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I - The Varieties of Goodness - The Varieties of Goodness
I - The Varieties of Goodness - The Varieties of Goodness
I had thought of using this title. But besides the fact that it has been
used before it would be too ambitious. For it is after all only an
aspect of the broader approach needed for ethics which I have
ventured to study with any thoroughness in the present work. What it
is and what the other main aspects are I shall indicate later in this
chapter (sect. 4).
The distinctions between the ought and the is and between the two
types of ethics is commonly understood in such a way that the term
‘ought’ covers both norms and values and that ‘normative’ as an
attribute of ‘ethics’ refers both to the prescriptive and to the
evaluative. As another off-shoot of the idea of a sharp distinction
between the evaluative and prescriptive on the one hand and the
factual on the other hand may be regarded the idea that ‘science’ is
value-free (Die Wertfreiheit der Wissenschaften).
I would not wish to maintain that the only fruitful way of dealing with
the problems here is to mould the unmoulded meanings to make
fixed and sharp that which ordinary usage leaves loose and
undetermined. It has seemed to me however that conceptual
inquiries which take the form of a moulding or shaping of concepts
are particularly suited for the treatment of problems in ethics and
some related branches of philosophy (aesthetics political
philosophy).
With the remarks in this and the preceding section I have not wanted
to deny that there is an activity deserving the name ‘meta-ethics’
and another deserving the name ‘normative ethics’ such that the two
are different in kind and sharply distinguishable. But I have wanted to
say that there is also a philosophic pursuit deserving the name
‘ethics’ which shares with a common conception of ‘meta-ethics’ the
feature of being a conceptual investigation and with a common
conception of ‘normative ethics’ the feature of aiming at directing
our lives.
:
4. The concepts which are relevant to ethics may for the purpose of
a first approximation be divided into three main groups.
To the third group of concepts belong the notion of a human act and
the notions which are relevant to action such as choice deliberation
intention motive reason and will. Closely related to them are the
notions of desire end need and want.
Secondly there are concepts which fall somehow between the first
and the third group. For example the notions of pleasure and
happiness and their contraries. Is pleasure a value-concept or is it a
psychological concept? The question is related to the problem
whether pleasantness is a ‘natural’ or a ‘non-natural’ characteristic
of things and states.
I do not wish to maintain that the two methods are exclusive of one
another or that they can be sharply distinguished. Nor would I say
that one of them must be given priority if one cannot pursue both.
The first may be regarded as the more fundamental in the sense that
one cannot study norms and values in isolation from the
psychological concepts whereas one can study the latter in relative
isolation from the former.
I shall group all these uses of ‘good’ under the head instrumental
goodness. It is not maintained that whenever ‘good’ is used as an
attribute of say ‘dog’ or ‘house’ it connotes instrumental goodness.
Which form of goodness is meant cannot be seen from the phrase
alone but must be gathered from its use in a context.
Medicine is good for the sick exercise for the health manure for the
soil lubrication for the engine to have good institutions is good for a
country good habits for everybody. Generally speaking something is
said to be good for a being when the doing or having or happening of
this thing affects the good of that being favourably. For this form of
goodness I shall here reserve the name of the beneficial. That again
which affects the good of a being adversely is called harmful
damaging injurious ‘a bad thing’ or quite often an evil.
As the useful and its sub-form the beneficial is related to that which
a man wants and needs in a similar manner the hedonic good is
related to that which a man enjoys and likes—to get to have to do to
be. The hedonic moreover has many rather different sub-forms.
Sometimes the hedonic is near the aesthetic sphere. What a good
smell is to the nose a nice tune is to the ear and a beautiful sight to
the eye. The hedonically good is frequently called amusing or
:
entertaining sometimes refreshing or exhilarating. It can always I
think be called pleasant. The philosopher's traditional term for it is as
well known pleasure.
What has been said in this section should give the reader an
impression of the semantic multiplicity and logical wealth of the
phenomenon which I have called the Varieties of Goodness It should
also show the inadequacy and artificiality of such schematisms as
:
say the traditional classification of all good—sometimes of all value
whatsoever—into two main types viz. good as a means and good as
an end instrumental and terminal extrinsic and intrinsic good. We
shall make no use of these dichotomies for our present purposes.
But I think it is appropriate to warn us against them once and for all.
One way to achieve unity in the variety here would be to view the
forms of goodness as species of a generic good. This possibility
would imply two things. Firstly that there is some feature which is
common to all forms of goodness something in which they all share
or participate. Secondly that there are distinguishing features which
when added to or combined with the generic feature mark off the
various forms of goodness from one another. The generic feature
would explain why instrumentally technically etc. good things are
good. The specific differences would explain why some good things
are instrumentally some technically etc. good.
Man and dog are both species of the genus mammal. Individual men
and individual dogs all have the essential characteristics of mammals
—‘the form of mammalhood’—in common. These features ‘make’
them mammals. Other specific features distinguish them as men and
as dogs. Is the relation of the concepts of man and dog to the
concept of mammal the logical pattern for understanding the relation
of the forms of goodness to the idea of good?
It is among other things the obvious difficulty of singling out one (or
some) of the uses of ‘good’ as primary or literal which speaks
strongly against the idea that the variety of forms of goodness is a
variety of primary and analogical meanings of the word ‘good’. With
this I have not wished to exclude the possibility that there actually
are some analogical uses of ‘good’. Some such analogical uses may
even be philosophically of great interest. Perhaps goodness as an
attribute of a supreme being (God) is analogical.
:
Wittgenstein in his later writings used the idea of what he called
family-resemblance. The idea is related both to vagueness ambiguity
and analogy and yet different from them all. Family-resemblance
gives unity to such concepts as those of language or sentence or
number or—to use one of Wittgenstein's favourite examples—the
concept of a game. We may call them family-concepts. The
philosophic importance—as I see it—of the idea of family-
resemblance is that the insight into the family-character of a concept
may make us give up an attempt to hunt for its ‘essence’ i.e. for a
common feature of all things falling under this concept which would
explain to us why these things are classified together.
What I have ventured to say in this and the preceding section about
the Varieties of Goodness are essentially negative things. The unity
in the variety if there is one is not that which a genus gives to the
species falling under it. Nor does it appear to be a unity of the sort
for which analogy or family-resemblance can be held responsible.
Ambiguity and vagueness again do not account for the variety of the
forms of the good. The meaning-pattern of ‘good’ is peculiar and
puzzling. It is worth more attention than it has received on the part of
philosophic semanticists.2 It is not however my plan to discuss these
aspects of the Varieties of Goodness in the present work. I have only
wanted to draw attention to some problems in the region.
8. From the problem of the nature of and reasons for the variety of
the forms of goodness one may distinguish the problem of the
:
logical relationships between the forms. The two problems are not
unrelated. If it could be shown that there is one basic form of the
good in the terms of which all the others can be defined then the
solution to the problem of relationships between the forms would
automatically cater also for the problem of the semantic character of
their variety. The same would be the case if it turned out that all
forms of the good can be defined in the terms of a small number of
more basic notions.