Aircraft Impact Dynamics Day 1

Crashworthiness of CS-25 Aeroplanes –
Review of structural airworthiness regulations

and some accidents
Wim Doeland / EASA
Senior Structures Expert
willem.doeland@easa.europa.eu
AIDAA Webinar, 25/28 May 2021
Your safety is our mission.
An Agency of the European Union
 Brief introduction
• Wim Doeland
• Senior Structures Expert at EASA
• Started career at CAA-NL in 1990
• Joined EASA in 2005
• 30+ years of experience in aircraft structures certification and rulemaking

working groups, including crashworthiness
2
Contents
 Part I: Review of CS-25 structural crashworthiness regulations

 Part II: Discussion of some accidents
o Note: other crashworthiness regulations (e.g. Cabin Safety) not discussed
3
Part I: Review of CS-25 structural crashworthiness regulations
 Minor crash landing
 Fuel tank crashworthiness
 Ditching (emergency landing on water)
 Special Conditions for new/novel configurations or design features
 CREEP (occupant protection/survivability):

C = Container
R = Restraint
E = Environment
E = Energy absorption
P = Post-crash factors
4
Part I: Review of CS-25 structural crashworthiness regulations (1/5)
 Minor crash landing (on land or on water)
o Occupant (passengers, flight and cabin crew) protection
- Seats, berths, belts, harnesses and attachments (CS 25.785)
- Static load conditions (CS 25.561 plus flight/ground loads)
- Dynamic load conditions (CS 25.562)
- Structural aspects
- Injury criteria
5
 Minor crash landing (on land or on water)
o Retention of items of mass (equipment, baggage, cargo, carry-on articles, APU’s, fuselage mounted
engines…) (CS 25.561, CS 25.787, CS 25.789)
- No injury to occupants
- No penetration of fuel tanks / lines, no fire / explosion
- No blocking of escape facilities
o Escape facilities (no jamming of doors) (CS 25.809)
o Emergency equipment (such as CVRs and FDRs) (CS 25.1457, CS 25.1459)
6
 Fuel tank crashworthiness
o Prevention of fuel spillage (CS 25.963, CS 25.994)
- Fuel tank pressures (separately in all directions)
- Crash conditions:
- Impact at 5 fps vertical velocity @ MLW
- All gears retracted
- Any on or any two (or more…) gears retracted
- Sliding on the ground
- With all gears retracted up to a yaw angle of 20 degrees
- With any one or any two gears retracted with zero yaw angle
=> abrasion / no unacceptable temperature rise should occur within the fuel tanks
- Landing gear breakaway (25.721)
- Engine pod (or pod plus pylon) breakaway (25.721)
7
 Ditching - emergency landing on water (CS 25.563, CS 25.801)
o “Planned” vs. “unplanned” ditching:

- “planned” ditching:
- time to prepare (dump fuel, close outflow valves,…)
- minimize impact (lower forward and vertical velocity Vz, aircraft attitude)
- consideration of impact loads (Vz = 5 fps @ MLW), structural damage and flotation / buoyancy
(evacuation time)
- “unplanned” ditching:
- no time to prepare (e.g. runway overshoot)
- considered @ MTOW and critical c.g.
- no consideration of impact loads or structural damage, only flotation / buoyancy
(evacuation time)
8
 Special Conditions (*) on Crashworthiness
o To address new / novel design features for CS-25 aircraft, such as:
- double deck configuration (A380)
- composite fuselage (A350, B787)
=> equivalency with existing metal designs
o Evidence (service history, drop tests and analysis) is that, for conventional metallic aircraft structure,
impacts can be survivable up to descent velocity of up to 30 ft/sec (Limit of Reasonable Survivability)
o Need to consider the “CREEP” survivability criteria
(*) Conditions in addition to CS-25 regulations
9
Part II: Discussion of some accidents
(1) A321, Moscow, August 2019
(2) ATR 42, Fond-du-Lac, December 2017
(3) A320, Hudson River / New York, January 2009
(4) SSJ-100, Moscow, May 2019
Disclaimer:
This review is based on publicly available information and reflects the opinion of the presenter
10
Part II: Discussion of some accidents (1/4)
 “Minor” crash landing: A321, near Moscow (Russia), August 2019
o No fatalities, 74 injuries (none severe)
11
 “Severe” crash landing: ATR 42, Fond-du-Lac (Canada), December 2017
o No fatalities (at time of crash)
12
• Ditching: A320, Hudson River, near New York (USA), January 2009
o No fatalities, 5 serious injuries
13
 Fuel tank crashworthiness (landing gear breakaway), SSJ-100, near Moscow
(Russia), May 2019
o 41 fatalities, 10 injuries
14
Summary & Conclusions
 Several structural crashworthiness regulations are in place to provide
occupant survivability
o Minor crash landing on land or water, fuel tank protection,…
 Conventional metallic (CS-25) aeroplanes have shown significant (vertical)
impact capability and overall level of protection
o New aircraft configurations / design features are required to perform at least as
good
 But….every accident / crash scenario is unique
o Extremely challenging (impossible…) to predict / prevent each and very case
o Fatalities cannot be completely prevented, but at least be minimized
15
Thank you for your attention –
any questions?
easa.europa.eu/connect Your safety is our mission.

An Agency of the European Union
Re-engineering the Accident
Learning from an accident scene to a computer screen
Michiel Schuurman
Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Delft University of Technology
m.j.schuurman@tudelft.nl
Aerospace Structures
& Materials
Faculty of Aerospace Engineering
Who am I?
A little background
• Michiel Schuurman
• Air Safety Investigation (Online Professional Education)
• Forensic Engineering (MSc elective AE4ASM513)
• Former Senior Air Safety Investigator – Dutch Safety Board

The Challenge?
The Challenge?
The Challenge?
The Challenge?
The Challenge?
The Challenge?
The Challenge?
The Challenge?
Wanted
The Challenge?
Wanted
The Challenge?
Wanted
45 minutes
The Challenge?
The Challenge?
• Live is not like television

What is it really like?
Hard work
• Aircraft Impact Dynamics
Airplanes
Helicopter
Impact Dynamics
Apache low level flying
Impact Dynamics
Apache hits high-voltage power line
• On 12 December 2007, during a night flying exercise near to the village of

Rossum, an Apache helicopter belonging to the Royal Netherlands Air Force
collided with the 150 kV high-voltage power line over the river Waal.
• This caused the high-voltage cables to snap, leaving part of the Bommelerwaard
and the Land van Maas en Waal areas without electricity for almost 50 hours.
Around 30,000 households and 7000 businesses were affected.
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Helicopter wire strike protection concepts
Impact Dynamics
NASA Langley's Impact Dynamics Research Facility

Impact Dynamics
NASA Langley's Impact Dynamics Research Facility

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20080014241/downloads/20080014241.pdf
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
“Both pilots later stated that they had no idea what was happening at the time of the collision”
Final report Dutch Safety Board: Accident with Apache during night flight training near Rossum, 12 December 2007
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
FDR CVR
Data Audio
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
Impact Dynamics
CVR FDR
Audio x=v*t Data
Impact Dynamics
Digitizing the accident
Tension wire failure
• Failure modes
• Failure modes
Impact point wire cut
Impact notch failure
Drag failure failure (outside impact point )

Digitizing the accident Future
• Failure modes
Quantifying the human factor
Night
Night
River bank
River Waal
River bank
Direction of Flight Apache

River bank
River Waal
River bank
Direction of Flight Apache

Conclusions report Apache low level flying
7. During the descent and the start of the low-level flight the back seater
displayed limited scan behaviour, which reduced the chance of detecting
the high-voltage pylons.
9. The high-voltage pylons on the left and right river banks were not
illuminated. The chance that the pilots would have noticed the pylons if
they had been illuminated is thought to be limited.
Another case?
Investigation
Air France Flight 4590 Concorde
On the afternoon of Tuesday, 25 July 2000 Air France Flight 4590 was an
international charter flight, from Charles de Gaulle Airport, Paris, to John F. Kennedy
International Airport, New York
Investigation
The evidence
Investigation
The evidence
Investigation
The evidence
Investigation
The evidence
Anatomy Concorde Investigation
The evidence
Runway debris
Evidence
The evidence
The evidence
The evidence
Runway debris
Evidence
The evidence
The evidence
The evidence
Runway debris
Tire failes/exploded
Evidence
Testing
Runway debris
Tire rolls over debirs
Evidence
Testing
Testing
Testing
The evidence
The evidence
Runway debris
Evidence Testing
Th evidence
The evidence
Train of thought
Runway debris
Piece hits fuel cell

wing
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell Evidence Testing Information
Train of thought
Runway debris

wing
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell Evidence Testing Information
Scenario 1
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Scenario 1
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Scenario 1
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Direct penetration
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Scenario 1
Scenario 1
Direct penetration
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Scenario 1
Scenario 1
Similar event (Dulles)
No fire
Fuel flow much greater (FDR)
Direct penetration
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Validation and Verification
Scenario 1
Data is inconsistent with the evidence
and information on previous event(s)
Direct penetration
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 2
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Scenario 2
impact exceeds
strength fuel cell
Scenario 2
Scenario 2
Scenario 2
Bending effect + hydraulic pressure

Scenario 2
Bending effect + hydraulic pressure
Bending/pressure
Structural failure
Scenario 2

Data is consistent with
the evidence Bending effect + hydraulic pressure
Bending/pressure
Structural failure
Conclusion Evidence Testing Information
Runway debris

wing
Impact creates
pressure wave
Bending/pressure
Structural failure
• Conclusion
• Accidents are “sometimes” (not) like television
• Accident investigations require scientific methodological investigation to understand
(and fix) the failure
• Experience from the past does not guarantee future safety
Integrated Safety and
Certification by Analysis
Methods for Urban Air
Crashworthiness
| Gerardo Olivares Ph.D. (NIAR) | AIDAA – Aircraft Impact Dynamics| May 25th 2021|
Agenda
Urban Air Mobility Crashworthiness
 Aerospace Safety Definition

 Non-Integrated vs. Integrated Safety
 Aerospace Integrated Safety (IS) Concept for UAM
 Emergency Landing – Crashworthiness IS Certification Methods
 Ongoing Research Programs FAA Funded Programs
 Conclusions
Proprietary - No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission of NIAR 2
Aerospace Safety
Non-Integrated vs. Integrated Safety
 Structural design for airplane safety combines
airworthiness and crashworthiness design objectives to
varying degrees.
 Airworthiness design objectives pertain to the ability of the
airframe to withstand design loads, or to maintain safety of
flight of the airplane relative to the operational
environment.
 Crashworthiness design objectives pertain to safety of the
occupants relative to the airplane.
 Occupant Safety must be an integral part of the overall
technical and management processes associated with the
design, development and operation of Urban Air Transport
Systems. Nowadays the crashworthiness design for
aerospace applications under 14 CFR *.561 and *.562 only
addresses the dynamic response of the seat and restraint
system during emergency landing conditions. In order to
improve the survivability rate of occupants an integrated
safety approach is required.
14CFR *.562 Dynamic Test Requirements
DYNAMIC
PART 23 PART 25 PART 27
TEST REQUIREMENTS
TEST 1
Test Velocity – ft/sec 31 (9.5 m/sec) 35 (10.7 m/sec) 30 (9.2 m/sec)

Seat Pitch Angle – Degrees 60 60 60
Seat Yaw Angle – Degrees 0 0 0
Peak Deceleration – G’s 19/15 14 30
Time to Peak – sec 0.05/0.06 0.08 0.031
Floor Deformation - Degrees None None 10 Pitch/10 Roll
TEST 2
Test Velocity – ft/sec 42 (12.8 m/sec) 44 (13.4 m/sec) 42 (12.8 m/sec)

Seat Pitch Angle – Degrees 0 0 0
Seat Yaw Angle – Degrees ±10 ±10 ±10
Peak Deceleration – G’s 26/21 16 18.4
Time to Peak – sec 0.05/0.06 0.09 0.071
Floor Deformation - Degrees 10 Pitch/10 Roll 10 Pitch/10 Roll 10 Pitch/10 Roll
COMPLIANCE
CRITERIA
- Pilot
HIC 1000 1000 1000
1 –Passenger 2
Lumbar Load – lbf 1500 (6675 N) 1500 (6675 N) 1500 (6675 N)
Strap Loads – lbf 17501/20002 17501/20002 17501/20002
(7787N1/8900N2) (7787N1/8900N2) (7787N1/8900N2)
Femur Loads – lbf N/A 2250 N/A
14 CFR *.562 Pulses Crush Requirements
Test I PART 25 PART 23 PART 27
Time to Peak (s) 0.08 0.05 0.031
Peak - Acceleration Pulse (g's) 14 19 30
Peak - Z Acceleration (g's) 12.1 16.4 26.0
Peak - Z Velocity (ft/s) 31.2 26.5 25.9
Peak - Z Displacement (inch) 30.3 16.2 9.6
Non-Integrated Safety
Example Aerospace Non-Integrated Safety Development
 Drop velocity: 30 ft./sec
 Composite Fuselage
Certified under 14 CFR
Part 25 - Airworthiness
 Dynamic Certified Seats
per 14 CFR 25.561 and
562 – Emergency Landing
Conditions
Non-Integrated Safety “Real World” Issues
Example Aerospace Non-Integrated Safety Development
Aerospace Integrated Safety
Integrated Safety for eVTOL Crashworthiness
Pre-Crash Sensing
 Occupant safety must be an integral part of the overall

technical and management processes associated with the Can the vehicle Land Safely under
design, development and operation of eVTOL Urban Air controlled autonomous or manual
mode?
Transport systems. YES
NO
 The different elements that constitute the integrated safety

concept approach are: YES
Altitude Required to Deploy
Ballistic Recovery System?
NO
 Pre‐crash: Event Recognition.

 Control Impact Velocity and Attitude: Distributed Deploy BRS Don t Deploy BRS
Propulsion System Redundancy, Parachute Ballistic

Recovery Systems, Retro Rockets ..etc.
 Integration of
Reduce Impact
Landing Gear‐Airframe Crashworthy Velocity and
Control Impact
Structure, Deployable Energy Absorbing Systems (Vehicle Orientation
Airbags, Structural EA Devices..etc.)

 High-energy Absorbing Seats, and Advanced Restraints. Optimized
Structural,
Seat Design Survivable Uncontrolled
 Post-crash: Battery Fire Suppression, and Egress
YES NO
and Advanced Impact Event? Impact
Restraints for Configuration
a Controlled
Impact
 Energy Absorbing Landing/Take off Sites Configuration

Safe Post-
Impact Egress?
NO Fatal Crash
 The implementation of Pre-Crash, Active Safety Systems can

prevent or mitigate the outcome of eVTOL crashes. The Non-Fatal Crash
autonomous nature of eVTOL Urban Air Transport systems

could potentially provide a significant effect in the reduction of
fatalities caused by human error (75 % of the cases for GA
fixed wing aircraft).
Video Source: Courtesy BRS
Example Urban Air Integrated Safety
UAM Architectures
Multicopters Quadcopters Hybrid Tilt Rotor Fixed Wing Ducted

Vectored Thrust
VTOL VTOL VTOL or VTOL & VTOL or VTOL & VTOL or VTOL &
CTOL CTOL CTOL
Skid System Skid System Skid System or LG Skid System or LG Skid System or LG
Integrated Safety - Typical Mission Profile
 Hover Climb (B) and Hover Descent (J):
 Distributed Propulsion: Reduce Impact Velocity
 Aircraft Systems: EA Seat, Advanced Restraints, EA Airframe, EA Skid/Landing Gear System,
Deployable Energy Absorbing Devices
 Take-off & Landing Site: Energy Absorbing Sites
 Impact Parameters:
 Max. AGL Altitude: 50 ft (15 m)
 Max. Vertical Impact Velocity: 56.7 ft/s (17.3 m/s )
 Max. Horizontal Impact Velocity: ~ 0 ft/s (0 m/s)
 Max. Time: 1.75 s
 Transition Climb (C) and Transition Descent (I):

 Take-off & Landing Site: Energy Absorbing Sites
 Ballistic Recovery System (10% Efficiency up to 150ft, 50 % Efficiency up to 250 ft, ~ 100% Efficiency
250 ft plus) [ Note these are estimates]
 Max. AGL Altitude: 300 ft (91.5 m)
 Max. Vertical Impact Velocity: 139 ft/s (42.3 m/s )
 Max. Horizontal Impact Velocity: 1.2*Vstall
 Min. Time: 4.3 s Reference: UberAir Vehicle Requirements and Missions Document
 Accel + Climb (E), Decel + Descent (G), Cruise (F)
 Ballistic Recovery System
 AGL Altitude: 1500 ft (457 m)
 Max. Vertical Impact Velocity: 310 ft/s (94 m/s )
 Max. Horizontal Impact Velocity: 220 ft/s (67 m/s)
 Min. Time: 9.69 s
Picture Source: BRS Website
Engineering and Certification Methods
 1 – Experimental – with physical ATDs:
 High Cost and Time.
 Difficulties optimizing the system through physical
prototypes.
 Difficult to quantify the Energy Absorbing
capabilities of the individual crashworthy design
features.
 Deterministic approach: Reduced to one single
impact configuration.
 Current ATD’s (HII and FAA HIII) will not capture real
world eVTOL occupants injury mechanisms.
 2 – Digital Engineering: Computational supported
by the building block approach - with Virtual ATDs:
 High Cost of entry: validated methods and tools.
 Reduced development and Certification cycles.
 Non-deterministic approach: Optimized solutions
for multiple impact conditions and occupant sizes.
Robust Design.
 Virtual ATD’s (HII and FAA HIII) will not capture real
Engineering and Certification Methods
 3 – Digital Engineering: Computational supported
by the building block approach - with Virtual
Human Body Models:
 High Cost of entry: validated methods and
tools.
 Reduced development and Certification cycles.
 Non-deterministic approach: Optimized
solutions for multiple impact conditions and
occupant sizes. Robust Design.
 Virtual Human Body models will capture real
Further V&V research is required to evaluate
Human body models for non-conventional
seating arrangements and aerospace loading
applications
Aerospace Safety Criteria
 Maintain Survivable Volume
 Overall Survivable Space Dimensional Check (Peak during
Dynamic Event and Post Test Deformations)
 Avoid Occupant to Interior Structure Contacts during impact
 Maintain Deceleration Loads to Occupants
 Injury Criteria Limits per 14 CFR *.562 :
 1500 lbf, HIC 1000, Shoulder Strap Loads….
 Retention Items of Mass

 Interior items of mass per 14 CFR *.561
 Occupants and Seat Structures supported throughout the
crash event (14 CFR *.562)
 Maintain Egress Paths
 Maintain Aisle Distance (if applicable)
 Evaluate Plastic deformations of the supporting structure
near the exit door
 Floor Warping
 Floor Beam Failures – Reduced Strength to support
passenger weight
CBA Modeling Philosophy
NIAR-FAA Certification by Analysis R&D Program
 Non-Physics Based Modeling:
 This approach has been used by the aerospace industry since the introduction of simulation due
to limitations in computing power and computational tools, complexity of the problems, poor
understanding of the physics, lack of test-to-test variability data, and poor modeling methodologies.
 Simulation follows system level testing. Hence models are not predictable.
 Testing results are used to calibrate the model [non-physics based].
 Models are evaluated by the calibration-validation methods.
 The validation criteria is always unreasonable (5 to 10 %) and vague (peak,
shape, subjective) due to the lack of research and understanding of the real test-to-test
variability.
 Physics Based Modeling:
 This approach used by NIAR takes advantage of the advances in computational power, the latest computational tools, years of research to
understand the physics, generated test-to-test variability data, and verified & validated (V&V) modelling methodologies.
 Defined modelling methodologies using the building block approach. Understanding of the physics and testing variability from the coupon
to the system level. Taking a conservative modeling approach based on data derived from R&D and the Building Block Approach to define
simplified models when required. The definition of the numerical model is not driven by system level test results, is driven by a predefined
V&V modeling methodology.
 Simulation predicts system level test results within the scope and scatter of the physical test results.
 Objective validation criteria based on an understanding of the test-to-test variability. Defined objective validation metrics (i.e. Sprague and
Gears). The correlation level between simulation and testing is driven by an understanding of the test-to-test variability.
eVTOL UAM Research
FAA ASSURE COE Research
 ASSURE: A36 Urban Air Mobility: Safety Standards, Aircraft
Certification and Impact on Market Feasibility and Growth Potentials
 Working Packages Overview:
 WP 1: Evaluation of UAM Market Potential: economic
feasibly, potential size and growth, characteristics of
population, and ground infrastructure.
 WP 2: Airworthiness regulations and its applicability to
UAM aircraft certification.
 WP 3: Evaluation of UAM integration on the National
Aerospace System – Air Traffic Control and Operations.
 WP 4: Final Report and Recommendations for future
research.
 Period of Performance: 10/5/2020 to 7/1/2022
 Universities: WSU– NIAR, Mississippi State University, Embry
Riddle Aeronautical University, South Carolina State University
• JAMS : EVTOL Crashworthiness Certification
Conclusions
Aerospace Integrated Safety
 In order to successfully operate eVTOL vehicles, occupant safety must be an integral part of
the overall technical and management processes associated with the design, development
and operation of eVTOL Urban Air Transport systems.
 Current emergency landing conditions requirements specified in 14 CFR *.561 and *.562 do
not provide the level of safety required for eVTOL vehicles.
 A successful implementation of the eVTOL market will require the development of Emergency
Landing Standards and means of compliance (FAA, EASA, ASTM.. etc.) that address real world
safety expectations.
 Emergency landing standards will need to be defined for eVTOL vehicles taking into
consideration their unique design features and operation:
 New and Novel Electric Distributed Propulsion Systems
 New and Novel Vehicle Architectures
 Non-conventional seating arrangements
 Complex Urban environment operations (sharing airspace with other aircraft, sUAS, building
infrastructure, people on the ground..etc..)
 Mixed Modes of Transportation (Air and Ground)
 Landing Sites crashworthiness design
 Battery System Protection and post impact fire risk assessment
 Crashworthiness design needs to be implemented from the conceptual design stage of the
vehicle, since the crashworthiness optimization of the various structural elements cannot be
implemented once the design has been driven only by airworthiness requirements.
 NIAR inaugurated in 2021 a Center of Excellence for Aerospace Crashworthiness : Advanced
Virtual Engineering and Testing Laboratories , to support industry and regulators address the
new challenges posed by Advanced Air Mobility Platforms
| Gerardo Olivares Ph.D. | Director AVET Laboratories and Crashworthiness Research| gerardo.olivares@wichita.edu|
18

Aircraft Impact Dynamics Day 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aircraft Impact Dynamics Day 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Crashworthiness of CS-25 Aeroplanes –

Review of structural airworthiness regulations

• 30+ years of experience in aircraft structures certification and rulemaking

 Part I: Review of CS-25 structural crashworthiness regulations

o Note: other crashworthiness regulations (e.g. Cabin Safety) not discussed

 CREEP (occupant protection/survivability):

o “Planned” vs. “unplanned” ditching:

o Need to consider the “CREEP” survivability criteria

(*) Conditions in addition to CS-25 regulations

easa.europa.eu/connect Your safety is our mission.

• Former Senior Air Safety Investigator – Dutch Safety Board

• Live is not like television

• Aircraft Impact Dynamics

• On 12 December 2007, during a night flying exercise near to the village of

NASA Langley's Impact Dynamics Research Facility

NASA Langley's Impact Dynamics Research Facility

Audio x=v*t Data

Impact point wire cut

Impact notch failure

Drag failure failure (outside impact point )

Direction of Flight Apache

Direction of Flight Apache

Tire rolls over debirs

Tire rolls over debirs

Tire rolls over debirs

Piece hits fuel cell

Tire rolls over debirs

Piece hits fuel cell

Bending effect + hydraulic pressure

Bending effect + hydraulic pressure

Tire rolls over debirs

Piece hits fuel cell

 Aerospace Safety Definition

Test Velocity – ft/sec 31 (9.5 m/sec) 35 (10.7 m/sec) 30 (9.2 m/sec)

Test Velocity – ft/sec 42 (12.8 m/sec) 44 (13.4 m/sec) 42 (12.8 m/sec)

 Occupant safety must be an integral part of the overall

Transport systems. YES

 The different elements that constitute the integrated safety

 Pre‐crash: Event Recognition.

Propulsion System Redundancy, Parachute Ballistic

Airbags, Structural EA Devices..etc.)

 Energy Absorbing Landing/Take off Sites Configuration

 The implementation of Pre-Crash, Active Safety Systems can

autonomous nature of eVTOL Urban Air Transport systems

Video Source: Courtesy BRS

Multicopters Quadcopters Hybrid Tilt Rotor Fixed Wing Ducted

 Transition Climb (C) and Transition Descent (I):

Picture Source: BRS Website

 Retention Items of Mass

You might also like