impor-

tant assignment for the Union Navy was
on the rivers in the Western theater—
the region between the Appalachian
Mountains and the Mississippi River.
Significantly, while the rivers in the East
nearly all ran horizontally (as viewed
on a map) and thus acted as barriers to
any Union advance, rivers in the West
mostly flowed vertically, either north to

largest peacetime naval expansion since

the Naval Act of 1816. Because of that,
though the 1861 Navy was relatively small,
it contained a disproportionate number
of new, up-to-date warships that gave it
an insurmountable superiority over its
WABASH LeAViNg NeW YoRk foR the SeAt of WAR, BY EdWARd MORAN, NAVY ART COLLECTION, NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMANd

Southern foe. the Merrimack-class screw frigate Wabash leaves New York harbor on 30 May 1861
The first ships of this dramatic expansion for duty as flagship of the Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Although the U.S. Navy
were five Merrimack-class screw (that is, needed to expand enormously to meet the demands of war, the presence in the fleet of
propeller-driven) frigates, all named for modern warships such as the Wabash gave it a solid core to build around.
American rivers and therefore sometimes • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

called River-class frigates. (The others

were the Wabash, Minnesota, Roanoke, and with sharper lines and having fewer guns.) propeller-driven and boasted an impressive
Colorado. Included in this same authorization Superficially, at least, they looked very armament consisting entirely of shell guns.
was a sixth frigate, the Niagara, which was much like sailing frigates of an earlier age. When the Merrimack visited English ports in
somewhat differently designed, being longer Nevertheless, they were steam-powered and 1856-57, her powerful battery so impressed

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 31

 armies from using the axes of the rivers as avenues of ad-
vance. They initially erected a defense line—the so-called
“long Kentucky line”—from Island Number Ten on the
Mississippi to the Cumberland Gap, more or less approxi-
mating the Tennessee-Kentucky border. The ensuing Union
campaign to break this line pitted Union ironclad warships
backed by land forces against Confederate fortifications.
One problem the Union had in executing its campaign
was that there was no existing protocol for joint operations
in the 19th century—no Department of Defense or Joint
Chiefs of Staff. There was simply no such thing as a Joint
Command in either the North or the South. The ability of
generals and admirals to work effectively together depended
entirely on the willingness of the commanders to cooper-
ate. After some confusion in the early months of war, what
emerged was an arrangement in which the Union Army
retained strategic control of operations within the Western
theater, and U.S. Navy officers exercised tactical command
of their ships and squadrons. Even then, however, it became
clear that the key to Union success on the Western rivers
was the willingness of Army and Navy officers to work
together, because neither could give orders to the other.
Key Early Victories
The first trial came at Fort Henry on the Tennessee River.
Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant, in his first important
operation, and Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote combined
to break through a key position in the long Kentucky line.
Foote’s ironclad gunboat flotilla carried Grant’s troops to a
point just above Fort Henry, and then took the fort under
fire from the river as Grant’s Soldiers advanced overland. As
it happened, the Confederate commander at Henry, Brigadier
General Lloyd Tilghman, recognized the vulnerability of his
position and evacuated his infantry, choosing to defend the
fort with his artillery alone. In the ensuing gun duel, Foote’s
four ironclads overwhelmed the fortress’ batteries, and Fort
Henry capitulated before Grant’s men could arrive. Foote’s
gunboats then steamed past the fort, seven miles upriver to
destroy the railroad bridge over the Tennessee River, thereby
cutting a crucial east-west link for the Confederacy. That
compelled two Confederate armies to evacuate not only all
of Kentucky, but most of Tennessee as well.
If the Navy won the honors at Fort Henry, the Army
had its turn at Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River,
only a day’s march east of Henry and the linchpin of Con-
federate defenses in the West. There, Foote’s gunboats
proved far less formidable, because Donelson was situated
on higher ground and its defenders could fire their artillery
down into the vessels on the river with plunging fire. This
time it was Grant’s army that compelled the surrender of
the Rebel fort, on 16 February 1862.
Army-Navy cooperation proved more efficient in the
Union campaign against Island Number Ten on the Mis-
sissippi River in April. The island, so named because it was
the tenth island in numbered sequence from the confluence
of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, was the site of the prin-
cipal Confederate defense of the Mississippi. Protected by
an impassable marshland to the east and the river itself to
the west, the fort was secure from a conventional overland
attack except from the south. Union forces could assail the
Rebel defenses only if the Navy could somehow get past
the Confederate fortifications on the island to escort Union
troops across the river.
On 4 April, Commander Henry Walke, captain of the
ironclad Carondelet, volunteered to run his ship past the
enemy batteries. Foote was skeptical but gave his permis-
sion. Despite a harrowing journey, Walke made it, and his
example inspired a second run by the Pittsburg two nights
later. The two gunboats then escorted the army of Major
General John Pope across the river to the Confederate

the British that they began planning a new
class of steam warships of their own.
Southerners complained that the
Merrimacks were so large (they drew more
than 23 feet) they were unable to operate
in shallow Southern ports. In 1856,
therefore, President Franklin Pierce’s
Navy Secretary, James C. Dobbin, went
back to Congress to urge the construction
of another new class of warships: smaller,
shallower-draft steam sloops, and the first
U.S. Navy warships to have twin screws.
The ships were named for American
cities. The first and the namesake of the
class was the Hartford, which during the
Civil War became famous as the flagship
of David Glasgow Farragut. (The others
were the Richmond, Brooklyn, Pensacola,
and Lancaster.) Launched in 1858, the
Hartford drew only 18 feet of water,
which allowed her and her sister ships
to enter most Southern ports where the
bigger Merrimacks could not go. This
pleased Southerners, though once the
war started they were less pleased. During
the conflict, the Hartford, as well as the
Richmond and Brooklyn, would steam up
the Mississippi to Vicksburg and fight her
way into Mobile Bay.
The same year the Hartford was
launched, Congress appropriated money
for yet a third type of new steam warships.
The first of these screw steamers, the
Mohican, was launched only a year later,
in 1859. (The others were the Pawnee,
Wyoming, Iroquois, Dacotah, Seminole, and
Narragansett.) Though these smaller ships
also carried masts and spars, their sail
pattern was much reduced, and they were
the first warships in American history to be
classified as genuine steam warships rather
than auxiliary steamers.
Thus it was that between 1854 and
1859—that is, between the Kansas-
Nebraska Act and John Brown’s raid
on Harpers Ferry—the U.S. Congress
authorized funds for three new classes
of steam-powered, propeller-driven
warships, as well as a handful of others—24
altogether. These timely appropriations
enlarged and modernized the U.S. Navy so
that it can be fairly argued that the service
was better prepared for war in 1861 than for
any previous war.

32 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

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rear to achieve a nearly bloodless victory. It was a model He did not have to; Grant could not order it. But porter’s
of effective joint operations. Neither the Army nor the gunboats nevertheless steamed through heavy Confederate
Navy working alone could have pulled it off, but working gunfire on 16 April and subsequently escorted Grant’s army
together they made it look easy. across the river. After a harrowing march into Mississippi,
several battles, and a 47-day siege, Vicksburg fell on 4 July.
From the Crescent City to Vicksburg
Once again, Grant could not have done it without the Navy,
That same month, 500 miles to the south as the river nor could porter have had done it without Grant. It was a
flows, Flag Officer David Glasgow Farragut ran his ocean- case of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts.
going warships past the forts on the lower Mississippi that Cooperation proved essential, too, in the Union effort
protected the city of New Orleans. Farragut’s feat was par- to close down the last of the important Confederate ports
ticularly significant because the Rebel fortifications were along the Atlantic coast: Charleston, Mobile, and Wilm-
not quickly erected dirt-and-log forts, like those at port ington. At each of these places a joint effort was essential
Royal or Island Number Ten, but large masonry structures; to Union success, though cooperation was more evident at
between them, Fort Jackson
(on the western bank) and
Fort St. philip (on the east-
ern side) boasted a total of
128 heavy guns. Neverthe-
less, on 24 April Farragut’s
wooden oceangoing warships
steamed through an open-
ing cut in a log-and-chain
boom across the Mississippi
and took the forts under
fire. Fourteen of the vessels
successfully ran the gauntlet
against the river’s current,
and easily dispatched the
small squadron of Confeder-
ate warships that came out
to contest their passage, Far-
ragut proceeded up to New LIBRARY OF CONGReSS

Orleans, anchored off Jack- Sailors and stevedores on Baton Rouge’s riverfront wait to coal Rear Admiral David G. Farragut’s sea-
son Square, and demanded going warships, at anchor in the background. Farragut took his fleet up the Mississippi past Vicksburg
the city’s surrender. New before it helped subdue the Confederacy’s last bastion on the river, Port Hudson, Louisiana.
Orleans was the largest city • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
and most important seaport
in the Confederacy, and its fall so early in the war was a some venues than others. Bickering between Union Army
tremendous blow to Southern hopes. and Navy commanders at Charleston continued throughout
With command of the lower Mississippi, Farragut steamed a siege that lasted more than two years, and in the end, the
upriver past Baton Rouge to Vicksburg. But he could not city fell only when it was threatened by Sherman’s army
capture the city. As Farragut’s foster-brother Commander marching north from Savannah in February 1865.
David Dixon porter archly noted, ships “cannot crawl up The Union assault on Mobile, Alabama, was also a joint
hills 300 feet high.” As at Island Number Ten, the key to operation, though the city was effectively neutralized as
eventual Union success at Vicksburg was the cooperation a haven for blockade runners when Farragut damned the
of Union Army and Navy commanders. Fortuitously, the torpedoes and ran past Fort Morgan into Mobile Bay on
triumvirate of Grant, Sherman, and porter, who took com- 5 August 1864. In December 1864, the first joint Union
mand of the Mississippi Squadron of gunboats in September assault on Fort Fisher, which guarded the port of Wilming-
1862, proved to be a model of cooperation, especially when ton, North Carolina, failed in large part because of mistrust
contrasted with the confusion and disagreement that char- between the Union Army and Navy commanders, Major
acterized the Confederate high command in the West. General Benjamin Butler and now–Rear Admiral porter.
In April 1863, when Grant asked porter to run his squadron However, a second attempt in January 1865, with Major
past the Vicksburg batteries, the naval officer agreed to do it. General Alfred H. Terry replacing Butler, proved successful.

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 33

 War on the High Seas
The third element of the Union naval effort in the Civil
War was its pursuit of Confederate commerce raiders such
as the Alabama, Florida, and Shenandoah. Initially, Jefferson
Davis sought to attack Yankee merchant shipping by issuing
letters of marque to Southern privateers. But the experi-
ment was short-lived simply because the combination of the
Union blockade and the British declaration of neutrality
eliminated most ports where prizes could be sent for adjudi-
cation and condemnation. Without the opportunity to make
a profit, the whole raison d’être for privateering disappeared.
Consequently, commerce raiding was left to Confederate
Navy warships that were built or purchased in England and
manned by international crews. The most successful of these
was the Alabama, commanded by Captain Raphael Semmes.
SHENANDOAH SuRReNdeRS, BY E.D. WALkER, WWW.EDWALkERMARINE.COM
The CSS Shenandoah, last of the Rebel commerce raiders, returns to Liverpool, england, to sur-
render. Although they bouyed Southern morale, Confederate cruisers could not challenge the u.S.
Navy’s superiority at sea and failed to seriously damage Northern maritime commerce.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Over the course of two years (July 1862–June 1864) Semmes
and the Alabama captured and burned no fewer than 64
Union merchant ships and sank one Union warship, the
Hatteras. Northern merchants were horrified by the success
of these “pirates,” as they were called in the Northern press.
The New York Chamber of Commerce pressed Welles to
establish convoys to protect American shipping. Convoys
might well have worked, but the concept was unpopular
with professional Navy men, and Navy Secretary Welles
rejected the idea. He could not inaugurate a convoy system
without weakening the blockade, which he considered more
important. Instead, he sent out fast, heavily armed ships to
try to hunt down the raiders, a strategy that mostly proved
frustrating and ineffectual. Nevertheless, Union warships did
capture or destroy two of the most notorious raiders in 1864.
34
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One was the Alabama. In a classic ship-to-ship duel on 19
June, the Kearsarge, commanded by Captain John Winslow,
sank the raider off Cherbourg, France. In October the Wa-
chusett, under Commander Napoleon Collins, captured the
Florida in the neutral port of Bahia, Brazil. The sinking of the
Alabama triggered unalloyed celebration in the North, but
the seizure of the Florida caused some embarrassment. Col-
lins had flagrantly attacked the Florida in a neutral port, and
for that he was subsequently found guilty at a court-martial
and sentenced to be dismissed from the Navy. Months later,
however, after tempers had cooled and the war had ended,
he was quietly restored to duty.
The last of the Rebel raiders was Commander James I.
Waddell’s CSS Shenandoah. After savaging the North’s Pa-
cific whaling fleet in the spring and summer of 1865, Wad-
dell learned that the war had
ended in May. Fearing reprisal
for the captures he had made
after that, he directed the
Shenandoah back to England,
where her flag was hauled
down in November 1865, the
last Confederate surrender of
the war.
The Union did not win the
Civil War because of its naval
superiority, but it was an im-
portant element in the victory.
The blockade created shortages
and hardship within the Con-
federacy and effectively cut off
the nascent nation from the
rest of the world. The Navy
was a full partner in the stra-
tegically important victories in
the Western theater that split
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • the Confederacy nearly in half.
For all their success, the hand-
ful of Rebel commerce raiders could not threaten Union naval
superiority or change the war’s outcome. In the end, despite
such innovations as ironclads, mines, and even a submarine,
the South simply found itself overmatched at sea.
1. Craig L. Symonds, The Civil War at Sea (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), p. 34.
2. Craig L. Symonds, “The Economics of Civil War: Money, Manufacturing, and
Commerce,” in Harold Holzer, ed., Lincoln and New York (New York: New-York
Historical Society, 2009), p. 87.
3. “Can Fort Sumter be Taken?” New York Tribune, reprinted in Washington Con-
stitution, 14 January 1861.
4. John D. Hayes, “The Battle of Port Royal, S.C. from the Journal of John
Sanford Barnes, October 8 to November 9, 1861,” The New-York Historical Society
Quarterly (October 1961), 45:379.
5. Symonds, The Civil War at Sea, pp. 54–57.
6. Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running in the Civil War
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), p. 226.
7. William H. Roberts, Now for the Contest: Coastal and Oceanic Naval Operations in
the Civil War (Lincoln, NE: 2004), p. 164; Symonds, The Civil War at Sea, p. 58.
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 LINCOLN’S
‘Father Neptune’
BY CRAIG L. SYMONDS

36 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

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Noted for his eccentricities and blunt
judgments, Gideon Welles proved to be a
surprisingly adept chief administrator of the
Navy during the Civil War.
G
ideon Welles was an important political
figure in Connecticut, serving as postmaster
of Hartford and editor of the Hartford Times
and Hartford Evening Press. But President
Abraham Lincoln appointed him Secretary
of the Navy primarily because of political geography. In
those days it was considered essential that each region of
the country be represented in the Cabinet, and Lincoln
selected Welles as the New England representative over
Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts, who was the other
contender. As a consolation prize, Banks was appointed a
major general, though he subsequently proved to be a very
disappointing one.
Welles’ appointment was not universally popular. When
the New York political operative Thurlow Weed learned of it,
he told the President that if he really wanted “an attractive
figure-head, to be adorned with an elaborate wig and luxuri-
ant whiskers,” he could easily “transfer it from the prow of a
ship to the entrance of the Navy Department” and it would
prove “quite as serviceable” as Welles. Lincoln deflected the
mean-spirited taunt by replying, “Oh, wooden midshipmen
answer very well in novels, but we must have a live secretary
of the navy.” Similarly, when the 40-year Navy veteran Cap-
tain Samuel Francis Du Pont learned of Welles’ appointment,
he wrote to a fellow officer that the best thing he could say
about the new Secretary was that when Welles had served as
the chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing, he had
“made a remarkable contract for cheese.”1
Over the years, those kinds of flippant assessments have
encouraged historians to dismiss Welles as a cartoonish
character—a voluble, sputtering, quick-tempered arriviste
who was little more than a figurehead at the Navy Depart-
ment, where the important decisions were supposedly made
by the assistant secretary, former naval officer Gustavus V.
Fox. Such a conclusion is both misleading and unfair to
Welles. In fact, he was earnest, candid, hard-working, loyal,
and remarkably successful in managing the greatest naval
expansion in the nation’s history until World War II. In
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Although his mismatched wig and beard helped make him the
subject of snickers, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was a
savvy power broker who had more experience in naval matters
when he came into office than any of his predecessors. During
the Mexican War he had served as chief of the Navy’s Bureau of
Provisions and Clothing.
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011
testimony to that, Welles was one of only two
men, Secretary of State William H. Seward
being the other, to hold his Cabinet position
throughout Lincoln’s presidency and into the
Johnson administration.
The origins of the negative appraisals of
Welles’ tenure as Navy Secretary are easy
to identify. For one thing, he looked eccentric. As Weed
noted, he had “luxuriant whiskers”—a full, bushy white
beard that no doubt contributed to Lincoln’s nickname for
him, “Father Neptune,” and he wore an elaborate shoul-
der-length wig. Welles had purchased it some years earlier
when he first began to lose his hair. At that time his beard
was still brown and only slightly tinged with gray, and he
bought a wig to match. When his whiskers turned to white,
his Yankee thrift apparently prevented him from buying a
new wig, so that by the time he became Secretary of the
Navy, the difference between the lustrous brown hair and
snow white beard was jarring. Moreover, when at his desk,
Welles had a tendency to push the wig back on his head
as he worked, and on other occasions it rested crookedly
on his head, which gave him a comical look. Those who
found Welles too blunt or insufficiently cooperative seized
on such details to portray him as a clown.
In addition, Welles not only spoke his mind freely, he
did so without much regard for the popular view of the day
or the personal feelings of others. There was little nuance
in Welles’ worldview: On most issues he saw things as either
manifestly right or utterly wrong, and he did not spare those
who either were wrong (in his view) or attempted to tempo-
rize. He found the dithering Major General Henry W. Hal-
leck and the hesitant Major General George B. McClellan
contemptible, and he said so. His judgmental attitude earned
him many enemies, but it also won him the gratitude of the
President, who appreciated Welles’ candor and counted on
his Secretary of the Navy to be honest and straightforward,
even if Lincoln did not always accept his views.
For both his eccentricity and his candor, Welles was
often a target of opposition newspapers. During the Civil
War, newspapers made no pretense of being neutral report-
ers of events, and instead openly championed one politi-
cal party or the other. In New York City the Democratic
paper was the New York Herald. Editor James Gordon Ben-
nett routinely attacked the Lincoln administration on the
grounds of perceived inefficiencies, particularly targeting
• • • • • • • • • •
Welles’ Navy Department. Every time a Rebel ship made
it through the blockade or a Confederate commerce raider
seized a Union merchantman, Bennett trumpeted it as an-
other failure of Welles’ Navy Department. During the ram-
page by the CSS Alabama in 1863, Bennett wrote that her
success as a commerce raider was evidence of “the neglect,
the carelessness, the incompetency, and the utter imbecility
of the Navy Department.” By humiliating Welles, Bennett
37

NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND
A cartoon in the 31 August 1861 issue of Harper’s Weekly depicts Welles as Rip Van Winkle.
While the Secretary sleeps and a U.S. Navy tub lolls in the background, blockade runners make about nepotism and peculation
off with loads of cotton and cigars.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
hoped to embarrass the Lincoln administration and pro-
mote the interests of New York Democrats.2
A
ll those circumstances contributed to a historical
view of Gideon Welles that emphasizes his ec-
centricity and undervalues his contributions to
victory, even though those contributions were many and
substantive. Despite unprecedented difficulties, Welles
played a central, even a crucial, role in virtually every
aspect of the naval war. He supervised the expansion of
the Navy from 42 warships in 1861 to 671 ships by 1865;
he authorized and organized the strategic planning for the
deployment of that armada; he was an early and consis-
tent advocate of innovation, especially the acquisition of
armored warships; and he oversaw the promotion (and
dismissal) of key Navy leaders. In each of these roles he
remained his uncompromising, blunt self and was conse-
quently a target for critics, but in each case he faced down
the criticism and emerged justified.
Welles’ first great task was to enlarge the Navy. Despite
the two dozen steam warships that had been built in the
last decade before the war, Lincoln’s blockade declaration
on 19 April 1861 meant that the prewar Navy would have
to be hugely expanded. To accomplish that, Welles im-
mediately did three things: order home all the ships on
distant station patrol; authorize the construction of 23 new
steam warships (the original 90-day wonders), doing so
38
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without congressional approval
in the hope that Congress would
approve his decision after the
fact, which it did; and begin a
program to purchase merchant
ships and convert them into
men-of-war. The latter proved,
by far, to be the Union Navy’s
most prolific source of new war-
ships, and in the end, 418 of
the Navy’s 671 combatants were
converted merchantmen.
The man Welles selected as
the Navy’s purchasing agent for
the ships was his brother-in-law
George D. Morgan, who had
carte blanche to buy whatever
vessels he believed suitable, and
to pocket generally a 2½-percent
commission for every ship he
bought. Naturally, the arrange-
ment provoked sharp criticism
in the opposition newspapers, es-
• • pecially Bennett’s New York Her-
ald. The chairman of the Senate
Naval Affairs Committee, John P. Hale, insisted it was simple
graft and corruption, and announced congressional hearings.
Hale’s motive was political: He was angered that Welles
had not granted enough government contracts to Hale’s
friends and political allies, and he hoped to secure Welles’
dismissal. His plan was derailed when he could not turn up
any actual examples of fraud or corruption. Morgan bought
some 89 ships for the government at a cost of $3.5 million, a
bargain at an average of $40,000 per vessel. Morgan thereby
earned commissions of some $70,000, a huge sum in 1861.
Embarrassed by that and by the public outcry, Morgan of-
fered to return all the money, but Welles would not hear
of it. Characteristically, his view was that a contract was a
contract and Morgan was entitled to every penny.3
Welles also established the first naval strategy board in
American history. Aware that establishing a blockade meant
more than simply sending warships one at a time down to
anchor off one or another Southern harbor, the Navy Sec-
retary called together a panel of experts headed by Captain
Du Pont, with instructions to establish organizing principles
for the blockade and the management of the saltwater war.
The report of the committee led to the creation of the four
blockading squadrons; the seizure of Port Royal, South Caro-
lina, in November 1861; and eventually the establishment
of a Union foothold all along the Rebel coast.4
Welles actively promoted the Navy’s first ironclads.
Only a few months into the war, it had become evident
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
that the Confederates in Norfolk were converting the for- He did not, however, criticize Lincoln, whose only weak-
mer U.S. steam frigate Merrimack into an iron-armored ness, Welles believed, was that he was too tenderhearted
battery. Though veteran officers tended to be skeptical of to protect himself from the many charlatans who tried to
the dangers posed by such a warship, Welles decided it was take advantage of his generosity and compassion. Welles
essential to develop a counterweapon. He asked Congress cast himself in the role of Lincoln’s protector against such
for an appropriation of $1.5 million for the construction of “schemers,” a group that, in Welles’ view, included both
three experimental ironclad warships, and issued a call for Seward and Stanton. Of the former, Welles wrote that the
proposals. By the end of the summer, a score of designs had Secretary of State was “assuming, presuming, meddlesome,
been submitted to the Ironclad Board, composed of three and uncertain,” that he had “no great original conceptions
officers. The officers themselves, all very senior Navy cap- of right, nor systematic ideas of administration,” and that
tains, tended to favor the proposals that looked most like he was “a trickster” who sought to take advantage of Lin-
the ships they already knew and understood. But with Lin- coln’s “wonderful kindness of heart.”5
coln’s support, Welles ensured
that one of the designs selected
was John Ericsson’s for the ves-
sel that eventually became the
Monitor.
After the Monitor’s success
against the Virginia in Hamp-
ton Roads on 9 March 1862,
Welles became an enthusiastic
champion of ironclads, and es-
pecially ironclads of the Monitor
type, characterized by a rotating
turret. Indeed, Welles’ commit-
ment to those ugly ducklings of
the naval war very likely led
the Union to overlook alter-
nate designs that might have U.S. SENATE COLLECTION

proved equally successful or In a painting of President Abraham Lincoln presenting the preliminary Emancipation
even better. That blind spot Proclamation to his Cabinet, Welles sits to the President’s immediate left, across the table from
led him to reject the assessment administration rival Secretary of State William H. Seward. A second Welles opponent, Secretary
of Du pont, then commanding of War Edwin M. Stanton, sits to Lincoln’s right.
the South Atlantic Blockading • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Squadron, that “monitors” were
not a kind of magic bullet that would allow him to steam For all his eccentricities, including his mismatched wig,
triumphantly into Charleston Harbor and put the city blunt and judgmental assertions, and unapologetic standard
under his guns. for promotion and recognition, Welles proved to be a re-
sponsible and reliable administrator whose contributions to

T
hanks to Welles, we know as much as we do
about the inner workings of the Lincoln Cabinet.
Throughout his years as head of the Navy Depart-
ment, he kept a careful record of each day’s events. He
was even more candid in his private diary than he was in
his public conversation, and since the publication of the
diary 50 years ago, it has provided historians with a rich
supply of insider observations about Lincoln, his Cabinet,
and the generals and admirals who ran the war. Welles did
not suffer fools of any rank, and he wrote scathingly about
his Cabinet rivals (especially Secretary of State Seward
and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton), Army generals
(especially Halleck and McClellan), and, of course, the
senior officers of the Navy.
Union victory are often underappreciated.
1. Thurlow Weed, The Life of Thurlow Weed (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1883),
vol. 1, p. 611; Du pont to Samuel Mercer, 13 March 1861, in Samuel Francis Du
Pont: A Selection from his Civil War Letters, edited by John D. Hayes (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University press, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 42–43. The best biography of Welles
is John Niven, Gideon Welles: Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy (New York: Oxford
University press, 1973).
2. The New York Herald, 9 October 1863.
3. Craig L. Symonds, Lincoln and his Admirals (New York: Oxford University
press, 2008), pp. 57–59; Craig L. Symonds, The Civil War at Sea (Santa Barbara,
CA: praeger, 2009), p. 35.
4. Kevin Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral: the Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia press, 2005), pp. 106–24; Stephen R.
Taaffe, Commanding Lincoln’s Navy: Union Naval Leadership during the Civil War
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute press, 2009), pp. 225–29.
5. Gideon Welles, The Diary of Gideon Welles, ed. by Howard K. Beale (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1960), entry of 16 September 1863, vol. 1, pp. 134–35. See
also Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward (New York: Sheldon, 1874).

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 39

 Suggestions for Further Civil War Reading
A fter decades of neglect, the naval
aspects of the Civil War are at last
getting a lot of serious attention from his-
torians. In addition to old standards such
as Virgil Carrington Jones’ three-volume
The Civil War at Sea (Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1960–62), published 50 years
ago during the centennial of the war, there
are a number of newer works that focus
on the naval war.
These include Ivan
Musicant’s Divided
Waters: The Naval
History of the Civil
War (HarperCollins,
1995), and Spencer
Tucker’s Blue & Gray
Navies: The Civil
War Afloat (Naval
Institute Press, 2006).
A recent shorter his-
tory is my own book
T h e C i v i l Wa r a t
Sea (Praeger, 2009).
Lincoln’s role in the
naval war is covered in my 2008 book
Lincoln and his Admirals: Abraham Lincoln,
The U.S. Navy, and the Civil War (Oxford
University Press, 2008), which won the
2009 Lincoln Prize.
Stephen R. Taaffe investigates the
Union high command and its manage-
ment of the Navy in Commanding Lincoln’s
Navy: Union Naval Leadership during the
Civil War (Naval Institute Press, 2009),
and Michael Bennett studies the lower
deck in his book Union Jacks: Yankee
40
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By Craig L. Symonds
Sailors in the Civil War (University of
North Carolina Press, 2004). The best
general history of the Confederate Navy
is by Raimondo Luraghi: A History of the
Confederate Navy (Naval Institute Press,
1996).
The war’s role as a technological water-
shed has not been overlooked. For Union
ironclads see William H. Roberts,
Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and
Industrial Mobilization (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2002), and for Confederate
ironclads see William N. Still Jr., Iron Afloat:
The Story of the Confederate Armorclads
(Vanderbilt University Press, 1971; reprinted
University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
The best book on the role of the submarine
H. L. Hunley is Tom Chaffin’s The H. L.
Hunley: The Secret Hope of the Confederacy
(Hill & Wang, 2008).
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
For the blockade, Robert Browning
covers the history of the Union effort in
two books: From Cape Charles to Cape
Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading
Squadron during the Civil War (University
of Alabama Press, 1993), and Success Is
All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic
Blockading Squadron during the Civil War
(Brassey’s, 2002).
Stephen A. Wise
covers the Southern
side of the story
in Lifeline of the
Confederacy: Blockade
Running during the
Civil War (University
of South Carolina
Press, 1988).
For the war on
t h e We s t e r n r i v -
ers, the best general
study is still John D.
Milligan, Gunboats
Down the Mississippi
(Naval Institute Press,
1949, reprint 1990). But see also the spe-
cialized campaign studies by B. Franklin
Cooling—Forts Henry and Donelson: The
Key to the Confederate Heartland (University
of Tennessee Press, 1987)—and Chester
Hearn—The Capture of New Orleans,
1862 (Louisiana State University Press,
1995). The best one-volume study of the
Vicksburg campaign is by Michael Ballard:
Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened the
Mississippi (University of North Carolina
Press, 2004).
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 Cavity

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www.downmagaz.com
 By Vladimir mandel

A conscript naval officer looks back on his service in a bygone era—

a revealing portrait of everyday life in a Soviet destroyer.

M
y service in the Soviet navy came about neither by
choice nor chance, for during the Cold War, con-
scription was a rite of passage, of sorts, for every
able-bodied male in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. At age 19 all were required to regis-
ter for—and eventually undergo—some form of military
training. It started while one yet was in school; active-duty
service came later. There were variations in the service
programs, but in general one could expect to serve two to
three years in the military.
Thus there were no enlistees among the navy’s sea-
men; everyone was a conscript. After completing his
service as a conscript—what Americans would call a
draftee—a young man could, if deemed
qualified, sign a contract to remain in the
navy as a (noncommissioned) petty officer
or as a midshipman, the equivalent of an
ensign in the U.S. Navy. Thereafter he
would move up the promotion ladder based on growth in
professional competence. The standard career for such
individuals was 25 years.
In that era the Soviet navy had two types of officers.
One group was the contract careerists, those who chose
to make the naval service their life’s work. The other was
made up of reservists. The majority in the latter group were
young men with some level of higher education. After mili-
tary training and usually some advanced coursework they’d
be demobilized—with the caveat that as reserv-
ists they would be recalled to active duty as
their talents were required.
I fell into the second category. In my
adolescence and young adulthood—the
1960s—the Cold War came in waves. I
was caught up in one of those waves in

42 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

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1966, when, after university graduation, I started my navy
service as a conscript in the Black Sea Fleet. It was but a
12-month tour, which included some specialized training.
Then I was designated a reserve officer and demobilized. A
civilian again, I went to work in a research institute, but
I was recalled to active duty in August 1969. I was 28. I
served as a lieutenant (junior grade), and then lieutenant,
until August 1972.  officers, realizing that there was no way out, and that this
Divergent Paths for Officers
The life of a career Soviet naval officer often was
tough—all the more so when he was stationed at a re-
mote base. The normal shortcomings of shipboard life were
made worse through so-called “organizing” or “disciplin-
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR
The author (left), a lieutenant in the Soviet navy, on
the deck of his ship, the Komsomolets Ukrainy, as she
cruises alongside the USS W. S. Sims (DE-1059) in the
Mediterranean Sea in 1972. So-called “battle duty” for
ships of the Black Sea Fleet at the time mostly entailed
attempts to detect U.S. Navy submarines and tracking the
activity of U.S. carriers in the region.
ary” periods—special drills ordered by senior officers. It was
the considered opinion of most that the only purpose such
exercises served was exhausting everyone, including the
upper echelon. Shore leave was limited, part of a general
policy of keeping young officers on board as much as pos-
sible. It commenced at 2200 hours and expired at 0800 the
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011
next day, in time for the flag-raising ceremony. Factoring
in travel time and the hope for a decent night’s sleep, very
little time was left to spend with family or friends. Addi-
tionally, at many bases living conditions ashore were very
difficult because of a chronic
shortage of apartments.
Of course, there also were the
normal problems of shipboard
life. Some crewmen were not
of high caliber—undisciplined,
The Soviet destroyer
Komsomolets Ukrainy, in which
the author served from 1969 to
1972. She was the first of the
Kashin-class destroyers, which
were powered by gas-turbine
engines and armed with guns,
missiles, and torpedoes. The
author recalls her as being very
seaworthy, but cramped, noisy,
and plagued by vibration.
recalcitrant, or otherwise unfit
for military service. The real-
life conditions in a ship were quite a contrast with the
romantic dreams that many young men had had about the
illustrious, glorious life of a naval officer. Young careerist
would be their life for the next 25 years, became appre-
hensive about the future, and often depressed. The only
way to be discharged—aside from medical reasons—was
to do something truly infamous, a course of action that
most found morally unacceptable. All such troubles could
be multiplied of course, if a ship’s first lieutenant (execu-
tive officer) was draconian in his leadership. In short, the
atmosphere and conditions were not good—in some cases
leading to alcoholism among officers.
For reservists the situation was different. After three years
of service, generally, we could return to civilian life and pur-
sue civilian careers. We felt that essentially we were civilians,
not military men. “Three-years-and-out” was not a guaran-
tee, however. It was not unheard of for a reservist to be kept
on active duty for 25 years, just like a careerist. Indeed, while
I was on active duty rumors surfaced that my year-group of
reservists would be ordered to serve for 25 years. So I remem-
ber particularly well the moment in 1972, when Admiral
Nikolay Nikolayevich Amelko—on board and participating
in an informal wardroom conversation—remarked, “Well,
this year we will say goodbye to Lieutenant Mandel, as his
service term ends soon.” I had learned straight from the ad-
miral himself that the rumors were not true; my reservist
43
 group would be allowed to leave the
service on schedule! Captain Valery Grishanov,
the commanding officer of
Rebuilding the Soviet Navy the Komsomolets Ukrainy,
instructs his crew before
Regardless of our status, regular or deployment in February 1970.
reservist, the Cold War decades of the Although he was the son of
1960s and 1970s kept us busy. Previous a high-ranking admiral in
reductions in the force levels through- the Soviet navy, Grishanov
out the Soviet military had been made never assumed the airs of the
in an atmosphere of political turmoil— privileged or received any
not well thought out and frequently special favors or treatment, the
in an unreasonable manner. A large author says.
number of distinguished and experi-
enced personnel had been thrown out
of military life. Many aircraft and ships were decommissioned
and destroyed. Military training institutions were closed, their
young graduates discharged from active duty. Many military
cadets became students in civil institutions.
Following Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s “ballistic missile
bluff” during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Soviet
leadership became determined to establish more realistic
requirements for the armed forces in preparation for a new
phase of the Cold War. The time had come to turn over a
new leaf. The need for corrective measures was understood.
A national effort to upgrade the armed forces was launched.
That was not the first large-scale buildup in the history
of the Soviet navy. In the late 1930s many new ships were
built and commissioned in a short period preceding World
War II. The navy recruited skippers from the merchant
fleet. My father, in fact, was drafted from the merchant
service for military duty in 1941 and commanded a mine-
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sweeper during the siege of Sevastopol in 1941-42.
The heroes of that era included Alexander Ivanov-
ich Marinesko, the submariner who torpedoed the
Wilhelm Gustloff, and Nikolai Alexandrovich Lunin,
who attacked the Tirpitz. They are still well remem-
bered, along with the likes of Aleksey Mikhailovich
Matayasevich, a captain renowned for his polar ex-
ploits, later the commander of the submarine Lembit.
But the effort to upgrade the armed services in the
1960s was complicated by a lack of manpower, a de-
mographic legacy of World War II. Additionally, there
was an acute shortage of noncommissioned and middle-
rank commissioned officers, a direct result of Marshal
Georgy Zhukov’s mid-1950s cancellation of benefits
for sergeants and petty officers who had signed on for
contract service.
The personnel shortages forced a lowering of standards.
Thus it was not uncommon for personnel in the lower
ranks to have criminal histories or be ill-educated. Inci-
dents of maltreatment and extreme hazing in the ranks
rose. The image of the armed forces suffered. More tangible
evidence of the problem manifested itself in incidents such
as the loss of the destroyer Otvajny. She burned and sank
in 1974 in an accident attributed to crew incompetence.
Life in a Black Sea Fleet Destroyer
The government had begun taking remedial steps prior
to the Otvajny disaster, however. One was the organiza-
tion of schools for petty officers—the “chief technicians.”
The schools produced high-quality personnel in almost
all the military specialties. The second significant step of
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
the government was the calling up of reserve officers. The
maximum age for those call-ups was 28, and so by a mat-
ter of months I was still eligible in 1969. I was assigned to
the Komsomolets Ukrainy. She was the first ship of the new
Kashin-class destroyers, serving with the Black Sea Fleet.
The Kashins were equipped with artillery, missiles, tor-
pedoes, sonar, and ASW weapons that were excellent.
The gas-turbine engines provided reliable performance and
maneuverability. The ship was very seaworthy, ascending
waves well and having smooth and moderate pitching, con-
trolled by retractable stabilizers. In a violent storm in the
North Atlantic the inclination never exceeded 46 degrees.
Living conditions, however, were another story. She was
somewhat cramped and vibrated noticeably. A high level
of noise from gas turbines was constant. The mess area was
able to serve only about two-thirds of the crew simultane-
ously. That area doubled as a meeting room and theater.
Commissioned officers and warrant officers had separate
messes. The officers’ wardroom was ruled by the first lieu-
tenant, while the warrant officers’ wardroom was led by the
chief boatswain of the ship.
Medical care, however, was of high quality and under
the direction of Lieutenant Eugeny Chikin. He was a very
talented surgeon and on numerous occasions conducted
serious surgeries while at sea, using the wardroom as an op-
erating room. Chikin later became a chief surgeon of
the Black Sea Fleet and in the 1990s he performed
a sensational surgery, successfully saving the life of
an officer whose head had nearly been severed in
an auto accident.
A great deal of attention on board was given to
physical fitness and sports. No special day or holiday
gun cruiser Slava (formerly the Molotov) commissioned in
1941. She was one of six “semi-heavy” gun cruisers of the
Soviet navy, armed with a battery of nine 7.1-inch (180-
mm) guns. Those ships should have been designated heavy
cruisers because the gun bores exceeded six inches. How-
ever, in the Soviet navy they were considered light cruisers.
The Slava had her own special story. She was torpedoed
in 1942 by German He-111 torpedo-bombers or possibly
Italian torpedo boats—it was never determined definitively.
In the engagement, she lost her stern, which was hastily
replaced with a stern from an incomplete Chapayev-class
cruiser, the Frunze. The Frunze, of course, had different
hull lines. Attaching the new stern to the damaged ship
created some visible “steps,” both on the deck and in the
hull-plating of the Slava. It was quite obvious where the
transplanted foreign stern section met the hull of the dam-
aged cruiser, and a matter of some curiosity for those en-
countering those strange steps for the first time.
Manning a Man-of-War
The call-up of reserve officers for fleet service filled the
vacancies of navigators, communication officers, specialists in
electronics, and weapon systems—mostly artillery. Typically a
young officer coming on board had a month to learn the ship.

Soviet navy crews traditionally celebrated Army and

Navy Day with tug-of-war contests. Right: The KGB
officer of the Komsomolets Ukrainy (left) serves as
a judge for a competition involving the ship’s officers.
Of the political team on board the ship, the author
says, the KGB man was the only one possessing the
qualities of a good officer.

passed without a traditional naval competition—

usually a tug-of-war, with the winning team tradi-
tionally being awarded a huge pie. There also were
fleet sailing contests. The crewmen of the Komso-
molets Ukrainy’s boat—a six-oared yawl—kept it in
perfect order. For a considerable period they held
the Grand Prize of the Fleet.
Not all the Black Sea Fleet ships were “brand
new” like ours. Some were veterans of World War
II, with impressive records. Most had been modern-
ized in the 1950s and 1960s. One such ship was the
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 45
 During that time he would thoroughly study all compartments,
systems, and equipment. He had to learn the tactical and
technical data relating to the operation of the ship. He had to
examine all systems, rules, and manuals associated with dam-
age control. He had to become familiar with the ship’s service
schedules as well as the duties of a watch-stander. Only then,
after passing all the prescribed tests—a tough procedure—was
he assigned to watch-standing duties. The ship’s officers gener-
ally were keenly interested in successful and timely examina-
tions for a young officer. They supported and helped him; his
success meant an addition of another man to the duty roster.
Personnel were assigned positions according to their abili-
ties, health, and education. The best men—whether officers
or noncommissioned—were routinely sent to the communi-
cation, navigation, or radio divisions. Weapons systems re-
lied on the services of career technicians—contract warrant
officers and chief petty officers. (Our missile-systems expert
was Midshipman Tikhon Bagryantsev, whose son was, at the
time, a student at Sevastopol Higher Naval School. The son
eventually rose to the rank of captain. Sadly, he was the
senior officer in the submarine Kursk when she sank in the
Barents Sea in 2000. In the Soviet navy as elsewhere, sons
often followed in the steps of their fathers.) Great atten-
tion was paid to the tactical training of the officers. It was
directly supervised by the commanding officer and included
exercises in navigation as well as the study of operations and
characteristics of U.S. and NATO ships.
In 1969-71 our ship was commanded by Valery Grishanov,
the eldest son of a very high-ranking admiral, the head of
the Main Political Administration of the Soviet navy. De-
spite his father’s status, Captain Grishanov never received
46
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special benefits or privileges. He endured all the “hardships
and deprivations of military service” as the Soviet military
oath required. He knew the needs and interests of all of the
sailors and officers in his ship and was very dedicated and
helpful as members of the crew prepared for exams. But he
ran a tight ship in every respect. He subsequently rose to
admiral and served as deputy commander of the Soviet navy.
He died too young in 1996.
Relations between the
officers on the ship were
healthy, and in general a
spirit of friendship, humor,
Fishing in the Mediterranean
provided diversion and
entertainment for officers and
crew alike. The author (left)
and his comrades, including
the ship’s captain (center),
show off their catch in 1971.
Observing quietly at far right is
the ever-watchful KGB officer.
and goodwill prevailed. At
meetings and “debriefings,”
which usually took place be-
fore dinner, those guilty of
some dereliction or mishap received their fair share of proper
admonishment from the commanding officer or first lieuten-
ant. Then, relieved and cheerfully enthusiastic, all joined the
common dinner. In the wardroom there was a piano and we
often watched movies. Dominoes, chess, and backgammon
also were popular in our spare time, but card games met with
disapproval and could be played only in secret.
The crew was essentially international, in a way, coming
from all the corners of the Soviet Union. I had under my
supervision Sailors from Lithuania to Vladivostok and from
Severodvinsk to Yerevan. Only men possessing a secondary
education could serve in my division (Connection and Ob-
servation). Being conscripts, they had spent almost a year in
a special training unit before stepping aboard the ship. Their
crewmates jokingly called them “the sailors’ aristocracy.”
Overall the ship embarked 27 officers and approximately 250
crew, making a total of 275-280 souls on board.
Battle Duty: Tracking the Enemy
In the 1960s the Soviet navy initiated a series of ex-
tended, long-range deployments—generally called “Battle
Duty.” The purpose was to show the flag and “ensure the
state interests of the USSR” around the globe. The Fifth
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 Operational Squadron was formed in the Mediterranean
comprising ships from the Black Sea, Baltic, and Northern
Soviet fleets, exchanging places as required to maintain
constant battle duty in the Mediterranean.
For ships’ crews, those deployment periods were the best
periods of service, despite being quite lengthy. In 1972, for
example, our ship once went without a port call for four
months, creating some uncomfortable conditions. How-
ever, it was always a pleasure to leave the main base in
Sevastopol with its senior officers and traditionally stern
commandant. We did not miss the tedious duties and for-
malities associated with shore stations. Service at sea with
the watch–break–watch routine went much faster. Every-
body was kept occupied with something real and necessary.
U.S. ships fared better than we did. They could use the
ports in Greece, Italy, and other NATO countries while we
were quite limited in that aspect. Our ships were always
on the move or anchored in the open sea, close to land.
Consequently, there were limited opportunities for neces-
sary repairs and routine maintenance. The crews became
tired. Shortages of fresh water occurred because of the lack
of power for desalinization plants. Crews could bathe only
when their ships rendezvoused with a large tanker for re-
fueling and receiving fresh water.
Weapon systems, on the other hand, always were kept
ready and properly maintained. Every ship, while on de-
ployment and cruising alone, also maintained around-the-
clock contact with headquarters in Moscow. For although
showing the Soviet flag ostensibly was our mission, in ac-
tuality we were, of course, attempting to detect and track
Foes, but Not Unfriendly
Naturally, as mariners any ship held strong interest for us,
particularly American vessels. When Soviet and U.S. ships
met at sea and cruised side by side, the commanders of the
U.S. ships often attempted to establish some form of com-
munication with our commanding officers. Usually, however,
the latter would cautiously retreat into the conning tower and
remain silent. Meanwhile, the crews in the two ships enjoyed
exchanging greetings and photographing each other. In those
spontaneous efforts at friendly contact, the U.S. Sailors be-
haved in a much more free and relaxed manner than ours—
who would be tense, looking over their shoulders to be sure
they were not earning the disapproval of the political officers.
That wariness was perhaps warranted. After all, those
fellows on the other ship were the enemy. Despite that, I
am comfortable in saying that our officers and crew never
expressed hate or hostility. Yes, we followed orders in a
professional manner, but did so without animosity—in part,
I think, because of the era. That was a time when many

Midshipman Tikhon Bagryantsev, a missile-systems expert, on the

quarterdeck of the Komsomolets Ukrainy circa 1970. His son
Vladimir was still in school at the time of this photo, but over the
years rose to the rank of captain. Tragically, he went down with his
submarine, the Kursk, when she sank in the Barents Sea in 2000.

America’s nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines.

They were considered the top strategic menace.
The aircraft carrier groups of the U.S. Navy and its
NATO allies were likewise regarded as serious threats, and
tracking them was a high priority as well. We knew that
their aircraft could carry and deliver nuclear weapons. An
important part of tracking a carrier, then, was to count all
aircraft launched and returned to her flight deck. If there
was a discrepancy in the number of those launched vs.
those that returned, we had a problem. Once, when we
were tracking the USS Forrestal (CVA-59) I believe, we
“lost” two A-4s that had launched, but by our count did
not return. That caused much concern. We later learned
that the A-4s had landed at a NATO airbase in Italy. Even
so, some in our crew received reprimands.
people remembered their experiences in World War II,
when the United States and the Soviet Union were allies
against Germany and Japan. The cordial inter-navy rela-
tions at the time are best illustrated anecdotally.
Two amusing incidents occurred while we were tracking
the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42).
One came on the first day of May—the official Labor Day
holiday in the Soviet Union. We were at anchor near the
Roosevelt in Italy when unexpectedly she weighed anchor
and headed out of the harbor. Naturally, we had no choice

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 47

 but to follow. As we did, we received a signal from the
Roosevelt: “Congratulations for the holiday. We apologize
for having to interrupt your vacation!”
On another occasion the big carrier sent us this signal:
“Today at 2200, your duty will be changed and you will be
ordered to proceed home. We have been pleased to cruise
together with you. Happy sailing!” A change in duty came as
news to us, but it was rather cheerfully welcomed. We then
contacted our headquarters seeking confirmation. In response
we got only silence. But then, precisely at 2200, we received
new orders from headquarters: We were to hand off our sur-
veillance of the Roosevelt to another ship and return home!
I also recall fondly how we met the flagship of the U.S.
Sixth Fleet—the cruiser USS Springfield (CLG-7) carrying
the flag of Vice Admiral Gerald Miller. As our ships cruised
side by side, we rendered a flag greeting, our crew lining
the railing on the upper deck. Our bugler played a signal
and our commanding officer and the other officers gave a
hand salute. The Springfield responded with a semaphore
message from Admiral Miller: “Thank you for the greeting!
It is always nice to see a sailor who is serving well!”
Two political developments also were at work at the time
and no doubt facilitated that atmosphere of friendly rivalry.
For one, it was the era of détente in Soviet-U.S. relations.
President Richard Nixon had visited Moscow and tensions
had eased considerably. On the other hand, in roughly the
same span of time Moscow’s relationship with China had
become increasingly strained. Starting as early as 1968,
in fact, political officers had been ordered to focus their
political propaganda on the Chinese. And in turn we had
then begun seeing a decline in anti-American propaganda.
Pervasive Propaganda and Politics
Incredible as it may seem to some Westerners, the time
and effort the Soviet navy devoted to ensuring maritime
security was nearly matched by its emphasis on political
indoctrination of ships’ crews. Marxist-Leninist “priest-
craft”—particularly the mindless task of note-taking on
Lenin’s works—often prevailed over professional military
training. The former was conducted by political officers
from different agencies who sometimes viewed each other
jealously and consequently did not work well together.
Three such officers were in our ship. They represented three
distinct levels of the Navy’s political structure: the Main Politi-
cal Administration, the Political Department of the Fleet, and
the Political Department of the Division of Ships. Each of the
officers carried an important-sounding title, but essentially their
shared task was conducting political and ideological indoctrina-
tion of the crew. A fourth political officer on board—from a
special department called Osobiy Otdel—was taken more seri-
ously. He was a senior operative from the navy’s branch of the
KGB—the Soviet Union’s state security apparatus.
48
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For some reason those of us in the navy—especially ship
crews—were subjected to less ideological indoctrination
than most Soviet military personnel. Even so, the politi-
cal officers were unpopular, for they produced unnecessary
paperwork and harassed the crew with boring, time-wasting
activities: political discussions, the study of Lenin, and per-
haps most annoying, specially prepared propaganda from
the media—rudimentary Marxist ideology that generally
was poorly written and intellectually insulting to any rea-
sonably educated man. In the eyes of officers and crew
those political fellows had little authority, and merited an
equal amount of respect. The KGB officer, on the other
hand, concerned himself mainly with treason. That elicited
some ironic and suspicious attitudes among the crew, but
interestingly, in his general qualities as an officer he dif-
fered favorably from his political-indoctrination comrades.
The main task of the political officers was to reveal and de-
bunk the evil nature of imperialism and its “atrocious fangs.”
Almost all world events were reviewed and presented in that
light, especially the contemporary war in Vietnam. However,
the “yakking parrots” were not only recognized exactly for what
they were by a generally well-educated and aware crew, the
political officers at times clumsily undermined their own efforts.
One such instance occurred as our ship transited the Black Sea
Strait. No one was allowed on the weather decks. The Deputy
Commander for Political Affairs then stationed himself on the
quarterdeck, armed with a pistol and a grenade—in case some
crewman tried to escape to the West by jumping overboard!
**********
Looking back I realize more than ever the one key dif-
ference between my service—that of a reserve—and that of
the career officers. For me and other reservists there were
hardships, yes, but there were special events that forged
fond memories of military service in a great ship. For the
career officers, however, such events became almost part
of a routine. They faced a long term of service, with all
of its attendant difficulties, problems, decisions, concerns,
and repetitive events. They served under arduous condi-
tions for extended periods. As my former first lieutenant
frequently comments today, it is difficult to persuade most
retired career officers to talk about their years of service, for
now they are simply tired. They prefer to forget the past,
which is understandable. They served the Soviet Union
honorably, and in most cases it just wore them out.
Many years have passed since the day my comrades and I
left the deck of the Komsomolets Ukrainy. Time has dimmed
many of the unpleasant memories of my naval service—things
that created irritation, frustration, and disapproval. But the
good memories and fond recollections—camaraderie, being
involved in something important, and making a contribution
to society—are brighter and more vivid than ever. Such is the
remarkable power of the human mind and spirit.
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
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C offee is a way of life for the American Sailor.
No other food or drink comes close to ap-
proximating its role in shipboard life. It is
the one constant—24/7/365.
Certainly there are many special memories
of sustenance in the Navy and Coast Guard psyche—bean
soup, steel beach barbecues, pizza at seaward Happy Hour
(mostly a Coast Guard tradition), Z-burgers, chipped beef on
toast (though SOS, as it is known, actually has Army ori-
The Tot of Rum—and How It Disappeared
Coffee, however, was not always the most popular drink
among American Sailors. The favorite had first been hard
spirits and beer. The early U.S. Navy, like every other navy
worthy of the name, had been modeled on Britain’s Royal
Navy. And of course that meant the daily tot of grog—rum
diluted with water. The British kept that tradition until 1970,
when it was determined that sophisticated electronics were
not well-attended by individuals with a Pusser’s Rum buzz.
gins), and holiday dinners.1 But by and large those are special
Rum, then, was an important staple of the U.S. Navy for
occasions. Coffee, on the other hand, is truly a daily ritual.
much of its existence. Captains were afforded great discretion
The Continental Congress declared coffee to be Amer-
in its distribution, and on occasion Kentucky bourbon was
ica’s national drink in the wake of the 1773 Boston Tea
employed. Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith, assuming the
Party, when the Sons of Liberty dumped English tea imports
office in 1801, substituted American-made sour mash for the
into Boston Harbor. That protest—of both excessive taxes
West Indies rum, and found that Yankee Sailors favored it.
and a government-engineered monopoly on the tea trade
But in 1862, during the Civil War, hard-liquor rations were
for the British East India Company—had actually been
discontinued. Two years later, General Order No. 29 put
spawned in a coffeehouse. Thus has coffee been prominent
restrictions on beer, ale, and wine; they could be brought
in the national identity since before there was a nation.
aboard only with the captain’s permission. A later regulation
Any reading of American military history, on land or
allowed officers to form their own wine messes, however, so
sea, from the time of the Revolution forward, indicates that
while it is not known precisely how permissive captains may
coffee has been at all times a supply necessity, invariably
have been, generally, in allowing drinking privileges to the
listed with the staples of flour, salt, and beef. Character-
crew, wine for officers at mealtime remained a customary and
istically, Commodore George Dewey’s flag captain in the
daily part of shipboard routine.
Olympia at Manila Bay—Captain Charles Gridley—in his
That all abruptly changed in 1914, during President
official report of the engagement on 1 May 1898, wrote in
Woodrow Wilson’s administration. His Secretary of the
the fourth sentence, amid other descriptions of final battle
Navy, Josephus Daniels—a teetotaler—issued General Order
preparations and approach to contact, “At 4 A.M. of May 1
No. 99, banning alcoholic beverages from all naval property,
coffee was served out to officers and men.” For he had to be
effectively abolishing even the sacred officers’ wine mess. It
prepared when Dewey uttered his famous phrase: “You may
was hardly a popular change, even with John Q. Public. The
fire when ready, Gridley.” Coffee was part of that readiness.
New York Tribune depicted Daniels, in cartoons, as “Admiral
Not surprisingly, references to coffee are prominent in
of the USS Grapejuice Pinafore.” A verse of an old Navy
the literature of the sea. The Victorian novels of R. M. Bal-
song, “The Armored Cruiser Squadron,” was parodied thusly:
lantyne and G. A. Henty own a good many references to
it. Roughly a century later, Captain Sam Lombard-Hobson
Josephus Daniels is a goose,
noted in his 1983 World War II memoir, A Sailor’s War,
If he thinks he can induce
there was nothing like strong coffee, “black as ink and hot
Us to drink his damn grape juice
as hell,” to keep the watch watchful on cold nights in the
In the Armored Cruiser Squadron.
North Atlantic. Coffee was and is important to operational
readiness—physically, psychologically, and even spiritually.
As one might expect, such cultural upheaval also spawned
numerous legends and tales, the authenticity of which is
often difficult to confirm. For example, perhaps because
Daniels’ name was for some time so closely associated with
ALL PHOTOS: U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE grape juice, a widely repeated anecdote has it that after
Sailors on the signal bridge of instituting his ban, the Secretary substituted grape juice
the cruiser USS Minneapolis in the wine messes—an action that lives on today in the
(CA-36) take a break for a form of the Navy’s omnipresent “bug juice.” Most of the
morning ritual—a hot cup sentiments applied to General Order No. 99 are lost to
of coffee—in August 1937. memory, however, and that is probably a good thing—given
The staple of shipboard life is Sailors’ capacity to get at the ribald heart of things.
important, the author contends, Yet another such link to Daniels persists in Navy lore. The
to operational readiness—physically, popular American slang for coffee—“a cup of Joe”—is held to
psychologically, and even spiritually. be an apt and direct association to the abstemious gentleman

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 51


who unwittingly had a hand in ushering in a new and even
greater drinking obsession. Regardless of that story’s verac-
ity, there can be no denying that while coffee had long
been an integral aspect of life in commissioned ships, the
banishment of alcohol made it an essential ritual. Coffee
replaced the daily rum tot (or the mealtime wine) with
numerous caffeine tots—all the day long.
Coffee, Coffee, Everywhere
Coffee has long been a democratic drink. Indeed, Eng-
land’s King Charles II called coffeehouses “seminaries of
sedition.”2 The U.S. Navy—and the American military in
general—seems always to have owned fewer inherent class
distinctions than foreign counterparts. In World War II it
was not uncommon for Allied sailors to comment on the
easier relationship between officers and enlisted men of the
American armed forces than in their own services. Coffee
had a hand in that.
Prior to the Civil War–era elimination of liquor rations
and Secretary Daniels’ 1914 ban on all alcohol, the tools of
relaxation were beer, rum, or bourbon for the lower deck and
wine for the officers. After 1914, it was—democratically—cof-
fee for all hands. An arbitrary distinction had been cast aside.
American Sailors, ever quick to espy and exploit an
opportunity to make a hard life of hard lying a bit easier,
made coffee messes afloat as prominent and omnipresent
as a Sailor’s knives, word passed over the 1MC, and errant
OODs being chewed out on the bridge wing by the Old
Man. By the time of World War II, there were coffeepots on
52
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Coffeepots and coffee cups are ubiquitous in Navy life
and can be found just about anywhere in any and every
ship. Left: Radioman 3rd Class J. E. Eicher kept his
cup handy while at work in 1948 in the USS Valley
Forge (CV-45). Below: Sea Service chiefs, according to
the author, always have the best coffee. In this October
1956 photo, Navy chiefs in the USS Radford (DDE-
446) relax in their quarters with some reading, cigarettes,
and—what else?—coffee.
the bridge, in the engine room, in CIC, in the boiler room,
in the ship’s office, in the supply office, in the armory, and
in the machine shop. Probably in other places, too.
In the vast buildup following the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the U.S. Navy quickly established its own coffee-roasting
plants in Oakland, California, and Brooklyn, New York.
Another was later established in Hawaii. The wartime
Navy took coffee quite seriously. Shortly after Pearl Har-
bor, most of Hawaii’s kona crop was purchased by the U.S.
Navy, in one of those cases where a young officer was told
to just get the job done and damn the lesser consequences.
Retired Coast Guard Chief Warrant Officer Fred Siegel,
whose “Fred’s Place” Web site unites Coast Guardsmen with
one another and links up with the wider armed forces com-
munity via www.military.com, has remarked on the fact that
so many sea stories seem to include coffee. One scribe on the
site wrote, typically: “For any sailor, coffee is a holy substance
blessed by King Neptune himself and gifted with the power
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 to jumpstart any watch-stander to a level of alertness that ensures success.
While engines run on diesel, I’m convinced that some boatswain’s mates
run only on coffee.”

In the End, What's Not to Like?

But it is not just the ubiquity of coffee around ships, and its stimulus
to watchfulness, that create its lore and welcome place among Sailors.
Consider the following:
• For a young officer to be invited into the chiefs’ mess for coffee is a
genuine mark of approval.
• Asked into the cabin—and then offered coffee—means that nothing
bad is about to happen to you.
• One’s own coffee mug in the wardroom is a sign of belonging.
• The quality of the coffee is always an opportunity for safe conversation.
• Amid a long and difficult evolution at sea, the serving of coffee is a testa-
ment to the seriousness of the endeavor, and the need for continued strength.
When that evolution has been completed, coffee is the celebratory drink.
• When a guest comes aboard and just cannot abide the strength of ship-
board coffee, it really is funny, providing a healthy feeling of superiority.
As Nicholas Monsarrat put it, “Sailors ought to be running the world.” 3
• Your hand around a hot mug on a cold and wet day is one of life’s quiet joys.
• When you are not sure which mission to tackle next, getting a “cuppa”
gives you time to think. Even the XO won’t begrudge you that.
Usually.
• The chiefs will always have the best coffee (as well as the
best of everything else). That is why they are chiefs. And, of
course, they don’t have the disparity of age and experience
that a wardroom has.

No matter how rotten the seaward day (or night) may

have been, coffee is a solace. George MacDonald Fra-
ser wrote, quite accurately, “That’s the hell-
ish thing about shipboard life—there is
nowhere to hide your carcass or your
nature.”4
But there is always a cup o’ Joe.

1. “Z-burger” is a service-academy term for

lunchtime hamburgers—a meal said to have a
guaranteed sleeping-pill effect for afternoon
classes. Its origin is the Coast Guard Acad-
emy, but it has made its way elsewhere—in-
cluding some restaurants in the South and
Secretary of the Navy Pacific Northwest.
2. In 1675 Charles II attempted to shut
Josephus Daniels in 1914 down England’s coffeehouses, fearing
banned alcohol from Navy they could spawn revolutionary activi-
ties. But the public outcry forced him
ships—medicinal use to rescind the order two days before it
excepted—inviting the was to take effect.
3. Nicholas Monsarrat, The Cruel
scorn of naval officers, Sea (Harmondsworth, England:
enlisted men, and even Penguin, 1956). Monsarrat served
as executive officer to Captain
the general public.
Sam Lombard-Hobson, aforemen-
tioned author of A Sailor’s War.
4. George MacDonald Fraser,
Flashman on the March (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 53

 Appalling
‘
An

Calamity’

By Noah aNdre Trudeau

Trouble brewing between Western powers in the Pacific was sidelined

by a fateful interruption—the Great Samoan Typhoon of 1889.

O n or about 13 March 1889, at a location in

the Pacific roughly 10° south latitude and
165° west longitude, the beast was born. No
one had charted its growth from a swirl of
winds to a tropical depression and then into
a tropical storm. At each stage it grew in size and acquired
more components of misery: towering cumulus and nimbus
clouds, increasingly steady strong winds, lengthening bursts
of torrential rains, and a tightening clockwise spiral. As it
toward a volcanic archipelago known as the Samoan Is-
lands—and contact with a second simmering storm that
was entirely of human making.
Two major powers were in a tense standoff regarding
which one would shape the future course of the Samoan
Islands. The crisis had its origins in the transformation
of the world’s navies from sail to steam. Steam engines
required lots of coal, and the Pacific’s vastness meant that
no warship could carry enough to cover its distances, so
expanded from a tropical storm into a full-fledged typhoon, hitherto inconsequential islands along the principal travel
it was moving on a southwesterly course, headed directly lanes suddenly became much prized as refueling stations.

54 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

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 Imperial Germany and the United States now vied
for influence over the islands, while Great Britain
was a most interested third-party observer.
Pacific Power Politics
The two powers meddled with the Samoan rul-
ing system, headed by a king selected by a major-
ity of the island chain’s five provincial leaders. By
1889 the Germans enjoyed direct control through
their candidate, Tamasese, while the United States
supported an exiled rival, Laupepa, and worked be-
hind the scenes to influence events. The Germans
backed their claimant with force. Beginning in
mid-August 1887, they stationed warships in the
small harbor serving the island chain’s administra-
tive center, Apia. Tensions between the two Sa-
moan sides erupted into something akin to a civil
war, with the resistance coalescing around a leader
named Mataafa. By March 1889, Germany and the
United States each had three warships anchored in
Apia Harbor. Relations were icily formal, although
several incidents came perilously close to igniting
a wider conflict.
The German ships present in Apia Harbor were
all sail/steam hybrids: the iron/wood composite
gunboat Adler, the iron-hulled gunboat Eber, and,
most powerful of the three, the 12-gunner Olga, a
2,424-ton corvette.
The biggest American warship on station was
also the most recent arrival, the 3,900-ton wooden-
hulled cruiser Trenton, mounting 15 guns and serv-
ing as the flagship for Rear Admiral Lewis Ashfield
Kimberly, commanding the U.S. naval force on pa-
cific Station. Next down in size was the 2,033-ton
screw sloop Vandalia. The 1,375-ton sloop Nipsic
rounded out the U.S. presence. The final major
player on the scene was the British observation
vessel HMS Calliope, a 2,770-ton iron- and steel-
sheathed cruiser armed with 16 guns. Also in Apia
Harbor were at least nine merchant vessels, mak-
ing things extremely tight in the small anchorage.
In the opinion of the Calliope’s Captain Henry
Coey Kane, no more than four major ships should
have been anchored in it at any one time. The
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
ALL IMAGES: NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND
March 1889: German and U.S. warships warily
watched each other in the cramped confines of Apia
Harbor, Samoa—until a typhoon swooped down and
curtailed the course of human events. With her rudder
smashed and her canvas in tatters, the cruiser Trenton,
the largest U.S. Navy vessel present, dragged along the
reefs in a desperate struggle to survive.
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011
restricted space underscored a litany of dangers for
craft caught there in a storm.
Apia was located on the northern side of the
island of Upolu, inside a fully exposed V-shaped
bay that faced almost directly north. A barrier
reef stretched across the harbor’s mouth with just
a single opening three cables (720 yards) wide per-
mitting entrance. Much of the harbor had been
fashioned by freshwater outflow from the Mulivai
and Vaisingano rivers, which descended from the
south. The harbor floor was all coral, but over the
years the rivers had deposited enough silt to allow
for marine growth and sufficient traction for ship
anchors. The river flow interacted with the ocean
movement to create strong and unpredictable cur-
rents throughout the harbor, which was ringed by
shelves and nearly continuous reefs. Only a short
stretch of sandy beach at the mouth of the Vaisin-
gano interrupted the sharp-edged perimeter.
For a ship captain, the best defense in case of
bad weather was to be somewhere else.
When March Winds Blow
The opening months of 1889 had not been with-
out their usual share of storms, the heaviest com-
ing on 13–14 February. That tempest had caused
the Eber to sideswipe a reef, bending her propeller
shaft, causing the loss of several knots in speed.
February’s intensity seemed to satisfy everyone that
the storm season was winding down. As Admiral
Kimberly recollected, “The local pilots and other
old residents on shore, supposed the backbone of
the season’s bad weather had been broken.”1 A cop-
pery red sunset was seen on 12 March. It began
to rain on 13 March, the precipitation continuing
into the next day with frequent squalls and a gener-
ally falling barometer.
The weather had worsened on the morning of
15 March to the point that the warships began to
batten down. Upper hampers were struck, leaving
only topgallants. Lower yards were eased down to
the deck. Any loose equipment was firmly lashed
or moved under cover. Anchors where checked.
Engines were warmed up. For each commander, a
• • • • • • • •
moment of truth arrived that day when the decision
had to be made whether to meet the weather in the
harbor or retreat into open water. Kimberly later
enumerated his reasons for staying. The most anyone
was expecting was heavy rains, and a run out to sea
would have consumed much hard-to-replace coal.
The admiral was confident that with kedge anchors
deployed and the steam engines operating to relieve
strain on the chains, they could weather the storm.
55
 National pride also played a part. No
captain wanted to be the first to scurry
his flag out of the harbor, and even late
in the morning of 15 March, with the
weather continuing to deteriorate, no
warship budged from the anchorage.
The one saving grace was that so far
the wind had come from the south.
All that began to change after
1400. It was about then, a scientist
later reckoned, that the eye of the
tempest was located just north of
Apia Harbor. The barometer dipped
to an ominous and record-setting
29.07. There was a sullen calm under a
leaden sky that made everyone hold their
breath. By now the local weather prophets
had changed their tune. “The old
timers,” wrote the American consul Rear Admiral Louis Ashfield Kimberly,
from his office in the town, “expect commanding U.S. Pacific naval
a hurricane during the night.”2 The an eyewitness to the cataclysmic weather
storm again began to increase in in- event that wreaked havoc on the ships of two
tensity. Rain fell in blinding sheets, powerful navies.
and the wind made a dramatic shift. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
It was roaring in from the north;
any vessel still hoping to clear the cramped harbor would
have to battle powerful headwinds and waves. By sunset the
combination of frothy spray, rain, and darkness had reduced
visibility to virtually nil. The seven warships, crammed so
tightly into the limited space, began yawing wildly at the
end of their iron tethers.
For a brief period around midnight the barometer began
rising and everyone thought the crisis was ending. It was
a cruel trick of nature. What was happening was a rare
but not unknown phenomenon called recurvature. The
typhoon was being pushed back by powerful upper-level
winds that forced the weather system to retrace its steps.
From the evidence in hand it would also seem that the
tempest further intensified during this period. The storm’s
greatest energy was now being funneled directly into the
unprotected bay.
Hell in a Harbor
The wind was unrelenting; according to Admiral Kim-
berly, “for nearly 24 hours, the gale was a hurricane.”3 Great
waves surged into the anchorage where they encountered
ricocheting currents from all quarters of the tight harbor,
made even worse by the blasting discharge from the two
rivers, suddenly hugely swollen by the rain deluging the
island’s interior. The powerful river flow began scouring
the bottom of the bay. The warship crews fighting for their
lives counted on their anchors to see them through the
storm, but now the overloaded rivers had ground the sea
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bed down to the hard coral, leaving little
for the anchors to grip. Soon the vessels
began dragging about the anchorage,
dangerous to themselves and others.
It is a testament to the skill and de-
termination of their crews that the
warships survived until the morning
of 16 March before they began to
succumb. The first was the Eber, al-
ready crippled by previous damage to
her propeller shaft. Starting around
0800, catastrophe piled on catastro-
phe. A series of mountainous waves
pushed the ship onto the inner basin
reefs bordering the harbor’s western side,
and the weakened propeller finally gave
way. For just a few seconds, the craft ground
along the coral edge before crash-
diving, taking with her the captain
forces, was and 72 of his crew. The four survi-
vors who struggled weakly toward
the shore found themselves plucked
from certain death by strong Samoan
• • • • • • arms. These were some of Mataafa’s
men, who had come down from the
hills to exploit the chaos caused by the storm but instead
followed their humanitarian impulses.
Next to go was the Nipsic, which had had more than her
share of ill luck. Caught in the powerful harbor currents near
the mouth of the Vaisingano, the ship had been propelled
about the anchorage, overrunning and sinking a merchant
schooner around dawn. Shortly after that, she was speared
on her port side by the Olga, also fighting for her life. Besides
having a section of her side crushed in, the Nipsic lost her
smokestack, allowing a torrent of seawater to engulf her criti-
cally important boilers. Adding insult to injury, the toppled
3,000-pound stack began rolling across the deck, piling on
the terror that gripped the Nipsic’s crew. A few brave men
continued to fight for the ship. When the drenched coal
refused to burn, Captain Dennis W. Mullan remembered he
had barrels of salt pork in the hold and ordered their con-
tents fed into the boiler furnaces—a desperate improvisation
that bought a few more hours of life to the vessel.
Perhaps a half hour after the Eber met her fate, another
series of heavy waves and the loss of a critical anchor left
Mullan with no choice but to try to beach the Nipsic.
Somehow in the cauldron of wave, rain, wind, and lurch-
ing ships, the determined captain conned his ship onto a
patch of sand near the mouth of the Vaisingano. Several
panicked men drowned as they jumped or were swept into
the tumultuous waters; a few more perished in efforts to get
a lifeline onto the shore where some of Mataafa’s men were
waiting to help. Finally, with the assistance of a Samoan
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
human chain that heroically pushed out into the turbulent Command passed to Lieutenant James Carlin, who soon
bay, the line was established and survivors began coming had a major problem. The Vandalia and Calliope had shifted
on shore. Once safe, many of the Nipsic’s exhausted and about so that the English cruiser was poised to puncture the
demoralized crew put distance between themselves and the American’s port side. Again and again the iron ship seemed
hellish harbor. Not only did they show no interest in help- sure to strike, yet just as often the surging seas pulled her
ing their mates still struggling on board the Trenton and away. The luck of the Vandalia ran out shortly after 0730
Vandalia, but a few uncovered liquor stocks in town and on 16 March as another wave brought the two ships hard
promptly got roaring drunk. together. For the next 90 minutes the Vandalia’s sturdy con-
The Olga already had been an unwilling collaborator struction and desperate damage control kept her afloat. It
in the demise of the Nipsic, and she performed a similar was during this period that Schoonmaker reappeared, pale
service for the Adler. After surviving several close calls but determined. The ship was now veering broadside to the
and a long night of barely avoiding the reef, the Adler was waves, the roiling maelstrom making it nearly impossible
just pulling free from a scrape with the coral by virtue of for men to work on deck. Not long after 1030 the decision
training, discipline, courage, and hastily repaired steering was reached to beach the Vandalia.
tackle, only to see the
Olga loom up out of
the dark. She struck,
splintering the Adler’s
bowsprit before slough-
ing off for a short dis-
tance. Contrary winds
and currents made the
Adler’s beaching attempt
impossible. With her
last anchor cut loose, a
powerful swell lifted the
Adler onto the western
reef, cracking her keel
and rolling her on her
side, but leaving the bow
facing the shore. About
20 men were lost in the
foaming brine while
the remainder lashed
themselves to whatever The German warship Adler survived a night of hell only to be crashed into by another German vessel in the
seemed secure. They morning. A swell subsequently hurled the Adler onto a reef, cracking her keel and leaving her on her side.
were drenched, cold, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
and miserable, and some
would bear the psychological scars of their experience for For a moment it seemed as if the desperate gamble would
the rest of their lives, but they were alive. pay off, but once the Vandalia came abreast of the Vaisin-
gano River, the powerfully swirling currents twisted the
Crashing Waves and Desperate Gambles
ship so that she was again broadside to the fierce elements.
The ordeal of the Vandalia was the worst suffered by She crashed against the lower western reef. At the com-
the American warships on station. Shortly after midnight mand to abandon ship, weary crewmen fought their way
the underpowered ship began shifting position, dragging onto the deck only to face peril in any attempt to essay the
perilously close to HMS Calliope. Being near the harbor 40 or 50 yards to shore. Fifteen-foot waves began break-
entrance exposed the Vandalia to powerful waves, and ing up the Vandalia, whose debris, Lieutenant Carlin later
an especially destructive one smashed into the ship just wrote, was “going over us as if shot out of a cannon. A
after daylight, violently slamming Captain Cornelius M. bump from this was death.”4 A great wave flooded the ship’s
Schoonmaker around in his cabin. When the badly in- entire length, and Schoonmaker was gone. The crew’s last
jured officer came out on deck, another sudden lurch of chance for survival was to clamber into the rigging and be
the vessel caused him to strike his head, requiring that he lashed by the howling winds, a desperate act that promised
be carried below. only to prolong their suffering.

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 57

 Blessed with the newest and most powerful engines in
the anchorage, HMS Calliope still fought a failing battle
trying to hold position. After unintentionally spearing the
Vandalia, the Calliope was nearly rammed by a careening
Olga. Between the reef and the other two struggling vessels,
Captain Kane’s ship was pinned in a deadly box. It was,
he said afterward, “the most ticklish position I was ever
in.”5 As he saw it, the only chance was to use the powerful
engines to haul out of the harbor. Orders were given to rev
them up to maximum and then, with the ship’s stern just
20 feet from the deadly reef, the anchor cables were cut.
Even with the boiler gauges red-lined, the Calliope made
barely one knot of headway. The last obstacle to her freedom
was the massive Trenton, as helpless as any of the smaller
ships. Expertly timing his move with the heaving seas and
the abrupt lurches of the unpredictable Trenton, Kane conned
the Calliope under the American’s looming stern and around
it. Fighting to maintain passageway, the officers and men of
the Calliope heard an unexpected sound mingled with the
keening winds. It was cheering. Even as they were fighting
for their lives, the Trenton’s Sailors paused long enough to sa-
lute the courage of their English compatriots. Captain Kane
could barely register the honor before the fight went on. In
the storm’s darkness and spray, he could barely see ahead.
After finding the narrow entrance by compass and nerve, he
drove the ship out of the harbor, though he wouldn’t realize
it until the next day. The Calliope’s engines ran at full power
for more than ten hours and never faltered.
Struggle and Salvation
Just two warships remained afloat in Apia Harbor as the
Calliope clawed her way out, but one would soon be on
the beach. After punching into the port side of the Nipsic,
coming close to doing the same thing to the Calliope, then
becoming fatally entangled with the Trenton later in the
afternoon, the Olga finally ended up grounded on the soft
mud of the eastern bay, her stern to the wind.
The fight of the Trenton was made far more difficult by a
serious design flaw. Most vessels’ bow ports for the anchor
chain and docking hawsers led to the open gun deck, but
the Trenton’s hawseholes vented internally, into the forward
berth area. In heavy seas the lower section could count on
a wetting; now, with her bow pointed into the teeth of a
typhoon, the influx was overwhelming the pumps. Frantic
efforts were made to stopper the flood, but they were never
enough. The added weight drove the bow down and by
1000 the water around the boilers was waist-deep.
Countless acts of heroism took place as the Yankee Blue-
jackets fought to keep the critical sails in place to maintain
the Trenton’s position to the wind, an especially difficult task
once the ship’s rudder had been smashed. The men only
paused in their efforts long enough to cheer the Calliope as
the valiant ship fought her way to freedom. Despite every-
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one’s efforts, wind and sea power began to tell, and the great
Trenton, originally anchored near the harbor’s mouth, was
steadily driven deeper into the bay. With all canvas in tat-
ters, crewmen were ordered into the mizzen rigging to form a
human sail in a last-ditch effort to keep the ship’s head into
the wind. Precious time was bought by a quirk in topography;
the western interior reef fell away to the southwest, so as the
Trenton was pushed along its coral perimeter, her hull found
enough open space to continue the struggle to survive.
Then came the entanglement with the Olga. In clear-
ing that, the Trenton got caught in the Vaisingano current,
which drove her hard toward the coral shelf, putting her
on a collision course with the already stricken Vandalia, her
surviving crew clinging desperately to the rigging. A widely
syndicated newspaper account at the time reported that the
Trenton’s band played “The Star-Spangled Banner” to buck up
less fortunate comrades—a notion later scoffed at by Trenton
survivors. “Why, man, it was as much as a man could do to
keep from being thrown about by the sea and the motion of
the vessel,” said a boatswain’s mate. “He did well if he held
on to himself, without thinking of such a thing as holding
on to a musical instrument and playing it into the bargain.”6
Now the storm swung the Trenton’s stern tightly into the
Vandalia’s side. A series of lines were quickly heaved from
the flagship. Even better, the storm pushed the Trenton
nearly parallel to the Vandalia and just 40 feet apart. For
a few precious and desperate minutes, many of the Van-
dalia’s crew climbed, swung, or hauled themselves aboard
the Trenton. As unexpectedly as it was offered, this last
chance was gone. “Soon after [the survivors crossed over]
we struck the Vandalia with violence,” Admiral Kimberly
later reported, “and her main and mizzen masts went by the
board.”7 In a dramatic turnabout, the hulk of the Vandalia
became an unmoving anchor point for the Trenton. The
flagship’s larger size now provided limited protection to
her crew and those lucky ones from the Vandalia who made
the dangerous transfer. As long as the Trenton’s hull held
together it offered refuge to the weary Sailors.
Then, finally, early on the morning of 17 March, the
storm began to abate. The winds died away completely by
0500, though the harbor waters still churned. With the
help of Samoan muscle, lines were made fast to the shore
and the slow process of transferring Sailors to the land
began. The effort soon spread to all ships in the harbor,
American or German, though Teutonic suspicions of Sa-
moan intentions limited the aid they received.
Foreign Domination Forestalled
The next days were a blur of activity as the injured were
tended and efforts made to restore the wrecked vessels. Na-
tional pride dictated that each country would repair one
of its own. For the Americans it would be the Nipsic, for
the Germans, the Olga. On 19 March, the Calliope returned
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
to Apia Harbor, her brave crewmen
astonished at the destruction they had
avoided. Besides the demolished war-
ships, none of the merchant vessels had
survived, though most of their crews had
been sent ashore before the storm broke.
The next day, with the Calliope’s help,
one of Kimberly’s officers connected with
an Auckland-bound steamer and a work-
ing telegraph to the United States. By 30
March the story of the disaster was filling
columns in U.S. newspapers.
Back in Apia Harbor, German and
American work on ship repairs paused
only for the sad duties of burial as bod-
ies were found and identified, includ-
ing that of the unfortunate Captain After the storm, newspaper reporters and Navy men gathered on the island to pay
Schoonmaker. On 2 April the Olga, in their respects at the grave of Captain Cornelius M. Schoonmaker, commander of the
company with a passing German passen- Vandalia, who died in the Great Samoan Typhoon along with 148 others.
ger steamer, set off for Sydney. Fifteen • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
days later the Nipsic weighed anchor and
reached Auckland, though not without scary moments when
some of the patchwork failed to hold up in the open sea. In
the final tally, 86 German sailors perished in the storm and
60 Americans, for a total of 146 military lives lost. Added
to that were one Samoan Samaritan and two merchant sea-
men. In the harbor itself, most of the hulks were completely
dismantled, while pieces of the Adler lingered for many years, of president Benjamin Harrison in his State of the Union
a poignant reminder at low tide of the life-and-death drama
that had played out in its usually placid waters. A stone me-
morial outside Apia remembers the German casualties, while
a Mare Island Navy Yard tablet notes the Americans lost.
At first it seemed that affairs in the Samoan Islands were
to pick up where they had left off before the typhoon in-
tervened. However, its awesome violence took much of the
starch out of the foreign warriors. Kimberly managed to
arrange for a truce while higher powers gathered in distant
Berlin. It was decided that the islands would remain free
of foreign domination. Laupepa was placed on the throne,
Mataafa professed himself a loyal subject, and Tamasese
was allowed to retire from public view. Ten years later, the
three powers reconsidered their positions and reinserted
themselves into Samoan affairs. By the Tripartite Conven-
tion of 1899 Germany assumed control of the islands lying
west of 171° latitude, and the Americans claimed oversight
of those east of that line.
The three surviving ships met varied fates. The Olga
lasted until 1908 when she was scrapped, while the Nipsic
was decommissioned in 1890 and spent several years as a
stationary barracks/prison before passing into private hands
as a barge. A bit more glory awaited the heroic HMS Cal-
liope, which took part in Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee
Review of the Fleet at Spithead in 1897. After reassign-
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011
ment to various service duties, the ship lost her name for
16 years and then regained it for 22 more before being
scrapped in 1953. Afterward, her helm was presented as
a gift to the government of Western Samoa, which subse-
quently passed it along to a New Zealand museum.
The events in Apia Harbor were still fresh on the mind
Message in early December 1889. Terming the incident an
“appalling calamity,” the president went on to praise the U.S.
Sailors for what they had accomplished. “It is most gratify-
ing,” he wrote, “to state that the credit of the American Navy
for seamanship, courage, and generosity was magnificently
sustained in the storm-beaten harbor of Apia.”8
1. Louis Ashfield Kimberly, Samoan Hurricane (Washington, DC: Naval Historical
Foundation, 1965), quoted from online version at www.history.navy.mil/library/
online/samoan.htm.
2. Edwin p. Hoyt, The Typhoon that Stopped a War (New York: David McKay
Company, 1968), p. 58.
3. Everett Hayden, “The Samoan Hurricane of March, 1889,” U.S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings, vol. 17, no. 2 (1891), p. 286.
4. James William Carlin, Letter of 26 March 1889, Naval Historical Foundation
papers (Library of Congress Manuscript Collection).
5. Graham Wilson, “Glory for the Squadron: HMS Calliope in the Great Hur-
ricane at Samoa 1889,” Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, May/July 1996, p.
52.
6. The New York Times, 3 July 1889.
7. Report of Rear Admiral L.A. Kimberly in Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Navy (1889); quoted from online version at www.history.navy.mil/faqs/
faq102-3.htm.
8. Benjamin Harrison (3 December 1889), http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-
of-the-union/101.html.
Other sources:
John Alexander Clinton Gray, Amerika Samoa (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval In-
stitute, 1960).
Bob Drury and Tom Clavin, Halsey’s Typhoon (New York: Grove press, 2007).
Harrie Webster, “A personal Narrative of the Wreck of the ‘Vandalia’ at Samoa,
March 16, 1889,” The United Service (October 1894).
59
 The
Sailor Who
‘Torpedoed’
Train
a
By Carl LaVO

An enlisted man with a thirst for

action and a will to win, ‘Swish’
Saunders helped revolutionize how
submarines could be used in war.

‘N
ow, there’s a target I would like to
blow up.”
In the closing months of World
War II, Commander Eugene Fluckey
saw a familiar scene through the peri-
scope: trains running up and down the remote eastern
coast of Japan’s Karafuto Prefecture. As skipper of the
USS Barb (SS-220) on patrol in the Okhotsk Sea, Fluckey
watched the feathery stream of locomotive smoke against
the mountains, trains no doubt loaded with troops and
supplies to thwart an American invasion. But how could NATIONAL ArCHIVES

the Barb stop them? Paul Golden “Swish” Saunders brought a winning combination
Fluckey’s comment about wanting to blow up the target of guts and ingenuity to a fight; a shipmate compared him to
perked the ears of Chief of the Boat Paul Golden “Swish” “a character out of a paperback novel.” Swish was destined to
Saunders. He had some ideas. At a plotting table the cap- become one of the Navy’s most decorated enlisted men.
tain unrolled a topographic map of the province showing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

the rail lines. Perhaps Barb Sailors in rubber boats could

go ashore, plant explosives under the tracks, then detonate
one of the sub’s scuttling charges under a moving train.
Imagine, offered Saunders, the crew of a submarine “sink-
ing” a train. The skipper smiled: “Well, let’s get on with it.”
The obvious choice for the mission was the COB him-
self, a wiry 26-year-old Virginian who had earned his
moniker quivering like a pointer dog as he “swished” back
and forth directing the firepower of the Barb in surface
gun action and rocket launches that were to revolutionize
submarine warfare. Swish also had the rare distinction of
being on board the same submarine through 12 arduous war
patrols—five in pursuit of German shipping in the Atlantic
off Europe and seven against Japan in the Pacific. Most
crewmen rotated to other subs after four or five patrols.
Not Swish. Described by a fellow submariner as “a real
salty Sailor, almost a character out of a paperback novel,”
he possessed unflappable will to engage the enemy.
Would the plan to destroy a train work? Saunders was
confident in his abilities from a long career in surface ships
and submarines. But he was mindful of what could go

60 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

www.downmagaz.com
wrong—as it had during the Barb’s first war patrol, almost Dynamic Duo
three years earlier. After five unremarkable war patrols off Europe, the
Barb moved to the pacific, where her first two patrols
Operation Torch
brought few successes. That abruptly changed when Eu-
In support of the November 1942 Allied invasion of gene Fluckey, 33, the boat’s prospective commanding of-
North Africa, Operation Torch, the Barb was deployed in ficer, became skipper and picked Saunders to be his chief
October to deliver scouts in rubber boats off the coast of of the boat. At first the gunnery chief demurred: “Not me,
Algiers. The commandos and the subs in Torch were outfit- Captain, no way. All the men are my friends. As chief
ted with infrared beacons to mark the way to beachheads of the boat I’d have to tell them off and discipline them.
at Fedhala, Mehedia, Safi, and Algiers. How could I do that?”
As a gunner’s mate in the Barb, Saunders was eager to “Swish, I don’t want a bastard, I want a leader,” the skip-
be part of the action. Growing up in the backwater of per later recalled saying. “We don’t drive men on board the
Singing Glen in western Virginia in the 1930s, he yearned Barb. We lead them. From my experience with bastards,
to be in the military as war overtook Europe. At 17, he
tried to enlist in the French Foreign Legion but was too
young. So he enlisted in the Navy and served in the USS
Raleigh (CL-7), Sampson (DD-394), and McCook (DD-
252), gaining experience at sea from Iceland to South
America to the south of France. Lured by the additional
danger and mystery of submarine duty, Saunders quali-
fied in the coastal-defense sub R-4 (SS-81) and was on
board the new fleet boat Barb at her commissioning in
1942. World War II was in full bore, and Operation Torch
promised to put the Gato-class submarine and her gunner’s
mate right in the middle of it.
Unfortunately, things didn’t go as intended.
Navigational problems and language differences beset the
invasion force and led to confusion. The Barb launched
her five scouts to proceed to a bell buoy off the Safi dock.
Because of inaccurate charts, the scouts had to paddle much
farther than anticipated and got caught in a crossfire be-
tween arriving Allied destroyers and shore batteries. The
ships quickly secured the anchorage, however, and rescued
the scouts unharmed.
For the next several months the Barb operated out of
Scotland, conducting war patrols against blockade runners
in the Bay of Biscay, where she sank a presumed Ger-
man tanker. During the boat’s fifth patrol in the North
Atlantic, Saunders came to the attention of the execu-
tive officer, Lieutenant Commander Everett H. Steinmetz,
after he told the then-chief of the boat to break in a
new manifold operator (the enlisted man who controlled
the dive). A day later, as the sub raced ahead on four
main engines, lookouts spotted an enemy periscope and
sounded the diving alarm. Normally, high-speed dives left NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND

less room for error and required practice. Steinmetz and The intrepid Saunders was well-paired with his skipper in the
the COB, realizing the new man was on the manifold, Barb, Commander Eugene Fluckey, a kindred spirit when it came
blanched. “The Chief of the Boat and I hit the control to taking the battle to the enemy. Above: Fluckey stands alongside
room from opposite directions,” Steinmetz recalled. “The the Barb’s fairwater after receiving the Navy Cross in December
trainee had executed his portion of the dive flawlessly. 1944. By war’s end he would garner the Medal of Honor, four
I qualified him then and there! I mention this because Navy Crosses, and an unmatched sunken-tonnage total for World
every man that made a patrol in Barb had the trainee as War II sub captains.
a shipmate. He was Swish Saunders.” • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 61

 they achieve about equal results. But there’s one big dif-
ference. When you lead men, they ship over and want to
stay with you.”
Saunders worried about making a mistake as COB. “So
you goof,” said Fluckey. “Don’t hide it or cover up. Do your
best to correct your mistakes and don’t be afraid to ask for
help from anyone from top to bottom. You’ll find people
are complimented when you ask for help. In submarines we
hang our rates on the gangway when we come aboard. It’s
what you can do that counts with me.”
The deal was struck.
“Swish never viewed himself as anything but an enlisted
man, even though he was COB,” according to Neal Sever,
the boat’s signalman. “I never saw him pull rank on any
of us, nor did I ever hear any of us bitch about Swish. He
was pleasant and treated us as his equal.”
But that wasn’t to say he was a pushover. According to
Barb Torpedo and Gunnery Officer Lieutenant Max Dun-
can: “Swish was all business on his watches and positions
such as chief of the watch on the hyudraulic manifold or
gun/rocket launcher captain. He dealt with people with
a velvet glove. It was the glove when needed but always
calm and deliberate.”
Swish retained his camaraderie with the men, kidded
around with them, and “drank his share of grog” with them
on liberty, as Sever put it. But first and foremost on Saun-
ders’ mind was fighting the enemy and manning the guns.
When it came to that, the Barb’s skipper and the chief
of the boat made a dynamic duo. “The combination of
Commander Eugene B. Fluckey and ‘Swish’ Saunders was
like electricity,” said one shipmate. “They were both of the
same mold. ‘Attack and Destroy’ was their motto.” That
lethal combination quickly made the Barb one of the most
successful submarines sent against Japan.
Action in the Pacific
In the boat’s first four patrols under Fluckey, she sank
the escort carrier Unyo, the frigate Gorkuko, and nu-
merous other vessels. The Barb also rescued Australian
and British prisoners of war shipwrecked for days and
near death in the South China Sea. Saunders and others
took turns diving into typhoon-roiled waters to pull 14
survivors aboard.
On the boat’s 11th war patrol off the east coast of China
in January 1945, Fluckey discovered secluded Namkwan
Harbor, where 30 or more Japanese ships were at anchor.
The skipper decided to gamble by taking the sub into the
shallow harbor after midnight for a surprise surface attack.
Amid confusion over where the attack was coming from,
the sub would dash for open seas through uncharted waters
to safety 20 miles offshore. As Fluckey put it in an address
to his crew, “OK, it is now time to take one of our well-
known calculated risks.”
62
www.downmagaz.com
Saunders later described the scene, recalling it from his
control-room vantage as the Barb inched past three roving
destroyers: “We creep in. You can’t hear a thing but the
fathometer pinging, and she says six fathoms. We could
almost get out and walk. Everybody’s heart is doing flip-
flops. The pickles are all set.”
Two minutes later, Fluckey gave the order to fire four
torpedoes from the boat’s bow tubes, then brought the sub
around to fire the “fish” in the four stern tubes. Eight tor-
pedoes raced ahead. The harbor erupted in exploding ships
and fireballs and return gunfire directed at phantom air-
craft. No one could believe a sub had attacked; the harbor
was too shallow. The Barb, meanwhile, raced for safety at
23 knots while using radar to plot a zig-zag course through a
fleet of Chinese junks, all the while pursued by a destroyer
lobbing shells at the retreating submarine. The ship gave
up after a 30-minute chase. Noted Fluckey in his patrol
log: “The Galloping Ghost of the China Coast crossed the
20-fathom curve with a sigh. Never realized how much
water that was before. However, life begins at forty (fath-
oms). Kept going.”
For the boat’s daring, the crew earned a Presidential Unit
Citation and Fluckey the nation’s highest award, the Medal
of Honor.
For her 12th and last war patrol, the Barb was deployed
from Pearl Harbor to the north coast of Japan. Fluckey’s or-
ders were “to raise a rumpus” by attacking shipping wherever
it was found. But attacking enemy vessels wasn’t the only
thing the skipper contemplated. He was intent on proving
that a submarine could be used to fire what he called “bal-
listic missiles.” Before casting off, he requisitioned 72 five-
inch spin-stabilized rockets, each tipped with ten pounds
of explosives. A simple rocket launcher was bolted to the
forward gun mount and could be raised to a 45-degree angle
to simultaneously fire a dozen four-foot-long MK10 rockets,
each of which had a range of nearly three miles.
The skipper got his chance to make history on the night
of 22 June 1945, as the sub slid unnoticed into the harbor
of Shari, a city of 20,000 on the coast of Hokkaido. At
Fluckey’s signal, Swish and the gunnery crew unstrapped
the rocket launcher, raised it to the desired angle, and
ran an electrical line to a firing switch in the conning
tower. On the bridge above, the skipper flipped his polar-
ized goggles to their darkest setting and barked the order,
“Rockets away!” An explosion of blue-white flame lit the
deck. A dozen rockets lifted off and disappeared into the
night sky. A minute later, several buildings in a factory
district burst into flames. It was the first such rocket attack
in submarine history.
The Barb made good her escape and raced for the west-
ern side of the Okhotsk Sea off Karafuto, where both the
skipper and the COB relished a fresh opportunity to wreak
havoc—by blowing up a train.
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND

The Barb saw service in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, completed 12 war patrols, and boasted a remarkably successful career.
She came through it all without a single casualty.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Attack of the ‘Land Torpedo’

“Boys,” the skipper said, “if you get stuck, head for Siberia
The captain convened a meeting in the wardroom. Eight 130 miles north. Follow the mountain ranges. Good luck.”
men were chosen to undertake the mission and divided
Dangerous Work in the Dark
into two teams, one each for the sub’s two inflatable rubber
boats. Lieutenant Bill Walker, the Barb’s engineering officer The teams used compass bearings in the ink-black night
and group leader, would lead one boat, Swish Saunders to reach the beach. Leaving two men to guard the boats,
the other. All were selected for their communications and the six others sprinted between two homes, stumbled
Boy Scout skills. In case they couldn’t make it back to the through two drainage ditches, thickets, and across a high-
submarine, Fluckey wanted them to have a fighting chance way to reach the railroad. Three split off along the tracks
to live off the land. He had them practice bird whistles as on guard duty. Three others—Walker, Saunders, and Hat-
a means of signaling each other in the dark. field—bent to the task of hollowing out stone from under
Saunders and Bill Hatfield, the boat’s third-class electri- the rails for the explosive.
cian’s mate, fashioned a 55-pound bomb out of a scuttling Before too long they heard someone running toward
charge that they wired to three dry-cell batteries and placed them. Hatfield picked up his weapon.
in an empty pickle can. Saunders christened the device a “Take it easy!” whispered Swish. “At this time of night
“land torpedo.” Since it was agreed the team could not there’s no one running up this track except a scared Ameri-
wait around to set off the bomb, Hatfield, who had worked can.”
on a railroad, devised a micro-switch detonator bolted to It was one of their sentries, reporting a guard shack down
a wooden wedge to be snugged up tight under the rails. the line with someone sleeping inside. Moments later, a
He knew the massive weight of a locomotive would exert locomotive came rumbling out of the dark. The men hit
enough downward pressure to trigger the switch. the ground, lying motionless alongside the track as the train
On the moonless night of 23 July, Fluckey gave the go- passed, its engineer hanging out of the cab, looking down.
ahead. With the sub surfaced 950 yards from the beach, With renewed urgency, Hatfield connected the charge to
the teams set out. The commandos—Walker, Saunders, the switch detonator. All six then dashed for the boats and
Hatfield (the only married man), signalman Sever, motor paddled furiously toward the Barb. They were halfway to
machinist Jim Richard, ship’s cook Larry Newland, auxil- the sub when they heard the sound of a northbound train.
iary man John Markuson, and torpedoman Edward Klingle- On the sub’s bridge, Fluckey grabbed a megaphone. “paddle
smith—were well equipped. They carried red-lens flash- like the devil!” he yelled. “We’re leaving!”
lights, watches, knives, D-rations, inflatable life jackets, Seconds later, the bomb went off, throwing wreckage 200
cigarette lighters, a signal gun, binoculars, electrical wire, feet into the air. Cars piled into one another and lurched
the demolition charge, carbines, tommy guns, and hand off the tracks in a screeching mass of twisted, rolling metal.
grenades. The skipper emphasized the sub would wait no Silhouetted in the fireworks, the jubilant saboteurs
more than three hours—just 15 minutes before the first reached the Barb and went below as the sub disappeared
glimmer of dawn, when the boat would be exposed. into the depths.

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • ApRIL 2011 63

 Over the next few nights, the Barb moved up the coast
and launched her remaining 30 rockets at the factory town
of Shiritori, destroying Japan’s largest paper factory. Enam-
ored of the sub’s utility attacking beach targets, Swish used
the boat’s 5-inch deck gun to obliterate a leather-tanning
factory that made pilot uniforms, and later directed the
boat’s gunnery to set a shipyard afire. Additional action
all around the rim of the Okhotsk destroyed many small
craft and medium-sized ships to conclude one of the most
audacious submarine patrols of World War II.
NAVAL HISTORy & HERITAGE COMMAND
The battle flag of the Barb tells the story of many sunken foes. Note the lit stick of dynamite in an eight-man team for the first
the insignia-fish’s hand.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
On 2 August 1945 the Barb returned to Midway Atoll,
where the Navy awarded Fluckey a fourth Navy Cross. The
skipper noted his submarine had endured an estimated 400
shells, bombs, and depth charges and some very narrow
escapes in her last five patrols. But the boat had come
through it all without a single casualty.
In a final accounting, the Navy credited Fluckey with
sinking 17 ships totaling 94,409 tons—number 1 in ton-
nage sunk among all American sub captains in the war.
An Undying Spirit of Adventure
The Navy honored Swish Saunders as one of the service’s
most decorated enlisted men. His awards included two Sil-
ver Stars, one Bronze Star, a Presidential Unit Citation,
a Navy Unit commendation, a Letter of Commendation
with Ribbon in recognition of his heroic actions in com-
64
www.downmagaz.com
bat during the World War II, the Submarine Combat pin,
the Victory Medal, the American Theater Medal, and the
Philppine Liberation Medal.
After the war, Saunders remained in the forefront of
submarine missile development. He became chief of the
boat in the Cusk (SS-348), which experimented with Ger-
man Loon rockets. As COB in the Carbonero (SS-337), he
helped develop the Regulus launch system. By the early
1960s, he was COB in the Theodore Roosevelt (SSBN-600),
where he helped perfect Polaris missile launches. It was the
ultimate realization of a dream
that Swish and Gene Fluckey
shared as pioneers in that last
patrol of the Barb.
Saunders’ spirit of adventure
lived on after his retirement in
1962. He began a professional
auto-racing career in California
and Mexico, and earned his pi-
lot’s license. When landing at
the wrong airport, he famously
quipped, “A malfunction of the
depth gauge caused a miscalcu-
lation of the depth and sank one
aircraft.”
His wartime exploits and
those of the Barb live on. A
few years ago, the head of the
Navy SEALs was asked why
there were always eight men in
a SEAL team rather than six
or ten or a dozen. The admiral
replied that the Barb had used
assault landing on the Japanese
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
home islands. “It worked,” he
said, “so eight is the number!”
Looking back on his naval career prior to his death in
August 2003, Saunders described his many adventures as
the product of his youth. His own welfare was secondary
to helping win the war against Germany and Japan and
making the Silent Service indomitable in defense of the
United States. As he put it regarding the dangers he faced
in the war, “I was a lot younger in those days.”
Sources:
Captain Max Duncan, USN (Ret.), interview with the author.
San Francisco Chapter, U.S. Submarine Veterans of World War II, “Simon Sez,”
Polaris, April 1969, p 15.
Paul G. Saunders biographical sketch, Sharkhunters International, www.shark-
hunters.com/EPSaunders.htm.
Paul G. Saunders obituary, United States Submarine Veterans Inc., 8 August
2003, www.nautilusbase.us/Patrol.html.
Captain Everett H. Steinmetz, USN (Ret.), “USS Barb (SS-220) and Subron 50,”
Polaris, June 1998, www.subvetpaul.com/SAGA_6_98.htm.
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
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 Historic Fleets
Eyewitness to the Fall of Fort Sumter
T
he wooden steam sloop Pawnee
pounded toward the South
Carolina coast through heavy
seas and gale-force winds in
the early hours of 12 April 1861. The
weather and darkness made it difficult
to distinguish landmarks, but the
warship’s commanding officer, 52-year-
old Commander Stephen C. Rowan,
recorded his arrival “as near the position
assigned me as the badness of the weather
would allow me to judge.” Once in
position off Charleston Harbor, Rowan
ordered his men to quarters and the guns
loaded with shell.
The packet steamer Baltic drew near in
the storm, bringing with her “Captain”
NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND
A view, looking aft, from the Pawnee’s forecastle, where a bewhiskered old salt poses with the
ship’s single 100-pounder Parrott rifle circa 1863-64. The starboard battery of four IX-inch
Dahlgren smoothbores can be seen in the background. Awnings shade her deck, and crewmen
can be seen sitting amidships.
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Gustavus Vasa Fox, who was eager
to set his brainchild—the relief of Fort
Sumter—into motion. (See story, p. 18.)
The Pawnee’s captain, however, when told
of Fox’s intent to proceed apace with the
mission, said his orders required him to
await the arrival of the sidewheel steamer
Powhatan. (Unbeknownst to either man,
the latter had been ordered elsewhere.)
Then, in reply to Fox’s invitation
to stand in toward the bar, Rowan
responded firmly that he “was not going
in there and inaugurate civil war.”
Commander Rowan, a native of
Ireland, was a seasoned seaman, having
won appointment as a midshipman in
66
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1826. His ship, however, was a relatively
new addition to the Navy. Laid down
in October 1858 at the Philadelphia
Navy Yard, the Pawnee slid down the
launching ways on 8 October 1859.
Miss Grace Tyler christened the ship
with a bottle of claret broken on the
figurehead of “a great Pawnee chief.”
She was commissioned at her building
yard, Commander Henry J. Hartstene in
command.
Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey
had recommended ten steamers of
“light draft, great speed and heavy guns”
in his annual report of 1857. Congress
authorized eight—seven screw sloops and
one sidewheeler—on 12 June 1858. Of
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
the sloops, four were to draw 13 feet, three
were to draw 10. John Willis Griffiths
received a government appointment
to design the largest of the three ships
ordered to the latter specification. The
49-year-old son of a New York shipwright
and an innovative naval architect in
his own right, Griffiths designed a screw
steamer of greater length and beam
than her near-sisters, which, when fully
outfitted, drew less than the 10-foot draft
specified. People identified the Pawnee
so closely with her designer that some
referred to her as “the Griffiths ship.”
The Pawnee’s main battery consisted of
four XI-inch Dahlgren smoothbores and
By Robert J. Cressman
eight IX-inch Dahlgrens. The former were
iron guns, each weighing 15,700 pounds
that could hurl a 136-pound shell nearly
a mile (1,712 yards) with a 15-pound
charge, and 1,975 yards with a 20-pound
charge. An experienced crew could fire
one round every 1.74 minutes for an hour;
over a three-hour span the time increased
to 2.86 minutes per round. In a real
emergency, a good crew could fire a round
every 1.33 minutes. The IX-inchers, also
of iron, each weighed 9,000 pounds and
could hurl a 72.5-pound projectile 1,740
yards, or 75-pound shrapnel 1,690 yards,
in both cases using a 10-pound charge.
The Philadelphia firm of Reaney and
Neafie, under the supervision of Chief
Engineer William W. W. Wood and R.
H. Lang, constructed the Pawnee’s
engines. A pair of horizontal direct-acting
cylinders, measuring 65 inches in diameter
by a 36-inch stroke, drove a 7-foot-3-
inch master gear wheel, asymmetrically
installed just off the centerline to port,
which in turn drove two smaller pinions
2 feet, 11 inches in diameter. Unlike the
other steamers in the 1858 budget, which
had single screws, her propulsion plant
drove twin four-bladed screws, each 9 feet
in diameter. She could make 10 knots top
speed. Given the heavy battery and the
weight of the engines needed to drive two
screws, Griffiths designed the ship with a
concave hull form.
The Pawnee sailed on 14 September
1860 for the Gulf of Mexico, with Flag
Officer George J. Pendergrast embarked.
Arriving off Vera Cruz, Mexico, on 15
• October, she operated with the Home
Squadron for less than two months,
returning to Philadelphia shortly
before Christmas of 1860 to be placed
“in ordinary”—a noncommissioned
status—soon after her arrival. But she
was recommissioned on 31 December,
Lieutenant Samuel Marcy in command.
Amid growing tensions between North
and South, Rowan relieved Marcy on
18 January 1861. By that time four slave
states had seceded from the Union;
three more were to follow suit within
a fortnight. Although married to a
Virginian and fond of the South, Rowan
stood firmly loyal to the Union.
The political crisis worsened, and
within a few weeks Fox, a former naval
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
 J. M. CAIELLA

The steam-powered Pawnee was launched in October 1859 at the

Pawnee-class wooden-hull steam Philadelphia Navy Yard. She was built at a cost of $457,151.12.
sloop-of-war, second rate • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Displacement 1,533 tons standing toward the Ultimately, the Sumter force that Fox
harbor entrance. had wanted to resupply ended up being
Length 233 feet (overall)
Rowan ordered his embarked in the Baltic on 15 April. The
Beam 47 feet ship’s launch and one badly battered fort had been surrendered
Draft 11 feet (mean) of the cutters “readied to Confederate forces and duly occupied.
Armament (1860) Four XI-inch Dahlgren smoothbores a n d a r m e d f o r t h e As the flag that had flown over Sumter’s
purpose.” ramparts snapped in the wind from the
Eight IX-inch Dahlgren smoothbores
Only then did those Baltic’s main truck that afternoon, the
Complement 151 officers and men and Marines in the relief squadron Pawnee’s men joined in three hearty
hear cannon fire and cheers for the Stars and Stripes.
officer, commander of merchantmen, realize that the fort was under attack (as But the war was not over for
and manufacturer, was presenting a plan it had been for a time) and the war Rowan the Pawnee, which went on to see
to Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield had not wanted to inaugurate had, in fact, considerable service during the conflict.
Scott in Washington, D.C., for the relief begun. As the Baltic stood out, Captain She retained her eight IX-inch Dahlgrens
of Fort Sumter. Fox chose for the rest of the war.
the Pawnee for inclusion, By 5 May 1863 she also
reasoning that she was mounted a 100-pounder
“the only available steam Parrott rifle—capable
vessel of war north of the of firing solid shot and
Gulf of Mexico . . . [with] long shells—and a
heavy guns.” He had also 50-pounder Dahlgren. For
noted that “As a steamer a brief period in 1864, she
she seems to be a failure, mounted four additional
but she may be got ready for IX-inchers. Soon after
this emergency; at least she hostilities ended, the
is, unfortunately our only Pawnee carried one
resource.” light 12-pounder and a
The Pawnee sailed from THE STEAM NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES, BY FRANK M. BENNETT 24-pounder howitzer.
Washington on the morning This cutaway elevation of the Pawnee shows her asymmetrically mounted master Naval historian K. Jack
of 6 April 1861, reaching wheel (c) and her unusual concave hull. Bauer praised the Pawnee
Norfolk the next day to take • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • as “a notable sea boat,”
on the supplies made ready but contended that “her
for her. After his Bluejackets had stowed Fox noted the Pawnee standing in. Rowan machinery [had been] poorly built.”
them, Rowan planned to sail at daylight hailed Fox, saying that if he could get Eventually, the excessive cost attendant
on 9 April, but a heavy gale, blowing a pilot, he would take his ship in and to repairs of her engines prompted their
since the previous Sunday, delayed share the fate of his Army brethren. As removal in 1869-70. The Pawnee served
departure until the following morning. the guns bombarding Sumter thundered as a floating store- and hospital-ship until
Now, two days later, he and Fox’s in the distance, Fox went on board the July 1874, then a receiving ship, and
little flotilla were off Charleston. The Pawnee and convinced Rowan that “the ended her days as a store-ship at Port
Baltic, carrying the Sumter-bound Government did not expect any such Royal, South Carolina. There, on 3 May
supplies, and accompanied by the gallant sacrifice” of sharing whatever 1884, she was sold to M. H. Gregory of
revenue cutter Harriet Lane, began awaited the Army. Great Neck, New York, for $6,011.

N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011 67

 In Contact continued from page 9
Robert Stern
Regarding James Hornfischer’s article,
I believe a few clarifying comments would
be useful.  fact reporting might misstate the timing of
While it adds to the drama to state
that neither the Washington (BB-56) nor
South Dakota (BB-57) “was put through
the usual round of sea trials prior to
deployment,” this is not in fact the case.
The South Dakota, the newer of the two,
had put in two months of shakedown
between the  beginning of June 1942 and
the end of July, and had a three-week-
long post-shakedown yard period before
departing for the South Pacific. The
Washington, which had been in commis-
sion since May 1941, had spent the period
between March and July 1942 operating
with the Royal Navy from Scapa Flow and
Hvalfjordur.
Describing a night action is always dif-
ficult, and describing one in which several
of the participants were sunk even more
so, but a little clarification of the order in
which events  happened among the four
van destroyers would help. In particular,
it would be difficult to explain how the
explosion of the Preston’s fire rooms, which
RJ-Bender-CWUUSMC-hp-ad_Layout 1 1/18/11league player
occurred a few minutes before  she rolled
over at 2337, could have rained oil and
debris on the Benham after she was  tor-
pedoed in the bow at 2338. It is possible
that the clocks on the Benham and Preston
were not set identically or that after-the-
events by a few minutes. 
Still, the only way the debris and oil
from “Preston ahead” could fall  on the
Benham, which had been ahead of the
Preston in line, is to note, as Hornfischer
did not, that the Benham turned back
briefly toward the sinking Preston. Some
sources say this was done to aid the Preston,
others that it was done to escape concen-
trated gunfire. But regardless, the Benham’s
CO found his ship rapidly losing speed
and increasingly difficult to control  and
decided to turn back again, away from the
Preston and from the Japanese.
‘The Kid’s’ War Service
Lieutenant Commander Robert L.
Bratman, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
In Paul Stillwell’s “Looking Back”  (“A
Night at the Ballpark,” February, p. 6),
he states that Jerry Coleman was a
Marine Corps pilot and  “the only major-
8:17 PM Page who
1 fought in combat in
both World War II and the Korean War.”
Wrong! Try Ted Williams, who also flew
in combat in both World War II and Korea
as a Marine Corps pilot.  There are prob-
ably others, but Williams, for obvious rea-
sons, stands out.
Mr. Stillwell responds:
Ted Williams joined the Boston Red Sox
in 1939 and began a spectacular baseball
career. In 1941 he compiled a batting aver-
age of .406; no player has had an aver-
age that high in the succeeding 70 years.
At the time he was classified 3-A in draft
status because he provided sole support for
his mother. When World War II came in
late 1941, he was reclassified as 1-A, fit to
be drafted. Williams protested and regained
his previous status. But public opinion was
against him, so the stubborn Williams enlist-
ed in the Navy in May 1942 and entered the
V-5 flight-training program.
He earned his wings as a naval aviator and
a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve in
May 1944. The exceptional eyesight that served
him so well as a hitter in baseball also made him
very capable as an aerial gunner. After he was
commissioned he served as a flight instructor at
In Contact continued on page 70

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 In Contact continued from page 68
the Pensacola Naval Air Station. In the sum-
mer of 1945 he received operational training in
the F4U Corsair fighter.
Had the war lasted longer than it did,
Williams probably would have gotten into
combat because he received orders for duty
overseas. Instead, the Japanese ceased hos-
tilities in August 1945 and formally surren-
dered the following month. Williams left active
duty in early 1946, rejoined the Red Sox, and
played in that year’s World Series against the
St. Louis Cardinals. During the Korean War a
few years later, Williams was recalled to active
duty and served as an F9F Panther pilot in
combat. In February 1953 he barely escaped
being killed in a crash landing after his air-
craft was damaged as a result of being hit over
North Korea. He left active duty in July 1953
Earn Your MastEr and rejoined the Red Sox, for whom he played
of arts in until 1960.
David McCampbell—he was transferred
to VF-15.
Morris was credited with downing
seven Japanese aircraft and survived the
war. Three of the Hellcats he flew had
to be pushed over the side because they
were too shot up to be of further use.
On release from the Navy in 1945, he
resumed his film career, appearing in sev-
eral movies and on television in the late
1940s and early ’50s.
In 1959 the USS Bon Homme Richard
(CVA-11) pulled into Oakland, California,
where the ship’s skipper, then-Captain
David McCampbell, invited Bert and other
ex-squadron mates to come aboard for a
short cruise and breakfast. After eating
a hearty meal, Morris climbed five lad-
ders to the bridge, where he collapsed and
died. His remains now rest at Arlington
National Cemetery.

MilitarY HistorY - McCampbell’s

onlinE
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Famous Nephew
Captain James E.
Wise Jr., U.S. Navy
(Retired)
Concerning “Hellcat
Ace in a Day—Twice!”
(February, pp. 18–23),
Captain McCampbell
is a major player in the
“Wayne Morris” chapter of
Stars in Blue: Movie Actors
in America’s Sea Service,
which I coauthored with
Anne Rehill (Naval
Institute Press, 1997). The
following is based on an
excerpt from the chapter.
During World War II, COURTESY OF CAPTAIN JAMES E. WISE JR., USN (RET)
one Hollywood star not During World War II, then–Commander David McCampbell
only got into the action (left) had his movie-star relative, Lieutenant Bert “Wayne”
but became an air ace: Morris (right), transferred to his fighter squadron.
Bert DeWayne Morris • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
J r. , p o p u l a r l y k n o w n
as Wayne Morris. He flew Hellcats off Editor’s note: In his U.S. Naval Institute
the USS Essex (CV-9) as a member of oral history, McCampbell recalled that there
“Fighting Fifteen.” Following flight train- were few good movies in the Essex’s wardroom
ing and receiving his wings, Morris was for officers to watch during down time:
initially assigned as a flight instructor at
NAS Hutchinson, Kansas. Determined Captain McCampbell: I remember we
to see action, he requested assignment to got ahold of one movie, a Wayne Morris
a fighter squadron. His request got him movie, Kid Galahad, and they must have
transferred to Jacksonville, Florida, not shown that six or eight times.
for fighter duty but for PBY training. He Paul Stillwell: Since he was on board.
hand delivered a second request to the Captain McCampbell: Yes. [Laughter]
Bureau of Naval Personnel, again request- He got real fed up with that. He told the
ing assignment to a fighter squadron, and exec that he’d had enough of seeing his own
with a little help from his wife’s uncle— movie: “Please get something else.”

70 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E

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 Naval History News continued from page 11
Seeking the Revenge of Perry
New England divers announced in
January that they have discovered what
they believe is the shipwreck of the U.S.
Navy schooner Revenge, which sank off the
Rhode Island coast in 1811. Her skipper?
A young lieutenant named Oliver Hazard
Perry, who soon moved on to bigger and
better things.
While en route from Newport, Rhode
Island, to New London, Connecticut,
the Revenge hit a reef in a storm, ran
aground, and was abandoned. Perry
was absolved of responsibility in the
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A cannon may mark the spot where Oliver Hazard Perry’s ship went down: New England divers
say they have located the wreck of the Revenge.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
ensuing court of inquiry (the pilot took
the blame). After a leave of absence,
Perry returned to service and assumed
command of the U.S. naval force on
Lake Erie in the War of 1812. On 10
September 1813, he earned his place in
the pantheon of American naval heroes
with his “Don’t give up the ship” victory
at the Battle of Lake Erie.
As the divers who made the recent
shipwreck discovery mused when making
their announcement, the wreck of the
Revenge in a sense altered the course of
naval history by altering the career
trajectory of Perry, indirectly setting the
Cradle of Naval Aviation Kicks off Centennial Year
Naval Air Station Pensacola on 20
January kicked off a year’s worth of
celebrations in honor of the centennial
of naval aviation. The event featured the
fly-by of a vintage-painted T-39 Saberliner
and speeches to mark the opening of 2011
festivities.
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• • • • • • • • • • • •
stage for his Lake Erie billet and his date
with destiny.
One of the divers, Charles Buffum, said
he had been fascinated with stories of the
Revenge wreck since childhood. He and his
fellow ship-hunters actually first knew they
were onto something in 2005, when they
located a cannon; since then they have found
four more cannon, an anchor, and enough
other artifacts that they are now “99 percent
sure” that this is the Revenge site. A true
“smoking gun” identifier, such as a ship’s bell,
has yet to turn up, however. Meanwhile, the
discoverers have notified Naval History &
Heritage Command of the find.
Training Command, addressed a crowd
of more than 500 people: “In this year of
2011, we absolutely know how aviation
positively impacts our maritime forces,
and is essential to the defense of our
republic.
“That was not always the case. In 1901
Rear Admiral George Melville wrote in
the North American Review that neither
the dirigible airship nor the powered
flying machine would ever prove of any
use commercially, let alone in warfare.
Rear Admiral Melville called flight
‘wholly unwarranted if not absurd.’ Well,
nobody ever said making admiral gives
you wisdom.”
Other speakers at the event included
C a p t a i n C h r i s t o p h e r P l u m m e r,
commanding officer of NAS Pensacola,
and Florida Governor Rick Scott.
The Navy officially dates the
beginning of its aviation element to
8 May 1911, when the service’s first
aircraft were requisitioned. Marine
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
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The 20 January date for Pensacola’s
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arrival of the team who would develop the
first training program and base. As Captain
Plummer noted in his address to the crowd,
“Today marks the exact day 97 years ago—20
January 1914—in the spot where Lieutenant
John H. Towers and Lieutenant Commander
Henry C. Mustin landed in Pensacola.”
Towers was the officer-in-charge of an
aviation unit from the U.S. Naval Academy,
consisting of nine officers and 23 Sailors who
arrived on board the battleship Mississippi and
cargo ship Orion to set up a Navy flying school
at Pensacola.
“This cadre of naval officers and Sailors
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The first-place prizes are a plaque and a cash
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Over the summer, a panel of judges will
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 Book Reviews
Passport Not Required: U.S.
Volunteers in the Royal
Navy, 1939-1941
Eric Dietrich-Berryman, Charlotte
Hammond, and R. E. White. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010. 186 pp.
Illus. Index. $27.95.
Reviewed by John Hattendorf
All Americans who have visited the
famous Painted Hall at the Old Royal
Naval College at Greenwich, England,
during the past 70 years will probably
have noticed the intriguing floor stone
with the inscription, “15 June 1941.
On this day came three citizens of the
United States of America, the first of
their countrymen to become Sea Officers
of the Royal Navy.” The three authors
of Passport Not Required have long been
enticed by the unanswered questions
that the inscribed stone has posed: Who
were these officers? Were there others?
How did they manage to do this? What
became of them?
For most naval historians, the story of
the Americans who volunteered to serve
as officers in the Royal Navy at the out-
break of World War II has been known
only through the single account that
one of them, Alex Cherry, published in
1951 titled, Yankee, R.N. This new slim
volume provides further valuable infor-
mation about this fascinating episode
in Anglo-American cooperation during
that war.
The authors show that there were 22
American citizens commissioned in the
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR)
during the period of American neutrality
in the first phase of the war. The June
1941 date on the Greenwich stone mere-
ly indicates when three of them came
to Greenwich for training. The first of
those who joined the RNVR was William
Taylor, who was commissioned on 14
September 1939; the last of the group
was Peter Morison, commissioned on 10
November 1941.
The Americans’ personalities, back-
grounds, experiences in the Royal Navy,
and subsequent careers were as diverse as
those of any group of naval volunteers.
The one who went furthest in the U.S.
Navy on his return was Draper Kaufman,
who subsequently became famous for
organizing the first U.S. naval under-
76
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water demolition team that became the
forerunner of present-day SEAL teams
and eventually became a rear admiral in
1960. Peter Morison was the only son
of the famous Harvard historian Samuel
Eliot Morison.
John Parker, one of the three com-
memorated on the Greenwich stone,
was commissioned 7 June 1941. Parker
was quickly assigned to serve in HMS
Broadwater (H-81), originally the
American-built Clemson-class flush-deck
four-piper USS Mason (DD-191) that
had been transferred to the Royal Navy
in the Destroyers for Bases Agreement
in 1940. On 17 October 1941, U-101
sank the Broadwater 400 miles south
of Iceland while she was guarding an
American convoy. Among those who
lost their lives was Parker, the first
American citizen to die in combat as a
British naval officer.
The authors also relate the sub-
sequent commemoration of these
Americans through a supplemen-
tary memorial, which was dedicat-
ed at Greenwich in October 2001 to
record the names of all 22 Americans
and a memorial to the Broadwater in
Chichester Cathedral.
This useful work is a welcome con-
tribution to the literature on Anglo-
American naval cooperation that serves
both as an excellent supplement to
Cherry’s classic 1951 account, as well as a
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
remembrance of all the men who volun-
teered for this unusual service.
Dr. Hattendorf is Ernest J. King Professor of
Maritime History, chairman of the Maritime History
Department, and director of the Naval War College
Museum at the Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island.
Guadalcanal, Tarawa and
Beyond: A Mud Marine’s
Memoir of the Pacific Island
War
William W. Rogal. Jefferson, NC: McFarland
& Company, 2010. 214 pp. Illus. Bib. Index.
$29.95.
Reviewed by Richard Frank
If I were asked to identify a model
combat memoir, this would be it. William
W. Rogal has a great story, and he tells
it deftly. He shrewdly incorporates other
sources for essential background to his
personal experiences. He is ever mindful
of his comrades, often detailing the exact
circumstances of wounds and deaths.
Finally, he comprehends that it is far bet-
ter to leave the reader wishing for more
than to leave him looking ahead to see
how much more there is left to read.
As did so many Marines of that era,
Rogal grew up during the Depression in
humble circumstances. Contemporary
adventure stories stoked a lust for travel
that he thought pointed him to the Navy
in 1940, with no thought of the coming
war. But a friend redirected him into the
Marine Corps with the bit of misinforma-
tion that the Marines on ships “boss the
Sailors around.”
He warmly recalls his “all busi-
ness” Parris Island boot camp instruc-
tors. Initial duty with the 5th Marines
morphed into service in Merritt “Red
Mike” Edson’s embryonic raider bat-
talion. He then found himself among
a detachment sent from Edson to help
establish Evans Carlson’s raider battalion.
Carlson and Rogal instantly achieved
a mutual dislike. Hence, Rogal swiftly
found himself in the newly forming A
Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.
Now-corporal Rogal took charge of
a Browning automatic rifle squad as his
regiment loaded out for what proved to
be Guadalcanal. Here Rogal airs a major

motivation for his memoirs: a well-found-
ed conviction that the Guadalcanal con-
tribution of 2d Marines rarely gets its due.
Yet even as his outfit’s champion, he is
ever careful with the facts of both his and
his regiment’s actual experiences.
In smooth prose, Rogal candidly nar-
rates the relatively peripheral role his
starving battalion played on Florida
and Tulagi islands prior to permanent
transfer to Guadalcanal in November
1942. While his combat experiences are
amply riveting in themselves, his narra-
tive affords a thoughtful study on com-
bat psychology and particularly combat
leadership. He identifies the overarching
aspiration of his comrades as “survival
with honor.” It was the “with honor” that
fueled the engine of effectiveness. His
saddest day of service occurred when his
first platoon leader proved a coward.
In his initial encounter with face-to-
face combat, he killed five Japanese. This
evokes no shame or sorrow, but likewise
no sense of elation or victory. As his
unit’s roll dwindled alarmingly from com-
bat losses and disease, Rogal found his
assignments increasing in responsibility,
but he acknowledges that “[a]s a troop
leader I felt obligated to exhibit uncon-
cern and a savoir-faire I certainly didn’t
feel.” He earned his highest personal
decoration, the Navy and Marine Corps
Medal, by rescuing a pilot from the sea.
As to this, he confesses, “I have always
been apathetic about it, for Marines get
paid to kill people, not save them.”
There followed a period of recupera-
tion in New Zealand before Tarawa.
Rogal, now a platoon sergeant, was
wounded on the harrowing run into
N AVA L H I S T O R Y • APRIL 2011
the beach in an LVT (landing vehicle
tracked) where one man was decapitat-
ed by a Japanese shell. On that famous
beachhead replete with chaos he did his
best at least to get his small command
moving beyond the breakwater to engage
the enemy.
After a protracted hospitalization,
Rogal returned to his unit. He narrates
the campaigns on Saipan and Tinian in
roughly the same space he gives Tarawa.
Just as he sensed his relative luck was
running out (he was wounded again on
Saipan), Rogal benefited from the pol-
icy of returning men with two years of
overseas service to the States. There he
trained new Marines for combat and mar-
ried the wonderful woman he met before
shipping out to the Pacific. The service
memoirs conclude with his postwar tour
in China. After discharge, he went on to
secure an undergraduate and law degree
and worked for decades as a lawyer.
Anyone who has read many personal
accounts of World War II service will
find this one truly outstanding, not just
in its intrinsic interest but also in the
care and craft of the author.
Mr. Frank is the author of the award-winning
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark
Battle (Random House, 1990) and Downfall: The
End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (1999). He was a
consultant for the HBO miniseries “The Pacific” and
is working on a trilogy about the Asian-Pacific War
from 1937 to 1945.
Perilous Fight: America’s
Intrepid War with Britain on
the High Seas, 1812-1815
Stephen Budiansky. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2010. 422 pp. Maps. Illus. Bib. Index.
$35.
Reviewed by Commander Tyrone G.
Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Stephen Budiansky’s book is on the
leading edge of what undoubtedly will
be a wave of works about the War of
1812. His opus may not be forgotten in
the crowd, for he has taken an unusual
approach: Sea battles are not its focus.
Instead, he traces the course of the war
through the politics and strategies of each
side and the impact of events on them, as
well as the logistical and financial prob-
lems, the changing public attitudes, and
the personalities of those involved. The
actual combat is a sideshow.
Opening with a brief review of the com-
bat origin of the U.S. Navy during the
First Barbary War, the author takes up the
British perception of America as a crude,
embryonic nation with little to recom-
mend it and certainly unworthy of respect,
and contrasts it with the young nation still
finding its way but with the revolution-
ary fires still smoldering. The two views
inevitably cause tensions and incidents,
particularly as Britain is in a life-and-death
struggle with France and will go to almost
any length to ensure victory. And so the
course is set for confrontation over “Free
Trade and Sailors’ Rights.”
Britain began the war with the hope
of bringing it to an end through diplo-
macy. The United States began with the
expectation of gaining Canada. Both
sides were mistaken. Not surprisingly, the
British turned to a strategy of blockade,
with which they had had so much suc-
cess against France. The coastline to be
blockaded and its distance from home
bases made that almost impossible and
required much greater resources than had
been anticipated. For the Americans, the
incompetency of their generals aside, the
unwelcome truth was that the Canadians
weren’t interested in leaving the empire.
Budiansky paints a number of interesting
portraits of the reactions of political and
military leaders on both sides and their
responses to the realities of the situation.
When the author turns to actual opera-
tions his treatment becomes sketchy, per-
haps betraying a lack of understanding of
the details of ship duels. With regard to
the opening U.S. victory of the war over
HMS Guerriere, he has chosen to repeat
the story that appeared in most newspa-
pers of the time, one that may have been
“good press” but bears little relation to
history. In retelling the Battle of Lake Erie,
77
 the American brig Lawrence is said to have
been fighting on both sides simultane-
ously, when she actually faced two foes on
the same side. About half of the battles are
ignored. And at no time is the point made
that, among the American captains, none
had fought a sea battle before.
This is an easy book to read and so
may gain a wide audience. Unfortunately,
the author treats the facts rather cava-
lierly—as when he states the Royal Navy
outnumbered the U.S. Navy 100 to 1—
and so the phrase, “a good read” must be
viewed with caution in terms of its being
an authoritative text.
Commander Martin is a Golden Life member of the
Naval Institute, the author of the prize-winning A
Most Fortunate Ship (Naval Institute Press, 1997), and
the 1997 Naval History Author of the Year.
The Battle for China: Essays
on the Military History of
the Sino-Japanese War of
1937-1945
Edited by Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and
Hans Van De Ven. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2010. 614 pp. Maps. Illus.
Index. Notes. $65
Reviewed by Major Robert S. Burrell, U.S.
Marine Corps
The title of this book implies a degree
of ambiguity concerning those who fought
over the territorial integrity and cultural
identity of China. The interplay of impe-
rial Japan, nationalist Chinese, commu-
nist Chinese, Great Britain, Germany, the
Soviet Union, France, and the United
States from 1937 through 1945 creates
a challenging labyrinth to navigate with
accuracy and objectivity. Consequently,
the editors have avoided attempting to
define the facts of the matter and instead
have offered essays from the perspectives
of scholars from China, Taiwan, Japan, and
the United States.
Editors Mark Peattie, research fellow
at the Hoover Institution; Edward Drea,
former chief of the Research and Analysis
Division of the U.S. Army Center of
Military History; and Hans Van De Ven,
professor of modern Chinese history at
Cambridge University, are leading authori-
ties on the Pacific war. The volume’s 17
other contributors range from unknown
doctoral candidates to historian heavy-
weights such as Ronald Spector. Despite
this diversity, the result is a text firmly
grounded in analyses of events from the
perspective of military affairs.
The book is organized in six parts: an
overview; opposing armies organization,
78
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training and equipment; initial hostili-
ties (1937–38); a stalemate in strategies
(1938–42); the Burma and Ichigo cam-
paigns (1943–45); and conclusions. One
innovative theme is the attention given
to the challenges facing Chiang Kai-shek
and the nationalist party Kuomintang
(KMT). While not excusing its failures,
the authors provide context for under-
standing the KMT’s weak position in an
agrarian society with undeveloped state
organization facing a growing commu-
nist insurgency, tepid Allied support, and
a vicious campaign of destruction car-
ried out by an industrialized opponent.
The deprivations the Chinese endured
and the sacrifices they made over seven
long years of some of the most brutal
warfare in history does much to explain
the KMT’s precarious situation at war’s
end. Spector provides excellent context
to these essays, placing the scholarship
within the framework of the Pacific war,
World War II, and the history of warfare.
The book provides important insights
into the Imperial Japanese Army. At a
tactical and operational level, the Sino-
Japanese War validates Japan’s empha-
sis on offensive tactics to overcome the
numeric superiority of its opponents—suc-
cessful in this case against the Chinese
rather than the Soviets, for whom it had
prepared. Although in most cases materi-
ally superior to the Chinese, Japan’s ability
to keep them off balance through limited
offensives was perhaps the primary fac-
tor in surmounting overwhelming odds in
manpower.
The book also emphasizes the impor-
tance of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
operations in central China, particularly
the considerable efforts of its naval air
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
forces in supporting the army and the
vital consequence of controlling inland
waterways for transportation and logis-
tics. Naval forces proved critical in the
amphibious landings at Shanghai. The
book offers additional lessons on how
Japan’s unclear strategy and inability to
focus resources toward ending the war
dragged the military deeper into a quag-
mire from which it could not emerge.
The Battle for China is a ground- and
air-centric study from which it is dif-
ficult to extract naval lessons. Japan’s
ability to attain sea control between
its main islands and the Chinese coast
gave it great advantages in maneuver-
ability and sustainment. In addition to
controlling the major islands of Formosa
(Taiwan) and Hainan, Japan seized every
major seaport in China. Early in the
war, the Imperial Japanese Navy initi-
ated its 4th Fleet to maintain China Sea
lines of communication and deny vital
maritime logistics to the KMT. Because
China could not oppose Japan with any
significant sea denial, the authors may
have chosen to avoid the subject of sea
power. The Peoples’ Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN), however, has not forgot-
ten the naval lessons of the war, in which
its coastline and waterways became the
highways for imperial aggression.
My only major criticism of The Battle
for China stems from the inadequacy of
its maps. Those unfamiliar with Chinese,
Japanese, and Burmese geography will
find the places described difficult to
locate. For instance, the prominent prov-
ince of Chahar in Inner Mongolia is not
named on any of the 14 maps—even on
the map of the Battle of Pingxingguan
Pass, which took place in Chahar. The
Burmese map shows fewer than half of
the important locations discussed in the
readings and no indication of the Burma
Road, for which the forces were fighting.
While I am not certain that Chinese or
Japanese audiences will gravitate to this
English work, and despite its targeting a
small niche of Sino-Japanese War history
enthusiasts in North America and Europe,
nevertheless I cannot praise the editors
enough for their effort in publishing this
important book. The Battle for China is a
rare treasure that will likely renew inter-
est in this underdeveloped field. For those
interested in the Pacific war or greater
insight into modern Chinese history, I
highly recommend it.
Major Burrell is author of the award-winning The
Ghosts of Iwo Jima (Texas A&M Press, 2006) and a
former history instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy.
 Celebrating 100 Years of
NAVAL AVIATION

HARDCOVER / 978-1-59114-879-1 / $37.95

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF U.S. NAVY AIR POWER

Edited by Douglas V. Smith
978-1-59114-795-4 / Hardcover: $44.95
HARDCOVER / 978-1-59114-285-0 / $52.95
“A monumental and eminently readable work from a group
of distinguished historians in the field of naval aviation. This
is an absolutely essential addition to the personal libraries
of military history readers and aviation enthusiasts alike. A
book to be carefully read and then kept within reach.”
— Admiral James L. Holloway III, USN (Ret.),
former Chief of Naval Operations
and author of Aircraft Carriers at War

“In time for the centennial of U.S. Navy aviation, this an-
thology by acknowledged authorities provides an excellent
one-volume source on the subject. While aircraft carriers
take pride of place, the chapters on maritime aviation and
helicopters also are well worth reading. With detailed notes
and sources, this book undoubtedly will remain a popular
reference well beyond 2011.”
—Barrett Tillman,
author of Clash of the Carriers HARDCOVER / 978-1-59114-516-5 / $49.95

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 Museum Report
Splendor of Gods and Kings in Thailand
T
he letters exchanged in 1861–62
between Mongkut, king of Siam,
and President Abraham Lincoln
are among the most curious in
the White House files. Mongkut’s offer to
ship breeding pairs of elephants, highly
valued beasts of many uses in his kingdom,
arrived in the United States in February
1861. A year later, Lincoln took a moment
away from the Civil War to reply:
I appreciate most highly Your
Majesty’s tender of good offices in
forwarding to this Government a
stock from which a supply of elephants
might be raised on our own soil. This
Government would not hesitate to
avail itself of so generous an offer if
the object were one which could be
made practically useful in the present
condition of the United States. Our
political jurisdiction, however, does
not reach a latitude so low as to favor
the multiplication of the elephant,
and steam on land, as well as on water,
has been our best and most efficient
agent of transportation in internal
commerce. (Dwight Young, Letters to
the Oval Office).
Although this diplomatic footnote isn’t
well known, many Americans are familiar
with Mongkut, if only as his majesty was
first portrayed by Yul Brynner on Broadway
in The King and I (1951)—a picture of the
sovereign and his kingdom that today most
Thais find patronizing and deeply offensive.
A better idea of the sophistication and
grandeur of the Thai royal house comes
from a tour of the precinct of the royal
palace in Bangkok, a fabulous, glittering
assembly of roughly 40 buildings behind
more than a mile of crenellated walls.
With this splendid site as a distraction,
relatively few tourists make it across the
Chao Phraya River to the Royal Barges
Museum near the Phra Pinklao Bridge.
That’s too bad. The barges are beautiful,
and more impressive than the generally
smaller Ottoman sultans’ caiques displayed
in Istanbul. Eight are intact, carved from
great teak trunks, with gilded figureheads
from the Hindu pantheon. Parts of several
other barges are also on display. All are
housed in an aircraft-hangar-like exhibit
80
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COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR
At one time constituting the king’s navy, the royal Thai barges were a stunning, gilded display of
power in the riverine nation. The largest, Subanahongsa (fanged-bird figurehead, second from
right), carried the royal family.
• • • • • • • • • • • •
hall enclosing the dock. The Thai barges
once constituted the king’s navy, a show of
royal power afloat in a riverine nation.
Sadly, the kingdom’s antique barges were
destroyed or damaged during World War
II. The largest of the eight on display, the
king’s own hundred-year-old Subanahongsa,
lies grandly behind a gilded figurehead of
a swan-like hamsa, the mythical fanged,
glaring bird associated with the Hindu
god Brahma, the creator. The figurehead
is meant to suggest the king’s wisdom and
grace. Afloat, the Subanahongsa is manned
by a crew of 63, including 52 paddlers
in red livery and seven pink-coated
“chanters.” Two helmsmen steer.
More imposing still is the ferocious,
seven-headed serpent figurehead on the
second-ranked and only slightly smaller
barge, the Anantanagaraj. This carving is
of a naga, one of a semi-divine race from
under the sea.
Two among the smaller (30–40
paddlers) and newer escort barges that
accompany the king’s vessel feature a
carving of Garuda, the fierce, snake-eating
half-man, half-eagle important in Hindu
and Buddhist mythology who is often
associated with Vishnu, the preserver. Both
figures straddle a dummy bow chaser gun.
Lesser barges exhibit crowned monkeys,
By Andrew C. A. Jampoler
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
tigers, and other beasts drawn from the
same fantastic menagerie of pious belief.
Another Garuda figurehead, this
one off the bow of the barge HTMS
Rattanakosin, is displayed at the Royal
Thai Navy Museum in Samut Prakan,
but relatively few tourists get there,
either. This museum is south of the
capital, across from the grounds of the
Royal Thai Naval Academy (admission
free; telephone 02 394 1997; open
0830–1530 daily, except public and
national holidays).
The easiest way to reach Bangkok’s
Royal Barges Museum is to rent a long-
tailed boat from any convenient place on
a canal. Like many things in Thailand,
both rental and taxi fare are negotiable.
Royal Barges Museum
Open daily 0900-1700
Arun Amarin Road
Bangkok Noi Bangkok 10700
Tel: 02 424 0004
Admission 100 Thai baht (about $3)
Andrew Jampoler thanks David Thomas of Wanna
Tours, Chiangmai, Thailand, for assistance.
His fourth Naval Institute Press book is Horrible
Shipwreck, published in 2010.
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