Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175602

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and

Promulgated:
EDWIN VALDEZ,

Accused-Appellants.
January 18, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the
elements of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the
ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation.

The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on January
20, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. They were
penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay to the heirs of
each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006,
subject to the modification that each accused pay to the heirs of each
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit. 1

The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however,
accused Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on
October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated.  Hence, the
2

Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez.

Antecedents
 The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in
the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises
Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson, alleging:

Criminal Case No. 00-90718

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon the person of one FERDINAND
SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun,
hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND SAYSON Y
DABOCOL.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Criminal Case No. 00-90719

 That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon the person of one MOISES SAYSON,
JR. Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him several times with a
gun, hitting him on his face and chest, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said MOISES
SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Criminal Case No. 00-90720

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon the person of one JOSELITO SAYSON
Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on
his back, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the State’s evidence of
guilt as follows:

On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella

Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai
alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay,
Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of
her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the
evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former
policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen
and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening,
Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson
(Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella’s
family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party (pp. 3-
5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 3-6, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 3-4,
TSN, July 31, 2001).

At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was

interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a
motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked
the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was
then attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises
approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella
saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises
from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mother’s
warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force
Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-
appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?”
Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises
fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the
ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother
Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his
head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the
back while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN,
 November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 5-10, TSN,
July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).

After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped

from the scene of the crime (p. 10, TSN, February 6, 2001). 6

In turn, the appellant’s brief filed by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)

rendered the version of the accused, to wit:

xxx [A]t about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a
barbecue vendor) and Noel Valad-on (a tricycle driver) saw accused
Edwin Valdez alight from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of
barbecue from Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was walking
along Corregidor Street when Heidi saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then
holding a gun, block his (Edwin’s) way. Jun Sayson poked a gun at
accused Edwin, shouting, ‘Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita’. The latter
raised both his hands and said ‘Wag kuya Jun, maawa ka.’

Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year

old child, was walking when his way was likewise blocked but this time,
by the siblings Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their stepfather. Joselito
twisted one of his (Eduardo’s) hands at his back while his (Joseltio’s)
stepfather held the other. Ferdinand fired a gun but accused Eduardo was
able to evade. Joselito, who was positioned behind Eduardo, was hit. He
slumped and bled. He asked Heidi to inform his family that he was hit.
Heidi ran away. She saw Jun (Moises) and accused Edwin grappling.
Thereafter, she heard gunshots.

Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be

dead. Ferdinand stopped firing. Accused Eduardo’s son approached him
crying. Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his service
firearm and on his way back to the scene of the incident when he met
 General Jesus Almadin, his commanding officer (CO). He reported the
incident and sought for advice. He was told to take a rest and go back on
(sic) the following day. He accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He
surrendered his firearm to Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused
Edwin Valdez likewise surrendered (TSN dated 05 February 2003; pp.
3-9; 12 March 2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003, pp. 2-18, 1 September
2003, pp. 3-10; 15 October 2003, pp. 2-8; 03 December 2003, pp. 2-4;
18 February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004, pp. 3-9; 10 April 2004, pp.
2-7; 07 June 2004, pp. 2-25). 7

The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced
them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. 8

On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. 9

Issues

In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State’s witnesses by
pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding
of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State did not establish the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. 10

Ruling

The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three
counts of homicide due to the failure of the informations to allege the facts and
circumstances constituting treachery.
 First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the State’s witnesses (Susan Sayson,
Marites Sayson and Estrella Sayson) did not really see the events as they transpired;
and that they wrongly identified the two accused as the persons who had shot and
killed the victims; and that the victims were themselves the aggressors.

The CA rejected PO2 Valdez’s insistence, holding thus:

In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to

discredit the testimonies of witnesses Susan, Marites and Estrella. They
claimed that a perusal of Estrella’s testimony would cast doubt on her
statement that she actually witnessed the shooting incident. The accused-
appellants claimed that Estrella Sayson did not actually see who
allegedly threatened her son Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin
na kita?” The accused-appellants also claimed that Estrella also failed to
see who shot Moises. They likewise assailed the testimonies of Susan
and Marites as being incredible. They said that Susan testified that she
was in a state of shock after the incident and that she could not speak;
yet she was still able to give her statement on the same day the incident
allegedly happened. The accused-appellants also said that Marites
testified that she was only about five (5) meters away from them
(accused-appellants) when they alighted from their motorcycle; but that,
“interestingly,” she only learned from her husband Joselito that the
accused-appellants were looking for a certain Jonathan.

We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily

explained her purported failure to see who between the accused-
appellants threatened Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin kita?”
and who shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing
Moises because she was preventing him from approaching the accused-
appellants, who were armed with short firearms. Estrella categorically
stated that she saw the accused-appellants alight from their motorcycle
on March 1, 2000. She could not have been mistaken about the identity
of the accused-appellants for the simple reason that they are her
 neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants’) father is her
“cumpadre.” When the incident happened, the accused-appellants were
about eight (8) to ten (10) meters away from where she and her son
Moises were standing. She also saw with her own eyes how her son
Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of gunshots (approximately
[9] shots) coming from where the accused-appellants were standing. 11

Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial court’s findings of fact, its
calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their probative
weight, as well as its conclusions, the Court accords high respect, if not conclusive
effect, to the CA’s findings.  The justification for this is that trial court was in the best
12

position to assess the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its firsthand observation of

the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The
only time when a reviewing court was not bound by the trial court’s assessment of
credibility arises upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence
that was overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case.  No such 13

fact or circumstance has been brought to the Court’s attention.

It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to

give an error-free testimony because of the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory; and that inaccuracies noted in testimony may even suggest that the witness
is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed.  To properly appreciate the worth of
14

testimony, therefore, the courts do not resort to the individual words or phrases alone
but seek out the whole impression or effect of what has been said and done. 15

Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves the
aggressors who had attacked to kill him and his brother. He narrated during the trial
that he dodged the bullet fired from the gun of Ferdinand (one of the victims), causing
the bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim); that he played dead to avoid being
shot at again, and walked away with his terrified son only after the way was clear for
them to leave; and that he heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third victim)
grappled for control of a gun, and assumed that the gunshots had hit and killed Jun
and Ferdinand. 16

The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.

It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused and the
victim was the unlawful aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the trial court for
determination based on the evidence on record.  The records show that the version of
17

PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and circumstances showing that he
and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of
Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily
attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to
come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened
Moises: Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!,
PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2
Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to
aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that
somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito
twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the
three victims were apparently fired from short distances.

The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the
physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had
a gunshot wound in the head;  that two gunshot wounds entered Joselito’s back and
18

the right side of his neck;  and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and
19

four gunshot wounds in the chest.  Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal
20

Office opined that the presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated
that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range.  Given that physical evidence
21

was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put
together,  the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical
22

evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
 Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.  Proof of the
23

actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be
implied or inferred from their acts.  Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy
24

between the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the
killings. We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted.

Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility
for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were
convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of
assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest
not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle,
but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots
at Moises and immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito
one after the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same
motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.

To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the

execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator
in the execution of the criminal acts.  Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy
25

between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts
that were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest. 26

And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty
of three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not
sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.

Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of

any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.  It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant
27

circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed.

Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or
qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety
generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or
particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the
liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to
defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but
by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.  In People v.
28

Dimaano,  the Court elaborated:

29

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name

of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated,
these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. 
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging
the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of
 the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense.  The presumption is that the accused
has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with
intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by
then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their
bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended
each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of
a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution
of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the
defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill
was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same
lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment,
for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of
a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an
attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify
in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his
liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to
enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in
his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the
body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for
which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United States v. Lim
San: 30
 From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in
no way aids him in a defense on the merits. xxx. That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform
the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which
those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of
the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the
accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and
complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no
consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real
and important question to him is, “Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?” not “Did you commit a crime named murder.” If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what
the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of
the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. xxx. (emphasis
supplied)

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his

liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence
that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in
the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in
the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the
offense proved.  In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense
31

proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.32

We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide.

 Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal.  There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the
33

penalty is applied in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the maximum from the
medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18,

2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late
Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice
 WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1 Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao (retired), with Associate Justice Rosmari D.
Carandang and Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa (retired) concurring.

2 Id., p. 57.

3 Id., p. 3.

4 Id., p. 3.

5 Id.

6 Id., p. 5.
7 Id., pp. 6-7.

8 Id., pp. 7-8.

9 Id., p. 17.

10 Id., p. 11.

11 Rollo, pp. 13-14 (bold emphases are in the original text).

12 People v. Darilay, G.R. Nos. 139751-752, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 45, 54.

13 People v. Santiago, G.R. Nos. 137542-43, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 248, 256; People v. Abolidor, G.R. No.
147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260; People v. Pacheco, G.R. No. 142887, March 2, 2004, 424 SCRA 164,
174; People v. Genita, Jr., G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 343, 349; People v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No.
144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139, 153-154; Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150433, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA
209, 219-220; Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 154804, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 489, 495; People v. Taan, G.R. No.
169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230; People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515
SCRA 537, 547; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 306.

14 People v. Ebrada, G.R. No. 122774, September 26, 1998, 296 SCRA 353, 365.

15 People v. Gailo, G.R. No. 116233, October. 13, 1999, 316 SCRA 733, 748.

16 Rollo, pp. 6-7.

17 Garcia v. People , G.R. No. 144699, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 221, 228.

18 Exhibits K and L.

19 Exhibit D.

20 Exhibits Q and R.

21 TSN, May 23, 2000, pp. 3-13; September 12, 2000, pp. 2-7.

22 People v. Bardaje, No. L-29271, August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 388, 399; People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No.
127818, November 11, 1998, 298 SCRA 450, 463.

23Art. 8, 2nd Par., Revised Penal Code; Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135619, January 15, 2004, 419
SCRA 514, 527; People v. Ogapay, No. L-28566, August 21, 1975, 66 SCRA 209, 214.

24 People v. Cabrera,G.R. No. 105992, February 1, 1995, 241 SCRA 28, 34.

25 People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384, 404; People v. Masagnay, G.R. No.
137364, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 572, 580.

26 People v. Natipravat, No. L-69876, November 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 483, 492; People v. Bausing, G.R. No.
64965, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 355, 364; People v. Merabueno, G.R. No. 87179, December 14, 1994, 239 SCRA
197, 203-204.
27 Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code.

28 Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298, 327.

29 G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 666-667.

30 United States v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).

31 Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.

32 Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.

33 Article 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty
of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.